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Accepting request 398802 from home:pcerny:factory

Browse Source 
- upgrade to 7.2p2

- changing license to 2-clause BSD to match source

- enable trusted X11 forwarding by default
  [-X11_trusted_forwarding]
- set UID for lastlog properly [-lastlog]
- enable use of PAM by default [-enable_PAM_by_default]
- copy command line arguments properly [-saveargv-fix]
- do not use pthreads in PAM code [-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM]
- fix paths in documentation [-eal3]
- prevent race consitions triggered by SIGALRM [-blocksigalrm]
- do send and accept locale environment variables by default
  [-send_locale]
- handle hostnames changes during X forwarding
  [-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X]
- try to remove xauth cookies on exit
  [-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit]
- properly format pts names for ?tmp? log files
  [-pts_names_formatting]
- check locked accounts when using PAM [-pam_check_locks]
- chenge default PermitRootLogin to 'yes' to prevent unwanted
  surprises on updates from older versions.
  See README.SUSE for details
  [-allow_root_password_login]
- Disable DH parameters under 2048 bits by default and allow
  lowering the limit back to the RFC 4419 specified minimum
  through an option (bsc#932483, bsc#948902)
  [-disable_short_DH_parameters]
- Add getuid() and stat() syscalls to the seccomp filter

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/398802
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=103
This commit is contained in:
Petr Cerny 2016-05-30 01:36:18 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
parent 252ed8ae18
commit 5093e42eaa
61 changed files with 1038 additions and 15991 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

34
CVE-2016-0777_CVE-2016-0778.patch
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@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
References: https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-announce/2016-January/000124.html https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=961645 https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=961642
--- readconf.c 30 Jul 2015 00:01:34 -0000 1.239
+++ readconf.c 13 Jan 2016 23:17:23 -0000
@@ -1648,7 +1648,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
options->tun_remote = -1;
options->local_command = NULL;
options->permit_local_command = -1;
- options->use_roaming = -1;
+ options->use_roaming = 0;
options->visual_host_key = -1;
options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
@@ -1819,8 +1819,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
if (options->permit_local_command == -1)
options->permit_local_command = 0;
- if (options->use_roaming == -1)
- options->use_roaming = 1;
+ options->use_roaming = 0;
if (options->visual_host_key == -1)
options->visual_host_key = 0;
if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
--- ssh.c 30 Jul 2015 00:01:34 -0000 1.420
+++ ssh.c 13 Jan 2016 23:17:23 -0000
@@ -1882,9 +1882,6 @@ ssh_session2(void)
fork_postauth();
}
- if (options.use_roaming)
- request_roaming();
-
return client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ?
options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
}

0
README.FIPS Normal file
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17
README.SUSE Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
This is OpenSSH version 7.2p2 for SLE12
There are following changes in default settings of ssh client and server:
* Accepting and sending of locale environment variables in protocol 2 is
enabled.
* PAM authentication is enabled.
* root authentiation with password is enabled by default (PermitRootLogin yes).
NOTE: this has security implications and is only done in order to not change
behaviour of the server in an update. We strongly suggest setting this option
either "prohibit-password" or even better to "no" (which disables direct
remote root login entirely).
For more information on differences in SUSE OpenSSH package see README.FIPS

15
README.SuSE
View File

@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
This is OpenSSH version 5.6p1.
There are following changes in default settings of ssh client:
* Accepting and sending of locale environment variables in protocol 2 is
enabled.
* New host keys will be hashed to and them unusable for malicious people or
software trying to use known_hosts to find further hops.
* Tunneled clear text passwords are disabled.
* PAM authentication is enabled.
* Only support for protocol 2 is enabled.

184
cavs_driver-ssh.pl Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
#!/usr/bin/env perl
#
# CAVS test driver for OpenSSH
#
# Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
#
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
#
# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
#
# NO WARRANTY
#
# BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
# FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN
# OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
# PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS
# TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE
# PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
# REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
#
# IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
# WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
# REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
# INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
# OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
# TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
# YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
# PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
# POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
#
use strict;
use warnings;
use IPC::Open2;
# Executing a program by feeding STDIN and retrieving
# STDOUT
# $1: data string to be piped to the app on STDIN
# rest: program and args
# returns: STDOUT of program as string
sub pipe_through_program($@) {
my $in = shift;
my @args = @_;
my ($CO, $CI);
my $pid = open2($CO, $CI, @args);
my $out = "";
my $len = length($in);
my $first = 1;
while (1) {
my $rin = "";
my $win = "";
# Output of prog is FD that we read
vec($rin,fileno($CO),1) = 1;
# Input of prog is FD that we write
# check for $first is needed because we can have NULL input
# that is to be written to the app
if ( $len > 0 || $first) {
(vec($win,fileno($CI),1) = 1);
$first=0;
}
# Let us wait for 100ms
my $nfound = select(my $rout=$rin, my $wout=$win, undef, 0.1);
if ( $wout ) {
my $written = syswrite($CI, $in, $len);
die "broken pipe" if !defined $written;
$len -= $written;
substr($in, 0, $written) = "";
if ($len <= 0) {
close $CI or die "broken pipe: $!";
}
}
if ( $rout ) {
my $tmp_out = "";
my $bytes_read = sysread($CO, $tmp_out, 4096);
$out .= $tmp_out;
last if ($bytes_read == 0);
}
}
close $CO or die "broken pipe: $!";
waitpid $pid, 0;
return $out;
}
# Parser of CAVS test vector file
# $1: Test vector file
# $2: Output file for test results
# return: nothing
sub parse($$) {
my $infile = shift;
my $outfile = shift;
my $out = "";
my $K = "";
my $H = "";
my $session_id = "";
my $ivlen = 0;
my $eklen = "";
my $iklen = "";
open(IN, "<$infile");
while(<IN>) {
my $line = $_;
chomp($line);
$line =~ s/\r//;
if ($line =~ /\[SHA-1\]/) {
$iklen = 20;
} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-256\]/) {
$iklen = 32;
} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-384\]/) {
$iklen = 48;
} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-512\]/) {
$iklen = 64;
} elsif ($line =~ /^\[IV length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
$ivlen = $1;
$ivlen = $ivlen / 8;
} elsif ($line =~ /^\[encryption key length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
$eklen = $1;
$eklen = $eklen / 8;
} elsif ($line =~ /^K\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
$K = $1;
$K = substr($K, 8);
$K = "00" . $K;
} elsif ($line =~ /^H\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
$H = $1;
} elsif ($line =~ /^session_id\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
$session_id = $1;
}
$out .= $line . "\n";
if ($K ne "" && $H ne "" && $session_id ne "" &&
$ivlen ne "" && $eklen ne "" && $iklen > 0) {
$out .= pipe_through_program("", "@LIBEXECDIR@/ssh/cavstest-kdf -H $H -K $K -s $session_id -i $ivlen -e $eklen -m $iklen");
$K = "";
$H = "";
$session_id = "";
}
}
close IN;
$out =~ s/\n/\r\n/g; # make it a dos file
open(OUT, ">$outfile") or die "Cannot create output file $outfile: $?";
print OUT $out;
close OUT;
}
############################################################
#
# let us pretend to be C :-)
sub main() {
my $infile=$ARGV[0];
die "Error: Test vector file $infile not found" if (! -f $infile);
my $outfile = $infile;
# let us add .rsp regardless whether we could strip .req
$outfile =~ s/\.req$//;
$outfile .= ".rsp";
if (-f $outfile) {
die "Output file $outfile could not be removed: $?"
unless unlink($outfile);
}
print STDERR "Performing tests from source file $infile with results stored in destination file $outfile\n";
# Do the job
parse($infile, $outfile);
}
###########################################
# Call it
main();
1;

34
openssh-6.6p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
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@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 1055b218140c3cc19228c47878a68740363d80dd
Do not throw away already open sockets for X11 forwarding if another socket
family is not available for bind()
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/channels.c b/openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
@@ -3476,22 +3476,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
}
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
sock_set_v6only(sock);
if (x11_use_localhost)
channel_set_reuseaddr(sock);
if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
debug2("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
-
+ continue;
+ /* do not remove successfully opened sockets
for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
close(socks[n]);
}
num_socks = 0;
break;
+ */
}
socks[num_socks++] = sock;
if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
break;
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
if (num_socks > 0)
break;

33
openssh-6.6p1-audit1-remove_duplicit_audit.patch
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@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
# Don't audit SSH_INVALID_USER twice.
# PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow()) a few lines above already did this.
#
# based on:
# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2010
# by jchadima@redhat.com
#
# PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow()) a few lines above already did this.
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c
@@ -236,19 +236,16 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user));
authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
authctxt->valid = 1;
debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user);
} else {
logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
-#endif
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
#endif
setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);

