From 6f3c78f2ff9211f6d25cc23381fc7900bb4b281e1819d01cc5a99d99b1adbd89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marcus Meissner Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 17:00:38 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Accepting request 946938 from home:stroeder:network Update to version 2.10 Seems to work just fine e.g. on my raspberry pi armv6. OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/946938 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Base:System/hostapd?expand=0&rev=66 --- CVE-2019-16275.patch | 73 ----------------- CVE-2020-12695.patch | 171 ---------------------------------------- CVE-2021-30004.patch | 115 --------------------------- hostapd-2.10.tar.gz | 3 + hostapd-2.10.tar.gz.asc | 6 ++ hostapd-2.9.tar.gz | 3 - hostapd-2.9.tar.gz.asc | 6 -- hostapd.changes | 50 ++++++++++++ hostapd.spec | 7 +- 9 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 373 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 CVE-2019-16275.patch delete mode 100644 CVE-2020-12695.patch delete mode 100644 CVE-2021-30004.patch create mode 100644 hostapd-2.10.tar.gz create mode 100644 hostapd-2.10.tar.gz.asc delete mode 100644 hostapd-2.9.tar.gz delete mode 100644 hostapd-2.9.tar.gz.asc diff --git a/CVE-2019-16275.patch b/CVE-2019-16275.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4f9c566..0000000 --- a/CVE-2019-16275.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,73 +0,0 @@ -From 8c07fa9eda13e835f3f968b2e1c9a8be3a851ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:52:04 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] AP: Silently ignore management frame from unexpected source - address - -Do not process any received Management frames with unexpected/invalid SA -so that we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end up -sending out frames to unexpected destination. This prevents unexpected -sequences where an unprotected frame might end up causing the AP to send -out a response to another device and that other device processing the -unexpected response. - -In particular, this prevents some potential denial of service cases -where the unexpected response frame from the AP might result in a -connected station dropping its association. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen ---- - src/ap/drv_callbacks.c | 13 +++++++++++++ - src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 12 ++++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c -index 31587685fe3b..34ca379edc3d 100644 ---- a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c -+++ b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c -@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ int hostapd_notif_assoc(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *addr, - "hostapd_notif_assoc: Skip event with no address"); - return -1; - } -+ -+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(addr) || -+ is_zero_ether_addr(addr) || -+ os_memcmp(addr, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) { -+ /* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that -+ * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end -+ * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */ -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Invalid SA=" MACSTR -+ " in received indication - ignore this indication silently", -+ __func__, MAC2STR(addr)); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - random_add_randomness(addr, ETH_ALEN); - - hostapd_logger(hapd, addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, -diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c -index c85a28db44b7..e7065372e158 100644 ---- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c -+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c -@@ -4626,6 +4626,18 @@ int ieee802_11_mgmt(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *buf, size_t len, - fc = le_to_host16(mgmt->frame_control); - stype = WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc); - -+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) || -+ is_zero_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) || -+ os_memcmp(mgmt->sa, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) { -+ /* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that -+ * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end -+ * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */ -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "MGMT: Invalid SA=" MACSTR -+ " in received frame - ignore this frame silently", -+ MAC2STR(mgmt->sa)); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - if (stype == WLAN_FC_STYPE_BEACON) { - handle_beacon(hapd, mgmt, len, fi); - return 1; --- -2.20.1 - diff --git a/CVE-2020-12695.patch b/CVE-2020-12695.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b2c3816..0000000 --- a/CVE-2020-12695.