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Sync from SUSE:SLFO:Main python-Django revision 2bd7ba1c498ee607b8fe04ff26398472

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Adrian Schröter 2024-09-04 09:08:57 +02:00
parent e1462fda93
commit 237f286c53
20 changed files with 1596 additions and 322 deletions
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121
CVE-2024-27351.patch
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@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
From 2d173757922183f7e9b79d31fd4ccd9086cc6ce2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shai Berger <shai@platonix.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2024 13:56:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] [4.2.x] Fixed CVE-2024-27351 -- Prevented potential ReDoS in
Truncator.words().
Thanks Seokchan Yoon for the report.
Co-Authored-By: Mariusz Felisiak <felisiak.mariusz@gmail.com>
---
django/utils/text.py | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
docs/releases/3.2.25.txt | 8 +++++
docs/releases/4.2.11.txt | 8 +++++
tests/utils_tests/test_text.py | 26 ++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Index: Django-4.2.6/django/utils/text.py
===================================================================
--- Django-4.2.6.orig/django/utils/text.py
+++ Django-4.2.6/django/utils/text.py
@@ -23,8 +23,61 @@ def capfirst(x):
return x[0].upper() + x[1:]
-# Set up regular expressions
-re_words = _lazy_re_compile(r"<[^>]+?>|([^<>\s]+)", re.S)
+# ----- Begin security-related performance workaround -----
+
+# We used to have, below
+#
+# re_words = _lazy_re_compile(r"<[^>]+?>|([^<>\s]+)", re.S)
+#
+# But it was shown that this regex, in the way we use it here, has some
+# catastrophic edge-case performance features. Namely, when it is applied to
+# text with only open brackets "<<<...". The class below provides the services
+# and correct answers for the use cases, but in these edge cases does it much
+# faster.
+re_notag = _lazy_re_compile(r"([^<>\s]+)", re.S)
+re_prt = _lazy_re_compile(r"<|([^<>\s]+)", re.S)
+
+
+class WordsRegex:
+ @staticmethod
+ def search(text, pos):
+ # Look for "<" or a non-tag word.
+ partial = re_prt.search(text, pos)
+ if partial is None or partial[1] is not None:
+ return partial
+
+ # "<" was found, look for a closing ">".
+ end = text.find(">", partial.end(0))
+ if end < 0:
+ # ">" cannot be found, look for a word.
+ return re_notag.search(text, pos + 1)
+ else:
+ # "<" followed by a ">" was found -- fake a match.
+ end += 1
+ return FakeMatch(text[partial.start(0) : end], end)
+
+
+class FakeMatch:
+ __slots__ = ["_text", "_end"]
+
+ def end(self, group=0):
+ assert group == 0, "This specific object takes only group=0"
+ return self._end
+
+ def __getitem__(self, group):
+ if group == 1:
+ return None
+ assert group == 0, "This specific object takes only group in {0,1}"
+ return self._text
+
+ def __init__(self, text, end):
+ self._text, self._end = text, end
+
+
+# ----- End security-related performance workaround -----
+
+# Set up regular expressions.
+re_words = WordsRegex
re_chars = _lazy_re_compile(r"<[^>]+?>|(.)", re.S)
re_tag = _lazy_re_compile(r"<(/)?(\S+?)(?:(\s*/)|\s.*?)?>", re.S)
re_newlines = _lazy_re_compile(r"\r\n|\r") # Used in normalize_newlines
Index: Django-4.2.6/tests/utils_tests/test_text.py
===================================================================
--- Django-4.2.6.orig/tests/utils_tests/test_text.py
+++ Django-4.2.6/tests/utils_tests/test_text.py
@@ -183,6 +183,32 @@ class TestUtilsText(SimpleTestCase):
truncator = text.Truncator("<p>I &lt;3 python, what about you?</p>")
self.assertEqual("<p>I &lt;3 python,…</p>", truncator.words(3, html=True))
+ # Only open brackets.
+ test = "<" * 60_000
+ truncator = text.Truncator(test)
+ self.assertEqual(truncator.words(1, html=True), test)
+
+ # Tags with special chars in attrs.
+ truncator = text.Truncator(
+ """<i style="margin: 5%; font: *;">Hello, my dear lady!</i>"""
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(
+ """<i style="margin: 5%; font: *;">Hello, my dear…</i>""",
+ truncator.words(3, html=True),
+ )
+
+ # Tags with special non-latin chars in attrs.
+ truncator = text.Truncator("""<p data-x="א">Hello, my dear lady!</p>""")
+ self.assertEqual(
+ """<p data-x="א">Hello, my dear…</p>""",
+ truncator.words(3, html=True),
+ )
+
+ # Misplaced brackets.
+ truncator = text.Truncator("hello >< world")
+ self.assertEqual(truncator.words(1, html=True), "hello…")
+ self.assertEqual(truncator.words(2, html=True), "hello >< world")
+
@patch("django.utils.text.Truncator.MAX_LENGTH_HTML", 10_000)
def test_truncate_words_html_size_limit(self):
max_len = text.Truncator.MAX_LENGTH_HTML

164
CVE-2024-38875.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
From 79f368764295df109a37192f6182fb6f361d85b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Adam Johnson <me@adamj.eu>
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2024 15:30:59 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] [4.2.x] Fixed CVE-2024-38875 -- Mitigated potential DoS in
urlize and urlizetrunc template filters.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Thank you to Elias Myllymäki for the report.
Co-authored-by: Sarah Boyce <42296566+sarahboyce@users.noreply.github.com>
---
django/utils/html.py | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
tests/utils_tests/test_html.py | 7 +++
2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/django/utils/html.py b/django/utils/html.py
index fdb88d6709..fd313ff9ca 100644
--- a/django/utils/html.py
+++ b/django/utils/html.py
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from html.parser import HTMLParser
from urllib.parse import parse_qsl, quote, unquote, urlencode, urlsplit, urlunsplit
from django.utils.encoding import punycode
-from django.utils.functional import Promise, keep_lazy, keep_lazy_text
+from django.utils.functional import Promise, cached_property, keep_lazy, keep_lazy_text
from django.utils.http import RFC3986_GENDELIMS, RFC3986_SUBDELIMS
from django.utils.regex_helper import _lazy_re_compile
from django.utils.safestring import SafeData, SafeString, mark_safe
@@ -225,6 +225,16 @@ def smart_urlquote(url):
return urlunsplit((scheme, netloc, path, query, fragment))
+class CountsDict(dict):
+ def __init__(self, *args, word, **kwargs):
+ super().__init__(*args, *kwargs)
+ self.word = word
+
+ def __missing__(self, key):
+ self[key] = self.word.count(key)
+ return self[key]
+
+
class Urlizer:
"""
Convert any URLs in text into clickable links.
@@ -330,40 +340,72 @@ class Urlizer:
return x
return "%s…" % x[: max(0, limit - 1)]
+ @cached_property
+ def wrapping_punctuation_openings(self):
+ return "".join(dict(self.wrapping_punctuation).keys())
+
+ @cached_property
+ def trailing_punctuation_chars_no_semicolon(self):
+ return self.trailing_punctuation_chars.replace(";", "")
+
+ @cached_property
+ def trailing_punctuation_chars_has_semicolon(self):
+ return ";" in self.trailing_punctuation_chars
+
def trim_punctuation(self, word):
"""
Trim trailing and wrapping punctuation from `word`. Return the items of
the new state.
"""
- lead, middle, trail = "", word, ""
+ # Strip all opening wrapping punctuation.
+ middle = word.lstrip(self.wrapping_punctuation_openings)
+ lead = word[: len(word) - len(middle)]
+ trail = ""
+
# Continue trimming until middle remains unchanged.
trimmed_something = True
- while trimmed_something:
+ counts = CountsDict(word=middle)
+ while trimmed_something and middle:
trimmed_something = False
# Trim wrapping punctuation.
for opening, closing in self.wrapping_punctuation:
- if middle.startswith(opening):
- middle = middle[len(opening) :]
- lead += opening
- trimmed_something = True
- # Keep parentheses at the end only if they're balanced.
- if (
- middle.endswith(closing)
- and middle.count(closing) == middle.count(opening) + 1
- ):
- middle = middle[: -len(closing)]
- trail = closing + trail
- trimmed_something = True
- # Trim trailing punctuation (after trimming wrapping punctuation,
- # as encoded entities contain ';'). Unescape entities to avoid
- # breaking them by removing ';'.
- middle_unescaped = html.unescape(middle)
- stripped = middle_unescaped.rstrip(self.trailing_punctuation_chars)
- if middle_unescaped != stripped:
- punctuation_count = len(middle_unescaped) - len(stripped)
- trail = middle[-punctuation_count:] + trail
- middle = middle[:-punctuation_count]
+ if counts[opening] < counts[closing]:
+ rstripped = middle.rstrip(closing)
+ if rstripped != middle:
+ strip = counts[closing] - counts[opening]
+ trail = middle[-strip:]
+ middle = middle[:-strip]
+ trimmed_something = True
+ counts[closing] -= strip
+
+ rstripped = middle.rstrip(self.trailing_punctuation_chars_no_semicolon)
+ if rstripped != middle:
+ trail = middle[len(rstripped) :] + trail
+ middle = rstripped
trimmed_something = True
+
+ if self.trailing_punctuation_chars_has_semicolon and middle.endswith(";"):
+ # Only strip if not part of an HTML entity.
+ amp = middle.rfind("&")
+ if amp == -1:
+ can_strip = True
+ else:
+ potential_entity = middle[amp:]
+ escaped = html.unescape(potential_entity)
+ can_strip = (escaped == potential_entity) or escaped.endswith(";")
+
+ if can_strip:
+ rstripped = middle.rstrip(";")
+ amount_stripped = len(middle) - len(rstripped)
+ if amp > -1 and amount_stripped > 1:
+ # Leave a trailing semicolon as might be an entity.
+ trail = middle[len(rstripped) + 1 :] + trail
+ middle = rstripped + ";"
+ else:
+ trail = middle[len(rstripped) :] + trail
+ middle = rstripped
+ trimmed_something = True
+
return lead, middle, trail
@staticmethod
diff --git a/tests/utils_tests/test_html.py b/tests/utils_tests/test_html.py
index b7a7396075..6dab41634a 100644
--- a/tests/utils_tests/test_html.py
+++ b/tests/utils_tests/test_html.py
@@ -342,6 +342,13 @@ class TestUtilsHtml(SimpleTestCase):
"foo@.example.com",
"foo@localhost",
"foo@localhost.",
+ # trim_punctuation catastrophic tests
+ "(" * 100_000 + ":" + ")" * 100_000,
+ "(" * 100_000 + "&:" + ")" * 100_000,
+ "([" * 100_000 + ":" + "])" * 100_000,
+ "[(" * 100_000 + ":" + ")]" * 100_000,
+ "([[" * 100_000 + ":" + "]])" * 100_000,
+ "&:" + ";" * 100_000,
)
for value in tests:
with self.subTest(value=value):
--
2.45.2

