glib/gio/gdbusauth.c

1420 lines
46 KiB
C
Raw Permalink Normal View History

/* GDBus - GLib D-Bus Library
*
2010-05-09 19:14:55 +02:00
* Copyright (C) 2008-2010 Red Hat, Inc.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General
2014-01-23 12:58:29 +01:00
* Public License along with this library; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
* Author: David Zeuthen <davidz@redhat.com>
*/
#include "config.h"
#include "gdbusauth.h"
#include "gdbusauthmechanismanon.h"
#include "gdbusauthmechanismexternal.h"
#include "gdbusauthmechanismsha1.h"
#include "gdbusauthobserver.h"
#include "gdbuserror.h"
#include "gdbusutils.h"
#include "gioenumtypes.h"
#include "gcredentials.h"
GDBus: prefer getsockopt()-style credentials-passing APIs Conceptually, a D-Bus server is really trying to determine the credentials of (the process that initiated) a connection, not the credentials that the process had when it sent a particular message. Ideally, it does this with a getsockopt()-style API that queries the credentials of the connection's initiator without requiring any particular cooperation from that process, avoiding a class of possible failures. The leading '\0' in the D-Bus protocol is primarily a workaround for platforms where the message-based credentials-passing API is strictly better than the getsockopt()-style API (for example, on FreeBSD, SCM_CREDS includes a process ID but getpeereid() does not), or where the getsockopt()-style API does not exist at all. As a result libdbus, the reference implementation of D-Bus, does not implement Linux SCM_CREDENTIALS at all - it has no reason to do so, because the SO_PEERCRED socket option is equally informative. This change makes GDBusServer on Linux more closely match the behaviour of libdbus. In particular, GNOME/glib#1831 indicates that when a libdbus client connects to a GDBus server, recvmsg() sometimes yields a SCM_CREDENTIALS message with cmsg_data={pid=0, uid=65534, gid=65534}. I think this is most likely a race condition in the early steps to connect: client server connect accept send '\0' <- race -> set SO_PASSCRED = 1 receive '\0' If the server wins the race: client server connect accept set SO_PASSCRED = 1 send '\0' receive '\0' then everything is fine. However, if the client wins the race: client server connect accept send '\0' set SO_PASSCRED = 1 receive '\0' then the kernel does not record credentials for the message containing '\0' (because SO_PASSCRED was 0 at the time). However, by the time the server receives the message, the kernel knows that credentials are desired. I would have expected the kernel to omit the credentials header in this case, but it seems that instead, it synthesizes a credentials structure with a dummy process ID 0, a dummy uid derived from /proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid and a dummy gid derived from /proc/sys/kernel/overflowgid. In an unconfigured GDBusServer, hitting this race condition results in falling back to DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication, which in practice usually succeeds in authenticating the peer's uid. However, we encourage AF_UNIX servers on Unix platforms to allow only EXTERNAL authentication as a security-hardening measure, because DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 relies on a series of assumptions including a cryptographically strong PRNG and a shared home directory with no write access by others, which are not necessarily true for all operating systems and users. EXTERNAL authentication will fail if the server cannot determine the client's credentials. In particular, this caused a regression when CVE-2019-14822 was fixed in ibus, which appears to be resolved by this commit. Qt clients (which use libdbus) intermittently fail to connect to an ibus server (which uses GDBusServer), because ibus no longer allows DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication or non-matching uids. Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com> Closes: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/issues/1831
2019-10-14 09:47:39 +02:00
#include "gcredentialsprivate.h"
#include "gdbusprivate.h"
#include "giostream.h"
#include "gdatainputstream.h"
#include "gdataoutputstream.h"
#include "gnetworking.h"
#include "gunixconnection.h"
#include "gunixcredentialsmessage.h"
2010-05-06 22:34:23 +02:00
#include "glibintl.h"
G_GNUC_PRINTF(1, 2)
static void
debug_print (const gchar *message, ...)
{
if (G_UNLIKELY (_g_dbus_debug_authentication ()))
{
gchar *s;
GString *str;
va_list var_args;
guint n;
_g_dbus_debug_print_lock ();
va_start (var_args, message);
s = g_strdup_vprintf (message, var_args);
va_end (var_args);
str = g_string_new (NULL);
for (n = 0; s[n] != '\0'; n++)
{
if (G_UNLIKELY (s[n] == '\r'))
g_string_append (str, "\\r");
else if (G_UNLIKELY (s[n] == '\n'))
g_string_append (str, "\\n");
else
g_string_append_c (str, s[n]);
}
g_print ("GDBus-debug:Auth: %s\n", str->str);
g_string_free (str, TRUE);
g_free (s);
_g_dbus_debug_print_unlock ();
}
}
typedef struct
{
const gchar *name;
gint priority;
GType gtype;
} Mechanism;
static void mechanism_free (Mechanism *m);
struct _GDBusAuthPrivate
{
GIOStream *stream;
/* A list of available Mechanism, sorted according to priority */
GList *available_mechanisms;
};
enum
{
PROP_0,
PROP_STREAM
};
G_DEFINE_TYPE_WITH_PRIVATE (GDBusAuth, _g_dbus_auth, G_TYPE_OBJECT)
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static void
_g_dbus_auth_finalize (GObject *object)
{
GDBusAuth *auth = G_DBUS_AUTH (object);
if (auth->priv->stream != NULL)
g_object_unref (auth->priv->stream);
g_list_free_full (auth->priv->available_mechanisms, (GDestroyNotify) mechanism_free);
if (G_OBJECT_CLASS (_g_dbus_auth_parent_class)->finalize != NULL)
G_OBJECT_CLASS (_g_dbus_auth_parent_class)->finalize (object);
}
static void
_g_dbus_auth_get_property (GObject *object,
guint prop_id,
GValue *value,
GParamSpec *pspec)
{
GDBusAuth *auth = G_DBUS_AUTH (object);
switch (prop_id)
{
case PROP_STREAM:
g_value_set_object (value, auth->priv->stream);
break;
default:
G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID (object, prop_id, pspec);
break;
}
}
static void
_g_dbus_auth_set_property (GObject *object,
guint prop_id,
const GValue *value,
GParamSpec *pspec)
{
GDBusAuth *auth = G_DBUS_AUTH (object);
switch (prop_id)
{
case PROP_STREAM:
auth->priv->stream = g_value_dup_object (value);
break;
default:
G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID (object, prop_id, pspec);
break;
}
}
static void
