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openssh/sshd@.service

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Accepting request 1193382 from home:alarrosa:branches:network:openssh-9.8 - Update to openssh 9.8p1: * No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for details. - Fix a dbus connection leaked in the logind patch that was missing a sd_bus_unref call (found by Matthias Gerstner): * logind_set_tty.patch - Add a patch that fixes a small memory leak when parsing the subsystem configuration option: * fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch - Update to openssh 9.8p1: = Security * 1) Race condition in sshd(8) (bsc#1226642, CVE-2024-6387). A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may allow arbitrary code execution with root privileges. Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit Linux/glibc systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack requires on average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to the maximum the server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit systems is believed to be possible but has not been demonstrated at this time. It's likely that these attacks will be improved upon. Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not been examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream Linux distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable per-connection ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no - we don't understand why) may potentially have an easier path to exploitation. OpenBSD is not vulnerable. OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1193382 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=272
2024-08-12 09:54:46 +00:00
[Unit]
Description=OpenSSH Per-Connection Server Daemon
Documentation=man:systemd-ssh-generator(8) man:sshd(8)
After=network.target
Accepting request 1303317 from home:ldragon:branches:network - Update sshd@.service to match upstream more closely, to enable support for ephemeral sshd keys - add openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch which fixes a performance issue where pam can do a reverse dns query of "UNKNOWN" which times out multiple times, causing a substantial slowdown when logging in. (bsc#1249352) OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1303317 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=294
2025-09-10 14:47:12 +00:00
Accepting request 1193382 from home:alarrosa:branches:network:openssh-9.8 - Update to openssh 9.8p1: * No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for details. - Fix a dbus connection leaked in the logind patch that was missing a sd_bus_unref call (found by Matthias Gerstner): * logind_set_tty.patch - Add a patch that fixes a small memory leak when parsing the subsystem configuration option: * fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch - Update to openssh 9.8p1: = Security * 1) Race condition in sshd(8) (bsc#1226642, CVE-2024-6387). A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may allow arbitrary code execution with root privileges. Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit Linux/glibc systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack requires on average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to the maximum the server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit systems is believed to be possible but has not been demonstrated at this time. It's likely that these attacks will be improved upon. Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not been examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream Linux distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable per-connection ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no - we don't understand why) may potentially have an easier path to exploitation. OpenBSD is not vulnerable. OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1193382 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=272
2024-08-12 09:54:46 +00:00
[Service]
EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/ssh
ExecStartPre=/usr/sbin/sshd-gen-keys-start
ExecStartPre=/usr/sbin/sshd -t $SSHD_OPTS
Accepting request 1303317 from home:ldragon:branches:network - Update sshd@.service to match upstream more closely, to enable support for ephemeral sshd keys - add openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch which fixes a performance issue where pam can do a reverse dns query of "UNKNOWN" which times out multiple times, causing a substantial slowdown when logging in. (bsc#1249352) OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1303317 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=294
2025-09-10 14:47:12 +00:00
ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $SSHD_OPTS -o "AuthorizedKeysFile ${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY}/ssh.ephemeral-authorized_keys-all .ssh/authorized_keys"
Accepting request 1193382 from home:alarrosa:branches:network:openssh-9.8 - Update to openssh 9.8p1: * No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for details. - Fix a dbus connection leaked in the logind patch that was missing a sd_bus_unref call (found by Matthias Gerstner): * logind_set_tty.patch - Add a patch that fixes a small memory leak when parsing the subsystem configuration option: * fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch - Update to openssh 9.8p1: = Security * 1) Race condition in sshd(8) (bsc#1226642, CVE-2024-6387). A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may allow arbitrary code execution with root privileges. Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit Linux/glibc systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack requires on average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to the maximum the server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit systems is believed to be possible but has not been demonstrated at this time. It's likely that these attacks will be improved upon. Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not been examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream Linux distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable per-connection ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no - we don't understand why) may potentially have an easier path to exploitation. OpenBSD is not vulnerable. OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1193382 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=272
2024-08-12 09:54:46 +00:00
StandardInput=socket
Accepting request 1303317 from home:ldragon:branches:network - Update sshd@.service to match upstream more closely, to enable support for ephemeral sshd keys - add openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch which fixes a performance issue where pam can do a reverse dns query of "UNKNOWN" which times out multiple times, causing a substantial slowdown when logging in. (bsc#1249352) OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1303317 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=294
2025-09-10 14:47:12 +00:00
ImportCredential=ssh.ephemeral-authorized_keys-all
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