87
CVE-2024-39329.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
From 156d3186c96e3ec2ca73b8b25dc2ef366e38df14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Manfre <mike@manfre.net>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2024 22:12:58 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] [4.2.x] Fixed CVE-2024-39329 -- Standarized timing of
verify_password() when checking unusuable passwords.
Refs #20760.
Thanks Michael Manfre for the fix and to Adam Johnson for the review.
---
django/contrib/auth/hashers.py | 10 ++++++++--
tests/auth_tests/test_hashers.py | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/django/contrib/auth/hashers.py b/django/contrib/auth/hashers.py
index 9db5a12e13..f11bc8a0f3 100644
--- a/django/contrib/auth/hashers.py
+++ b/django/contrib/auth/hashers.py
@@ -43,14 +43,20 @@ def check_password(password, encoded, setter=None, preferred="default"):
If setter is specified, it'll be called when you need to
regenerate the password.
"""
- if password is None or not is_password_usable(encoded):
- return False
+ fake_runtime = password is None or not is_password_usable(encoded)
preferred = get_hasher(preferred)
try:
hasher = identify_hasher(encoded)
except ValueError:
# encoded is gibberish or uses a hasher that's no longer installed.
+ fake_runtime = True
+
+ if fake_runtime:
+ # Run the default password hasher once to reduce the timing difference
+ # between an existing user with an unusable password and a nonexistent
+ # user or missing hasher (similar to #20760).
+ make_password(get_random_string(UNUSABLE_PASSWORD_SUFFIX_LENGTH))
return False
hasher_changed = hasher.algorithm != preferred.algorithm
diff --git a/tests/auth_tests/test_hashers.py b/tests/auth_tests/test_hashers.py
index 36f22d5f09..3da495f2be 100644
--- a/tests/auth_tests/test_hashers.py
+++ b/tests/auth_tests/test_hashers.py
@@ -613,6 +613,38 @@ class TestUtilsHashPass(SimpleTestCase):
check_password("wrong_password", encoded)
self.assertEqual(hasher.harden_runtime.call_count, 1)
+ def test_check_password_calls_make_password_to_fake_runtime(self):
+ hasher = get_hasher("default")
+ cases = [
+ (None, None, None), # no plain text password provided
+ ("foo", make_password(password=None), None), # unusable encoded
+ ("letmein", make_password(password="letmein"), ValueError), # valid encoded
+ ]
+ for password, encoded, hasher_side_effect in cases:
+ with (
+ self.subTest(encoded=encoded),
+ mock.patch(
+ "django.contrib.auth.hashers.identify_hasher",
+ side_effect=hasher_side_effect,
+ ) as mock_identify_hasher,
+ mock.patch(
+ "django.contrib.auth.hashers.make_password"
+ ) as mock_make_password,
+ mock.patch(
+ "django.contrib.auth.hashers.get_random_string",
+ side_effect=lambda size: "x" * size,
+ ),
+ mock.patch.object(hasher, "verify"),
+ ):
+ # Ensure make_password is called to standardize timing.
+ check_password(password, encoded)
+ self.assertEqual(hasher.verify.call_count, 0)
+ self.assertEqual(mock_identify_hasher.mock_calls, [mock.call(encoded)])
+ self.assertEqual(
+ mock_make_password.mock_calls,
+ [mock.call("x" * UNUSABLE_PASSWORD_SUFFIX_LENGTH)],
+ )
+
def test_encode_invalid_salt(self):
hasher_classes = [
MD5PasswordHasher,
--
2.45.2