_g_dbus_auth_class_init (GDBusAuthClass *klass)
{
GObjectClass *gobject_class;
gobject_class = G_OBJECT_CLASS (klass);
gobject_class->get_property = _g_dbus_auth_get_property;
gobject_class->set_property = _g_dbus_auth_set_property;
gobject_class->finalize = _g_dbus_auth_finalize;
g_object_class_install_property (gobject_class,
PROP_STREAM,
g_param_spec_object ("stream", NULL, NULL,
G_TYPE_IO_STREAM,
G_PARAM_READABLE |
G_PARAM_WRITABLE |
G_PARAM_CONSTRUCT_ONLY |
G_PARAM_STATIC_NAME |
G_PARAM_STATIC_BLURB |
G_PARAM_STATIC_NICK));
}
static void
mechanism_free (Mechanism *m)
{
g_free (m);
}
static void
add_mechanism (GDBusAuth *auth,
GDBusAuthObserver *observer,
GType mechanism_type)
{
const gchar *name;
name = _g_dbus_auth_mechanism_get_name (mechanism_type);
if (observer == NULL || g_dbus_auth_observer_allow_mechanism (observer, name))
{
Mechanism *m;
m = g_new0 (Mechanism, 1);
m->name = name;
m->priority = _g_dbus_auth_mechanism_get_priority (mechanism_type);
m->gtype = mechanism_type;
auth->priv->available_mechanisms = g_list_prepend (auth->priv->available_mechanisms, m);
}
}
static gint
mech_compare_func (Mechanism *a, Mechanism *b)
{
gint ret;
/* ensure deterministic order */
ret = b->priority - a->priority;
if (ret == 0)
ret = g_strcmp0 (b->name, a->name);
return ret;
}
static void
_g_dbus_auth_init (GDBusAuth *auth)
{
auth->priv = _g_dbus_auth_get_instance_private (auth);
}
static void
_g_dbus_auth_add_mechs (GDBusAuth *auth,
GDBusAuthObserver *observer)
{
/* TODO: trawl extension points */
add_mechanism (auth, observer, G_TYPE_DBUS_AUTH_MECHANISM_ANON);
add_mechanism (auth, observer, G_TYPE_DBUS_AUTH_MECHANISM_SHA1);
add_mechanism (auth, observer, G_TYPE_DBUS_AUTH_MECHANISM_EXTERNAL);
auth->priv->available_mechanisms = g_list_sort (auth->priv->available_mechanisms,
(GCompareFunc) mech_compare_func);
}
static GType
find_mech_by_name (GDBusAuth *auth,
const gchar *name)
{
GType ret;
GList *l;
ret = (GType) 0;
for (l = auth->priv->available_mechanisms; l != NULL; l = l->next)
{
Mechanism *m = l->data;
if (g_strcmp0 (name, m->name) == 0)
{
ret = m->gtype;
goto out;
}
}
out:
return ret;
}
GDBusAuth *
_g_dbus_auth_new (GIOStream *stream)
{
return g_object_new (G_TYPE_DBUS_AUTH,
"stream", stream,
NULL);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* like g_data_input_stream_read_line() but sets error if there's no content to read */
static gchar *
_my_g_data_input_stream_read_line (GDataInputStream *dis,
gsize *out_line_length,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GError **error)
{
gchar *ret;
g_return_val_if_fail (error == NULL || *error == NULL, NULL);
ret = g_data_input_stream_read_line (dis,
out_line_length,
cancellable,
error);
if (ret == NULL && error != NULL && *error == NULL)
{
g_set_error_literal (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
_("Unexpected lack of content trying to read a line"));
}
return ret;
}
/* This function is to avoid situations like this
*
* BEGIN\r\nl\0\0\1...
*
* e.g. where we read into the first D-Bus message while waiting for
* the final line from the client (TODO: file bug against gio for
* this)
*/
static gchar *
_my_g_input_stream_read_line_safe (GInputStream *i,
gsize *out_line_length,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GError **error)
{
GString *str;
gchar c;
gssize num_read;
gboolean last_was_cr;
str = g_string_new (NULL);
last_was_cr = FALSE;
while (TRUE)
{
num_read = g_input_stream_read (i,
&c,
1,
cancellable,
error);
if (num_read == -1)
goto fail;
if (num_read == 0)
{
if (error != NULL && *error == NULL)
{
g_set_error_literal (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
_("Unexpected lack of content trying to (safely) read a line"));
}
goto fail;
}
g_string_append_c (str, (gint) c);
if (last_was_cr)
{
if (c == 0x0a)
{
g_assert (str->len >= 2);
g_string_set_size (str, str->len - 2);
goto out;
}
}
last_was_cr = (c == 0x0d);
}
out:
if (out_line_length != NULL)
*out_line_length = str->len;
return g_string_free (str, FALSE);
fail:
g_assert (error == NULL || *error != NULL);
g_string_free (str, TRUE);
return NULL;
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static gchar *
hexdecode (const gchar *str,
gsize *out_len,
GError **error)
{
gchar *ret;
GString *s;
guint n;
ret = NULL;
s = g_string_new (NULL);
for (n = 0; str[n] != '\0'; n += 2)
{
gint upper_nibble;
gint lower_nibble;
guint value;
upper_nibble = g_ascii_xdigit_value (str[n]);
lower_nibble = g_ascii_xdigit_value (str[n + 1]);
if (upper_nibble == -1 || lower_nibble == -1)
{
g_set_error (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
"Error hexdecoding string '%s' around position %d",
str, n);
goto out;
}
value = (upper_nibble<<4) | lower_nibble;
g_string_append_c (s, value);
}
*out_len = s->len;
ret = g_string_free (s, FALSE);
s = NULL;
out:
if (s != NULL)
{
*out_len = 0;
g_string_free (s, TRUE);
}
return ret;
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static GDBusAuthMechanism *
client_choose_mech_and_send_initial_response (GDBusAuth *auth,
GCredentials *credentials_that_were_sent,
gdbusauthmechanismexternal: Optionally send empty authorization identity When using a GDBus client in a non-trivial user namespace, the result of geteuid() can differ from the uid in the namespace where the server is running. This would result in connection attempts being rejected, because the identity that the client claims to have does not match the identity that the server derives from its credentials. RFC 4422 allows us to send an empty authorization identity, which means we want to authenticate as whatever identity the server can derive from our out-of-band credentials. In particular, this resolves the authentication failure when crossing between different Linux user namespaces. Because D-Bus does not have a way to represent an empty initial response as distinct from the absence of an initial response, we cannot use the initial-response optimization (RFC 4422 §4.3.a) in this case, and must fall back to waiting for the server to send a challenge. Unfortunately, GDBus versions older than glib!2826 did not implement the server side of this protocol correctly, and would respond to the missing initial response in a way that breaks the SASL state machine (expecting a response without sending a challenge), causing client and server to deadlock with each waiting for the other to respond. Until fixed versions of GDBus are widespread, we can't rely on having a server that can cope with this, so gate it behind a flag, which can be set for connections that are known to cross non-trivial namespace boundaries. Originally inspired by <https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/1ed4723d38cd0d1423c8fe650f90fa86007ddf55>, and based on earlier work by Giuseppe Scrivano (in which the cross-namespace behaviour was unconditional, rather than gated by a flag). Co-authored-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <giuseppe@scrivano.org> Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
