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OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/at?expand=0&rev=2

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OBS User unknown
2007-03-20 00:14:00 +00:00
committed by Git OBS Bridge
parent 9de569f3ef
commit ffd69c3d3e
4 changed files with 451 additions and 4 deletions
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433
at-3.1.8-pam.diff Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,433 @@
Index: Makefile.in
===================================================================
--- Makefile.in.orig 2007-03-19 16:40:39.612098659 +0100
+++ Makefile.in 2007-03-19 16:41:20.522510161 +0100
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ YACC = @YACC@
LEX = @LEX@
LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@
SELINUXLIB = @SELINUXLIB@
+PAMLIB = @PAMLIB@
CC = @CC@
CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@
@@ -67,13 +68,13 @@ LIST = Filelist Filelist.asc
all: at atd atrun
at: $(ATOBJECTS)
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o at -pie $(ATOBJECTS) $(LIBS) $(LEXLIB)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o at -pie $(ATOBJECTS) $(LIBS) $(LEXLIB)
rm -f $(CLONES)
$(LN_S) -f at atq
$(LN_S) -f at atrm
atd: $(RUNOBJECTS)
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o atd -pie $(RUNOBJECTS) $(LIBS) $(SELINUXLIB)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o atd -pie $(RUNOBJECTS) $(LIBS) $(SELINUXLIB) $(PAMLIB)
y.tab.c y.tab.h: parsetime.y
$(YACC) -d parsetime.y
Index: atd.c
===================================================================
--- atd.c.orig 2007-03-19 16:40:39.612098659 +0100
+++ atd.c 2007-03-19 16:41:20.526510397 +0100
@@ -93,6 +93,20 @@ int selinux_enabled=0;
#include <selinux/av_permissions.h>
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+static const struct pam_conv conv = {
+ NULL
+};
+#define PAM_FAIL_CHECK if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n%s\n",pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); \
+ syslog(LOG_ERR,"%s",pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); \
+ pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT); \
+ pam_end(pamh, retcode); exit(1); \
+ }
+#endif
+
/* Local headers */
#include "privs.h"
@@ -102,6 +116,10 @@ int selinux_enabled=0;
#include "getloadavg.h"
#endif
+#ifndef LOG_ATD
+#define LOG_ATD LOG_DAEMON
+#endif
+
/* Macros */
#define BATCH_INTERVAL_DEFAULT 60
@@ -195,6 +213,19 @@ myfork()
#define fork myfork
#endif
+#undef ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM
+#undef ATD_MAIL_NAME
+#if defined(SENDMAIL)
+#define ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM SENDMAIL
+#define ATD_MAIL_NAME "sendmail"
+#elif defined(MAILC)
+#define ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM MAILC
+#define ATD_MAIL_NAME "mail"
+#elif defined(MAILX)
+#define ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM MAILX
+#define ATD_MAIL_NAME "mailx"
+#endif
+
static void
run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
@@ -217,6 +248,9 @@ run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid
int ngid;
char queue;
unsigned long jobno;
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ int retcode;
+#endif
sscanf(filename, "%c%5lx", &queue, &jobno);
@@ -361,6 +395,23 @@ run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid
fstat(fd_out, &buf);
size = buf.st_size;
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ PRIV_START
+ retcode = pam_start("atd", pentry->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "atd");
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ closelog();
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
+ PRIV_END
+#endif
+
close(STDIN_FILENO);
close(STDOUT_FILENO);
close(STDERR_FILENO);
@@ -372,6 +423,16 @@ run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid
else if (pid == 0) {
char *nul = NULL;
char **nenvp = &nul;
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ char **pam_envp=0L;
+#endif
+
+ PRIV_START
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ pam_envp = pam_getenvlist(pamh);
+ if ( ( pam_envp != 0L ) && (pam_envp[0] != 0L) )
+ nenvp = pam_envp;
+#endif
/* Set up things for the child; we want standard input from the
* input file, and standard output and error sent to our output file.
@@ -394,8 +455,6 @@ run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid
if (chdir(ATJOB_DIR) < 0)
perr("Cannot chdir to " ATJOB_DIR);
- PRIV_START
-
nice((tolower((int) queue) - 'a' + 1) * 2);
if (initgroups(pentry->pw_name, pentry->pw_gid))
@@ -419,8 +478,8 @@ run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid
int retval=0;
struct av_decision avd;
- if (get_default_context(pentry->pw_name, NULL, &user_context))
- perr("execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ if (get_default_context(pentry->pw_name, NULL, &user_context))
+ perr("execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
/*
* Since crontab files are not directly executed,
* crond must ensure that the crontab file has
@@ -428,7 +487,7 @@ run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid
* the user cron job. It performs an entrypoint
* permission check for this purpose.
*/
- if (fgetfilecon(STDIN_FILENO, &file_context) < 0)
+ if (fgetfilecon(STDIN_FILENO, &file_context) < 0)
perr("fgetfilecon FAILED %s", filename);
retval = security_compute_av(user_context,
@@ -438,26 +497,45 @@ run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid
&avd);
freecon(file_context);
if (retval || ((FILE__ENTRYPOINT & avd.allowed) != FILE__ENTRYPOINT)) {
- if (security_getenforce()==1)
- perr("Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ if (security_getenforce()==1)
+ perr("Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
}
if (setexeccon(user_context) < 0) {
if (security_getenforce()==1) {
- perr("Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ perr("Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
} else {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
}
}
freecon(user_context);
}
-#endif
+#endif
if (execle("/bin/sh", "sh", (char *) NULL, nenvp) != 0)
perr("Exec failed for /bin/sh");
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+ if (setexeccon(NULL) < 0) {
+ perr("Could not resset exec context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ if ( ( nenvp != &nul ) && (pam_envp != 0L) && (*pam_envp != 0L))
+ {
+ for( nenvp = pam_envp; *nenvp != 0L; nenvp++)
+ free(*nenvp);
+ free( pam_envp );
+ nenvp = &nul;
+ pam_envp=0L;
+ }
+#endif
PRIV_END
}
+
/* We're the parent. Let's wait.
