Sync from SUSE:SLFO:1.1 gpg2 revision 045c6036ffb3d8c960bc2c6934c19a20

gnupg-add_legacy_FIPS_mode_option.patch

@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@
  g10/gpg.c    |    9 +++++++++
  2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
 
-Index: gnupg-2.5.4/doc/gpg.texi
+Index: gnupg-2.4.2/doc/gpg.texi
 ===================================================================
---- gnupg-2.5.4.orig/doc/gpg.texi
+--- gnupg-2.4.2.orig/doc/gpg.texi
-+++ gnupg-2.5.4/doc/gpg.texi
++++ gnupg-2.4.2/doc/gpg.texi
-@@ -2340,6 +2340,24 @@ implies, this option is for experts only
+@@ -2285,6 +2285,24 @@ implies, this option is for experts only
  understand the implications of what it allows you to do, leave this
  off. @option{--no-expert} disables this option.
  
@@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/doc/gpg.texi
  @end table
  
  
-Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/gpg.c
+Index: gnupg-2.4.2/g10/gpg.c
 ===================================================================
---- gnupg-2.5.4.orig/g10/gpg.c
+--- gnupg-2.4.2.orig/g10/gpg.c
-+++ gnupg-2.5.4/g10/gpg.c
++++ gnupg-2.4.2/g10/gpg.c
-@@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values
+@@ -446,6 +446,7 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values
      oForceSignKey,
      oForbidGenKey,
      oRequireCompliance,
@@ -44,15 +44,15 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/gpg.c
      oCompatibilityFlags,
      oAddDesigRevoker,
      oAssertSigner,
-@@ -907,6 +908,7 @@ static gpgrt_opt_t opts[] = {
+@@ -886,6 +887,7 @@ static gpgrt_opt_t opts[] = {
    ARGPARSE_s_s (oCipherAlgo, "cipher-algo", "@"),
    ARGPARSE_s_s (oDigestAlgo, "digest-algo", "@"),
    ARGPARSE_s_s (oCertDigestAlgo, "cert-digest-algo", "@"),
 +  ARGPARSE_s_n (oSetLegacyFips, "set-legacy-fips", "@"),
-   ARGPARSE_s_n (oRequirePQCEncryption, "require-pqc-encryption", "@"),
-   ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisablePQCEncryption, "disable-pqc-encryption", "@"),
  
-@@ -3865,6 +3867,14 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+   ARGPARSE_header (NULL, N_("Options for unattended use")),
+@@ -3756,6 +3758,14 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
              keybox_set_buffersize (pargs.r.ret_ulong, 0);
              break;
  

gnupg-allow-import-of-previously-known-keys-even-without-UIDs.patch

@@ -17,19 +17,19 @@ Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
  g10/import.c | 49 +++++++++++--------------------------------------
  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
 
-Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/import.c
+Index: gnupg-2.4.0/g10/import.c
 ===================================================================
---- gnupg-2.5.4.orig/g10/import.c
+--- gnupg-2.4.0.orig/g10/import.c
-+++ gnupg-2.5.4/g10/import.c
++++ gnupg-2.4.0/g10/import.c
-@@ -1996,7 +1996,6 @@ import_one_real (ctrl_t ctrl,
+@@ -1954,7 +1954,6 @@ import_one_real (ctrl_t ctrl,
-   int non_self_or_utk = 0;
+   size_t an;
    char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
    int merge_keys_done = 0;
 -  int any_filter = 0;
    KEYDB_HANDLE hd = NULL;
  
    if (r_valid)
-@@ -2033,14 +2032,6 @@ import_one_real (ctrl_t ctrl,
+@@ -1991,14 +1990,6 @@ import_one_real (ctrl_t ctrl,
        log_printf ("\n");
      }
  
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/import.c
    if (screener && screener (keyblock, screener_arg))
      {
        log_error (_("key %s: %s\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk),
-@@ -2134,18 +2125,10 @@ import_one_real (ctrl_t ctrl,
+@@ -2078,18 +2069,10 @@ import_one_real (ctrl_t ctrl,
  	  }
      }
  
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/import.c
  
    /* Get rid of deleted nodes.  */
    commit_kbnode (&keyblock);
-@@ -2155,24 +2138,11 @@ import_one_real (ctrl_t ctrl,
+@@ -2099,24 +2082,11 @@ import_one_real (ctrl_t ctrl,
      {
        apply_keep_uid_filter (ctrl, keyblock, import_filter.keep_uid);
        commit_kbnode (&keyblock);
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/import.c
      }
  
    /* The keyblock is valid and ready for real import.  */
-@@ -2234,6 +2204,13 @@ import_one_real (ctrl_t ctrl,
+@@ -2174,6 +2144,13 @@ import_one_real (ctrl_t ctrl,
        err = 0;
        stats->skipped_new_keys++;
      }

gnupg-dirmngr-Don-t-install-expired-sks-certificate.patch

@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Lucas Mulling <lucas.mulling@suse.com>
  dirmngr/Makefile.am | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
-Index: gnupg-2.5.5/dirmngr/Makefile.am
+Index: gnupg-2.4.4/dirmngr/Makefile.am
 ===================================================================
---- gnupg-2.5.5.orig/dirmngr/Makefile.am
+--- gnupg-2.4.4.orig/dirmngr/Makefile.am
-+++ gnupg-2.5.5/dirmngr/Makefile.am
++++ gnupg-2.4.4/dirmngr/Makefile.am
 @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST = OAUTHORS ONEWS ChangeLog-20
  
  
@@ -24,10 +24,10 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.5/dirmngr/Makefile.am
  
  bin_PROGRAMS = dirmngr dirmngr-client
  
-Index: gnupg-2.5.5/dirmngr/Makefile.in
+Index: gnupg-2.4.4/dirmngr/Makefile.in
 ===================================================================
---- gnupg-2.5.5.orig/dirmngr/Makefile.in
+--- gnupg-2.4.4.orig/dirmngr/Makefile.in
-+++ gnupg-2.5.5/dirmngr/Makefile.in
++++ gnupg-2.4.4/dirmngr/Makefile.in
 @@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST = OAUTHORS ONEWS ChangeLog-20
               dirmngr_ldap-w32info.rc dirmngr_ldap.w32-manifest.in \
               dirmngr-client-w32info.rc dirmngr-client.w32-manifest.in

gnupg-gpg-Allow-the-use-of-an-ADSK-subkey-as-ADSK-subkey.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From d30e345692440b9c6677118c1d20b9d17d80f873 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2024 15:11:55 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH GnuPG] gpg: Allow the use of an ADSK subkey as ADSK subkey.
+
+* g10/packet.h (PKT_public_key): Increased size of req_usage to 16.
+* g10/getkey.c (key_byname): Set allow_adsk in the context if ir was
+requested via req_usage.
+(finish_lookup): Allow RENC usage matching.
+* g10/keyedit.c (append_adsk_to_key): Adjust the assert.
+* g10/keygen.c (prepare_adsk): Also allow to find an RENC subkey.
+--
+
+If an ADSK is to be added it may happen that an ADSK subkey is found
+first and this should then be used even that it does not have the E
+usage.  However, it used to have that E usage when it was added.
+
+While testing this I found another pecularity: If you do
+  gpg -k ADSK_SUBKEY_FPR
+without the '!' suffix and no corresponding encryption subkey is dound,
+you will get an unusabe key error.  I hesitate to fix that due to
+possible side-effects.
+
+GnuPG-bug-id: 6882
+Signed-off-by: Lucas Mulling <lucas.mulling@suse.com>
+---
+ g10/packet.h | 7 +++----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/g10/packet.h b/g10/packet.h
+index 5cef17543..375392807 100644
+--- a/g10/packet.h
++++ b/g10/packet.h
+@@ -400,11 +400,10 @@ typedef struct
+      when serializing.  (Serialized.)  */
+   byte    version;
+   byte    selfsigversion; /* highest version of all of the self-sigs */
+-  /* The public key algorithm.  (Serialized.)  */
+-  byte    pubkey_algo;
+-  u16     pubkey_usage;   /* carries the usage info.            */
+-  byte    req_usage;      /* hack to pass a request to getkey() */
+   byte    fprlen;         /* 0 or length of FPR.  */
++  byte    pubkey_algo;    /* The public key algorithm.  (PGP format)  */
++  u16     pubkey_usage;   /* carries the usage info.            */
++  u16     req_usage;      /* hack to pass a request to getkey() */
+   u32     has_expired;    /* set to the expiration date if expired */
+   /* keyid of the primary key.  Never access this value directly.
+      Instead, use pk_main_keyid().  */
+-- 
+2.50.0
+