867
openssh-6.6p1-audit2-better_audit_of_user_actions.patch
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@ -1,867 +0,0 @@
# extended auditing of user actions
# based on:
# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2011
# by jchadima@redhat.com
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
@@ -370,20 +370,33 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
/* this is used on IPv4-only machines */
tid->port = (dev_t)port;
tid->machine = inet_addr(host);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x", tid->machine);
debug3("BSM audit: machine ID %s", buf);
#endif
}
-void
+int
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
/* not implemented */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_count_session_open(void)
+{
+ /* not necessary */
}
void
audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
{
/* not implemented */
}
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
@@ -30,97 +30,210 @@
#include "includes.h"
#if defined(USE_LINUX_AUDIT)
#include <libaudit.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "audit.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
const char* audit_username(void);
-int
-linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
- const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
+static void
+linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
+ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
{
int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
audit_fd = audit_open();
if (audit_fd < 0) {
if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
- return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
else
- return 0; /* Must prevent login */
+ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
}
- rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
saved_errno = errno;
close(audit_fd);
/*
* Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
* root user.
*/
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
rc = 0;
errno = saved_errno;
- return (rc >= 0);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+fatal_report:
+ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
}
+static void
+linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username,
+ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
+{
+ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+ static const char *event_name[] = {
+ "maxtries exceeded",
+ "root denied",
+ "success",
+ "none",
+ "password",
+ "challenge-response",
+ "pubkey",
+ "hostbased",
+ "gssapi",
+ "invalid user",
+ "nologin",
+ "connection closed",
+ "connection abandoned",
+ "unknown"
+ };
+
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ else
+ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
+ }
+
+ if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN))
+ event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
+
+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH,
+ NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)",
+ username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ close(audit_fd);
+ /*
+ * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
+ * root user.
+ */
+ if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
+ rc = 0;
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ if (rc < 0) {
+fatal_report:
+ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+}
+
+static int user_login_count = 0;
+
/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
void
audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
{
+ /* not implemented */
}
- /* not implemented */
+
+int
+audit_run_command(const char *command)
+{
+ if (!user_login_count++)
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
+ return 0;
+}
void
-audit_run_command(const char *command)
+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
{
- /* not implemented */
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+}
+
+void
+audit_count_session_open(void)
+{
+ user_login_count++;
}
void
audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
{
- if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
- NULL, li->line, 1) == 0)
- fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (!user_login_count++)
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
}
void
audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
{
- /* not implemented */
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
}
void
audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
switch(event) {
case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
- case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
- case SSH_NOLOGIN:
- case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
- case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 1, event);
break;
+ case SSH_NOLOGIN:
+ case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event);
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event);
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+ if (user_login_count) {
+ while (user_login_count--)
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
case SSH_INVALID_USER:
- linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
- get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0);
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
break;
default:
debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
}
}
#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
@@ -135,16 +135,27 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
void
audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
debug("audit event euid %d user %s event %d (%s)", geteuid(),
audit_username(), event, audit_event_lookup(event));
}
/*
+ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
+ * audit_session_open.
+ */
+void
+audit_count_session_open(void)
+{
+ debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
+ audit_username());
+}
+
+/*
* Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to
* the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
*
* Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used
* within a single connection.
*/
void
audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
@@ -169,18 +180,34 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
debug("audit session close euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
audit_username(), t);
}
/*
* This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that
* it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for
+ * audit_end_command.
*/
-void
+int
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
audit_username(), command);
+ return 0;
}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that
+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from
+ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
+ */
+void
+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+{
+ debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
+ audit_username(), command);
+}
+
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
@@ -44,14 +44,16 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE, /* closed after attempting auth or session */
SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, /* closed without completing auth */
SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
};
typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
void audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+void audit_count_session_open(void);
void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
-void audit_run_command(const char *);
+int audit_run_command(const char *);
+void audit_end_command(int, const char *);
ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
@@ -175,16 +175,17 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer
int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
#endif
static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
static Authctxt *authctxt;
static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
/* local state for key verify */
@@ -255,16 +256,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
{MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
{MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
{MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
{MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
@@ -297,16 +299,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[]
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
{MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
{MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
@@ -1420,16 +1423,22 @@ mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passw
static void
mm_session_close(Session *s)
{
debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
session_pty_cleanup2(s);
}
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (s->command != NULL) {
+ debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle);
+ session_end_command2(s);
+ }
+#endif
session_unused(s->self);
}
int
mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
Session *s;
@@ -1742,21 +1751,53 @@ mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
{
u_int len;
char *cmd;
+ Session *s;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
/* sanity check command, if so how? */
- audit_run_command(cmd);
+ s = session_new();
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__);
+ s->command = cmd;
+ s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, s->self);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int handle;
+ u_int len;
+ char *cmd;
+ Session *s;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ handle = buffer_get_int(m);
+ cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+
+ s = session_by_id(handle);
+ if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL ||
+ strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__);
+ mm_session_close(s);
+
free(cmd);
return (0);
}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
void
monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
@@ -59,16 +59,17 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
+ MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 115,
};
struct mm_master;
struct monitor {
int m_recvfd;
int m_sendfd;
int m_log_recvfd;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1184,27 +1184,48 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_int(&m, event);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, &m);
buffer_free(&m);
}
-void
+int
mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
Buffer m;
+ int handle;
debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
+
+ handle = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (handle);
+}
+
+void
+mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, handle);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m);
buffer_free(&m);
}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#ifdef GSSAPI
OM_uint32
mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)
{
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -69,17 +69,18 @@ void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt
int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#include "audit.h"
void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
-void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
#endif
struct Session;
void mm_terminate(void);
int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
/* SSHv1 interfaces */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
@@ -740,16 +740,24 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
#endif
s->pid = pid;
/* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
+#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+ /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process,
+ compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely
+ ugly. */
+ if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL))
+ audit_count_session_open();
+#endif
+
/* Enter interactive session. */
s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
packet_set_interactive(1,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
if (compat20) {
session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
} else {
server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1);
@@ -834,25 +842,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
session_type,
tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
tty == NULL ? "" : tty,
s->pw->pw_name,
get_remote_ipaddr(),
get_remote_port());
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
+ fatal("do_exec: command already set");
if (command != NULL)
- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
+ s->command = xstrdup(command);
else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */
shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
+ s->command = xstrdup(shell);
}
+ if (s->command != NULL)
+ s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command));
#endif
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
else
ret = do_exec_no_pty(s, command);
original_command = NULL;
@@ -1908,16 +1920,17 @@ session_unused(int id)
memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions));
sessions[id].self = id;
sessions[id].used = 0;
sessions[id].chanid = -1;
sessions[id].ptyfd = -1;
sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
+ sessions[id].command_handle = -1;
sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
sessions_first_unused = id;
}
Session *
session_new(void)
{
Session *s, *tmp;
@@ -1990,16 +2003,29 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha
if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid)
fatal("no user for session %d", s->self);
debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid);
s->chanid = chanid;
return 1;
}
Session *
+session_by_id(int id)
+{
+ if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[id];
+ if (s->used)
+ return s;
+ }
+ debug("session_by_id: unknown id %d", id);
+ session_dump();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+Session *
session_by_tty(char *tty)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) {
debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty);
return s;
@@ -2506,16 +2532,40 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta
* interested in data we write.
* Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could
* be some more data waiting in the pipe.
*/
if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
chan_write_failed(c);
}
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+void
+session_end_command2(Session *s)
+{
+ if (s->command != NULL) {
+ audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command);
+ free(s->command);
+ s->command = NULL;
+ s->command_handle = -1;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+session_end_command(Session *s)
+{
+ if (s->command != NULL) {
+ PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command));
+ free(s->command);
+ s->command = NULL;
+ s->command_handle = -1;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
void
session_close(Session *s)
{
u_int i;
int do_xauth;
debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
@@ -2546,16 +2596,20 @@ session_close(Session *s)
int status;
waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
}
}
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
session_pty_cleanup(s);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (s->command)
+ session_end_command(s);
+#endif
free(s->term);
free(s->display);
free(s->x11_chanids);
free(s->auth_display);
free(s->auth_data);
free(s->auth_proto);
free(s->subsys);
if (s->env != NULL) {
@@ -2760,16 +2814,25 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
}
static void
do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
server_loop2(authctxt);
}
+static void
+do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s)
+{
+ session_pty_cleanup2(s);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ session_end_command2(s);
+#endif
+}
+
void
do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
static int called = 0;
debug("do_cleanup");
/* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */
@@ -2808,10 +2871,10 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
/* remove agent socket */
auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
/*
* Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled,
* or if running in monitor.
*/
if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
- session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2);
+ session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session);
}
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.h b/openssh-6.6p1/session.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/session.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/session.h
@@ -56,29 +56,37 @@ struct Session {
int *x11_chanids;
int is_subsystem;
char *subsys;
u_int num_env;
struct {
char *name;
char *val;
} *env;
+
+ /* exec */
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ int command_handle;
+ char *command;
+#endif
};
void do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
void do_cleanup(Authctxt *);
int session_open(Authctxt *, int);
void session_unused(int);
int session_input_channel_req(Channel *, const char *);
void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int);
void session_close_by_channel(int, void *);
void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *));
void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
+void session_end_command2(Session *);
Session *session_new(void);
+Session *session_by_id(int);
Session *session_by_tty(char *);
void session_close(Session *);
void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
const char *value);
#endif
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
@@ -2532,13 +2532,14 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
errno != ESRCH)
error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
}
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
- if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+ if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
+ (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
#endif
_exit(i);
}

61
openssh-6.6p1-audit3-key_auth_usage-fips.patch
View File

@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 5482d21e8bd06309af51dea77a5f3668859fb2a0
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
@@ -94,16 +94,20 @@ int
auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge,
u_char response[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH])
{
u_char buf[2 * SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], mdbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
int len;
int dgst;
size_t dgst_len;
+ int rv;
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ char *fp;
+#endif
/* don't allow short keys */
if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
__func__,
BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
return (0);
}
@@ -121,22 +125,28 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU
if ((md = ssh_digest_start(dgst)) == NULL ||
ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 2 * dgst_len) < 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, dgst_len) < 0 ||
ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0)
fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
ssh_digest_free(md);
/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
- if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, dgst_len) != 0) {
- /* Wrong answer. */
- return (0);
+ rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, dgst_len) == 0;
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) {
+ debug("unsuccessful audit");
+ rv = 0;
}
- /* Correct answer. */
- return (1);
+ free(fp);
+#endif
+
+ return rv;
}
/*
* Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
* and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
* our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
*/

506
openssh-6.6p1-audit3-key_auth_usage.patch
View File

@ -1,506 +0,0 @@
# auditing key-based authentication (both server and client)
# based on:
# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2012
# (replaces: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=1975)
# by jchadima@redhat.com
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
@@ -401,16 +401,22 @@ audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
}
void
audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
{
/* not implemented */
}
+int
+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
void
audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
char textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ];
static int logged_in = 0;
const char *user = the_authctxt ? the_authctxt->user : "(unknown user)";
if (cannot_audit(0))
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
@@ -36,16 +36,18 @@
#include "log.h"
#include "audit.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
+#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128
+
extern ServerOptions options;
extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
extern u_int utmp_len;
const char* audit_username(void);
static void
linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
@@ -125,16 +127,47 @@ linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const cha
rc = 0;
errno = saved_errno;
if (rc < 0) {
fatal_report:
fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
}
}
+int
+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
+{
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ else
+ return 0; /* Must prevent login */
+ }
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", get_remote_port());
+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
+ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);
+ if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ goto out;
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s rport=%d",
+ type, bits, fp, get_remote_port());
+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
+ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);
+out:
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ /* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0));
+}
+
static int user_login_count = 0;
/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
void
audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
{
/* not implemented */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
@@ -31,16 +31,17 @@
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#include "audit.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
/*
* Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
* audit_connection_from() is called and MAY NOT be initialized when
* audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called. Test for NULL before using.
*/
extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
@@ -106,16 +107,32 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
};
for (i = 0; event_lookup[i].event != SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; i++)
if (event_lookup[i].event == ev)
break;
return(event_lookup[i].name);
}
+void
+audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key)
+{
+ char *fp;
+ const char *crypto_name;
+
+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA1)
+ crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1";
+ else
+ crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key);
+ if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0)
+ *rv = 0;
+ free(fp);
+}
+
# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/*
* Null implementations of audit functions.
* These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
*/
/*
* Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication
@@ -204,10 +221,22 @@ audit_run_command(const char *command)
*/
void
audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
{
debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
audit_username(), command);
}
+/*
+ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.
+ *
+ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.
+ */
+int
+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
+{
+ debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s, result %d",
+ host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits,
+ fp, rv);
+}
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
@@ -23,16 +23,17 @@
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef _SSH_AUDIT_H
# define _SSH_AUDIT_H
#include "loginrec.h"
+#include "key.h"
enum ssh_audit_event_type {
SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,
SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,
SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,
SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,
SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT, /* keyboard-interactive or challenge-response */
@@ -50,10 +51,12 @@ typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_au
void audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
void audit_count_session_open(void);
void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
int audit_run_command(const char *);
void audit_end_command(int, const char *);
ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
+void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth.h b/openssh-6.6p1/auth.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth.h
@@ -178,16 +178,17 @@ int allowed_user(struct passwd *);
struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user);
char *get_challenge(Authctxt *);
int verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *);
void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *);
char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
+int user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
int auth_key_is_revoked(Key *);
HostStatus
check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *,
const char *, const char *);
@@ -195,16 +196,17 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *,
/* hostkey handling */
Key *get_hostkey_by_index(int);
Key *get_hostkey_public_by_index(int);
Key *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int);
Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int);
int get_hostkey_index(Key *);
int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
void sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
+int hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
/* debug messages during authentication */
void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
void auth_debug_send(void);
void auth_debug_reset(void);
struct passwd *fakepw(void);
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
@@ -124,33 +124,45 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
#endif
pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
"client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
buffer_free(&b);
done:
debug2("userauth_hostbased: authenticated %d", authenticated);
if (key != NULL)
key_free(key);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
free(cuser);
free(chost);
free(sig);
return authenticated;
}
+int
+hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ int rv;
+
+ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_key(0, &rv, key);
+#endif
+ return rv;
+}
+
/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
int
hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
Key *key)
{
const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason;
HostStatus host_status;
int len;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -153,17 +153,17 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
buffer_dump(&b);
#endif
pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
buffer_free(&b);
free(sig);
} else {
debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
packet_check_eom();
@@ -190,16 +190,28 @@ done:
debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
if (key != NULL)
key_free(key);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
return authenticated;
}
+int
+user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ int rv;
+
+ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_key(1, &rv, key);
+#endif
+ return rv;
+}
+
void
pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
{
char *fp, *extra;
va_list ap;
int i;
extra = NULL;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
@@ -1340,26 +1340,30 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
}
int
mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
Key *key;
u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
+ int type = 0;
int verified = 0;
int valid_data = 0;
+ type = buffer_get_int(m);
blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
!monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+ if (type != key_blobtype)
+ fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__);
key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
if (key == NULL)
fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
switch (key_blobtype) {
case MM_USERKEY:
valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
@@ -1370,17 +1374,27 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
break;
default:
valid_data = 0;
break;
}
if (!valid_data)
fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
- verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ switch (key_blobtype) {
+ case MM_USERKEY:
+ verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ break;
+ case MM_HOSTKEY:
+ verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ verified = 0;
+ break;
+ }
debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
__func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
key_free(key);
free(blob);
free(signature);
free(data);
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -426,30 +426,31 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, cha
/*
* This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the
* privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed
* for authentication.
*/
int
-mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
Buffer m;
u_char *blob;
u_int len;
int verified = 0;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
/* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */
if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len))
return (0);
buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, type);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
free(blob);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__);
@@ -457,16 +458,29 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i
verified = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_free(&m);
return (verified);
}
+int
+mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
+}
+
+int
+mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
+}
+
+
/* Export key state after authentication */
Newkeys *
mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
{
Buffer b;
u_int len;
Newkeys *newkey = NULL;
Enc *enc;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -44,17 +44,18 @@ int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int
void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *);
int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
-int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
#ifdef GSSAPI
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);

