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Accepting request 708941 from Virtualization:containers

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OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/708941
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/docker?expand=0&rev=90
This commit is contained in:
Dominique Leuenberger 2019-06-24 19:47:17 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
commit 4f5d8c2bc7
3 changed files with 558 additions and 0 deletions
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548
CVE-2018-15664.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,548 @@
From 33df3c9fb60ed22422c101e3fd618d5eb284c199 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 11:15:09 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2018-15664
This is a backported fix of the following upstream commits:
* d089b639372a ("Pass root to chroot to for chroot Untar")
* 3029e765e241 ("Add chroot for tar packing operations")
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
---
components/engine/daemon/archive.go | 15 +-
components/engine/daemon/export.go | 2 +-
.../engine/pkg/chrootarchive/archive.go | 32 +++-
.../engine/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix.go | 130 ++++++++++++-
.../pkg/chrootarchive/archive_windows.go | 9 +-
.../engine/pkg/chrootarchive/init_unix.go | 1 +
pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix_test.go | 171 ++++++++++++++++++
7 files changed, 342 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix_test.go
diff --git a/components/engine/daemon/archive.go b/components/engine/daemon/archive.go
index 9c7971b56ea3..109376b4b566 100644
--- a/components/engine/daemon/archive.go
+++ b/components/engine/daemon/archive.go
@@ -31,18 +31,19 @@ type archiver interface {
}
// helper functions to extract or archive
-func extractArchive(i interface{}, src io.Reader, dst string, opts *archive.TarOptions) error {
+func extractArchive(i interface{}, src io.Reader, dst string, opts *archive.TarOptions, root string) error {
if ea, ok := i.(extractor); ok {
return ea.ExtractArchive(src, dst, opts)
}
- return chrootarchive.Untar(src, dst, opts)
+
+ return chrootarchive.UntarWithRoot(src, dst, opts, root)
}
-func archivePath(i interface{}, src string, opts *archive.TarOptions) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
+func archivePath(i interface{}, src string, opts *archive.TarOptions, root string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
if ap, ok := i.(archiver); ok {
return ap.ArchivePath(src, opts)
}
- return archive.TarWithOptions(src, opts)
+ return chrootarchive.Tar(src, opts, root)
}
// ContainerCopy performs a deprecated operation of archiving the resource at
@@ -238,7 +239,7 @@ func (daemon *Daemon) containerArchivePath(container *container.Container, path
sourceDir, sourceBase := driver.Dir(resolvedPath), driver.Base(resolvedPath)
opts := archive.TarResourceRebaseOpts(sourceBase, driver.Base(absPath))
- data, err := archivePath(driver, sourceDir, opts)
+ data, err := archivePath(driver, sourceDir, opts, container.BaseFS.Path())
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
@@ -367,7 +368,7 @@ func (daemon *Daemon) containerExtractToDir(container *container.Container, path
}
}
- if err := extractArchive(driver, content, resolvedPath, options); err != nil {
+ if err := extractArchive(driver, content, resolvedPath, options, container.BaseFS.Path()); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -432,7 +433,7 @@ func (daemon *Daemon) containerCopy(container *container.Container, resource str
archive, err := archivePath(driver, basePath, &archive.TarOptions{
Compression: archive.Uncompressed,
IncludeFiles: filter,
- })
+ }, container.BaseFS.Path())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
diff --git a/components/engine/daemon/export.go b/components/engine/daemon/export.go
index 27bc35967d22..01593f4e8a4f 100644
--- a/components/engine/daemon/export.go
+++ b/components/engine/daemon/export.go
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ func (daemon *Daemon) containerExport(container *container.Container) (arch io.R
Compression: archive.Uncompressed,
UIDMaps: daemon.idMapping.UIDs(),
GIDMaps: daemon.idMapping.GIDs(),
- })
+ }, basefs.Path())
if err != nil {
rwlayer.Unmount()
return nil, err
diff --git a/components/engine/pkg/chrootarchive/archive.go b/components/engine/pkg/chrootarchive/archive.go
index 2d9d662830b7..6ff61e6a767a 100644
--- a/components/engine/pkg/chrootarchive/archive.go
+++ b/components/engine/pkg/chrootarchive/archive.go
@@ -27,18 +27,34 @@ func NewArchiver(idMapping *idtools.IdentityMapping) *archive.Archiver {
// The archive may be compressed with one of the following algorithms:
// identity (uncompressed), gzip, bzip2, xz.
