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Revert "gdbus: Use DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS if AT_SECURE but not setuid"

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This reverts commit 7aa0580cc5.

As stated in #2316, that commit was a workaround to allow gnome-keyring
and msmtp to continue to get their session bus address from
`DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS`, even though they’re `AT_SECURE`. The timeout
on that workaround has expired so that commit is now being reverted.

Fixes: #2316
This commit is contained in:
Philip Withnall 2021-08-04 16:16:16 +01:00
parent 709df8eeb4
commit 0f9c7ed021
1 changed files with 2 additions and 24 deletions
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26
gio/gdbusaddress.c
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@ -1343,31 +1343,9 @@ g_dbus_address_get_for_bus_sync (GBusType bus_type,
case G_BUS_TYPE_SESSION:
if (has_elevated_privileges)
{
#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
if (geteuid () == getuid ())
{
/* Ideally we shouldn't do this, because setgid and
* filesystem capabilities are also elevated privileges
* with which we should not be trusting environment variables
* from the caller. Unfortunately, there are programs with
* elevated privileges that rely on the session bus being
* available. We already prevent the really dangerous
* transports like autolaunch: and unixexec: when our
* privileges are elevated, so this can only make us connect
* to the wrong AF_UNIX or TCP socket. */
ret = g_strdup (g_getenv ("DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS"));
}
else
#endif
{
ret = NULL;
}
}
ret = NULL;
else
{
ret = g_strdup (g_getenv ("DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS"));
}
ret = g_strdup (g_getenv ("DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS"));
if (ret == NULL)
{