Nicks and blurbs don't have any practical use for gio/gobject libraries.
Leaving tests untouched since this features is still used by other libraries.
Closes#2991
Otherwise, the content of the buffer is thrown away when switching
from reading via a GDataInputStream to unbuffered reads when waiting
for the "BEGIN" line.
(The code already tried to protect against over-reading like this by
using unbuffered reads for the last few lines of the auth protocol,
but it might already be too late at that point. The buffer of the
GDataInputStream might already contain the "BEGIN" line for example.)
This matters when connecting a sd-bus client directly to a GDBus
client. A sd-bus client optimistically sends the whole auth
conversation in one go without waiting for intermediate replies. This
is done to improve performance for the many short-lived connections
that are typically made.
The dominant implementations of the well-known session and system
message buses are the reference implementation from the dbus project
(dbus-daemon) and the sd-bus-based reimplementation dbus-broker, both
of which have correct implementations for EXTERNAL authentication with
an unspecified authorization identity.
This makes it reasonably safe to assume that the well-known message
buses can cope with the unspecified authorization identity, even if we
cannot make the same assumption for custom servers such as the ones
used in ibus and gvfs (which might have been started with an older
GLib version before upgrading GLib in-place).
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
When using a GDBus client in a non-trivial user namespace, the result of
geteuid() can differ from the uid in the namespace where the server is
running. This would result in connection attempts being rejected, because
the identity that the client claims to have does not match the identity
that the server derives from its credentials.
RFC 4422 allows us to send an empty authorization identity, which means we
want to authenticate as whatever identity the server can derive from our
out-of-band credentials. In particular, this resolves the authentication
failure when crossing between different Linux user namespaces.
Because D-Bus does not have a way to represent an empty initial response
as distinct from the absence of an initial response, we cannot use the
initial-response optimization (RFC 4422 §4.3.a) in this case, and must
fall back to waiting for the server to send a challenge.
Unfortunately, GDBus versions older than glib!2826 did not implement
the server side of this protocol correctly, and would respond to the
missing initial response in a way that breaks the SASL state machine
(expecting a response without sending a challenge), causing client and
server to deadlock with each waiting for the other to respond. Until
fixed versions of GDBus are widespread, we can't rely on having a server
that can cope with this, so gate it behind a flag, which can be set for
connections that are known to cross non-trivial namespace boundaries.
Originally inspired by
<1ed4723d38>,
and based on earlier work by Giuseppe Scrivano (in which the
cross-namespace behaviour was unconditional, rather than gated by a
flag).
Co-authored-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <giuseppe@scrivano.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
This is an interoperability fix. The reference implementation of D-Bus
treats "DATA\r\n" as equivalent to "DATA \r\n", but sd-bus does not,
and only accepts the former.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
This is an interoperability fix. If the line is exactly "DATA\r\n",
the reference implementation of D-Bus treats this as equivalent to
"DATA \r\n", meaning the data block consists of zero hex-encoded bytes.
In practice, D-Bus clients send empty data blocks as "DATA\r\n", and
in fact sd-bus only accepts that, rejecting "DATA \r\n".
[Originally part of a larger commit; commit message added by smcv]
Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <giuseppe@scrivano.org>
Co-authored-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Add SPDX license (but not copyright) headers to all files which follow a
certain pattern in their existing non-machine-readable header comment.
This commit was entirely generated using the command:
```
git ls-files gio/*.[ch] | xargs perl -0777 -pi -e 's/\n \*\n \* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and\/or\n \* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public/\n \*\n \* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later\n \*\n \* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and\/or\n \* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public/igs'
```
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Helps: #1415
The AF_UNIX API is available under all platforms since 2.71.1, and
credentials functions returns NOT_SUPPORTED error appropriately,
we can thus remove the special-casing for !unix.
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
This eliminates a common use case for the
`GDBusAuthObserver::authorize-authenticated-peer` signal, which is often
implemented incorrectly by people.
Suggested by Simon McVittie.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Fixes: #1804
Conceptually, a D-Bus server is really trying to determine the credentials
of (the process that initiated) a connection, not the credentials that
the process had when it sent a particular message. Ideally, it does
this with a getsockopt()-style API that queries the credentials of the
connection's initiator without requiring any particular cooperation from
that process, avoiding a class of possible failures.