func Untar(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions) error {
- return untarHandler(tarArchive, dest, options, true)
+ return untarHandler(tarArchive, dest, options, true, dest)
+}
+
+// UntarWithRoot is the same as `Untar`, but allows you to pass in a root directory
+// The root directory is the directory that will be chrooted to.
+// `dest` must be a path within `root`, if it is not an error will be returned.
+//
+// `root` should set to a directory which is not controlled by any potentially
+// malicious process.
+//
+// This should be used to prevent a potential attacker from manipulating `dest`
+// such that it would provide access to files outside of `dest` through things
+// like symlinks. Normally `ResolveSymlinksInScope` would handle this, however
+// sanitizing symlinks in this manner is inherrently racey:
+// ref: CVE-2018-15664
+func UntarWithRoot(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions, root string) error {
+ return untarHandler(tarArchive, dest, options, true, root)
}
// UntarUncompressed reads a stream of bytes from `archive`, parses it as a tar archive,
// and unpacks it into the directory at `dest`.
// The archive must be an uncompressed stream.
func UntarUncompressed(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions) error {
- return untarHandler(tarArchive, dest, options, false)
+ return untarHandler(tarArchive, dest, options, false, dest)
}
// Handler for teasing out the automatic decompression
-func untarHandler(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions, decompress bool) error {
+func untarHandler(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions, decompress bool, root string) error {
if tarArchive == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Empty archive")
}
@@ -69,5 +85,13 @@ func untarHandler(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions
r = decompressedArchive
}
- return invokeUnpack(r, dest, options)
+ return invokeUnpack(r, dest, options, root)
+}
+
+// Tar tars the requested path while chrooted to the specified root.
+func Tar(srcPath string, options *archive.TarOptions, root string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
+ if options == nil {
+ options = &archive.TarOptions{}
+ }
+ return invokePack(srcPath, options, root)
}
diff --git a/components/engine/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix.go b/components/engine/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix.go
index 5df8afd66205..ea2879dc002f 100644
--- a/components/engine/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix.go
+++ b/components/engine/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix.go
@@ -10,10 +10,13 @@ import (
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"os"
+ "path/filepath"
"runtime"
+ "strings"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/reexec"
+ "github.com/pkg/errors"
)
// untar is the entry-point for docker-untar on re-exec. This is not used on
@@ -23,18 +26,28 @@ func untar() {
runtime.LockOSThread()
flag.Parse()
- var options *archive.TarOptions
+ var options archive.TarOptions
//read the options from the pipe "ExtraFiles"
if err := json.NewDecoder(os.NewFile(3, "options")).Decode(&options); err != nil {
fatal(err)
}
- if err := chroot(flag.Arg(0)); err != nil {
+ dst := flag.Arg(0)
+ var root string
+ if len(flag.Args()) > 1 {
+ root = flag.Arg(1)
+ }
+
+ if root == "" {
+ root = dst
+ }
+
+ if err := chroot(root); err != nil {
fatal(err)
}
- if err := archive.Unpack(os.Stdin, "/", options); err != nil {
+ if err := archive.Unpack(os.Stdin, dst, &options); err != nil {
fatal(err)
}
// fully consume stdin in case it is zero padded
@@ -45,7 +58,10 @@ func untar() {
os.Exit(0)
}
-func invokeUnpack(decompressedArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions) error {
+func invokeUnpack(decompressedArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions, root string) error {
+ if root == "" {
+ return errors.New("must specify a root to chroot to")
+ }
// We can't pass a potentially large exclude list directly via cmd line
// because we easily overrun the kernel's max argument/environment size