82
openssh-6.6p1-audit4-kex_results-fips.patch
View File

@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 274a545b591567f1378c1086ad3ba40c911a8bd6
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in b/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in
@@ -72,17 +72,18 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o
atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o \
sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \
- fips.o
+ fips.o \
+ auditstub.o
SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
roaming_common.o roaming_client.o
SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c b/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c
@@ -54,30 +54,16 @@
/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
-struct Cipher {
- char *name;
- int number; /* for ssh1 only */
- u_int block_size;
- u_int key_len;
- u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
- u_int auth_len;
- u_int discard_len;
- u_int flags;
-#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
-#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
- const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
-};
-
static const struct Cipher ciphers_all[] = {
{ "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
{ "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
{ "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
{ "blowfish", SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_bf },
{ "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
{ "blowfish-cbc",
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
@@ -119,16 +119,18 @@
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "roaming.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "fips.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+
#ifdef LIBWRAP
#include <tcpd.h>
#include <syslog.h>
int allow_severity;
int deny_severity;
#endif /* LIBWRAP */
#ifndef O_NOCTTY

701
openssh-6.6p1-audit4-kex_results.patch
View File

@ -1,701 +0,0 @@
# key exhange auditing
# based on:
# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2013
# (replaces: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=1976)
# by jchadima@redhat.com
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
@@ -468,9 +468,21 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
bsm_audit_bad_login("interactive password entry");
break;
default:
debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
}
}
+
+void
+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
#endif /* BSM */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
@@ -35,16 +35,18 @@
#include "log.h"
#include "audit.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128
extern ServerOptions options;
extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
extern u_int utmp_len;
const char* audit_username(void);
@@ -264,9 +266,65 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
break;
default:
debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
}
}
+void
+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+{
+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
+ char *s;
+ int audit_fd;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
+ name[what], get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
+ get_local_port());
+ free(s);
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0)
+ /* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */
+ return;
+ audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
+ uid_t uid)
+{
+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+ const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
+ Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
+ char *s;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
+ direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0,
+ (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
+ get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port());
+ free(s);
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ else
+ fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */
+#endif
+}
+
#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
@@ -23,24 +23,27 @@
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#include "audit.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
/*
* Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
* audit_connection_from() is called and MAY NOT be initialized when
* audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called. Test for NULL before using.
*/
extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
@@ -123,16 +126,28 @@ audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const
crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1";
else
crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key);
if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0)
*rv = 0;
free(fp);
}
+void
+audit_unsupported(int what)
+{
+ PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what));
+}
+
+void
+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
+{
+ PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
+}
+
# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/*
* Null implementations of audit functions.
* These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
*/
/*
* Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication
@@ -233,10 +248,31 @@ audit_end_command(int handle, const char
*/
int
audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
{
debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s, result %d",
host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits,
fp, rv);
}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails.
+ */
+void
+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+{
+ debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
+ */
+void
+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
+ uid_t uid)
+{
+ debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u",
+ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
+ (unsigned)uid);
+}
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
@@ -53,10 +53,14 @@ void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
void audit_count_session_open(void);
void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
int audit_run_command(const char *);
void audit_end_command(int, const char *);
ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
+void audit_unsupported(int);
+void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
+void audit_unsupported_body(int);
+void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auditstub.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auditstub.c
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auditstub.c
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+void
+audit_unsupported(int n)
+{
+}
+
+void
+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
+{
+}
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.h b/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.h
@@ -58,17 +58,30 @@
#define SSH_CIPHER_MAX 31
#define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1
#define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0
typedef struct Cipher Cipher;
typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
-struct Cipher;
+struct Cipher {
+ char *name;
+ int number; /* for ssh1 only */
+ u_int block_size;
+ u_int key_len;
+ u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
+ u_int auth_len;
+ u_int discard_len;
+ u_int flags;
+#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
+#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
+ const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
+};
+
struct CipherContext {
int plaintext;
int encrypt;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX evp;
struct chachapoly_ctx cp_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
const Cipher *cipher;
};
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c b/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c
@@ -45,16 +45,17 @@
#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#include "roaming.h"
#include "digest.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
# if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
# define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
# else
extern const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void);
# endif
#endif
@@ -346,53 +347,65 @@ kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *kex)
fatal("Unsupported key exchange %d", kex->kex_type);
}
}
static void
choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- if (name == NULL)
+ if (name == NULL) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_unsupported(0);
+#endif
fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s",
client, server);
+ }
if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name);
enc->name = name;
enc->enabled = 0;
enc->iv = NULL;
enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher);
enc->key = NULL;
enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher);
enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher);
}
static void
choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- if (name == NULL)
+ if (name == NULL) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_unsupported(1);
+#endif
fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s",
client, server);
+ }
if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
fatal("unsupported mac %s", name);
/* truncate the key */
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HMAC)
mac->key_len = 16;
mac->name = name;
mac->key = NULL;
mac->enabled = 0;
}
static void
choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- if (name == NULL)
+ if (name == NULL) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_unsupported(2);
+#endif
fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server);
+ }
if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_ZLIB;
} else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_NONE;
} else {
fatal("unsupported comp %s", name);
@@ -497,16 +510,19 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
if (authlen == 0)
choose_mac(&newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac], sprop[nmac]);
choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], sprop[ncomp]);
debug("kex: %s %s %s %s",
ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
newkeys->enc.name,
authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
newkeys->comp.name);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_kex(ctos, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name);
+#endif
}
choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]);
need = dh_need = 0;
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode];
need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.key_len);
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
@@ -92,16 +92,17 @@
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "roaming.h"
#include "authfd.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
#endif
/* Imports */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern u_int utmp_len;
@@ -176,16 +177,18 @@ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer
int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
#endif
static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
static Authctxt *authctxt;
static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
/* local state for key verify */
@@ -227,16 +230,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
#endif
#ifdef SKEY
{MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
{MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
@@ -257,16 +262,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
{MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
{MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
{MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
{MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
@@ -288,28 +295,32 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[]
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
{MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
{MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
@@ -2187,8 +2198,52 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
return (authenticated);
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+int
+mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int what;
+
+ what = buffer_get_int(m);
+
+ audit_unsupported_body(what);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int ctos, len;
+ char *cipher, *mac, *compress;
+ pid_t pid;
+ uid_t uid;
+
+ ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
+ cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+
+ audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pid, uid);
+
+ free(cipher);
+ free(mac);
+ free(compress);
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
@@ -60,16 +60,18 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 115,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 116, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 117,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 119,
};
struct mm_master;
struct monitor {
int m_recvfd;
int m_sendfd;
int m_log_recvfd;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1320,8 +1320,46 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_free(&m);
debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
return (authenticated);
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+void
+mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, what);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
+ &m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
+ uid_t uid)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher ? cipher : "");
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, mac ? mac : "");
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress ? compress : "");
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
+ &m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -72,16 +72,18 @@ int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, cha
void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#include "audit.h"
void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
#endif
struct Session;
void mm_terminate(void);
int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
/* SSHv1 interfaces */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
@@ -2325,16 +2325,20 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
/* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we
sent earlier with the public key packet. */
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none");
+#endif
+
debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
/* Get the encrypted integer. */
if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
packet_get_bignum(session_key_int);
protocol_flags = packet_get_int();