180
CVE-2024-39330.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
From 2b00edc0151a660d1eb86da4059904a0fc4e095e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Natalia <124304+nessita@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2024 13:55:21 -0300
Subject: [PATCH] [4.2.x] Fixed CVE-2024-39330 -- Added extra file name
validation in Storage's save method.
Thanks to Josh Schneier for the report, and to Carlton Gibson and Sarah
Boyce for the reviews.
---
django/core/files/storage/base.py | 11 +++++
django/core/files/utils.py | 7 ++--
tests/file_storage/test_base.py | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tests/file_storage/tests.py | 11 ++---
tests/file_uploads/tests.py | 2 +-
5 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tests/file_storage/test_base.py
diff --git a/django/core/files/storage/base.py b/django/core/files/storage/base.py
index 16ac22f70a..03a1b44edb 100644
--- a/django/core/files/storage/base.py
+++ b/django/core/files/storage/base.py
@@ -34,7 +34,18 @@ class Storage:
if not hasattr(content, "chunks"):
content = File(content, name)
+ # Ensure that the name is valid, before and after having the storage
+ # system potentially modifying the name. This duplicates the check made
+ # inside `get_available_name` but it's necessary for those cases where
+ # `get_available_name` is overriden and validation is lost.
+ validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=True)
+
+ # Potentially find a different name depending on storage constraints.
name = self.get_available_name(name, max_length=max_length)
+ # Validate the (potentially) new name.
+ validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=True)
+
+ # The save operation should return the actual name of the file saved.
name = self._save(name, content)
# Ensure that the name returned from the storage system is still valid.
validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=True)
diff --git a/django/core/files/utils.py b/django/core/files/utils.py
index 85342b2f3f..11e4f07724 100644
--- a/django/core/files/utils.py
+++ b/django/core/files/utils.py
@@ -10,10 +10,9 @@ def validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=False):
raise SuspiciousFileOperation("Could not derive file name from '%s'" % name)
if allow_relative_path:
- # Use PurePosixPath() because this branch is checked only in
- # FileField.generate_filename() where all file paths are expected to be
- # Unix style (with forward slashes).
- path = pathlib.PurePosixPath(name)
+ # Ensure that name can be treated as a pure posix path, i.e. Unix
+ # style (with forward slashes).
+ path = pathlib.PurePosixPath(str(name).replace("\\", "/"))
if path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts:
raise SuspiciousFileOperation(
"Detected path traversal attempt in '%s'" % name
diff --git a/tests/file_storage/test_base.py b/tests/file_storage/test_base.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c5338b8e66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/file_storage/test_base.py
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+import os
+from unittest import mock
+
+from django.core.exceptions import SuspiciousFileOperation
+from django.core.files.storage import Storage
+from django.test import SimpleTestCase
+
+
+class CustomStorage(Storage):
+ """Simple Storage subclass implementing the bare minimum for testing."""
+
+ def exists(self, name):
+ return False
+
+ def _save(self, name):
+ return name
+
+
+class StorageValidateFileNameTests(SimpleTestCase):
+ invalid_file_names = [
+ os.path.join("path", "to", os.pardir, "test.file"),
+ os.path.join(os.path.sep, "path", "to", "test.file"),
+ ]
+ error_msg = "Detected path traversal attempt in '%s'"
+
+ def test_validate_before_get_available_name(self):
+ s = CustomStorage()
+ # The initial name passed to `save` is not valid nor safe, fail early.
+ for name in self.invalid_file_names:
+ with (
+ self.subTest(name=name),
+ mock.patch.object(s, "get_available_name") as mock_get_available_name,
+ mock.patch.object(s, "_save") as mock_internal_save,
+ ):
+ with self.assertRaisesMessage(
+ SuspiciousFileOperation, self.error_msg % name
+ ):
+ s.save(name, content="irrelevant")
+ self.assertEqual(mock_get_available_name.mock_calls, [])
+ self.assertEqual(mock_internal_save.mock_calls, [])
+
+ def test_validate_after_get_available_name(self):
+ s = CustomStorage()
+ # The initial name passed to `save` is valid and safe, but the returned
+ # name from `get_available_name` is not.
+ for name in self.invalid_file_names:
+ with (
+ self.subTest(name=name),
+ mock.patch.object(s, "get_available_name", return_value=name),
+ mock.patch.object(s, "_save") as mock_internal_save,
+ ):
+ with self.assertRaisesMessage(
+ SuspiciousFileOperation, self.error_msg % name
+ ):
+ s.save("valid-file-name.txt", content="irrelevant")
+ self.assertEqual(mock_internal_save.mock_calls, [])
+
+ def test_validate_after_internal_save(self):
+ s = CustomStorage()
+ # The initial name passed to `save` is valid and safe, but the result
+ # from `_save` is not (this is achieved by monkeypatching _save).
+ for name in self.invalid_file_names:
+ with (
+ self.subTest(name=name),
+ mock.patch.object(s, "_save", return_value=name),
+ ):
+ with self.assertRaisesMessage(
+ SuspiciousFileOperation, self.error_msg % name
+ ):
+ s.save("valid-file-name.txt", content="irrelevant")
diff --git a/tests/file_storage/tests.py b/tests/file_storage/tests.py
index 7fb57fbce4..44bea8c180 100644
--- a/tests/file_storage/tests.py
+++ b/tests/file_storage/tests.py
@@ -342,22 +342,17 @@ class FileStorageTests(SimpleTestCase):
self.storage.delete("path/to/test.file")
- def test_file_save_abs_path(self):
- test_name = "path/to/test.file"
- f = ContentFile("file saved with path")
- f_name = self.storage.save(os.path.join(self.temp_dir, test_name), f)
- self.assertEqual(f_name, test_name)
-
@unittest.skipUnless(
symlinks_supported(), "Must be able to symlink to run this test."
)
def test_file_save_broken_symlink(self):
"""A new path is created on save when a broken symlink is supplied."""
nonexistent_file_path = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "nonexistent.txt")
- broken_symlink_path = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "symlink.txt")
+ broken_symlink_file_name = "symlink.txt"
+ broken_symlink_path = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, broken_symlink_file_name)
os.symlink(nonexistent_file_path, broken_symlink_path)
f = ContentFile("some content")
- f_name = self.storage.save(broken_symlink_path, f)
+ f_name = self.storage.save(broken_symlink_file_name, f)
self.assertIs(os.path.exists(os.path.join(self.temp_dir, f_name)), True)
def test_save_doesnt_close(self):
diff --git a/tests/file_uploads/tests.py b/tests/file_uploads/tests.py
index 693efc4c62..24c703a309 100644
--- a/tests/file_uploads/tests.py
+++ b/tests/file_uploads/tests.py
@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ class DirectoryCreationTests(SimpleTestCase):
default_storage.delete(UPLOAD_TO)
# Create a file with the upload directory name
with SimpleUploadedFile(UPLOAD_TO, b"x") as file:
- default_storage.save(UPLOAD_TO, file)
+ default_storage.save(UPLOAD_FOLDER, file)
self.addCleanup(default_storage.delete, UPLOAD_TO)
msg = "%s exists and is not a directory." % UPLOAD_TO
with self.assertRaisesMessage(FileExistsError, msg):
--
2.45.2

135
CVE-2024-39614.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
From 17358fb35fb7217423d4c4877ccb6d1a3a40b1c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sarah Boyce <42296566+sarahboyce@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2024 12:11:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] [4.2.x] Fixed CVE-2024-39614 -- Mitigated potential DoS in
get_supported_language_variant().
Language codes are now parsed with a maximum length limit of 500 chars.
Thanks to MProgrammer for the report.
---
django/utils/translation/trans_real.py | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
docs/ref/utils.txt | 10 ++++++++++
tests/i18n/tests.py | 11 +++++++++++
3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/django/utils/translation/trans_real.py b/django/utils/translation/trans_real.py
index 872c80b00f..ce13d1e69c 100644
--- a/django/utils/translation/trans_real.py
+++ b/django/utils/translation/trans_real.py
@@ -31,9 +31,10 @@ _default = None
CONTEXT_SEPARATOR = "\x04"
# Maximum number of characters that will be parsed from the Accept-Language
-# header to prevent possible denial of service or memory exhaustion attacks.
-# About 10x longer than the longest value shown on MDN’s Accept-Language page.
-ACCEPT_LANGUAGE_HEADER_MAX_LENGTH = 500
+# header or cookie to prevent possible denial of service or memory exhaustion
+# attacks. About 10x longer than the longest value shown on MDN’s
+# Accept-Language page.
+LANGUAGE_CODE_MAX_LENGTH = 500
# Format of Accept-Language header values. From RFC 9110 Sections 12.4.2 and
# 12.5.4, and RFC 5646 Section 2.1.
@@ -497,11 +498,25 @@ def get_supported_language_variant(lang_code, strict=False):
If `strict` is False (the default), look for a country-specific variant
when neither the language code nor its generic variant is found.
+ The language code is truncated to a maximum length to avoid potential
+ denial of service attacks.
+
lru_cache should have a maxsize to prevent from memory exhaustion attacks,
as the provided language codes are taken from the HTTP request. See also
<https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2007/oct/26/security-fix/>.
"""
if lang_code:
+ # Truncate the language code to a maximum length to avoid potential
+ # denial of service attacks.
+ if len(lang_code) > LANGUAGE_CODE_MAX_LENGTH:
+ if (
+ not strict
+ and (index := lang_code.rfind("-", 0, LANGUAGE_CODE_MAX_LENGTH)) > 0
+ ):
+ # There is a generic variant under the maximum length accepted length.
+ lang_code = lang_code[:index]
+ else:
+ raise ValueError("'lang_code' exceeds the maximum accepted length")
# If 'zh-hant-tw' is not supported, try special fallback or subsequent
# language codes i.e. 'zh-hant' and 'zh'.
possible_lang_codes = [lang_code]
@@ -625,13 +640,13 @@ def parse_accept_lang_header(lang_string):
functools.lru_cache() to avoid repetitive parsing of common header values.
"""
# If the header value doesn't exceed the maximum allowed length, parse it.
- if len(lang_string) <= ACCEPT_LANGUAGE_HEADER_MAX_LENGTH:
+ if len(lang_string) <= LANGUAGE_CODE_MAX_LENGTH:
return _parse_accept_lang_header(lang_string)
# If there is at least one comma in the value, parse up to the last comma
# before the max length, skipping any truncated parts at the end of the
# header value.
- if (index := lang_string.rfind(",", 0, ACCEPT_LANGUAGE_HEADER_MAX_LENGTH)) > 0:
+ if (index := lang_string.rfind(",", 0, LANGUAGE_CODE_MAX_LENGTH)) > 0:
return _parse_accept_lang_header(lang_string[:index])
# Don't attempt to parse if there is only one language-range value which is
diff --git a/docs/ref/utils.txt b/docs/ref/utils.txt
index b2b826684d..471a4b31eb 100644
--- a/docs/ref/utils.txt
+++ b/docs/ref/utils.txt
@@ -1155,6 +1155,11 @@ For a complete discussion on the usage of the following see the
``lang_code`` is ``'es-ar'`` and ``'es'`` is in :setting:`LANGUAGES` but
``'es-ar'`` isn't.
+ ``lang_code`` has a maximum accepted length of 500 characters. A
+ :exc:`ValueError` is raised if ``lang_code`` exceeds this limit and
+ ``strict`` is ``True``, or if there is no generic variant and ``strict``
+ is ``False``.
+
If ``strict`` is ``False`` (the default), a country-specific variant may
be returned when neither the language code nor its generic variant is found.
For example, if only ``'es-co'`` is in :setting:`LANGUAGES`, that's
@@ -1163,6 +1168,11 @@ For a complete discussion on the usage of the following see the
Raises :exc:`LookupError` if nothing is found.
+ .. versionchanged:: 4.2.14
+
+ In older versions, ``lang_code`` values over 500 characters were
+ processed without raising a :exc:`ValueError`.
+
.. function:: to_locale(language)
Turns a language name (en-us) into a locale name (en_US).
diff --git a/tests/i18n/tests.py b/tests/i18n/tests.py
index f517c5eac7..9b029d5992 100644
--- a/tests/i18n/tests.py
+++ b/tests/i18n/tests.py
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ from django.utils.translation.reloader import (
translation_file_changed,
watch_for_translation_changes,
)
+from django.utils.translation.trans_real import LANGUAGE_CODE_MAX_LENGTH
from .forms import CompanyForm, I18nForm, SelectDateForm
from .models import Company, TestModel
@@ -1888,6 +1889,16 @@ class MiscTests(SimpleTestCase):
g("xyz")
with self.assertRaises(LookupError):
g("xy-zz")
+ msg = "'lang_code' exceeds the maximum accepted length"
+ with self.assertRaises(LookupError):
+ g("x" * LANGUAGE_CODE_MAX_LENGTH)
+ with self.assertRaisesMessage(ValueError, msg):
+ g("x" * (LANGUAGE_CODE_MAX_LENGTH + 1))
+ # 167 * 3 = 501 which is LANGUAGE_CODE_MAX_LENGTH + 1.
+ self.assertEqual(g("en-" * 167), "en")
+ with self.assertRaisesMessage(ValueError, msg):
+ g("en-" * 167, strict=True)
+ self.assertEqual(g("en-" * 30000), "en") # catastrophic test
def test_get_supported_language_variant_null(self):
g = trans_null.get_supported_language_variant
--
2.45.2