@@ -57,7 +73,21 @@ func invokeUnpack(decompressedArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.T
return fmt.Errorf("Untar pipe failure: %v", err)
}
- cmd := reexec.Command("docker-untar", dest)
+ if root != "" {
+ relDest, err := filepath.Rel(root, dest)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ if relDest == "." {
+ relDest = "/"
+ }
+ if relDest[0] != '/' {
+ relDest = "/" + relDest
+ }
+ dest = relDest
+ }
+
+ cmd := reexec.Command("docker-untar", dest, root)
cmd.Stdin = decompressedArchive
cmd.ExtraFiles = append(cmd.ExtraFiles, r)
@@ -69,6 +99,7 @@ func invokeUnpack(decompressedArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.T
w.Close()
return fmt.Errorf("Untar error on re-exec cmd: %v", err)
}
+
//write the options to the pipe for the untar exec to read
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(options); err != nil {
w.Close()
@@ -86,3 +117,92 @@ func invokeUnpack(decompressedArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.T
}
return nil
}
+
+func tar() {
+ runtime.LockOSThread()
+ flag.Parse()
+
+ src := flag.Arg(0)
+ var root string
+ if len(flag.Args()) > 1 {
+ root = flag.Arg(1)
+ }
+
+ if root == "" {
+ root = src
+ }
+
+ if err := realChroot(root); err != nil {
+ fatal(err)
+ }
+
+ var options archive.TarOptions
+ if err := json.NewDecoder(os.Stdin).Decode(&options); err != nil {
+ fatal(err)
+ }
+
+ rdr, err := archive.TarWithOptions(src, &options)
+ if err != nil {
+ fatal(err)
+ }
+ defer rdr.Close()
+
+ if _, err := io.Copy(os.Stdout, rdr); err != nil {
+ fatal(err)
+ }
+
+ os.Exit(0)
+}
+
+func invokePack(srcPath string, options *archive.TarOptions, root string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
+ if root == "" {
+ return nil, errors.New("root path must not be empty")
+ }
+
+ relSrc, err := filepath.Rel(root, srcPath)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ if relSrc == "." {
+ relSrc = "/"
+ }
+ if relSrc[0] != '/' {
+ relSrc = "/" + relSrc
+ }
+
+ // make sure we didn't trim a trailing slash with the call to `Rel`
+ if strings.HasSuffix(srcPath, "/") && !strings.HasSuffix(relSrc, "/") {
+ relSrc += "/"
+ }
+
+ cmd := reexec.Command("docker-tar", relSrc, root)
+
+ errBuff := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
+ cmd.Stderr = errBuff
+
+ tarR, tarW := io.Pipe()
+ cmd.Stdout = tarW
+
+ stdin, err := cmd.StdinPipe()
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error getting options pipe for tar process")
+ }
+
+ if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+ return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "tar error on re-exec cmd")
+ }
+
+ go func() {
+ err := cmd.Wait()
+ err = errors.Wrapf(err, "error processing tar file: %s", errBuff)
+ tarW.CloseWithError(err)
+ }()
+
+ if err := json.NewEncoder(stdin).Encode(options); err != nil {
+ stdin.Close()
+ return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "tar json encode to pipe failed")
+ }
+ stdin.Close()
+
+ return tarR, nil
+}
diff --git a/components/engine/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_windows.go b/components/engine/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_windows.go
index f2973132a391..de87113e9544 100644
--- a/components/engine/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_windows.go
+++ b/components/engine/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_windows.go
@@ -14,9 +14,16 @@ func chroot(path string) error {
func invokeUnpack(decompressedArchive io.ReadCloser,
dest string,
- options *archive.TarOptions) error {
+ options *archive.TarOptions, root string) error {
// Windows is different to Linux here because Windows does not support
// chroot. Hence there is no point sandboxing a chrooted process to
// do the unpack. We call inline instead within the daemon process.
return archive.Unpack(decompressedArchive, longpath.AddPrefix(dest), options)
}
+
+func invokePack(srcPath string, options *archive.TarOptions, root string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
+ // Windows is different to Linux here because Windows does not support
+ // chroot. Hence there is no point sandboxing a chrooted process to
+ // do the pack. We call inline instead within the daemon process.
