Update version for 2.4.0.1 release

Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
net: avoid infinite loop when receiving packets(CVE-2015-5278)
2015-09-22 16:53:29 -05:00 · 2015-09-21 17:04:22 -05:00 · 2015-09-21 17:04:14 -05:00 · 2015-09-21 17:04:05 -05:00 · 2015-09-21 17:03:16 -05:00
4 changed files with 29 additions and 12 deletions
--- a/2
+++ b/2
@@ -1 +1 @@
-2.4.0
+2.4.0.1
--- a/hw/net/e1000.c
+++ b/hw/net/e1000.c
@@ -740,7 +740,8 @@ process_tx_desc(E1000State *s, struct e1000_tx_desc *dp)
                memmove(tp->data, tp->header, tp->hdr_len);
                tp->size = tp->hdr_len;
            }
-        } while (split_size -= bytes);
+            split_size -= bytes;
+        } while (bytes && split_size);
    } else if (!tp->tse && tp->cptse) {
        // context descriptor TSE is not set, while data descriptor TSE is set
        DBGOUT(TXERR, "TCP segmentation error\n");
--- a/hw/net/ne2000.c
+++ b/hw/net/ne2000.c
@@ -230,6 +230,9 @@ ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
    }

    index = s->curpag << 8;
+    if (index >= NE2000_PMEM_END) {
+        index = s->start;
+    }
    /* 4 bytes for header */
    total_len = size + 4;
    /* address for next packet (4 bytes for CRC) */
@@ -253,7 +256,7 @@ ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
        if (index <= s->stop)
            avail = s->stop - index;
        else
-            avail = 0;
+            break;
        len = size;
        if (len > avail)
            len = avail;
@@ -315,13 +318,19 @@ static void ne2000_ioport_write(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val)
        offset = addr | (page << 4);
        switch(offset) {
        case EN0_STARTPG:
+            if (val << 8 <= NE2000_PMEM_END) {
                s->start = val << 8;
+            }
            break;
        case EN0_STOPPG:
+            if (val << 8 <= NE2000_PMEM_END) {
                s->stop = val << 8;
+            }
            break;
        case EN0_BOUNDARY:
+            if (val << 8 < NE2000_PMEM_END) {
                s->boundary = val;
+            }
            break;
        case EN0_IMR:
            s->imr = val;
@@ -362,7 +371,9 @@ static void ne2000_ioport_write(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val)
            s->phys[offset - EN1_PHYS] = val;
            break;
        case EN1_CURPAG:
+            if (val << 8 < NE2000_PMEM_END) {
                s->curpag = val;
+            }
            break;
        case EN1_MULT ... EN1_MULT + 7:
            s->mult[offset - EN1_MULT] = val;
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -2872,7 +2872,7 @@ static int vnc_refresh_server_surface(VncDisplay *vd)
                    pixman_image_get_width(vd->server));
    int height = MIN(pixman_image_get_height(vd->guest.fb),
                     pixman_image_get_height(vd->server));
-    int cmp_bytes, server_stride, min_stride, guest_stride, y = 0;
+    int cmp_bytes, server_stride, line_bytes, guest_ll, guest_stride, y = 0;
    uint8_t *guest_row0 = NULL, *server_row0;
    VncState *vs;
    int has_dirty = 0;
@@ -2891,17 +2891,21 @@ static int vnc_refresh_server_surface(VncDisplay *vd)
     * Update server dirty map.
     */
    server_row0 = (uint8_t *)pixman_image_get_data(vd->server);
-    server_stride = guest_stride = pixman_image_get_stride(vd->server);
+    server_stride = guest_stride = guest_ll =
+        pixman_image_get_stride(vd->server);
    cmp_bytes = MIN(VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES,
                    server_stride);
    if (vd->guest.format != VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT) {
        int width = pixman_image_get_width(vd->server);
        tmpbuf = qemu_pixman_linebuf_create(VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT, width);
    } else {
+        int guest_bpp =
+            PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP(pixman_image_get_format(vd->guest.fb));
        guest_row0 = (uint8_t *)pixman_image_get_data(vd->guest.fb);
        guest_stride = pixman_image_get_stride(vd->guest.fb);
+        guest_ll = pixman_image_get_width(vd->guest.fb) * ((guest_bpp + 7) / 8);
    }
-    min_stride = MIN(server_stride, guest_stride);
+    line_bytes = MIN(server_stride, guest_ll);

