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nodejs4/CVE-2018-12116.patch

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Backport security fixes from NodeJS 6.x: * debugger: prevent the debugger from listening on 0.0.0.0. It now defaults to 127.0.0.1. CVE-2018-12120.patch - (CVE-2018-12120, bsc#1117625) * http: + Two-byte characters are now strictly disallowed for the path option in HTTP client requests. Paths containing characters outside of the range \u0021 - \u00ff will now be rejected with a TypeError. This behavior can be reverted if necessary by supplying the --security-revert=CVE-2018-12116 command line argument (this is not recommended). CVE-2018-12116.patch - (CVE-2018-12116, bsc#1117630) * util: Fix a bug that would allow a hostname being spoofed when parsing URLs with url.parse() with the 'javascript:' protocol. CVE-2018-12123.patch - (CVE-2018-12123, bnc#1117629) OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/devel:languages:nodejs/nodejs4?expand=0&rev=99
2019-01-08 16:04:58 +00:00
Ported from following patches,
http: disallow two-byte characters in URL path
CVE-2018-12116
Backport of b961d9f to 6.x
Original commit:
This commit changes node's handling of two-byte characters in
the path component of an http URL. Previously, node would just
strip the higher byte when generating the request. So this code:
```
http.request({host: "example.com", port: "80", "/Ｎ"})
```
would request `http://example.com/.`
(`.` is the character for the byte `0x2e`).
This is not useful and can in some cases lead to filter evasion.
With this change, the code generates `ERR_UNESCAPED_CHARACTERS`,
just like space and control characters already did.
PR-URL: #16237
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
Reviewed-By: Anatoli Papirovski <apapirovski@mac.com>
Reviewed-By: Ruben Bridgewater <ruben@bridgewater.de>
Reviewed-By: Timothy Gu <timothygu99@gmail.com>
PR-URL: nodejs-private/node-private#146
Fixes: nodejs-private/security#207
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <michael_dawson@ca.ibm.com>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Sakthipriyan Vairamani <thechargingvolcano@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
Reviewed-By: Timothy Gu <timothygu99@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Ruben Bridgewater <ruben@bridgewater.de>
From 35344e87bfc7c01079502850ce023e781a85db2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 09:34:37 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] src: minor cleanup for node_revert
Make the revert related functions inline to eliminate the need
for node_revert.cc, prefitx the constants and the def, other misc
cleanup
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/14864
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
From dd20c0186fab9dd92b42f280b8d2b6f980f6b406 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matteo Collina <hello@matteocollina.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 15:02:26 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] http: add --security-revert for CVE-2018-12116
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/146
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <michael_dawson@ca.ibm.com>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Sakthipriyan Vairamani <thechargingvolcano@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
Reviewed-By: Timothy Gu <timothygu99@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Ruben Bridgewater <ruben@bridgewater.de>
Index: node-v4.9.1/lib/_http_client.js
===================================================================
--- node-v4.9.1.orig/lib/_http_client.js
+++ node-v4.9.1/lib/_http_client.js
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ const OutgoingMessage = require('_http_o
const Agent = require('_http_agent');
const Buffer = require('buffer').Buffer;
+const REVERT_CVE_2018_12116 = process.REVERT_CVE_2018_12116;
+
+const INVALID_PATH_REGEX = /[^\u0021-\u00ff]/;
+
function ClientRequest(options, cb) {
var self = this;
@@ -40,15 +44,21 @@ function ClientRequest(options, cb) {
if (self.agent && self.agent.protocol)
expectedProtocol = self.agent.protocol;
- if (options.path && /[\u0000-\u0020]/.test(options.path)) {
- // The actual regex is more like /[^A-Za-z0-9\-._~!$&'()*+,;=/:@]/
- // with an additional rule for ignoring percentage-escaped characters
- // but that's a) hard to capture in a regular expression that performs
- // well, and b) possibly too restrictive for real-world usage. That's
- // why it only scans for spaces because those are guaranteed to create
- // an invalid request.
- throw new TypeError('Request path contains unescaped characters.');
- } else if (protocol !== expectedProtocol) {
+ var path;
+ if (options.path) {
+ path = String(options.path);
+ var invalidPath;
+ if (REVERT_CVE_2018_12116) {
+ invalidPath = /[\u0000-\u0020]/.test(path);
+ } else {
+ invalidPath = INVALID_PATH_REGEX.test(path);
+ }
+
+ if (invalidPath)
+ throw new TypeError('Request path contains unescaped characters');
+ }
+
+ if (protocol !== expectedProtocol) {
throw new Error('Protocol "' + protocol + '" not supported. ' +
'Expected "' + expectedProtocol + '".');
}
Index: node-v4.9.1/test/parallel/test-http-client-invalid-path.js
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ node-v4.9.1/test/parallel/test-http-client-invalid-path.js
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+'use strict';
+
+require('../common');
+
+const http = require('http');
+const assert = require('assert');
+
+assert.throws(() => {
+ http.request({