983
openssh-6.6p1-audit5-session_key_destruction.patch
View File

@ -1,983 +0,0 @@
# session key destruction and auditing
# based on:
# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2014
# by jchadima@redhat.com
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
@@ -480,9 +480,15 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
/* not implemented */
}
void
audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
{
/* not implemented */
}
+
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
#endif /* BSM */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
@@ -289,24 +289,25 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
/* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */
return;
audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0);
audit_close(audit_fd);
#endif
}
+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
+
void
audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
uid_t uid)
{
#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
int audit_fd, audit_ok;
- const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
char *s;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0,
(intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port());
free(s);
@@ -322,9 +323,37 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
audit_close(audit_fd);
/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */
#endif
}
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+ char *s;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
+ direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
+ get_remote_port(),
+ (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
+ get_local_port());
+ free(s);
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ error("cannot open audit");
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ error("cannot write into audit");
+}
+
#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
@@ -138,16 +138,22 @@ audit_unsupported(int what)
}
void
audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
{
PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
}
+void
+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
+{
+ PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
+}
+
# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/*
* Null implementations of audit functions.
* These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
*/
/*
* Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication
@@ -269,10 +275,20 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
void
audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
uid_t uid)
{
debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u",
(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
(unsigned)uid);
}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
+ */
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
+ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
+}
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
@@ -57,10 +57,12 @@ int audit_run_command(const char *);
void audit_end_command(int, const char *);
ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
void audit_unsupported(int);
void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
void audit_unsupported_body(int);
void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+void audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
+void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auditstub.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auditstub.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auditstub.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auditstub.c
@@ -22,18 +22,29 @@
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
*/
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
void
audit_unsupported(int n)
{
}
void
audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
{
}
+void
+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
+{
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+}
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c b/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c
@@ -700,8 +700,39 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, i
if (i%32 == 31)
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
else if (i%8 == 7)
fprintf(stderr, " ");
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
+
+static void
+enc_destroy(Enc *enc)
+{
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (enc->key) {
+ memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
+ free(enc->key);
+ }
+
+ if (enc->iv) {
+ memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size);
+ free(enc->iv);
+ }
+
+ memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc));
+}
+
+void
+newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys)
+{
+ if (newkeys == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc);
+ mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac);
+ memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
+}
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/kex.h b/openssh-6.6p1/kex.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/kex.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/kex.h
@@ -162,16 +162,18 @@ void kexdh_client(Kex *);
void kexdh_server(Kex *);
void kexgex_client(Kex *);
void kexgex_server(Kex *);
void kexecdh_client(Kex *);
void kexecdh_server(Kex *);
void kexc25519_client(Kex *);
void kexc25519_server(Kex *);
+void newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys);
+
void
kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
void
kexgex_hash(int, char *, char *, char *, int, char *,
int, u_char *, int, int, int, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/mac.c b/openssh-6.6p1/mac.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/mac.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/mac.c
@@ -253,16 +253,30 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac)
if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
umac128_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
} else if (mac->hmac_ctx != NULL)
ssh_hmac_free(mac->hmac_ctx);
mac->hmac_ctx = NULL;
mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
}
+void
+mac_destroy(Mac *mac)
+{
+ if (mac == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (mac->key) {
+ memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
+ free(mac->key);
+ }
+
+ memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac));
+}
+
/* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
#define MAC_SEP ","
int
mac_valid(const char *names)
{
char *maclist, *cp, *p;
if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/mac.h b/openssh-6.6p1/mac.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/mac.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/mac.h
@@ -24,8 +24,9 @@
*/
int mac_valid(const char *);
char *mac_alg_list(char);
int mac_setup(Mac *, char *);
int mac_init(Mac *);
u_char *mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int);
void mac_clear(Mac *);
+void mac_destroy(Mac *);
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
@@ -179,16 +179,17 @@ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
#endif
static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
static Authctxt *authctxt;
static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
/* local state for key verify */
@@ -232,16 +233,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
#endif
#ifdef SKEY
{MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
{MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
@@ -264,16 +266,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
{MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
{MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
{MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
{MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
{MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
@@ -297,30 +300,32 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[]
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
{MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
{MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
@@ -1949,21 +1954,23 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
goto skip;
} else {
/* Get the Kex for rekeying */
*pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
}
blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
free(blob);
debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
free(blob);
/* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
@@ -1999,16 +2006,31 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
/* Roaming */
if (compat20) {
child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
}
buffer_free(&m);
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (compat20) {
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
+ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ ;
+
}
/* Allocation functions for zlib */
void *
mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
{
size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
@@ -2240,10 +2262,28 @@ mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffe
free(mac);
free(compress);
buffer_clear(m);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m);
return 0;
}
+int
+mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int ctos;
+ pid_t pid;
+ uid_t uid;
+
+ ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+
+ audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
@@ -62,16 +62,17 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 115,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 116, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 117,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 119,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 121,
};
struct mm_master;
struct monitor {
int m_recvfd;
int m_sendfd;
int m_log_recvfd;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -649,22 +649,24 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor
__func__, packet_get_newkeys(MODE_OUT),
packet_get_newkeys(MODE_IN));
/* Keys from Kex */
if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_OUT, &blob, &bloblen))
fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
free(blob);
if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen))
fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
free(blob);
packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
buffer_put_int(&m, seqnr);
buffer_put_int64(&m, blocks);
buffer_put_int(&m, packets);
buffer_put_int64(&m, bytes);
packet_get_state(MODE_IN, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
@@ -1356,10 +1358,25 @@ mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher
buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
&m);
buffer_free(&m);
}
+
+void
+mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
+ &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -74,16 +74,17 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#include "audit.h"
void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
#endif
struct Session;
void mm_terminate(void);
int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
/* SSHv1 interfaces */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/packet.c b/openssh-6.6p1/packet.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/packet.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/packet.c
@@ -56,16 +56,17 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "crc32.h"
#include "compress.h"
#include "deattack.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
@@ -469,41 +470,51 @@ packet_get_connection_in(void)
/* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
int
packet_get_connection_out(void)
{
return active_state->connection_out;
}
+static int
+packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state)
+{
+ return state != NULL &&
+ (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL);
+}
+
/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
void
packet_close(void)
{
if (!active_state->initialized)
return;
active_state->initialized = 0;
- if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
- shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
- close(active_state->connection_out);
- } else {
- close(active_state->connection_in);
- close(active_state->connection_out);
- }
buffer_free(&active_state->input);
buffer_free(&active_state->output);
buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
buffer_free(&active_state->incoming_packet);
if (active_state->compression_buffer_ready) {
buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer);
buffer_compress_uninit();
}
- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
+ if (packet_state_has_keys(active_state)) {
+ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
+ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
+ audit_session_key_free(2);
+ }
+ if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
+ shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
+ close(active_state->connection_out);
+ } else {
+ close(active_state->connection_in);
+ close(active_state->connection_out);
+ }
}
/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
void
packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int protocol_flags)
{
active_state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
@@ -729,16 +740,35 @@ packet_send1(void)
/*
* Note that the packet is now only buffered in output. It won't be
* actually sent until packet_write_wait or packet_write_poll is
* called.
*/
}
+static void
+newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys)
+{
+ if (newkeys == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ free(newkeys->enc.name);
+
+ mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
+ /* MAC may happen to be empty - if the GCM mode of AES is used */
+ if (newkeys->mac.name)
+ free(newkeys->mac.name);
+
+ free(newkeys->comp.name);
+
+ newkeys_destroy(newkeys);
+ free(newkeys);
+}
+
void
set_newkeys(int mode)
{
Enc *enc;
Mac *mac;
Comp *comp;
CipherContext *cc;
u_int64_t *max_blocks;
@@ -754,31 +784,19 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
} else {
cc = &active_state->receive_context;
crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
active_state->p_read.packets = active_state->p_read.blocks = 0;
max_blocks = &active_state->max_blocks_in;
}
if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");
+ audit_session_key_free(mode);
cipher_cleanup(cc);
- enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
- mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
- comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
- mac_clear(mac);
- explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->iv_len);
- explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
- explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len);
- free(enc->name);
- free(enc->iv);
- free(enc->key);
- free(mac->name);
- free(mac->key);
- free(comp->name);
- free(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
}
active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
fatal("newkeys: no keys for mode %d", mode);
enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0 && mac_init(mac) == 0)
@@ -2004,54 +2022,93 @@ packet_get_output(void)
}
void *
packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
{
return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode];
}
+static void
+packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state)
+{
+ if (state == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context);
+ cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context);
+
+ buffer_free(&state->input);
+ buffer_free(&state->output);
+ buffer_free(&state->outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_free(&state->incoming_packet);
+ buffer_free(&state->compression_buffer);
+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]);
+ state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL;
+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]);
+ state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
+ mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac);
+// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
+// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
+}
+
+void
+packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep)
+{
+ if (audit_it)
+ audit_it = packet_state_has_keys (active_state) ||
+ packet_state_has_keys (backup_state);
+ packet_destroy_state(active_state);
+ packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
+ if (audit_it) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (privsep)
+ audit_session_key_free(2);
+ else
+ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when
* resuming a suspended connection.
*/
void
packet_backup_state(void)
{
- struct session_state *tmp;
-
close(active_state->connection_in);
active_state->connection_in = -1;
close(active_state->connection_out);
active_state->connection_out = -1;
- if (backup_state)
- tmp = backup_state;
- else
- tmp = alloc_session_state();
backup_state = active_state;
- active_state = tmp;
+ active_state = alloc_session_state();
}
/*
* Swap in the old state when resuming a connecion.
*/
void
packet_restore_state(void)
{
struct session_state *tmp;
void *buf;
u_int len;
tmp = backup_state;
backup_state = active_state;
active_state = tmp;
active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in;
- backup_state->connection_in = -1;
active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out;
- backup_state->connection_out = -1;
len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input);
if (len > 0) {
buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input);
buffer_append(&active_state->input, buf, len);
buffer_clear(&backup_state->input);
add_recv_bytes(len);
}
+ backup_state->connection_in = -1;
+ backup_state->connection_out = -1;
+ packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
+ free(backup_state);
+ backup_state = NULL;
}
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/packet.h b/openssh-6.6p1/packet.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/packet.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/packet.h
@@ -119,9 +119,10 @@ void packet_set_rekey_limits(u_int32_t,
time_t packet_get_rekey_timeout(void);
void packet_backup_state(void);
void packet_restore_state(void);
void *packet_get_input(void);
void *packet_get_output(void);
+void packet_destroy_all(int, int);
#endif /* PACKET_H */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
@@ -1694,16 +1694,19 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
int env_size;
char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL;
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
int r = 0;
/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
destroy_sensitive_data();
+ /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
+ monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
+ packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
/* Force a password change */
if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
do_setusercontext(pw);
child_close_fds();
do_pwchange(s);
exit(1);
}
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
@@ -720,16 +720,18 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_child(box);
return 0;
}
}
+extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
+
static void
privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
u_int32_t rnd[256];
#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
if (1) {
#else
@@ -744,16 +746,20 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+ newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_OUT]);
+ newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_IN]);
+ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
+ packet_destroy_all(0, 0);
monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
/* NEVERREACHED */
exit(0);
}
/* child */
@@ -2118,16 +2124,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
do_authentication(authctxt);
}
/*
* If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
* the current keystate and exits
*/
if (use_privsep) {
mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
+ packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
exit(0);
}
authenticated:
/*
* Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
* authentication.
*/
@@ -2170,16 +2177,18 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
options.client_alive_count_max);
/* Start session. */
do_authenticated(authctxt);
/* The connection has been terminated. */
+ packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
+
packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
(unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
#ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -2526,26 +2535,38 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
#endif
debug("KEX done");
}
/* server specific fatal cleanup */
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
+ static int in_cleanup = 0;
+ int is_privsep_child;
+
+ /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
+ wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse
+ indefinitely. */
+ if (in_cleanup)
+ _exit(i);
+ in_cleanup = 1;
+
if (the_authctxt) {
do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
errno != ESRCH)
error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
}
}
+ is_privsep_child = use_privsep && (pmonitor != NULL) && !mm_is_monitor();
+ packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
(!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
#endif
_exit(i);
}

742
openssh-6.6p1-audit6-server_key_destruction.patch
View File

@ -1,742 +0,0 @@
# server key destruction and auditing
# based on:
# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2015
# by jchadima@redhat.com
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
@@ -486,9 +486,27 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
/* not implemented */
}
void
audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
{
/* not implemented */
}
+
+void
+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
#endif /* BSM */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
@@ -351,9 +351,55 @@ audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pi
audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
audit_close(audit_fd);
/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
error("cannot write into audit");
}
+void
+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ",
+ fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid);
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ error("cannot open audit");
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
+ buf, NULL,
+ listening_for_clients() ? NULL : get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ error("cannot write into audit");
+}
+
+void
+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
+{
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=create kind=server fp=%s direction=? ", fp);
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ error("cannot open audit");
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
+ buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ error("cannot write into audit");
+}
#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
@@ -285,10 +285,29 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
* This will be called on succesfull session key discard
*/
void
audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
{
debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key
+ */
+void
+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u",
+ geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
+ */
+void
+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
+{
+ debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
+}
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
@@ -43,26 +43,30 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
SSH_INVALID_USER,
SSH_NOLOGIN, /* denied by /etc/nologin, not implemented */
SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE, /* closed after attempting auth or session */
SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, /* closed without completing auth */
SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
};
typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
+int listening_for_clients(void);
+
void audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
void audit_count_session_open(void);
void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
int audit_run_command(const char *);
void audit_end_command(int, const char *);
ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
void audit_unsupported(int);
void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
void audit_unsupported_body(int);
void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
void audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
+void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+void audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/key.c b/openssh-6.6p1/key.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/key.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/key.c
@@ -1964,16 +1964,43 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
fatal("key_demote: bad key type %d", k->type);
break;
}
return (pk);
}
int
+key_is_private(const Key *k)
+{
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ return k->rsa->d != NULL;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL;
+#endif
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ return k->ed25519_sk != NULL;
+ default:
+ fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type);
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+int
key_is_cert(const Key *k)
{
if (k == NULL)
return 0;
return key_type_is_cert(k->type);
}
/* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/key.h b/openssh-6.6p1/key.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/key.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/key.h
@@ -113,16 +113,17 @@ int key_read(Key *, char **);
u_int key_size(const Key *);
enum fp_type key_fp_type_select(void);
char *key_fp_type_str(enum fp_type);
Key *key_generate(int, u_int);
Key *key_from_private(const Key *);
int key_type_from_name(char *);
int key_is_cert(const Key *);
+int key_is_private(const Key *k);
int key_type_is_cert(int);
int key_type_plain(int);
int key_to_certified(Key *, int);
int key_drop_cert(Key *);
int key_certify(Key *, Key *);
void key_cert_copy(const Key *, struct Key *);
int key_cert_check_authority(const Key *, int, int, const char *,
const char **);
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
@@ -109,16 +109,18 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
extern z_stream incoming_stream;
extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
extern u_char session_id[];
extern Buffer auth_debug;
extern int auth_debug_init;
extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
+
/* State exported from the child */
struct {
z_stream incoming;
z_stream outgoing;
u_char *keyin;
u_int keyinlen;
u_char *keyout;
@@ -180,16 +182,17 @@ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, Buffer *);
#endif
static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
static Authctxt *authctxt;
static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
/* local state for key verify */
@@ -234,16 +237,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
#endif
#ifdef SKEY
{MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
{MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
@@ -267,16 +271,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
{MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
{MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
{MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
{MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
@@ -301,31 +306,33 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[]
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
{MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
{MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
@@ -1739,16 +1746,18 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
/* The child is terminating */
session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
sshpam_cleanup();
#endif
+ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
+
while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
exit(1);
res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
/* Terminate process */
exit(res);
@@ -2280,10 +2289,31 @@ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(in
audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid);
buffer_clear(m);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
return 0;
}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int len;
+ char *fp;
+ pid_t pid;
+ uid_t uid;
+
+ fp = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+
+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
+
+ free(fp);
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
@@ -63,16 +63,17 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 115,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 116, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 117,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 119,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 121,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 123,
};
struct mm_master;
struct monitor {
int m_recvfd;
int m_sendfd;
int m_log_recvfd;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1373,10 +1373,26 @@ mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos,
buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
&m);
buffer_free(&m);
}
+
+void
+mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, fp);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE,
+ &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -75,16 +75,17 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#include "audit.h"
void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
+void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
#endif
struct Session;
void mm_terminate(void);
int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
/* SSHv1 interfaces */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
@@ -132,17 +132,17 @@ static int session_pty_req(Session *);
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern char *__progname;
extern int log_stderr;
extern int debug_flag;
extern u_int utmp_len;
extern int startup_pipe;
-extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
extern Buffer loginmsg;
/* original command from peer. */
const char *original_command = NULL;
/* data */
static int sessions_first_unused = -1;
static int sessions_nalloc = 0;
@@ -1693,17 +1693,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
char **env;
int env_size;
char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL;
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
int r = 0;
/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
- destroy_sensitive_data();
+ destroy_sensitive_data(1);
/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
/* Force a password change */
if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
do_setusercontext(pw);
child_close_fds();
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
@@ -259,17 +259,17 @@ Buffer cfg;
/* message to be displayed after login */
Buffer loginmsg;
/* Unprivileged user */
struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
-void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
void demote_sensitive_data(void);
static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
/*
* Close all listening sockets
*/
@@ -278,16 +278,25 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
close(listen_socks[i]);
num_listen_socks = -1;
}
+/*
+ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
+ * client connection?)
+ */
+int listening_for_clients(void)
+{
+ return num_listen_socks > 0;
+}
+
static void
close_startup_pipes(void)
{
int i;
if (startup_pipes)
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
@@ -557,60 +566,99 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in
close(sock_out);
logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
get_remote_ipaddr(),
server_version_string, client_version_string);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
}
-/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
+/*
+ * Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. Careful,
+ * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere.
+ */
void
-destroy_sensitive_data(void)
+destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep)
{
int i;
+ pid_t pid;
+ uid_t uid;
if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
}
+ pid = getpid();
+ uid = getuid();
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+ char *fp;
+
+ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
+ fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i],
+ key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ else
+ fp = NULL;
key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+ if (fp != NULL) {
+ if (privsep)
+ PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
+ pid, uid));
+ else
+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
+ pid, uid);
+ free(fp);
+ }
}
- if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
+ if (sensitive_data.host_certificates
+ && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
}
}
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
explicit_bzero(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
}
/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
void
demote_sensitive_data(void)
{
Key *tmp;
+ pid_t pid;
+ uid_t uid;
int i;
+ pid = getpid();
+ uid = getuid();
if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+ char *fp;
+
+ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
+ fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i],
+ key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ else
+ fp = NULL;
tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
+ if (fp != NULL) {
+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
+ free(fp);
+ }
}
/* Certs do not need demotion */
}
/* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */
}
static void
@@ -1201,16 +1249,17 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
/* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (received_sigterm) {
logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
(int) received_sigterm);
+ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
close_listen_socks();
unlink(options.pid_file);
exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
}
if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
generate_ephemeral_server_key();
key_used = 0;
key_do_regen = 0;
@@ -2167,27 +2216,28 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
/*
* In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
* file descriptor passing.
*/
if (use_privsep) {
privsep_postauth(authctxt);
/* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
if (!compat20)
- destroy_sensitive_data();
+ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
}
packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
options.client_alive_count_max);
/* Start session. */
do_authenticated(authctxt);
/* The connection has been terminated. */
packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
+ destroy_sensitive_data(1);
packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
(unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
@@ -2412,17 +2462,17 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
fatal("%s: hash failed", __func__);
ssh_digest_free(md);
explicit_bzero(buf, bytes);
free(buf);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
}
/* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
- destroy_sensitive_data();
+ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
if (use_privsep)
mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
/* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */
BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
/* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
@@ -2556,16 +2606,18 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
errno != ESRCH)
error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
}
}
is_privsep_child = use_privsep && (pmonitor != NULL) && !mm_is_monitor();
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL)
+ destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child);
packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
(!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
#endif
_exit(i);