    for (;;) {
        int x;
@@ -2932,9 +2936,10 @@ static int vnc_refresh_server_surface(VncDisplay *vd)
            if (!test_and_clear_bit(x, vd->guest.dirty[y])) {
                continue;
            }
-            if ((x + 1) * cmp_bytes > min_stride) {
-                _cmp_bytes = min_stride - x * cmp_bytes;
+            if ((x + 1) * cmp_bytes > line_bytes) {
+                _cmp_bytes = line_bytes - x * cmp_bytes;
            }
+            assert(_cmp_bytes >= 0);
            if (memcmp(server_ptr, guest_ptr, _cmp_bytes) == 0) {
                continue;
            }
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Michael Roth	83c92b4514	Update version for 2.4.0.1 release Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>	2015-09-22 16:53:29 -05:00
P J P	5a1ccdfe44	net: avoid infinite loop when receiving packets(CVE-2015-5278) Ne2000 NIC uses ring buffer of NE2000_MEM_SIZE(49152) bytes to process network packets. While receiving packets via ne2000_receive() routine, a local 'index' variable could exceed the ring buffer size, leading to an infinite loop situation. Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <luodalongde@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: P J P <pjp@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit `737d2b3c41`) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>	2015-09-21 17:04:22 -05:00
P J P	7aa2bcad0c	net: add checks to validate ring buffer pointers(CVE-2015-5279) Ne2000 NIC uses ring buffer of NE2000_MEM_SIZE(49152) bytes to process network packets. While receiving packets via ne2000_receive() routine, a local 'index' variable could exceed the ring buffer size, which could lead to a memory buffer overflow. Added other checks at initialisation. Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <luodalongde@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: P J P <pjp@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit `9bbdbc66e5`) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>	2015-09-21 17:04:14 -05:00
P J P	3a56af1fbc	e1000: Avoid infinite loop in processing transmit descriptor (CVE-2015-6815) While processing transmit descriptors, it could lead to an infinite loop if 'bytes' was to become zero; Add a check to avoid it. [The guest can force 'bytes' to 0 by setting the hdr_len and mss descriptor fields to 0. --Stefan] Signed-off-by: P J P <pjp@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Message-id: 1441383666-6590-1-git-send-email-stefanha@redhat.com (cherry picked from commit `b947ac2bf2`) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>	2015-09-21 17:04:05 -05:00
Gerd Hoffmann	efec4dcd25	vnc: fix memory corruption (CVE-2015-5225) The _cmp_bytes variable added by commit "bea60dd ui/vnc: fix potential memory corruption issues" can become negative. Result is (possibly exploitable) memory corruption. Reason for that is it uses the stride instead of bytes per scanline to apply limits. For the server surface is is actually fine. vnc creates that itself, there is never any padding and thus scanline length always equals stride. For the guest surface scanline length and stride are typically identical too, but it doesn't has to be that way. So add and use a new variable (guest_ll) for the guest scanline length. Also rename min_stride to line_bytes to make more clear what it actually is. Finally sprinkle in an assert() to make sure we never use a negative _cmp_bytes again. Reported-by: 范祚至(库特) <zuozhi.fzz@alibaba-inc.com> Reviewed-by: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit `eb8934b041`) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>	2015-09-21 17:03:16 -05:00
@@ -1 +1 @@
 .4.0
 .4.0.1