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@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
From 0521744d21a7854e849336af1e3a3aad44cee017 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sarah Boyce <42296566+sarahboyce@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2024 11:38:34 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] [4.2.x] Fixed CVE-2024-41989 -- Prevented excessive
memory consumption in floatformat.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Thanks Elias Myllymäki for the report.
Co-authored-by: Shai Berger <shai@platonix.com>
---
django/template/defaultfilters.py | 13 +++++++++++++
.../filter_tests/test_floatformat.py | 17 +++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
diff --git a/django/template/defaultfilters.py b/django/template/defaultfilters.py
index d446b54ade..3f89eba6bb 100644
--- a/django/template/defaultfilters.py
+++ b/django/template/defaultfilters.py
@@ -163,6 +163,19 @@ def floatformat(text, arg=-1):
except ValueError:
return input_val
+ _, digits, exponent = d.as_tuple()
+ try:
+ number_of_digits_and_exponent_sum = len(digits) + abs(exponent)
+ except TypeError:
+ # Exponent values can be "F", "n", "N".
+ number_of_digits_and_exponent_sum = 0
+
+ # Values with more than 200 digits, or with a large exponent, are returned "as is"
+ # to avoid high memory consumption and potential denial-of-service attacks.
+ # The cut-off of 200 is consistent with django.utils.numberformat.floatformat().
+ if number_of_digits_and_exponent_sum > 200:
+ return input_val
+
try:
m = int(d) - d
except (ValueError, OverflowError, InvalidOperation):
diff --git a/tests/template_tests/filter_tests/test_floatformat.py b/tests/template_tests/filter_tests/test_floatformat.py
index db17622309..c22b5dca6b 100644
--- a/tests/template_tests/filter_tests/test_floatformat.py
+++ b/tests/template_tests/filter_tests/test_floatformat.py
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ class FunctionTests(SimpleTestCase):
self.assertEqual(floatformat(1.5e-15, 20), "0.00000000000000150000")
self.assertEqual(floatformat(1.5e-15, -20), "0.00000000000000150000")
self.assertEqual(floatformat(1.00000000000000015, 16), "1.0000000000000002")
+ self.assertEqual(floatformat("1e199"), "1" + "0" * 199)
def test_force_grouping(self):
with translation.override("en"):
@@ -134,6 +135,22 @@ class FunctionTests(SimpleTestCase):
self.assertEqual(floatformat(pos_inf), "inf")
self.assertEqual(floatformat(neg_inf), "-inf")
self.assertEqual(floatformat(pos_inf / pos_inf), "nan")
+ self.assertEqual(floatformat("inf"), "inf")
+ self.assertEqual(floatformat("NaN"), "NaN")
+
+ def test_too_many_digits_to_render(self):
+ cases = [
+ "1e200",
+ "1E200",
+ "1E10000000000000000",
+ "-1E10000000000000000",
+ "1e10000000000000000",
+ "-1e10000000000000000",
+ "1" + "0" * 1_000_000,
+ ]
+ for value in cases:
+ with self.subTest(value=value):
+ self.assertEqual(floatformat(value), value)
def test_float_dunder_method(self):
class FloatWrapper:
--
2.34.1

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@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
From 729d7934e34ff91f262f3e7089e32cab701b09ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sarah Boyce <42296566+sarahboyce@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2024 13:19:34 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] [4.2.x] Fixed CVE-2024-41990 -- Mitigated potential DoS
in urlize and urlizetrunc template filters.
Thanks to MProgrammer for the report.
---
django/utils/html.py | 18 ++++++++----------
tests/utils_tests/test_html.py | 2 ++
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/django/utils/html.py b/django/utils/html.py
index fd313ff9ca..dd52f1f7fe 100644
--- a/django/utils/html.py
+++ b/django/utils/html.py
@@ -378,7 +378,11 @@ class Urlizer:
trimmed_something = True
counts[closing] -= strip
- rstripped = middle.rstrip(self.trailing_punctuation_chars_no_semicolon)
+ amp = middle.rfind("&")
+ if amp == -1:
+ rstripped = middle.rstrip(self.trailing_punctuation_chars)
+ else:
+ rstripped = middle.rstrip(self.trailing_punctuation_chars_no_semicolon)
if rstripped != middle:
trail = middle[len(rstripped) :] + trail
middle = rstripped
@@ -386,15 +390,9 @@ class Urlizer:
if self.trailing_punctuation_chars_has_semicolon and middle.endswith(";"):
# Only strip if not part of an HTML entity.
- amp = middle.rfind("&")
- if amp == -1:
- can_strip = True
- else:
- potential_entity = middle[amp:]
- escaped = html.unescape(potential_entity)
- can_strip = (escaped == potential_entity) or escaped.endswith(";")
-
- if can_strip:
+ potential_entity = middle[amp:]
+ escaped = html.unescape(potential_entity)
+ if escaped == potential_entity or escaped.endswith(";"):
rstripped = middle.rstrip(";")
amount_stripped = len(middle) - len(rstripped)
if amp > -1 and amount_stripped > 1:
diff --git a/tests/utils_tests/test_html.py b/tests/utils_tests/test_html.py
index 6dab41634a..c45e0dfac1 100644
--- a/tests/utils_tests/test_html.py
+++ b/tests/utils_tests/test_html.py
@@ -349,6 +349,8 @@ class TestUtilsHtml(SimpleTestCase):
"[(" * 100_000 + ":" + ")]" * 100_000,
"([[" * 100_000 + ":" + "]])" * 100_000,
"&:" + ";" * 100_000,
+ "&.;" * 100_000,
+ ".;" * 100_000,
)
for value in tests:
with self.subTest(value=value):
--
2.34.1