107
openssh-6.6p1-audit7-libaudit_compat.patch
View File

@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
# definitions for AUDIT_CRYPTO_* symbols fom libaudit 2.x
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
@@ -25,16 +25,17 @@
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
*/
#include "includes.h"
#if defined(USE_LINUX_AUDIT)
#include <libaudit.h>
+#include "compat-libaudit.h"
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "audit.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/compat-libaudit.h b/openssh-6.6p1/compat-libaudit.h
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/compat-libaudit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/* AUDIT_CRYPTO symbol definitions from libaudit 2.x */
+/* libaudit.h --
+ * Copyright 2004-2011 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
+ * All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
+ * Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
+ */
+#ifndef _COMPAT_LIBAUDIT_H_
+#define _COMPAT_LIBAUDIT_H_
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#ifndef AUDIT_FIRST_CRYPTO_MSG
+#define AUDIT_FIRST_CRYPTO_MSG 2400
+#endif
+
+#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_TEST_USER
+#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_TEST_USER 2400 /* Crypto test results */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE_USER
+#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE_USER 2401 /* Crypto attribute change */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_LOGIN
+#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_LOGIN 2402 /* Logged in as crypto officer */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_LOGOUT
+#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_LOGOUT 2403 /* Logged out from crypto */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER
+#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER 2404 /* Create,delete,negotiate */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_FAILURE_USER
+#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_FAILURE_USER 2405 /* Fail decrypt,encrypt,randomiz */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_REPLAY_USER
+#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_REPLAY_USER 2406 /* Crypto replay detected */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
+#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION 2407 /* Record parameters set during
+ TLS session establishment */
+#endif
+
+
+#ifndef AUDIT_LAST_CRYPTO_MSG
+#define AUDIT_LAST_CRYPTO_MSG 2499
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _COMPAT_LIBAUDIT_H_ */
+

47
openssh-6.6p1-audit8-libaudit_dns_timeouts.patch
View File

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
# bnc#752354, bnc#757360
# prevent timeouts in libaudit code caused by DNS misconfiguration by
# explicitely disabling DNS lookups in libaudit when UseDNS is false.
# Note that this particular solution causes the logs to always contain
# "hostname=?, addr=?" when DNS lookups are disabled.
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
@@ -62,17 +62,17 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const c
if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
return; /* No audit support in kernel */
else
goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
}
rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
- username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ username == NULL ? uid : -1, options.use_dns ? hostname : NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
saved_errno = errno;
close(audit_fd);
/*
* Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
* root user.
*/
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
rc = 0;
@@ -114,17 +114,17 @@ linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const cha
goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
}
if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN))
event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH,
NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)",
- username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ username == NULL ? uid : -1, options.use_dns ? hostname : NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
saved_errno = errno;
close(audit_fd);
/*
* Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
* root user.
*/
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
rc = 0;

205
openssh-6.6p1-curve25519-6.6.1p1.patch
View File

@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
# Date: Sun, 20 Apr 2014 17:14:08 +1000 (EST)
# From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
# To: openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org
# Subject: bad bignum encoding for curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
# Message-ID: <alpine.BSO.2.11.1404201713390.26134@natsu.mindrot.org>
#
# Hi,
#
# So I screwed up when writing the support for the curve25519 KEX method
# that doesn't depend on OpenSSL's BIGNUM type - a bug in my code left
# leading zero bytes where they should have been skipped. The impact of
# this is that OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 will fail during key exchange with a
# peer that implements curve25519-sha256@libssh.org properly about 0.2%
# of the time (one in every 512ish connections).
#
# We've fixed this for OpenSSH 6.7 by avoiding the curve25519-sha256
# key exchange for previous versions, but I'd recommend distributors
# of OpenSSH apply this patch so the affected code doesn't become
# too entrenched in LTS releases.
#
# The patch fixes the bug and makes OpenSSH identify itself as 6.6.1 so as
# to distinguish itself from the incorrect versions so the compatibility
# code to disable the affected KEX isn't activated.
#
# I've committed this on the 6.6 branch too.
#
# Apologies for the hassle.
#
# -d
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/bufaux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/bufaux.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/bufaux.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/bufaux.c
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.56 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.57 2014/04/16 23:22:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Auxiliary functions for storing and retrieving various data types to/from
* Buffers.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
@@ -367,16 +367,19 @@ buffer_get_bignum2_as_string(Buffer *buf
void
buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *buffer, const u_char *s, u_int l)
{
u_char *buf, *p;
int pad = 0;
if (l > 8 * 1024)
fatal("%s: length %u too long", __func__, l);
+ /* Skip leading zero bytes */
+ for (; l > 0 && *s == 0; l--, s++)
+ ;
p = buf = xmalloc(l + 1);
/*
* If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to
* avoid interpretation as a negative number.
*/
if (l > 0 && (s[0] & 0x80) != 0) {
*p++ = '\0';
pad = 1;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/compat.c b/openssh-6.6p1/compat.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/compat.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/compat.c
@@ -90,16 +90,19 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
{ "OpenSSH_2.*,"
"OpenSSH_3.0*,"
"OpenSSH_3.1*", SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
{ "OpenSSH_3.*", SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR },
{ "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
{ "OpenSSH_4*", 0 },
{ "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT},
+ { "OpenSSH_6.6.1*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH},
+ { "OpenSSH_6.5*,"
+ "OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD},
{ "OpenSSH*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH },
{ "*MindTerm*", 0 },
{ "2.1.0*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|
SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
{ "2.1 *", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
@@ -246,22 +249,34 @@ compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop
debug2("%s: original cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
cipher_prop = filter_proposal(cipher_prop, "aes*");
debug2("%s: compat cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
if (*cipher_prop == '\0')
fatal("No supported ciphers found");
return cipher_prop;
}
-
char *
compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop)
{
if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
return pkalg_prop;
debug2("%s: original public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
pkalg_prop = filter_proposal(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa");
debug2("%s: compat public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
if (*pkalg_prop == '\0')
fatal("No supported PK algorithms found");
return pkalg_prop;
}
+char *
+compat_kex_proposal(char *kex_prop)
+{
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD))
+ return kex_prop;
+ debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop);
+ kex_prop = filter_proposal(kex_prop, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org");
+ debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop);
+ if (*kex_prop == '\0')
+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
+ return kex_prop;
+}
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/compat.h b/openssh-6.6p1/compat.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/compat.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/compat.h
@@ -54,20 +54,22 @@
#define SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN 0x00100000
#define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF 0x00200000
#define SSH_BUG_PROBE 0x00400000
#define SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX 0x00800000
#define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR 0x01000000
#define SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR 0x02000000
#define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000
#define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000
+#define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000
void enable_compat13(void);
void enable_compat20(void);
void compat_datafellows(const char *);
int proto_spec(const char *);
char *compat_cipher_proposal(char *);
char *compat_pkalg_proposal(char *);
+char *compat_kex_proposal(char *);
extern int compat13;
extern int compat20;
extern int datafellows;
#endif
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
@@ -190,16 +190,18 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
else {
/* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
compat_pkalg_proposal(
order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
}
if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
(time_t)options.rekey_interval);
/* start key exchange */
kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
@@ -2457,16 +2457,19 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
} else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com";
}
if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
+
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
(time_t)options.rekey_interval);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
list_hostkey_types());
/* start key exchange */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/version.h b/openssh-6.6p1/version.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/version.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/version.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.70 2014/02/27 22:57:40 djm Exp $ */
-#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.6"
+#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.6.1"
#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE

24
openssh-6.6p1-default-protocol.patch
View File

@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
# only enable SSHv2 protocol by default (upstream default is fallback to v1)
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
@@ -41,17 +41,17 @@ ForwardX11Trusted yes
# CheckHostIP yes
# AddressFamily any
# ConnectTimeout 0
# StrictHostKeyChecking ask
# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa
# Port 22
-# Protocol 2,1
+Protocol 2
# Cipher 3des
# Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc
# MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160
# EscapeChar ~
# Tunnel no
# TunnelDevice any:any
# PermitLocalCommand no
# VisualHostKey no

32
openssh-6.6p1-disable-openssl-abi-check.patch
View File

@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
# disable run-time check for OpenSSL ABI by version number as that is not a
# reliable indicator of ABI changes and doesn't make much sense in a
# distribution package
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c b/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
@@ -212,22 +212,23 @@ seed_rng(void)
#endif
/*
* OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
* We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
* After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
* allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
* within a patch series.
*/
+#if 0
u_long version_mask = SSLeay() >= 0x1000000f ? ~0xffff0L : ~0xff0L;
if (((SSLeay() ^ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) & version_mask) ||
(SSLeay() >> 12) < (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >> 12))
fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
"have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
-
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
if (RAND_status() == 1) {
debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
return;
}
if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");