gnupg-gpg-Fix-a-verification-DoS-due-to-a-malicious-subkey-in-the-keyring.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,634 @@
+From 48978ccb4e20866472ef18436a32744350a65158 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2025 12:16:17 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH GnuPG] gpg: Fix a verification DoS due to a malicious subkey
+ in the keyring.
+
+* g10/getkey.c (get_pubkey): Factor code out to ...
+(get_pubkey_bykid): new.  Add feature to return the keyblock.
+(get_pubkey_for_sig): Add arg r_keyblock to return the used keyblock.
+Request a signing usage.
+(get_pubkeyblock_for_sig): Remove.
+(finish_lookup): Improve debug output.
+* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature): Add arg r_keyblock and pass it
+down.
+* g10/mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Ditto.
+(check_sig_and_print): Use the keyblock returned by do_check_sig to
+show further information instead of looking it up again with
+get_pubkeyblock_for_sig.  Also re-check the signature after the import
+of an included keyblock.
+--
+
+The problem here is that it is possible to import a key from someone
+who added a signature subkey from another public key and thus inhibits
+that a good signature good be verified.
+
+Such a malicious key signature subkey must have been created w/o the
+mandatory backsig which bind a signature subkey to its primary key.
+For encryption subkeys this is not an issue because the existence of a
+decryption private key is all you need to decrypt something and then
+it does not matter if the public subkey or its binding signature has
+been put below another primary key; in fact we do the latter for
+ADSKs.
+
+GnuPG-bug-id: 7527
+Signed-off-by: Lucas Mulling <lucas.mulling@suse.com>
+---
+ NEWS            |   2 +
+ g10/getkey.c    | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ g10/gpg.h       |   3 +-
+ g10/keydb.h     |  10 ++++-
+ g10/mainproc.c  |  92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ g10/packet.h    |   2 +-
+ g10/sig-check.c |  23 +++++++----
+ 7 files changed, 154 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
+
+Index: gnupg-2.4.4/NEWS
+===================================================================
+--- gnupg-2.4.4.orig/NEWS
++++ gnupg-2.4.4/NEWS
+@@ -99,6 +99,8 @@ Noteworthy changes in version 2.4.4 (202
+ 
+   * Improve the speedo build system for Unix.  [T6710]
+ 
++  * gpg: Fix a verification DoS due to a malicious subkey in the
++    keyring.  [T7527]
+ 
+   Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T6578
+ 
+Index: gnupg-2.4.4/g10/getkey.c
+===================================================================
+--- gnupg-2.4.4.orig/g10/getkey.c
++++ gnupg-2.4.4/g10/getkey.c
+@@ -310,27 +310,51 @@ pk_from_block (PKT_public_key *pk, kbnod
+ 
+ /* Specialized version of get_pubkey which retrieves the key based on
+  * information in SIG.  In contrast to get_pubkey PK is required.  IF
+- * FORCED_PK is not NULL, this public key is used and copied to PK. */
++ * FORCED_PK is not NULL, this public key is used and copied to PK.
++ * If R_KEYBLOCK is not NULL the entire keyblock is stored there if
++ * found and FORCED_PK is not used; if not used or on error NULL is
++ * stored there. */
+ gpg_error_t
+ get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig,
+-                    PKT_public_key *forced_pk)
++                    PKT_public_key *forced_pk, kbnode_t *r_keyblock)
+ {
++  gpg_error_t err;
+   const byte *fpr;
+   size_t fprlen;
+ 
++  if (r_keyblock)
++    *r_keyblock = NULL;
++
+   if (forced_pk)
+     {
+       copy_public_key (pk, forced_pk);
+       return 0;
+     }
+ 
++  /* Make sure to request only keys cabable of signing.  This makes
++   * sure that a subkey w/o a valid backsig or with bad usage flags
++   * will be skipped.  */
++  pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
++
+   /* First try the ISSUER_FPR info.  */
+   fpr = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &fprlen);
+-  if (fpr && !get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl, pk, NULL, fpr, fprlen))
++  if (fpr && !get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl, pk, r_keyblock, fpr, fprlen))
+     return 0;
+ 
++  if (r_keyblock)
++    {
++      release_kbnode (*r_keyblock);
++      *r_keyblock = NULL;
++    }
++
+   /* Fallback to use the ISSUER_KEYID.  */
+-  return get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, sig->keyid);
++  err = get_pubkey_bykid (ctrl, pk, r_keyblock, sig->keyid);
++  if (err && r_keyblock)
++    {
++      release_kbnode (*r_keyblock);
++      *r_keyblock = NULL;
++    }
++  return err;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -348,6 +372,10 @@ get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_pub
+  * usage will be returned.  As such, it is essential that
+  * PK->REQ_USAGE be correctly initialized!
+  *
++ * If R_KEYBLOCK is not NULL, then the first result's keyblock is
++ * returned in *R_KEYBLOCK.  This should be freed using
++ * release_kbnode().
++ *
+  * Returns 0 on success, GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY if there is no public key
+  * with the specified key id, or another error code if an error
+  * occurs.
+@@ -355,24 +383,30 @@ get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_pub
+  * If the data was not read from the cache, then the self-signed data
+  * has definitely been merged into the public key using
+  * merge_selfsigs.  */
+-int
+-get_pubkey (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key * pk, u32 * keyid)
++gpg_error_t
++get_pubkey_bykid (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, kbnode_t *r_keyblock,
++                  u32 *keyid)
+ {
+   int internal = 0;
+-  int rc = 0;
++  gpg_error_t rc = 0;
++
++  if (r_keyblock)
++    *r_keyblock = NULL;
+ 
+ #if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
+-  if (pk)
++  if (pk && !r_keyblock)
+     {
+       /* Try to get it from the cache.  We don't do this when pk is
+-         NULL as it does not guarantee that the user IDs are
+-         cached. */
++       * NULL as it does not guarantee that the user IDs are cached.
++       * The old get_pubkey_function did not check PK->REQ_USAGE when
++       * reading form the caceh.  This is probably a bug.  Note that
++       * the cache is not used when the caller asked to return the
++       * entire keyblock.  This is because the cache does not
++       * associate the public key wit its primary key.  */
+       pk_cache_entry_t ce;
+       for (ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next)
+ 	{
+ 	  if (ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1])
+-	    /* XXX: We don't check PK->REQ_USAGE here, but if we don't
+-	       read from the cache, we do check it!  */
+ 	    {
+ 	      copy_public_key (pk, ce->pk);
+ 	      return 0;
+@@ -380,6 +414,7 @@ get_pubkey (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key
+ 	}
+     }
+ #endif
++
+   /* More init stuff.  */
+   if (!pk)
+     {
+@@ -425,16 +460,18 @@ get_pubkey (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key
+     ctx.req_usage = pk->req_usage;
+     rc = lookup (ctrl, &ctx, 0, &kb, &found_key);
+     if (!rc)
++      pk_from_block (pk, kb, found_key);
++    getkey_end (ctrl, &ctx);
++    if (!rc && r_keyblock)
+       {
+-	pk_from_block (pk, kb, found_key);
++        *r_keyblock = kb;
++        kb = NULL;
+       }
+-    getkey_end (ctrl, &ctx);
+     release_kbnode (kb);
+   }
+-  if (!rc)
+-    goto leave;
+ 
+-  rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
++  if (rc)  /* Return a more useful error code.  */
++    rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
+ 
+ leave:
+   if (!rc)
+@@ -445,6 +482,14 @@ leave:
+ }
+ 
+ 
++/* Wrapper for get_pubkey_bykid w/o keyblock return feature.  */
++int
++get_pubkey (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid)
++{
++  return get_pubkey_bykid (ctrl, pk, NULL, keyid);
++}
++
++
+ /* Same as get_pubkey but if the key was not found the function tries
+  * to import it from LDAP.  FIXME: We should not need this but swicth
+  * to a fingerprint lookup.  */
+@@ -557,28 +602,6 @@ get_pubkey_fast (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-/* Return the entire keyblock used to create SIG.  This is a
+- * specialized version of get_pubkeyblock.
+- *
+- * FIXME: This is a hack because get_pubkey_for_sig was already called
+- * and it could have used a cache to hold the key.  */
+-kbnode_t
+-get_pubkeyblock_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig)
+-{
+-  const byte *fpr;
+-  size_t fprlen;
+-  kbnode_t keyblock;
+-
+-  /* First try the ISSUER_FPR info.  */
+-  fpr = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &fprlen);
+-  if (fpr && !get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl, NULL, &keyblock, fpr, fprlen))
+-    return keyblock;
+-
+-  /* Fallback to use the ISSUER_KEYID.  */
+-  return get_pubkeyblock (ctrl, sig->keyid);
+-}
+-
+-
+ /* Return the key block for the key with key id KEYID or NULL, if an