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@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
From 772a73f70c3d249c99c23012849e66276b7b0715 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mariusz Felisiak <felisiak.mariusz@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jul 2024 20:30:12 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] [4.2.x] Fixed CVE-2024-41991 -- Prevented potential ReDoS
in django.utils.html.urlize() and AdminURLFieldWidget.
Thanks Seokchan Yoon for the report.
Co-authored-by: Sarah Boyce <42296566+sarahboyce@users.noreply.github.com>
---
django/contrib/admin/widgets.py | 2 +-
django/utils/html.py | 10 ++++++++--
tests/admin_widgets/tests.py | 7 ++++++-
tests/utils_tests/test_html.py | 13 +++++++++++++
5 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/django/contrib/admin/widgets.py b/django/contrib/admin/widgets.py
index 5e3416bc28..3d11a40efe 100644
--- a/django/contrib/admin/widgets.py
+++ b/django/contrib/admin/widgets.py
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ class AdminURLFieldWidget(forms.URLInput):
context["current_label"] = _("Currently:")
context["change_label"] = _("Change:")
context["widget"]["href"] = (
- smart_urlquote(context["widget"]["value"]) if value else ""
+ smart_urlquote(context["widget"]["value"]) if url_valid else ""
)
context["url_valid"] = url_valid
return context
diff --git a/django/utils/html.py b/django/utils/html.py
index dd52f1f7fe..23575d3c11 100644
--- a/django/utils/html.py
+++ b/django/utils/html.py
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ from django.utils.regex_helper import _lazy_re_compile
from django.utils.safestring import SafeData, SafeString, mark_safe
from django.utils.text import normalize_newlines
+MAX_URL_LENGTH = 2048
+
@keep_lazy(SafeString)
def escape(text):
@@ -300,9 +302,9 @@ class Urlizer:
# Make URL we want to point to.
url = None
nofollow_attr = ' rel="nofollow"' if nofollow else ""
- if self.simple_url_re.match(middle):
+ if len(middle) <= MAX_URL_LENGTH and self.simple_url_re.match(middle):
url = smart_urlquote(html.unescape(middle))
- elif self.simple_url_2_re.match(middle):
+ elif len(middle) <= MAX_URL_LENGTH and self.simple_url_2_re.match(middle):
url = smart_urlquote("http://%s" % html.unescape(middle))
elif ":" not in middle and self.is_email_simple(middle):
local, domain = middle.rsplit("@", 1)
@@ -417,6 +419,10 @@ class Urlizer:
except ValueError:
# value contains more than one @.
return False
+ # Max length for domain name labels is 63 characters per RFC 1034.
+ # Helps to avoid ReDoS vectors in the domain part.
+ if len(p2) > 63:
+ return False
# Dot must be in p2 (e.g. example.com)
if "." not in p2 or p2.startswith("."):
return False
diff --git a/tests/admin_widgets/tests.py b/tests/admin_widgets/tests.py
index 0e20206048..4281ed07c6 100644
--- a/tests/admin_widgets/tests.py
+++ b/tests/admin_widgets/tests.py
@@ -461,7 +461,12 @@ class AdminSplitDateTimeWidgetTest(SimpleTestCase):
class AdminURLWidgetTest(SimpleTestCase):
def test_get_context_validates_url(self):
w = widgets.AdminURLFieldWidget()
- for invalid in ["", "/not/a/full/url/", 'javascript:alert("Danger XSS!")']:
+ for invalid in [
+ "",
+ "/not/a/full/url/",
+ 'javascript:alert("Danger XSS!")',
+ "http://" + "한.글." * 1_000_000 + "com",
+ ]:
with self.subTest(url=invalid):
self.assertFalse(w.get_context("name", invalid, {})["url_valid"])
self.assertTrue(w.get_context("name", "http://example.com", {})["url_valid"])
diff --git a/tests/utils_tests/test_html.py b/tests/utils_tests/test_html.py
index c45e0dfac1..83ebe4334b 100644
--- a/tests/utils_tests/test_html.py
+++ b/tests/utils_tests/test_html.py
@@ -328,6 +328,15 @@ class TestUtilsHtml(SimpleTestCase):
'Search for <a href="http://google.com/?q=">google.com/?q=</a>!',
),
("foo@example.com", '<a href="mailto:foo@example.com">foo@example.com</a>'),
+ (
+ "test@" + "한.글." * 15 + "aaa",
+ '<a href="mailto:test@'
+ + "xn--6q8b.xn--bj0b." * 15
+ + 'aaa">'
+ + "test@"
+ + "한.글." * 15
+ + "aaa</a>",
+ ),
)
for value, output in tests:
with self.subTest(value=value):
@@ -336,6 +345,10 @@ class TestUtilsHtml(SimpleTestCase):
def test_urlize_unchanged_inputs(self):
tests = (
("a" + "@a" * 50000) + "a", # simple_email_re catastrophic test
+ # Unicode domain catastrophic tests.
+ "a@" + "한.글." * 1_000_000 + "a",
+ "http://" + "한.글." * 1_000_000 + "com",
+ "www." + "한.글." * 1_000_000 + "com",
("a" + "." * 1000000) + "a", # trailing_punctuation catastrophic test
"foo@",
"@foo.com",
--
2.34.1

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@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
From b6de28f897709ee5d94ca2da21bcc98f9dade01c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon Charette <charette.s@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2024 18:19:13 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] [4.2.x] Fixed CVE-2024-42005 -- Mitigated
QuerySet.values() SQL injection attacks against JSON fields.
Thanks Eyal (eyalgabay) for the report.
---
django/db/models/sql/query.py | 2 ++
tests/expressions/models.py | 7 +++++++
tests/expressions/test_queryset_values.py | 17 +++++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/django/db/models/sql/query.py b/django/db/models/sql/query.py
index f98c6c668b..e68fd9efb7 100644
--- a/django/db/models/sql/query.py
+++ b/django/db/models/sql/query.py
@@ -2415,6 +2415,8 @@ class Query(BaseExpression):
self.has_select_fields = True
if fields:
+ for field in fields:
+ self.check_alias(field)
field_names = []
extra_names = []
annotation_names = []
diff --git a/tests/expressions/models.py b/tests/expressions/models.py
index 0a8a0a6584..6b21e9ccf3 100644
--- a/tests/expressions/models.py
+++ b/tests/expressions/models.py
@@ -106,3 +106,10 @@ class UUIDPK(models.Model):
class UUID(models.Model):
uuid = models.UUIDField(null=True)
uuid_fk = models.ForeignKey(UUIDPK, models.CASCADE, null=True)
+
+
+class JSONFieldModel(models.Model):
+ data = models.JSONField(null=True)
+
+ class Meta:
+ required_db_features = {"supports_json_field"}
diff --git a/tests/expressions/test_queryset_values.py b/tests/expressions/test_queryset_values.py
index 80addef37b..47bd1358de 100644
--- a/tests/expressions/test_queryset_values.py
+++ b/tests/expressions/test_queryset_values.py
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
from django.db.models import F, Sum
-from django.test import TestCase
+from django.test import TestCase, skipUnlessDBFeature
-from .models import Company, Employee
+from .models import Company, Employee, JSONFieldModel
class ValuesExpressionsTests(TestCase):
@@ -43,6 +43,19 @@ class ValuesExpressionsTests(TestCase):
with self.assertRaisesMessage(ValueError, msg):
Company.objects.values(**{crafted_alias: F("ceo__salary")})
+ @skipUnlessDBFeature("supports_json_field")
+ def test_values_expression_alias_sql_injection_json_field(self):
+ crafted_alias = """injected_name" from "expressions_company"; --"""
+ msg = (
+ "Column aliases cannot contain whitespace characters, quotation marks, "
+ "semicolons, or SQL comments."
+ )
+ with self.assertRaisesMessage(ValueError, msg):
+ JSONFieldModel.objects.values(f"data__{crafted_alias}")
+
+ with self.assertRaisesMessage(ValueError, msg):
+ JSONFieldModel.objects.values_list(f"data__{crafted_alias}")
+
def test_values_expression_group_by(self):
# values() applies annotate() first, so values selected are grouped by
# id, not firstname.
--
2.34.1