*/
close(fd_in);
@@ -469,13 +547,6 @@ run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid
*/
waitpid(pid, (int *) NULL, 0);
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- if (selinux_enabled>0) {
- if (setexeccon(NULL) < 0) {
- perr("Could not resset exec context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
- }
- }
-#endif
/* Send mail. Unlink the output file after opening it, so it
* doesn't hang around after the run.
*/
@@ -485,6 +556,14 @@ run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid
unlink(filename);
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+ pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+ closelog();
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
+#endif
+
/* The job is now finished. We can delete its input file.
*/
chdir(ATJOB_DIR);
@@ -493,7 +572,31 @@ run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid
if (((send_mail != -1) && (buf.st_size != size)) || (send_mail == 1)) {
+ int mail_pid = -1;
+
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
PRIV_START
+ retcode = pam_start("atd", pentry->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "atd");
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ /* PAM has now re-opened our log to auth.info ! */
+ closelog();
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
+ PRIV_END
+#endif
+
+ mail_pid = fork();
+
+ if ( mail_pid == 0 )
+ {
+ PRIV_START
if (initgroups(pentry->pw_name, pentry->pw_gid))
perr("Cannot delete saved userids");
@@ -506,6 +609,47 @@ run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid
chdir ("/");
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+ security_context_t user_context=NULL;
+ security_context_t file_context=NULL;
+ int retval=0;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+
+ if (get_default_context(pentry->pw_name, NULL, &user_context))
+ perr("execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ /*
+ * Since crontab files are not directly executed,
+ * crond must ensure that the crontab file has
+ * a context that is appropriate for the context of
+ * the user cron job. It performs an entrypoint
+ * permission check for this purpose.
+ */
+ if (fgetfilecon(STDIN_FILENO, &file_context) < 0)
+ perr("fgetfilecon FAILED %s", filename);
+
+ retval = security_compute_av(user_context,
+ file_context,
+ SECCLASS_FILE,
+ FILE__ENTRYPOINT,
+ &avd);
+ freecon(file_context);
+ if (retval || ((FILE__ENTRYPOINT & avd.allowed) != FILE__ENTRYPOINT)) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1)
+ perr("Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ }
+
+ if (setexeccon(user_context) < 0) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+ perr("Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ } else {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ }
+ }
+ freecon(user_context);
+ }
+#endif
+
#if defined(SENDMAIL)
execl(SENDMAIL, "sendmail", mailname, (char *) NULL);
#elif defined(MAILC)
@@ -517,7 +661,33 @@ run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid
#endif
perr("Exec failed for mail command");
- PRIV_END
+ exit (-1);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+ if (setexeccon(NULL) < 0) {
+ perr("Could not resset exec context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ PRIV_END;
+ } else if ( mail_pid == -1 )
+ {
+ perr("fork of mailer failed");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Parent */
+ waitpid(mail_pid, (int *) NULL, 0);
+ }
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+ pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+ closelog();
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
+#endif
}
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
@@ -712,7 +882,7 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
selinux_enabled=is_selinux_enabled();
-#endif
+#endif
/* We don't need root privileges all the time; running under uid and gid
* daemon is fine.
*/
@@ -729,12 +899,7 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
RELINQUISH_PRIVS_ROOT(daemon_uid, daemon_gid)
-#ifndef LOG_CRON
-#define LOG_CRON LOG_DAEMON
-#endif
-
- openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_CRON);
-
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
opterr = 0;
errno = 0;
run_as_daemon = 1;
Index: config.h.in
===================================================================
--- config.h.in.orig 2007-03-19 16:40:39.612098659 +0100
+++ config.h.in 2007-03-19 16:41:20.550511811 +0100
@@ -187,3 +187,7 @@
/* Define if you are building with_selinux */
#undef WITH_SELINUX
+
+/* Define if you are building with_pam */
+#undef WITH_PAM
+
Index: configure.in
===================================================================
--- configure.in.orig 2007-03-19 16:40:39.644100546 +0100
+++ configure.in 2007-03-19 16:41:20.566512755 +0100
@@ -323,4 +323,11 @@ AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, is_selinux_enabled
AC_SUBST(SELINUXLIB)
AC_SUBST(WITH_SELINUX)
+AC_ARG_WITH(pam,
+[ --with-pam Define to enable pam support ],
+AC_DEFINE(WITH_PAM),
+)
+AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, PAMLIB='-lpam -lpam_misc')
+AC_SUBST(PAMLIB)
+
AC_OUTPUT(Makefile atrun atd.8 atrun.8 at.1 batch)
Index: perm.c
===================================================================
--- perm.c.orig 2007-03-19 16:40:39.644100546 +0100
+++ perm.c 2007-03-19 16:41:35.667402890 +0100
@@ -109,14 +109,15 @@ user_in_file(const char *path, const cha
int
check_permission()
{
- uid_t uid = geteuid();
+ uid_t euid = geteuid(), uid=getuid(), egid=getegid(), gid=getgid();
struct passwd *pentry;
int allow = 0, deny = 1;
+ int retcode=0;
- if (uid == 0)
+ if (euid == 0)
return 1;
- if ((pentry = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) {
+ if ((pentry = getpwuid(euid)) == NULL) {
perror("Cannot access user database");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}