+  * error occurs.  Use release_kbnode() to release the key block.
+  *
+@@ -3640,6 +3663,7 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsign
+   kbnode_t latest_key;
+   PKT_public_key *pk;
+   int req_prim;
++  int diag_exactfound = 0;
+   u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
+ 
+   if (r_flags)
+@@ -3667,11 +3691,10 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsign
+         {
+           if (want_exact)
+             {
+-              if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+-                log_debug ("finish_lookup: exact search requested and found\n");
+               foundk = k;
+               pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+               pk->flags.exact = 1;
++              diag_exactfound = 1;
+               break;
+             }
+           else if ((k->pkt->pkt.public_key->pubkey_usage == PUBKEY_USAGE_RENC))
+@@ -3700,10 +3723,14 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsign
+     log_debug ("finish_lookup: checking key %08lX (%s)(req_usage=%x)\n",
+ 	       (ulong) keyid_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL),
+ 	       foundk ? "one" : "all", req_usage);
++  if (diag_exactfound && DBG_LOOKUP)
++    log_debug ("\texact search requested and found\n");
+ 
+   if (!req_usage)
+     {
+       latest_key = foundk ? foundk : keyblock;
++      if (DBG_LOOKUP)
++        log_debug ("\tno usage requested - accepting key\n");
+       goto found;
+     }
+ 
+Index: gnupg-2.4.4/g10/gpg.h
+===================================================================
+--- gnupg-2.4.4.orig/g10/gpg.h
++++ gnupg-2.4.4/g10/gpg.h
+@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ struct dirmngr_local_s;
+ typedef struct dirmngr_local_s *dirmngr_local_t;
+ 
+ /* Object used to describe a keyblock node.  */
+-typedef struct kbnode_struct *KBNODE;   /* Deprecated use kbnode_t. */typedef struct kbnode_struct *kbnode_t;
++typedef struct kbnode_struct *KBNODE;   /* Deprecated use kbnode_t. */
++typedef struct kbnode_struct *kbnode_t;
+ 
+ /* The handle for keydb operations.  */
+ typedef struct keydb_handle_s *KEYDB_HANDLE;
+Index: gnupg-2.4.4/g10/keydb.h
+===================================================================
+--- gnupg-2.4.4.orig/g10/keydb.h
++++ gnupg-2.4.4/g10/keydb.h
+@@ -332,9 +332,15 @@ void getkey_disable_caches(void);
+ /* Return the public key used for signature SIG and store it at PK.  */
+ gpg_error_t get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl,
+                                 PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig,
+-                                PKT_public_key *forced_pk);
++                                PKT_public_key *forced_pk,
++                                kbnode_t *r_keyblock);
+ 
+-/* Return the public key with the key id KEYID and store it at PK.  */
++/* Return the public key with the key id KEYID and store it at PK.
++ * Optionally return the entire keyblock.  */
++gpg_error_t get_pubkey_bykid (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk,
++                              kbnode_t *r_keyblock, u32 *keyid);
++
++/* Same as get_pubkey_bykid but w/o r_keyblock.  */
+ int get_pubkey (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid);
+ 
+ /* Same as get_pubkey but with auto LDAP fetch.  */
+Index: gnupg-2.4.4/g10/mainproc.c
+===================================================================
+--- gnupg-2.4.4.orig/g10/mainproc.c
++++ gnupg-2.4.4/g10/mainproc.c
+@@ -1155,12 +1155,15 @@ proc_compressed (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+  * used to verify the signature will be stored there, or NULL if not
+  * found.  If FORCED_PK is not NULL, this public key is used to verify
+  * _data signatures_ and no key lookup is done.  Returns: 0 = valid
+- * signature or an error code
++ * signature or an error code.  If R_KEYBLOCK is not NULL the keyblock
++ * carries the used PK is stored there.  The caller should always free
++ * the return value using release_kbnode.
+  */
+ static int
+ do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, const void *extrahash, size_t extrahashlen,
+               PKT_public_key *forced_pk, int *is_selfsig,
+-	      int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey, PKT_public_key **r_pk)
++              int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey,
++              PKT_public_key **r_pk, kbnode_t *r_keyblock)
+ {
+   PKT_signature *sig;
+   gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL;
+@@ -1170,6 +1173,8 @@ do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, cons
+ 
+   if (r_pk)
+     *r_pk = NULL;
++  if (r_keyblock)
++    *r_keyblock = NULL;
+ 
+   log_assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
+   if (is_selfsig)
+@@ -1247,17 +1252,19 @@ do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, cons
+      (0x00) or text document (0x01).  */
+   rc = check_signature2 (c->ctrl, sig, md, extrahash, extrahashlen,
+                          forced_pk,
+-                         NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, r_pk);
++                         NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, r_pk, r_keyblock);
+   if (! rc)
+     md_good = md;
+   else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE && md2)
+     {
+       PKT_public_key *pk2;
+ 
++      if (r_keyblock)
++        release_kbnode (*r_keyblock);
+       rc = check_signature2 (c->ctrl, sig, md2, extrahash, extrahashlen,
+                              forced_pk,
+                              NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey,
+-                             r_pk? &pk2 : NULL);
++                             r_pk? &pk2 : NULL, r_keyblock);
+       if (!rc)
+         {
+           md_good = md2;
+@@ -1420,7 +1427,7 @@ list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
+         {
+           fflush (stdout);
+           rc2 = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, 0, NULL,
+-                              &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++                              &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+           switch (gpg_err_code (rc2))
+             {
+             case 0:		          sigrc = '!'; break;
+@@ -1880,7 +1887,7 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t nod
+   PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;  /* The public key for the signature or NULL. */
+   const void *extrahash = NULL;
+   size_t extrahashlen = 0;
+-  kbnode_t included_keyblock = NULL;
++  kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
+ 
+   if (opt.skip_verify)
+     {
+@@ -1999,7 +2006,8 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t nod
+       {
+       ambiguous:
+         log_error(_("can't handle this ambiguous signature data\n"));
+-        return 0;
++        rc = 0;
++        goto leave;
+       }
+   } /* End checking signature packet composition.  */
+ 
+@@ -2035,7 +2043,7 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t nod
+     log_info (_("               issuer \"%s\"\n"), sig->signers_uid);
+ 
+   rc = do_check_sig (c, node, extrahash, extrahashlen, NULL,
+-                     NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
++                     NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk, &keyblock);
+ 
+   /* If the key is not found but the signature includes a key block we
+    * use that key block for verification and on success import it.  */
+@@ -2043,6 +2051,7 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t nod
+       && sig->flags.key_block
+       && opt.flags.auto_key_import)
+     {
++      kbnode_t included_keyblock = NULL;
+       PKT_public_key *included_pk;
+       const byte *kblock;
+       size_t kblock_len;
+@@ -2054,10 +2063,12 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t nod
+                                       kblock+1, kblock_len-1,
+                                       sig->keyid, &included_keyblock))
+         {
++          /* Note: This is the only place where we use the forced_pk
++           *       arg (ie. included_pk) with do_check_sig.  */
+           rc = do_check_sig (c, node, extrahash, extrahashlen, included_pk,
+-                             NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
++                             NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk, NULL);
+           if (opt.verbose)
+-            log_debug ("checked signature using included key block: %s\n",
++            log_info ("checked signature using included key block: %s\n",
+                        gpg_strerror (rc));
+           if (!rc)
+             {
+@@ -2067,6 +2078,18 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t nod
+ 
+         }
+       free_public_key (included_pk);
++      release_kbnode (included_keyblock);
++
++      /* To make sure that nothing strange happened we check the
++       * signature again now using our own key store. This also
++       * returns the keyblock which we use later on.  */
++      if (!rc)
++        {
