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Merge branch 'backport-1920-setgid-dbus-session-glib-2-66' into 'glib-2-66'
Backport !1920 “Resolve GDBus regressions in setcap/setgid programs” to glib-2-66 See merge request GNOME/glib!1922
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commit
0051c06355
@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@ g_dbus_address_get_for_bus_sync (GBusType bus_type,
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GCancellable *cancellable,
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GCancellable *cancellable,
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GError **error)
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GError **error)
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{
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{
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gboolean is_setuid = GLIB_PRIVATE_CALL (g_check_setuid) ();
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gboolean has_elevated_privileges = GLIB_PRIVATE_CALL (g_check_setuid) ();
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gchar *ret, *s = NULL;
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gchar *ret, *s = NULL;
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const gchar *starter_bus;
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const gchar *starter_bus;
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GError *local_error;
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GError *local_error;
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@ -1324,7 +1324,11 @@ g_dbus_address_get_for_bus_sync (GBusType bus_type,
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switch (bus_type)
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switch (bus_type)
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{
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{
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case G_BUS_TYPE_SYSTEM:
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case G_BUS_TYPE_SYSTEM:
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ret = !is_setuid ? g_strdup (g_getenv ("DBUS_SYSTEM_BUS_ADDRESS")) : NULL;
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if (has_elevated_privileges)
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ret = NULL;
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else
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ret = g_strdup (g_getenv ("DBUS_SYSTEM_BUS_ADDRESS"));
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if (ret == NULL)
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if (ret == NULL)
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{
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{
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ret = g_strdup ("unix:path=/var/run/dbus/system_bus_socket");
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ret = g_strdup ("unix:path=/var/run/dbus/system_bus_socket");
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@ -1332,7 +1336,33 @@ g_dbus_address_get_for_bus_sync (GBusType bus_type,
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break;
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break;
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case G_BUS_TYPE_SESSION:
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case G_BUS_TYPE_SESSION:
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ret = !is_setuid ? g_strdup (g_getenv ("DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS")) : NULL;
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if (has_elevated_privileges)
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{
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#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
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if (geteuid () == getuid ())
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{
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/* Ideally we shouldn't do this, because setgid and
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* filesystem capabilities are also elevated privileges
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* with which we should not be trusting environment variables
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* from the caller. Unfortunately, there are programs with
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* elevated privileges that rely on the session bus being
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* available. We already prevent the really dangerous
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* transports like autolaunch: and unixexec: when our
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* privileges are elevated, so this can only make us connect
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* to the wrong AF_UNIX or TCP socket. */
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ret = g_strdup (g_getenv ("DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS"));
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}
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else
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#endif
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{
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ret = NULL;
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}
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}
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else
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{
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ret = g_strdup (g_getenv ("DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS"));
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}
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if (ret == NULL)
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if (ret == NULL)
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{
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{
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ret = get_session_address_platform_specific (&local_error);
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ret = get_session_address_platform_specific (&local_error);
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