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VUL-0: multiple issues in libvirt

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OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/libvirt?expand=0&rev=60
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James Fehlig 2010-07-16 22:40:42 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
parent 118ab4ae54
commit 274bce922a
13 changed files with 3778 additions and 1 deletions
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339
CVE-2010-223x-0001.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
>From 7b91c43bef0348c8cc18037bec5aef668b51fc90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 15:53:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 01/10] Extract the backing store format as well as name, if available
When QEMU opens a backing store for a QCow2 file, it will
normally auto-probe for the format of the backing store,
rather than assuming it has the same format as the referencing
file. There is a QCow2 extension that allows an explicit format
for the backing store to be embedded in the referencing file.
This closes the auto-probing security hole in QEMU.
This backing store format can be useful for libvirt users
of virStorageFileGetMetadata, so extract this data and report
it.
QEMU does not require disk image backing store files to be in
the same format the file linkee. It will auto-probe the disk
format for the backing store when opening it. If the backing
store was intended to be a raw file this could be a security
hole, because a guest may have written data into its disk that
then makes the backing store look like a qcow2 file. If it can
trick QEMU into thinking the raw file is a qcow2 file, it can
access arbitrary files on the host by adding further backing
store links.
To address this, callers of virStorageFileGetMeta need to be
told of the backing store format. If no format is declared,
they can make a decision whether to allow format probing or
not.
---
src/util/storage_file.c | 192 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
src/util/storage_file.h | 2 +
2 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/storage_file.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/util/storage_file.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/storage_file.c
@@ -71,12 +71,18 @@ struct FileTypeInfo {
int qcowCryptOffset; /* Byte offset from start of file
* where to find encryption mode,
* -1 if encryption is not used */
- int (*getBackingStore)(char **res, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_size);
+ int (*getBackingStore)(char **res, int *format,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_size);
};
-static int cowGetBackingStore(char **, const unsigned char *, size_t);
-static int qcowXGetBackingStore(char **, const unsigned char *, size_t);
-static int vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **, const unsigned char *, size_t);
+static int cowGetBackingStore(char **, int *,
+ const unsigned char *, size_t);
+static int qcow1GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
+ const unsigned char *, size_t);
+static int qcow2GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
+ const unsigned char *, size_t);
+static int vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
+ const unsigned char *, size_t);
static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
@@ -112,11 +118,11 @@ static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTyp
/* QCow */
{ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW, "QFI", NULL,
LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
- 4+4+8+4+4, 8, 1, 4+4+8+4+4+8+1+1+2, qcowXGetBackingStore },
+ 4+4+8+4+4, 8, 1, 4+4+8+4+4+8+1+1+2, qcow1GetBackingStore },
/* QCow 2 */
{ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW2, "QFI", NULL,
LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
- 4+4+8+4+4, 8, 1, 4+4+8+4+4+8, qcowXGetBackingStore },
+ 4+4+8+4+4, 8, 1, 4+4+8+4+4+8, qcow2GetBackingStore },
/* VMDK 3 */
/* XXX Untested
{ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VMDK, "COWD", NULL,
@@ -137,11 +143,14 @@ static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTyp
static int
cowGetBackingStore(char **res,
+ int *format,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buf_size)
{
#define COW_FILENAME_MAXLEN 1024
*res = NULL;
+ *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+
if (buf_size < 4+4+ COW_FILENAME_MAXLEN)
return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
if (buf[4+4] == '\0') /* cow_header_v2.backing_file[0] */
@@ -155,31 +164,101 @@ cowGetBackingStore(char **res,
return BACKING_STORE_OK;
}
+
+
+#define QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET 4+4
+#define QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE 4+4+8
+
+#define QCOW2_HDR_TOTAL_SIZE 4+4+8+4+4+8+4+4+8+8+4+4+8
+#define QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_END 0
+#define QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_BACKING_FORMAT 0xE2792ACA
+
+static int
+qcow2GetBackingStoreFormat(int *format,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buf_size,
+ size_t extension_start,
+ size_t extension_end)
+{
+ size_t offset = extension_start;
+
+ /*
+ * The extensions take format of
+ *
+ * int32: magic
+ * int32: length
+ * byte[length]: payload
+ *
+ * Unknown extensions can be ignored by skipping
+ * over "length" bytes in the data stream.
+ */
+ while (offset < (buf_size-8) &&
+ offset < (extension_end-8)) {
+ int magic = (buf[offset] << 24) +
+ (buf[offset+1] << 16) +
+ (buf[offset+2] << 8) +
+ (buf[offset+3]);
+ int len = (buf[offset+4] << 24) +
+ (buf[offset+5] << 16) +
+ (buf[offset+6] << 8) +
+ (buf[offset+7]);
+
+ offset += 8;
+
+ if ((offset + len) > buf_size)
+ break;
+
+ switch (magic) {
+ case QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_END:
+ goto done;
+
+ case QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_BACKING_FORMAT:
+ if (buf[offset+len] != '\0')
+ break;
+ *format = virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString(
+ ((const char *)buf)+offset);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ offset += len;
+ }
+
+done:
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
static int
qcowXGetBackingStore(char **res,
+ int *format,
const unsigned char *buf,
- size_t buf_size)
+ size_t buf_size,
+ bool isQCow2)
{
unsigned long long offset;
unsigned long size;
*res = NULL;
- if (buf_size < 4+4+8+4)
+ if (format)
+ *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+
+ if (buf_size < QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+8+4)
return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
- offset = (((unsigned long long)buf[4+4] << 56)
- | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+1] << 48)
- | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+2] << 40)
- | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+3] << 32)
- | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+4] << 24)
- | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+5] << 16)
- | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+6] << 8)
- | buf[4+4+7]); /* QCowHeader.backing_file_offset */
+ offset = (((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET] << 56)
+ | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+1] << 48)
+ | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+2] << 40)
+ | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+3] << 32)
+ | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+4] << 24)
+ | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+5] << 16)
+ | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+6] << 8)
+ | buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+7]); /* QCowHeader.backing_file_offset */
if (offset > buf_size)
return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
- size = ((buf[4+4+8] << 24)
- | (buf[4+4+8+1] << 16)
- | (buf[4+4+8+2] << 8)
- | buf[4+4+8+3]); /* QCowHeader.backing_file_size */
+ size = ((buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE] << 24)
+ | (buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE+1] << 16)
+ | (buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE+2] << 8)
+ | buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE+3]); /* QCowHeader.backing_file_size */
if (size == 0)
return BACKING_STORE_OK;
if (offset + size > buf_size || offset + size < offset)
@@ -192,12 +271,63 @@ qcowXGetBackingStore(char **res,
}
memcpy(*res, buf + offset, size);
(*res)[size] = '\0';
+
+ /*
+ * Traditionally QCow2 files had a layout of
+ *
+ * [header]
+ * [backingStoreName]
+ *
+ * Although the backingStoreName typically followed
+ * the header immediately, this was not required by
+ * the format. By specifying a higher byte offset for
+ * the backing file offset in the header, it was
+ * possible to leave space between the header and
+ * start of backingStore.
+ *
+ * This hack is now used to store extensions to the
+ * qcow2 format:
+ *
+ * [header]
+ * [extensions]
+ * [backingStoreName]
+ *
+ * Thus the file region to search for extensions is
+ * between the end of the header (QCOW2_HDR_TOTAL_SIZE)
+ * and the start of the backingStoreName (offset)
+ */
+ if (isQCow2)
+ qcow2GetBackingStoreFormat(format, buf, buf_size, QCOW2_HDR_TOTAL_SIZE, offset);
+
return BACKING_STORE_OK;
}
static int
+qcow1GetBackingStore(char **res,
+ int *format,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buf_size)
+{
+ /* QCow1 doesn't have the extensions capability
+ * used to store backing format */
+ *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+ return qcowXGetBackingStore(res, NULL, buf, buf_size, false);
+}
+
+static int
+qcow2GetBackingStore(char **res,
+ int *format,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buf_size)
+{
+ return qcowXGetBackingStore(res, format, buf, buf_size, true);
+}
+
+
+static int
vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **res,
+ int *format,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buf_size)
{
@@ -207,6 +337,12 @@ vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **res,
size_t len;
*res = NULL;
+ /* XXX should we set VMDK instead ? QEMU does auto
+ * probing, but this isn't in compliance with the
+ * VMDK spec/VMWare impl which presumes only VMDK
+ * backing format
+ */
+ *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
if (buf_size <= 0x200)
return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
@@ -351,9 +487,12 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const ch
/* Validation passed, we know the file format now */
meta->format = fileTypeInfo[i].type;
if (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore != NULL) {
- char *base;
+ char *backing;
+ int backingFormat;
- switch (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore(&base, head, len)) {
+ switch (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore(&backing,
+ &backingFormat,
+ head, len)) {
case BACKING_STORE_OK:
break;
@@ -363,13 +502,16 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const ch
case BACKING_STORE_ERROR:
return -1;
}
- if (base != NULL) {
- meta->backingStore = absolutePathFromBaseFile(path, base);
- VIR_FREE(base);
+ if (backing != NULL) {
+ meta->backingStore = absolutePathFromBaseFile(path, backing);
+ VIR_FREE(backing);
if (meta->backingStore == NULL) {
virReportOOMError();
return -1;
}
+ meta->backingStoreFormat = backingFormat;
+ } else {
+ meta->backingStoreFormat = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
}
}
return 0;
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/storage_file.h
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/util/storage_file.h
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/storage_file.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
# include <stdbool.h>
enum virStorageFileFormat {
+ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO = -1,
VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW = 0,
VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DIR,
VIR_STORAGE_FILE_BOCHS,
@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virStorageFileFormat);
typedef struct _virStorageFileMetadata {
int format;
char *backingStore;
+ int backingStoreFormat;
unsigned long long capacity;
bool encrypted;
} virStorageFileMetadata;

158
CVE-2010-223x-0002.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
>From 66c633413960e869a15062cee8667db51e6c817a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 16:39:32 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 02/10] Remove 'type' field from FileTypeInfo struct
Instead of including a field in FileTypeInfo struct for the
disk format, rely on the array index matching the format.