The leading '\0' in the D-Bus protocol is primarily a workaround
for platforms where the message-based credentials-passing API is
strictly better than the getsockopt()-style API (for example, on
FreeBSD, SCM_CREDS includes a process ID but getpeereid() does not),
or where the getsockopt()-style API does not exist at all. As a result
libdbus, the reference implementation of D-Bus, does not implement
Linux SCM_CREDENTIALS at all - it has no reason to do so, because the
SO_PEERCRED socket option is equally informative.
This change makes GDBusServer on Linux more closely match the behaviour
of libdbus.
In particular, GNOME/glib#1831 indicates that when a libdbus client
connects to a GDBus server, recvmsg() sometimes yields a SCM_CREDENTIALS
message with cmsg_data={pid=0, uid=65534, gid=65534}. I think this is
most likely a race condition in the early steps to connect:
client server
connect
accept
send '\0' <- race -> set SO_PASSCRED = 1
receive '\0'
If the server wins the race:
client server
connect
accept
set SO_PASSCRED = 1
send '\0'
receive '\0'
then everything is fine. However, if the client wins the race:
client server
connect
accept
send '\0'
set SO_PASSCRED = 1
receive '\0'
then the kernel does not record credentials for the message containing
'\0' (because SO_PASSCRED was 0 at the time). However, by the time the
server receives the message, the kernel knows that credentials are
desired. I would have expected the kernel to omit the credentials header
in this case, but it seems that instead, it synthesizes a credentials
structure with a dummy process ID 0, a dummy uid derived from
/proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid and a dummy gid derived from
/proc/sys/kernel/overflowgid.
In an unconfigured GDBusServer, hitting this race condition results in
falling back to DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication, which in practice usually
succeeds in authenticating the peer's uid. However, we encourage AF_UNIX
servers on Unix platforms to allow only EXTERNAL authentication as a
security-hardening measure, because DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 relies on a series
of assumptions including a cryptographically strong PRNG and a shared
home directory with no write access by others, which are not necessarily
true for all operating systems and users. EXTERNAL authentication will
fail if the server cannot determine the client's credentials.
In particular, this caused a regression when CVE-2019-14822 was fixed
in ibus, which appears to be resolved by this commit. Qt clients
(which use libdbus) intermittently fail to connect to an ibus server
(which uses GDBusServer), because ibus no longer allows DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1
authentication or non-matching uids.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Closes: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/issues/1831
This mostly affects the 2.56 branch, but, given that GCC 9 is being
stricter about passing null string pointers to printf-like functions, it
might make sense to proactively fix such calls.
gdbusauth.c: In function '_g_dbus_auth_run_server':
gdbusauth.c:1302:11: error: '%s' directive argument is null
[-Werror=format-overflow=]
1302 | debug_print ("SERVER: WaitingForBegin, read '%s'",
line);
|
gdbusmessage.c: In function ‘g_dbus_message_to_blob’:
gdbusmessage.c:2730:30: error: ‘%s’ directive argument is null [-Werror=format-overflow=]
2730 | tupled_signature_str = g_strdup_printf ("(%s)", signature_str);
|
Setting a variable and then assigning it to itself avoids
-Wunused-but-set-variable but this specific trick is now caught by
-Wself-assign. Instead, actually use the value or don't bother
assigning it at all:
gdbusauth.c: call g_data_input_stream_read_byte() in void context
gdbusauthmechanismsha1.c: value is actually used
gdbusmessage.c: use consistent preprocessor-token protection
gthreadedresolver.c: skip over bytes in data blob
httpd.c: do something useful with the value
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=745723
Happens when the waiting-for-auth state is re-entered:
SERVER_STATE_WAITING_FOR_AUTH
|
v
G_DBUS_AUTH_MECHANISM_STATE_REJECTED
|
v
SERVER_STATE_WAITING_FOR_AUTH
Causing the previous `mech` pointer to get overwritten.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=778991
_g_dbus_auth_mechanism_server_data_send may fail in which case
we would endup getting a NULL data. In this case we should not
try to encode the data and simply let the state machine to continue.
The auth mechanism will change internally to REJECTED so we just
need to continue the iteration.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=775309
As it turns out, we have examples of internal functions called
type_name_get_private() in the wild (especially among older libraries),
so we need to use a name for the per-instance private data getter
function that hopefully won't conflict with anything.
