openssh/openssh-6.6p1-seed-prng.patch

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# extended support for (re-)seeding the OpenSSL PRNG from /dev/random
# bnc#703221, FATE#312172
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
@@ -504,9 +504,15 @@ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char
/* not implemented */
}
void
audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
{
/* not implemented */
}
+
+void
+audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
#endif /* BSM */
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
@@ -398,9 +398,31 @@ audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(cons
}
audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
audit_close(audit_fd);
/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
error("cannot write into audit");
}
+
+void
+audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
+{
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=prng_seed kind=server bytes=%li source=%s ", bytes, rf);
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ error("cannot open audit");
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE_USER,
+ buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ error("cannot write into audit");
+}
#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
@@ -304,10 +304,16 @@ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char
/*
* This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
*/
void
audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
{
debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
}
+
+void
+audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
+{
+ debug("audit PRNG seed euid %d bytes %li source %s", geteuid(), bytes, rf);
+}
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
@@ -63,10 +63,11 @@ void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
void audit_unsupported(int);
void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
void audit_unsupported_body(int);
void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
void audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
void audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
+void audit_linux_prng_seed(long, const char *);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c b/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
@@ -45,16 +45,17 @@
#include "ssh.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "buffer.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h"
/*
* Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding:
* If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from
* /dev/random), then collect RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes of randomness from
* PRNGd.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
@@ -229,11 +230,14 @@ seed_rng(void)
}
if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");
RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
+
+ linux_seed();
+
if (RAND_status() != 1)
fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
}
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
@@ -15,17 +15,17 @@ AR=@AR@
RANLIB=@RANLIB@
INSTALL=@INSTALL@
LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha2.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o explicit_bzero.o
Accepting request 222365 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.5p1 - Update to 6.5p1 Features since 6.4p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for key exchange using ECDH in Daniel Bernstein's Curve25519; default when both the client and server support it. * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for Ed25519 as a public key type fo rboth server and client. Ed25519 is an EC signature offering better security than ECDSA and DSA and good performance. * Add a new private key format that uses a bcrypt KDF to better protect keys at rest. Used unconditionally for Ed25519 keys, on demand for other key types via the -o ssh-keygen(1) option. Intended to become default in the near future. Details documented in PROTOCOL.key. * ssh(1), sshd(8): new transport cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" combining Daniel Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an authenticated encryption mode. Details documented PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305. * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients and servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. It will still be possible to connect with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and OpenSSH will refuse connection entirely in a future release. * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse old proprietary clients and servers that use a weaker key exchange hash calculation. * ssh(1): increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for each symmetric key size. New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with the upper limit specified by OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/222365 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=63
2014-02-14 15:54:10 +01:00
COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
.c.o:
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
all: libopenbsd-compat.a
$(COMPAT): ../config.h
$(OPENBSD): ../config.h
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
+ * (c) 2011 Petr Cerny <pcerny@suse.cz>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "defines.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+
+#define RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT 6L
+#define RNG_ENV_VAR "SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG"
+
+long rand_bytes = 0;
+char *rand_file = NULL;
+
+static void
+linux_seed_init(void)
+{
+ long elen = 0;
+ char *env = getenv(RNG_ENV_VAR);
+
+ if (env) {
+ errno = 0;
+ elen = strtol(env, NULL, 10);
+ if (errno) {
+ debug("bogus value in the %s environment variable, using default %li\n",
+ RNG_ENV_VAR, RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (elen)
+ rand_file = "/dev/random";
+ else
+ rand_file = "/dev/urandom";
+
+ rand_bytes = MAX(elen, RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+void
+linux_seed(void)
+{
+ long len;
+ if (!rand_file)
+ linux_seed_init();
+
+ errno = 0;
+ len = RAND_load_file(rand_file, rand_bytes);
+ if (len != rand_bytes) {
+ if (errno)
+ fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", random, strerror(errno));
+ else
+ fatal ("EOF reading %s", random);
+ }
+}
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
@@ -14,16 +14,20 @@
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef _PORT_LINUX_H
#define _PORT_LINUX_H
+extern long rand_bytes;
+extern char *rand_file;
+void linux_seed(void);
+
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
#endif
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.1 b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.1
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.1
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.1
Accepting request 222365 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.5p1 - Update to 6.5p1 Features since 6.4p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for key exchange using ECDH in Daniel Bernstein's Curve25519; default when both the client and server support it. * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for Ed25519 as a public key type fo rboth server and client. Ed25519 is an EC signature offering better security than ECDSA and DSA and good performance. * Add a new private key format that uses a bcrypt KDF to better protect keys at rest. Used unconditionally for Ed25519 keys, on demand for other key types via the -o ssh-keygen(1) option. Intended to become default in the near future. Details documented in PROTOCOL.key. * ssh(1), sshd(8): new transport cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" combining Daniel Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an authenticated encryption mode. Details documented PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305. * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients and servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. It will still be possible to connect with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and OpenSSH will refuse connection entirely in a future release. * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse old proprietary clients and servers that use a weaker key exchange hash calculation. * ssh(1): increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for each symmetric key size. New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with the upper limit specified by OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/222365 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=63
2014-02-14 15:54:10 +01:00
@@ -156,16 +156,30 @@ or related script.
