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xen/66d8690f-SUPPORT-split-XSM-from-Flask.patch

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# Commit d7c18b8720824d7efc39ffa7296751e1812865a9
# Date 2024-09-04 16:05:03 +0200
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
SUPPORT.md: split XSM from Flask
XSM is a generic framework, which in particular is also used by SILO.
With this it can't really be experimental: Arm mandates SILO for having
a security supported configuration.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
--- a/SUPPORT.md
+++ b/SUPPORT.md
@@ -768,13 +768,21 @@ Compile time disabled for ARM by default
Status, x86: Supported, not security supported
-### XSM & FLASK
+### XSM (Xen Security Module) Framework
+
+XSM is a security policy framework. The dummy implementation is covered by this
+statement, and implements a policy whereby dom0 is all powerful. See below for
+alternative modules (FLASK, SILO).
+
+ Status: Supported
+
+### FLASK XSM Module
Status: Experimental
Compile time disabled by default.
-Also note that using XSM
+Also note that using FLASK
to delegate various domain control hypercalls
to particular other domains, rather than only permitting use by dom0,
is also specifically excluded from security support for many hypercalls.
@@ -787,6 +795,13 @@ Please see XSA-77 for more details.
The default policy includes FLASK labels and roles for a "typical" Xen-based system
with dom0, driver domains, stub domains, domUs, and so on.
+### SILO XSM Module
+
+SILO extends the dummy policy by enforcing that DomU-s can only communicate
+with Dom0, yet not with each other.
+
+ Status: Supported
+
## Virtual Hardware, Hypervisor
### x86/Nested PV