++          release_kbnode (keyblock);
++          keyblock = NULL;
++          rc = do_check_sig (c, node, extrahash, extrahashlen, NULL,
++                             NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk, &keyblock);
++        }
+     }
+ 
+   /* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver.  Note
+@@ -2113,8 +2136,13 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t nod
+                                                 KEYSERVER_IMPORT_FLAG_QUICK);
+                   glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+                   if (!res)
+-                    rc = do_check_sig (c, node, extrahash, extrahashlen, NULL,
+-                                       NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
++                    {
++                      release_kbnode (keyblock);
++                      keyblock = NULL;
++                      rc = do_check_sig (c, node, extrahash, extrahashlen, NULL,
++                                         NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk,
++                                         &keyblock);
++                    }
+                   else if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+                     log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "Pref-KS",
+                                gpg_strerror (res));
+@@ -2155,8 +2183,12 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t nod
+       /* Fixme: If the fingerprint is embedded in the signature,
+        * compare it to the fingerprint of the returned key.  */
+       if (!res)
+-        rc = do_check_sig (c, node, extrahash, extrahashlen, NULL,
+-                           NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
++        {
++          release_kbnode (keyblock);
++          keyblock = NULL;
++          rc = do_check_sig (c, node, extrahash, extrahashlen, NULL,
++                             NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk, &keyblock);
++        }
+       else if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+         log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "WKD", gpg_strerror (res));
+     }
+@@ -2186,8 +2218,13 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t nod
+                                          KEYSERVER_IMPORT_FLAG_QUICK);
+           glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+           if (!res)
+-            rc = do_check_sig (c, node, extrahash, extrahashlen, NULL,
+-                               NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
++            {
++              release_kbnode (keyblock);
++              keyblock = NULL;
++              rc = do_check_sig (c, node, extrahash, extrahashlen, NULL,
++                                 NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk,
++                                 &keyblock);
++            }
+           else if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+             log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "KS", gpg_strerror (res));
+         }
+@@ -2198,7 +2235,7 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t nod
+     {
+       /* We have checked the signature and the result is either a good
+        * signature or a bad signature.  Further examination follows.  */
+-      kbnode_t un, keyblock;
++      kbnode_t un;
+       int count = 0;
+       int keyblock_has_pk = 0;  /* For failsafe check.  */
+       int statno;
+@@ -2216,18 +2253,6 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t nod
+       else
+         statno = STATUS_GOODSIG;
+ 
+-      /* FIXME: We should have the public key in PK and thus the
+-       * keyblock has already been fetched.  Thus we could use the
+-       * fingerprint or PK itself to lookup the entire keyblock.  That
+-       * would best be done with a cache.  */
+-      if (included_keyblock)
+-        {
+-          keyblock = included_keyblock;
+-          included_keyblock = NULL;
+-        }
+-      else
+-        keyblock = get_pubkeyblock_for_sig (c->ctrl, sig);
+-
+       snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ",
+                 (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
+ 
+@@ -2293,10 +2318,10 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t nod
+            * contained in the keyring.*/
+ 	}
+ 
+-      log_assert (mainpk);
+-      if (!keyblock_has_pk)
++      if (!mainpk || !keyblock_has_pk)
+         {
+-          log_error ("signature key lost from keyblock\n");
++          log_error ("signature key lost from keyblock (%p,%p,%d)\n",
++                     keyblock, mainpk, keyblock_has_pk);
+           rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
+         }
+ 
+@@ -2567,8 +2592,8 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t nod
+         log_error (_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
+     }
+ 
++ leave:
+   free_public_key (pk);
+-  release_kbnode (included_keyblock);
+   xfree (issuer_fpr);
+   return rc;
+ }
+Index: gnupg-2.4.4/g10/packet.h
+===================================================================
+--- gnupg-2.4.4.orig/g10/packet.h
++++ gnupg-2.4.4/g10/packet.h
+@@ -914,7 +914,7 @@ gpg_error_t check_signature2 (ctrl_t ctr
+                               const void *extrahash, size_t extrahashlen,
+                               PKT_public_key *forced_pk,
+                               u32 *r_expiredate, int *r_expired, int *r_revoked,
+-                              PKT_public_key **r_pk);
++                              PKT_public_key **r_pk, kbnode_t *r_keyblock);
+ 
+ 
+ /*-- pubkey-enc.c --*/
+Index: gnupg-2.4.4/g10/sig-check.c
+===================================================================
+--- gnupg-2.4.4.orig/g10/sig-check.c
++++ gnupg-2.4.4/g10/sig-check.c
+@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ int
+ check_signature (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest)
+ {
+   return check_signature2 (ctrl, sig, digest, NULL, 0, NULL,
+-                           NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++                           NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -142,6 +142,11 @@ check_signature (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signat
+  * If R_PK is not NULL, the public key is stored at that address if it
+  * was found; other wise NULL is stored.
+  *
++ * If R_KEYBLOCK is not NULL, the entire keyblock used to verify the
++ * signature is stored at that address.  If no key was found or on
++ * some other errors NULL is stored there.  The callers needs to
++ * release the keyblock using release_kbnode (kb).
++ *
+  * Returns 0 on success.  An error code otherwise.  */
+ gpg_error_t
+ check_signature2 (ctrl_t ctrl,
+@@ -149,7 +154,7 @@ check_signature2 (ctrl_t ctrl,
+                   const void *extrahash, size_t extrahashlen,
+                   PKT_public_key *forced_pk,
+                   u32 *r_expiredate,
+-		  int *r_expired, int *r_revoked, PKT_public_key **r_pk)
++                  int *r_expired, int *r_revoked, PKT_public_key **r_pk, kbnode_t *r_keyblock)
+ {
+   int rc=0;
+   PKT_public_key *pk;
+@@ -162,6 +167,8 @@ check_signature2 (ctrl_t ctrl,
+     *r_revoked = 0;
+   if (r_pk)
+     *r_pk = NULL;
++  if (r_keyblock)
++    *r_keyblock = NULL;
+ 
+   pk = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pk);
+   if (!pk)
+@@ -192,7 +199,7 @@ check_signature2 (ctrl_t ctrl,
+       log_info(_("WARNING: signature digest conflict in message\n"));
+       rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
+     }
+-  else if (get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl, pk, sig, forced_pk))
++  else if (get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl, pk, sig, forced_pk, r_keyblock))
+     rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
+   else if ((rc = check_key_verify_compliance (pk)))
+     ;/* Compliance failure.  */
+@@ -791,9 +798,9 @@ check_revocation_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_
+           keyid_from_fingerprint (ctrl, pk->revkey[i].fpr, pk->revkey[i].fprlen,
+                                   keyid);
+ 
+-          if(keyid[0]==sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1]==sig->keyid[1])
+-	    /* The signature was generated by a designated revoker.
+-	       Verify the signature.  */
++          /* If the signature was generated by a designated revoker
++           * verify the signature.  */
++          if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
+ 	    {
+               gcry_md_hd_t md;
+ 
+@@ -1007,7 +1014,7 @@ check_signature_over_key_or_uid (ctrl_t
+               if (IS_CERT (sig))
+                 signer->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT;
+ 
+-              rc = get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl, signer, sig, NULL);
++              rc = get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl, signer, sig, NULL, NULL);
+               if (rc)
+                 {
+                   xfree (signer);

