Merge branch 'wip/smcv/but-what-if-capabilities' into 'master'

Make tests pass if we are euid != 0 with capabilities

Closes #2029, #2028, and #2027

See merge request GNOME/glib!1363
This commit is contained in:
Philip Withnall 2020-02-14 11:45:01 +00:00
commit 4a153abebe
3 changed files with 192 additions and 29 deletions

View File

@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <glib/glib.h>
#include <gio/gio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
@ -115,6 +116,65 @@ static gboolean write_test;
static gboolean verbose;
static gboolean posix_compat;
#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
/*
* check_cap_dac_override:
* @tmpdir: A temporary directory in which we can create and delete files
*
* Check whether the current process can bypass DAC permissions.
*
* Traditionally, "privileged" processes (those with effective uid 0)
* could do this (and bypass many other checks), and "unprivileged"
* processes could not.
*
* In Linux, the special powers of euid 0 are divided into many
* capabilities: see `capabilities(7)`. The one we are interested in
* here is `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE`.
*
* We do this generically instead of actually looking at the capability
* bits, so that the right thing will happen on non-Linux Unix
* implementations, in particular if they have something equivalent to
* but not identical to Linux permissions.
*
* Returns: %TRUE if we have Linux `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE` or equivalent
* privileges
*/
static gboolean
check_cap_dac_override (const char *tmpdir)
{
gchar *dac_denies_write;
gchar *inside;
gboolean have_cap;
dac_denies_write = g_build_filename (tmpdir, "dac-denies-write", NULL);
inside = g_build_filename (dac_denies_write, "inside", NULL);
g_assert_cmpint (mkdir (dac_denies_write, S_IRWXU) == 0 ? 0 : errno, ==, 0);
g_assert_cmpint (chmod (dac_denies_write, 0) == 0 ? 0 : errno, ==, 0);
if (mkdir (inside, S_IRWXU) == 0)
{
g_test_message ("Looks like we have CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or equivalent");
g_assert_cmpint (rmdir (inside) == 0 ? 0 : errno, ==, 0);
have_cap = TRUE;
}
else
{
int saved_errno = errno;
g_test_message ("We do not have CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or equivalent");
g_assert_cmpint (saved_errno, ==, EACCES);
have_cap = FALSE;
}
g_assert_cmpint (chmod (dac_denies_write, S_IRWXU) == 0 ? 0 : errno, ==, 0);
g_assert_cmpint (rmdir (dac_denies_write) == 0 ? 0 : errno, ==, 0);
g_free (dac_denies_write);
g_free (inside);
return have_cap;
}
#endif
#ifdef G_HAVE_ISO_VARARGS
#define log(...) if (verbose) g_printerr (__VA_ARGS__)
#elif defined(G_HAVE_GNUC_VARARGS)
@ -708,6 +768,9 @@ do_copy_move (GFile * root, struct StructureItem item, const char *target_dir,
GFile *dst_dir, *src_file, *dst_file;
gboolean res;
GError *error;
#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
gboolean have_cap_dac_override = check_cap_dac_override (g_file_peek_path (root));
#endif
log (" do_copy_move: '%s' --> '%s'\n", item.filename, target_dir);
@ -768,12 +831,17 @@ do_copy_move (GFile * root, struct StructureItem item, const char *target_dir,
(extra_flags == TEST_NO_ACCESS))
{
/* This works for root, see bug #552912 */
if (test_suite && getuid () == 0)
#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
if (have_cap_dac_override)
{
g_test_message ("Unable to exercise g_file_copy() or g_file_move() "
"failing with EACCES: we probably have "
"CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE");
g_assert_true (res);
g_assert_no_error (error);
}
else
#endif
{
g_assert_false (res);
g_assert_error (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
@ -1121,6 +1189,9 @@ test_make_directory_with_parents (gconstpointer test_data)
GFile *root, *child, *grandchild, *greatgrandchild;
gboolean res;
GError *error = NULL;
#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
gboolean have_cap_dac_override = check_cap_dac_override (test_data);
#endif
g_assert_nonnull (test_data);
@ -1171,9 +1242,16 @@ test_make_directory_with_parents (gconstpointer test_data)
if (!posix_compat)
goto out;
#ifndef G_PLATFORM_WIN32
if (getuid() == 0) /* permissions are ignored for root */
goto out;
#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
/* Permissions are ignored if we have CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or equivalent,
* and in particular if we're root */
if (have_cap_dac_override)
{
g_test_skip ("Unable to exercise g_file_make_directory_with_parents "
"failing with EACCES: we probably have "
"CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE");
goto out;
}
#endif
g_file_make_directory (child, NULL, NULL);
@ -1343,7 +1421,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
}
g_option_context_free (context);
/* Write test - clean target directory first */
/* this can be also considered as a test - enumerate + delete */
if (write_test || only_create_struct)