730
openssh-6.6p1-fingerprint_hash.patch
View File

@ -1,730 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 8b2615db484b7061edd15f3bee36958f790f790e
# select fingerprint hash algorithms based on the environment variable
# SSH_FP_TYPE_ENVVAR and append it to hex and randomart fingerprints
# Petr Cerny <pcerny@suse.cz>
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
@@ -230,17 +230,17 @@ rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *p
/* check the real bits */
keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
if (keybits < 0 || bits != keybits)
logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
"actual %d vs. announced %d.",
file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
file, linenum, key_type(key), fp);
free(fp);
/* Never accept a revoked key */
if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
break;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c
@@ -680,17 +680,17 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
case -1:
/* Error opening revoked_keys_file: refuse all keys */
error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key "
"authentication");
return 1;
case 1:
revoked:
/* Key revoked */
- key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
"%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
free(key_fp);
return 1;
}
fatal("key_in_file returned junk");
}
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
@@ -202,23 +202,23 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw,
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2,
options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL :
_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
}
if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
if (key_is_cert(key)) {
fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
"%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
cuser, lookup);
} else {
- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
}
free(fp);
}
return (host_status == HOST_OK);
}
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -208,25 +208,25 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con
i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (i < 0 || extra == NULL)
fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
}
if (key_is_cert(key)) {
fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
free(fp);
} else {
- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp,
extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
free(fp);
}
free(extra);
}
static int
@@ -360,17 +360,17 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file,
if (key_is_cert(key)) {
if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
continue;
if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
linenum) != 1)
continue;
if (!key_is_cert_authority)
continue;
- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,
+ fp = key_fingerprint(found, key_fp_type_select(),
SSH_FP_HEX);
debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
/*
* If the user has specified a list of principals as
* a key option, then prefer that list to matching
* their username in the certificate principals list.
*/
@@ -401,17 +401,17 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file,
break;
} else if (key_equal(found, key)) {
if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
linenum) != 1)
continue;
if (key_is_cert_authority)
continue;
found_key = 1;
- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ fp = key_fingerprint(found, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
free(fp);
break;
}
}
if (found != NULL)
key_free(found);
@@ -427,17 +427,17 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw,
char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
const char *reason;
int ret = 0;
if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
return 0;
ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) {
debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
goto out;
}
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/key.c b/openssh-6.6p1/key.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/key.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/key.c
@@ -420,30 +420,39 @@ key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum f
*dgst_raw_length = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
} else {
fatal("%s: blob is null", __func__);
}
return retval;
}
static char *
-key_fingerprint_hex(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len)
+key_fingerprint_hex(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len, enum fp_type dgst_type)
{
char *retval;
u_int i;
- retval = xcalloc(1, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
+ /* reserve space for both the key hash and the string for the hash type */
+ retval = xcalloc(1, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1 + SSH_FP_TYPE_STRLEN + 2);
for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
char hex[4];
snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%02x:", dgst_raw[i]);
strlcat(retval, hex, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
}
/* Remove the trailing ':' character */
- retval[(dgst_raw_len * 3) - 1] = '\0';
+ retval[(dgst_raw_len * 3) - 1] = ' ';
+
+ /* Append hash type */
+ {
+ char hash[SSH_FP_TYPE_STRLEN + 2 + 1];
+ snprintf(hash, sizeof(hash), "[%s]", key_fp_type_str(dgst_type));
+ strlcat(retval, hash, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1 + SSH_FP_TYPE_STRLEN + 2);
+ }
+
return retval;
}
static char *
key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len)
{
char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' };
char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm',
@@ -518,17 +527,18 @@ key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgs
* can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 .
* Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would
* fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore.
*/
#define FLDBASE 8
#define FLDSIZE_Y (FLDBASE + 1)
#define FLDSIZE_X (FLDBASE * 2 + 1)
static char *
-key_fingerprint_randomart(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len, const Key *k)
+key_fingerprint_randomart(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len, const Key *k,
+ enum fp_type dgst_type)
{
/*
* Chars to be used after each other every time the worm
* intersects with itself. Matter of taste.
*/
char *augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE";
char *retval, *p;
u_char field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y];
@@ -585,18 +595,19 @@ key_fingerprint_randomart(u_char *dgst_r
*p++ = '|';
for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++)
*p++ = augmentation_string[MIN(field[x][y], len)];
*p++ = '|';
*p++ = '\n';
}
/* output lower border */
- *p++ = '+';
- for (i = 0; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
+ i = snprintf(p, FLDSIZE_X, "+--[%s]", key_fp_type_str(dgst_type));
+ p += i;
+ for (i--; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
*p++ = '-';
*p++ = '+';
return retval;
}
char *
key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
@@ -605,34 +616,91 @@ key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_ty
u_char *dgst_raw;
u_int dgst_raw_len;
dgst_raw = key_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_type, &dgst_raw_len);
if (!dgst_raw)
fatal("key_fingerprint: null from key_fingerprint_raw()");
switch (dgst_rep) {
case SSH_FP_HEX:
- retval = key_fingerprint_hex(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ retval = key_fingerprint_hex(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, dgst_type);
break;
case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE:
retval = key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
break;
case SSH_FP_RANDOMART:
- retval = key_fingerprint_randomart(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k);
+ retval = key_fingerprint_randomart(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k, dgst_type);
break;
default:
fatal("key_fingerprint: bad digest representation %d",
dgst_rep);
break;
}
explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
free(dgst_raw);
return retval;
}
+enum fp_type
+key_fp_type_select(void)
+{
+ static enum fp_type fp;
+ static char fp_defined = 0;
+ char *env;
+
+ if (!fp_defined) {
+ env = getenv(SSH_FP_TYPE_ENVVAR);
+ if (env) {
+ if (!strcasecmp(env, "md5") ||
+ !strcasecmp(env, "md-5"))
+ fp = SSH_FP_MD5;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(env, "sha1") ||
+ !strcasecmp(env, "sha-1"))
+ fp = SSH_FP_SHA1;
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+ else if (!strcasecmp(env, "sha256") ||
+ !strcasecmp(env, "sha-256"))
+ fp = SSH_FP_SHA256;
+#endif
+ else {
+ error("invalid key type in environment variable "
+ SSH_FP_TYPE_ENVVAR ": '%s' - falling back to MD5.",
+ env);
+ fp = SSH_FP_MD5;
+ }
+ } else
+ fp = SSH_FP_MD5;
+
+ fp_defined = 1;
+ }
+ return fp;
+}
+
+/*
+ * string lengths must be less or equal to SSH_FP_TYPE_STRLEN (defined in
+ * key.h) as to fit into the fingerprint string buffer
+ */
+char *
+key_fp_type_str(enum fp_type dgst_type)
+{
+ switch (dgst_type) {
+ case SSH_FP_MD5:
+ return "MD5";
+ case SSH_FP_SHA1:
+ return "SHA-1";
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+ case SSH_FP_SHA256:
+ return "SHA-256";
+#endif
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unknown key fingerprint hash algorithm requested", __func__);
+ }
+}
+
+
/*
* Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
* the pointer. The integer must already be initialized. This function is
* permitted to modify the buffer. This leaves *cpp to point just beyond the
* last processed (and maybe modified) character. Note that this may modify
* the buffer containing the number.
*/
static int
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/key.h b/openssh-6.6p1/key.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/key.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/key.h
@@ -53,16 +53,18 @@ enum fp_type {
SSH_FP_MD5,
SSH_FP_SHA256
};
enum fp_rep {
SSH_FP_HEX,
SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE,
SSH_FP_RANDOMART
};
+#define SSH_FP_TYPE_ENVVAR "SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE"
+#define SSH_FP_TYPE_STRLEN 8
/* key is stored in external hardware */
#define KEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001
#define CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS 256
struct KeyCert {
Buffer certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */
u_int type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */
@@ -104,16 +106,18 @@ int key_equal_public(const Key *, cons
int key_equal(const Key *, const Key *);
char *key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);
u_char *key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
const char *key_type(const Key *);
const char *key_cert_type(const Key *);
int key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
int key_read(Key *, char **);
u_int key_size(const Key *);
+enum fp_type key_fp_type_select(void);
+char *key_fp_type_str(enum fp_type);
Key *key_generate(int, u_int);
Key *key_from_private(const Key *);
int key_type_from_name(char *);
int key_is_cert(const Key *);
int key_type_is_cert(int);
int key_type_plain(int);
int key_to_certified(Key *, int);
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.c b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.c
@@ -325,17 +325,17 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection
int version;
for (version = 1; version <= 2; version++) {
for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, version);
key != NULL;
key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) {
had_identities = 1;
if (do_fp) {
- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(),
SSH_FP_HEX);
printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n",
key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key));
free(fp);
} else {
if (!key_write(key, stdout))
fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed");
fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", comment);
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.c b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.c
@@ -193,17 +193,17 @@ lookup_identity(Key *key, int version)
/* Check confirmation of keysign request */
static int
confirm_key(Identity *id)
{
char *p;
int ret = -1;
- p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ p = key_fingerprint(id->key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
id->comment, p))
ret = 0;
free(p);
return (ret);
}
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.c b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -741,27 +741,27 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
Key **keys = NULL;
int i, nkeys;
enum fp_rep rep;
enum fp_type fptype;
char *fp, *ra;
- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fp_type_select();
rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
pkcs11_init(0);
nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys);
if (nkeys <= 0)
fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if (print_fingerprint) {
fp = key_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep);
- ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], SSH_FP_MD5,
+ ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], key_fp_type_select(),
SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", key_size(keys[i]),
fp, key_type(keys[i]));
if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
printf("%s\n", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
} else {
@@ -784,29 +784,29 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
FILE *f;
Key *public;
char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra;
int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1;
enum fp_rep rep;
enum fp_type fptype;
struct stat st;
- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fp_type_select();
rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
perror(identity_file);
exit(1);
}
public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);
if (public != NULL) {
fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ ra = key_fingerprint(public, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment,
key_type(public));
if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
printf("%s\n", ra);
key_free(public);
free(comment);
free(ra);
free(fp);
@@ -862,17 +862,17 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
public = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
if (key_read(public, &cp) != 1) {
key_free(public);
continue;
}
}
comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ ra = key_fingerprint(public, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp,
comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public));
if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
printf("%s\n", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
key_free(public);
invalid = 0;
@@ -983,20 +983,20 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
static void
printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key *public, int ca, int hash)
{
if (print_fingerprint) {
enum fp_rep rep;
enum fp_type fptype;
char *fp, *ra;
- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fp_type_select();
rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ ra = key_fingerprint(public, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name,
key_type(public));
if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
printf("%s\n", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
} else {
if (hash && (name = host_hash(name, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
@@ -1873,19 +1873,19 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
if ((key = key_load_public(identity_file, NULL)) == NULL)
fatal("%s is not a public key", identity_file);
if (!key_is_cert(key))
fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file);
v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00;
- key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
printf("%s:\n", identity_file);
printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key),
key_cert_type(key));
printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp);
printf(" Signing CA: %s %s\n",
key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp);
printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
@@ -2681,18 +2681,18 @@ passphrase_again:
exit(1);
}
if (!key_write(public, f))
fprintf(stderr, "write key failed\n");
fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
fclose(f);
if (!quiet) {
- char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5,
+ char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, key_fp_type_select(),
SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
identity_file);
printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
printf("%s\n", ra);
free(ra);
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c
@@ -909,18 +909,18 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
"address '%.128s' to the list of known "
"hosts (%.30s).", type, ip,
user_hostfiles[0]);
else
logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
"key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
"of known hosts.", type, ip);
} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+ fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(),
SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
}
break;
case HOST_NEW:
if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
@@ -950,18 +950,18 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key))
snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1),
"\nbut keys of different type are already"
" known for this host.");
else
snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
/* The default */
- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+ fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(),
SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
msg2[0] = '\0';
if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
if (matching_host_key_dns)
snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
"Matching host key fingerprint"
" found in DNS.\n");
else
@@ -1215,17 +1215,17 @@ fail:
/* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
int
verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
{
int flags = 0;
char *fp;
- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp);
free(fp);
/* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */
if (!key_is_cert(host_key) && options.verify_host_key_dns &&
verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) {
if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
@@ -1322,18 +1322,18 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkey
char *fp, *ra;
const struct hostkey_entry *found;
for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) {
if (type[i] == key->type)
continue;
if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
continue;
- fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
"in %s:%lu\n"
"%s key fingerprint %s.",
key_type(found->key),
found->host, found->file, found->line,
key_type(found->key), fp);
if (options.visual_host_key)
logit("%s", ra);
@@ -1344,17 +1344,17 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkey
return ret;
}
static void
warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
{
char *fp;
- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
@@ -579,17 +579,17 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
"for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
free(fp);
/*
* search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been
* moved to the end of the queue. this also avoids confusion by
* duplicate keys
*/
@@ -990,17 +990,17 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt,
Buffer b;
u_char *blob, *signature;
u_int bloblen, slen;
u_int skip = 0;
int ret = -1;
int have_sig = 1;
char *fp;
- fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp);
free(fp);
if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
/* we cannot handle this key */
debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key");
return 0;
}