2022-07-24 14:02:51 +02:00
GDBusConnectionFlags conn_flags,
const gchar* const *supported_auth_mechs,
GPtrArray *attempted_auth_mechs,
GDataOutputStream *dos,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GError **error)
{
GDBusAuthMechanism *mech;
GType auth_mech_to_use_gtype;
guint n;
guint m;
gchar *initial_response;
gsize initial_response_len;
gchar *encoded;
gchar *s;
again:
mech = NULL;
debug_print ("CLIENT: Trying to choose mechanism");
/* find an authentication mechanism to try, if any */
auth_mech_to_use_gtype = (GType) 0;
for (n = 0; supported_auth_mechs[n] != NULL; n++)
{
gboolean attempted_already;
attempted_already = FALSE;
for (m = 0; m < attempted_auth_mechs->len; m++)
{
if (g_strcmp0 (supported_auth_mechs[n], attempted_auth_mechs->pdata[m]) == 0)
{
attempted_already = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (!attempted_already)
{
auth_mech_to_use_gtype = find_mech_by_name (auth, supported_auth_mechs[n]);
if (auth_mech_to_use_gtype != (GType) 0)
break;
}
}
if (auth_mech_to_use_gtype == (GType) 0)
{
gchar *available;
GString *tried_str;
debug_print ("CLIENT: Exhausted all available mechanisms");
available = g_strjoinv (", ", (gchar **) supported_auth_mechs);
tried_str = g_string_new (NULL);
for (n = 0; n < attempted_auth_mechs->len; n++)
{
if (n > 0)
g_string_append (tried_str, ", ");
g_string_append (tried_str, attempted_auth_mechs->pdata[n]);
}
g_set_error (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
_("Exhausted all available authentication mechanisms (tried: %s) (available: %s)"),
tried_str->str,
available);
g_string_free (tried_str, TRUE);
g_free (available);
goto out;
}
/* OK, decided on a mechanism - let's do this thing */
mech = g_object_new (auth_mech_to_use_gtype,
"stream", auth->priv->stream,
"credentials", credentials_that_were_sent,
NULL);
debug_print ("CLIENT: Trying mechanism '%s'", _g_dbus_auth_mechanism_get_name (auth_mech_to_use_gtype));
g_ptr_array_add (attempted_auth_mechs, (gpointer) _g_dbus_auth_mechanism_get_name (auth_mech_to_use_gtype));
/* the auth mechanism may not be supported
* (for example, EXTERNAL only works if credentials were exchanged)
*/
if (!_g_dbus_auth_mechanism_is_supported (mech))
{
debug_print ("CLIENT: Mechanism '%s' says it is not supported", _g_dbus_auth_mechanism_get_name (auth_mech_to_use_gtype));
g_object_unref (mech);
mech = NULL;
goto again;
}
initial_response_len = 0;
initial_response = _g_dbus_auth_mechanism_client_initiate (mech,
gdbusauthmechanismexternal: Optionally send empty authorization identity When using a GDBus client in a non-trivial user namespace, the result of geteuid() can differ from the uid in the namespace where the server is running. This would result in connection attempts being rejected, because the identity that the client claims to have does not match the identity that the server derives from its credentials. RFC 4422 allows us to send an empty authorization identity, which means we want to authenticate as whatever identity the server can derive from our out-of-band credentials. In particular, this resolves the authentication failure when crossing between different Linux user namespaces. Because D-Bus does not have a way to represent an empty initial response as distinct from the absence of an initial response, we cannot use the initial-response optimization (RFC 4422 §4.3.a) in this case, and must fall back to waiting for the server to send a challenge. Unfortunately, GDBus versions older than glib!2826 did not implement the server side of this protocol correctly, and would respond to the missing initial response in a way that breaks the SASL state machine (expecting a response without sending a challenge), causing client and server to deadlock with each waiting for the other to respond. Until fixed versions of GDBus are widespread, we can't rely on having a server that can cope with this, so gate it behind a flag, which can be set for connections that are known to cross non-trivial namespace boundaries. Originally inspired by <https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/1ed4723d38cd0d1423c8fe650f90fa86007ddf55>, and based on earlier work by Giuseppe Scrivano (in which the cross-namespace behaviour was unconditional, rather than gated by a flag). Co-authored-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <giuseppe@scrivano.org> Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
2022-07-24 14:02:51 +02:00
conn_flags,
&initial_response_len);
#if 0
g_printerr ("using auth mechanism with name '%s' of type '%s' with initial response '%s'\n",
_g_dbus_auth_mechanism_get_name (auth_mech_to_use_gtype),
g_type_name (G_TYPE_FROM_INSTANCE (mech)),
initial_response);
#endif
if (initial_response != NULL)
{
//g_printerr ("initial_response = '%s'\n", initial_response);
encoded = _g_dbus_hexencode (initial_response, initial_response_len);
s = g_strdup_printf ("AUTH %s %s\r\n",
_g_dbus_auth_mechanism_get_name (auth_mech_to_use_gtype),
encoded);
g_free (initial_response);
g_free (encoded);
}
else
{
s = g_strdup_printf ("AUTH %s\r\n", _g_dbus_auth_mechanism_get_name (auth_mech_to_use_gtype));
}
debug_print ("CLIENT: writing '%s'", s);
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_string (dos, s, cancellable, error))
{
g_object_unref (mech);
mech = NULL;
g_free (s);
goto out;
}
g_free (s);
out:
return mech;
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
typedef enum
{
CLIENT_STATE_WAITING_FOR_DATA,
CLIENT_STATE_WAITING_FOR_OK,
CLIENT_STATE_WAITING_FOR_REJECT,
CLIENT_STATE_WAITING_FOR_AGREE_UNIX_FD
} ClientState;
gchar *
_g_dbus_auth_run_client (GDBusAuth *auth,
GDBusAuthObserver *observer,