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@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
From 65a776dd25b657cc32edafaad98d91aa0b51e641 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sarah Boyce <42296566+sarahboyce@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2024 15:17:57 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] [4.2.x] Fixed CVE-2024-45230 -- Mitigated potential DoS
in urlize and urlizetrunc template filters.
Thanks MProgrammer (https://hackerone.com/mprogrammer) for the report.
---
django/utils/html.py | 17 ++++++++------
docs/ref/templates/builtins.txt | 11 ++++++++++
docs/releases/4.2.16.txt | 15 +++++++++++++
docs/releases/index.txt | 1 +
.../filter_tests/test_urlize.py | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
tests/utils_tests/test_html.py | 1 +
6 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 docs/releases/4.2.16.txt
Index: Django-4.2.11/django/utils/html.py
===================================================================
--- Django-4.2.11.orig/django/utils/html.py
+++ Django-4.2.11/django/utils/html.py
@@ -395,14 +395,17 @@ class Urlizer:
potential_entity = middle[amp:]
escaped = html.unescape(potential_entity)
if escaped == potential_entity or escaped.endswith(";"):
- rstripped = middle.rstrip(";")
- amount_stripped = len(middle) - len(rstripped)
- if amp > -1 and amount_stripped > 1:
- # Leave a trailing semicolon as might be an entity.
- trail = middle[len(rstripped) + 1 :] + trail
- middle = rstripped + ";"
+ rstripped = middle.rstrip(self.trailing_punctuation_chars)
+ trail_start = len(rstripped)
+ amount_trailing_semicolons = len(middle) - len(middle.rstrip(";"))
+ if amp > -1 and amount_trailing_semicolons > 1:
+ # Leave up to most recent semicolon as might be an entity.
+ recent_semicolon = middle[trail_start:].index(";")
+ middle_semicolon_index = recent_semicolon + trail_start + 1
+ trail = middle[middle_semicolon_index:] + trail
+ middle = rstripped + middle[trail_start:middle_semicolon_index]
else:
- trail = middle[len(rstripped) :] + trail
+ trail = middle[trail_start:] + trail
middle = rstripped
trimmed_something = True
Index: Django-4.2.11/docs/ref/templates/builtins.txt
===================================================================
--- Django-4.2.11.orig/docs/ref/templates/builtins.txt
+++ Django-4.2.11/docs/ref/templates/builtins.txt
@@ -2831,6 +2831,17 @@ Django's built-in :tfilter:`escape` filt
email addresses that contain single quotes (``'``), things won't work as
expected. Apply this filter only to plain text.
+.. warning::
+
+ Using ``urlize`` or ``urlizetrunc`` can incur a performance penalty, which
+ can become severe when applied to user controlled values such as content
+ stored in a :class:`~django.db.models.TextField`. You can use
+ :tfilter:`truncatechars` to add a limit to such inputs:
+
+ .. code-block:: html+django
+
+ {{ value|truncatechars:500|urlize }}
+
.. templatefilter:: urlizetrunc
``urlizetrunc``
Index: Django-4.2.11/docs/releases/4.2.16.txt
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ Django-4.2.11/docs/releases/4.2.16.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+===========================
+Django 4.2.16 release notes
+===========================
+
+*September 3, 2024*
+
+Django 4.2.16 fixes one security issue with severity "moderate" and one
+security issues with severity "low" in 4.2.15.
+
+CVE-2024-45230: Potential denial-of-service vulnerability in ``django.utils.html.urlize()``
+===========================================================================================
+
+:tfilter:`urlize` and :tfilter:`urlizetrunc` were subject to a potential
+denial-of-service attack via very large inputs with a specific sequence of
+characters.
Index: Django-4.2.11/tests/template_tests/filter_tests/test_urlize.py
===================================================================
--- Django-4.2.11.orig/tests/template_tests/filter_tests/test_urlize.py
+++ Django-4.2.11/tests/template_tests/filter_tests/test_urlize.py
@@ -305,6 +305,28 @@ class FunctionTests(SimpleTestCase):
"http://testing.com/example</a>.,:;)&quot;!",
)
+ def test_trailing_semicolon(self):
+ self.assertEqual(
+ urlize("http://example.com?x=&amp;", autoescape=False),
+ '<a href="http://example.com?x=" rel="nofollow">'
+ "http://example.com?x=&amp;</a>",
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(
+ urlize("http://example.com?x=&amp;;", autoescape=False),
+ '<a href="http://example.com?x=" rel="nofollow">'
+ "http://example.com?x=&amp;</a>;",
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(
+ urlize("http://example.com?x=&amp;;;", autoescape=False),
+ '<a href="http://example.com?x=" rel="nofollow">'
+ "http://example.com?x=&amp;</a>;;",
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(
+ urlize("http://example.com?x=&amp.;...;", autoescape=False),
+ '<a href="http://example.com?x=" rel="nofollow">'
+ "http://example.com?x=&amp</a>.;...;",
+ )
+
def test_brackets(self):
"""
#19070 - Check urlize handles brackets properly
Index: Django-4.2.11/tests/utils_tests/test_html.py
===================================================================
--- Django-4.2.11.orig/tests/utils_tests/test_html.py
+++ Django-4.2.11/tests/utils_tests/test_html.py
@@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ class TestUtilsHtml(SimpleTestCase):
"&:" + ";" * 100_000,
"&.;" * 100_000,
".;" * 100_000,
+ "&" + ";:" * 100_000,
)
for value in tests:
with self.subTest(value=value):

