grub2/0003-cryptodisk-wipe-out-the-cached-keys-from-protectors.patch

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Accepting request 1105405 from home:michael-chang:grub:2.12rc1 - Implement NV index mode for TPM 2.0 key protector 0001-protectors-Implement-NV-index.patch - Fall back to passphrase mode when the key protector fails to unlock the disk 0002-cryptodisk-Fallback-to-passphrase.patch - Wipe out the cached key cleanly 0003-cryptodisk-wipe-out-the-cached-keys-from-protectors.patch - Make diskfiler to look up cryptodisk devices first 0004-diskfilter-look-up-cryptodisk-devices-first.patch - Version bump to 2.12~rc1 * Added: - grub-2.12~rc1.tar.xz * Removed: - grub-2.06.tar.xz * Patch dropped merged by new version: - grub2-GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_RECOVERY-for-recovery-mode.patch - grub2-s390x-02-kexec-module-added-to-emu.patch - grub2-efi-chainloader-root.patch - grub2-Fix-incorrect-netmask-on-ppc64.patch - 0001-osdep-Introduce-include-grub-osdep-major.h-and-use-i.patch - 0002-osdep-linux-hostdisk-Use-stat-instead-of-udevadm-for.patch - 0002-net-read-bracketed-ipv6-addrs-and-port-numbers.patch - grub2-s390x-10-keep-network-at-kexec.patch - 0001-Fix-build-error-in-binutils-2.36.patch - 0001-emu-fix-executable-stack-marking.patch - 0046-squash-verifiers-Move-verifiers-API-to-kernel-image.patch - 0001-30_uefi-firmware-fix-printf-format-with-null-byte.patch - 0001-tpm-Pass-unknown-error-as-non-fatal-but-debug-print-.patch - 0001-Filter-out-POSIX-locale-for-translation.patch OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1105405 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Base:System/grub2?expand=0&rev=458
2023-08-24 05:25:56 +02:00
From 64494ffc442a5de05b237ad48d27c70d22849a44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2023 15:52:52 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] cryptodisk: wipe out the cached keys from protectors
An attacker may insert a malicious disk with the same crypto UUID and
trick grub2 to mount the fake root. Even though the key from the key
protector fails to unlock the fake root, it's not wiped out cleanly so
the attacker could dump the memory to retrieve the secret key. To defend
such attack, wipe out the cached key when we don't need it.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
---
grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c
index cf37a0934..f42437f4e 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c
@@ -1348,7 +1348,11 @@ grub_cryptodisk_clear_key_cache (struct grub_cryptomount_args *cargs)
return;
for (i = 0; cargs->protectors[i]; i++)
- grub_free (cargs->key_cache[i].key);
+ {
+ if (cargs->key_cache[i].key)
+ grub_memset (cargs->key_cache[i].key, 0, cargs->key_cache[i].key_len);
+ grub_free (cargs->key_cache[i].key);
+ }
grub_free (cargs->key_cache);
}
--
2.35.3