buildah/0004-http2-close-connections-when-receiving-too-many-head.patch

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From f8b2315b75ad8a9c8b386502504525e1816982cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Dan=20=C4=8Cerm=C3=A1k?= <dcermak@suse.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2025 15:33:28 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] http2: close connections when receiving too many headers
(#1)
Maintaining HPACK state requires that we parse and process
all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection.
When a request's headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, we don't
allocate memory to store the excess headers but we do
parse them. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2
endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of data, all associated
with a request which is going to be rejected.
Set a limit on the amount of excess header frames we
will process before closing a connection.
Thanks to Bartek Nowotarski for reporting this issue.
Fixes CVE-2023-45288
Fixes bsc#1236531
This is a backport of
https://go.googlesource.com/net/+/ba872109ef2dc8f1da778651bd1fd3792d0e4587%5E%21/#F0
---
vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/frame.go | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/frame.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/frame.go
index e2b298d85..a5a94411d 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/frame.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/frame.go
@@ -1564,6 +1564,7 @@ func (fr *Framer) readMetaFrame(hf *HeadersFrame) (*MetaHeadersFrame, error) {
if size > remainSize {
hdec.SetEmitEnabled(false)
mh.Truncated = true
+ remainSize = 0
return
}
remainSize -= size
@@ -1576,6 +1577,36 @@ func (fr *Framer) readMetaFrame(hf *HeadersFrame) (*MetaHeadersFrame, error) {
var hc headersOrContinuation = hf
for {
frag := hc.HeaderBlockFragment()
+
+ // Avoid parsing large amounts of headers that we will then discard.
+ // If the sender exceeds the max header list size by too much,
+ // skip parsing the fragment and close the connection.
+ //
+ // "Too much" is either any CONTINUATION frame after we've already
+ // exceeded the max header list size (in which case remainSize is 0),
+ // or a frame whose encoded size is more than twice the remaining
+ // header list bytes we're willing to accept.
+ if int64(len(frag)) > int64(2*remainSize) {
+ if VerboseLogs {
+ log.Printf("http2: header list too large")
+ }
+ // It would be nice to send a RST_STREAM before sending the GOAWAY,
+ // but the struture of the server's frame writer makes this difficult.
+ return nil, ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
+ }
+
+ // Also close the connection after any CONTINUATION frame following an
+ // invalid header, since we stop tracking the size of the headers after
+ // an invalid one.
+ if invalid != nil {
+ if VerboseLogs {
+ log.Printf("http2: invalid header: %v", invalid)
+ }
+ // It would be nice to send a RST_STREAM before sending the GOAWAY,
+ // but the struture of the server's frame writer makes this difficult.
+ return nil, ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
+ }
+
if _, err := hdec.Write(frag); err != nil {
return nil, ConnectionError(ErrCodeCompression)
}
--
2.48.1