529
openssh-6.6p1-fips-checks.patch
View File

@ -1,529 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 717873621cf4991164c61caafd9ac07473231f10
# Simple implementation of FIPS 140-2 selfchecks. Use OpenSSL to generate and
# verify checksums of binaries. Any hash iused in OpenSSH can be used (MD5 would
# obviously be a poor choice, since OpenSSL would barf and abort immediately in
# FIPS mode). SHA-2 seems to be a reasonable choice.
#
# The logic of the checks is as follows: decide whether FIPS mode is mandated
# (either by checking /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled or envoroinment variable
# SSH_FORCE_FIPS. In FIPS mode, checksums are required to match (inability to
# retrieve pre-calculated hash is a fatal error). In non-FIPS mode the checks
# still must be performed, unless the hashes are not installed. Thus if the hash
# file is not found (or the hash matches), proceed in non-FIPS mode and abort
# otherwise.
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/fips-check.c b/openssh-6.6p1/fips-check.c
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/fips-check.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "fips.h"
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#define PROC_NAME_LEN 64
+
+static const char *argv0;
+
+void
+print_help_exit(int ev)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s <-c|-w> <file> <checksum_file>\n", argv0);
+ fprintf(stderr, " -c verify hash of 'file' against hash in 'checksum_file'\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -w write hash of 'file' into 'checksum_file'\n");
+ exit(ev);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+
+ fips_ssh_init();
+// printf("SSL Error: %lx: %s", ERR_get_error(), ERR_get_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/fips.c b/openssh-6.6p1/fips.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/fips.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/fips.c
@@ -24,21 +24,342 @@
#include "includes.h"
#include "fips.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include <openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+enum fips_checksum_status {
+ CHECK_OK = 0,
+ CHECK_FAIL,
+ CHECK_MISSING
+};
static int fips_state = -1;
+static char *
+hex_fingerprint(u_int raw_len, u_char *raw)
+{
+ char *retval;
+ u_int i;
+
+ /* reserve space for both the key hash and the string for the hash type */
+ retval = malloc(3 * raw_len);
+ for (i = 0; i < raw_len; i++) {
+ char hex[4];
+ snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%02x:", raw[i]);
+ strlcat(retval, hex, raw_len * 3);
+ }
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/* calculates hash of contents of file given by filename using algorithm alg
+ * and placing the resukt into newly allacated memory - remember to free it
+ * when not needed anymore */
+static int
+hash_file(const char *filename, int alg, u_char **hash_out)
+{
+ int check = -1;
+ int hash_len;
+ int fd;
+ struct stat fs;
+ void *hmap;
+ char *hash;
+
+ hash_len = ssh_digest_bytes(alg);
+ hash = xmalloc(hash_len);
+
+ fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+ if (-1 == fd)
+ goto bail_out;
+
+ if (-1 == fstat(fd, &fs))
+ goto bail_out;
+
+ hmap = mmap(NULL, fs.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
+
+ if ((void *)(-1) != hmap) {
+ check = ssh_digest_memory(alg, hmap, fs.st_size, hash, hash_len);
+ munmap(hmap, fs.st_size);
+ }
+ close(fd);
+
+bail_out:
+ if (0 == check) {
+ check = CHECK_OK;
+ *hash_out = hash;
+ } else {
+ check = CHECK_FAIL;
+ *hash_out = NULL;
+ free(hash);
+ }
+ return check;
+}
+
+/* find pathname of binary of process with PID pid. exe is buffer expected to
+ * be capable of holding at least max_pathlen characters
+ */
+static int
+get_executable_path(pid_t pid, char *exe, int max_pathlen)
+{
+ char exe_sl[PROC_EXE_PATH_LEN];
+ int n;
+
+ n = snprintf(exe_sl, sizeof(exe_sl), "/proc/%u/exe", pid);
+ if ((n <= 10) || (n >= max_pathlen)) {
+ fatal("error compiling filename of link to executable");
+ }
+
+ n = readlink(exe_sl, exe, max_pathlen);
+ if (n < max_pathlen) {
+ exe[n] = 0;
+ } else {
+ fatal("error getting executable pathname");
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Read checksum file chk, storing the algorithm used for generating it into
+ * *alg; allocate enough memory to hold the hash and return it in *hash.
+ * Remember to free() it when not needed anymore.
+ */
+static int
+read_hash(const char *chk, int *alg, u_char **hash)
+{
+ int check = -1;
+ int hash_len;
+ int fdh, n;
+ char alg_c;
+ char *hash_in;
+
+ *hash = NULL;
+
+ fdh = open(chk, O_RDONLY);
+ if (-1 == fdh) {
+ switch (errno) {
+ case ENOENT:
+ check = CHECK_MISSING;
+ debug("fips: checksum file %s is missing\n", chk);
+ break;
+ default:
+ check = CHECK_FAIL;
+ debug("fips: ckecksum file %s not accessible\n", chk);
+ break;
+
+ }
+ goto bail_out;
+ }
+
+ n = read(fdh, &alg_c, 1);
+ if (1 != n) {
+ check = CHECK_FAIL;
+ goto bail_out;
+ }
+
+ *alg = (int)alg_c;
+ hash_len = ssh_digest_bytes(*alg);
+ hash_in = xmalloc(hash_len);
+
+ n = read(fdh, (void *)hash_in, hash_len);
+ if (hash_len != n) {
+ debug("fips: unable to read whole checksum from checksum file\n");
+ free (hash_in);
+ check = CHECK_FAIL;
+ } else {
+ check = CHECK_OK;
+ *hash = hash_in;
+ }
+bail_out:
+ return check;
+}
+
+static int
+fips_hash_self(void)
+{
+ int check = -1;
+ int alg;
+ u_char *hash, *hash_chk;
+ char *exe, *chk;
+
+ exe = xmalloc(PATH_MAX);
+ chk = xmalloc(PATH_MAX);
+
+ /* we will need to add the ".chk" suffix and the null terminator */
+ check = get_executable_path(getpid(), exe
+ , PATH_MAX - strlen(CHECKSUM_SUFFIX) - 1);
+
+ strncpy(chk, exe, PATH_MAX);
+ strlcat(chk, CHECKSUM_SUFFIX, PATH_MAX);
+
+ check = read_hash(chk, &alg, &hash_chk);
+ if (CHECK_OK != check)
+ goto cleanup_chk;
+
+ check = hash_file(exe, alg, &hash);
+ if (CHECK_OK != check)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ check = memcmp(hash, hash_chk, ssh_digest_bytes(alg));
+ if (0 == check) {
+ check = CHECK_OK;
+ debug("fips: checksum matches\n");
+ } else {
+ check = CHECK_FAIL;
+ debug("fips: checksum mismatch!\n");
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ free(hash);
+cleanup_chk:
+ free(hash_chk);
+ free(chk);
+ free(exe);
+
+ return check;
+}
+
+static int
+fips_check_required_proc(void)
+{
+ int fips_required = 0;
+ int fips_fd;
+ char fips_sys = 0;
+
+ struct stat dummy;
+ if (-1 == stat(FIPS_PROC_PATH, &dummy)) {
+ switch (errno) {
+ case ENOENT:
+ case ENOTDIR:
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Check for system-wide FIPS mode is required and %s cannot"
+ " be accessed for reason other than non-existence - aborting"
+ , FIPS_PROC_PATH);
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (-1 == (fips_fd = open(FIPS_PROC_PATH, O_RDONLY)))
+ fatal("Check for system-wide FIPS mode is required and %s cannot"
+ " be opened for reading - aborting"
+ , FIPS_PROC_PATH);
+ if (1 > read(fips_fd, &fips_sys, 1))
+ fatal("Check for system-wide FIPS mode is required and %s doesn't"
+ " return at least one character - aborting"
+ , FIPS_PROC_PATH);
+ close(fips_sys);
+ switch (fips_sys) {
+ case '0':
+ case '1':
+ fips_required = fips_sys - '0';
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Bogus character %c found in %s - aborting"
+ , fips_sys, FIPS_PROC_PATH);
+ }
+ }
+ return fips_required;
+}
+
+static int
+fips_check_required_env(void)
+{
+ int fips_required = 0;
+ char *env = getenv(SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV);
+
+ if (env) {
+ errno = 0;
+ fips_required = strtol(env, NULL, 10);
+ if (errno) {
+ debug("bogus value in the %s environment variable, ignoring\n"
+ , SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV);
+ fips_required = 0;
+ } else
+ fips_required = 1;
+ }
+ return fips_required;
+}
+
+static int
+fips_required(void)
+{
+ int fips_requests = 0;
+ fips_requests += fips_check_required_proc();
+ fips_requests += fips_check_required_env();
+ return fips_requests;
+}
+
+/* check whether FIPS mode is required and perform selfchecksum/selftest */
+void
+fips_ssh_init(void)
+{
+ int checksum;
+
+ checksum = fips_hash_self();
+
+ if (fips_required()) {
+ switch (checksum) {
+ case CHECK_OK:
+ debug("fips: mandatory checksum ok");
+ break;
+ case CHECK_FAIL:
+ fatal("fips: mandatory checksum failed - aborting");
+ break;
+ case CHECK_MISSING:
+ fatal("fips: mandatory checksum data missing - aborting");
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Fatal error: internal error at %s:%u"
+ , __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ break;
+ }
+ fips_state = FIPS_mode_set(1);
+ if (1 != fips_state) {
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ u_long err = ERR_get_error();
+ error("fips: OpenSSL error %lx: %s", err, ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
+ fatal("fips: unable to set OpenSSL into FIPS mode - aborting"
+ , fips_state);
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch (checksum) {
+ case CHECK_OK:
+ debug("fips: checksum ok");
+ break;
+ case CHECK_FAIL:
+ fatal("fips: checksum failed - aborting");
+ break;
+ case CHECK_MISSING:
+ debug("fips: mandatory checksum data missing, but not required - continuing non-FIPS");
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Fatal error: internal error at %s:%u",
+ __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return;
+}
+
int
fips_mode()
{
if (-1 == fips_state) {
fips_state = FIPS_mode();
if (fips_state)
debug("FIPS mode initialized");
}
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/fips.h b/openssh-6.6p1/fips.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/fips.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/fips.h
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2012 Petr Cerny. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2012-2014 Petr Cerny. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
@@ -19,15 +19,22 @@
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef FIPS_H
#define FIPS_H
+#define SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV "SSH_FORCE_FIPS"
+#define FIPS_PROC_PATH "/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled"
+
+#define PROC_EXE_PATH_LEN 64
+#define CHECKSUM_SUFFIX ".chk"
+
+void fips_ssh_init(void);
int fips_mode(void);
int fips_correct_dgst(int);
int fips_dgst_min(void);
enum fp_type fips_correct_fp_type(enum fp_type);
#endif
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
@@ -47,16 +47,18 @@
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "fips.h"
+
/* helper */
#define get_int64() buffer_get_int64(&iqueue);
#define get_int() buffer_get_int(&iqueue);
#define get_string(lenp) buffer_get_string(&iqueue, lenp);
/* Our verbosity */
static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
@@ -1453,16 +1455,19 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
ssize_t len, olen, set_size;
SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
char *cp, *homedir = NULL, buf[4*4096];
long mask;
extern char *optarg;
extern char *__progname;
+ /* initialize fips */
+ fips_ssh_init();
+
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
"d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.c b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.c
@@ -420,16 +420,19 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
struct stat st;
struct passwd *pw;
int timeout_ms;
extern int optind, optreset;
extern char *optarg;
Forward fwd;
struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL;
+ /* initialize fips */
+ fips_ssh_init();
+
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
/* Save argv so it isn't clobbered by setproctitle() emulation */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
@@ -1466,16 +1466,19 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
mode_t new_umask;
Key *key;
Key *pubkey;
int keytype;
Authctxt *authctxt;
struct connection_info *connection_info = get_connection_info(0, 0);
+ /* initialize fips */
+ fips_ssh_init();
+
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
#endif
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
saved_argc = ac;
rexec_argc = ac;