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,171 +0,0 @@ -unchanged: ---- a/src/wps/wps_er.c -+++ b/src/wps/wps_er.c -@@ -1298,7 +1298,7 @@ wps_er_init(struct wps_context *wps, const char *ifname, const char *filter) - "with %s", filter); - } - if (get_netif_info(er->ifname, &er->ip_addr, &er->ip_addr_text, -- er->mac_addr)) { -+ NULL, er->mac_addr)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS UPnP: Could not get IP/MAC address " - "for %s. Does it have IP address?", er->ifname); - wps_er_deinit(er, NULL, NULL); -unchanged: ---- b/src/wps/wps_upnp.c -+++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp.c -@@ -303,6 +303,14 @@ - } - - -+static int local_network_addr(struct upnp_wps_device_sm *sm, -+ struct sockaddr_in *addr) -+{ -+ return (addr->sin_addr.s_addr & sm->netmask.s_addr) == -+ (sm->ip_addr & sm->netmask.s_addr); -+} -+ -+ - /* subscr_addr_add_url -- add address(es) for one url to subscription */ - static void subscr_addr_add_url(struct subscription *s, const char *url, - size_t url_len) -@@ -320,9 +328,14 @@ - int rerr; - size_t host_len, path_len; - -- /* url MUST begin with http: */ -- if (url_len < 7 || os_strncasecmp(url, "http://", 7)) -+ /* URL MUST begin with HTTP scheme. In addition, limit the length of -+ * the URL to 700 characters which is around the limit that was -+ * implicitly enforced for more than 10 years due to a bug in -+ * generating the event messages. */ -+ if (url_len < 7 || os_strncasecmp(url, "http://", 7) || url_len > 700) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPS UPnP: Reject an unacceptable URL"); - goto fail; -+ } - url += 7; - url_len -= 7; - -@@ -381,6 +394,7 @@ - - for (rp = result; rp; rp = rp->ai_next) { - struct subscr_addr *a; -+ struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *) rp->ai_addr; - - /* Limit no. of address to avoid denial of service attack */ - if (dl_list_len(&s->addr_list) >= MAX_ADDR_PER_SUBSCRIPTION) { -@@ -389,6 +403,13 @@ - break; - } - -+ if (!local_network_addr(s->sm, addr)) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, -+ "WPS UPnP: Ignore a delivery URL that points to another network %s", -+ inet_ntoa(addr->sin_addr)); -+ continue; -+ } -+ - a = os_zalloc(sizeof(*a) + alloc_len); - if (a == NULL) - break; -@@ -890,11 +911,12 @@ - * @net_if: Selected network interface name - * @ip_addr: Buffer for returning IP address in network byte order - * @ip_addr_text: Buffer for returning a pointer to allocated IP address text -+ * @netmask: Buffer for returning netmask or %NULL if not needed - * @mac: Buffer for returning MAC address - * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure - */ - int get_netif_info(const char *net_if, unsigned *ip_addr, char **ip_addr_text, -- u8 mac[ETH_ALEN]) -+ struct in_addr *netmask, u8 mac[ETH_ALEN]) - { - struct ifreq req; - int sock = -1; -@@ -920,6 +942,19 @@ - in_addr.s_addr = *ip_addr; - os_snprintf(*ip_addr_text, 16, "%s", inet_ntoa(in_addr)); - -+ if (netmask) { -+ os_memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req)); -+ os_strlcpy(req.ifr_name, net_if, sizeof(req.ifr_name)); -+ if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFNETMASK, &req) < 0) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, -+ "WPS UPnP: SIOCGIFNETMASK failed: %d (%s)", -+ errno, strerror(errno)); -+ goto fail; -+ } -+ addr = (struct sockaddr_in *) &req.ifr_netmask; -+ netmask->s_addr = addr->sin_addr.s_addr; -+ } -+ - #ifdef __linux__ - os_strlcpy(req.ifr_name, net_if, sizeof(req.ifr_name)); - if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &req) < 0) { -@@ -1026,11 +1061,15 @@ - - /* Determine which IP and mac address we're using */ - if (get_netif_info(net_if, &sm->ip_addr, &sm->ip_addr_text, -- sm->mac_addr)) { -+ &sm->netmask, sm->mac_addr)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS UPnP: Could not get IP/MAC address " - "for %s. Does it have IP address?", net_if); - goto fail; - } -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPS UPnP: Local IP address %s netmask %s hwaddr " -+ MACSTR, -+ sm->ip_addr_text, inet_ntoa(sm->netmask), -+ MAC2STR(sm->mac_addr)); - - /* Listen for incoming TCP connections so that others - * can fetch our "xml files" from us. -unchanged: ---- a/src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h -+++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp_i.h -@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct upnp_wps_device_sm { - u8 mac_addr[ETH_ALEN]; /* mac addr of network i.f. we use */ - char *ip_addr_text; /* IP address of network i.f. we use */ - unsigned ip_addr; /* IP address of network i.f. we use (host order) */ -+ struct in_addr netmask; - int multicast_sd; /* send multicast messages over this socket */ - int ssdp_sd; /* receive discovery UPD packets on socket */ - int ssdp_sd_registered; /* nonzero if we must unregister */ -@@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ struct subscription * subscription_find(struct upnp_wps_device_sm *sm, - const u8 uuid[UUID_LEN]); - void subscr_addr_delete(struct subscr_addr *a); - int get_netif_info(const char *net_if, unsigned *ip_addr, char **ip_addr_text, -- u8 mac[ETH_ALEN]); -+ struct in_addr *netmask, u8 mac[ETH_ALEN]); - - /* wps_upnp_ssdp.c */ - void msearchreply_state_machine_stop(struct advertisement_state_machine *a); -diff -u b/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c b/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c ---- b/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c -+++ b/src/wps/wps_upnp_event.c -@@ -147,7 +147,8 @@ - struct wpabuf *buf; - char *b; - -- buf = wpabuf_alloc(1000 + wpabuf_len(e->data)); -+ buf = wpabuf_alloc(1000 + os_strlen(e->addr->path) + -+ wpabuf_len(e->data)); - if (buf == NULL) - return NULL; - wpabuf_printf(buf, "NOTIFY %s HTTP/1.1\r\n", e->addr->path); -@@ -293,7 +294,7 @@ - - buf = event_build_message(e); - if (buf == NULL) { -- event_retry(e, 0); -+ event_addr_failure(e); - return -1; - } - -@@ -301,7 +302,7 @@ - event_http_cb, e); - if (e->http_event == NULL) { - wpabuf_free(buf); -- event_retry(e, 0); -+ event_addr_failure(e); - return -1; - } - diff --git a/CVE-2021-30004.patch b/CVE-2021-30004.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e00c010..0000000 --- a/CVE-2021-30004.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,115 +0,0 @@ -From a0541334a6394f8237a4393b7372693cd7e96f15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 18:19:31 +0200 -Subject: ASN.1: Validate DigestAlgorithmIdentifier parameters - -The supported hash algorithms do not use AlgorithmIdentifier parameters. -However, there are implementations that include NULL parameters in -addition to ones that omit the parameters. Previous implementation did -not check the parameters value at all which supported both these cases, -but did not reject any other unexpected information. - -Use strict validation of digest algorithm parameters and reject any -unexpected value when validating a signature. This is needed to prevent -potential forging attacks. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen ---- - src/tls/pkcs1.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ - src/tls/x509v3.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/tls/pkcs1.c b/src/tls/pkcs1.c -index bbdb0d7..5761dfe 100644 ---- a/src/tls/pkcs1.c -+++ b/src/tls/pkcs1.c -@@ -244,6 +244,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk, - os_free(decrypted); - return -1; - } -+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestInfo", -+ hdr.payload, hdr.length); - - pos = hdr.payload; - end = pos + hdr.length; -@@ -265,6 +267,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk, - os_free(decrypted); - return -1; - } -+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier", -+ hdr.payload, hdr.length); - da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length; - - if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) { -@@ -273,6 +277,23 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk, - os_free(decrypted); - return -1; - } -+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: Digest algorithm parameters", -+ next, da_end - next); -+ -+ /* -+ * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to -+ * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these -+ * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else. -+ */ -+ if (da_end > next && -+ (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 || -+ !asn1_is_null(&hdr) || -+ hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "PKCS #1: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters"); -+ os_free(decrypted); -+ return -1; -+ } - - if (!asn1_oid_equal(&oid, hash_alg)) { - char txt[100], txt2[100]; -diff --git a/src/tls/x509v3.c b/src/tls/x509v3.c -index a8944dd..df337ec 100644 ---- a/src/tls/x509v3.c -+++ b/src/tls/x509v3.c -@@ -1964,6 +1964,7 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer, - os_free(data); - return -1; - } -+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestInfo", hdr.payload, hdr.length); - - pos = hdr.payload; - end = pos + hdr.length; -@@ -1985,6 +1986,8 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer, - os_free(data); - return -1; - } -+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier", -+ hdr.payload, hdr.length); - da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length; - - if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) { -@@ -1992,6 +1995,23 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer, - os_free(data); - return -1; - } -+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: Digest algorithm parameters", -+ next, da_end - next); -+ -+ /* -+ * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to -+ * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these -+ * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else. -+ */ -+ if (da_end > next && -+ (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 || -+ !asn1_is_null(&hdr) || -+ hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "X509: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters"); -+ os_free(data); -+ return -1; -+ } - - if (x509_sha1_oid(&oid)) { - if (signature->oid.oid[6] != 5 /* sha-1WithRSAEncryption */) { --- -cgit v0.12 - diff --git a/hostapd-2.10.tar.gz b/hostapd-2.10.tar.gz new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b3f61cc --- /dev/null +++ b/hostapd-2.10.tar.gz @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:206e7c799b678572c2e3d12030238784bc4a9f82323b0156b4c9466f1498915d +size 2440435 diff --git a/hostapd-2.10.tar.gz.asc b/hostapd-2.10.tar.gz.asc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d3ddd24 --- /dev/null +++ b/hostapd-2.10.tar.gz.asc @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- + +iF0EABECAB0WIQTsSqCpkaXyRkWC1S0rbvQy78iV+gUCYeSJ0QAKCRArbvQy78iV ++ryaAJ9Dg6Jolf9k10113AamARgeJObKPgCdGhRdfhroyDzd5qglBkDB0wDsqXc= +=N0h0 +-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- diff --git a/hostapd-2.9.tar.gz b/hostapd-2.9.tar.gz deleted file mode 100644 index 2cd5e5e..0000000 --- a/hostapd-2.9.tar.gz +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 -oid sha256:881d7d6a90b2428479288d64233151448f8990ab4958e0ecaca7eeb3c9db2bd7 -size 2244312 diff --git a/hostapd-2.9.tar.gz.asc b/hostapd-2.9.tar.gz.asc deleted file mode 100644 index 1b46a29..0000000 --- a/hostapd-2.9.tar.gz.asc +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ ------BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- - -iF0EABECAB0WIQTsSqCpkaXyRkWC1S0rbvQy78iV+gUCXUrV2QAKCRArbvQy78iV -+i6YAJ91waMVmURN1HmmyFsqt/LGqhB4yACeN7gXHMZhR/xCcwvJIG9abeynflg= -=mwkH ------END PGP SIGNATURE----- diff --git a/hostapd.changes b/hostapd.changes index 732769a..0405fc7 100644 --- a/hostapd.changes +++ b/hostapd.changes @@ -1,3 +1,53 @@ +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Jan 17 08:33:09 UTC 2022 - Michael Ströder + +- Removed obsolete patches: + * CVE-2019-16275.patch + * CVE-2020-12695.patch + * CVE-2021-30004.patch +- Update to version 2.10 + * SAE changes + - improved protection against side channel attacks + [https://w1.fi/security/2022-1/] + - added option send SAE Confirm immediately (sae_config_immediate=1) + after SAE Commit + - added support for the hash-to-element mechanism (sae_pwe=1 or + sae_pwe=2) + - fixed PMKSA caching with OKC + - added support for SAE-PK + * EAP-pwd changes + - improved protection against side channel attacks + [https://w1.fi/security/2022-1/] + * fixed WPS UPnP SUBSCRIBE handling of invalid operations + [https://w1.fi/security/2020-1/] + * fixed PMF disconnection protection bypass + [https://w1.fi/security/2019-7/] + * added support for using OpenSSL 3.0 + * fixed various issues in experimental support for EAP-TEAP server + * added configuration (max_auth_rounds, max_auth_rounds_short) to + increase the maximum number of EAP message exchanges (mainly to + support cases with very large certificates) for the EAP server + * added support for DPP release 2 (Wi-Fi Device Provisioning Protocol) + * extended HE (IEEE 802.11ax) support, including 6 GHz support + * removed obsolete IAPP functionality + * fixed EAP-FAST server with TLS GCM/CCM ciphers + * dropped support for libnl 1.1 + * added support for nl80211 control port for EAPOL frame TX/RX + * fixed OWE key derivation with groups 20 and 21; this breaks backwards + compatibility for these groups while the default group 19 remains + backwards compatible; owe_ptk_workaround=1 can be used to enabled a + a workaround for the group 20/21 backwards compatibility + * added support for Beacon protection + * added support for Extended Key ID for pairwise keys + * removed WEP support from the default build (CONFIG_WEP=y can be used + to enable it, if really needed) + * added a build option to remove TKIP support (CONFIG_NO_TKIP=y) + * added support for Transition Disable mechanism to allow the AP to + automatically disable transition mode to improve security + * added support for PASN + * added EAP-TLS server support for TLS 1.3 (disabled by default for now) + * a large number of other fixes, cleanup, and extensions + ------------------------------------------------------------------- Fri Nov 26 20:52:19 UTC 2021 - Clemens Famulla-Conrad diff --git a/hostapd.spec b/hostapd.spec index 7584772..e705096 100644 --- a/hostapd.spec +++ b/hostapd.spec @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # # spec file for package hostapd # -# Copyright (c) 2021 SUSE LLC +# Copyright (c) 2022 SUSE LLC # # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ %bcond_without apparmor Name: hostapd -Version: 2.9 +Version: 2.10 Release: 0 Summary: Daemon for running a WPA capable Access Point License: BSD-3-Clause OR GPL-2.0-only @@ -31,9 +31,6 @@ Source2: %{name}.keyring Source3: config Source4: hostapd.service Source5: apparmor-usr.sbin.hostapd -Patch1: CVE-2019-16275.patch -Patch2: CVE-2020-12695.patch -Patch3: CVE-2021-30004.patch BuildRequires: libnl3-devel BuildRequires: openssl-devel BuildRequires: pkgconfig