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Sync from SUSE:SLFO:Main git revision 3db6954da868a17e5b9076cd4ef49f66

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Adrian Schröter 2025-02-07 18:06:44 +01:00
parent df3c7d5158
commit a9f7335aa9
5 changed files with 622 additions and 0 deletions
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98
CVE-2024-50349-1.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
From c903985bf7e772e2d08275c1a95c8a55ab011577 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2024 08:57:52 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] credential_format(): also encode <host>[:<port>]
An upcoming change wants to sanitize the credential password prompt
where a URL is displayed that may potentially come from a `.gitmodules`
file. To this end, the `credential_format()` function is employed.
To sanitize the host name (and optional port) part of the URL, we need a
new mode of the `strbuf_add_percentencode()` function because the
current mode is both too strict and too lenient: too strict because it
encodes `:`, `[` and `]` (which should be left unencoded in
`<host>:<port>` and in IPv6 addresses), and too lenient because it does
not encode invalid host name characters `/`, `_` and `~`.
So let's introduce and use a new mode specifically to encode the host
name and optional port part of a URI, leaving alpha-numerical
characters, periods, colons and brackets alone and encoding all others.
This only leads to a change of behavior for URLs that contain invalid
host names.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
---
credential.c | 3 ++-
strbuf.c | 4 +++-
strbuf.h | 1 +
t/t0300-credentials.sh | 13 +++++++++++++
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/credential.c b/credential.c
index f32011343f..572f1785da 100644
--- a/credential.c
+++ b/credential.c
@@ -164,7 +164,8 @@ static void credential_format(struct credential *c, struct strbuf *out)
strbuf_addch(out, '@');
}
if (c->host)
- strbuf_addstr(out, c->host);
+ strbuf_add_percentencode(out, c->host,
+ STRBUF_ENCODE_HOST_AND_PORT);
if (c->path) {
strbuf_addch(out, '/');
strbuf_add_percentencode(out, c->path, 0);
diff --git a/strbuf.c b/strbuf.c
index c383f41a3c..756b96c561 100644
--- a/strbuf.c
+++ b/strbuf.c
@@ -492,7 +492,9 @@ void strbuf_add_percentencode(struct strbuf *dst, const char *src, int flags)
unsigned char ch = src[i];
if (ch <= 0x1F || ch >= 0x7F ||
(ch == '/' && (flags & STRBUF_ENCODE_SLASH)) ||
- strchr(URL_UNSAFE_CHARS, ch))
+ ((flags & STRBUF_ENCODE_HOST_AND_PORT) ?
+ !isalnum(ch) && !strchr("-.:[]", ch) :
+ !!strchr(URL_UNSAFE_CHARS, ch)))
strbuf_addf(dst, "%%%02X", (unsigned char)ch);
else
strbuf_addch(dst, ch);
diff --git a/strbuf.h b/strbuf.h
index f6dbb9681e..f9f8bb0381 100644
--- a/strbuf.h
+++ b/strbuf.h
@@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ size_t strbuf_expand_dict_cb(struct strbuf *sb,
void strbuf_addbuf_percentquote(struct strbuf *dst, const struct strbuf *src);
#define STRBUF_ENCODE_SLASH 1
+#define STRBUF_ENCODE_HOST_AND_PORT 2
/**
* Append the contents of a string to a strbuf, percent-encoding any characters
diff --git a/t/t0300-credentials.sh b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
index c66d91e82d..cb91be1427 100755
--- a/t/t0300-credentials.sh
+++ b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
@@ -514,6 +514,19 @@ test_expect_success 'match percent-encoded values in username' '
EOF
'
+test_expect_success 'match percent-encoded values in hostname' '
+ test_config "credential.https://a%20b%20c/.helper" "$HELPER" &&
+ check fill <<-\EOF
+ url=https://a b c/
+ --
+ protocol=https
+ host=a b c
+ username=foo
+ password=bar
+ --
+ EOF
+'
+
test_expect_success 'fetch with multiple path components' '
test_unconfig credential.helper &&
test_config credential.https://example.com/foo/repo.git.helper "verbatim foo bar" &&
--
2.47.1

314
CVE-2024-50349-2.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
From 7725b8100ffbbff2750ee4d61a0fcc1f53a086e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2024 13:26:10 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] credential: sanitize the user prompt
When asking the user interactively for credentials, we want to avoid
misleading them e.g. via control sequences that pretend that the URL
targets a trusted host when it does not.