159
CVE-2024-45231.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
From fe42da9cdacd9f43fb0d499244314c36f9a11a19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Natalia <124304+nessita@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2024 14:47:38 -0300
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] [4.2.x] Fixed CVE-2024-45231 -- Avoided server error on
password reset when email sending fails.
On successful submission of a password reset request, an email is sent
to the accounts known to the system. If sending this email fails (due to
email backend misconfiguration, service provider outage, network issues,
etc.), an attacker might exploit this by detecting which password reset
requests succeed and which ones generate a 500 error response.
Thanks to Thibaut Spriet for the report, and to Mariusz Felisiak and
Sarah Boyce for the reviews.
---
django/contrib/auth/forms.py | 9 ++++++++-
docs/ref/logging.txt | 12 ++++++++++++
docs/releases/4.2.16.txt | 11 +++++++++++
docs/topics/auth/default.txt | 4 +++-
tests/auth_tests/test_forms.py | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
tests/mail/custombackend.py | 5 +++++
6 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/django/contrib/auth/forms.py b/django/contrib/auth/forms.py
index 061dc81b42..20ce1ba39c 100644
--- a/django/contrib/auth/forms.py
+++ b/django/contrib/auth/forms.py
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import logging
import unicodedata
from django import forms
@@ -16,6 +17,7 @@ from django.utils.translation import gettext
from django.utils.translation import gettext_lazy as _
UserModel = get_user_model()
+logger = logging.getLogger("django.contrib.auth")
def _unicode_ci_compare(s1, s2):
@@ -314,7 +316,12 @@ class PasswordResetForm(forms.Form):
html_email = loader.render_to_string(html_email_template_name, context)
email_message.attach_alternative(html_email, "text/html")
- email_message.send()
+ try:
+ email_message.send()
+ except Exception:
+ logger.exception(
+ "Failed to send password reset email to %s:", context["user"].pk
+ )
def get_users(self, email):
"""Given an email, return matching user(s) who should receive a reset.
diff --git a/docs/ref/logging.txt b/docs/ref/logging.txt
index b11fb752f7..3d33e0af63 100644
--- a/docs/ref/logging.txt
+++ b/docs/ref/logging.txt
@@ -204,6 +204,18 @@ all database queries.
Support for logging transaction management queries (``BEGIN``, ``COMMIT``,
and ``ROLLBACK``) was added.
+.. _django-contrib-auth-logger:
+
+``django.contrib.auth``
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+.. versionadded:: 4.2.16
+
+Log messages related to :doc:`contrib/auth`, particularly ``ERROR`` messages
+are generated when a :class:`~django.contrib.auth.forms.PasswordResetForm` is
+successfully submitted but the password reset email cannot be delivered due to
+a mail sending exception.
+
.. _django-security-logger:
``django.security.*``
diff --git a/docs/releases/4.2.16.txt b/docs/releases/4.2.16.txt
index 043041a97f..4e632d5d77 100644
--- a/docs/releases/4.2.16.txt
+++ b/docs/releases/4.2.16.txt
@@ -13,3 +13,14 @@ CVE-2024-45230: Potential denial-of-service vulnerability in ``django.utils.html
:tfilter:`urlize` and :tfilter:`urlizetrunc` were subject to a potential
denial-of-service attack via very large inputs with a specific sequence of
characters.
+
+CVE-2024-45231: Potential user email enumeration via response status on password reset
+======================================================================================
+
+Due to unhandled email sending failures, the
+:class:`~django.contrib.auth.forms.PasswordResetForm` class allowed remote
+attackers to enumerate user emails by issuing password reset requests and
+observing the outcomes.
+
+To mitigate this risk, exceptions occurring during password reset email sending
+are now handled and logged using the :ref:`django-contrib-auth-logger` logger.
diff --git a/docs/topics/auth/default.txt b/docs/topics/auth/default.txt
index 528902416d..ad840c5e57 100644
--- a/docs/topics/auth/default.txt
+++ b/docs/topics/auth/default.txt
@@ -1661,7 +1661,9 @@ provides several built-in forms located in :mod:`django.contrib.auth.forms`:
.. method:: send_mail(subject_template_name, email_template_name, context, from_email, to_email, html_email_template_name=None)
Uses the arguments to send an ``EmailMultiAlternatives``.
- Can be overridden to customize how the email is sent to the user.
+ Can be overridden to customize how the email is sent to the user. If
+ you choose to override this method, be mindful of handling potential
+ exceptions raised due to email sending failures.
:param subject_template_name: the template for the subject.
:param email_template_name: the template for the email body.
diff --git a/tests/auth_tests/test_forms.py b/tests/auth_tests/test_forms.py
index 81c56a428e..ccb1a26a2b 100644
--- a/tests/auth_tests/test_forms.py
+++ b/tests/auth_tests/test_forms.py
@@ -1245,6 +1245,27 @@ class PasswordResetFormTest(TestDataMixin, TestCase):
)
)
+ @override_settings(EMAIL_BACKEND="mail.custombackend.FailingEmailBackend")
+ def test_save_send_email_exceptions_are_catched_and_logged(self):
+ (user, username, email) = self.create_dummy_user()
+ form = PasswordResetForm({"email": email})
+ self.assertTrue(form.is_valid())
+
+ with self.assertLogs("django.contrib.auth", level=0) as cm:
+ form.save()
+
+ self.assertEqual(len(mail.outbox), 0)
+ self.assertEqual(len(cm.output), 1)
+ errors = cm.output[0].split("\n")
+ pk = user.pk
+ self.assertEqual(
+ errors[0],
+ f"ERROR:django.contrib.auth:Failed to send password reset email to {pk}:",
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(
+ errors[-1], "ValueError: FailingEmailBackend is doomed to fail."
+ )
+
@override_settings(AUTH_USER_MODEL="auth_tests.CustomEmailField")
def test_custom_email_field(self):
email = "test@mail.com"
diff --git a/tests/mail/custombackend.py b/tests/mail/custombackend.py
index 14e7f077ba..c6c567b642 100644
--- a/tests/mail/custombackend.py
+++ b/tests/mail/custombackend.py
@@ -12,3 +12,8 @@ class EmailBackend(BaseEmailBackend):
# Messages are stored in an instance variable for testing.
self.test_outbox.extend(email_messages)
return len(email_messages)
+
+
+class FailingEmailBackend(BaseEmailBackend):
+ def send_messages(self, email_messages):
+ raise ValueError("FailingEmailBackend is doomed to fail.")
--
2.46.0

67
Django-4.2.11.checksum.txt Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
This file contains MD5, SHA1, and SHA256 checksums for the source-code
tarball and wheel files of Django 4.2.11, released March 4, 2024.
To use this file, you will need a working install of PGP or other
compatible public-key encryption software. You will also need to have
the Django release manager's public key in your keyring. This key has
the ID ``2EF56372BA48CD1B`` and can be imported from the MIT
keyserver, for example, if using the open-source GNU Privacy Guard
implementation of PGP:
gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --recv-key 2EF56372BA48CD1B
or via the GitHub API:
curl https://github.com/felixxm.gpg | gpg --import -
Once the key is imported, verify this file:
gpg --verify Django-4.2.11.checksum.txt
Once you have verified this file, you can use normal MD5, SHA1, or SHA256
checksumming applications to generate the checksums of the Django
package and compare them to the checksums listed below.
Release packages
================
https://www.djangoproject.com/m/releases/4.2/Django-4.2.11-py3-none-any.whl
https://www.djangoproject.com/m/releases/4.2/Django-4.2.11.tar.gz
MD5 checksums
=============
5ac62cf0d75216275a8d5f3b9a87b7a1 Django-4.2.11-py3-none-any.whl
33dc961e25b6ed54e22b62726b334d4d Django-4.2.11.tar.gz
SHA1 checksums
==============
69943b2e90d352cd8d536f34a0cd38dc3d3026be Django-4.2.11-py3-none-any.whl
fda76a55736054cb5aafb73d2caa3f2d47765f9f Django-4.2.11.tar.gz
SHA256 checksums
================
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6e6ff3db2d8dd0c986b4eec8554c8e4f919b5c1ff62a5b4390c17aff2ed6e5c4 Django-4.2.11.tar.gz
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67
Django-4.2.6.checksum.txt
View File

@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
This file contains MD5, SHA1, and SHA256 checksums for the source-code
tarball and wheel files of Django 4.2.6, released October 4, 2023.
To use this file, you will need a working install of PGP or other
compatible public-key encryption software. You will also need to have
the Django release manager's public key in your keyring. This key has
the ID ``2EE82A8D9470983E`` and can be imported from the MIT
keyserver, for example, if using the open-source GNU Privacy Guard
implementation of PGP:
gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --recv-key 2EE82A8D9470983E
or via the GitHub API:
curl https://github.com/nessita.gpg | gpg --import -
Once the key is imported, verify this file:
gpg --verify Django-4.2.6.checksum.txt
Once you have verified this file, you can use normal MD5, SHA1, or SHA256
checksumming applications to generate the checksums of the Django
package and compare them to the checksums listed below.
Release packages
================
https://www.djangoproject.com/m/releases/4.2/Django-4.2.6-py3-none-any.whl
https://www.djangoproject.com/m/releases/4.2/Django-4.2.6.tar.gz
MD5 checksums
=============
db83d48600d6afff838e53f42f9ebebb Django-4.2.6-py3-none-any.whl
ad84c2b9bbebaa26427a2a656fe5ceea Django-4.2.6.tar.gz
SHA1 checksums
==============
36650eb323bd34afbe47936bd3e7bf62ed4d929c Django-4.2.6-py3-none-any.whl
6e912eeabd1df0b652e0da44cd3a556a496a1811 Django-4.2.6.tar.gz
SHA256 checksums
================
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08f41f468b63335aea0d904c5729e0250300f6a1907bf293a65499496cdbc68f Django-4.2.6.tar.gz
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25
dirty-hack-remove-assert.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
From 36736edaf595d2bbf1fe881609b2a4c8e3bac68a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Miro=20Hron=C4=8Dok?= <miro@hroncok.cz>
Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2023 12:29:21 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Dirty hack: Remove a failing assert, failure does not seem
critical
---
tests/settings_tests/tests.py | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tests/settings_tests/tests.py b/tests/settings_tests/tests.py
index 62cbffb..b7432d3 100644
--- a/tests/settings_tests/tests.py
+++ b/tests/settings_tests/tests.py
@@ -397,7 +397,6 @@ class TestComplexSettingOverride(SimpleTestCase):
with self.assertWarnsMessage(UserWarning, msg) as cm:
with override_settings(TEST_WARN="override"):
self.assertEqual(settings.TEST_WARN, "override")
- self.assertEqual(cm.filename, __file__)
class SecureProxySslHeaderTest(SimpleTestCase):
--
2.40.1

14
fix-safemimetext-set_payload.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
Index: Django-4.2.11/django/core/mail/message.py
===================================================================
--- Django-4.2.11.orig/django/core/mail/message.py
+++ Django-4.2.11/django/core/mail/message.py
@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ class SafeMIMEText(MIMEMixin, MIMEText):
def set_payload(self, payload, charset=None):
if charset == "utf-8" and not isinstance(charset, Charset.Charset):
has_long_lines = any(
- len(line.encode()) > RFC5322_EMAIL_LINE_LENGTH_LIMIT
+ len(line.encode(errors="surrogateescape"))
+ > RFC5322_EMAIL_LINE_LENGTH_LIMIT
for line in payload.splitlines()
)
# Quoted-Printable encoding has the side effect of shortening long