gdbusauthmechanismexternal: Optionally send empty authorization identity When using a GDBus client in a non-trivial user namespace, the result of geteuid() can differ from the uid in the namespace where the server is running. This would result in connection attempts being rejected, because the identity that the client claims to have does not match the identity that the server derives from its credentials. RFC 4422 allows us to send an empty authorization identity, which means we want to authenticate as whatever identity the server can derive from our out-of-band credentials. In particular, this resolves the authentication failure when crossing between different Linux user namespaces. Because D-Bus does not have a way to represent an empty initial response as distinct from the absence of an initial response, we cannot use the initial-response optimization (RFC 4422 §4.3.a) in this case, and must fall back to waiting for the server to send a challenge. Unfortunately, GDBus versions older than glib!2826 did not implement the server side of this protocol correctly, and would respond to the missing initial response in a way that breaks the SASL state machine (expecting a response without sending a challenge), causing client and server to deadlock with each waiting for the other to respond. Until fixed versions of GDBus are widespread, we can't rely on having a server that can cope with this, so gate it behind a flag, which can be set for connections that are known to cross non-trivial namespace boundaries. Originally inspired by <https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/1ed4723d38cd0d1423c8fe650f90fa86007ddf55>, and based on earlier work by Giuseppe Scrivano (in which the cross-namespace behaviour was unconditional, rather than gated by a flag). Co-authored-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <giuseppe@scrivano.org> Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
2022-07-24 14:02:51 +02:00
GDBusConnectionFlags conn_flags,
GDBusCapabilityFlags offered_capabilities,
GDBusCapabilityFlags *out_negotiated_capabilities,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GError **error)
{
gchar *s;
GDataInputStream *dis;
GDataOutputStream *dos;
GCredentials *credentials;
gchar *ret_guid;
gchar *line;
gsize line_length;
gchar **supported_auth_mechs;
GPtrArray *attempted_auth_mechs;
GDBusAuthMechanism *mech;
ClientState state;
GDBusCapabilityFlags negotiated_capabilities;
g_return_val_if_fail ((conn_flags & G_DBUS_CONNECTION_FLAGS_AUTHENTICATION_CLIENT), NULL);
g_return_val_if_fail (!(conn_flags & G_DBUS_CONNECTION_FLAGS_AUTHENTICATION_SERVER), NULL);
gdbusauthmechanismexternal: Optionally send empty authorization identity When using a GDBus client in a non-trivial user namespace, the result of geteuid() can differ from the uid in the namespace where the server is running. This would result in connection attempts being rejected, because the identity that the client claims to have does not match the identity that the server derives from its credentials. RFC 4422 allows us to send an empty authorization identity, which means we want to authenticate as whatever identity the server can derive from our out-of-band credentials. In particular, this resolves the authentication failure when crossing between different Linux user namespaces. Because D-Bus does not have a way to represent an empty initial response as distinct from the absence of an initial response, we cannot use the initial-response optimization (RFC 4422 §4.3.a) in this case, and must fall back to waiting for the server to send a challenge. Unfortunately, GDBus versions older than glib!2826 did not implement the server side of this protocol correctly, and would respond to the missing initial response in a way that breaks the SASL state machine (expecting a response without sending a challenge), causing client and server to deadlock with each waiting for the other to respond. Until fixed versions of GDBus are widespread, we can't rely on having a server that can cope with this, so gate it behind a flag, which can be set for connections that are known to cross non-trivial namespace boundaries. Originally inspired by <https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/1ed4723d38cd0d1423c8fe650f90fa86007ddf55>, and based on earlier work by Giuseppe Scrivano (in which the cross-namespace behaviour was unconditional, rather than gated by a flag). Co-authored-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <giuseppe@scrivano.org> Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
2022-07-24 14:02:51 +02:00
debug_print ("CLIENT: initiating");
_g_dbus_auth_add_mechs (auth, observer);
ret_guid = NULL;
supported_auth_mechs = NULL;
attempted_auth_mechs = g_ptr_array_new ();
mech = NULL;
negotiated_capabilities = 0;
credentials = NULL;
dis = G_DATA_INPUT_STREAM (g_data_input_stream_new (g_io_stream_get_input_stream (auth->priv->stream)));
dos = G_DATA_OUTPUT_STREAM (g_data_output_stream_new (g_io_stream_get_output_stream (auth->priv->stream)));
g_filter_input_stream_set_close_base_stream (G_FILTER_INPUT_STREAM (dis), FALSE);
g_filter_output_stream_set_close_base_stream (G_FILTER_OUTPUT_STREAM (dos), FALSE);
g_data_input_stream_set_newline_type (dis, G_DATA_STREAM_NEWLINE_TYPE_CR_LF);
#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
if (G_IS_UNIX_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream))
{
credentials = g_credentials_new ();
if (!g_unix_connection_send_credentials (G_UNIX_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream),
cancellable,
error))
goto out;
}
else
{
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_byte (dos, '\0', cancellable, error))
goto out;
}
#else
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_byte (dos, '\0', cancellable, error))
goto out;
#endif
if (credentials != NULL)
{
if (G_UNLIKELY (_g_dbus_debug_authentication ()))
{
s = g_credentials_to_string (credentials);
debug_print ("CLIENT: sent credentials '%s'", s);
g_free (s);
}
}
else
{
debug_print ("CLIENT: didn't send any credentials");
}
/* TODO: to reduce roundtrips, try to pick an auth mechanism to start with */
/* Get list of supported authentication mechanisms */
s = "AUTH\r\n";
debug_print ("CLIENT: writing '%s'", s);
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_string (dos, s, cancellable, error))
goto out;
state = CLIENT_STATE_WAITING_FOR_REJECT;
while (TRUE)
{
switch (state)
{
case CLIENT_STATE_WAITING_FOR_REJECT:
debug_print ("CLIENT: WaitingForReject");
line = _my_g_data_input_stream_read_line (dis, &line_length, cancellable, error);
if (line == NULL)
goto out;
debug_print ("CLIENT: WaitingForReject, read '%s'", line);
choose_mechanism:
if (!g_str_has_prefix (line, "REJECTED "))
{
g_set_error (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
"In WaitingForReject: Expected 'REJECTED am1 am2 ... amN', got '%s'",
line);
g_free (line);
goto out;
}
if (supported_auth_mechs == NULL)
{