While Git learned, over the course of the preceding commits, to disallow
URLs containing URL-encoded control characters by default, credential
helpers are still allowed to specify values very freely (apart from Line
Feed and NUL characters, anything is allowed), and this would allow,
say, a username containing control characters to be specified that would
then be displayed in the interactive terminal prompt asking the user for
the password, potentially sending those control characters directly to
the terminal. This is undesirable because control characters can be used
to mislead users to divulge secret information to untrusted sites.
To prevent such an attack vector, let's add a `git_prompt()` that forces
the displayed text to be sanitized, i.e. displaying question marks
instead of control characters.
Note: While this commit's diff changes a lot of `user@host` strings to
`user%40host`, which may look suspicious on the surface, there is a good
reason for that: this string specifies a user name, not a
<username>@<hostname> combination! In the context of t5541, the actual
combination looks like this: `user%40@127.0.0.1:5541`. Therefore, these
string replacements document a net improvement introduced by this
commit, as `user@host@127.0.0.1` could have left readers wondering where
the user name ends and where the host name begins.
Hinted-at-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
---
Documentation/config/credential.txt | 6 ++++++
credential.c | 7 ++++++-
credential.h | 4 +++-
t/t0300-credentials.sh | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
t/t5541-http-push-smart.sh | 6 +++---
t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh | 14 +++++++-------
t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh | 16 ++++++++--------
7 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
Index: b/Documentation/config/credential.txt
===================================================================
--- a/Documentation/config/credential.txt
+++ b/Documentation/config/credential.txt
@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ credential.useHttpPath::
or https URL to be important. Defaults to false. See
linkgit:gitcredentials[7] for more information.
+credential.sanitizePrompt::
+ By default, user names and hosts that are shown as part of the
+ password prompt are not allowed to contain control characters (they
+ will be URL-encoded by default). Configure this setting to `false` to
+ override that behavior.
+
credential.username::
If no username is set for a network authentication, use this username
by default. See credential.<context>.* below, and
Index: b/credential.c
===================================================================
--- a/credential.c
+++ b/credential.c
@@ -125,6 +125,8 @@ static int credential_config_callback(co
}
else if (!strcmp(key, "usehttppath"))
c->use_http_path = git_config_bool(var, value);
+ else if (!strcmp(key, "sanitizeprompt"))
+ c->sanitize_prompt = git_config_bool(var, value);
return 0;
}
@@ -237,7 +239,10 @@ static char *credential_ask_one(const ch
struct strbuf prompt = STRBUF_INIT;
char *r;
- credential_describe(c, &desc);
+ if (c->sanitize_prompt)
+ credential_format(c, &desc);
+ else
+ credential_describe(c, &desc);
if (desc.len)
strbuf_addf(&prompt, "%s for '%s': ", what, desc.buf);
else
Index: b/credential.h
===================================================================
--- a/credential.h
+++ b/credential.h
@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ struct credential {
multistage: 1,
quit:1,
use_http_path:1,
- username_from_proto:1;
+ username_from_proto:1,
+ sanitize_prompt:1;
struct credential_capability capa_authtype;
struct credential_capability capa_state;
@@ -195,6 +196,7 @@ struct credential {
.wwwauth_headers = STRVEC_INIT, \
.state_headers = STRVEC_INIT, \
.state_headers_to_send = STRVEC_INIT, \
+ .sanitize_prompt = 1, \
}
/* Initialize a credential structure, setting all fields to empty. */
Index: b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
===================================================================
--- a/t/t0300-credentials.sh
+++ b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
@@ -77,6 +77,10 @@ test_expect_success 'setup helper script
test -z "$pexpiry" || echo password_expiry_utc=$pexpiry
EOF
+ write_script git-credential-cntrl-in-username <<-\EOF &&