View File

@ -522,6 +522,65 @@ test_mkdir_with_parents (void)
g_assert_cmpint (errno, ==, EINVAL);
}
#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
/*
* check_cap_dac_override:
* @tmpdir: A temporary directory in which we can create and delete files
*
* Check whether the current process can bypass DAC permissions.
*
* Traditionally, "privileged" processes (those with effective uid 0)
* could do this (and bypass many other checks), and "unprivileged"
* processes could not.
*
* In Linux, the special powers of euid 0 are divided into many
* capabilities: see `capabilities(7)`. The one we are interested in
* here is `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE`.
*
* We do this generically instead of actually looking at the capability
* bits, so that the right thing will happen on non-Linux Unix
* implementations, in particular if they have something equivalent to
* but not identical to Linux permissions.
*
* Returns: %TRUE if we have Linux `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE` or equivalent
* privileges
*/
static gboolean
check_cap_dac_override (const char *tmpdir)
{
gchar *dac_denies_write;
gchar *inside;
gboolean have_cap;
dac_denies_write = g_build_filename (tmpdir, "dac-denies-write", NULL);
inside = g_build_filename (dac_denies_write, "inside", NULL);
g_assert_cmpint (mkdir (dac_denies_write, S_IRWXU) == 0 ? 0 : errno, ==, 0);
g_assert_cmpint (chmod (dac_denies_write, 0) == 0 ? 0 : errno, ==, 0);
if (mkdir (inside, S_IRWXU) == 0)
{
g_test_message ("Looks like we have CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or equivalent");
g_assert_cmpint (rmdir (inside) == 0 ? 0 : errno, ==, 0);
have_cap = TRUE;
}
else
{
int saved_errno = errno;
g_test_message ("We do not have CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or equivalent");
g_assert_cmpint (saved_errno, ==, EACCES);
have_cap = FALSE;
}
g_assert_cmpint (chmod (dac_denies_write, S_IRWXU) == 0 ? 0 : errno, ==, 0);
g_assert_cmpint (rmdir (dac_denies_write) == 0 ? 0 : errno, ==, 0);
g_free (dac_denies_write);
g_free (inside);
return have_cap;
}
#endif
/* Reproducer for https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/issues/1852 */
static void
test_mkdir_with_parents_permission (void)
@ -534,21 +593,23 @@ test_mkdir_with_parents_permission (void)
GError *error = NULL;
int result;
int saved_errno;
gboolean have_cap_dac_override;
tmpdir = g_dir_make_tmp ("test-fileutils.XXXXXX", &error);
g_assert_no_error (error);
g_assert_nonnull (tmpdir);
have_cap_dac_override = check_cap_dac_override (tmpdir);
subdir = g_build_filename (tmpdir, "sub", NULL);
subdir2 = g_build_filename (subdir, "sub2", NULL);
subdir3 = g_build_filename (subdir2, "sub3", NULL);
g_assert_cmpint (g_mkdir (subdir, 0700) == 0 ? 0 : errno, ==, 0);
g_assert_cmpint (g_chmod (subdir, 0) == 0 ? 0 : errno, ==, 0);
if (g_mkdir (subdir2, 0700) == 0)
if (have_cap_dac_override)
{
g_test_skip ("have CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or equivalent, cannot test");
g_remove (subdir2);
}
else
{
@ -949,14 +1010,8 @@ test_stdio_wrappers (void)
GError *error = NULL;
GStatBuf path_statbuf, cwd_statbuf;
time_t now;
/* The permissions tests here dont work when running as root. */
#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
if (getuid () == 0 || geteuid () == 0)
{
g_test_skip ("File permissions tests cannot be run as root");
return;
}
gboolean have_cap_dac_override;
#endif
g_remove ("mkdir-test/test-create");
@ -973,13 +1028,32 @@ test_stdio_wrappers (void)
cwd = g_get_current_dir ();
path = g_build_filename (cwd, "mkdir-test", NULL);
g_free (cwd);
#ifndef G_OS_WIN32
/* 0666 on directories means nothing to Windows, it only obeys ACLs */
ret = g_chdir (path);
g_assert_cmpint (errno, ==, EACCES);
g_assert_cmpint (ret, ==, -1);
#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
have_cap_dac_override = check_cap_dac_override (cwd);
#endif
g_free (cwd);
/* 0666 on directories means nothing to Windows, it only obeys ACLs.
* It doesn't necessarily mean anything on Unix either: if we have
* Linux CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or equivalent (in particular if we're root),
* then we ignore filesystem permissions. */
#ifdef G_OS_UNIX
if (have_cap_dac_override)
{
g_test_message ("Cannot test g_chdir() failing with EACCES: we "
"probably have CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or equivalent");
}
else
{
ret = g_chdir (path);
g_assert_cmpint (ret == 0 ? 0 : errno, ==, EACCES);
g_assert_cmpint (ret, ==, -1);
}
#else
g_test_message ("Cannot test g_chdir() failing with EACCES: "
"it's Unix-specific behaviour");
#endif
ret = g_chmod (path, 0777);
g_assert_cmpint (ret, ==, 0);
ret = g_chdir (path);

View File

@ -138,12 +138,6 @@ test_thread4 (void)
GError *error;
gint ret;
/* Linux CAP_SYS_RESOURCE overrides RLIMIT_NPROC, and probably similar
* things are true on other systems.
*/
if (getuid () == 0 || geteuid () == 0)
return;
getrlimit (RLIMIT_NPROC, &nl);
nl.rlim_cur = 1;
@ -152,9 +146,26 @@ test_thread4 (void)
error = NULL;
thread = g_thread_try_new ("a", thread1_func, NULL, &error);
g_assert (thread == NULL);
g_assert_error (error, G_THREAD_ERROR, G_THREAD_ERROR_AGAIN);
g_error_free (error);
if (thread != NULL)
{
gpointer result;
/* Privileged processes might be able to create new threads even
* though the rlimit is too low. There isn't much we can do about
* this; we just can't test this failure mode in this situation. */
g_test_skip ("Unable to test g_thread_try_new() failing with EAGAIN "
"while privileged (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, CAP_SYS_ADMIN or "
"euid 0?)");
result = g_thread_join (thread);
g_assert_cmpint (GPOINTER_TO_INT (result), ==, 1);
}
else
{
g_assert (thread == NULL);
g_assert_error (error, G_THREAD_ERROR, G_THREAD_ERROR_AGAIN);
g_error_free (error);
}
if ((ret = prlimit (getpid (), RLIMIT_NPROC, &ol, NULL)) != 0)
g_error ("resetting RLIMIT_NPROC failed: %s", g_strerror (errno));