supported_auth_mechs = g_strsplit (line + sizeof ("REJECTED ") - 1, " ", 0);
#if 0
for (n = 0; supported_auth_mechs != NULL && supported_auth_mechs[n] != NULL; n++)
g_printerr ("supported_auth_mechs[%d] = '%s'\n", n, supported_auth_mechs[n]);
#endif
}
g_free (line);
mech = client_choose_mech_and_send_initial_response (auth,
credentials,
gdbusauthmechanismexternal: Optionally send empty authorization identity When using a GDBus client in a non-trivial user namespace, the result of geteuid() can differ from the uid in the namespace where the server is running. This would result in connection attempts being rejected, because the identity that the client claims to have does not match the identity that the server derives from its credentials. RFC 4422 allows us to send an empty authorization identity, which means we want to authenticate as whatever identity the server can derive from our out-of-band credentials. In particular, this resolves the authentication failure when crossing between different Linux user namespaces. Because D-Bus does not have a way to represent an empty initial response as distinct from the absence of an initial response, we cannot use the initial-response optimization (RFC 4422 §4.3.a) in this case, and must fall back to waiting for the server to send a challenge. Unfortunately, GDBus versions older than glib!2826 did not implement the server side of this protocol correctly, and would respond to the missing initial response in a way that breaks the SASL state machine (expecting a response without sending a challenge), causing client and server to deadlock with each waiting for the other to respond. Until fixed versions of GDBus are widespread, we can't rely on having a server that can cope with this, so gate it behind a flag, which can be set for connections that are known to cross non-trivial namespace boundaries. Originally inspired by <https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/1ed4723d38cd0d1423c8fe650f90fa86007ddf55>, and based on earlier work by Giuseppe Scrivano (in which the cross-namespace behaviour was unconditional, rather than gated by a flag). Co-authored-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <giuseppe@scrivano.org> Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
2022-07-24 14:02:51 +02:00
conn_flags,
(const gchar* const *) supported_auth_mechs,
attempted_auth_mechs,
dos,
cancellable,
error);
if (mech == NULL)
goto out;
if (_g_dbus_auth_mechanism_client_get_state (mech) == G_DBUS_AUTH_MECHANISM_STATE_WAITING_FOR_DATA)
state = CLIENT_STATE_WAITING_FOR_DATA;
else
state = CLIENT_STATE_WAITING_FOR_OK;
break;
case CLIENT_STATE_WAITING_FOR_OK:
debug_print ("CLIENT: WaitingForOK");
line = _my_g_data_input_stream_read_line (dis, &line_length, cancellable, error);
if (line == NULL)
goto out;
debug_print ("CLIENT: WaitingForOK, read '%s'", line);
if (g_str_has_prefix (line, "OK "))
{
if (!g_dbus_is_guid (line + 3))
{
g_set_error (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
"Invalid OK response '%s'",
line);
g_free (line);
goto out;
}
ret_guid = g_strdup (line + 3);
g_free (line);
if (offered_capabilities & G_DBUS_CAPABILITY_FLAGS_UNIX_FD_PASSING)
{
s = "NEGOTIATE_UNIX_FD\r\n";
debug_print ("CLIENT: writing '%s'", s);
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_string (dos, s, cancellable, error))
goto out;
state = CLIENT_STATE_WAITING_FOR_AGREE_UNIX_FD;
}
else
{
s = "BEGIN\r\n";
debug_print ("CLIENT: writing '%s'", s);
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_string (dos, s, cancellable, error))
goto out;
/* and we're done! */
goto out;
}
}
else if (g_str_has_prefix (line, "REJECTED "))
{
goto choose_mechanism;
}
else
{
/* TODO: handle other valid responses */
g_set_error (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
"In WaitingForOk: unexpected response '%s'",
line);
g_free (line);
goto out;
}
break;
case CLIENT_STATE_WAITING_FOR_AGREE_UNIX_FD:
debug_print ("CLIENT: WaitingForAgreeUnixFD");
line = _my_g_data_input_stream_read_line (dis, &line_length, cancellable, error);
if (line == NULL)
goto out;
debug_print ("CLIENT: WaitingForAgreeUnixFD, read='%s'", line);
if (g_strcmp0 (line, "AGREE_UNIX_FD") == 0)
{
g_free (line);
negotiated_capabilities |= G_DBUS_CAPABILITY_FLAGS_UNIX_FD_PASSING;
s = "BEGIN\r\n";
debug_print ("CLIENT: writing '%s'", s);
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_string (dos, s, cancellable, error))
goto out;
/* and we're done! */
goto out;
}
else if (g_str_has_prefix (line, "ERROR") && (line[5] == 0 || g_ascii_isspace (line[5])))
{
//g_strstrip (line + 5); g_debug ("bah, no unix_fd: '%s'", line + 5);
g_free (line);
s = "BEGIN\r\n";
debug_print ("CLIENT: writing '%s'", s);
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_string (dos, s, cancellable, error))
goto out;
/* and we're done! */
goto out;
}
else
{
/* TODO: handle other valid responses */
g_set_error (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
"In WaitingForAgreeUnixFd: unexpected response '%s'",
line);
g_free (line);
goto out;
}
break;
case CLIENT_STATE_WAITING_FOR_DATA:
debug_print ("CLIENT: WaitingForData");
line = _my_g_data_input_stream_read_line (dis, &line_length, cancellable, error);
if (line == NULL)
goto out;
debug_print ("CLIENT: WaitingForData, read='%s'", line);
if (g_str_equal (line, "DATA") || g_str_has_prefix (line, "DATA "))
{
gchar *encoded;
gchar *decoded_data;
gsize decoded_data_len = 0;
encoded = g_strdup (line + 4);
g_free (line);
g_strstrip (encoded);
decoded_data = hexdecode (encoded, &decoded_data_len, error);
g_free (encoded);
if (decoded_data == NULL)
{
g_prefix_error (error, "DATA response is malformed: ");
/* invalid encoding, disconnect! */
goto out;
}
_g_dbus_auth_mechanism_client_data_receive (mech, decoded_data, decoded_data_len);
g_free (decoded_data);
if (_g_dbus_auth_mechanism_client_get_state (mech) == G_DBUS_AUTH_MECHANISM_STATE_HAVE_DATA_TO_SEND)
{
gchar *data;
gsize data_len;
data = _g_dbus_auth_mechanism_client_data_send (mech, &data_len);
if (data_len == 0)
{
s = g_strdup ("DATA\r\n");
}
else
{
gchar *encoded_data = _g_dbus_hexencode (data, data_len);
s = g_strdup_printf ("DATA %s\r\n", encoded_data);
g_free (encoded_data);
}
g_free (data);
debug_print ("CLIENT: writing '%s'", s);
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_string (dos, s, cancellable, error))
{
g_free (s);
goto out;
}
g_free (s);
}
state = CLIENT_STATE_WAITING_FOR_OK;
}
else if (g_str_has_prefix (line, "REJECTED "))
{
/* could be the chosen authentication method just doesn't work. Try
* another one...