+ printf "username=\\007latrix Lestrange\\n"
+ EOF
+
PATH="$PWD:$PATH"
'
@@ -1008,4 +1012,20 @@ test_expect_success 'credential config w
test_grep "skipping credential lookup for key" stderr
'
+BEL="$(printf '\007')"
+
+test_expect_success 'interactive prompt is sanitized' '
+ check fill cntrl-in-username <<-EOF
+ protocol=https
+ host=example.org
+ --
+ protocol=https
+ host=example.org
+ username=${BEL}latrix Lestrange
+ password=askpass-password
+ --
+ askpass: Password for ${SQ}https://%07latrix%20Lestrange@example.org${SQ}:
+ EOF
+'
+
test_done
Index: b/t/t5541-http-push-smart.sh
===================================================================
--- a/t/t5541-http-push-smart.sh
+++ b/t/t5541-http-push-smart.sh
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ test_expect_success 'push over smart htt
git push "$HTTPD_URL"/auth/smart/test_repo.git &&
git --git-dir="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/test_repo.git" \
log -1 --format=%s >actual &&
- expect_askpass both user@host &&
+ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
test_cmp expect actual
'
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ test_expect_success 'push to auth-only-f
git push "$HTTPD_URL"/auth-push/smart/test_repo.git &&
git --git-dir="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/test_repo.git" \
log -1 --format=%s >actual &&
- expect_askpass both user@host &&
+ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
test_cmp expect actual
'
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ test_expect_success 'push into half-auth
git push "$HTTPD_URL/half-auth-complete/smart/half-auth.git" &&
git --git-dir="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/half-auth.git" \
log -1 --format=%s >actual &&
- expect_askpass both user@host &&
+ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
test_cmp expect actual
'
Index: b/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh
===================================================================
--- a/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh
+++ b/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh
@@ -111,13 +111,13 @@ test_expect_success 'http auth can use u
test_expect_success 'http auth can use just user in URL' '
set_askpass wrong pass@host &&
git clone "$HTTPD_URL_USER/auth/dumb/repo.git" clone-auth-pass &&
- expect_askpass pass user@host
+ expect_askpass pass user%40host
'
test_expect_success 'http auth can request both user and pass' '
set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
git clone "$HTTPD_URL/auth/dumb/repo.git" clone-auth-both &&
- expect_askpass both user@host
+ expect_askpass both user%40host
'
test_expect_success 'http auth respects credential helper config' '
@@ -135,14 +135,14 @@ test_expect_success 'http auth can get u
test_config_global "credential.$HTTPD_URL.username" user@host &&
set_askpass wrong pass@host &&
git clone "$HTTPD_URL/auth/dumb/repo.git" clone-auth-user &&
- expect_askpass pass user@host
+ expect_askpass pass user%40host
'
test_expect_success 'configured username does not override URL' '
test_config_global "credential.$HTTPD_URL.username" wrong &&
set_askpass wrong pass@host &&
git clone "$HTTPD_URL_USER/auth/dumb/repo.git" clone-auth-user2 &&
- expect_askpass pass user@host
+ expect_askpass pass user%40host
'
test_expect_success 'set up repo with http submodules' '
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ test_expect_success 'cmdline credential
set_askpass wrong pass@host &&
git -c "credential.$HTTPD_URL.username=user@host" \
clone --recursive super super-clone &&
- expect_askpass pass user@host
+ expect_askpass pass user%40host
'
test_expect_success 'cmdline credential config passes submodule via fetch' '
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ test_expect_success 'cmdline credential
git -C super-clone \
-c "credential.$HTTPD_URL.username=user@host" \
fetch --recurse-submodules &&
- expect_askpass pass user@host
+ expect_askpass pass user%40host
'
test_expect_success 'cmdline credential config passes submodule update' '
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ test_expect_success 'cmdline credential
git -C super-clone \
-c "credential.$HTTPD_URL.username=user@host" \
submodule update &&
- expect_askpass pass user@host
+ expect_askpass pass user%40host