+ return archive.TarWithOptions(srcPath, options)
+}
diff --git a/components/engine/pkg/chrootarchive/init_unix.go b/components/engine/pkg/chrootarchive/init_unix.go
index a15e4bb83c40..c24fea7d9c13 100644
--- a/components/engine/pkg/chrootarchive/init_unix.go
+++ b/components/engine/pkg/chrootarchive/init_unix.go
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import (
func init() {
reexec.Register("docker-applyLayer", applyLayer)
reexec.Register("docker-untar", untar)
+ reexec.Register("docker-tar", tar)
}
func fatal(err error) {
diff --git a/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix_test.go b/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f39a88ad3814
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+// +build !windows
+
+package chrootarchive
+
+import (
+ gotar "archive/tar"
+ "bytes"
+ "io"
+ "io/ioutil"
+ "os"
+ "path"
+ "path/filepath"
+ "strings"
+ "testing"
+
+ "github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive"
+ "golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+ "gotest.tools/assert"
+)
+
+// Test for CVE-2018-15664
+// Assures that in the case where an "attacker" controlled path is a symlink to
+// some path outside of a container's rootfs that we do not copy data to a
+// container path that will actually overwrite data on the host
+func TestUntarWithMaliciousSymlinks(t *testing.T) {
+ dir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", t.Name())
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+ defer os.RemoveAll(dir)
+
+ root := filepath.Join(dir, "root")
+
+ err = os.MkdirAll(root, 0755)
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+
+ // Add a file into a directory above root
+ // Ensure that we can't access this file while tarring.
+ err = ioutil.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "host-file"), []byte("I am a host file"), 0644)
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+
+ // Create some data which which will be copied into the "container" root into
+ // the symlinked path.
+ // Before this change, the copy would overwrite the "host" content.
+ // With this change it should not.
+ data := filepath.Join(dir, "data")
+ err = os.MkdirAll(data, 0755)
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+ err = ioutil.WriteFile(filepath.Join(data, "local-file"), []byte("pwn3d"), 0644)
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+
+ safe := filepath.Join(root, "safe")
+ err = unix.Symlink(dir, safe)
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+
+ rdr, err := archive.TarWithOptions(data, &archive.TarOptions{IncludeFiles: []string{"local-file"}, RebaseNames: map[string]string{"local-file": "host-file"}})
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+
+ // Use tee to test both the good case and the bad case w/o recreating the archive
+ bufRdr := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
+ tee := io.TeeReader(rdr, bufRdr)
+
+ err = UntarWithRoot(tee, safe, nil, root)
+ assert.Assert(t, err != nil)
+ assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "open /safe/host-file: no such file or directory")
+
+ // Make sure the "host" file is still in tact
+ // Before the fix the host file would be overwritten
+ hostData, err := ioutil.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, "host-file"))
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, string(hostData), "I am a host file")
+
+ // Now test by chrooting to an attacker controlled path
+ // This should succeed as is and overwrite a "host" file
+ // Note that this would be a mis-use of this function.
+ err = UntarWithRoot(bufRdr, safe, nil, safe)
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+
+ hostData, err = ioutil.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, "host-file"))
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, string(hostData), "pwn3d")
+}
+
+// Test for CVE-2018-15664
+// Assures that in the case where an "attacker" controlled path is a symlink to
+// some path outside of a container's rootfs that we do not unwittingly leak
+// host data into the archive.