*/
goto choose_mechanism;
}
else
{
g_set_error (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
"In WaitingForData: unexpected response '%s'",
line);
g_free (line);
goto out;
}
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached ();
break;
}
}; /* main authentication client loop */
out:
if (mech != NULL)
g_object_unref (mech);
g_ptr_array_unref (attempted_auth_mechs);
g_strfreev (supported_auth_mechs);
g_object_unref (dis);
g_object_unref (dos);
/* ensure return value is NULL if error is set */
if (error != NULL && *error != NULL)
{
g_free (ret_guid);
ret_guid = NULL;
}
if (ret_guid != NULL)
{
if (out_negotiated_capabilities != NULL)
*out_negotiated_capabilities = negotiated_capabilities;
}
if (credentials != NULL)
g_object_unref (credentials);
debug_print ("CLIENT: Done, authenticated=%d", ret_guid != NULL);
return ret_guid;
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static gchar *
get_auth_mechanisms (GDBusAuth *auth,
gboolean allow_anonymous,
const gchar *prefix,
const gchar *suffix,
const gchar *separator)
{
GList *l;
GString *str;
gboolean need_sep;
str = g_string_new (prefix);
need_sep = FALSE;
for (l = auth->priv->available_mechanisms; l != NULL; l = l->next)
{
Mechanism *m = l->data;
if (!allow_anonymous && g_strcmp0 (m->name, "ANONYMOUS") == 0)
continue;
if (need_sep)
g_string_append (str, separator);
g_string_append (str, m->name);
need_sep = TRUE;
}
g_string_append (str, suffix);
return g_string_free (str, FALSE);
}
typedef enum
{
SERVER_STATE_WAITING_FOR_AUTH,
SERVER_STATE_WAITING_FOR_DATA,
SERVER_STATE_WAITING_FOR_BEGIN
} ServerState;
gboolean
_g_dbus_auth_run_server (GDBusAuth *auth,
GDBusAuthObserver *observer,
const gchar *guid,
gboolean allow_anonymous,
gboolean require_same_user,
GDBusCapabilityFlags offered_capabilities,
GDBusCapabilityFlags *out_negotiated_capabilities,
GCredentials **out_received_credentials,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GError **error)
{
gboolean ret;
ServerState state;
GDataOutputStream *dos;
GError *local_error;
gchar *line;
gsize line_length;
GDBusAuthMechanism *mech;
gchar *s;
GDBusCapabilityFlags negotiated_capabilities;
GCredentials *credentials;
GCredentials *own_credentials = NULL;
debug_print ("SERVER: initiating");
_g_dbus_auth_add_mechs (auth, observer);
ret = FALSE;
dos = NULL;
mech = NULL;
negotiated_capabilities = 0;
credentials = NULL;
if (!g_dbus_is_guid (guid))
{
g_set_error (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
"The given GUID '%s' is not valid",
guid);
goto out;
}
/* We use an extremely slow (but reliable) line reader for input
* instead of something buffered - this basically does a recvfrom()
* system call per character
*
* (the problem with using GDataInputStream's read_line is that
* because of buffering it might start reading into the first D-Bus
* message that appears after "BEGIN\r\n"....)