gnupg-gpg-Fix-another-regression-due-to-the-T7547-fix.patch

@@ -14,24 +14,24 @@ export-clean.
 
 GnuPG-bug-id: 7583
 
-diff --git a/g10/getkey.c b/g10/getkey.c
+Index: gnupg-2.4.4/g10/getkey.c
-index e93c0a904..0fe17d054 100644
+===================================================================
---- a/g10/getkey.c
+--- gnupg-2.4.4.orig/g10/getkey.c
-+++ b/g10/getkey.c
++++ gnupg-2.4.4/g10/getkey.c
-@@ -341,8 +341,10 @@ get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig,
+@@ -336,8 +336,10 @@ get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_pub
    /* Make sure to request only keys cabable of signing.  This makes
     * sure that a subkey w/o a valid backsig or with bad usage flags
     * will be skipped.  We also request the verification mode so that
--   * expired and reoked keys are returned.  */
+-   * expired and revoked keys are returned.  */
 -  pk->req_usage = (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG | PUBKEY_USAGE_VERIFY);
-+   * expired and revoked keys are returned.  We keep only a requested
++   * expired and revoked keys are returned. We keep only a requested
-+   * CERT usage in PK for the sake of key signatures.  */
++   * CERT usage in PK for the sake of key signatures. */
 +  pk->req_usage = (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG | PUBKEY_USAGE_VERIFY
 +                   | (pk->req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT));
  
    /* First try the ISSUER_FPR info.  */
    fpr = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &fprlen);
-@@ -3735,7 +3737,7 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsigned int req_usage, int want_exact,
+@@ -3675,7 +3677,7 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsign
    /* The verify mode is used to change the behaviour so that we can
     * return an expired or revoked key for signature verification.  */
    verify_mode = ((req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_VERIFY)
@@ -40,6 +40,3 @@ index e93c0a904..0fe17d054 100644
  
  #define USAGE_MASK  (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC|PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT)
    req_usage &= USAGE_MASK;
--- 
-2.50.0
-

gnupg-gpg-Fix-regression-for-the-recent-malicious-subkey-D.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+From d3d7713c1799754160260cb350309dd183b397f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2025 17:17:17 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 0901/1000] gpg: Fix regression for the recent malicious subkey
+ DoS fix.
+
+* g10/packet.h (PUBKEY_USAGE_VERIFY): New.
+* g10/getkey.c (get_pubkey_for_sig): Pass new flag also to requested
+usage.
+(finish_lookup): Introduce a verify_mode.
+--
+
+Fixes-commit: 48978ccb4e20866472ef18436a32744350a65158
+GnuPG-bug-id: 7547
+
+Index: gnupg-2.4.4/g10/getkey.c
+===================================================================
+--- gnupg-2.4.4.orig/g10/getkey.c
++++ gnupg-2.4.4/g10/getkey.c
+@@ -309,11 +309,12 @@ pk_from_block (PKT_public_key *pk, kbnod
+ 
+ 
+ /* Specialized version of get_pubkey which retrieves the key based on
+- * information in SIG.  In contrast to get_pubkey PK is required.  IF
++ * information in SIG.  In contrast to get_pubkey PK is required.  If
+  * FORCED_PK is not NULL, this public key is used and copied to PK.
+  * If R_KEYBLOCK is not NULL the entire keyblock is stored there if
+  * found and FORCED_PK is not used; if not used or on error NULL is
+- * stored there. */
++ * stored there. Use this function only to find the key for
++ * verification; it can't be used to select a key for signing. */
+ gpg_error_t
+ get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig,
+                     PKT_public_key *forced_pk, kbnode_t *r_keyblock)
+@@ -333,8 +334,9 @@ get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_pub
+ 
+   /* Make sure to request only keys cabable of signing.  This makes
+    * sure that a subkey w/o a valid backsig or with bad usage flags
+-   * will be skipped.  */
+-  pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
++   * will be skipped.  We also request the verification mode so that
++   * expired and revoked keys are returned.  */
++  pk->req_usage = (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG | PUBKEY_USAGE_VERIFY);
+ 
+   /* First try the ISSUER_FPR info.  */
+   fpr = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &fprlen);
+@@ -399,10 +401,10 @@ get_pubkey_bykid (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_publi
+       /* Try to get it from the cache.  We don't do this when pk is
+        * NULL as it does not guarantee that the user IDs are cached.
+        * The old get_pubkey_function did not check PK->REQ_USAGE when
+-       * reading form the caceh.  This is probably a bug.  Note that
++       * reading from the cache.  This is probably a bug.  Note that
+        * the cache is not used when the caller asked to return the
+        * entire keyblock.  This is because the cache does not
+-       * associate the public key wit its primary key.  */
++       * associate the public key with its primary key.  */
+       pk_cache_entry_t ce;
+       for (ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next)
+ 	{
+@@ -3664,11 +3666,18 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsign
+   PKT_public_key *pk;
+   int req_prim;
+   int diag_exactfound = 0;
++  int verify_mode = 0;
+   u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
+ 
+   if (r_flags)
+     *r_flags = 0;
+ 
++
++  /* The verify mode is used to change the behaviour so that we can
++   * return an expired or revoked key for signature verification.  */
++  verify_mode = ((req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_VERIFY)
++                 && (req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG));
++
+ #define USAGE_MASK  (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC|PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT)
+   req_usage &= USAGE_MASK;
+ 
+@@ -3720,9 +3729,9 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsign
+     }
+ 
+   if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+-    log_debug ("finish_lookup: checking key %08lX (%s)(req_usage=%x)\n",
++    log_debug ("finish_lookup: checking key %08lX (%s)(req_usage=%x%s)\n",
+ 	       (ulong) keyid_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL),
+-	       foundk ? "one" : "all", req_usage);
++	       foundk ? "one" : "all", req_usage, verify_mode? ",verify":"");
+   if (diag_exactfound && DBG_LOOKUP)
+     log_debug ("\texact search requested and found\n");
+ 
+@@ -3785,28 +3794,28 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsign
+ 	    }
+ 
+           n_subkeys++;
+-	  if (pk->flags.revoked)
++	  if (!verify_mode && pk->flags.revoked)
+ 	    {
+ 	      if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+ 		log_debug ("\tsubkey has been revoked\n");
+               n_revoked_or_expired++;
+ 	      continue;
+ 	    }
+-	  if (pk->has_expired && !opt.ignore_expiration)
++	  if (!verify_mode && pk->has_expired && !opt.ignore_expiration)
+ 	    {
+ 	      if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+ 		log_debug ("\tsubkey has expired\n");
+               n_revoked_or_expired++;
+ 	      continue;
+ 	    }
+-	  if (pk->timestamp > curtime && !opt.ignore_valid_from)
++	  if (!verify_mode && pk->timestamp > curtime && !opt.ignore_valid_from)
+ 	    {
+ 	      if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+ 		log_debug ("\tsubkey not yet valid\n");
+ 	      continue;
+ 	    }
+ 
+-          if (want_secret)
++          if (!verify_mode && want_secret)
+             {
+               int secret_key_avail = agent_probe_secret_key (NULL, pk);
+ 
+@@ -3833,7 +3842,8 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsign
+             }
+ 
+ 	  if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+-	    log_debug ("\tsubkey might be fine\n");
++	    log_debug ("\tsubkey might be fine%s\n",
++                       verify_mode? " for verification":"");
+ 	  /* In case a key has a timestamp of 0 set, we make sure
+ 	     that it is used.  A better change would be to compare
+ 	     ">=" but that might also change the selected keys and
+@@ -3874,12 +3884,12 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsign
+ 	    log_debug ("\tprimary key usage does not match: "
+ 		       "want=%x have=%x\n", req_usage, pk->pubkey_usage);
+ 	}
+-      else if (pk->flags.revoked)
++      else if (!verify_mode && pk->flags.revoked)
+ 	{
+ 	  if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+ 	    log_debug ("\tprimary key has been revoked\n");
+ 	}
+-      else if (pk->has_expired)
++      else if (!verify_mode && pk->has_expired)
+ 	{
+ 	  if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+ 	    log_debug ("\tprimary key has expired\n");
+@@ -3887,7 +3897,8 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsign
+       else /* Okay.  */
+ 	{
+ 	  if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+-	    log_debug ("\tprimary key may be used\n");
++	    log_debug ("\tprimary key may be used%s\n",
++                       verify_mode? " for verification":"");
+ 	  latest_key = keyblock;
+ 	}
+     }
+Index: gnupg-2.4.4/g10/packet.h
+===================================================================
+--- gnupg-2.4.4.orig/g10/packet.h
++++ gnupg-2.4.4/g10/packet.h
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
+ #define SIGNHINT_SELFSIG 2
+ #define SIGNHINT_ADSK    4
+ 
++#define PUBKEY_USAGE_VERIFY  16384               /* Verify only modifier.  */
+ 
+ /* Helper macros.  */
+ #define is_RSA(a)     ((a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA || (a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E \

gnupg-nobetasuffix.patch

@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
-Index: gnupg-2.5.1/autogen.sh
+Index: gnupg-2.4.3/autogen.sh
 ===================================================================
---- gnupg-2.5.1.orig/autogen.sh
+--- gnupg-2.4.3.orig/autogen.sh
-+++ gnupg-2.5.1/autogen.sh
++++ gnupg-2.4.3/autogen.sh
-@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ if [ "$myhost" = "find-version" ]; then
+@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ if [ "$myhost" = "find-version" ]; then
-     fi
+     esac
  
      beta=no
 -    if [ -e .git ]; then
 +    if false; then
        ingit=yes
        tmp=$(git describe --match "${matchstr1}" --long 2>/dev/null)
-       if [ -n "$tmp" ]; then
+       tmp=$(echo "$tmp" | sed s/^"$package"//)
-@@ -270,8 +270,8 @@ if [ "$myhost" = "find-version" ]; then
+@@ -237,8 +237,8 @@ if [ "$myhost" = "find-version" ]; then
        rvd=$((0x$(echo ${rev} | dd bs=1 count=4 2>/dev/null)))
      else
        ingit=no
@@ -19,6 +19,6 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.1/autogen.sh
 -      tmp="-unknown"
 +      beta=no
 +      tmp=""
-       cid="0000000"
        rev="0000000"
        rvd="0"
+     fi

gnupg-revert-rfc4880bis.patch

@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ Subject: [PATCH GnuPG] gpg: Merge --rfc4880bis features into --gnupg
 (read_parameter_file): Activate the v4 and v5 keywords.
 --
 
-Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/gpg.c
+Index: gnupg-2.4.1/g10/gpg.c
 ===================================================================
---- gnupg-2.5.4.orig/g10/gpg.c
+--- gnupg-2.4.1.orig/g10/gpg.c
-+++ gnupg-2.5.4/g10/gpg.c
++++ gnupg-2.4.1/g10/gpg.c
-@@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values
+@@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values
      oGnuPG,
      oRFC2440,
      oRFC4880,
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/gpg.c
      oOpenPGP,
      oPGP7,
      oPGP8,
-@@ -654,6 +655,7 @@ static gpgrt_opt_t opts[] = {
+@@ -636,6 +637,7 @@ static gpgrt_opt_t opts[] = {
    ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp8", "@"),
    ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC2440, "rfc2440", "@"),
    ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC4880, "rfc4880", "@"),
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/gpg.c
    ARGPARSE_s_n (oOpenPGP, "openpgp", N_("use strict OpenPGP behavior")),
    ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP7, "pgp6", "@"),
    ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP7, "pgp7", "@"),
-@@ -1008,7 +1010,6 @@ static gpgrt_opt_t opts[] = {
+@@ -978,7 +980,6 @@ static gpgrt_opt_t opts[] = {
    ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-allow-multiple-messages", "@"),
    ARGPARSE_s_s (oNoop, "aead-algo", "@"),
    ARGPARSE_s_s (oNoop, "personal-aead-preferences","@"),
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/gpg.c
    ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "override-compliance-check", "@"),
  
  
-@@ -2263,7 +2264,7 @@ static struct gnupg_compliance_option co
+@@ -2227,7 +2228,7 @@ static struct gnupg_compliance_option co
    {
      { "gnupg",      oGnuPG },
      { "openpgp",    oOpenPGP },
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/gpg.c
      { "rfc4880",    oRFC4880 },
      { "rfc2440",    oRFC2440 },
      { "pgp6",       oPGP7 },
-@@ -2279,8 +2280,29 @@ static struct gnupg_compliance_option co
+@@ -2243,8 +2244,28 @@ static struct gnupg_compliance_option co
  static void
  set_compliance_option (enum cmd_and_opt_values option)
  {
@@ -76,19 +76,26 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/gpg.c
 +      opt.s2k_digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256;
 +      opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_AES256;
 +      break;
-+
+     case oOpenPGP:
+     case oRFC4880:
+       /* This is effectively the same as RFC2440, but with
+@@ -2288,6 +2309,7 @@ set_compliance_option (enum cmd_and_opt_
+     case oPGP8:  opt.compliance = CO_PGP8;  break;
      case oGnuPG:
-       /* set up default options affected by policy compliance: */
        opt.compliance = CO_GNUPG;
-@@ -2299,6 +2321,7 @@ set_compliance_option (enum cmd_and_opt_
-       opt.s2k_digest_algo = 0;
-       opt.s2k_cipher_algo = DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO;
-       opt.flags.allow_old_cipher_algos = 0;
 +      opt.flags.rfc4880bis = 1;
        break;
  
-     case oOpenPGP:
+     case oDE_VS:
-@@ -3090,6 +3113,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -2490,6 +2512,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
+     opt.emit_version = 0;
+     opt.weak_digests = NULL;
+     opt.compliance = CO_GNUPG;
++    opt.flags.rfc4880bis = 1;
+ 
+     /* Check special options given on the command line.  */
+     orig_argc = argc;
+@@ -3032,6 +3055,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
            case oOpenPGP:
            case oRFC2440:
            case oRFC4880:
@@ -96,7 +103,7 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/gpg.c
            case oPGP7:
            case oPGP8:
            case oGnuPG:
-@@ -4000,6 +4024,11 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -3868,6 +3892,11 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
      if( may_coredump && !opt.quiet )
  	log_info(_("WARNING: program may create a core file!\n"));
  
@@ -108,7 +115,7 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/gpg.c
      if (eyes_only) {
        if (opt.set_filename)
  	  log_info(_("WARNING: %s overrides %s\n"),
-@@ -4222,7 +4251,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -4084,7 +4113,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
      /* Check our chosen algorithms against the list of legal
         algorithms. */
  
@@ -117,20 +124,20 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/gpg.c
        {
  	const char *badalg=NULL;
  	preftype_t badtype=PREFTYPE_NONE;
-Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/keygen.c
+Index: gnupg-2.4.1/g10/keygen.c
 ===================================================================
---- gnupg-2.5.4.orig/g10/keygen.c
+--- gnupg-2.4.1.orig/g10/keygen.c
-+++ gnupg-2.5.4/g10/keygen.c
++++ gnupg-2.4.1/g10/keygen.c
-@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ keygen_set_std_prefs (const char *string
+@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ keygen_set_std_prefs (const char *string
  	      strcat(dummy_string,"S7 ");
  	    strcat(dummy_string,"S2 "); /* 3DES */
  
 -            if (!openpgp_aead_test_algo (AEAD_ALGO_OCB))
-+        if (opt.flags.rfc4880bis && !openpgp_aead_test_algo (AEAD_ALGO_OCB))
++            if (opt.flags.rfc4880bis && !openpgp_aead_test_algo (AEAD_ALGO_OCB))
  	      strcat(dummy_string,"A2 ");
  
              if (personal)
-@@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ keygen_upd_std_prefs (PKT_signature *sig
+@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ keygen_upd_std_prefs (PKT_signature *sig
    /* Make sure that the MDC feature flag is set if needed.  */
    add_feature_mdc (sig,mdc_available);
    add_feature_aead (sig, aead_available);
@@ -139,7 +146,7 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/keygen.c
    add_keyserver_modify (sig,ks_modify);
    keygen_add_keyserver_url(sig,NULL);
  
-@@ -4118,7 +4118,10 @@ parse_key_parameter_part (ctrl_t ctrl,
+@@ -3382,7 +3382,10 @@ parse_key_parameter_part (ctrl_t ctrl,
                  }
              }
            else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (s, "v5"))
@@ -151,7 +158,7 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/keygen.c
            else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (s, "v4"))
              keyversion = 4;
            else
-@@ -4379,7 +4382,7 @@ parse_key_parameter_part (ctrl_t ctrl,
+@@ -3641,7 +3644,7 @@ parse_key_parameter_part (ctrl_t ctrl,
   *   ecdsa := Use algorithm ECDSA.
   *   eddsa := Use algorithm EdDSA.
   *   ecdh  := Use algorithm ECDH.
@@ -160,7 +167,7 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/keygen.c
   *
   * There are several defaults and fallbacks depending on the
   * algorithm.  PART can be used to select which part of STRING is
-@@ -5353,9 +5356,9 @@ read_parameter_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const
+@@ -4513,9 +4516,9 @@ read_parameter_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const
  	    }
  	}
  
@@ -173,9 +180,9 @@ Index: gnupg-2.5.4/g10/keygen.c
          else
            {
              r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + strlen( value ) );
-@@ -5450,11 +5453,14 @@ quickgen_set_para (struct para_data_s *p
+@@ -4610,11 +4613,14 @@ quickgen_set_para (struct para_data_s *p
-   r->next = para;
+       para = r;
-   para = r;
+     }
  
 -  r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r + 20);
 -  r->key = for_subkey? pSUBVERSION : pVERSION;

gpg2.changes

@@ -2,188 +2,25 @@
 Thu Jun 26 11:26:15 UTC 2025 - Pedro Monreal <pmonreal@suse.com>
 
