150 lines
6.3 KiB
Diff
150 lines
6.3 KiB
Diff
From a325a23bc83f4efd60130001c417ca5b96bdbff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
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Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 19:33:02 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] signature: Add indicator for PSS salt length
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
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5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS [...] the length (in bytes) of the
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salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
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the hash function output block (in bytes)."
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It is not exactly clear from this text whether hLen refers to the
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message digest or the hash function used for the mask generation
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function MGF1. PKCS#1 v2.1 suggests it is the former:
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| Typical salt lengths in octets are hLen (the length of the output of
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| the hash function Hash) and 0. In both cases the security of
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| RSASSA-PSS can be closely related to the hardness of inverting RSAVP1.
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| Bellare and Rogaway [4] give a tight lower bound for the security of
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| the original RSA-PSS scheme, which corresponds roughly to the former
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| case, while Coron [12] gives a lower bound for the related Full Domain
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| Hashing scheme, which corresponds roughly to the latter case. In [13]
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| Coron provides a general treatment with various salt lengths ranging
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| from 0 to hLen; see [27] for discussion. See also [31], which adapts
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| the security proofs in [4][13] to address the differences between the
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| original and the present version of RSA-PSS as listed in Note 1 above.
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Since OpenSSL defaults to creating signatures with the maximum salt
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length, blocking the use of longer salts would probably lead to
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significant problems in practice. Instead, introduce an explicit
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indicator that can be obtained from the EVP_PKEY_CTX object using
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params() with the
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OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR
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parameter.
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We also add indicator for RSA_NO_PADDING here to avoid patch-over-patch.
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Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
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---
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include/openssl/evp.h | 4 ++++
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providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++
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util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm | 23 ++++++++++---------
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3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
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Index: openssl-3.1.4/include/openssl/evp.h
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-3.1.4.orig/include/openssl/evp.h
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+++ openssl-3.1.4/include/openssl/evp.h
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@@ -801,6 +801,10 @@ __owur int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CT
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__owur int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
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int *outl);
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+# define EVP_SIGNATURE_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
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+# define EVP_SIGNATURE_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED 1
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+# define EVP_SIGNATURE_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
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+
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__owur int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s,
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EVP_PKEY *pkey);
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__owur int EVP_SignFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s,
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Index: openssl-3.1.4/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-3.1.4.orig/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
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+++ openssl-3.1.4/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
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@@ -1167,6 +1167,24 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprs
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}
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}
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+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
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+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR);
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+ if (p != NULL) {
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+ int fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
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+ if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
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+ if (prsactx->md == NULL) {
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+ fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED;
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+ } else if (rsa_pss_compute_saltlen(prsactx) > EVP_MD_get_size(prsactx->md)) {
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+ fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
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+ }
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+ } else if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
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+ if (prsactx->md == NULL) /* Should always be the case */
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+ fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
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+ }
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+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator);
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+ }
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+#endif
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+
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return 1;
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}
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@@ -1176,6 +1194,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_c
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OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
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+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
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+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
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+#endif
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OSSL_PARAM_END
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};
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Index: openssl-3.1.4/include/openssl/core_names.h
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-3.1.4.orig/include/openssl/core_names.h
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+++ openssl-3.1.4/include/openssl/core_names.h
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@@ -458,6 +458,7 @@ extern "C" {
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#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES \
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OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES
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#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE
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+#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR "suse-fips-indicator"
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/* Asym cipher parameters */
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#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_DIGEST OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST
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Index: openssl-3.1.4/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-3.1.4.orig/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
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+++ openssl-3.1.4/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
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@@ -696,8 +696,13 @@ static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprs
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size_t rsabits = RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa);
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if (rsabits < 2048) {
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- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_FIPS, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
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- return 0;
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+ if (rsabits != 1024
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+ && rsabits != 1280
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+ && rsabits != 1536
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+ && rsabits != 1792) {
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+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_FIPS, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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}
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# endif
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@@ -792,8 +797,13 @@ static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, co
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size_t rsabits = RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa);
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if (rsabits < 2048) {
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- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_FIPS, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
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- return 0;
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+ if (rsabits != 1024
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+ && rsabits != 1280
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+ && rsabits != 1536
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+ && rsabits != 1792) {
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+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_FIPS, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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}
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# endif
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