'
test_expect_success 'fetch changes via http' '
Index: b/t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh
===================================================================
--- a/t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh
+++ b/t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ test_expect_success 'clone from password
echo two >expect &&
set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
git clone --bare "$HTTPD_URL/auth/smart/repo.git" smart-auth &&
- expect_askpass both user@host &&
+ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
git --git-dir=smart-auth log -1 --format=%s >actual &&
test_cmp expect actual
'
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ test_expect_success 'clone from auth-onl
echo two >expect &&
set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
git clone --bare "$HTTPD_URL/auth-fetch/smart/repo.git" half-auth &&
- expect_askpass both user@host &&
+ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
git --git-dir=half-auth log -1 --format=%s >actual &&
test_cmp expect actual
'
@@ -224,14 +224,14 @@ test_expect_success 'redirects send auth
set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
git -c credential.useHttpPath=true \
clone $HTTPD_URL/smart-redir-auth/repo.git repo-redir-auth &&
- expect_askpass both user@host auth/smart/repo.git
+ expect_askpass both user%40host auth/smart/repo.git
'
test_expect_success 'GIT_TRACE_CURL redacts auth details' '
rm -rf redact-auth trace &&
set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
GIT_TRACE_CURL="$(pwd)/trace" git clone --bare "$HTTPD_URL/auth/smart/repo.git" redact-auth &&
- expect_askpass both user@host &&
+ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
# Ensure that there is no "Basic" followed by a base64 string, but that
# the auth details are redacted
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ test_expect_success 'GIT_CURL_VERBOSE re
rm -rf redact-auth trace &&
set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
GIT_CURL_VERBOSE=1 git clone --bare "$HTTPD_URL/auth/smart/repo.git" redact-auth 2>trace &&
- expect_askpass both user@host &&
+ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
# Ensure that there is no "Basic" followed by a base64 string, but that
# the auth details are redacted
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ test_expect_success 'GIT_TRACE_CURL does
set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
GIT_TRACE_REDACT=0 GIT_TRACE_CURL="$(pwd)/trace" \
git clone --bare "$HTTPD_URL/auth/smart/repo.git" redact-auth &&
- expect_askpass both user@host &&
+ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
grep -i "Authorization: Basic [0-9a-zA-Z+/]" trace
'
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ test_expect_success 'http auth remembers
# the first request prompts the user...
set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
git ls-remote "$HTTPD_URL/auth/smart/repo.git" >/dev/null &&
- expect_askpass both user@host &&
+ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
# ...and the second one uses the stored value rather than
# prompting the user.
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ test_expect_success 'http auth forgets b
# us to prompt the user again.
set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
git ls-remote "$HTTPD_URL/auth/smart/repo.git" >/dev/null &&
- expect_askpass both user@host
+ expect_askpass both user%40host
'
test_expect_success 'client falls back from v2 to v0 to match server' '

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@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
From b01b9b81d36759cdcd07305e78765199e1bc2060 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2024 14:48:22 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] credential: disallow Carriage Returns in the protocol by
default
While Git has documented that the credential protocol is line-based,
with newlines as terminators, the exact shape of a newline has not been
documented.
From Git's perspective, which is firmly rooted in the Linux ecosystem,
it is clear that "a newline" means a Line Feed character.
However, even Git's credential protocol respects Windows line endings
(a Carriage Return character followed by a Line Feed character, "CR/LF")
by virtue of using `strbuf_getline()`.