*/
dos = G_DATA_OUTPUT_STREAM (g_data_output_stream_new (g_io_stream_get_output_stream (auth->priv->stream)));
g_filter_output_stream_set_close_base_stream (G_FILTER_OUTPUT_STREAM (dos), FALSE);
GDBus: prefer getsockopt()-style credentials-passing APIs Conceptually, a D-Bus server is really trying to determine the credentials of (the process that initiated) a connection, not the credentials that the process had when it sent a particular message. Ideally, it does this with a getsockopt()-style API that queries the credentials of the connection's initiator without requiring any particular cooperation from that process, avoiding a class of possible failures. The leading '\0' in the D-Bus protocol is primarily a workaround for platforms where the message-based credentials-passing API is strictly better than the getsockopt()-style API (for example, on FreeBSD, SCM_CREDS includes a process ID but getpeereid() does not), or where the getsockopt()-style API does not exist at all. As a result libdbus, the reference implementation of D-Bus, does not implement Linux SCM_CREDENTIALS at all - it has no reason to do so, because the SO_PEERCRED socket option is equally informative. This change makes GDBusServer on Linux more closely match the behaviour of libdbus. In particular, GNOME/glib#1831 indicates that when a libdbus client connects to a GDBus server, recvmsg() sometimes yields a SCM_CREDENTIALS message with cmsg_data={pid=0, uid=65534, gid=65534}. I think this is most likely a race condition in the early steps to connect: client server connect accept send '\0' <- race -> set SO_PASSCRED = 1 receive '\0' If the server wins the race: client server connect accept set SO_PASSCRED = 1 send '\0' receive '\0' then everything is fine. However, if the client wins the race: client server connect accept send '\0' set SO_PASSCRED = 1 receive '\0' then the kernel does not record credentials for the message containing '\0' (because SO_PASSCRED was 0 at the time). However, by the time the server receives the message, the kernel knows that credentials are desired. I would have expected the kernel to omit the credentials header in this case, but it seems that instead, it synthesizes a credentials structure with a dummy process ID 0, a dummy uid derived from /proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid and a dummy gid derived from /proc/sys/kernel/overflowgid. In an unconfigured GDBusServer, hitting this race condition results in falling back to DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication, which in practice usually succeeds in authenticating the peer's uid. However, we encourage AF_UNIX servers on Unix platforms to allow only EXTERNAL authentication as a security-hardening measure, because DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 relies on a series of assumptions including a cryptographically strong PRNG and a shared home directory with no write access by others, which are not necessarily true for all operating systems and users. EXTERNAL authentication will fail if the server cannot determine the client's credentials. In particular, this caused a regression when CVE-2019-14822 was fixed in ibus, which appears to be resolved by this commit. Qt clients (which use libdbus) intermittently fail to connect to an ibus server (which uses GDBusServer), because ibus no longer allows DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication or non-matching uids. Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com> Closes: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/issues/1831
2019-10-14 09:47:39 +02:00
/* read the NUL-byte, possibly with credentials attached */
#ifndef G_CREDENTIALS_PREFER_MESSAGE_PASSING
if (G_IS_SOCKET_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream))
{
GSocket *sock = g_socket_connection_get_socket (G_SOCKET_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream));
local_error = NULL;
credentials = g_socket_get_credentials (sock, &local_error);
if (credentials == NULL && !g_error_matches (local_error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED))
{
g_propagate_error (error, local_error);
goto out;
}
else
{
/* Clear the error indicator, so we can retry with
* g_unix_connection_receive_credentials() if necessary */
g_clear_error (&local_error);
}
}
#endif
if (credentials == NULL && G_IS_UNIX_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream))
{
local_error = NULL;
credentials = g_unix_connection_receive_credentials (G_UNIX_CONNECTION (auth->priv->stream),
cancellable,
&local_error);
if (credentials == NULL && !g_error_matches (local_error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED))
{
g_propagate_error (error, local_error);
goto out;
}
g_clear_error (&local_error);
}
else
{
gchar c;
gssize num_read;
local_error = NULL;
num_read = g_input_stream_read (g_io_stream_get_input_stream (auth->priv->stream),
&c, 1,
cancellable, &local_error);
if (num_read != 1 || local_error != NULL)
{
if (local_error == NULL)
g_set_error_literal (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
_ ("Unexpected lack of content trying to read a byte"));
else
g_propagate_error (error, local_error);
goto out;
}
}
if (credentials != NULL)
{
if (G_UNLIKELY (_g_dbus_debug_authentication ()))
{
s = g_credentials_to_string (credentials);
debug_print ("SERVER: received credentials '%s'", s);
g_free (s);
}
}
else
{
debug_print ("SERVER: didn't receive any credentials");
}
own_credentials = g_credentials_new ();
state = SERVER_STATE_WAITING_FOR_AUTH;
while (TRUE)
{
switch (state)
{
case SERVER_STATE_WAITING_FOR_AUTH:
debug_print ("SERVER: WaitingForAuth");
line = _my_g_input_stream_read_line_safe (g_io_stream_get_input_stream (auth->priv->stream),
&line_length,
cancellable,
error);
debug_print ("SERVER: WaitingForAuth, read '%s'", line);
if (line == NULL)
goto out;
if (g_strcmp0 (line, "AUTH") == 0)
{
s = get_auth_mechanisms (auth, allow_anonymous, "REJECTED ", "\r\n", " ");
debug_print ("SERVER: writing '%s'", s);
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_string (dos, s, cancellable, error))
{
g_free (s);
g_free (line);
goto out;
}
g_free (s);
g_free (line);
}
else if (g_str_has_prefix (line, "AUTH "))
{
gchar **tokens;
const gchar *encoded;
const gchar *mech_name;
GType auth_mech_to_use_gtype;
tokens = g_strsplit (line, " ", 0);
switch (g_strv_length (tokens))
{
case 2:
/* no initial response */
mech_name = tokens[1];
encoded = NULL;
break;
case 3:
/* initial response */
mech_name = tokens[1];
encoded = tokens[2];
break;
default:
g_set_error (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
"Unexpected line '%s' while in WaitingForAuth state",