Use verify() to assert the correct number of elements in the
array.
* src/util/storage_file.c: remove type field from FileTypeInfo
---
src/util/storage_file.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/storage_file.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/util/storage_file.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/storage_file.c
@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ enum {
/* Either 'magic' or 'extension' *must* be provided */
struct FileTypeInfo {
- int type; /* One of the constants above */
const char *magic; /* Optional string of file magic
* to check at head of file */
const char *extension; /* Optional file extension to check */
@@ -86,60 +85,59 @@ static int vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **,
static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
- /* Bochs */
- /* XXX Untested
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_BOCHS, "Bochs Virtual HD Image", NULL,
- LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 64, 0x20000,
- 32+16+16+4+4+4+4+4, 8, 1, -1, NULL },*/
- /* CLoop */
- /* XXX Untested
- { VIR_STORAGE_VOL_CLOOP, "#!/bin/sh\n#V2.0 Format\nmodprobe cloop file=$0 && mount -r -t iso9660 /dev/cloop $1\n", NULL,
- LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, -1, 0,
- -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL }, */
- /* Cow */
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_COW, "OOOM", NULL,
- LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
- 4+4+1024+4, 8, 1, -1, cowGetBackingStore },
- /* DMG */
- /* XXX QEMU says there's no magic for dmg, but we should check... */
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DMG, NULL, ".dmg",
- 0, -1, 0,
- -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL },
- /* XXX there's probably some magic for iso we can validate too... */
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_ISO, NULL, ".iso",
- 0, -1, 0,
- -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL },
- /* Parallels */
- /* XXX Untested
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_PARALLELS, "WithoutFreeSpace", NULL,
- LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 16, 2,
- 16+4+4+4+4, 4, 512, -1, NULL },
- */
- /* QCow */
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW, "QFI", NULL,
- LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
- 4+4+8+4+4, 8, 1, 4+4+8+4+4+8+1+1+2, qcow1GetBackingStore },
- /* QCow 2 */
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW2, "QFI", NULL,
- LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
- 4+4+8+4+4, 8, 1, 4+4+8+4+4+8, qcow2GetBackingStore },
- /* VMDK 3 */
- /* XXX Untested
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VMDK, "COWD", NULL,
- LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
- 4+4+4, 4, 512, -1, NULL },
- */
- /* VMDK 4 */
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VMDK, "KDMV", NULL,
- LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
- 4+4+4, 8, 512, -1, vmdk4GetBackingStore },
- /* Connectix / VirtualPC */
- /* XXX Untested
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VPC, "conectix", NULL,
- LV_BIG_ENDIAN, -1, 0,
- -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL},
- */
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW] = { NULL, NULL, LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DIR] = { NULL, NULL, LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_BOCHS] = {
+ /*"Bochs Virtual HD Image", */ /* Untested */ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 64, 0x20000,
+ 32+16+16+4+4+4+4+4, 8, 1, -1, NULL
+ },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_CLOOP] = {
+ /*"#!/bin/sh\n#V2.0 Format\nmodprobe cloop file=$0 && mount -r -t iso9660 /dev/cloop $1\n", */ /* Untested */ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, -1, 0,
+ -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL
+ },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_COW] = {
+ "OOOM", NULL,
+ LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
+ 4+4+1024+4, 8, 1, -1, cowGetBackingStore
+ },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DMG] = {
+ NULL, /* XXX QEMU says there's no magic for dmg, but we should check... */
+ ".dmg",
+ 0, -1, 0,
+ -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL
+ },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_ISO] = {
+ NULL, /* XXX there's probably some magic for iso we can validate too... */
+ ".iso",
+ 0, -1, 0,
+ -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL
+ },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW] = {
+ "QFI", NULL,
+ LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
+ 4+4+8+4+4, 8, 1, 4+4+8+4+4+8+1+1+2, qcow1GetBackingStore
+ },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW2] = {
+ "QFI", NULL,
+ LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
+ 4+4+8+4+4, 8, 1, 4+4+8+4+4+8, qcow2GetBackingStore
+ },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VMDK] = {
+ "KDMV", NULL,
+ LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
+ 4+4+4, 8, 512, -1, vmdk4GetBackingStore
+ },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VPC] = {
+ "conectix", NULL,
+ LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 12, 0x10000,
+ 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 2 + 2 + 4, 8, 1, -1, NULL
+ },
};
+verify(ARRAY_CARDINALITY(fileTypeInfo) == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_LAST);
static int
cowGetBackingStore(char **res,
@@ -485,7 +483,7 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const ch
}
/* Validation passed, we know the file format now */
- meta->format = fileTypeInfo[i].type;
+ meta->format = i;
if (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore != NULL) {
char *backing;
int backingFormat;
@@ -525,7 +523,7 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const ch
if (!virFileHasSuffix(path, fileTypeInfo[i].extension))
continue;
- meta->format = fileTypeInfo[i].type;
+ meta->format = i;
return 0;
}

486
CVE-2010-223x-0003.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,486 @@
>From f8d3e740cee4903bd2eef1a072e8190f5e9e92b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 14:58:10 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 03/10] Refactor virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD to separate functionality
The virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD did two jobs in one. First
it probed for storage type, then it extracted metadata for the
type. It is desirable to be able to separate these jobs, allowing
probing without querying metadata, and querying metadata without
probing.
To prepare for this, split out probing code into a new pair of
methods
virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD
virStorageFileProbeFormat
* src/util/storage_file.c, src/util/storage_file.h,
src/libvirt_private.syms: Introduce virStorageFileProbeFormat
and virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD
---
src/libvirt_private.syms | 2 +
src/util/storage_file.c | 393 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
src/util/storage_file.h | 4 +
3 files changed, 281 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-)
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/libvirt_private.syms
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/libvirt_private.syms
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/libvirt_private.syms
@@ -619,6 +619,8 @@ virStorageGenerateQcowPassphrase;
# storage_file.h
virStorageFileFormatTypeToString;
virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString;
+virStorageFileProbeFormat;
+virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD;
virStorageFileGetMetadata;
virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD;
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/storage_file.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/util/storage_file.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/storage_file.c
@@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ static int vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **,
static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
- [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW] = { NULL, NULL, LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL },
- [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DIR] = { NULL, NULL, LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW] = { NULL, NULL, LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DIR] = { NULL, NULL, LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL },
[VIR_STORAGE_FILE_BOCHS] = {
/*"Bochs Virtual HD Image", */ /* Untested */ NULL,
NULL,
@@ -390,146 +390,302 @@ absolutePathFromBaseFile(const char *bas
return res;
}
+static int
+virStorageFileMatchesMagic(int format,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen)
+{
+ int mlen;
+
+ if (fileTypeInfo[format].magic == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Validate magic data */
+ mlen = strlen(fileTypeInfo[format].magic);
+ if (mlen > buflen)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (memcmp(buf, fileTypeInfo[format].magic, mlen) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+virStorageFileMatchesExtension(int format,
+ const char *path)
+{
+ if (fileTypeInfo[format].extension == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (virFileHasSuffix(path, fileTypeInfo[format].extension))
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+virStorageFileMatchesVersion(int format,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen)
+{
+ int version;
+
+ /* Validate version number info */
+ if (fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset == -1)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset + 4) > buflen)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (fileTypeInfo[format].endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
+ version =
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+3] << 24) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+2] << 16) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+1] << 8) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset]);
+ } else {
+ version =
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset] << 24) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+1] << 16) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+2] << 8) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+3]);
+ }
+ if (version != fileTypeInfo[format].versionNumber)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+virStorageFileGetMetadataFromBuf(int format,
+ const char *path,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen,
+ virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
+{
+ /* XXX we should consider moving virStorageBackendUpdateVolInfo
+ * code into this method, for non-magic files
+ */
+ if (!fileTypeInfo[format].magic) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Optionally extract capacity from file */
+ if (fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset != -1) {
+ if ((fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset + 8) > buflen)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (fileTypeInfo[format].endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
+ meta->capacity =
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+7] << 56) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+6] << 48) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+5] << 40) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+4] << 32) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+3] << 24) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+2] << 16) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+1] << 8) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset]);
+ } else {
+ meta->capacity =
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset] << 56) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+1] << 48) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+2] << 40) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+3] << 32) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+4] << 24) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+5] << 16) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+6] << 8) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+7]);
+ }
+ /* Avoid unlikely, but theoretically possible overflow */
+ if (meta->capacity > (ULLONG_MAX / fileTypeInfo[format].sizeMultiplier))
+ return 1;
+ meta->capacity *= fileTypeInfo[format].sizeMultiplier;
+ }
+
+ if (fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset != -1) {
+ int crypt_format;
+
+ crypt_format =
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset] << 24) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset+1] << 16) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset+2] << 8) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset+3]);
+ meta->encrypted = crypt_format != 0;
+ }
+
+ if (fileTypeInfo[format].getBackingStore != NULL) {
+ char *backing;
+ int backingFormat;
+ int ret = fileTypeInfo[format].getBackingStore(&backing,
+ &backingFormat,
+ buf, buflen);
+ if (ret == BACKING_STORE_INVALID)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (ret == BACKING_STORE_ERROR)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (backing != NULL) {
+ meta->backingStore = absolutePathFromBaseFile(path, backing);
+ VIR_FREE(backing);
+ if (meta->backingStore == NULL) {
+ virReportOOMError();
+ return -1;
+ }
+ meta->backingStoreFormat = backingFormat;
+ } else {
+ meta->backingStore = NULL;
+ meta->backingStoreFormat = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(const char *path,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen)
+{
+ int format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW;
+ int i;
+
+ /* First check file magic */
+ for (i = 0 ; i < VIR_STORAGE_FILE_LAST ; i++) {
+ if (virStorageFileMatchesMagic(i, buf, buflen) &&
+ virStorageFileMatchesVersion(i, buf, buflen)) {
+ format = i;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* No magic, so check file extension */
+ for (i = 0 ; i < VIR_STORAGE_FILE_LAST ; i++) {
+ if (virStorageFileMatchesExtension(i, path)) {
+ format = i;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ return format;
+}
+
/**
- * Probe the header of a file to determine what type of disk image
- * it is, and info about its capacity if available.
+ * virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD:
+ *
+ * Probe for the format of 'fd' (which is an open file descriptor
+ * pointing to 'path'), returning the detected disk format.
+ *
+ * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'format'
+ * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
+ * malicious guest can turn a file into any other non-raw
+ * format at will.
+ *
+ * Best option: Don't use this function
*/
int
-virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
- int fd,
- virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
+virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(const char *path, int fd)
{
unsigned char head[20*512]; /* vmdk4GetBackingStore needs this much. */
- int len, i;
+ int len;
- /* If all else fails, call it a raw file */
- meta->format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW;
+ if (lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
+ virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot set to start of '%s'"), path);
+ return -1;
+ }
if ((len = read(fd, head, sizeof(head))) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read header '%s'"), path);
return -1;
}
- /* First check file magic */
- for (i = 0 ; i < ARRAY_CARDINALITY(fileTypeInfo) ; i++) {
- int mlen;
+ return virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(path, head, len);
+}
- if (fileTypeInfo[i].magic == NULL)
- continue;
+/**
+ * virStorageFileProbeFormat:
+ *
+ * Probe for the format of 'path', returning the detected
+ * disk format.
+ *
+ * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'format'
+ * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
+ * malicious guest can turn a file into any other non-raw
+ * format at will.
+ *
+ * Best option: Don't use this function
+ */
+int
+virStorageFileProbeFormat(const char *path)
+{
+ int fd, ret;
- /* Validate magic data */
- mlen = strlen(fileTypeInfo[i].magic);
- if (mlen > len)
- continue;
- if (memcmp(head, fileTypeInfo[i].magic, mlen) != 0)
- continue;
-
- /* Validate version number info */
- if (fileTypeInfo[i].versionNumber != -1) {
- int version;
-
- if (fileTypeInfo[i].endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
- version = (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+3] << 24) |
- (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+2] << 16) |
- (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+1] << 8) |
- head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset];
- } else {
- version = (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset] << 24) |
- (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+1] << 16) |
- (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+2] << 8) |
- head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+3];
- }
- if (version != fileTypeInfo[i].versionNumber)
- continue;
- }
+ if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+ virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot open file '%s'"), path);
+ return -1;
+ }
- /* Optionally extract capacity from file */
- if (fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset != -1) {
- if (fileTypeInfo[i].endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
- meta->capacity =
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+7] << 56) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+6] << 48) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+5] << 40) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+4] << 32) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+3] << 24) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+2] << 16) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+1] << 8) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset]);
- } else {
- meta->capacity =
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset] << 56) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+1] << 48) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+2] << 40) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+3] << 32) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+4] << 24) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+5] << 16) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+6] << 8) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+7]);
- }
- /* Avoid unlikely, but theoretically possible overflow */
- if (meta->capacity > (ULLONG_MAX / fileTypeInfo[i].sizeMultiplier))
- continue;
- meta->capacity *= fileTypeInfo[i].sizeMultiplier;
- }
+ ret = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(path, fd);
- if (fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset != -1) {
- int crypt_format;
+ close(fd);
- crypt_format = (head[fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset] << 24) |
- (head[fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset+1] << 16) |
- (head[fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset+2] << 8) |
- head[fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset+3];
- meta->encrypted = crypt_format != 0;
- }
+ return ret;
+}
- /* Validation passed, we know the file format now */
- meta->format = i;
- if (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore != NULL) {
- char *backing;
- int backingFormat;
-
- switch (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore(&backing,
- &backingFormat,
- head, len)) {
- case BACKING_STORE_OK:
- break;
+/**
+ * virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD:
+ *
+ * Probe for the format of 'fd' (which is an open file descriptor
+ * for the file 'path'), filling 'meta' with the detected
+ * format and other associated metadata.
+ *
+ * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'meta->format'
+ * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
+ * malicious guest can turn a file into any other non-raw
+ * format at will.
+ */
+int
+virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
+ int fd,
+ virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
+{
+ unsigned char head[20*512]; /* vmdk4GetBackingStore needs this much. */
+ int len;
- case BACKING_STORE_INVALID:
- continue;
+ memset(meta, 0, sizeof (*meta));
- case BACKING_STORE_ERROR:
- return -1;
- }
- if (backing != NULL) {
- meta->backingStore = absolutePathFromBaseFile(path, backing);
- VIR_FREE(backing);
- if (meta->backingStore == NULL) {
- virReportOOMError();
- return -1;
- }
- meta->backingStoreFormat = backingFormat;
- } else {
- meta->backingStoreFormat = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
- }
- }
- return 0;
+ if (lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
+ virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot set to start of '%s'"), path);
+ return -1;
}
- /* No magic, so check file extension */
- for (i = 0 ; i < ARRAY_CARDINALITY(fileTypeInfo) ; i++) {
- if (fileTypeInfo[i].extension == NULL)
- continue;
-
- if (!virFileHasSuffix(path, fileTypeInfo[i].extension))
- continue;
-
- meta->format = i;
- return 0;
+ if ((len = read(fd, head, sizeof(head))) < 0) {
+ virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read header '%s'"), path);
+ return -1;
}
- return 0;
+ meta->format = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(path, head, len);
+
+ return virStorageFileGetMetadataFromBuf(meta->format, path, head, len, meta);
}
+/**
+ * virStorageFileGetMetadata:
+ *
+ * Probe for the format of 'path', filling 'meta' with the detected
+ * format and other associated metadata.
+ *
+ * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'meta->format'
+ * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
+ * malicious guest can turn a file into any other non-raw
+ * format at will.
+ */
int
virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/storage_file.h
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/util/storage_file.h
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/storage_file.h
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ typedef struct _virStorageFileMetadata {
# define DEV_BSIZE 512
# endif
+int virStorageFileProbeFormat(const char *path);
+int virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(const char *path,
+ int fd);
+
int virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
virStorageFileMetadata *meta);
int virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,

218
CVE-2010-223x-0004.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
>From 7b2c30d0af7938df533b85e948918cfdff2e5f01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 16:15:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 04/10] Require format to be passed into virStorageFileGetMetadata
Require the disk image to be passed into virStorageFileGetMetadata.
If this is set to VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO, then the format will be
resolved using probing. This makes it easier to control when
probing will be used
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c,
src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/virt-aa-helper.c:
Set VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO when calling virStorageFileGetMetadata.
* src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c: Probe for disk format before
caling virStorageFileGetMetadata.
* src/util/storage_file.h, src/util/storage_file.c: Remove format
from virStorageFileMeta struct & require it to be passed into
method.
---
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c | 4 +++-
src/security/security_selinux.c | 4 +++-
src/security/virt-aa-helper.c | 4 +++-
src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c | 11 ++++++++---
src/util/storage_file.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
src/util/storage_file.h | 3 ++-
7 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
@@ -9059,8 +9059,10 @@ static int qemuDomainGetBlockInfo(virDom
int fd = -1;
off_t end;
virStorageFileMetadata meta;
+ virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = NULL;
struct stat sb;
int i;
+ int format;
virCheckFlags(0, -1);
@@ -9086,6 +9088,7 @@ static int qemuDomainGetBlockInfo(virDom
if (vm->def->disks[i]->src != NULL &&
STREQ (vm->def->disks[i]->src, path)) {
ret = 0;
+ disk = vm->def->disks[i];
break;
}
}
@@ -9108,7 +9111,21 @@ static int qemuDomainGetBlockInfo(virDom
/* Probe for magic formats */
memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
- if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd, &meta) < 0)
+ if (disk->driverType) {
+ if ((format = virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString(disk->driverType)) < 0) {
+ qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("unknown disk format %s for %s"),
+ disk->driverType, disk->src);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ((format = virStorageFileProbeFormat(disk->src)) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd,
+ format,
+ &meta) < 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Get info for normal formats */
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
@@ -118,7 +118,9 @@ qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel(vir
memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
- ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
+ ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+ &meta);
if (path != disk->src)
VIR_FREE(path);
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/security_selinux.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/security/security_selinux.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/security_selinux.c
@@ -431,7 +431,9 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virDomainOb
memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
- ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
+ ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+ &meta);
if (path != disk->src)
VIR_FREE(path);
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
@@ -833,7 +833,9 @@ get_files(vahControl * ctl)
memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
- ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
+ ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+ &meta);
if (path != ctl->def->disks[i]->src)
VIR_FREE(path);
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
@@ -77,14 +77,19 @@ virStorageBackendProbeTarget(virStorageV
memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
- if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(target->path, fd, &meta) < 0) {
+ if ((target->format = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(target->path, fd)) < 0) {
close(fd);
return -1;
}
- close(fd);
+ if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(target->path, fd,
+ target->format,
+ &meta) < 0) {
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
- target->format = meta.format;
+ close(fd);
if (backingStore) {
*backingStore = meta.backingStore;
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/storage_file.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/util/storage_file.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/storage_file.c
@@ -653,6 +653,7 @@ virStorageFileProbeFormat(const char *pa
int
virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
int fd,
+ int format,
virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
{
unsigned char head[20*512]; /* vmdk4GetBackingStore needs this much. */
@@ -670,9 +671,16 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const ch
return -1;
}
- meta->format = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(path, head, len);
+ if (format == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO)
+ format = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(path, head, len);
- return virStorageFileGetMetadataFromBuf(meta->format, path, head, len, meta);
+ if (format < 0 ||
+ format >= VIR_STORAGE_FILE_LAST) {
+ virReportSystemError(EINVAL, _("unknown storage file format %d"), format);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return virStorageFileGetMetadataFromBuf(format, path, head, len, meta);
}
/**
@@ -688,6 +696,7 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const ch
*/
int
virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
+ int format,
virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
{
int fd, ret;
@@ -697,7 +706,7 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *pa
return -1;
}
- ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd, meta);
+ ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd, format, meta);
close(fd);
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/storage_file.h
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/util/storage_file.h
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/storage_file.h
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ enum virStorageFileFormat {
VIR_ENUM_DECL(virStorageFileFormat);
typedef struct _virStorageFileMetadata {
- int format;
char *backingStore;
int backingStoreFormat;
unsigned long long capacity;
@@ -62,9 +61,11 @@ int virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(cons
int fd);
int virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
+ int format,
virStorageFileMetadata *meta);
int virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
int fd,
+ int format,
virStorageFileMetadata *meta);
#endif /* __VIR_STORAGE_FILE_H__ */

167
CVE-2010-223x-0005.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
>From 494b96317334716f846436a5ec485963411cb4a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 18:09:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 05/10] Add an API for iterating over disk paths
There is duplicated code which iterates over disk backing stores
performing some action. Provide a convenient helper for doing
this to eliminate duplication & risk of mistakes with disk format
probing
* src/conf/domain_conf.c, src/conf/domain_conf.h,
src/libvirt_private.syms: Add virDomainDiskDefForeachPath()
---
src/conf/domain_conf.c | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/conf/domain_conf.h | 11 +++++
src/libvirt_private.syms | 1 +
3 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/conf/domain_conf.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/conf/domain_conf.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/conf/domain_conf.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#include "macvtap.h"
#include "nwfilter_conf.h"
#include "ignore-value.h"
+#include "storage_file.h"
#define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_DOMAIN
@@ -6928,4 +6929,102 @@ int virDomainSnapshotHasChildren(virDoma
}
+int virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+ bool allowProbing,
+ bool ignoreOpenFailure,
+ virDomainDiskDefPathIterator iter,
+ void *opaque)
+{
+ virHashTablePtr paths;
+ int format;
+ int ret = -1;
+ int depth = 0;
+ char *nextpath = NULL;
+
+ if (!disk->src)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (disk->driverType) {
+ const char *formatStr = disk->driverType;
+ if (STREQ(formatStr, "aio"))
+ formatStr = "raw"; /* Xen compat */
+
+ if ((format = virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString(formatStr)) < 0) {
+ virDomainReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("unknown disk format '%s' for %s"),
+ disk->driverType, disk->src);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (allowProbing) {
+ format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+ } else {
+ virDomainReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("no disk format for %s and probing is disabled"),
+ disk->src);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ paths = virHashCreate(5);
+
+ do {
+ virStorageFileMetadata meta;
+ const char *path = nextpath ? nextpath : disk->src;
+ int fd;
+
+ if (iter(disk, path, depth, opaque) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if (virHashLookup(paths, path)) {
+ virDomainReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("backing store for %s is self-referential"),
+ disk->src);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+ if (ignoreOpenFailure) {
+ char ebuf[1024];
+ VIR_WARN("Ignoring open failure on %s: %s", path,
+ virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf)));
+ break;
+ } else {
+ virReportSystemError(errno,
+ _("unable to open disk path %s"),
+ path);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd, format, &meta) < 0) {
+ close(fd);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+
+ if (virHashAddEntry(paths, path, (void*)0x1) < 0) {
+ virReportOOMError();
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ depth++;
+ nextpath = meta.backingStore;
+
+ format = meta.backingStoreFormat;
+
+ if (format == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO &&
+ !allowProbing)
+ format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW; /* Stops further recursion */
+ } while (nextpath);
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ virHashFree(paths, NULL);
+ VIR_FREE(nextpath);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
#endif /* ! PROXY */
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/conf/domain_conf.h
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/conf/domain_conf.h
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/conf/domain_conf.h
@@ -1057,6 +1057,17 @@ int virDomainObjListGetInactiveNames(vir
int maxnames);
+typedef int (*virDomainDiskDefPathIterator)(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+ const char *path,
+ unsigned int depth,
+ void *opaque);
+
+int virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+ bool allowProbing,
+ bool ignoreOpenFailure,
+ virDomainDiskDefPathIterator iter,
+ void *opaque);
+
VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainVirt)
VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainBoot)
VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainFeature)
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/libvirt_private.syms
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/libvirt_private.syms
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/libvirt_private.syms
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ virDomainSnapshotObjUnref;
virDomainSnapshotDefParseString;
virDomainSnapshotDefFormat;
virDomainSnapshotAssignDef;
+virDomainDiskDefForeachPath;
# domain_event.h

273
CVE-2010-223x-0006.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
>From e2ebe4b785eccb930f36f400a22940fa9660a24b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 16:40:47 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 06/10] Convert all disk backing store loops to shared helper API
Update the QEMU cgroups code, QEMU DAC security driver, SELinux
and AppArmour security drivers over to use the shared helper API
virDomainDiskDefForeachPath().
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c,
src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/virt-aa-helper.c:
Convert over to use virDomainDiskDefForeachPath()
---
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++----------------------
src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c | 47 ++++--------
src/security/security_selinux.c | 67 +++++++----------
src/security/virt-aa-helper.c | 71 ++++++++----------
4 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 204 deletions(-)
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
@@ -99,47 +99,28 @@ err:
static int
+qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityFileLabel(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ const char *path,
+ unsigned int depth ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ void *opaque ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
+{
+ return qemuSecurityDACSetOwnership(path, driver->user, driver->group);
+}
+
+
+static int
qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
{
- const char *path;
-
if (!driver->privileged || !driver->dynamicOwnership)
return 0;
- if (!disk->src)
- return 0;
-
- path = disk->src;
- do {
- virStorageFileMetadata meta;
- int ret;
-
- memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
-
- ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
- VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
- &meta);
-
- if (path != disk->src)
- VIR_FREE(path);
- path = NULL;
-
- if (ret < 0)
- return -1;
-
- if (meta.backingStore != NULL &&
- qemuSecurityDACSetOwnership(meta.backingStore,
- driver->user, driver->group) < 0) {
- VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
- return -1;
- }
-
- path = meta.backingStore;
- } while (path != NULL);
-
- return qemuSecurityDACSetOwnership(disk->src, driver->user, driver->group);
+ return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
+ true,
+ false,
+ qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityFileLabel,
+ NULL);
}
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/security_selinux.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/security/security_selinux.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/security_selinux.c
@@ -411,56 +411,43 @@ SELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabel(virDoma
}
static int
+SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+ const char *path,
+ unsigned int depth,
+ void *opaque)
+{
+ const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = opaque;
+
+ if (depth == 0) {
+ if (disk->shared) {
+ return SELinuxSetFilecon(path, default_image_context);
+ } else if (disk->readonly) {
+ return SELinuxSetFilecon(path, default_content_context);
+ } else if (secdef->imagelabel) {
+ return SELinuxSetFilecon(path, secdef->imagelabel);
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ return SELinuxSetFilecon(path, default_content_context);
+ }
+}
+
+static int
SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
- const char *path;
if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC)
return 0;
- if (!disk->src)
- return 0;
-
- path = disk->src;
- do {
- virStorageFileMetadata meta;
- int ret;
-
- memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
-
- ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
- VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
- &meta);
-
- if (path != disk->src)
- VIR_FREE(path);
- path = NULL;
-
- if (ret < 0)
- break;
-
- if (meta.backingStore != NULL &&
- SELinuxSetFilecon(meta.backingStore,
- default_content_context) < 0) {
- VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
- return -1;
- }
-
- path = meta.backingStore;
- } while (path != NULL);
-
- if (disk->shared) {
- return SELinuxSetFilecon(disk->src, default_image_context);
- } else if (disk->readonly) {
- return SELinuxSetFilecon(disk->src, default_content_context);
- } else if (secdef->imagelabel) {
- return SELinuxSetFilecon(disk->src, secdef->imagelabel);
- }
-
- return 0;
+ return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
+ true,
+ false,
+ SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel,
+ secdef);
}
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@
#include "uuid.h"
#include "hostusb.h"
#include "pci.h"
-#include "storage_file.h"
static char *progname;
@@ -802,6 +801,28 @@ file_iterate_pci_cb(pciDevice *dev ATTRI
}
static int
+add_file_path(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+ const char *path,
+ unsigned int depth,
+ void *opaque)
+{
+ virBufferPtr buf = opaque;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (depth == 0) {
+ if (disk->readonly)
+ ret = vah_add_file(buf, path, "r");
+ else
+ ret = vah_add_file(buf, path, "rw");
+ } else {
+ ret = vah_add_file(buf, path, "r");
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+static int
get_files(vahControl * ctl)
{
virBuffer buf = VIR_BUFFER_INITIALIZER;
@@ -822,47 +843,15 @@ get_files(vahControl * ctl)
goto clean;
}
- for (i = 0; i < ctl->def->ndisks; i++)
- if (ctl->def->disks[i] && ctl->def->disks[i]->src) {
- int ret;
- const char *path;
-
- path = ctl->def->disks[i]->src;
- do {
- virStorageFileMetadata meta;
-
- memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
-
- ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
- VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
- &meta);
-
- if (path != ctl->def->disks[i]->src)
- VIR_FREE(path);
- path = NULL;
-
- if (ret < 0) {
- vah_warning("could not open path, skipping");
- continue;
- }
-
- if (meta.backingStore != NULL &&
- (ret = vah_add_file(&buf, meta.backingStore, "rw")) != 0) {
- VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
- goto clean;
- }
-
- path = meta.backingStore;
- } while (path != NULL);
-
- if (ctl->def->disks[i]->readonly)
- ret = vah_add_file(&buf, ctl->def->disks[i]->src, "r");
- else
- ret = vah_add_file(&buf, ctl->def->disks[i]->src, "rw");
-
- if (ret != 0)
- goto clean;
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < ctl->def->ndisks; i++) {
+ int ret = virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(ctl->def->disks[i],
+ true,
+ false,
+ add_file_path,
+ &buf);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto clean;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < ctl->def->nserials; i++)
if (ctl->def->serials[i] && ctl->def->serials[i]->data.file.path)

1058
CVE-2010-223x-0007.patch Normal file
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

385
CVE-2010-223x-0008.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
>From e7db25186de8cb278f2b5f5c51e965129defaa11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 17:58:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 08/10] Disable all disk probing in QEMU driver & add config option to re-enable
Disk format probing is now disabled by default. A new config
option in /etc/qemu/qemu.conf will re-enable it for existing
deployments where this causes trouble
---
src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug | 1 +
src/qemu/qemu.conf | 12 ++++++++++++
src/qemu/qemu_conf.c | 4 ++++
src/qemu/qemu_conf.h | 1 +
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c | 2 +-
src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug | 4 ++++
src/security/security_apparmor.c | 12 ++++++++----
src/security/security_driver.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
src/security/security_driver.h | 10 ++++++++--
src/security/security_selinux.c | 9 ++++++---
src/security/virt-aa-helper.c | 10 +++++++++-
tests/seclabeltest.c | 2 +-
13 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ module Libvirtd_qemu =
| str_entry "save_image_format"
| str_entry "hugetlbfs_mount"
| bool_entry "relaxed_acs_check"
+ | bool_entry "allow_disk_format_probing"
(* Each enty in the config is one of the following three ... *)
let entry = vnc_entry
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu.conf
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/qemu/qemu.conf
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu.conf
@@ -168,3 +168,15 @@
# be assigned to guests.
#
# relaxed_acs_check = 1
+
+
+
+# If allow_disk_format_probing is enabled, libvirt will probe disk
+# images to attempt to identify their format, when not otherwise
+# specified in the XML. This is disabled by default.
+#
+# WARNING: Enabling probing is a security hole in almost all
+# deployments. It is strongly recommended that users update their
+# guest XML <disk> elements to include <driver type='XXXX'/>
+# elements instead of enabling this option.
+# allow_disk_format_probing = 1
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c
@@ -351,6 +351,10 @@ int qemudLoadDriverConfig(struct qemud_d
CHECK_TYPE ("relaxed_acs_check", VIR_CONF_LONG);
if (p) driver->relaxedACS = p->l;
+ p = virConfGetValue (conf, "allow_disk_format_probing");
+ CHECK_TYPE ("allow_disk_format_probing", VIR_CONF_LONG);
+ if (p) driver->allowDiskFormatProbing = p->l;
+
virConfFree (conf);
return 0;
}
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
@@ -1289,7 +1289,8 @@ qemudSecurityInit(struct qemud_driver *q
qemuSecurityDACSetDriver(qemud_drv);
ret = virSecurityDriverStartup(&security_drv,
- qemud_drv->securityDriverName);
+ qemud_drv->securityDriverName,
+ qemud_drv->allowDiskFormatProbing);
if (ret == -1) {
VIR_ERROR0(_("Failed to start security driver"));
return -1;
@@ -9145,8 +9146,15 @@ static int qemuDomainGetBlockInfo(virDom
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
- if ((format = virStorageFileProbeFormat(disk->src)) < 0)
+ if (driver->allowDiskFormatProbing) {
+ if ((format = virStorageFileProbeFormat(disk->src)) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+ } else {
+ qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("no disk format for %s and probing is disabled"),
+ disk->src);
goto cleanup;
+ }
}
if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd,
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel(vir
return 0;
return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
- true,
+ driver->allowDiskFormatProbing,
false,
qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityFileLabel,
NULL);
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug
@@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ save_image_format = \"gzip\"
hugetlbfs_mount = \"/dev/hugepages\"
relaxed_acs_check = 1
+
+allow_disk_format_probing = 1
"
test Libvirtd_qemu.lns get conf =
@@ -204,3 +206,5 @@ relaxed_acs_check = 1
{ "hugetlbfs_mount" = "/dev/hugepages" }
{ "#empty" }
{ "relaxed_acs_check" = "1" }
+{ "#empty" }
+{ "allow_disk_format_probing" = "1" }
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/security_apparmor.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/security/security_apparmor.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/security_apparmor.c
@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ load_profile(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
char *xml = NULL;
int pipefd[2];
pid_t child;
+ const char *probe = virSecurityDriverGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(drv)
+ ? "1" : "0";
if (pipe(pipefd) < -1) {
virReportSystemError(errno, "%s", _("unable to create pipe"));
@@ -172,19 +174,19 @@ load_profile(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
if (create) {
const char *const argv[] = {
- VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-c", "-u", profile, NULL
+ VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-p", probe, "-c", "-u", profile, NULL
};
ret = virExec(argv, NULL, NULL, &child,
pipefd[0], NULL, NULL, VIR_EXEC_NONE);
} else if (disk && disk->src) {
const char *const argv[] = {
- VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-r", "-u", profile, "-f", disk->src, NULL
+ VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-p", probe, "-r", "-u", profile, "-f", disk->src, NULL
};
ret = virExec(argv, NULL, NULL, &child,
pipefd[0], NULL, NULL, VIR_EXEC_NONE);
} else {
const char *const argv[] = {
- VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-r", "-u", profile, NULL
+ VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-p", probe, "-r", "-u", profile, NULL
};
ret = virExec(argv, NULL, NULL, &child,
pipefd[0], NULL, NULL, VIR_EXEC_NONE);
@@ -312,9 +314,11 @@ AppArmorSecurityDriverProbe(void)
* currently not used.
*/
static int
-AppArmorSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+AppArmorSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing)
{
virSecurityDriverSetDOI(drv, SECURITY_APPARMOR_VOID_DOI);
+ virSecurityDriverSetAllowDiskFormatProbing(drv, allowDiskFormatProbing);
return 0;
}
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/security_driver.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/security/security_driver.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/security_driver.c
@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ virSecurityDriverVerify(virDomainDefPtr
int
virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr *drv,
- const char *name)
+ const char *name,
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing)
{
unsigned int i;
@@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriv
switch (tmp->probe()) {
case SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE:
virSecurityDriverInit(tmp);
- if (tmp->open(tmp) == -1) {
+ if (tmp->open(tmp, allowDiskFormatProbing) == -1) {
return -1;
} else {
*drv = tmp;
@@ -125,3 +126,14 @@ virSecurityDriverGetModel(virSecurityDri
{
return drv->name;
}
+
+void virSecurityDriverSetAllowDiskFormatProbing(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing)
+{
+ drv->_private.allowDiskFormatProbing = allowDiskFormatProbing;
+}
+
+bool virSecurityDriverGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+{
+ return drv->_private.allowDiskFormatProbing;
+}
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/security_driver.h
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/security/security_driver.h
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/security_driver.h
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ typedef struct _virSecurityDriverState v
typedef virSecurityDriverState *virSecurityDriverStatePtr;
typedef virSecurityDriverStatus (*virSecurityDriverProbe) (void);
-typedef int (*virSecurityDriverOpen) (virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+typedef int (*virSecurityDriverOpen) (virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing);
typedef int (*virSecurityDomainRestoreImageLabel) (virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk);
@@ -94,12 +95,14 @@ struct _virSecurityDriver {
*/
struct {
char doi[VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN];
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing;
} _private;
};
/* Global methods */
int virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr *drv,
- const char *name);
+ const char *name,
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing);
int
virSecurityDriverVerify(virDomainDefPtr def);
@@ -112,7 +115,10 @@ virSecurityDriverVerify(virDomainDefPtr
void virSecurityDriverInit(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
int virSecurityDriverSetDOI(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
const char *doi);
+void virSecurityDriverSetAllowDiskFormatProbing(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing);
const char *virSecurityDriverGetDOI(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
const char *virSecurityDriverGetModel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+bool virSecurityDriverGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
#endif /* __VIR_SECURITY_H__ */
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/security_selinux.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/security/security_selinux.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/security_selinux.c
@@ -266,13 +266,15 @@ SELinuxSecurityDriverProbe(void)
}
static int
-SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing)
{
/*
* Where will the DOI come from? SELinux configuration, or qemu
* configuration? For the moment, we'll just set it to "0".
*/
virSecurityDriverSetDOI(drv, SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI);
+ virSecurityDriverSetAllowDiskFormatProbing(drv, allowDiskFormatProbing);
return SELinuxInitialize();
}
@@ -438,18 +440,19 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel(virDomainDis
}
static int
-SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing = virSecurityDriverGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(drv);
if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC)
return 0;
return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
- true,
+ allowDiskFormatProbing,
false,
SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel,
secdef);
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
static char *progname;
typedef struct {
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing;
char uuid[PROFILE_NAME_SIZE]; /* UUID of vm */
bool dryrun; /* dry run */
char cmd; /* 'c' create
@@ -845,7 +846,7 @@ get_files(vahControl * ctl)
for (i = 0; i < ctl->def->ndisks; i++) {
int ret = virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(ctl->def->disks[i],
- true,
+ ctl->allowDiskFormatProbing,
false,
add_file_path,
&buf);
@@ -944,6 +945,7 @@ vahParseArgv(vahControl * ctl, int argc,
{
int arg, idx = 0;
struct option opt[] = {
+ {"probing", 1, 0, 'p' },
{"add", 0, 0, 'a'},
{"create", 0, 0, 'c'},
{"dryrun", 0, 0, 'd'},
@@ -992,6 +994,12 @@ vahParseArgv(vahControl * ctl, int argc,
PROFILE_NAME_SIZE) == NULL)
vah_error(ctl, 1, "error copying UUID");
break;
+ case 'p':
+ if (STREQ(optarg, "1"))
+ ctl->allowDiskFormatProbing = true;
+ else
+ ctl->allowDiskFormatProbing = false;
+ break;
default:
vah_error(ctl, 1, "unsupported option");
break;
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/tests/seclabeltest.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/tests/seclabeltest.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/tests/seclabeltest.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ main (int argc ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, char **
const char *doi, *model;
virSecurityDriverPtr security_drv;
- ret = virSecurityDriverStartup (&security_drv, "selinux");
+ ret = virSecurityDriverStartup (&security_drv, "selinux", false);
if (ret == -1)
{
fprintf (stderr, "Failed to start security driver");
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ struct qemud_driver {
ebtablesContext *ebtables;
unsigned int relaxedACS : 1;
+ unsigned int allowDiskFormatProbing : 1;
virCapsPtr caps;
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/tests/secaatest.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/tests/secaatest.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/tests/secaatest.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ main (int argc ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, char **
const char *doi, *model;
virSecurityDriverPtr security_drv;
- ret = virSecurityDriverStartup (&security_drv, "apparmor");
+ ret = virSecurityDriverStartup (&security_drv, "apparmor", false);
if (ret == -1)
{
fprintf (stderr, "Failed to start security driver");

110
CVE-2010-223x-0009.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
>From f087f0656f882be305783e24d55921b57fbbcb97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 16:08:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 09/10] Add ability to set a default driver name/type when parsing disks
Record a default driver name/type in capabilities struct. Use this
when parsing disks if value is not set in XML config.
* src/conf/capabilities.h: Record default driver name/type for disks
* src/conf/domain_conf.c: Fallback to default driver name/type
when parsing disks
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Set default driver name/type to raw
---
src/conf/capabilities.h | 2 ++
src/conf/domain_conf.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 8 ++++++++
3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/conf/capabilities.h
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/conf/capabilities.h
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/conf/capabilities.h
@@ -120,6 +120,8 @@ struct _virCaps {
virCapsGuestPtr *guests;
unsigned char macPrefix[VIR_MAC_PREFIX_BUFLEN];
unsigned int emulatorRequired : 1;
+ const char *defaultDiskDriverName;
+ const char *defaultDiskDriverType;
void *(*privateDataAllocFunc)(void);
void (*privateDataFreeFunc)(void *);
int (*privateDataXMLFormat)(virBufferPtr, void *);
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/conf/domain_conf.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/conf/domain_conf.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/conf/domain_conf.c
@@ -1366,7 +1366,8 @@ virDomainDiskDefAssignAddress(virDomainD
* @param node XML nodeset to parse for disk definition
*/
static virDomainDiskDefPtr
-virDomainDiskDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr node,
+virDomainDiskDefParseXML(virCapsPtr caps,
+ xmlNodePtr node,
int flags) {
virDomainDiskDefPtr def;
xmlNodePtr cur;
@@ -1595,6 +1596,16 @@ virDomainDiskDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr node
def->serial = serial;
serial = NULL;
+ if (!def->driverType &&
+ caps->defaultDiskDriverType &&
+ !(def->driverType = strdup(caps->defaultDiskDriverType)))
+ goto no_memory;
+
+ if (!def->driverName &&
+ caps->defaultDiskDriverName &&
+ !(def->driverName = strdup(caps->defaultDiskDriverName)))
+ goto no_memory;
+
if (def->info.type == VIR_DOMAIN_DEVICE_ADDRESS_TYPE_NONE
&& virDomainDiskDefAssignAddress(def) < 0)
goto error;
@@ -1615,6 +1626,9 @@ cleanup:
return def;
+no_memory:
+ virReportOOMError();
+
error:
virDomainDiskDefFree(def);
def = NULL;
@@ -3521,7 +3535,7 @@ virDomainDeviceDefPtr virDomainDeviceDef
if (xmlStrEqual(node->name, BAD_CAST "disk")) {
dev->type = VIR_DOMAIN_DEVICE_DISK;
- if (!(dev->data.disk = virDomainDiskDefParseXML(node, flags)))
+ if (!(dev->data.disk = virDomainDiskDefParseXML(caps, node, flags)))
goto error;
} else if (xmlStrEqual(node->name, BAD_CAST "filesystem")) {
dev->type = VIR_DOMAIN_DEVICE_FS;
@@ -4028,7 +4042,8 @@ static virDomainDefPtr virDomainDefParse
if (n && VIR_ALLOC_N(def->disks, n) < 0)
goto no_memory;
for (i = 0 ; i < n ; i++) {
- virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = virDomainDiskDefParseXML(nodes[i],
+ virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = virDomainDiskDefParseXML(caps,
+ nodes[i],
flags);
if (!disk)
goto error;
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
@@ -1324,6 +1324,14 @@ qemuCreateCapabilities(virCapsPtr oldcap
return NULL;
}
+ if (driver->allowDiskFormatProbing) {
+ caps->defaultDiskDriverName = NULL;
+ caps->defaultDiskDriverType = NULL;
+ } else {
+ caps->defaultDiskDriverName = "qemu";
+ caps->defaultDiskDriverType = "raw";
+ }
+
/* Domain XML parser hooks */
caps->privateDataAllocFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateAlloc;
caps->privateDataFreeFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateFree;

288
CVE-2010-223x-0010.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
>From 6883117e3c6a6cabd760b6e6a468b69ad7b02839 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 2010 14:14:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 10/10] Rewrite qemu-img backing store format handling
When creating qcow2 files with a backing store, it is important
to set an explicit format to prevent QEMU probing. The storage
backend was only doing this if it found a 'kvm-img' binary. This
is wrong because plenty of kvm-img binaries don't support an
explicit format, and plenty of 'qemu-img' binaries do support
a format. The result was that most qcow2 files were not getting
a backing store format.
This patch runs 'qemu-img -h' to check for the two support
argument formats
'-o backing_format=raw'
'-F raw'
and use whichever option it finds
* src/storage/storage_backend.c: Query binary to determine
how to set the backing store format
---
src/storage/storage_backend.c | 214 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/storage/storage_backend.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/storage/storage_backend.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/storage/storage_backend.c
@@ -563,6 +563,69 @@ static int virStorageBackendCreateExecCo
return 0;
}
+enum {
+ QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_NONE = 0,
+ QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_FLAG,
+ QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_OPTIONS,
+};
+
+static int virStorageBackendQEMUImgBackingFormat(const char *qemuimg)
+{
+ const char *const qemuarg[] = { qemuimg, "-h", NULL };
+ const char *const qemuenv[] = { "LC_ALL=C", NULL };
+ pid_t child = 0;
+ int status;
+ int newstdout = -1;
+ char *help = NULL;
+ enum { MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE = 1024*8 };
+ int len;
+ char *start;
+ char *end;
+ char *tmp;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (virExec(qemuarg, qemuenv, NULL,
+ &child, -1, &newstdout, NULL, VIR_EXEC_CLEAR_CAPS) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if ((len = virFileReadLimFD(newstdout, MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE, &help)) < 0) {
+ virReportSystemError(errno,
+ _("Unable to read '%s -h' output"),
+ qemuimg);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ start = strstr(help, " create ");
+ end = strstr(start, "\n");
+ if ((tmp = strstr(start, "-F fmt")) && tmp < end)
+ ret = QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_FLAG;
+ else if ((tmp = strstr(start, "[-o options]")) && tmp < end)
+ ret = QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_OPTIONS;
+ else
+ ret = QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_NONE;
+
+cleanup:
+ VIR_FREE(help);
+ close(newstdout);
+rewait:
+ if (child) {
+ if (waitpid(child, &status, 0) != child) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ goto rewait;
+
+ VIR_ERROR(_("Unexpected exit status from qemu %d pid %lu"),
+ WEXITSTATUS(status), (unsigned long)child);
+ }
+ if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+ VIR_WARN("Unexpected exit status '%d', qemu probably failed",
+ WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
static int
virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg(virConnectPtr conn,
virStoragePoolObjPtr pool,
@@ -570,10 +633,9 @@ virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg(virConnec
virStorageVolDefPtr inputvol,
unsigned int flags ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = -1;
char size[100];
char *create_tool;
- short use_kvmimg;
const char *type = virStorageFileFormatTypeToString(vol->target.format);
const char *backingType = vol->backingStore.path ?
@@ -584,41 +646,10 @@ virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg(virConnec
const char *inputPath = inputvol ? inputvol->target.path : NULL;
/* Treat input block devices as 'raw' format */
const char *inputType = inputPath ?
- virStorageFileFormatTypeToString(inputvol->type == VIR_STORAGE_VOL_BLOCK ? VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW : inputvol->target.format) :
- NULL;
-
- const char **imgargv;
- /* The extra NULL field is for indicating encryption (-e). */
- const char *imgargvnormal[] = {
- NULL, "create",
- "-f", type,
- vol->target.path,
- size,
- NULL,
- NULL
- };
- /* Extra NULL fields are for including "backingType" when using
- * kvm-img (-F backingType), and for indicating encryption (-e).
- */
- const char *imgargvbacking[] = {
- NULL, "create",
- "-f", type,
- "-b", vol->backingStore.path,
- vol->target.path,
- size,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL
- };
- const char *convargv[] = {
- NULL, "convert",
- "-f", inputType,
- "-O", type,
- inputPath,
- vol->target.path,
- NULL,
- };
+ virStorageFileFormatTypeToString(inputvol->type == VIR_STORAGE_VOL_BLOCK ?
+ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW :
+ inputvol->target.format) :
+ NULL;
if (type == NULL) {
virStorageReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
@@ -692,44 +723,103 @@ virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg(virConnec
}
}
- if ((create_tool = virFindFileInPath("kvm-img")) != NULL)
- use_kvmimg = 1;
- else if ((create_tool = virFindFileInPath("qemu-img")) != NULL)
- use_kvmimg = 0;
- else {
+ /* Size in KB */
+ snprintf(size, sizeof(size), "%lluK", vol->capacity/1024);
+
+ /* KVM is usually ahead of qemu on features, so try that first */
+ create_tool = virFindFileInPath("kvm-img");
+ if (!create_tool)
+ create_tool = virFindFileInPath("qemu-img");
+
+ if (!create_tool) {
virStorageReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"%s", _("unable to find kvm-img or qemu-img"));
return -1;
}
if (inputvol) {
- convargv[0] = create_tool;
- imgargv = convargv;
+ const char *imgargv[] = {
+ create_tool,
+ "convert",
+ "-f", inputType,
+ "-O", type,
+ inputPath,
+ vol->target.path,
+ NULL,
+ };
+
+ ret = virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(pool, vol, imgargv);
} else if (vol->backingStore.path) {
- imgargvbacking[0] = create_tool;
- if (use_kvmimg) {
- imgargvbacking[6] = "-F";
- imgargvbacking[7] = backingType;
- imgargvbacking[8] = vol->target.path;
- imgargvbacking[9] = size;
+ const char *imgargv[] = {
+ create_tool,
+ "create",
+ "-f", type,
+ "-b", vol->backingStore.path,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+ };
+ int imgformat = virStorageBackendQEMUImgBackingFormat(create_tool);
+ char *optflag = NULL;
+ if (imgformat < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ switch (imgformat) {
+ case QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_FLAG:
+ imgargv[6] = "-F";
+ imgargv[7] = backingType;
+ imgargv[8] = vol->target.path;
+ imgargv[9] = size;
+ if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
+ imgargv[10] = "-e";
+ break;
+
+ case QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_OPTIONS:
+ if (virAsprintf(&optflag, "backing_fmt=%s", backingType) < 0) {
+ virReportOOMError();
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ imgargv[6] = "-o";
+ imgargv[7] = optflag;
+ imgargv[8] = vol->target.path;
+ imgargv[9] = size;
+ if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
+ imgargv[10] = "-e";
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ VIR_INFO("Unable to set backing store format for %s with %s",
+ vol->target.path, create_tool);
+ imgargv[6] = vol->target.path;
+ imgargv[7] = size;
if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
- imgargvbacking[10] = "-e";
- } else if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
- imgargvbacking[8] = "-e";
- imgargv = imgargvbacking;
+ imgargv[8] = "-e";
+ }
+
+ ret = virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(pool, vol, imgargv);
+ VIR_FREE(optflag);
} else {
- imgargvnormal[0] = create_tool;
- imgargv = imgargvnormal;
+ /* The extra NULL field is for indicating encryption (-e). */
+ const char *imgargv[] = {
+ create_tool,
+ "create",
+ "-f", type,
+ vol->target.path,
+ size,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+ };
if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
imgargv[6] = "-e";
- }
-
- /* Size in KB */
- snprintf(size, sizeof(size), "%lluK", vol->capacity/1024);
+ ret = virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(pool, vol, imgargv);
+ }
- ret = virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(pool, vol, imgargv);
- VIR_FREE(imgargv[0]);
+ cleanup:
+ VIR_FREE(create_tool);
return ret;
}

262
CVE-2010-2242-nat.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
From 02318d5d46e1952294c20b41427dea124cbebb0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2010 12:50:38 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Apply a source port mapping to virtual network masquerading
IPtables will seek to preserve the source port unchanged when
doing masquerading, if possible. NFS has a pseudo-security
option where it checks for the source port <= 1023 before
allowing a mount request. If an admin has used this to make the
host OS trusted for mounts, the default iptables behaviour will
potentially allow NAT'd guests access too. This needs to be
stopped.
With this change, the iptables -t nat -L -n -v rules for the
default network will be
Chain POSTROUTING (policy ACCEPT 95 packets, 9163 bytes)
pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination
14 840 MASQUERADE tcp -- * * 192.168.122.0/24 !192.168.122.0/24 masq ports: 1024-65535
75 5752 MASQUERADE udp -- * * 192.168.122.0/24 !192.168.122.0/24 masq ports: 1024-65535
0 0 MASQUERADE all -- * * 192.168.122.0/24 !192.168.122.0/24
* src/network/bridge_driver.c: Add masquerade rules for TCP
and UDP protocols
* src/util/iptables.c, src/util/iptables.c: Add source port
mappings for TCP & UDP protocols when masquerading.