There is a third category of line endings that has been used originally
by MacOS, and that is respected by the default line readers of .NET and
node.js: bare Carriage Returns.
Git cannot handle those, and what is worse: Git's remedy against
CVE-2020-5260 does not catch when credential helpers are used that
interpret bare Carriage Returns as newlines.
Git Credential Manager addressed this as CVE-2024-50338, but other
credential helpers may still be vulnerable. So let's not only disallow
Line Feed characters as part of the values in the credential protocol,
but also disallow Carriage Return characters.
In the unlikely event that a credential helper relies on Carriage
Returns in the protocol, introduce an escape hatch via the
`credential.protectProtocol` config setting.
This addresses CVE-2024-52006.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
---
Documentation/config/credential.txt | 5 +++++
credential.c | 21 ++++++++++++++-------
credential.h | 4 +++-
t/t0300-credentials.sh | 16 ++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Index: b/Documentation/config/credential.txt
===================================================================
--- a/Documentation/config/credential.txt
+++ b/Documentation/config/credential.txt
@@ -20,6 +20,11 @@ credential.sanitizePrompt::
will be URL-encoded by default). Configure this setting to `false` to
override that behavior.
+credential.protectProtocol::
+ By default, Carriage Return characters are not allowed in the protocol
+ that is used when Git talks to a credential helper. This setting allows
+ users to override this default.
+
credential.username::
If no username is set for a network authentication, use this username
by default. See credential.<context>.* below, and
Index: b/credential.c
===================================================================
--- a/credential.c
+++ b/credential.c
@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ static int credential_config_callback(co
c->use_http_path = git_config_bool(var, value);
else if (!strcmp(key, "sanitizeprompt"))
c->sanitize_prompt = git_config_bool(var, value);
+ else if (!strcmp(key, "protectprotocol"))
+ c->protect_protocol = git_config_bool(var, value);
return 0;
}
@@ -361,7 +363,8 @@ int credential_read(struct credential *c
return 0;
}
-static void credential_write_item(FILE *fp, const char *key, const char *value,
+static void credential_write_item(const struct credential *c,
+ FILE *fp, const char *key, const char *value,
int required)
{
if (!value && required)
@@ -370,6 +373,10 @@ static void credential_write_item(FILE *
return;
if (strchr(value, '\n'))
die("credential value for %s contains newline", key);
+ if (c->protect_protocol && strchr(value, '\r'))
+ die("credential value for %s contains carriage return\n"
+ "If this is intended, set `credential.protectProtocol=false`",
+ key);
fprintf(fp, "%s=%s\n", key, value);
}
@@ -377,34 +384,34 @@ void credential_write(const struct crede
enum credential_op_type op_type)
{
if (credential_has_capability(&c->capa_authtype, op_type))
- credential_write_item(fp, "capability[]", "authtype", 0);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "capability[]", "authtype", 0);
if (credential_has_capability(&c->capa_state, op_type))
- credential_write_item(fp, "capability[]", "state", 0);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "capability[]", "state", 0);
if (credential_has_capability(&c->capa_authtype, op_type)) {
- credential_write_item(fp, "authtype", c->authtype, 0);
- credential_write_item(fp, "credential", c->credential, 0);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "authtype", c->authtype, 0);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "credential", c->credential, 0);
if (c->ephemeral)
- credential_write_item(fp, "ephemeral", "1", 0);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "ephemeral", "1", 0);
}
- credential_write_item(fp, "protocol", c->protocol, 1);
- credential_write_item(fp, "host", c->host, 1);
- credential_write_item(fp, "path", c->path, 0);
- credential_write_item(fp, "username", c->username, 0);
- credential_write_item(fp, "password", c->password, 0);
