openssh/openssh-8.1p1-seccomp-clock_gettime64.patch

From b110cefdfbf5a20f49b774a55062d6ded2fb6e22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2020 16:26:45 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] seccomp: Allow clock_gettime64() in sandbox.

This helps sshd accept connections on mips platforms with
upcoming glibc ( 2.31 )
---
 sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

Index: openssh-8.8p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
===================================================================
--- openssh-8.8p1.orig/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ openssh-8.8p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -279,6 +279,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
 #ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep_time64
 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep_time64),
 #endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64),
+#endif
 #ifdef __NR__newselect
 	SC_ALLOW(__NR__newselect),
 #endif
- Update to openssh 9.9p1: * No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for details. - Update to openssh 9.9p1: = Future deprecation notice * OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in early 2025. This release disables DSA by default at compile time. DSA, as specified in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently weak - being limited to a 160 bit private key and use of the SHA1 digest. Its estimated security level is only 80 bits symmetric equivalent. OpenSSH has disabled DSA keys by default since 2015 but has retained run-time optional support for them. DSA was the only mandatory-to-implement algorithm in the SSHv2 RFCs, mostly because alternative algorithms were encumbered by patents when the SSHv2 protocol was specified. This has not been the case for decades at this point and better algorithms are well supported by all actively-maintained SSH implementations. We do not consider the costs of maintaining DSA in OpenSSH to be justified and hope that removing it from OpenSSH can accelerate its wider deprecation in supporting cryptography libraries. = Potentially-incompatible changes * ssh(1): remove support for pre-authentication compression. OpenSSH has only supported post-authentication compression in the server for some years. Compression before authentication significantly increases the attack surface of SSH servers and risks creating oracles that reveal information about information sent during authentication. OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=275 2024-09-25 10:42:29 +02:00			`From b110cefdfbf5a20f49b774a55062d6ded2fb6e22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001`
			`From: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>`
			`Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2020 16:26:45 -0800`
			`Subject: [PATCH] seccomp: Allow clock_gettime64() in sandbox.`

			`This helps sshd accept connections on mips platforms with`
			`upcoming glibc ( 2.31 )`
			`---`
			`sandbox-seccomp-filter.c \| 3 +++`
			`1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)`

			`Index: openssh-8.8p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c`
			`===================================================================`
			`--- openssh-8.8p1.orig/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c`
			`+++ openssh-8.8p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c`
			`@@ -279,6 +279,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_`
			`#ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep_time64`
			`SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep_time64),`
			`#endif`
			`+#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64`
			`+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64),`
			`+#endif`
			`#ifdef __NR__newselect`
			`SC_ALLOW(__NR__newselect),`
			`#endif`