+func TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks(t *testing.T) {
+ dir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", t.Name())
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+ // defer os.RemoveAll(dir)
+ t.Log(dir)
+
+ root := filepath.Join(dir, "root")
+
+ err = os.MkdirAll(root, 0755)
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+
+ hostFileData := []byte("I am a host file")
+
+ // Add a file into a directory above root
+ // Ensure that we can't access this file while tarring.
+ err = ioutil.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "host-file"), hostFileData, 0644)
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+
+ safe := filepath.Join(root, "safe")
+ err = unix.Symlink(dir, safe)
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+
+ data := filepath.Join(dir, "data")
+ err = os.MkdirAll(data, 0755)
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+
+ type testCase struct {
+ p string
+ includes []string
+ }
+
+ cases := []testCase{
+ {p: safe, includes: []string{"host-file"}},
+ {p: safe + "/", includes: []string{"host-file"}},
+ {p: safe, includes: nil},
+ {p: safe + "/", includes: nil},
+ {p: root, includes: []string{"safe/host-file"}},
+ {p: root, includes: []string{"/safe/host-file"}},
+ {p: root, includes: nil},
+ }
+
+ maxBytes := len(hostFileData)
+
+ for _, tc := range cases {
+ t.Run(path.Join(tc.p+"_"+strings.Join(tc.includes, "_")), func(t *testing.T) {
+ // Here if we use archive.TarWithOptions directly or change the "root" parameter
+ // to be the same as "safe", data from the host will be leaked into the archive
+ var opts *archive.TarOptions
+ if tc.includes != nil {
+ opts = &archive.TarOptions{
+ IncludeFiles: tc.includes,
+ }
+ }
+ rdr, err := Tar(tc.p, opts, root)
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+ defer rdr.Close()
+
+ tr := gotar.NewReader(rdr)
+ assert.Assert(t, !isDataInTar(t, tr, hostFileData, int64(maxBytes)), "host data leaked to archive")
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+func isDataInTar(t *testing.T, tr *gotar.Reader, compare []byte, maxBytes int64) bool {
+ for {
+ h, err := tr.Next()
+ if err == io.EOF {
+ break
+ }
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+
+ if h.Size == 0 {
+ continue
+ }
+ assert.Assert(t, h.Size <= maxBytes, "%s: file size exceeds max expected size %d: %d", h.Name, maxBytes, h.Size)
+
+ data := make([]byte, int(h.Size))
+ _, err = io.ReadFull(tr, data)
+ assert.NilError(t, err)
+ if bytes.Contains(data, compare) {
+ return true
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false
+}
--
2.21.0

6
docker.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Jun 7 08:36:17 UTC 2019 - Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.com>
- Add patch for CVE-2018-15664. bsc#1096726
+ CVE-2018-15664.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon May 6 18:25:14 UTC 2019 - Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.com>

4
docker.spec
View File

@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ Patch403: packaging-0001-revert-Remove-docker-prefix-for-containerd-and-ru
Patch404: bsc1001161-0001-oci-include-the-domainname-in-kernel.domainname.patch
# SUSE-BACKPORT: Backport of https://github.com/docker/cli/pull/1130. bsc#1001161
Patch405: bsc1001161-0002-cli-add-a-separate-domainname-flag.patch
# SUSE-BACKPORT: Backport of https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/39292. CVE-2018-15664 bsc#1096726
Patch406: CVE-2018-15664.patch
# SUSE-FEATURE: Add support to mirror inofficial/private registries
# (https://github.com/docker/docker/pull/34319)
Patch500: private-registry-0001-Add-private-registry-mirror-support.patch
@ -273,6 +275,8 @@ docker container runtime configuration for kubeadm
# bsc#1001161
%patch404 -p1
%patch405 -p1
# CVE-2018-15664 bsc#1096726
%patch406 -p1
%if "%flavour" == "kubic"
# PATCH-SUSE: Mirror patch.
%patch500 -p1