Back in the far-off twentieth century, it was normal on unix
workstations for U+0060 GRAVE ACCENT to be drawn as "‛" and for U+0027
APOSTROPHE to be drawn as "’". This led to the convention of using
them as poor-man's ‛smart quotes’ in ASCII-only text.
However, "'" is now universally drawn as a vertical line, and "`" at a
45-degree angle, making them an `odd couple' when used together.
Unfortunately, there are lots of very old strings in glib, and also
lots of new strings in which people have kept up the old tradition,
perhaps entirely unaware that it used to not look stupid.
Fix this by just using 'dumb quotes' everywhere.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=700746
This allows compilation with clang without errors, even when
-Wformat-nonliteral is active (as long as there are no real cases of
non literal formatting).
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=691608
Install a public "gnetworking.h" header that can be used to include
the relevant OS-dependent networking headers. This does not really
abstract away unix-vs-windows however; error codes, in particular,
are incompatible.
gnetworkingprivate.h now contains just a few internal URI-related
functions
Also add a g_networking_init() function to gnetworking.h, which can be
used to explicitly initialize OS-level networking, rather than having
that happen as a side-effect of registering GInetAddress.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=623187
==6793== 16 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 632 of 1,423
==6793== at 0x4005BDC: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:195)
==6793== by 0x4057094: g_malloc (gmem.c:134)
==6793== by 0x417FC29: g_data_input_stream_read_line (gdatainputstream.c:797)
==6793== by 0x41F99C1: _my_g_data_input_stream_read_line (gdbusauth.c:279)
==6793== by 0x41FA728: _g_dbus_auth_run_client (gdbusauth.c:759)
Bug #628327.
These fixes makes udisks-daemon from udisks' gdbus-port branch, see
http://cgit.freedesktop.org/udisks/log/?h=gdbus-port
handle 200 add/remove uevents generated by e.g.
#!/bin/bash
DEV=mmcblk0p1
for n in `seq 200` ; do
udevadm trigger --sysname-match=$DEV --action=remove
udevadm trigger --sysname-match=$DEV --action=add
echo foo $n
done
without any substantial leaks.
Signed-off-by: David Zeuthen <davidz@redhat.com>
- Fix various #include issues
- Change #error to #warning for the EXTERNAL authentication mechanism.
It is not clear if this should work on Win32 at all.
- Call close() before unlink() for the SHA1 keyring
- Change #error to #warning so we don't forget to do
permission checking of the .dbus-keyrings directory
- Use Win32 SID for the SHA1 auth mech
- Apparently we can't use word 'interface' as an identifier
- Implement a _g_dbus_win32_get_user_sid() function. For now it's
private. Don't know if it should be public somewhere. Maybe in
a future GCredentials support for Win32? I don't know.
- GFileDescriptorBased is not available on Win32. So avoid using
it in GLocalFile stuff. Now, Win32 still uses GLocalFile + friends
(which works with file descriptors) so expose a private function
to get the fd for an OutputStream so things still work.
- Fixup gio.symbols
- Fixup tests/gdbus-peer.c so it builds
With this, at least things compile and the gdbus-peer.exe test case
passes. Which is a great start. I've tested this by cross-compiling on
a x86_64 Fedora 13 host using mingw32 and running the code on a 32-bit
Windows 7 box.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=619142
Signed-off-by: David Zeuthen <davidz@redhat.com>
From valgrind running gdbus-peer test:
==20513== 32 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 1 of 15
==20513== at 0x4024E4C: realloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:429)
==20513== by 0x4079BB1: g_realloc (gmem.c:174)
==20513== by 0x4099472: g_string_maybe_expand (gstring.c:396)
==20513== by 0x409A42A: g_string_insert_c (gstring.c:1050)
==20513== by 0x42169AC: g_string_append_c_inline (gstring.h:153)
==20513== by 0x421682C: _my_g_input_stream_read_line_safe (gdbusauth.c:336)
==20513== by 0x421843E: _g_dbus_auth_run_server (gdbusauth.c:1265)
==20513== by 0x4222B94: initable_init (gdbusconnection.c:1783)
==20513== by 0x41CF8D5: g_initable_init (ginitable.c:106)
==20513== by 0x41CFA8D: g_initable_new_valist (ginitable.c:219)
==20513== by 0x41CF920: g_initable_new (ginitable.c:139)
==20513== by 0x4223479: g_dbus_connection_new_sync (gdbusconnection.c:2046)
Bug #618650.
