78 lines
2.8 KiB
Diff
78 lines
2.8 KiB
Diff
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From 5216718e4837d4dcc6020cd5f6d5d629222bad8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>
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Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2020 19:10:09 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 3/6] vhost/crypto: validate keys lengths
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transform_cipher_param() and transform_chain_param() handle
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the payload data for the VHOST_USER_CRYPTO_CREATE_SESS
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message. These payloads have to be validated, since it
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could come from untrusted sources.
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Two buffers and their lenghts are defined in this payload,
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one the the auth key and one for the cipher key. But above
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functions do not validate the key length inputs, which could
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lead to read out of bounds, as buffers have static sizes of
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64 bytes for the cipher key and 512 bytes for the auth key.
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This patch adds necessary checks on the key length field
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before being used.
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Fixes: e80a98708166 ("vhost/crypto: add session message handler")
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Cc: stable@dpdk.org
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This issue has been assigned CVE-2020-10724
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Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
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Signed-off-by: Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Xiaolong Ye <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
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Reviewed-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
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---
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lib/librte_vhost/vhost_crypto.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
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1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/lib/librte_vhost/vhost_crypto.c b/lib/librte_vhost/vhost_crypto.c
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index 68911972b6..07a4115482 100644
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--- a/lib/librte_vhost/vhost_crypto.c
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+++ b/lib/librte_vhost/vhost_crypto.c
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@@ -237,6 +237,11 @@ transform_cipher_param(struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *xform,
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if (unlikely(ret < 0))
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return ret;
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+ if (param->cipher_key_len > VHOST_USER_CRYPTO_MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH) {
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+ VC_LOG_DBG("Invalid cipher key length\n");
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+ return -VIRTIO_CRYPTO_BADMSG;
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+ }
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+
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xform->type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER;
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xform->cipher.key.length = param->cipher_key_len;
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if (xform->cipher.key.length > 0)
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@@ -287,6 +292,12 @@ transform_chain_param(struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *xforms,
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&xform_cipher->cipher.algo);
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if (unlikely(ret < 0))
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return ret;
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+
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+ if (param->cipher_key_len > VHOST_USER_CRYPTO_MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH) {
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+ VC_LOG_DBG("Invalid cipher key length\n");
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+ return -VIRTIO_CRYPTO_BADMSG;
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+ }
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+
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xform_cipher->type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER;
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xform_cipher->cipher.key.length = param->cipher_key_len;
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xform_cipher->cipher.key.data = param->cipher_key_buf;
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@@ -301,6 +312,12 @@ transform_chain_param(struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *xforms,
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ret = auth_algo_transform(param->hash_algo, &xform_auth->auth.algo);
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if (unlikely(ret < 0))
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return ret;
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+
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+ if (param->auth_key_len > VHOST_USER_CRYPTO_MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH) {
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+ VC_LOG_DBG("Invalid auth key length\n");
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+ return -VIRTIO_CRYPTO_BADMSG;
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+ }
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+
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xform_auth->auth.digest_length = param->digest_len;
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xform_auth->auth.key.length = param->auth_key_len;
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xform_auth->auth.key.data = param->auth_key_buf;
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--
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2.25.2
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