112
python-Django.changes
View File

@ -1,7 +1,112 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Feb 29 13:19:00 UTC 2024 - Alberto Planas Dominguez <aplanas@suse.com>
Mon Sep 2 12:48:52 UTC 2024 - Markéta Machová <mmachova@suse.com>
- Add CVE-2024-27351.patch patch (CVE-2024-27351, bsc#1220358)
- Add more security patches:
* CVE-2024-45230.patch (bsc#1229823)
* CVE-2024-45231.patch (bsc#1229824)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Aug 1 09:37:57 UTC 2024 - Markéta Machová <mmachova@suse.com>
- Add bunch of security patches:
* CVE-2024-42005.patch (bsc#1228629)
* CVE-2024-41989.patch (bsc#1228630)
* CVE-2024-41990.patch (bsc#1228631)
* CVE-2024-41991.patch (bsc#1228632)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Jul 12 12:40:47 UTC 2024 - Nico Krapp <nico.krapp@suse.com>
- Add CVE-2024-38875.patch (bsc#1227590)
* CVE-2024-38875: Potential denial-of-service attack via
certain inputs with a very large number of brackets
- Add CVE-2024-39329.patch (bsc#1227593)
* CVE-2024-39329: Username enumeration through timing difference
for users with unusable passwords
- Add CVE-2024-39330.patch (bsc#1227594)
* CVE-2024-39330: Potential directory traversal in
django.core.files.storage.Storage.save()
- Add CVE-2024-39614.patch (bsc#1227595)
* CVE-2024-39614: Potential denial-of-service through
django.utils.translation.get_supported_language_variant()
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Apr 18 06:39:36 UTC 2024 - Daniel Garcia <daniel.garcia@suse.com>
- Add fix-safemimetext-set_payload.patch, to support python 3.11.9+
(gh#django/django@b231bcd19e57, bsc#1222880)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Mar 4 14:05:28 UTC 2024 - Alberto Planas Dominguez <aplanas@suse.com>
- Update to 4.2.11 (CVE-2024-27351, bsc#1220358)
* CVE-2024-27351: Potential regular expression denial-of-service in
django.utils.text.Truncator.words()
* Fixed a regression in Django 4.2.10 where intcomma template filter
could return a leading comma for string representation of floats
- Remove python3122.patch, already upstream
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Feb 9 10:18:37 UTC 2024 - Daniel Garcia <daniel.garcia@suse.com>
- Add python3122.patch to fix tests with python 3.12.2
gh#django/django#17843
- Update to 4.2.10 (bsc#1219683, CVE-2024-24680):
- Django 4.2.10 fixes a security issue with severity "moderate" in
4.2.9.
CVE-2024-24680: Potential denial-of-service in intcomma template
filter The intcomma template filter was subject to a potential
denial-of-service attack when used with very long strings.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Jan 4 09:27:51 UTC 2024 - Alberto Planas Dominguez <aplanas@suse.com>
- Update to 4.2.9:
* Fixed a regression in Django 4.2.8 where admin fields on the same
line could overflow the page and become non-interactive
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Dec 4 10:21:00 UTC 2023 - Alberto Planas Dominguez <aplanas@suse.com>
- Update to 4.2.8
* Fixed a regression in Django 4.2 that caused makemigrations
--check to stop displaying pending migrations
* Fixed a regression in Django 4.2 that caused a crash of
QuerySet.aggregate() with aggregates referencing other aggregates
or window functions through conditional expressions
* Fixed a regression in Django 4.2 that caused a crash when
annotating a QuerySet with a Window expressions composed of a
partition_by clause mixing field types and aggregation expressions
* Fixed a regression in Django 4.2 where the admin’s change list
page had misaligned pagination links and inputs when using
list_editable
* Fixed a regression in Django 4.2 where checkboxes in the admin
would be centered on narrower screen widths
* Fixed a regression in Django 4.2 that caused a crash of querysets
with aggregations on MariaDB when the ONLY_FULL_GROUP_BY SQL mode
was enabled
* Fixed a regression in Django 4.2 where the admin’s read-only
password widget and some help texts were incorrectly aligned at
tablet widths
* Fixed a regression in Django 4.2 that caused a migration crash on
SQLite when altering unsupported Meta.db_table_comment
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Nov 27 12:20:48 UTC 2023 - Dirk Müller <dmueller@suse.com>
- add dirty-hack-remove-assert.patch from fedora to fix
minor test failure with python 3.12
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Nov 1 08:12:59 UTC 2023 - Alberto Planas Dominguez <aplanas@suse.com>
- Update to 4.2.7
* Fixed a regression in Django 4.2 that caused a crash of
QuerySet.aggregate() with aggregates referencing expressions
containing subqueries
* Restored, following a regression in Django 4.2, creating
varchar/text_pattern_ops indexes on CharField and TextField with
deterministic collations on PostgreSQL
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Oct 16 08:33:05 UTC 2023 - Daniel Garcia Moreno <daniel.garcia@suse.com>
@ -117,7 +222,8 @@ Tue Jun 6 06:35:28 UTC 2023 - Alberto Planas Dominguez <aplanas@suse.com>
Thu May 4 07:02:58 UTC 2023 - Alberto Planas Dominguez <aplanas@suse.com>
- Update to 4.2.1
+ CVE-2023-31047: Potential bypass of validation when uploading multiple files using one form field
+ CVE-2023-31047: Potential bypass of validation when uploading
multiple files using one form field (bsc#1210866)
+ Bugfixes
* Fixed a regression in Django 4.2 that caused a crash of
QuerySet.defer() when deferring fields by attribute names

205
python-Django.keyring
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35
python-Django.spec
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#
# spec file for package python-Django
#
# Copyright (c) 2023 SUSE LLC
# Copyright (c) 2024 SUSE LLC
#
# All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties
# remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed
@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
%{?sle15_python_module_pythons}
Name: python-Django
# We want support LTS versions of Django - numbered 2.2 -> 3.2 -> 4.2 etc
Version: 4.2.6
Version: 4.2.11
Release: 0
Summary: A high-level Python Web framework
License: BSD-3-Clause
@ -34,9 +34,32 @@ Source1: https://media.djangoproject.com/pgp/Django-%{version}.checksum.t
Source2: %{name}.keyring
Source99: python-Django-rpmlintrc
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM https://github.com/django/django/commit/da2f8e8257d1bea4215381684ca4abfcee333c43 Refs #34118 -- Improved sanitize_address() error message for tuple with empty strings.
Patch: sanitize_address.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-27351.patch bsc#1220358
Patch1: CVE-2024-27351.patch
Patch0: sanitize_address.patch
# PATCH-FIX-OPENSUSE: ignore minor failure on Python 3.12
Patch1: dirty-hack-remove-assert.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM: fix-safemimetext-set_payload.patch, gh#django/django@b231bcd19e57
# Add support for python 3.11.9+
Patch2: fix-safemimetext-set_payload.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-38875.patch bsc#1227590
Patch3: CVE-2024-38875.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-39329.patch bsc#1227593
Patch4: CVE-2024-39329.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-39330.patch bsc#1227594
Patch5: CVE-2024-39330.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-39614.patch bsc#1227595
Patch6: CVE-2024-39614.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-41989.patch bsc#1228629
Patch7: CVE-2024-41989.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-41990.patch bsc#1228630
Patch8: CVE-2024-41990.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-41991.patch bsc#1228631
Patch9: CVE-2024-41991.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-42005.patch bsc#1228632
Patch10: CVE-2024-42005.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-45230.patch bsc#1229823
Patch11: CVE-2024-45230.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-45231.patch bsc#1229824
Patch12: CVE-2024-45231.patch
BuildRequires: %{python_module Jinja2 >= 2.9.2}
BuildRequires: %{python_module Pillow >= 6.2.0}
BuildRequires: %{python_module PyYAML}
@ -68,7 +91,7 @@ Requires: python-pytz
Requires: python-setuptools
Requires: python-sqlparse >= 0.3.1
Requires(post): update-alternatives
Requires(postun):update-alternatives
Requires(postun): update-alternatives
Recommends: python-Jinja2 >= 2.9.2
Recommends: python-PyYAML
Recommends: python-geoip2