 - Security fix: [bsc#1236931, bsc#1239119, CVE-2025-30258]
+  * gpg: Fix regression for the recent malicious subkey DoS fix.
   * gpg: Fix another regression due to the T7547 fix.
-  * The fix for CVE-2025-30258 was introduced in 2.5.5
+  * gpg: Allow the use of an ADSK subkey as ADSK subkey.
-  * Add gnupg-gpg-Fix-another-regression-due-to-the-T7547-fix.patch
+  * Add patches:
+    - gnupg-gpg-Fix-regression-for-the-recent-malicious-subkey-D.patch
+    - gnupg-gpg-Fix-another-regression-due-to-the-T7547-fix.patch
+    - gnupg-gpg-Allow-the-use-of-an-ADSK-subkey-as-ADSK-subkey.patch
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
-Tue Jun 17 13:11:07 UTC 2025 - Lucas Mulling <lucas.mulling@suse.com>
+Tue Jun  3 11:31:57 UTC 2025 - Lucas Mulling <lucas.mulling@suse.com>
 
 - Don't install expired sks certificate [bsc#1243069]
   * Add patch gnupg-dirmngr-Don-t-install-expired-sks-certificate.patch
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
-Fri Mar  7 17:13:14 UTC 2025 - Lucas Mulling <lucas.mulling@suse.com>
+Mon Mar 17 17:36:17 UTC 2025 - Lucas Mulling <lucas.mulling@suse.com>
 
-- Update to 2.5.5: [bsc#1236931, bsc#1239119]
+- Fix a verification DoS due to a malicious subkey in the keyring: [bsc#1239119]
-  * gpg: Fix a verification DoS due to a malicious subkey in the
+  * Add patch gnupg-gpg-Fix-a-verification-DoS-due-to-a-malicious-subkey-in-the-keyring.patch
-    keyring.  [T7527]
-  * dirmngr: Fix possible hangs due to blocking connection requests.
-    [T6606, T7434]
-  Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T7530
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Wed Feb 26 14:13:02 UTC 2025 - Adrian Schröter <adrian@suse.de>
-
-- Fixing gpg-agent integration by changing --supervised to
-  --deprecated-supervised in service files.
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Wed Feb 19 10:41:27 UTC 2025 - Pedro Monreal <pmonreal@suse.com>
-
-- Update to 2.5.4:
-  * gpg: New option --disable-pqc-encryption. [rG00c31f8b04]
-  * gpg: Fix --quick-add-key for Weierstrass ECC with usage given. [T7506]
-  * gpg: Fix handling with no CRC armor. [T7071]
-  * gpg: New private Kyber keys are now cross-referenced using a new
-    Link attribute. [T6638]
-  * gpg: Fix an import problem with keys having another primary key as
-    a subkey. [T7527]
-  * gpgsm: Allow unattended PKCS#12 export without passphrase. [rG159e801043]
-  * gpgsm: Allow CSR generation with an unprotected key. [rG89055f24f4]
-  * agent: New option --change-std-env-name. [T7522]
-  * agent: Fix ssh-agent's request_identities for skipped Brainpool
-    keys. [rG2469dc5aae]
-  * Do not package zlib and bzip2 object files in a speedo release build. [T7442]
-  * Rebase patches:
-    - gnupg-add_legacy_FIPS_mode_option.patch
-    - gnupg-allow-import-of-previously-known-keys-even-without-UIDs.patch
-    - gnupg-revert-rfc4880bis.patch
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Tue Jan 14 14:09:10 UTC 2025 - Lucas Mulling <lucas.mulling@suse.com>
-
-- Update to 2.5.3
-  * gpg: Allow for signature subpackets of up to 30000 octets.
-    [rG36dbca3e69]
-  * gpg: Silence expired trusted-key diagnostics in quiet mode.  [T7351]
-  * gpg: Allow smaller session keys with Kyber and enforce the use of
-    AES-256 if useful.  [T7472]
-  * gpg: Fix regression in key generation from existing card key.
-    [T7309,T7457]
-  * gpg: Print a warning if the card backup key could not be written.
-    [T2169]
-  * The --supervised options of gpg-agent and dirmngr have been
-    renamed to --deprecated-supervised as preparation for their removal.
-    [rGa019a0fcd8]
-  * There is no more default for a keyserver.
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Mon Jan  6 21:41:40 UTC 2025 - Andreas Stieger <andreas.stieger@gmx.de>
-
-- note updated 2.5.x build dependencies 
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Wed Dec 11 12:12:50 UTC 2024 - Lucas Mulling <lucas.mulling@suse.com>
-
-- Update to 2.5.2:
-  * gpg: Add option 16 to --full-gen-key to create ECC+Kyber.  [T6638]
-  * gpg: For composite algos add the algo string to the colons
-    listings.  [T6638]
-  * gpg: Validate the trustdb after the import of a trusted key.
-    [T7200]
-  * gpg: Exclude expired trusted keys from the key validation process.
-    [T7200]
-  * gpg: Fix a wrong decryption failed status for signed and OCB
-    encrypted messages without a signature verification key.  [T7042]
-  * gpg: Retain binary representation for import->export with Ed25519
-    key signatures.  [T7426]
-  * gpg: Fix comparing ed448 to ed25519 with --assert-pubkey-algo.
-    [T7425]
-  * gpg: Avoid a failure exit code for expired ultimately trusted
-    keys.  [T7351]
-  * gpg: Emit status error for an invalid ADSK.  [T7322]
-  * gpg: Allow the use of an ADSK subkey as ADSK subkey.  [T6882]
-  * gpg: Fix --quick-set-expire for V5 subkey fingerprints.  [T7298]
-  * gpg: Robust error handling for SCD READKEY.  [T7309]
-  * gpg: Fix cv25519 v5 export regression.  [T7316]
-  * gpgsm: Nearly fourfold speedup of validated certificate listings.
-    [T7308]
-  * gpgsm: Improvement for some rare P12 files.  [rGf50dde6269]
-  * gpgsm: Terminate key listing on output write error.  [T6185]
-  * agent: Add option --status to the LISTRUSTED command.
-    [rG4275d5fa7a]
-  * agent: Fix detection of the yet unused trustflag de-vs.  [T5079]
-  * agent: Allow ssh to sign data larger than the Assuan line length.
-    [T7436]
-  * keyboxd: Fix a race condition on the database handle.  [T7294]
-  * dirmngr: A list of used URLs for loaded CRLs is printed first in
-    the output of the LISTCRL command.  [T7337]
-  * scd: More mitigations against lock ups with multiple cards or
-    apps.  [T7323, T7402]
-  * gpgtar: Use log-file from common.conf only in --batch mode.
-    [rGb389e04ef5]
-  * gpgtar: Fix directory creation during extraction.  [T7380]
-  * gpg-mail-tube: Minor fixes.
-  * gpgconf: Add list flag to trusted-key et al.  [T7313]
-  * Implement GNUPG_ASSUME_COMPLIANCE envvar and registry key for
-    testing de-vs compliance mode.  [rGb287fb5775,rG7b0be541a9]
-  * Fix a race condition in creating the socket directory.  [T7332]
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Thu Dec  5 18:47:10 UTC 2024 - Adrian Schröter <adrian@suse.de>
-
-- Disable ibmswtpm2 on LoongArch64
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Mon Oct 21 18:52:37 UTC 2024 - Pedro Monreal <pmonreal@suse.com>
-
-- Update to 2.5.1:
-  * gpg: The support for composite Kyber+ECC public key algorithms
-    does now use the final FIPS-203 and LibrePGP specifications. The
-    experimental keys from 2.5.0 are no longer supported. [T6815]
-  * gpg: New commands --add-recipients and --change-recipients. [T1825]
-  * gpg: New option --proc-all-sigs. [T7261]
-  * gpg: Fix a regression in 2.5.0 in gpgme's tests. [T7195]
-  * gpg: Make --no-literal work again for -c and --store. [T5852]
-  * gpg: Improve detection of input data read errors. [T6528]
-  * gpg: Fix getting key by IPGP record (rfc-4398). [T7288]
-  * gpgsm: New option --assert-signer. [T7286]
-  * gpgsm: More improvements to PKCS#12 parsing to cope with latest
-    IVBB changes. [T7213]
-  * agent: Fix KEYTOCARD command when used with a loopback pinentry. [T7283]
-  * gpg-mail-tube: Make sure GNUPGHOME is set in vsd mode.  New option
-    --as-attach. [rG4511997e9e1b]
-  * Now uses the process spawn API from libgpg-error. [T7192,T7194]
-  * Removed the --enable-gpg-is-gpg2 configure time option.
-    [rG2125f228d36c]
-  * Rebase patches:
-    - gnupg-add_legacy_FIPS_mode_option.patch
-    - gnupg-revert-rfc4880bis.patch
-    - gnupg-nobetasuffix.patch
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Mon Aug 12 04:30:42 UTC 2024 - Andreas Stieger <andreas.stieger@gmx.de>
-
-- Remove explicit runtime library dependency, pick ease of
-  maintenance in Tumbleweed over mixed project use runtime bugs.
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Fri Mar  8 13:14:00 UTC 2024 - Pedro Monreal <pmonreal@suse.com>
-
-- Update to 2.4.5:
-  * gpg,gpgv: New option --assert-pubkey-algo. [T6946]
-  * gpg: Emit status lines for errors in the compression layer. [T6977]
-  * gpg: Fix invocation with --trusted-keys and --no-options. [T7025]
-  * gpgsm: Allow for a longer salt in PKCS#12 files. [T6757]
-  * gpgtar: Make --status-fd=2 work on Windows. [T6961]
-  * scd: Support for the ACR-122U NFC reader. [rG1682ca9f01]
-  * scd: Suport D-TRUST ECC cards. [T7000,T7001]
-  * scd: Allow auto detaching of kernel drivers; can be disabled with
-    the new compatibility-flag ccid-no-auto-detach. [rGa1ea3b13e0]
-  * scd: Allow setting a PIN length of 6 also with a reset code for
-    openpgp cards. [T6843]
-  * agent: Allow GET_PASSPHRASE in restricted mode. [rGadf4db6e20]
-  * dirmngr: Trust system's root CAs for checking CRL issuers. [T6963]
-  * dirmngr: Fix regression in 2.4.4 in fetching keys via hkps. [T6997]
-  * gpg-wks-client: Make option --mirror work properly w/o specifying
-    domains. [rG37cc255e49]
-  * g13,gpg-wks-client: Allow command style options as in "g13 mount
-    foo". [rGa09157ccb2]
-  * Allow tilde expansion for the foo-program options. [T7017]
-  * Make the getswdb.sh tool usable outside the GnuPG tree.
-  * Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T6960
-  * Update the required versions for the dependencies.
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Thu Jan 25 18:51:03 UTC 2024 - Pedro Monreal <pmonreal@suse.com>

