openssh/openssh-6.6p1-audit8-libaudit_dns_timeouts.patch

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# bnc#752354, bnc#757360
# prevent timeouts in libaudit code caused by DNS misconfiguration by
# explicitely disabling DNS lookups in libaudit when UseDNS is false.
# Note that this particular solution causes the logs to always contain
# "hostname=?, addr=?" when DNS lookups are disabled.
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
@@ -62,17 +62,17 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const c
if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
return; /* No audit support in kernel */
else
goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
}
rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
- username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ username == NULL ? uid : -1, options.use_dns ? hostname : NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
saved_errno = errno;
close(audit_fd);
/*
* Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
* root user.
*/
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
rc = 0;
@@ -114,17 +114,17 @@ linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const cha
goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
}
if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN))
event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH,
NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)",
- username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ username == NULL ? uid : -1, options.use_dns ? hostname : NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
saved_errno = errno;
close(audit_fd);
/*
* Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
* root user.
*/
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
rc = 0;