grub2/grub2-efi-chainload-harder.patch
Michael Chang 8ee92f5194 Accepting request 1105405 from home:michael-chang:grub:2.12rc1
- Implement NV index mode for TPM 2.0 key protector
  0001-protectors-Implement-NV-index.patch
- Fall back to passphrase mode when the key protector fails to
  unlock the disk
  0002-cryptodisk-Fallback-to-passphrase.patch
- Wipe out the cached key cleanly
  0003-cryptodisk-wipe-out-the-cached-keys-from-protectors.patch
- Make diskfiler to look up cryptodisk devices first
  0004-diskfilter-look-up-cryptodisk-devices-first.patch

- Version bump to 2.12~rc1
  * Added:
    - grub-2.12~rc1.tar.xz
  * Removed:
    - grub-2.06.tar.xz
  * Patch dropped merged by new version:
    - grub2-GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_RECOVERY-for-recovery-mode.patch
    - grub2-s390x-02-kexec-module-added-to-emu.patch
    - grub2-efi-chainloader-root.patch
    - grub2-Fix-incorrect-netmask-on-ppc64.patch
    - 0001-osdep-Introduce-include-grub-osdep-major.h-and-use-i.patch
    - 0002-osdep-linux-hostdisk-Use-stat-instead-of-udevadm-for.patch
    - 0002-net-read-bracketed-ipv6-addrs-and-port-numbers.patch
    - grub2-s390x-10-keep-network-at-kexec.patch
    - 0001-Fix-build-error-in-binutils-2.36.patch
    - 0001-emu-fix-executable-stack-marking.patch
    - 0046-squash-verifiers-Move-verifiers-API-to-kernel-image.patch
    - 0001-30_uefi-firmware-fix-printf-format-with-null-byte.patch
    - 0001-tpm-Pass-unknown-error-as-non-fatal-but-debug-print-.patch
    - 0001-Filter-out-POSIX-locale-for-translation.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1105405
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Base:System/grub2?expand=0&rev=458
2023-08-24 03:25:56 +00:00

117 lines
4.0 KiB
Diff

v2:
Use grub_efi_get_secureboot to get secure boot status
---
grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
--- a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
+++ b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
@@ -305,40 +305,41 @@
static grub_efi_boolean_t
read_header (void *data, grub_efi_uint32_t size, pe_coff_loader_image_context_t *context)
{
- grub_efi_guid_t guid = SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
- grub_efi_shim_lock_t *shim_lock;
- grub_efi_status_t status;
-
- shim_lock = grub_efi_locate_protocol (&guid, NULL);
+ char *msdos = (char *)data;
+ struct grub_pe32_header_no_msdos_stub *pe32 = (struct grub_pe32_header_no_msdos_stub *)data;
- if (!shim_lock)
+ if (size < sizeof (*pe32))
{
- grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "no shim lock protocol");
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "Invalid image");
return 0;
}
- status = shim_lock->context (data, size, context);
-
- if (status == GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
+ if (grub_memcmp (msdos, "MZ", 2) == 0)
{
- grub_dprintf ("chain", "context success\n");
- return 1;
+ grub_uint32_t off = *((grub_uint32_t *) (msdos + 0x3c));
+ pe32 = (struct grub_pe32_header_no_msdos_stub *) ((char *)data + off);
}
- switch (status)
+ if (grub_memcmp (pe32->signature, "PE\0\0", 4) != 0 ||
+ pe32->coff_header.machine != GRUB_PE32_MACHINE_X86_64 ||
+ pe32->optional_header.magic != GRUB_PE32_PE64_MAGIC)
{
- case GRUB_EFI_UNSUPPORTED:
- grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "context error unsupported");
- break;
- case GRUB_EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER:
- grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "context error invalid parameter");
- break;
- default:
- grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "context error code");
- break;
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "Not supported image");
+ return 0;
}
- return 0;
+ context->number_of_rva_and_sizes = pe32->optional_header.num_data_directories;
+ context->size_of_headers = pe32->optional_header.header_size;
+ context->image_size = pe32->optional_header.image_size;
+ context->image_address = pe32->optional_header.image_base;
+ context->entry_point = pe32->optional_header.entry_addr;
+ context->reloc_dir = &pe32->optional_header.base_relocation_table;
+ context->sec_dir = &pe32->optional_header.certificate_table;
+ context->number_of_sections = pe32->coff_header.num_sections;
+ context->pe_hdr = pe32;
+ context->first_section = (struct grub_pe32_section_table *)((char *)(&pe32->optional_header) + pe32->coff_header.optional_header_size);
+
+ return 1;
}
static void*
@@ -604,6 +605,9 @@
if (buffer)
b->free_pool (buffer);
+ if (grub_errno)
+ grub_print_error ();
+
return 0;
}
@@ -821,6 +825,30 @@
status = b->load_image (0, grub_efi_image_handle, file_path,
boot_image, size,
&image_handle);
+#ifdef SUPPORT_SECURE_BOOT
+ if (status == GRUB_EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION && grub_efi_get_secureboot () != GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED)
+ {
+ /* If it failed with security violation while not in secure boot mode,
+ the firmware might be broken. We try to workaround on that by forcing
+ the SB method! (bsc#887793) */
+ struct grub_secureboot_chainloader_context *sb_context;
+
+ grub_dprintf ("chain", "Possible firmware flaw! Security violation while not in secure boot mode.\n");
+ sb_context = grub_malloc (sizeof (*sb_context));
+ if (!sb_context)
+ goto fail;
+ sb_context->cmdline = cmdline;
+ sb_context->cmdline_len = cmdline_len;
+ sb_context->fsize = size;
+ sb_context->dev_handle = dev_handle;
+ sb_context->address = address;
+ sb_context->pages = pages;
+ grub_file_close (file);
+ grub_loader_set_ex (grub_secureboot_chainloader_boot,
+ grub_secureboot_chainloader_unload, sb_context, 0);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
{
if (status == GRUB_EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES)