Accepting request 1235881 from devel:libraries:c_c++

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1235881
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/libgcrypt?expand=0&rev=105

libgcrypt-jitterentropy-3.4.0.patch

@@ -1,618 +0,0 @@
-Index: libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-base.c
-===================================================================
---- libgcrypt-1.10.0.orig/random/jitterentropy-base.c
-+++ libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-base.c
-@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
- 		      * require consumer to be updated (as long as this number
- 		      * is zero, the API is not considered stable and can
- 		      * change without a bump of the major version) */
--#define MINVERSION 3 /* API compatible, ABI may change, functional
-+#define MINVERSION 4 /* API compatible, ABI may change, functional
- 		      * enhancements only, consumer can be left unchanged if
- 		      * enhancements are not considered */
- #define PATCHLEVEL 0 /* API / ABI compatible, no functional changes, no
-@@ -200,29 +200,38 @@ ssize_t jent_read_entropy(struct rand_da
- 			tocopy = (DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8);
- 		else
- 			tocopy = len;
--		memcpy(p, &ec->data, tocopy);
-+
-+		jent_read_random_block(ec, p, tocopy);
- 
- 		len -= tocopy;
- 		p += tocopy;
- 	}
- 
- 	/*
--	 * To be on the safe side, we generate one more round of entropy
--	 * which we do not give out to the caller. That round shall ensure
--	 * that in case the calling application crashes, memory dumps, pages
--	 * out, or due to the CPU Jitter RNG lingering in memory for long
--	 * time without being moved and an attacker cracks the application,
--	 * all he reads in the entropy pool is a value that is NEVER EVER
--	 * being used for anything. Thus, he does NOT see the previous value
--	 * that was returned to the caller for cryptographic purposes.
-+	 * Enhanced backtracking support: At this point, the hash state
-+	 * contains the digest of the previous Jitter RNG collection round
-+	 * which is inserted there by jent_read_random_block with the SHA
-+	 * update operation. At the current code location we completed
-+	 * one request for a caller and we do not know how long it will
-+	 * take until a new request is sent to us. To guarantee enhanced
-+	 * backtracking resistance at this point (i.e. ensure that an attacker
-+	 * cannot obtain information about prior random numbers we generated),
-+	 * but still stirring the hash state with old data the Jitter RNG
-+	 * obtains a new message digest from its state and re-inserts it.
-+	 * After this operation, the Jitter RNG state is still stirred with
-+	 * the old data, but an attacker who gets access to the memory after
-+	 * this point cannot deduce the random numbers produced by the
-+	 * Jitter RNG prior to this point.
- 	 */
- 	/*
--	 * If we use secured memory, do not use that precaution as the secure
--	 * memory protects the entropy pool. Moreover, note that using this
--	 * call reduces the speed of the RNG by up to half
-+	 * If we use secured memory, where backtracking support may not be
-+	 * needed because the state is protected in a different method,
-+	 * it is permissible to drop this support. But strongly weigh the
-+	 * pros and cons considering that the SHA3 operation is not that
-+	 * expensive.
- 	 */
- #ifndef JENT_CPU_JITTERENTROPY_SECURE_MEMORY
--	jent_random_data(ec);
-+	jent_read_random_block(ec, NULL, 0);
- #endif
- 
- err:
-@@ -379,6 +388,7 @@ static struct rand_data
- *jent_entropy_collector_alloc_internal(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags)
- {
- 	struct rand_data *entropy_collector;
-+	uint32_t memsize = 0;
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Requesting disabling and forcing of internal timer
-@@ -405,7 +415,7 @@ static struct rand_data
- 		return NULL;
- 
- 	if (!(flags & JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS)) {
--		uint32_t memsize = jent_memsize(flags);
-+		memsize = jent_memsize(flags);
- 
- 		entropy_collector->mem = _gcry_calloc (1, memsize);
- 
-@@ -431,13 +441,19 @@ static struct rand_data
- 		entropy_collector->memaccessloops = JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (sha3_alloc(&entropy_collector->hash_state))
-+		goto err;
-+
-+	/* Initialize the hash state */
-+	sha3_256_init(entropy_collector->hash_state);
-+
- 	/* verify and set the oversampling rate */
- 	if (osr < JENT_MIN_OSR)
- 		osr = JENT_MIN_OSR;
- 	entropy_collector->osr = osr;
- 	entropy_collector->flags = flags;
- 
--	if (jent_fips_enabled() || (flags & JENT_FORCE_FIPS))
-+	if ((flags & JENT_FORCE_FIPS) || jent_fips_enabled())
- 		entropy_collector->fips_enabled = 1;
- 
- 	/* Initialize the APT */
-@@ -469,7 +485,7 @@ static struct rand_data
- 
- err:
- 	if (entropy_collector->mem != NULL)
--		jent_zfree(entropy_collector->mem, JENT_MEMORY_SIZE);
-+		jent_zfree(entropy_collector->mem, memsize);
- 	jent_zfree(entropy_collector, sizeof(struct rand_data));
- 	return NULL;
- }
-@@ -511,6 +527,7 @@ JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
- void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector)
- {
- 	if (entropy_collector != NULL) {
-+		sha3_dealloc(entropy_collector->hash_state);
- 		jent_notime_disable(entropy_collector);
- 		if (entropy_collector->mem != NULL) {
- 			jent_zfree(entropy_collector->mem,
-@@ -664,6 +681,7 @@ static inline int jent_entropy_init_comm
- 	int ret;
- 
- 	jent_notime_block_switch();
-+	jent_health_cb_block_switch();
- 
- 	if (sha3_tester())
- 		return EHASH;
-@@ -710,6 +728,8 @@ int jent_entropy_init_ex(unsigned int os
- 	if (ret)
- 		return ret;
- 
-+	ret = ENOTIME;
-+
- 	/* Test without internal timer unless caller does not want it */
- 	if (!(flags & JENT_FORCE_INTERNAL_TIMER))
- 		ret = jent_time_entropy_init(osr,
-@@ -732,3 +752,9 @@ int jent_entropy_switch_notime_impl(stru
- 	return jent_notime_switch(new_thread);
- }
- #endif
-+
-+JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
-+int jent_set_fips_failure_callback(jent_fips_failure_cb cb)
-+{
-+	return jent_set_fips_failure_callback_internal(cb);
-+}
-Index: libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-gcd.c
-===================================================================
---- libgcrypt-1.10.0.orig/random/jitterentropy-gcd.c
-+++ libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-gcd.c
-@@ -113,12 +113,8 @@ int jent_gcd_analyze(uint64_t *delta_his
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
--	/*
--	 * Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 100 for at
--	 * least 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter increments
--	 * in multiples of 100, but not always
--	 */
--	if (running_gcd >= 100) {
-+	/* Set a sensible maximum value. */
-+	if (running_gcd >= UINT32_MAX / 2) {
- 		ret = ECOARSETIME;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-Index: libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-health.c
-===================================================================
---- libgcrypt-1.10.0.orig/random/jitterentropy-health.c
-+++ libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-health.c
-@@ -19,9 +19,24 @@
-  * DAMAGE.
-  */
- 
--#include "jitterentropy.h"
- #include "jitterentropy-health.h"
- 
-+static jent_fips_failure_cb fips_cb = NULL;
-+static int jent_health_cb_switch_blocked = 0;
-+
-+void jent_health_cb_block_switch(void)
-+{
-+	jent_health_cb_switch_blocked = 1;
-+}
-+
-+int jent_set_fips_failure_callback_internal(jent_fips_failure_cb cb)
-+{
-+	if (jent_health_cb_switch_blocked)
-+		return -EAGAIN;
-+	fips_cb = cb;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- /***************************************************************************
-  * Lag Predictor Test
-  *
-@@ -434,5 +449,9 @@ unsigned int jent_health_failure(struct
- 	if (!ec->fips_enabled)
- 		return 0;
- 
-+	if (fips_cb && ec->health_failure) {
-+		fips_cb(ec, ec->health_failure);
-+	}
-+
- 	return ec->health_failure;
- }
-Index: libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-health.h
-===================================================================
---- libgcrypt-1.10.0.orig/random/jitterentropy-health.h
-+++ libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-health.h
-@@ -20,11 +20,16 @@
- #ifndef JITTERENTROPY_HEALTH_H
- #define JITTERENTROPY_HEALTH_H
- 
-+#include "jitterentropy.h"
-+
- #ifdef __cplusplus
- extern "C"
- {
- #endif
- 
-+void jent_health_cb_block_switch(void);
-+int jent_set_fips_failure_callback_internal(jent_fips_failure_cb cb);
-+
- static inline uint64_t jent_delta(uint64_t prev, uint64_t next)
- {
- 	return (next - prev);
-Index: libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-noise.c
-===================================================================
---- libgcrypt-1.10.0.orig/random/jitterentropy-noise.c
-+++ libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-noise.c
-@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
-  * Update of the loop count used for the next round of
-  * an entropy collection.
-  *
-- * @ec [in] entropy collector struct -- may be NULL
-+ * @ec [in] entropy collector struct
-  * @bits [in] is the number of low bits of the timer to consider
-  * @min [in] is the number of bits we shift the timer value to the right at
-  *	     the end to make sure we have a guaranteed minimum value
-@@ -61,16 +61,13 @@ static uint64_t jent_loop_shuffle(struct
- 	 * Mix the current state of the random number into the shuffle
- 	 * calculation to balance that shuffle a bit more.
- 	 */
--	if (ec) {
--		jent_get_nstime_internal(ec, &time);
--		time ^= ec->data[0];
--	}
-+	jent_get_nstime_internal(ec, &time);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * We fold the time value as much as possible to ensure that as many
- 	 * bits of the time stamp are included as possible.
- 	 */
--	for (i = 0; ((DATA_SIZE_BITS + bits - 1) / bits) > i; i++) {
-+	for (i = 0; (((sizeof(time) << 3) + bits - 1) / bits) > i; i++) {
- 		shuffle ^= time & mask;
- 		time = time >> bits;
- 	}
-@@ -91,11 +88,11 @@ static uint64_t jent_loop_shuffle(struct
-  * This function injects the individual bits of the time value into the
-  * entropy pool using a hash.
-  *
-- * @ec [in] entropy collector struct -- may be NULL
-- * @time [in] time stamp to be injected
-+ * @ec [in] entropy collector struct
-+ * @time [in] time delta to be injected
-  * @loop_cnt [in] if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as
-  *		  number of loops to perform the hash operation
-- * @stuck [in] Is the time stamp identified as stuck?
-+ * @stuck [in] Is the time delta identified as stuck?
-  *
-  * Output:
-  * updated hash context
-@@ -104,17 +101,19 @@ static void jent_hash_time(struct rand_d
- 			   uint64_t loop_cnt, unsigned int stuck)
- {
- 	HASH_CTX_ON_STACK(ctx);
--	uint8_t itermediary[SHA3_256_SIZE_DIGEST];
-+	uint8_t intermediary[SHA3_256_SIZE_DIGEST];
- 	uint64_t j = 0;
--	uint64_t hash_loop_cnt;
- #define MAX_HASH_LOOP 3
- #define MIN_HASH_LOOP 0
- 
- 	/* Ensure that macros cannot overflow jent_loop_shuffle() */
- 	BUILD_BUG_ON((MAX_HASH_LOOP + MIN_HASH_LOOP) > 63);
--	hash_loop_cnt =
-+	uint64_t hash_loop_cnt =
- 		jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_HASH_LOOP, MIN_HASH_LOOP);
- 
-+	/* Use the memset to shut up valgrind */
-+	memset(intermediary, 0, sizeof(intermediary));
-+
- 	sha3_256_init(&ctx);
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -125,35 +124,54 @@ static void jent_hash_time(struct rand_d
- 		hash_loop_cnt = loop_cnt;
- 
- 	/*
--	 * This loop basically slows down the SHA-3 operation depending
--	 * on the hash_loop_cnt. Each iteration of the loop generates the
--	 * same result.
-+	 * This loop fills a buffer which is injected into the entropy pool.
-+	 * The main reason for this loop is to execute something over which we
-+	 * can perform a timing measurement. The injection of the resulting
-+	 * data into the pool is performed to ensure the result is used and
-+	 * the compiler cannot optimize the loop away in case the result is not
-+	 * used at all. Yet that data is considered "additional information"
-+	 * considering the terminology from SP800-90A without any entropy.
-+	 *
-+	 * Note, it does not matter which or how much data you inject, we are
-+	 * interested in one Keccack1600 compression operation performed with
-+	 * the sha3_final.
- 	 */
- 	for (j = 0; j < hash_loop_cnt; j++) {
--		sha3_update(&ctx, ec->data, SHA3_256_SIZE_DIGEST);
--		sha3_update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)&time, sizeof(uint64_t));
-+		sha3_update(&ctx, intermediary, sizeof(intermediary));
-+		sha3_update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)&ec->rct_count,
-+			    sizeof(ec->rct_count));
-+		sha3_update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)&ec->apt_cutoff,
-+			    sizeof(ec->apt_cutoff));
-+		sha3_update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)&ec->apt_observations,
-+			    sizeof(ec->apt_observations));
-+		sha3_update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)&ec->apt_count,
-+			    sizeof(ec->apt_count));
-+		sha3_update(&ctx,(uint8_t *) &ec->apt_base,
-+			    sizeof(ec->apt_base));
- 		sha3_update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)&j, sizeof(uint64_t));
-+		sha3_final(&ctx, intermediary);
-+	}
- 
--		/*
--		 * If the time stamp is stuck, do not finally insert the value
--		 * into the entropy pool. Although this operation should not do
--		 * any harm even when the time stamp has no entropy, SP800-90B
--		 * requires that any conditioning operation to have an identical
--		 * amount of input data according to section 3.1.5.
--		 */
-+	/*
-+	 * Inject the data from the previous loop into the pool. This data is
-+	 * not considered to contain any entropy, but it stirs the pool a bit.
-+	 */
-+	sha3_update(ec->hash_state, intermediary, sizeof(intermediary));
- 
--		/*
--		 * The sha3_final operations re-initialize the context for the
--		 * next loop iteration.
--		 */
--		if (stuck || (j < hash_loop_cnt - 1))
--			sha3_final(&ctx, itermediary);
--		else
--			sha3_final(&ctx, ec->data);
--	}
-+	/*
-+	 * Insert the time stamp into the hash context representing the pool.
-+	 *
-+	 * If the time stamp is stuck, do not finally insert the value into the
-+	 * entropy pool. Although this operation should not do any harm even
-+	 * when the time stamp has no entropy, SP800-90B requires that any
-+	 * conditioning operation to have an identical amount of input data
-+	 * according to section 3.1.5.
-+	 */
-+	if (!stuck)
-+		sha3_update(ec->hash_state, (uint8_t *)&time, sizeof(uint64_t));
- 
- 	jent_memset_secure(&ctx, SHA_MAX_CTX_SIZE);
--	jent_memset_secure(itermediary, sizeof(itermediary));
-+	jent_memset_secure(intermediary, sizeof(intermediary));
- }
- 
- #define MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT 7
-@@ -184,13 +202,12 @@ static inline uint32_t xoshiro128starsta
- 
- static void jent_memaccess(struct rand_data *ec, uint64_t loop_cnt)
- {
--	uint64_t i = 0;
-+	uint64_t i = 0, time = 0;
- 	union {
- 		uint32_t u[4];
- 		uint8_t b[sizeof(uint32_t) * 4];
- 	} prngState = { .u = {0x8e93eec0, 0xce65608a, 0xa8d46b46, 0xe83cef69} };
- 	uint32_t addressMask;
--        uint64_t acc_loop_cnt;
- 
- 	if (NULL == ec || NULL == ec->mem)
- 		return;
-@@ -199,7 +216,7 @@ static void jent_memaccess(struct rand_d
- 
- 	/* Ensure that macros cannot overflow jent_loop_shuffle() */
- 	BUILD_BUG_ON((MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT + MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT) > 63);
--	acc_loop_cnt =
-+	uint64_t acc_loop_cnt =
- 		jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT, MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT);
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -213,8 +230,10 @@ static void jent_memaccess(struct rand_d
- 	 * "per-update: timing, it gets you mostly independent "per-update"
- 	 * timing, so we can now benefit from the Central Limit Theorem!
- 	 */
--	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(prngState); i++)
--		prngState.b[i] ^= ec->data[i];
-+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(prngState); i++) {
-+		jent_get_nstime_internal(ec, &time);
-+		prngState.b[i] ^= (uint8_t)(time & 0xff);
-+	}
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not
-@@ -358,21 +377,21 @@ unsigned int jent_measure_jitter(struct
- 
- /**
-  * Generator of one 256 bit random number
-- * Function fills rand_data->data
-+ * Function fills rand_data->hash_state
-  *
-  * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
-  */
- void jent_random_data(struct rand_data *ec)
- {
--	unsigned int k = 0, safety_factor = ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR;
-+	unsigned int k = 0, safety_factor = 0;
- 
--	if (!ec->fips_enabled)
--		safety_factor = 0;
-+	if (ec->fips_enabled)
-+		safety_factor = ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR;
- 
- 	/* priming of the ->prev_time value */
- 	jent_measure_jitter(ec, 0, NULL);
- 
--	while (1) {
-+	while (!jent_health_failure(ec)) {
- 		/* If a stuck measurement is received, repeat measurement */
- 		if (jent_measure_jitter(ec, 0, NULL))
- 			continue;
-@@ -385,3 +404,22 @@ void jent_random_data(struct rand_data *
- 			break;
- 	}
- }
-+
-+void jent_read_random_block(struct rand_data *ec, char *dst, size_t dst_len)
-+{
-+	uint8_t jent_block[SHA3_256_SIZE_DIGEST];
-+
-+	BUILD_BUG_ON(SHA3_256_SIZE_DIGEST != (DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8));
-+
-+	/* The final operation automatically re-initializes the ->hash_state */
-+	sha3_final(ec->hash_state, jent_block);
-+	if (dst_len)
-+		memcpy(dst, jent_block, dst_len);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Stir the new state with the data from the old state - the digest
-+	 * of the old data is not considered to have entropy.
-+	 */
-+	sha3_update(ec->hash_state, jent_block, sizeof(jent_block));
-+	jent_memset_secure(jent_block, sizeof(jent_block));
-+}
-Index: libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-noise.h
-===================================================================
---- libgcrypt-1.10.0.orig/random/jitterentropy-noise.h
-+++ libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-noise.h
-@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ unsigned int jent_measure_jitter(struct
- 				 uint64_t loop_cnt,
- 				 uint64_t *ret_current_delta);
- void jent_random_data(struct rand_data *ec);
-+void jent_read_random_block(struct rand_data *ec, char *dst, size_t dst_len);
- 
- #ifdef __cplusplus
- }
-Index: libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-sha3.c
-===================================================================
---- libgcrypt-1.10.0.orig/random/jitterentropy-sha3.c
-+++ libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-sha3.c
-@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
-  */
- 
- #include "jitterentropy-sha3.h"
-+#include "jitterentropy.h"
- 
- /***************************************************************************
-  * Message Digest Implementation
-@@ -380,3 +381,23 @@ int sha3_tester(void)
- 
- 	return 0;
- }
-+
-+int sha3_alloc(void **hash_state)
-+{
-+	struct sha_ctx *tmp;
-+
-+	tmp = jent_zalloc(SHA_MAX_CTX_SIZE);
-+	if (!tmp)
-+		return 1;
-+
-+	*hash_state = tmp;
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+void sha3_dealloc(void *hash_state)
-+{
-+	struct sha_ctx *ctx = (struct sha_ctx *)hash_state;
-+
-+	jent_zfree(ctx, SHA_MAX_CTX_SIZE);
-+}
-Index: libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-sha3.h
-===================================================================
---- libgcrypt-1.10.0.orig/random/jitterentropy-sha3.h
-+++ libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-sha3.h
-@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ struct sha_ctx {
- void sha3_256_init(struct sha_ctx *ctx);
- void sha3_update(struct sha_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen);
- void sha3_final(struct sha_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *digest);
-+int sha3_alloc(void **hash_state);
-+void sha3_dealloc(void *hash_state);
- int sha3_tester(void);
- 
- #ifdef __cplusplus
-Index: libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-timer.c
-===================================================================
---- libgcrypt-1.10.0.orig/random/jitterentropy-timer.c
-+++ libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-timer.c
-@@ -202,8 +202,8 @@ int jent_notime_enable(struct rand_data
- 	if (jent_force_internal_timer || (flags & JENT_FORCE_INTERNAL_TIMER)) {
- 		/* Self test not run yet */
- 		if (!jent_force_internal_timer &&
--		    jent_time_entropy_init(flags | JENT_FORCE_INTERNAL_TIMER,
--					   ec->osr))
-+		    jent_time_entropy_init(ec->osr,
-+					   flags | JENT_FORCE_INTERNAL_TIMER))
- 			return EHEALTH;
- 
- 		ec->enable_notime = 1;
-Index: libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy.h
-===================================================================
---- libgcrypt-1.10.0.orig/random/jitterentropy.h
-+++ libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy.h
-@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
-  ***************************************************************************/
- 
- /*
-- * Enable timer-less timer support
-+ * Enable timer-less timer support with JENT_CONF_ENABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER
-  *
-  * In case the hardware is identified to not provide a high-resolution time
-  * stamp, this option enables a built-in high-resolution time stamp mechanism.
-@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct rand_data
- 	 * of the RNG are marked as SENSITIVE. A user must not
- 	 * access that information while the RNG executes its loops to
- 	 * calculate the next random value. */
--	uint8_t data[SHA3_256_SIZE_DIGEST]; /* SENSITIVE Actual random number */
-+	void *hash_state;		/* SENSITIVE hash state entropy pool */
- 	uint64_t prev_time;		/* SENSITIVE Previous time stamp */
- #define DATA_SIZE_BITS (SHA3_256_SIZE_DIGEST_BITS)
- 
-@@ -378,28 +378,34 @@ int jent_entropy_init(void);
- JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
- int jent_entropy_init_ex(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags);
- 
-+/*
-+ * Set a callback to run on health failure in FIPS mode.
-+ * This function will take an action determined by the caller.
-+ */
-+typedef void (*jent_fips_failure_cb)(struct rand_data *ec,
-+				     unsigned int health_failure);
-+JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
-+int jent_set_fips_failure_callback(jent_fips_failure_cb cb);
-+
- /* return version number of core library */
- JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
- unsigned int jent_version(void);
- 
--#ifdef JENT_CONF_ENABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER
- /* Set a different thread handling logic for the notimer support */
- JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
- int jent_entropy_switch_notime_impl(struct jent_notime_thread *new_thread);
--#endif
- 
- /* -- END of Main interface functions -- */
- 
- /* -- BEGIN timer-less threading support functions to prevent code dupes -- */
- 
--struct jent_notime_ctx {
- #ifdef JENT_CONF_ENABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER
-+
-+struct jent_notime_ctx {
- 	pthread_attr_t notime_pthread_attr;	/* pthreads library */
- 	pthread_t notime_thread_id;		/* pthreads thread ID */
--#endif
- };
- 
--#ifdef JENT_CONF_ENABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER
- 
- JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
- int jent_notime_init(void **ctx);
-Index: libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-base-user.h
-===================================================================
---- libgcrypt-1.10.0.orig/random/jitterentropy-base-user.h
-+++ libgcrypt-1.10.0/random/jitterentropy-base-user.h
-@@ -213,12 +213,12 @@ static inline void jent_get_cachesize(lo
- 		ext = strstr(buf, "K");
- 		if (ext) {
- 			shift = 10;
--			ext = '\0';
-+			*ext = '\0';
- 		} else {
- 			ext = strstr(buf, "M");
- 			if (ext) {
- 				shift = 20;
--				ext = '\0';
-+				*ext = '\0';
- 			}
- 		}
- 

libgcrypt-no-deprecated-grep-alias.patch

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
---- libgcrypt-1.10.3.orig/acinclude.m4
-+++ libgcrypt-1.10.3/acinclude.m4
-@@ -130,10 +130,10 @@ EOF
-     ac_nlist=conftest.nm
-     if AC_TRY_EVAL(NM conftest.$ac_objext \| $lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_pipe \| cut -d \' \' -f 2 \> $ac_nlist) && test -s "$ac_nlist"; then
-       # See whether the symbols have a leading underscore.
--      if egrep '^_nm_test_func' "$ac_nlist" >/dev/null; then
-+      if grep -E '^_nm_test_func' "$ac_nlist" >/dev/null; then
-         ac_cv_sys_symbol_underscore=yes
-       else
--        if egrep '^nm_test_func ' "$ac_nlist" >/dev/null; then
-+        if grep -E '^nm_test_func ' "$ac_nlist" >/dev/null; then
-           :
-         else
-           echo "configure: cannot find nm_test_func in $ac_nlist" >&AS_MESSAGE_LOG_FD
---- libgcrypt-1.10.3.orig/src/libgcrypt-config.in
-+++ libgcrypt-1.10.3/src/libgcrypt-config.in
-@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ if test "$echo_cflags" = "yes"; then
- 
-     tmp=""
-     for i in $includes $cflags_final; do
--       if echo "$tmp" | fgrep -v -- "$i" >/dev/null; then
-+       if echo "$tmp" | @GREP@ -F -v -- "$i" >/dev/null; then
-            tmp="$tmp $i"
-        fi
-     done
-@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ if test "$echo_libs" = "yes"; then
- 
-     tmp=""
-     for i in $libdirs $libs_final; do
--       if echo "$tmp" | fgrep -v -- "$i" >/dev/null; then
-+       if echo "$tmp" | @GREP@ -F -v -- "$i" >/dev/null; then
-            tmp="$tmp $i"
-        fi
-     done

libgcrypt-ppc-enable-P10-assembly-with-ENABLE_FORCE_SOF.patch

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-commit 2c5e5ab6843d747c4b877d2c6f47226f61e9ff14
-Author: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
-Date:   Sun Jun 12 21:51:34 2022 +0300
-
-    ppc enable P10 assembly with ENABLE_FORCE_SOFT_HWFEATURES on arch 3.00
-    
-    * cipher/chacha20.c (chacha20_do_setkey) [USE_PPC_VEC]: Enable
-    P10 assembly for HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_00 if ENABLE_FORCE_SOFT_HWFEATURES is
-    defined.
-    * cipher/poly1305.c (poly1305_init) [POLY1305_USE_PPC_VEC]: Likewise.
-    * cipher/rijndael.c (do_setkey) [USE_PPC_CRYPTO_WITH_PPC9LE]: Likewise.
-    ---
-    
-    This change allows testing P10 implementations with P9 and with QEMU-PPC.
-    
-    GnuPG-bug-id: 6006
-    Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
-
-Index: libgcrypt-1.10.2/cipher/chacha20.c
-===================================================================
---- libgcrypt-1.10.2.orig/cipher/chacha20.c
-+++ libgcrypt-1.10.2/cipher/chacha20.c
-@@ -484,6 +484,11 @@ chacha20_do_setkey (CHACHA20_context_t *
-   ctx->use_ppc = (features & HWF_PPC_ARCH_2_07) != 0;
- # ifndef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
-   ctx->use_p10 = (features & HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_10) != 0;
-+#  ifdef ENABLE_FORCE_SOFT_HWFEATURES
-+  /* HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_10 above is used as soft HW-feature indicator for P10.
-+   * Actual implementation works with HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_00 also. */
-+  ctx->use_p10 |= (features & HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_00) != 0;
-+#  endif
- # endif
- #endif
- #ifdef USE_S390X_VX
-Index: libgcrypt-1.10.2/cipher/poly1305.c
-===================================================================
---- libgcrypt-1.10.2.orig/cipher/poly1305.c
-+++ libgcrypt-1.10.2/cipher/poly1305.c
-@@ -90,11 +90,19 @@ static void poly1305_init (poly1305_cont
- 			   const byte key[POLY1305_KEYLEN])
- {
-   POLY1305_STATE *st = &ctx->state;
-+  unsigned int features = _gcry_get_hw_features ();
- 
- #ifdef POLY1305_USE_PPC_VEC
--  ctx->use_p10 = (_gcry_get_hw_features () & HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_10) != 0;
-+  ctx->use_p10 = (features & HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_10) != 0;
-+# ifdef ENABLE_FORCE_SOFT_HWFEATURES
-+  /* HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_10 above is used as soft HW-feature indicator for P10.
-+   * Actual implementation works with HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_00 also. */
-+  ctx->use_p10 |= (features & HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_00) != 0;
-+# endif
- #endif
- 
-+  (void)features;
-+
-   ctx->leftover = 0;
- 
-   st->h[0] = 0;
-Index: libgcrypt-1.10.2/cipher/rijndael.c
-===================================================================
---- libgcrypt-1.10.2.orig/cipher/rijndael.c
-+++ libgcrypt-1.10.2/cipher/rijndael.c
-@@ -605,6 +605,12 @@ do_setkey (RIJNDAEL_context *ctx, const
-       bulk_ops->xts_crypt = _gcry_aes_ppc9le_xts_crypt;
-       if (hwfeatures & HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_10)  /* for P10 */
-         bulk_ops->gcm_crypt = _gcry_aes_p10le_gcm_crypt;
-+# ifdef ENABLE_FORCE_SOFT_HWFEATURES
-+      /* HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_10 above is used as soft HW-feature indicator for P10.
-+       * Actual implementation works with HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_00 also. */
-+      if (hwfeatures & HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_00)
-+        bulk_ops->gcm_crypt = _gcry_aes_p10le_gcm_crypt;
-+# endif
-     }
- #endif
- #ifdef USE_PPC_CRYPTO