openssh/openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch

# HG changeset patch
# Parent  d25c96855fd67e997e25ec1198d953af33eb289c
# enable trusted X11 forwarding by default in both sshd and sshsystem-wide
# configuration
# bnc#50836 (was suse #35836)
Enable Trusted X11 forwarding by default, since the security benefits of
having it disabled are negligible these days with XI2 being widely used.

Index: openssh-8.8p1/ssh_config
===================================================================
--- openssh-8.8p1.orig/ssh_config
+++ openssh-8.8p1/ssh_config
@@ -17,9 +17,20 @@
 # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
 # ssh_config(5) man page.
 
-# Host *
+Host *
 #   ForwardAgent no
 #   ForwardX11 no
+
+# If you do not trust your remote host (or its administrator), you
+# should not forward X11 connections to your local X11-display for
+# security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the
+# remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your
+# keystrokes as you type, just like any other X11 client could do.
+# Set this to "no" here for global effect or in your own ~/.ssh/config
+# file if you want to have the remote X11 authentification data to 
+# expire after twenty minutes after remote login.
+    ForwardX11Trusted yes
+
 #   PasswordAuthentication yes
 #   HostbasedAuthentication no
 #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
Index: openssh-8.8p1/sshd_config
===================================================================
--- openssh-8.8p1.orig/sshd_config
+++ openssh-8.8p1/sshd_config
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
 #AllowAgentForwarding yes
 #AllowTcpForwarding yes
 #GatewayPorts no
-#X11Forwarding no
+X11Forwarding yes
 #X11DisplayOffset 10
 #X11UseLocalhost yes
 #PermitTTY yes
- Update to openssh 9.8p1: * No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for details. - Fix a dbus connection leaked in the logind patch that was missing a sd_bus_unref call (found by Matthias Gerstner): * logind_set_tty.patch - Add a patch that fixes a small memory leak when parsing the subsystem configuration option: * fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch - Update to openssh 9.8p1: = Security * 1) Race condition in sshd(8) (bsc#1226642, CVE-2024-6387). A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may allow arbitrary code execution with root privileges. Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit Linux/glibc systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack requires on average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to the maximum the server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit systems is believed to be possible but has not been demonstrated at this time. It's likely that these attacks will be improved upon. Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not been examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream Linux distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable per-connection ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no - we don't understand why) may potentially have an easier path to exploitation. OpenBSD is not vulnerable. OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=272 2024-08-12 11:54:46 +02:00			`# HG changeset patch`
			`# Parent d25c96855fd67e997e25ec1198d953af33eb289c`
			`# enable trusted X11 forwarding by default in both sshd and sshsystem-wide`
			`# configuration`
			`# bnc#50836 (was suse #35836)`
			`Enable Trusted X11 forwarding by default, since the security benefits of`
			`having it disabled are negligible these days with XI2 being widely used.`

			`Index: openssh-8.8p1/ssh_config`
			`===================================================================`
			`--- openssh-8.8p1.orig/ssh_config`
			`+++ openssh-8.8p1/ssh_config`
			`@@ -17,9 +17,20 @@`
			`# list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the`
			`# ssh_config(5) man page.`

			`-# Host *`
			`+Host *`
			`# ForwardAgent no`
			`# ForwardX11 no`
			`+`
			`+# If you do not trust your remote host (or its administrator), you`
			`+# should not forward X11 connections to your local X11-display for`
			`+# security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the`
			`+# remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your`
			`+# keystrokes as you type, just like any other X11 client could do.`
			`+# Set this to "no" here for global effect or in your own ~/.ssh/config`
			`+# file if you want to have the remote X11 authentification data to`
			`+# expire after twenty minutes after remote login.`
			`+ ForwardX11Trusted yes`
			`+`
			`# PasswordAuthentication yes`
			`# HostbasedAuthentication no`
			`# GSSAPIAuthentication no`
			`Index: openssh-8.8p1/sshd_config`
			`===================================================================`
			`--- openssh-8.8p1.orig/sshd_config`
			`+++ openssh-8.8p1/sshd_config`
			`@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys`
			`#AllowAgentForwarding yes`
			`#AllowTcpForwarding yes`
			`#GatewayPorts no`
			`-#X11Forwarding no`
			`+X11Forwarding yes`
			`#X11DisplayOffset 10`
			`#X11UseLocalhost yes`
			`#PermitTTY yes`