line);
g_strfreev (tokens);
g_free (line);
goto out;
}
g_free (line);
/* TODO: record that the client has attempted to use this mechanism */
//g_debug ("client is trying '%s'", mech_name);
auth_mech_to_use_gtype = find_mech_by_name (auth, mech_name);
if ((auth_mech_to_use_gtype == (GType) 0) ||
(!allow_anonymous && g_strcmp0 (mech_name, "ANONYMOUS") == 0))
{
/* We don't support this auth mechanism */
g_strfreev (tokens);
s = get_auth_mechanisms (auth, allow_anonymous, "REJECTED ", "\r\n", " ");
debug_print ("SERVER: writing '%s'", s);
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_string (dos, s, cancellable, error))
{
g_free (s);
goto out;
}
g_free (s);
/* stay in WAITING FOR AUTH */
state = SERVER_STATE_WAITING_FOR_AUTH;
}
else
{
gchar *initial_response;
gsize initial_response_len;
g_clear_object (&mech);
mech = g_object_new (auth_mech_to_use_gtype,
"stream", auth->priv->stream,
"credentials", credentials,
NULL);
initial_response = NULL;
initial_response_len = 0;
if (encoded != NULL)
{
initial_response = hexdecode (encoded, &initial_response_len, error);
if (initial_response == NULL)
{
g_prefix_error (error, "Initial response is malformed: ");
/* invalid encoding, disconnect! */
g_strfreev (tokens);
goto out;
}
}
_g_dbus_auth_mechanism_server_initiate (mech,
initial_response,
initial_response_len);
g_free (initial_response);
g_strfreev (tokens);
change_state:
switch (_g_dbus_auth_mechanism_server_get_state (mech))
{
case G_DBUS_AUTH_MECHANISM_STATE_ACCEPTED:
if (require_same_user &&
(credentials == NULL ||
!g_credentials_is_same_user (credentials, own_credentials, NULL)))
{
/* disconnect */
g_set_error_literal (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
_("User IDs must be the same for peer and server"));
goto out;
}
else if (observer != NULL &&
!g_dbus_auth_observer_authorize_authenticated_peer (observer,
auth->priv->stream,
credentials))
{
/* disconnect */
g_set_error_literal (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
_("Cancelled via GDBusAuthObserver::authorize-authenticated-peer"));
goto out;
}
else
{
s = g_strdup_printf ("OK %s\r\n", guid);
debug_print ("SERVER: writing '%s'", s);
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_string (dos, s, cancellable, error))
{
g_free (s);
goto out;
}
g_free (s);
state = SERVER_STATE_WAITING_FOR_BEGIN;
}
break;
case G_DBUS_AUTH_MECHANISM_STATE_REJECTED:
s = get_auth_mechanisms (auth, allow_anonymous, "REJECTED ", "\r\n", " ");
debug_print ("SERVER: writing '%s'", s);
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_string (dos, s, cancellable, error))
{
g_free (s);
goto out;
}
g_free (s);
state = SERVER_STATE_WAITING_FOR_AUTH;
break;
case G_DBUS_AUTH_MECHANISM_STATE_WAITING_FOR_DATA:
state = SERVER_STATE_WAITING_FOR_DATA;
break;
case G_DBUS_AUTH_MECHANISM_STATE_HAVE_DATA_TO_SEND:
{
gchar *data;
gsize data_len;
data = _g_dbus_auth_mechanism_server_data_send (mech, &data_len);
if (data != NULL)
{
if (data_len == 0)
{
s = g_strdup ("DATA\r\n");
}
else
{
gchar *encoded_data = _g_dbus_hexencode (data, data_len);
s = g_strdup_printf ("DATA %s\r\n", encoded_data);
g_free (encoded_data);
}
g_free (data);
debug_print ("SERVER: writing '%s'", s);
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_string (dos, s, cancellable, error))
{
g_free (s);
goto out;
}
g_free (s);
}
}
goto change_state;
break;
default:
/* TODO */
g_assert_not_reached ();
break;
}
}
}
else
{
g_set_error (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
"Unexpected line '%s' while in WaitingForAuth state",
line);
g_free (line);
goto out;
}
break;
case SERVER_STATE_WAITING_FOR_DATA:
debug_print ("SERVER: WaitingForData");
line = _my_g_input_stream_read_line_safe (g_io_stream_get_input_stream (auth->priv->stream),
&line_length,
cancellable,
error);
debug_print ("SERVER: WaitingForData, read '%s'", line);
if (line == NULL)
goto out;
if (g_str_equal (line, "DATA") || g_str_has_prefix (line, "DATA "))
{
gchar *encoded;
gchar *decoded_data;
gsize decoded_data_len = 0;
encoded = g_strdup (line + 4);
g_free (line);
g_strstrip (encoded);
decoded_data = hexdecode (encoded, &decoded_data_len, error);
g_free (encoded);
if (decoded_data == NULL)
{
g_prefix_error (error, "DATA response is malformed: ");
/* invalid encoding, disconnect! */
goto out;
}
_g_dbus_auth_mechanism_server_data_receive (mech, decoded_data, decoded_data_len);
g_free (decoded_data);
/* oh man, this goto-crap is so ugly.. really need to rewrite the state machine */
goto change_state;
}
else
{
g_set_error (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
"Unexpected line '%s' while in WaitingForData state",
line);
g_free (line);
}
goto out;
case SERVER_STATE_WAITING_FOR_BEGIN:
debug_print ("SERVER: WaitingForBegin");
line = _my_g_input_stream_read_line_safe (g_io_stream_get_input_stream (auth->priv->stream),
&line_length,
cancellable,
error);
if (line == NULL)
goto out;
debug_print ("SERVER: WaitingForBegin, read '%s'", line);
if (g_strcmp0 (line, "BEGIN") == 0)
{
/* YAY, done! */
ret = TRUE;
g_free (line);
goto out;
}
else if (g_strcmp0 (line, "NEGOTIATE_UNIX_FD") == 0)
{
g_free (line);
if (offered_capabilities & G_DBUS_CAPABILITY_FLAGS_UNIX_FD_PASSING)
{
negotiated_capabilities |= G_DBUS_CAPABILITY_FLAGS_UNIX_FD_PASSING;
s = "AGREE_UNIX_FD\r\n";
debug_print ("SERVER: writing '%s'", s);
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_string (dos, s, cancellable, error))
goto out;
}
else
{
s = "ERROR \"fd passing not offered\"\r\n";
debug_print ("SERVER: writing '%s'", s);
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_string (dos, s, cancellable, error))
goto out;
}
}
else
{
g_debug ("Unexpected line '%s' while in WaitingForBegin state", line);
g_free (line);
s = "ERROR \"Unknown Command\"\r\n";
debug_print ("SERVER: writing '%s'", s);
if (!g_data_output_stream_put_string (dos, s, cancellable, error))
goto out;
}
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached ();
break;
}
}
g_set_error_literal (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
"Not implemented (server)");
out:
g_clear_object (&mech);
g_clear_object (&dos);
g_clear_object (&own_credentials);
/* ensure return value is FALSE if error is set */
if (error != NULL && *error != NULL)
{
ret = FALSE;
}
if (ret)
{
if (out_negotiated_capabilities != NULL)
*out_negotiated_capabilities = negotiated_capabilities;
if (out_received_credentials != NULL)
*out_received_credentials = credentials != NULL ? g_object_ref (credentials) : NULL;
}
if (credentials != NULL)
g_object_unref (credentials);
debug_print ("SERVER: Done, authenticated=%d", ret);
return ret;
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */