- Update to 2.27.0:
API changes:
* Update AEAD output size macros to bring them in line with the PSA Crypto
API version 1.0 spec. This version of the spec parameterizes them on the
key type used, as well as the key bit-size in the case of
PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH.
The old versions of these macros were renamed and deprecated as follows:
- PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH -> PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_1_ARG
- PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE -> PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG
- PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE -> PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG
- PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE -> PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG
- PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE -> PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE_1_ARG
- PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE -> PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE_1_ARG
* Implement one-shot cipher functions, psa_cipher_encrypt and
psa_cipher_decrypt, according to the PSA Crypto API 1.0.0
specification.
Features:
* Add mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext() function allowing to generate a
signature with a specific salt length. This function allows to validate
test cases provided in the NIST's CAVP test suite.
* Added support for built-in driver keys through the PSA opaque crypto
driver interface. Refer to the documentation of
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS for more information.
* Implement psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message().
* The new function mbedtls_mpi_random() generates a random value in a
given range uniformly.
* Implement psa_mac_compute() and psa_mac_verify() as defined in the
PSA Cryptograpy API 1.0.0 specification.
* MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS is now determined automatically from the configured
curves and no longer needs to be configured explicitly to save RAM.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/907287
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/mbedtls?expand=0&rev=31
- update to 2.25.0:
* This release of Mbed TLS provides bug fixes, minor enhancements and new
features. This release includes fixes for security issues.
* see https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.25.0
* The functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and
mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() would write past the minimum documented size
of the output buffer when used with NIST_KW. As a result, code using those
functions as documented with NIST_KW could have a buffer overwrite of up to
15 bytes, with consequences ranging up to arbitrary code execution
depending on the location of the output buffer.
* Limit the size of calculations performed by mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod to
MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE to prevent a potential denial of service when generating
Diffie-Hellman key pairs. Credit to OSS-Fuzz.
* A failure of the random generator was ignored in mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(),
which is how most uses of randomization in asymmetric cryptography (including
key generation, intermediate value randomization and blinding) are implemented.
This could cause failures or the silent use of non-random values. A random
generator can fail if it needs reseeding and cannot not obtain entropy, or due
to an internal failure (which, for Mbed TLS's own CTR_DRBG or HMAC_DRBG, can
only happen due to a misconfiguration).
* Fix a compliance issue whereby we were not checking the tag on the algorithm
parameters (only the size) when comparing the signature in the description part
of the cert to the real signature. This meant that a NULL algorithm parameters
entry would look identical to an array of REAL (size zero) to the library and
thus the certificate would be considered valid. However, if the parameters do
not match in any way then the certificate should be considered invalid, and
indeed OpenSSL marks these certs as invalid when mbedtls did not. Many thanks
to guidovranken who found this issue via differential fuzzing and reported it
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/858114
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/mbedtls?expand=0&rev=22
- update to 2.23.0:
a lot of changes see https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.23.0
* Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. Noticed by Sangho Lee, Ming-Wei Shih, Prasun Gera, Taesoo Kim and Hyesoon Kim (Georgia Institute of Technology); and Marcus Peinado (Microsoft Research). Reported by Raoul Strackx (Fortanix) in #3394.
* Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. Found and reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Brumley.
* Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). This would cause the original Lucky 13 attack to be possible in those configurations, allowing an active network attacker to recover plaintext after repeated timing measurements under some conditions. Reported and fix suggested by Luc Perneel in #3246.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/827276
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/mbedtls?expand=0&rev=15
- Library package version bumped to libmbedtls12
- Update to version 2.14.1: [bsc#1118727, CVE-2018-19608]
Security
* Fix timing variations and memory access variations in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5
decryption that could lead to a Bleichenbacher-style padding oracle
attack. In TLS, this affects servers that accept ciphersuites based on
RSA decryption (i.e. ciphersuites whose name contains RSA but not
(EC)DH(E)). Discovered by Eyal Ronen (Weizmann Institute), Robert Gillham
(University of Adelaide), Daniel Genkin (University of Michigan),
Adi Shamir (Weizmann Institute), David Wong (NCC Group), and Yuval Yarom
(University of Adelaide, Data61). The attack is described in more detail
in the paper available here: http://cat.eyalro.net/cat.pdf CVE-2018-19608
* In mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(), don't leak the exact size of the number
via branching and memory access patterns. An attacker who could submit
a plaintext for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption but only observe the timing
of the decryption and not its result could nonetheless decrypt RSA
plaintexts and forge RSA signatures. Other asymmetric algorithms may
have been similarly vulnerable. Reported by Eyal Ronen, Robert Gillham,
Daniel Genkin, Adi Shamir, David Wong and Yuval Yarom.
* Wipe sensitive buffers on the stack in the CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG
modules.
API Changes
* The new functions mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret() and
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret() are similar to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update()
and mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update() respectively, but the new functions
report errors whereas the old functions return void. We recommend that
applications use the new functions.
- Version 2.14.0:
Security
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/657220
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/mbedtls?expand=0&rev=4
