58d3215b4a
- Security Fix: [CVE-2023-40661, bsc#1215761]
* opensc: multiple memory issues with pkcs15-init (enrollment tool)
* Add patches:
- opensc-CVE-2023-40661-1of12.patch
- opensc-CVE-2023-40661-2of12.patch
- opensc-CVE-2023-40661-3of12.patch
- opensc-CVE-2023-40661-4of12.patch
- opensc-CVE-2023-40661-5of12.patch
- opensc-CVE-2023-40661-6of12.patch
- opensc-CVE-2023-40661-7of12.patch
- opensc-CVE-2023-40661-8of12.patch
- opensc-CVE-2023-40661-9of12.patch
- opensc-CVE-2023-40661-10of12.patch
- opensc-CVE-2023-40661-11of12.patch
- opensc-CVE-2023-40661-12of12.patch
- Security Fix: [CVE-2023-4535, bsc#1215763]
* Add patches:
- opensc-CVE-2023-4535.patch
- opensc-NULL_pointer_fix.patch
- Security Fix: [CVE-2023-40660, bsc#1215762]
* opensc: PIN bypass when card tracks its own login state
* Add patches:
- opensc-CVE-2023-40660-1of2.patch
- opensc-CVE-2023-40660-2of2.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1116477
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:chipcard/opensc?expand=0&rev=75
51 lines
2.2 KiB
Diff
51 lines
2.2 KiB
Diff
From 74ddc3636db18ae78de62922a74bfdefae015c76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Frank Morgner <frankmorgner@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 12:27:23 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] Fixed PIN authentication bypass
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If two processes are accessing a token, then one process may leave the
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card usable with an authenticated PIN so that a key may sign/decrypt any
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data. This is especially the case if the token does not support a way of
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resetting the authentication status (logout).
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We have some tracking of the authentication status in software via
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PKCS#11, Minidriver (os-wise) and CryptoTokenKit, which is why a
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PIN-prompt will appear even though the card may technically be unlocked
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as described in the above example. However, before this change, an empty
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PIN was not verified (likely yielding an error during PIN-verification),
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but it was just checked whether the PIN is authenticated. This defeats
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the purpose of the PIN verification, because an empty PIN is not the
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correct one. Especially during OS Logon, we don't want that kind of
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shortcut, but we want the user to verify the correct PIN (even though
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the token was left unattended and authentication at the computer).
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This essentially reverts commit e6f7373ef066cfab6e3162e8b5f692683db23864.
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---
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src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c | 13 -------------
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1 file changed, 13 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c
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index 48e16fdc1c..2402675316 100644
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--- a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c
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+++ b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c
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@@ -307,19 +307,6 @@ sc_pkcs15_verify_pin(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card, struct sc_pkcs15_object *pi
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LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_PIN_REFERENCE);
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auth_info = (struct sc_pkcs15_auth_info *)pin_obj->data;
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- /*
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- * if pin cache is disabled, we can get here with no PIN data.
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- * in this case, to avoid error or unnecessary pin prompting on pinpad,
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- * check if the PIN has been already verified and the access condition
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- * is still open on card.
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- */
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- if (pinlen == 0) {
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- r = sc_pkcs15_get_pin_info(p15card, pin_obj);
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-
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- if (r == SC_SUCCESS && auth_info->logged_in == SC_PIN_STATE_LOGGED_IN)
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- LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, r);
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- }
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-
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r = _validate_pin(p15card, auth_info, pinlen);
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if (r)
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