openssh/openssh-whitelist-syscalls.patch

Index: openssh-8.8p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
===================================================================
--- openssh-8.8p1.orig/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ openssh-8.8p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -201,6 +201,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
 #ifdef __NR_close
 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_close),
 #endif
+#ifdef __NR_close_range
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_close_range),
+#endif
 #ifdef __NR_exit
 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit),
 #endif
@@ -213,6 +216,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
 #ifdef __NR_futex_time64
 	SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex_time64),
 #endif
+#ifdef __NR_futex_time64
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex_time64),
+#endif
 #ifdef __NR_geteuid
 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
 #endif
@@ -293,6 +299,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64
 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_read
 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),
- Update to openssh 9.8p1: * No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for details. - Fix a dbus connection leaked in the logind patch that was missing a sd_bus_unref call (found by Matthias Gerstner): * logind_set_tty.patch - Add a patch that fixes a small memory leak when parsing the subsystem configuration option: * fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch - Update to openssh 9.8p1: = Security * 1) Race condition in sshd(8) (bsc#1226642, CVE-2024-6387). A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may allow arbitrary code execution with root privileges. Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit Linux/glibc systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack requires on average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to the maximum the server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit systems is believed to be possible but has not been demonstrated at this time. It's likely that these attacks will be improved upon. Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not been examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream Linux distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable per-connection ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no - we don't understand why) may potentially have an easier path to exploitation. OpenBSD is not vulnerable. OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=272 2024-08-12 11:54:46 +02:00			`Index: openssh-8.8p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c`
			`===================================================================`
			`--- openssh-8.8p1.orig/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c`
			`+++ openssh-8.8p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c`
			`@@ -201,6 +201,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_`
			`#ifdef __NR_close`
			`SC_ALLOW(__NR_close),`
			`#endif`
			`+#ifdef __NR_close_range`
			`+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_close_range),`
			`+#endif`
			`#ifdef __NR_exit`
			`SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit),`
			`#endif`
			`@@ -213,6 +216,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_`
			`#ifdef __NR_futex_time64`
			`SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex_time64),`
			`#endif`
			`+#ifdef __NR_futex_time64`
			`+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex_time64),`
			`+#endif`
			`#ifdef __NR_geteuid`
			`SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),`
			`#endif`
			`@@ -293,6 +299,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_`
			`#endif`
			`#ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64`
			`SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64),`
			`+#endif`
			`+#ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64`
			`+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64),`
			`#endif`
			`#ifdef __NR_read`
			`SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),`