gpg2.spec

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
 #
 # spec file for package gpg2
 #
-# Copyright (c) 2025 SUSE LLC
+# Copyright (c) 2024 SUSE LLC
-# Copyright (c) 2025 Andreas Stieger <Andreas.Stieger@gmx.de>
 #
 # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties
 # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed
@@ -18,7 +17,7 @@
 
 
 Name:           gpg2
-Version:        2.5.5
+Version:        2.4.4
 Release:        0
 Summary:        File encryption, decryption, signature creation and verification utility
 License:        GPL-3.0-or-later
@@ -47,15 +46,21 @@ Patch11:        gnupg-allow-large-rsa.patch
 Patch12:        gnupg-revert-rfc4880bis.patch
 #PATCH-FIX-OPENSUSE Do not pull revision info from GIT when autoconf is run
 Patch13:        gnupg-nobetasuffix.patch
-#PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM Don't install exipred sks certificate
+#PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM: bsc#1239119 - VUL-0: gpg2: verification DoS due to a malicious subkey in the keyring
-Patch14:        gnupg-dirmngr-Don-t-install-expired-sks-certificate.patch
+Patch14:        gnupg-gpg-Fix-a-verification-DoS-due-to-a-malicious-subkey-in-the-keyring.patch
-#PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM gpg: Fix another regression due to the T7547 fix.
+#PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM: bsc#1243069 - remove expired and insecure key /usr/share/gnupg/sks-keyservers.netCA.pem
-Patch15:        gnupg-gpg-Fix-another-regression-due-to-the-T7547-fix.patch
+Patch15:        gnupg-dirmngr-Don-t-install-expired-sks-certificate.patch
+#PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM Fix regressions introduced in the fix for CVE-2025-30258
+Patch16:        gnupg-gpg-Fix-regression-for-the-recent-malicious-subkey-D.patch
+Patch17:        gnupg-gpg-Fix-another-regression-due-to-the-T7547-fix.patch
+Patch18:        gnupg-gpg-Allow-the-use-of-an-ADSK-subkey-as-ADSK-subkey.patch
 BuildRequires:  expect
 BuildRequires:  fdupes
-BuildRequires:  libassuan-devel >= 3.0.0
+BuildRequires:  ibmswtpm2
-BuildRequires:  libgcrypt-devel >= 1.11.0
+BuildRequires:  ibmtss-devel
-BuildRequires:  libgpg-error-devel >= 1.51
+BuildRequires:  libassuan-devel >= 2.5.0
+BuildRequires:  libgcrypt-devel >= 1.9.1
+BuildRequires:  libgpg-error-devel >= 1.46
 BuildRequires:  libksba-devel >= 1.6.3
 BuildRequires:  makeinfo
 BuildRequires:  npth-devel >= 1.2
@@ -63,20 +68,21 @@ BuildRequires:  openldap2-devel
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig
 BuildRequires:  readline-devel
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(bzip2)
-BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(gnutls) >= 3.2
+BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(gnutls) >= 3.0
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(libusb-1.0)
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(sqlite3) >= 3.27
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(zlib)
+# runtime dependency to support devel repository users - boo#955982
+Requires:       libassuan0 >= 2.5.0
+Requires:       libgcrypt20 >= 1.9.1
+Requires:       libgpg-error >= 1.46
+Requires:       libksba >= 1.3.4
 Requires:       pinentry
 Recommends:     dirmngr = %{version}
 Provides:       gnupg = %{version}
 Provides:       gpg = 1.4.9
 Provides:       newpg
 Obsoletes:      gpg < 1.4.9
-%ifnarch loongarch64
-BuildRequires:  ibmswtpm2
-BuildRequires:  ibmtss-devel
-%endif
 
 %description
 GnuPG is a hybrid-encryption software program; it uses a combination
@@ -124,7 +130,8 @@ date=$(date -u +%%Y-%%m-%%dT%%H:%%M+0000 -r %{SOURCE99})
     --enable-large-secmem \
     --with-gnu-ld \
     --with-default-trust-store-file=%{_sysconfdir}/ssl/ca-bundle.pem \
-    --enable-build-timestamp=$date
+    --enable-build-timestamp=$date \
+    --enable-gpg-is-gpg2
 
 %make_build
 
@@ -141,11 +148,10 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}%{_docdir}/gpg2/examples/gpgconf.conf
 rm %{buildroot}%{_infodir}/dir
 
 # compat symlinks
-ln -sf gpg %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/gpg2
+ln -sf gpg2 %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/gpg
-ln -sf gpgv %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/gpgv2
+ln -sf gpgv2 %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/gpgv
-ln -sf gpg.1 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1/gpg2.1
+ln -sf gpg2.1 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1/gpg.1
-ln -sf gpgv.1 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1/gpgv2.1
+ln -sf gpgv2.1 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1/gpgv.1
-ln -sf gnupg.7 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man7/gnupg2.7
 
 # install udev rules for scdaemon
 install -Dm 0644 %{SOURCE4} %{buildroot}%{_udevrulesdir}/60-scdaemon.rules
@@ -171,7 +177,7 @@ cp systemd-user/README.systemd %{buildroot}%{_docdir}/gpg2/
 %license COPYING*
 %doc AUTHORS NEWS THANKS TODO ChangeLog
 %{_infodir}/gnupg*
-%{_mandir}/*/[aghsw]*%{ext_man}
+%{_mandir}/*/[agsw]*%{ext_man}
 %doc %{_docdir}/%{name}
 %{_bindir}/[gkw]*
 %{_libexecdir}/[gks]*
@@ -194,10 +200,8 @@ cp systemd-user/README.systemd %{buildroot}%{_docdir}/gpg2/
 %{_libexecdir}/dirmngr_ldap
 %{_userunitdir}/dirmngr.*
 
-%ifnarch loongarch64
 %files tpm
 %license COPYING*
 %{_libexecdir}/tpm2daemon*
-%endif
 
 %changelog