(Note that on some machines it
may be necessary to redirect the input from
.Pa /dev/null
to make this work.)
.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
Identifies the path of a
.Ux Ns -domain
socket used to communicate with the agent.
+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
.El
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.1 b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.1
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.1
Accepting request 222365 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.5p1 - Update to 6.5p1 Features since 6.4p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for key exchange using ECDH in Daniel Bernstein's Curve25519; default when both the client and server support it. * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for Ed25519 as a public key type fo rboth server and client. Ed25519 is an EC signature offering better security than ECDSA and DSA and good performance. * Add a new private key format that uses a bcrypt KDF to better protect keys at rest. Used unconditionally for Ed25519 keys, on demand for other key types via the -o ssh-keygen(1) option. Intended to become default in the near future. Details documented in PROTOCOL.key. * ssh(1), sshd(8): new transport cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" combining Daniel Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an authenticated encryption mode. Details documented PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305. * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients and servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. It will still be possible to connect with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and OpenSSH will refuse connection entirely in a future release. * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse old proprietary clients and servers that use a weaker key exchange hash calculation. * ssh(1): increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for each symmetric key size. New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with the upper limit specified by OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/222365 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=63
2014-02-14 15:54:10 +01:00
@@ -196,16 +196,33 @@ Contains the protocol version 2 ED25519
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt
.Ux Ns -domain
sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.1 b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.1
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.1
Accepting request 222365 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.5p1 - Update to 6.5p1 Features since 6.4p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for key exchange using ECDH in Daniel Bernstein's Curve25519; default when both the client and server support it. * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for Ed25519 as a public key type fo rboth server and client. Ed25519 is an EC signature offering better security than ECDSA and DSA and good performance. * Add a new private key format that uses a bcrypt KDF to better protect keys at rest. Used unconditionally for Ed25519 keys, on demand for other key types via the -o ssh-keygen(1) option. Intended to become default in the near future. Details documented in PROTOCOL.key. * ssh(1), sshd(8): new transport cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" combining Daniel Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an authenticated encryption mode. Details documented PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305. * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients and servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. It will still be possible to connect with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and OpenSSH will refuse connection entirely in a future release. * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse old proprietary clients and servers that use a weaker key exchange hash calculation. * ssh(1): increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for each symmetric key size. New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with the upper limit specified by OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/222365 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=63
2014-02-14 15:54:10 +01:00
@@ -827,16 +827,33 @@ on all machines
where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/moduli
Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
The file format is described in
.Xr moduli 5 .
.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr moduli 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Rs
.%R RFC 4716
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keysign.8 b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keysign.8
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keysign.8
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keysign.8
Accepting request 222365 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.5p1 - Update to 6.5p1 Features since 6.4p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for key exchange using ECDH in Daniel Bernstein's Curve25519; default when both the client and server support it. * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for Ed25519 as a public key type fo rboth server and client. Ed25519 is an EC signature offering better security than ECDSA and DSA and good performance. * Add a new private key format that uses a bcrypt KDF to better protect keys at rest. Used unconditionally for Ed25519 keys, on demand for other key types via the -o ssh-keygen(1) option. Intended to become default in the near future. Details documented in PROTOCOL.key. * ssh(1), sshd(8): new transport cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" combining Daniel Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an authenticated encryption mode. Details documented PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305. * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients and servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. It will still be possible to connect with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and OpenSSH will refuse connection entirely in a future release. * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse old proprietary clients and servers that use a weaker key exchange hash calculation. * ssh(1): increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for each symmetric key size. New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with the upper limit specified by OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/222365 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=63
2014-02-14 15:54:10 +01:00
@@ -75,16 +75,33 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authe
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
Accepting request 222365 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.5p1 - Update to 6.5p1 Features since 6.4p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for key exchange using ECDH in Daniel Bernstein's Curve25519; default when both the client and server support it. * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for Ed25519 as a public key type fo rboth server and client. Ed25519 is an EC signature offering better security than ECDSA and DSA and good performance. * Add a new private key format that uses a bcrypt KDF to better protect keys at rest. Used unconditionally for Ed25519 keys, on demand for other key types via the -o ssh-keygen(1) option. Intended to become default in the near future. Details documented in PROTOCOL.key. * ssh(1), sshd(8): new transport cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" combining Daniel Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an authenticated encryption mode. Details documented PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305. * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients and servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. It will still be possible to connect with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and OpenSSH will refuse connection entirely in a future release. * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse old proprietary clients and servers that use a weaker key exchange hash calculation. * ssh(1): increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for each symmetric key size. New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with the upper limit specified by OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/222365 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=63
2014-02-14 15:54:10 +01:00
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
information corresponding with the private keys above.