- credential_write_item(fp, "oauth_refresh_token", c->oauth_refresh_token, 0);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "protocol", c->protocol, 1);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "host", c->host, 1);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "path", c->path, 0);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "username", c->username, 0);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "password", c->password, 0);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "oauth_refresh_token", c->oauth_refresh_token, 0);
if (c->password_expiry_utc != TIME_MAX) {
char *s = xstrfmt("%"PRItime, c->password_expiry_utc);
- credential_write_item(fp, "password_expiry_utc", s, 0);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "password_expiry_utc", s, 0);
free(s);
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < c->wwwauth_headers.nr; i++)
- credential_write_item(fp, "wwwauth[]", c->wwwauth_headers.v[i], 0);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "wwwauth[]", c->wwwauth_headers.v[i], 0);
if (credential_has_capability(&c->capa_state, op_type)) {
if (c->multistage)
- credential_write_item(fp, "continue", "1", 0);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "continue", "1", 0);
for (size_t i = 0; i < c->state_headers_to_send.nr; i++)
- credential_write_item(fp, "state[]", c->state_headers_to_send.v[i], 0);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "state[]", c->state_headers_to_send.v[i], 0);
}
}
Index: b/credential.h
===================================================================
--- a/credential.h
+++ b/credential.h
@@ -169,7 +169,8 @@ struct credential {
quit:1,
use_http_path:1,
username_from_proto:1,
- sanitize_prompt:1;
+ sanitize_prompt:1,
+ protect_protocol:1;
struct credential_capability capa_authtype;
struct credential_capability capa_state;
@@ -197,6 +198,7 @@ struct credential {
.state_headers = STRVEC_INIT, \
.state_headers_to_send = STRVEC_INIT, \
.sanitize_prompt = 1, \
+ .protect_protocol = 1, \
}
/* Initialize a credential structure, setting all fields to empty. */
Index: b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
===================================================================
--- a/t/t0300-credentials.sh
+++ b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
@@ -903,6 +903,22 @@ test_expect_success 'url parser rejects
test_cmp expect stderr
'
+test_expect_success 'url parser rejects embedded carriage returns' '
+ test_config credential.helper "!true" &&
+ test_must_fail git credential fill 2>stderr <<-\EOF &&
+ url=https://example%0d.com/
+ EOF
+ cat >expect <<-\EOF &&
+ fatal: credential value for host contains carriage return
+ If this is intended, set `credential.protectProtocol=false`
+ EOF
+ test_cmp expect stderr &&
+ GIT_ASKPASS=true \
+ git -c credential.protectProtocol=false credential fill <<-\EOF
+ url=https://example%0d.com/
+ EOF
+'
+
test_expect_success 'host-less URLs are parsed as empty host' '
check fill "verbatim foo bar" <<-\EOF
url=cert:///path/to/cert.pem

10
git.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Jan 16 22:29:07 UTC 2025 - Antonio Teixeira <antonio.teixeira@suse.com>
- Add CVE-2024-50349-1.patch, CVE-2024-50349-2.patch
* CVE-2024-50349: passwords for trusted sites could be sent to untrusted
sites (bsc#1235600)
- Add CVE-2024-52006.patch
* CVE-2024-52006: Carriage Returns via the credential protocol to credential
helpers (bsc#1235601)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Sep 20 08:18:30 UTC 2024 - Dominique Leuenberger <dimstar@opensuse.org>

7
git.spec
View File

@ -70,6 +70,13 @@ Patch8: git-asciidoc.patch
Patch10: setup-don-t-fail-if-commondir-reference-is-deleted.patch
# PATCH-FIX-OPENSUSE CVE-2024-24577.patch boo#1219660 antonio.teixeira@suse.com
Patch11: CVE-2024-24577.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM antonio.teixeira@suse.com bsc#1235600
# passwords for trusted sites could be sent to untrusted sites
Patch12: CVE-2024-50349-1.patch
Patch13: CVE-2024-50349-2.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM antonio.teixeira@suse.com bsc#1235601
# Carriage Returns via the credential protocol to credential helpers
Patch14: CVE-2024-52006.patch
BuildRequires: fdupes
BuildRequires: gpg2
BuildRequires: libcurl-devel