+ path: '/thisisinvalid\uffe2'
+ }).end();
+}, /Request path contains unescaped characters/);
+
Index: node-v4.9.1/node.gyp
===================================================================
--- node-v4.9.1.orig/node.gyp
+++ node-v4.9.1/node.gyp
@@ -152,7 +152,6 @@
'src/node_javascript.cc',
'src/node_main.cc',
'src/node_os.cc',
- 'src/node_revert.cc',
'src/node_util.cc',
'src/node_v8.cc',
'src/node_stat_watcher.cc',
Index: node-v4.9.1/src/node.cc
===================================================================
--- node-v4.9.1.orig/src/node.cc
+++ node-v4.9.1/src/node.cc
@@ -153,6 +153,9 @@ static node_module* modlist_builtin;
static node_module* modlist_linked;
static node_module* modlist_addon;
+// Bit flag used to track security reverts (see node_revert.h)
+unsigned int reverted = 0;
+
#if defined(NODE_HAVE_I18N_SUPPORT)
// Path to ICU data (for i18n / Intl)
static const char* icu_data_dir = nullptr;
@@ -3126,11 +3129,11 @@ void SetupProcessObject(Environment* env
// --security-revert flags
#define V(code, _, __) \
do { \
- if (IsReverted(REVERT_ ## code)) { \
+ if (IsReverted(SECURITY_REVERT_ ## code)) { \
READONLY_PROPERTY(process, "REVERT_" #code, True(env->isolate())); \
} \
} while (0);
- REVERSIONS(V)
+ SECURITY_REVERSIONS(V)
#undef V
size_t exec_path_len = 2 * PATH_MAX;
Index: node-v4.9.1/src/node_revert.cc
===================================================================
--- node-v4.9.1.orig/src/node_revert.cc
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-#include "node_revert.h"
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-namespace node {
-
-unsigned int reverted = 0;
-
-const char* RevertMessage(const unsigned int cve) {
-#define V(code, label, msg) case REVERT_ ## code: return label ": " msg;
- switch (cve) {
- REVERSIONS(V)
- default:
- return "Unknown";
- }
-#undef V
-}
-
-void Revert(const unsigned int cve) {
- reverted |= 1 << cve;
- printf("SECURITY WARNING: Reverting %s\n", RevertMessage(cve));
-}
-
-void Revert(const char* cve) {
-#define V(code, label, _) \
- do { \
- if (strcmp(cve, label) == 0) { \
- Revert(static_cast<unsigned int>(REVERT_ ## code)); \
- return; \
- } \
- } while (0);
- REVERSIONS(V)
-#undef V
- printf("Error: Attempt to revert an unknown CVE [%s]\n", cve);
- exit(12);
-}
-
-bool IsReverted(const unsigned int cve) {
- return reverted & (1 << cve);
-}
-
-bool IsReverted(const char * cve) {
-#define V(code, label, _) \
- do { \
- if (strcmp(cve, label) == 0) \
- return IsReverted(static_cast<unsigned int>(REVERT_ ## code)); \
- } while (0);
- REVERSIONS(V)
- return false;
-#undef V
-}
-
-} // namespace node
Index: node-v4.9.1/src/node_revert.h
===================================================================
--- node-v4.9.1.orig/src/node_revert.h
+++ node-v4.9.1/src/node_revert.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#define SRC_NODE_REVERT_H_
#include "node.h"
+#include <string.h>
/**
* Note that it is expected for this list to vary across specific LTS and
@@ -10,33 +11,56 @@
* consensus.
*
* For *master* this list should always be empty!
- *
**/
-#define REVERSIONS(XX) \
- XX(CVE_2016_2216, "CVE-2016-2216", "Strict HTTP Header Parsing")
-
namespace node {
-typedef enum {
-#define V(code, _, __) REVERT_ ## code,
- REVERSIONS(V)
+#define SECURITY_REVERSIONS(XX) \
+ XX(CVE_2016_2216, "CVE-2016-2216", "Strict HTTP Header Parsing") \
+ XX(CVE_2018_12116, "CVE-2018-12116", "HTTP request splitting")
+
+enum reversion {
+#define V(code, ...) SECURITY_REVERT_##code,
+ SECURITY_REVERSIONS(V)
#undef V
-} reversions_t;
+};
-/* A bit field for tracking the active reverts */
extern unsigned int reverted;
-/* Revert the given CVE (see reversions_t enum) */
-void Revert(const unsigned int cve);
-
-/* Revert the given CVE by label */
-void Revert(const char* cve);
-
-/* true if the CVE has been reverted **/
-bool IsReverted(const unsigned int cve);
+inline const char* RevertMessage(const reversion cve) {
+#define V(code, label, msg) case SECURITY_REVERT_##code: return label ": " msg;
+ switch (cve) {
+ SECURITY_REVERSIONS(V)
+ default:
+ return "Unknown";
+ }
+#undef V
+}
-/* true if the CVE has been reverted **/
-bool IsReverted(const char * cve);
+inline void Revert(const reversion cve) {
+ reverted |= 1 << cve;
+ printf("SECURITY WARNING: Reverting %s\n", RevertMessage(cve));
+}
+
+inline void Revert(const char* cve) {
+#define V(code, label, _) \
+ if (strcmp(cve, label) == 0) return Revert(SECURITY_REVERT_##code);
+ SECURITY_REVERSIONS(V)
+#undef V
+ printf("Error: Attempt to revert an unknown CVE [%s]\n", cve);
+ exit(12);
+}
+
+inline bool IsReverted(const reversion cve) {
+ return reverted & (1 << cve);
+}
+
+inline bool IsReverted(const char* cve) {
+#define V(code, label, _) \
+ if (strcmp(cve, label) == 0) return IsReverted(SECURITY_REVERT_##code);
+ SECURITY_REVERSIONS(V)
+ return false;
+#undef V
+}
} // namespace node
Index: node-v4.9.1/src/node_http_parser.cc
===================================================================
--- node-v4.9.1.orig/src/node_http_parser.cc
+++ node-v4.9.1/src/node_http_parser.cc
@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ class Parser : public AsyncWrap {
void Init(enum http_parser_type type) {
http_parser_init(&parser_, type);
/* Allow the strict http header parsing to be reverted */
- parser_.lenient_http_headers = IsReverted(REVERT_CVE_2016_2216) ? 1 : 0;
+ parser_.lenient_http_headers = IsReverted(SECURITY_REVERT_CVE_2016_2216) ? 1 : 0;
url_.Reset();
status_message_.Reset();
num_fields_ = 0;
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