grub2/0004-Key-revocation-on-out-of-bound-file-access.patch
Michael Chang d1a4631c13 - Fix grub.cfg is loaded from an unexpected fallback directory instead of the
root directory during PXE boot when grub is loaded from the tftp root
  directory (bsc#1232391)
  * 0001-kern-main-Fix-cmdpath-in-root-directory.patch
  * grub2.spec: Refine PPC grub.elf early config to derive root from cmdpath
    directly, avoiding the unneeded search 

- Fix CVE-2024-49504 (bsc#1229163) (bsc#1229164)
- Restrict CLI access if the encrypted root device is automatically unlocked by
  the TPM. LUKS password authentication is required for access to be granted
  * 0001-cli_lock-Add-build-option-to-block-command-line-inte.patch
  * 0002-Requiring-authentication-after-tpm-unlock-for-CLI-ac.patch
- Obsolete, as CLI access is now locked and granted access no longer requires
  the previous restrictions
  * 0002-Restrict-file-access-on-cryptodisk-print.patch
  * 0003-Restrict-ls-and-auto-file-completion-on-cryptodisk-p.patch
- Rediff
  * 0004-Key-revocation-on-out-of-bound-file-access.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Base:System/grub2?expand=0&rev=519
2024-11-06 05:53:45 +00:00

169 lines
4.4 KiB
Diff

From 6547d22fc9e20720d1a896be82b2d50d842f86b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 09:25:53 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Key revocation on out of bound file access
After successful disk unlocking, grub now takes on the responsibility of
safeguarding passwords or TPM keys exclusively within authenticated
cryptodisk files. Any attempt to access boot-related files outside this
trust realm triggers immediate key revocation, preventing potential
compromise by out of bound access.
This patch strengthens security measures by restricting grub's access to
system boot files, except for essential internal processes like memdisk
and procfs, ensuring key protection against potential breaches due to
inadvertent customizations in grub.cfg.
Signed-Off-by Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
---
grub-core/commands/crypttab.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/grub/file.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
--- a/grub-core/commands/crypttab.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/crypttab.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <grub/mm.h>
#include <grub/list.h>
#include <grub/crypttab.h>
+#include <grub/file.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -89,6 +90,41 @@
grub_cryptokey_discard();
}
+static grub_file_t
+grub_distrust_open (grub_file_t io,
+ enum grub_file_type type __attribute__ ((unused)))
+{
+ grub_disk_t disk = io->device->disk;
+
+ if (io->device->disk &&
+ (io->device->disk->dev->id == GRUB_DISK_DEVICE_MEMDISK_ID
+ || io->device->disk->dev->id == GRUB_DISK_DEVICE_PROCFS_ID))
+ return io;
+
+ /* Ensure second stage files is in a protected location or grub won't hand
+ * over the key and discards it */
+ switch (type & GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MASK)
+ {
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_ACPI_TABLE:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CONFIG:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_DEVICE_TREE_IMAGE:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_FONT:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GRUB_MODULE:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GRUB_MODULE_LIST:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_KERNEL:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_INITRD:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LOADENV:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_THEME:
+ if (!disk || !grub_disk_is_crypto (disk))
+ grub_cryptokey_discard ();
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return io;
+}
+
static grub_err_t
grub_cmd_crypttab_entry (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
int argc, char **argv)
@@ -121,6 +157,8 @@
{
cmd = grub_register_command ("crypttab_entry", grub_cmd_crypttab_entry,
N_("VOLUME-NAME ENCRYPTED-DEVICE KEY-FILE") , N_("No description"));
+ grub_file_filter_register (GRUB_FILE_FILTER_DISTRUST, grub_distrust_open);
+ grub_dl_set_persistent (mod);
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI(crypttab)
--- a/include/grub/file.h
+++ b/include/grub/file.h
@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@
/* Filters with lower ID are executed first. */
typedef enum grub_file_filter_id
{
+ GRUB_FILE_FILTER_DISTRUST,
GRUB_FILE_FILTER_VERIFY,
GRUB_FILE_FILTER_GZIO,
GRUB_FILE_FILTER_XZIO,
--- a/grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c
@@ -558,6 +558,39 @@
return NULL;
}
+static int
+grub_diskfilter_has_cryptodisk (const struct grub_diskfilter_lv *lv)
+{
+ struct grub_diskfilter_pv *pv;
+
+ if (!lv)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (lv->vg->pvs)
+ for (pv = lv->vg->pvs; pv; pv = pv->next)
+ {
+ if (!pv->disk)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("diskfilter", _("Couldn't find physical volume `%s'."
+ " Some modules may be missing from core image."),
+ pv->name);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ switch (pv->disk->dev->id)
+ {
+ case GRUB_DISK_DEVICE_CRYPTODISK_ID:
+ return 1;
+ case GRUB_DISK_DEVICE_DISKFILTER_ID:
+ return grub_diskfilter_has_cryptodisk (pv->disk->data);
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static grub_err_t
grub_diskfilter_open (const char *name, grub_disk_t disk)
{
@@ -589,6 +622,8 @@
disk->total_sectors = lv->size;
disk->max_agglomerate = GRUB_DISK_MAX_MAX_AGGLOMERATE;
+ disk->is_crypto_diskfilter = grub_diskfilter_has_cryptodisk (lv);
+
return 0;
}
--- a/include/grub/disk.h
+++ b/include/grub/disk.h
@@ -147,6 +147,8 @@
/* Device-specific data. */
void *data;
+
+ int is_crypto_diskfilter;
};
typedef struct grub_disk *grub_disk_t;
@@ -317,4 +319,12 @@
void grub_diskfilter_fini (void);
#endif
+static inline int
+grub_disk_is_crypto (grub_disk_t disk)
+{
+ return ((disk->is_crypto_diskfilter ||
+ disk->dev->id == GRUB_DISK_DEVICE_CRYPTODISK_ID) ?
+ 1 : 0);
+}
+
#endif /* ! GRUB_DISK_HEADER */