diff --git a/openssl-3.changes b/openssl-3.changes index 4267466..5edf0b2 100644 --- a/openssl-3.changes +++ b/openssl-3.changes @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Thu Jan 23 16:35:19 UTC 2025 - Lucas Mulling + +- Security fix: [bsc#1236136, CVE-2024-13176] + * Fix timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computation + * Add openssl-CVE-2024-13176.patch + ------------------------------------------------------------------- Mon Dec 23 20:14:08 UTC 2024 - Giuliano Belinassi diff --git a/openssl-3.spec b/openssl-3.spec index 054b34c..62a1093 100644 --- a/openssl-3.spec +++ b/openssl-3.spec @@ -144,6 +144,8 @@ Patch64: openssl-3-fix-memleak-s390x_HMAC_CTX_copy.patch # PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM: Fix failing tests on ppc64 jsc#PED-10280 Patch65: openssl-3-fix-sha3-squeeze-ppc64.patch Patch66: openssl-3-fix-quic_multistream_test.patch +# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM: bsc#1236136 CVE-2024-13176: Fix timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computation +Patch67: openssl-CVE-2024-13176.patch BuildRequires: pkgconfig diff --git a/openssl-CVE-2024-13176.patch b/openssl-CVE-2024-13176.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d6e869 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-CVE-2024-13176.patch @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +From 4b1cb94a734a7d4ec363ac0a215a25c181e11f65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tomas Mraz +Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 18:27:02 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computation + +There is a timing signal of around 300 nanoseconds when the top word of +the inverted ECDSA nonce value is zero. This can happen with significant +probability only for some of the supported elliptic curves. In particular +the NIST P-521 curve is affected. To be able to measure this leak, the +attacker process must either be located in the same physical computer or +must have a very fast network connection with low latency. + +Attacks on ECDSA nonce are also known as Minerva attack. + +Fixes CVE-2024-13176 + +Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman +Reviewed-by: Paul Dale +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26429) + +(cherry picked from commit 63c40a66c5dc287485705d06122d3a6e74a6a203) +(cherry picked from commit 392dcb336405a0c94486aa6655057f59fd3a0902) +--- + crypto/bn/bn_exp.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ + crypto/ec/ec_lib.c | 7 ++++--- + include/crypto/bn.h | 3 +++ + 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c +index b876edbfac36e..af52e2ced6914 100644 +--- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c ++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c +@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top, + * out by Colin Percival, + * http://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful/) + */ +-int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, ++int bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, + BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) + { +@@ -623,10 +623,6 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + unsigned int t4 = 0; + #endif + +- bn_check_top(a); +- bn_check_top(p); +- bn_check_top(m); +- + if (!BN_is_odd(m)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS); + return 0; +@@ -1146,7 +1142,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + goto err; + } else + #endif +- if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx)) ++ if (!bn_from_mont_fixed_top(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx)) + goto err; + ret = 1; + err: +@@ -1160,6 +1156,19 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + return ret; + } + ++int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, ++ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, ++ BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) ++{ ++ bn_check_top(a); ++ bn_check_top(p); ++ bn_check_top(m); ++ if (!bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont)) ++ return 0; ++ bn_correct_top(rr); ++ return 1; ++} ++ + int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) + { +diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c +index c92b4dcb0ac45..a79fbb98cf6fa 100644 +--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c ++++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c +@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include "crypto/ec.h" ++#include "crypto/bn.h" + #include "internal/nelem.h" + #include "ec_local.h" + +@@ -1261,10 +1262,10 @@ static int ec_field_inverse_mod_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, + if (!BN_sub(e, group->order, e)) + goto err; + /*- +- * Exponent e is public. +- * No need for scatter-gather or BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. ++ * Although the exponent is public we want the result to be ++ * fixed top. + */ +- if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, x, e, group->order, ctx, group->mont_data)) ++ if (!bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(r, x, e, group->order, ctx, group->mont_data)) + goto err; + + ret = 1; +diff --git a/include/crypto/bn.h b/include/crypto/bn.h +index 302f031c2ff1d..499e1d10efab0 100644 +--- a/include/crypto/bn.h ++++ b/include/crypto/bn.h +@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG *words, int num_words); + */ + int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); ++int bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, ++ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, ++ BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont); + int bn_to_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, + BN_CTX *ctx); + int bn_from_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,