.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh HISTORY
.Nm
first appeared in
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.1 b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.1
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.1
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.1
Accepting request 222365 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.5p1 - Update to 6.5p1 Features since 6.4p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for key exchange using ECDH in Daniel Bernstein's Curve25519; default when both the client and server support it. * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for Ed25519 as a public key type fo rboth server and client. Ed25519 is an EC signature offering better security than ECDSA and DSA and good performance. * Add a new private key format that uses a bcrypt KDF to better protect keys at rest. Used unconditionally for Ed25519 keys, on demand for other key types via the -o ssh-keygen(1) option. Intended to become default in the near future. Details documented in PROTOCOL.key. * ssh(1), sshd(8): new transport cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" combining Daniel Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an authenticated encryption mode. Details documented PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305. * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients and servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. It will still be possible to connect with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and OpenSSH will refuse connection entirely in a future release. * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse old proprietary clients and servers that use a weaker key exchange hash calculation. * ssh(1): increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for each symmetric key size. New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with the upper limit specified by OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/222365 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=63
2014-02-14 15:54:10 +01:00
@@ -1304,16 +1304,30 @@ reads
and adds lines of the format
.Dq VARNAME=value
to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to
change their environment.
For more information, see the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa ~/.rhosts
This file is used for host-based authentication (see above).
On some machines this file may need to be
world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
because
.Xr sshd 8
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
Accepting request 222365 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.5p1 - Update to 6.5p1 Features since 6.4p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for key exchange using ECDH in Daniel Bernstein's Curve25519; default when both the client and server support it. * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for Ed25519 as a public key type fo rboth server and client. Ed25519 is an EC signature offering better security than ECDSA and DSA and good performance. * Add a new private key format that uses a bcrypt KDF to better protect keys at rest. Used unconditionally for Ed25519 keys, on demand for other key types via the -o ssh-keygen(1) option. Intended to become default in the near future. Details documented in PROTOCOL.key. * ssh(1), sshd(8): new transport cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" combining Daniel Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an authenticated encryption mode. Details documented PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305. * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients and servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. It will still be possible to connect with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and OpenSSH will refuse connection entirely in a future release. * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse old proprietary clients and servers that use a weaker key exchange hash calculation. * ssh(1): increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for each symmetric key size. New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with the upper limit specified by OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/222365 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=63
2014-02-14 15:54:10 +01:00
@@ -946,16 +946,33 @@ and not group or world-writable.
.It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
Contains the process ID of the
.Nm
listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
started last).
The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
@@ -50,16 +50,18 @@
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h"
+
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
@@ -218,16 +220,23 @@ struct {
Accepting request 220466 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.4p1 - Update to 6.4p1 Features since 6.2p2: * ssh-agent(1) support in sshd(8); allows encrypted hostkeys, or hostkeys on smartcards. * ssh(1)/sshd(8): allow optional time-based rekeying via a second argument to the existing RekeyLimit option. RekeyLimit is now supported in sshd_config as well as on the client. * sshd(8): standardise logging of information during user authentication. * The presented key/cert and the remote username (if available) is now logged in the authentication success/failure message on the same log line as the local username, remote host/port and protocol in use. Certificates contents and the key fingerprint of the signing CA are logged too. * ssh(1) ability to query what cryptographic algorithms are supported in the binary. * ssh(1): ProxyCommand=- for cases where stdin and stdout already point to the proxy. * ssh(1): allow IdentityFile=none * ssh(1)/sshd(8): -E option to append debugging logs to a specified file instead of stderr or syslog. * sftp(1): support resuming partial downloads with the "reget" command and on the sftp commandline or on the "get" commandline with the "-a" (append) option. * ssh(1): "IgnoreUnknown" configuration option to selectively suppress errors arising from unknown configuration directives. * sshd(8): support for submethods to be appended to required authentication methods listed via AuthenticationMethods. OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/220466 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=58
2014-01-31 13:18:41 +01:00
Key **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */
Key **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */
int have_ssh1_key;
int have_ssh2_key;
u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
} sensitive_data;
/*
+ * Every RESEED_AFTERth connection triggers call to linux_seed() to re-seed the
+ * random pool.
+ */
+#define RESEED_AFTER 100
+static int re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
+
+/*
* Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
* Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
*/
static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory - Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1 - update to 6.6p1 Security: * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. Features since 6.5p1: * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code, which was experimental, never enabled and has been unmaintained for some time. * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed to match while processing Match blocks. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 23:53:01 +02:00
@@ -1322,16 +1331,21 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
maxfd = startup_p[0];
startups++;
break;
}
+ if(!(--re_seeding_counter)) {
+ re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
+ linux_seed();
+ audit_linux_prng_seed(rand_bytes, rand_file);
+ }
/*
* Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
* we are in debugging mode.
*/
if (debug_flag) {
/*
* In debugging mode. Close the listening