---
src/network/bridge_driver.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
src/util/iptables.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
src/util/iptables.h | 6 ++-
3 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/network/bridge_driver.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/network/bridge_driver.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/network/bridge_driver.c
@@ -638,18 +638,75 @@ networkAddMasqueradingIptablesRules(stru
goto masqerr2;
}
+ /*
+ * Enable masquerading.
+ *
+ * We need to end up with 3 rules in the table in this order
+ *
+ * 1. protocol=tcp with sport mapping restricton
+ * 2. protocol=udp with sport mapping restricton
+ * 3. generic any protocol
+ *
+ * The sport mappings are required, because default IPtables
+ * MASQUERADE is maintain port number unchanged where possible.
+ *
+ * NFS can be configured to only "trust" port numbers < 1023.
+ *
+ * Guests using NAT thus need to be prevented from having port
+ * numbers < 1023, otherwise they can bypass the NFS "security"
+ * check on the source port number.
+ *
+ * Since we use '--insert' to add rules to the header of the
+ * chain, we actually need to add them in the reverse of the
+ * order just mentioned !
+ */
+
+ /* First the generic masquerade rule for other protocols */
/* enable masquerading */
if ((err = iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
network->def->network,
- network->def->forwardDev))) {
+ network->def->forwardDev,
+ NULL))) {
virReportSystemError(err,
_("failed to add iptables rule to enable masquerading to '%s'\n"),
network->def->forwardDev ? network->def->forwardDev : NULL);
goto masqerr3;
}
+ /* UDP with a source port restriction */
+ if ((err = iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+ network->def->network,
+ network->def->forwardDev,
+ "udp"))) {
+ virReportSystemError(err,
+ _("failed to add iptables rule to enable UDP masquerading to '%s'"),
+ network->def->forwardDev ? network->def->forwardDev : NULL);
+ goto masqerr4;
+ }
+
+ /* TCP with a source port restriction */
+ if ((err = iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+ network->def->network,
+ network->def->forwardDev,
+ "tcp"))) {
+ virReportSystemError(err,
+ _("failed to add iptables rule to enable TCP masquerading to '%s'"),
+ network->def->forwardDev ? network->def->forwardDev : NULL);
+ goto masqerr5;
+ }
+
return 1;
+ masqerr5:
+ iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+ network->def->network,
+ network->def->forwardDev,
+ "udp");
+ masqerr4:
+ iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+ network->def->network,
+ network->def->forwardDev,
+ NULL);
masqerr3:
iptablesRemoveForwardAllowRelatedIn(driver->iptables,
network->def->network,
@@ -801,8 +858,17 @@ networkRemoveIptablesRules(struct networ
if (network->def->forwardType != VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_NONE) {
if (network->def->forwardType == VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_NAT) {
iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
- network->def->network,
- network->def->forwardDev);
+ network->def->network,
+ network->def->forwardDev,
+ "tcp");
+ iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+ network->def->network,
+ network->def->forwardDev,
+ "udp");
+ iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+ network->def->network,
+ network->def->forwardDev,
+ NULL);
iptablesRemoveForwardAllowRelatedIn(driver->iptables,
network->def->network,
network->def->bridge,
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/iptables.c
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/util/iptables.c
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/iptables.c
@@ -692,25 +692,49 @@ iptablesRemoveForwardRejectIn(iptablesCo
*/
static int
iptablesForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
- const char *network,
- const char *physdev,
- int action)
+ const char *network,
+ const char *physdev,
+ const char *protocol,
+ int action)
{
- if (physdev && physdev[0]) {
- return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
- action,
- "--source", network,
- "!", "--destination", network,
- "--out-interface", physdev,
- "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
- NULL);
+ if (protocol && protocol[0]) {
+ if (physdev && physdev[0]) {
+ return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
+ action,
+ "--source", network,
+ "-p", protocol,
+ "!", "--destination", network,
+ "--out-interface", physdev,
+ "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
+ "--to-ports", "1024-65535",
+ NULL);
+ } else {
+ return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
+ action,
+ "--source", network,
+ "-p", protocol,
+ "!", "--destination", network,
+ "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
+ "--to-ports", "1024-65535",
+ NULL);
+ }
} else {
- return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
- action,
- "--source", network,
- "!", "--destination", network,
- "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
- NULL);
+ if (physdev && physdev[0]) {
+ return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
+ action,
+ "--source", network,
+ "!", "--destination", network,
+ "--out-interface", physdev,
+ "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
+ NULL);
+ } else {
+ return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
+ action,
+ "--source", network,
+ "!", "--destination", network,
+ "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
+ NULL);
+ }
}
}
@@ -719,6 +743,7 @@ iptablesForwardMasquerade(iptablesContex
* @ctx: pointer to the IP table context
* @network: the source network name
* @physdev: the physical input device or NULL
+ * @protocol: the network protocol or NULL
*
* Add rules to the IP table context to allow masquerading
* network @network on @physdev. This allow the bridge to
@@ -729,9 +754,10 @@ iptablesForwardMasquerade(iptablesContex
int
iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
const char *network,
- const char *physdev)
+ const char *physdev,
+ const char *protocol)
{
- return iptablesForwardMasquerade(ctx, network, physdev, ADD);
+ return iptablesForwardMasquerade(ctx, network, physdev, protocol, ADD);
}
/**
@@ -739,6 +765,7 @@ iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(iptablesCon
* @ctx: pointer to the IP table context
* @network: the source network name
* @physdev: the physical input device or NULL
+ * @protocol: the network protocol or NULL
*
* Remove rules from the IP table context to stop masquerading
* network @network on @physdev. This stops the bridge from
@@ -749,7 +776,8 @@ iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(iptablesCon
int
iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
const char *network,
- const char *physdev)
+ const char *physdev,
+ const char *protocol)
{
- return iptablesForwardMasquerade(ctx, network, physdev, REMOVE);
+ return iptablesForwardMasquerade(ctx, network, physdev, protocol, REMOVE);
}
Index: libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/iptables.h
===================================================================
--- libvirt-0.8.1.orig/src/util/iptables.h
+++ libvirt-0.8.1/src/util/iptables.h
@@ -85,9 +85,11 @@ int iptablesRemoveForwardRe
int iptablesAddForwardMasquerade (iptablesContext *ctx,
const char *network,
- const char *physdev);
+ const char *physdev,
+ const char *protocol);
int iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade (iptablesContext *ctx,
const char *network,
- const char *physdev);
+ const char *physdev,
+ const char *protocol);
#endif /* __QEMUD_IPTABLES_H__ */

8
libvirt.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Jul 9 14:35:04 MDT 2010 - jfehlig@novell.com
- VUL-0: multiple issues in libvirt
CVE-2010-223x-000[1-0].patch, CVE-2010-223x-0010.patch,
CVE-2010-2242-nat.patch
bnc#618155
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Jun 25 09:02:38 MDT 2010 - jfehlig@novell.com

27
libvirt.spec
View File

@ -96,6 +96,9 @@ BuildRequires: avahi-devel
%if %{with_selinux}
BuildRequires: libselinux-devel
%endif
%if %{with_apparmor}
BuildRequires: libapparmor-devel
%endif
%if %{with_numactl}
BuildRequires: libnuma-devel
%endif
@ -114,7 +117,7 @@ License: LGPLv2.1+
Group: Development/Libraries/C and C++
AutoReqProv: yes
Version: 0.8.1
Release: 3
Release: 2
Summary: A C toolkit to interract with the virtualization capabilities of Linux
# The client side, i.e. shared libs and virsh are in a subpackage
Requires: %{name}-client = %{version}-%{release}
@ -146,6 +149,17 @@ Patch4: bitmap-alloc.patch
Patch5: bitmap-fixes.patch
Patch6: xend-content-buf.patch
Patch7: xend-content-buf-fix.patch
Patch8: CVE-2010-223x-0001.patch
Patch9: CVE-2010-223x-0002.patch
Patch10: CVE-2010-223x-0003.patch
Patch11: CVE-2010-223x-0004.patch
Patch12: CVE-2010-223x-0005.patch
Patch13: CVE-2010-223x-0006.patch
Patch14: CVE-2010-223x-0007.patch
Patch15: CVE-2010-223x-0008.patch
Patch16: CVE-2010-223x-0009.patch
Patch17: CVE-2010-223x-0010.patch
Patch18: CVE-2010-2242-nat.patch
# Need to go upstream
Patch100: xen-name-for-devid.patch
Patch102: clone.patch
@ -266,6 +280,17 @@ Authors:
%patch5 -p1
%patch6 -p1
%patch7 -p1
%patch8 -p1
%patch9 -p1
%patch10 -p1
%patch11 -p1
%patch12 -p1
%patch13 -p1
%patch14 -p1
%patch15 -p1
%patch16 -p1
%patch17 -p1
%patch18 -p1
%patch100 -p1
%patch102
%patch103 -p1