1059
openssh-6.6p1-fips.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

3807
openssh-6.6p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

428
openssh-6.6p1-gssapimitm.patch
View File

@ -1,428 +0,0 @@
# The patch below adds support for the deprecated 'gssapi' authentication
# mechanism to OpenSSH 3.8p1. The newer 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism is included
# in this release. The use of 'gssapi' is deprecated due to the presence of
# potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which 'gssapi-with-mic' is not
# susceptible to.
#
# To use the patch apply it to a OpenSSH 3.8p1 source tree. After compiling,
# backwards compatibility may be obtained by supplying the
# 'GssapiEnableMitmAttack yes' option to either the client or server.
#
# It should be noted that this patch is being made available purely as a means
# of easing the process of moving to OpenSSH 3.8p1. Any new installations are
# recommended to use the 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism. Existing installations
# are encouraged to upgrade as soon as possible.
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-gss.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-gss.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-gss.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-gss.c
@@ -168,16 +168,25 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t p
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
&input_gssapi_mic);
else
dispatch_set(
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
&input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
+
+ /*
+ * Old style 'gssapi' didn't have the GSSAPI_MIC
+ * and went straight to sending exchange_complete
+ */
+ if (options.gss_enable_mitm)
+ dispatch_set(
+ SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
+ &input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
}
}
gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
}
static void
input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
@@ -286,9 +295,15 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
}
Authmethod method_gssapi = {
"gssapi-with-mic",
userauth_gssapi,
&options.gss_authentication
};
+Authmethod method_gssapi_old = {
+ "gssapi",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+ &options.gss_enable_mitm
+};
+
#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c
@@ -65,23 +65,25 @@ extern Buffer loginmsg;
extern Authmethod method_none;
extern Authmethod method_pubkey;
extern Authmethod method_passwd;
extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
#ifdef GSSAPI
extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+extern Authmethod method_gssapi_old;
#endif
Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
&method_none,
&method_pubkey,
#ifdef GSSAPI
&method_gssapi,
+ &method_gssapi_old,
#endif
&method_passwd,
&method_kbdint,
&method_hostbased,
NULL
};
/* protocol */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c
@@ -135,17 +135,17 @@ typedef enum {
oCompressionLevel, oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts,
oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oProtocol, oMacs,
oGlobalKnownHostsFile2, oUserKnownHostsFile2, oPubkeyAuthentication,
oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias,
oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication,
oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oPKCS11Provider,
oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
- oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
+ oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, oGssEnableMITM,
oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
oHashKnownHosts,
oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming,
oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
@@ -179,19 +179,21 @@ static struct {
{ "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
{ "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
{ "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
#if defined(GSSAPI)
{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
+ { "gssapienablemitmattack", oGssEnableMITM },
#else
{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapienablemitmattack", oUnsupported },
#endif
{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
{ "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
{ "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* obsolete */
{ "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly },
{ "hostname", oHostName },
{ "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias },
@@ -839,16 +841,20 @@ parse_time:
case oGssAuthentication:
intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oGssDelegateCreds:
intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oGssEnableMITM:
+ intptr = &options->gss_enable_mitm;
+ goto parse_flag;
case oBatchMode:
intptr = &options->batch_mode;
goto parse_flag;
case oCheckHostIP:
intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
goto parse_flag;
@@ -1493,16 +1499,17 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
options->xauth_location = NULL;
options->gateway_ports = -1;
options->use_privileged_port = -1;
options->rsa_authentication = -1;
options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
options->gss_authentication = -1;
options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
+ options->gss_enable_mitm = -1;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1;
options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
options->batch_mode = -1;
options->check_host_ip = -1;
options->strict_host_key_checking = -1;
@@ -1613,16 +1620,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
options->gss_authentication = 0;
if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+ if (options->gss_enable_mitm == -1)
+ options->gss_enable_mitm = 0;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1)
options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h b/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h
@@ -50,16 +50,17 @@ typedef struct {
* authentication. */
int rsa_authentication; /* Try RSA authentication. */
int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
int challenge_response_authentication;
/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
+ int gss_enable_mitm; /* Enable old style gssapi auth */
int password_authentication; /* Try password
* authentication. */
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
char *kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */
int batch_mode; /* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */
int check_host_ip; /* Also keep track of keys for IP address */
int strict_host_key_checking; /* Strict host key checking. */
int compression; /* Compress packets in both directions. */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
@@ -104,16 +104,17 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
options->rsa_authentication = -1;
options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
options->kerberos_authentication = -1;
options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
options->gss_authentication=-1;
options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+ options->gss_enable_mitm = -1;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
options->permit_user_env = -1;
options->use_login = -1;
options->compression = -1;
options->rekey_limit = -1;
@@ -241,16 +242,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1)
options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
options->gss_authentication = 0;
if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
+ if (options->gss_enable_mitm == -1)
+ options->gss_enable_mitm = 0;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1)
options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
@@ -335,17 +338,17 @@ typedef enum {
sPermitUserEnvironment, sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile,
sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem,
sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, sGssEnableMITM,
sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
sHostCertificate,
sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent,
sDeprecated, sUnsupported
@@ -402,19 +405,21 @@ static struct {
{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#ifdef GSSAPI
{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapienablemitmattack", sGssEnableMITM },
#else
{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapienablemitmattack", sUnsupported },
#endif
{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
{ "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -1085,16 +1090,20 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
case sGssAuthentication:
intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sGssCleanupCreds:
intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
goto parse_flag;
+ case sGssEnableMITM:
+ intptr = &options->gss_enable_mitm;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
case sPasswordAuthentication:
intptr = &options->password_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h
@@ -108,16 +108,17 @@ typedef struct {
* such as SecurID or
* /etc/passwd */
int kerberos_ticket_cleanup; /* If true, destroy ticket
* file on logout. */
int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
* authenticated with Kerberos. */
int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+ int gss_enable_mitm; /* If true, enable old style GSSAPI */
int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
* authentication. */
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
int challenge_response_authentication;
int permit_empty_passwd; /* If false, do not permit empty
* passwords. */
int permit_user_env; /* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */
int use_login; /* If true, login(1) is used */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
@@ -51,9 +51,16 @@ ForwardX11Trusted yes
# Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc
# MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160
# EscapeChar ~
# Tunnel no
# TunnelDevice any:any
# PermitLocalCommand no
# VisualHostKey no
# ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
+
+# Set this to 'yes' to enable support for the deprecated 'gssapi' authentication
+# mechanism to OpenSSH 3.8p1. The newer 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism is included
+# in this release. The use of 'gssapi' is deprecated due to the presence of
+# potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which 'gssapi-with-mic' is not susceptible to.
+# GSSAPIEnableMITMAttack no
+
# RekeyLimit 1G 1h
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
@@ -318,16 +318,21 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
Authmethod authmethods[] = {
#ifdef GSSAPI
{"gssapi-with-mic",
userauth_gssapi,
NULL,
&options.gss_authentication,
NULL},
+ {"gssapi",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+ NULL,
+ &options.gss_enable_mitm,
+ NULL},
#endif
{"hostbased",
userauth_hostbased,
NULL,
&options.hostbased_authentication,
NULL},
{"publickey",
userauth_pubkey,
@@ -685,17 +690,19 @@ process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buf
packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
packet_send();
gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
}
if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
/* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */
- if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
+
+ if (strcmp(authctxt->method->name,"gssapi") == 0 ||
+ (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE);
packet_send();
} else {
ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user,
authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic");
gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
@@ -80,16 +80,23 @@ PasswordAuthentication no
#KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
#KerberosTicketCleanup yes
#KerberosGetAFSToken no
# GSSAPI options
#GSSAPIAuthentication no
#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+# Set this to 'yes' to enable support for the deprecated 'gssapi' authentication
+# mechanism to OpenSSH 3.8p1. The newer 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism is included
+# in this release. The use of 'gssapi' is deprecated due to the presence of
+# potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which 'gssapi-with-mic' is not susceptible to.
+#GSSAPIEnableMITMAttack no
+
+
# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
# be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
# PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration,
# PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
# the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication

28
openssh-6.6p1-host_ident.patch
View File

@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
# identify hashed hosts in known_hosts and suggest command line for their
# removal
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c
@@ -1070,16 +1070,21 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
}
/* The host key has changed. */
warn_changed_key(host_key);
error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
user_hostfiles[0]);
error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
host_found->file, host_found->line);
+ error("You can use following command to remove all keys for this IP:");
+ if (host_found->file)
+ error("ssh-keygen -R %s -f %s", hostname, host_found->file);
+ else
+ error("ssh-keygen -R %s", hostname);
/*
* If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
* to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
*/
if (options.strict_host_key_checking) {
error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
"requested strict checking.", type, host);

534
openssh-6.6p1-key-converter.patch
View File

@ -1,534 +0,0 @@
# SSHv1 to SSHv2 RSA keys converter
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/converter/Makefile b/openssh-6.6p1/converter/Makefile
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/converter/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+
+bindir=/usr/bin
+mandir=/usr/share/man
+
+all : ssh-keyconverter
+
+ssh-keyconverter.o: ssh-keyconverter.c ../key.h ../authfile.h ../misc.h ../xmalloc.h
+ gcc $(RPM_OPT_FLAGS) -c -I../ $< -o $@
+
+ssh-keyconverter: ssh-keyconverter.o ../libssh.a ../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
+ gcc $< -Wl,--no-as-needed $(RPM_OPT_FLAGS) -L../ -L../openbsd-compat/ -lcrypto -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lpam -ldl -lwrap -lutil -lz -lnsl -lcrypt -lssl -o $@
+
+install: ssh-keyconverter ssh-keyconverter.1
+ if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) ]; then install -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(bindir); fi
+ install -m 755 ssh-keyconverter $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
+ if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1 ]; then install -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1; fi
+ install -m 644 ssh-keyconverter.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.1 b/openssh-6.6p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.1
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.1
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+.\" Manpage for ssh-keyconverter
+.\"
+.Dd February 2, 2002
+.Dt SSH-KEYCONVER 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-keyconvert
+.Nd convert ssh v1 keys and authorization files
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-keyconvert
+.Op Fl k
+.Op Fl o Ar output_file
+.Ar identity_file ...
+.Nm ssh-keyconvert
+.Op Fl a
+.Op Fl o Ar output_file
+.Ar authorization_file ...
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+converts RSA public and private keys used for public key based
+user authentication with protocol version 1 to the format
+used with protocol version 2.
+.Pp
+When using RSA user authentication with SSH protocol version 1,
+the client uses the private key from
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+to provide its identity to the server. The server grants or denies
+access based on whether the public part of this key is listed in
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys .
+.Pp
+SSH protocol version 2 supports both DSA and RSA keys, but the
+way RSA keys are stored are differently. On the client, the default
+file name is
+.Pa .ssh/id_rsa
+rather than
+.Pa .ssh/identity ,
+and the file's format is different as well. On the server, the
+public porting of the key can still be stored in
+.Pa .ssh/authorized_keys ,
+but the key notation has changed as well.
+Therefore, when switching from protocol version 1
+to version 2, you either have to create a new identity key using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+and add that key to the server's
+.Pa authorized_keys
+file, or you need to convert your keys using
+.Nm ssh-keyconvert .
+.Pp
+By default,
+.Nm
+will try to guess the type of file that is to be converted.
+If it fails to guess correctly, you can tell if what type of
+conversion to perform by specifying the
+.Fl k
+option to convert the private key, or the
+.Fl a
+option to convert an authorisation file.
+.Pp
+When converting your private keys stored in
+.Pa .ssh/identity ,
+.Nm
+will read the private key, prompting you for the pass phrase
+if the key is protected by a pass phrase. If the
+.Fl o
+option is given, it will write the private key to the specified
+file, using version 2 syntax. If the key was protected by a
+pass phrase, it will use the same pass phrase to protect the new
+file.
+It will also write the public portion of the key to a second file,
+using the specified file name with
+.Dq .pub
+appended.
+If the
+.Fl o
+option was not given, private and public key will be written to
+.Pa id_rsa
+and
+.Pa id_rsa.pub ,
+respectively, relative to the directory of the input key file.
+.Pp
+If the destination file already exists,
+.Nm
+will prompt the user for confirmation before overwriting the
+file, unless the
+.Fl f
+option is given.
+.Pp
+When converting your
+.Pa authorized_keys
+file,
+.Nm
+will ignore any keys in SSH version 2 format. Any public keys
+in version 1 format will be converted and appended to the output file
+using the new syntax. If the
+.Fl o
+option is given, keys are appended to the specified file. If it
+is not given,
+.Nm
+will append all keys to the input file.
+.Pp
+Note that
+.Nm
+does not check for duplicate keys, so if you run it on
+.Pa .ssh/authorized_keys
+more several times, the converted keys will show up several times.
+.Sh OPTIONS
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl k
+Convert private key file(s). The default is to guess the
+type of file that should be converted.
+.It Fl a
+Convert
+.Pa authorized_keys
+file(s). The default is to guess the
+type of file that should be converted.
+.It Fl o Ar outfile
+Specify the name of the output file.
+When converting an authorization file, all public keys will
+be appended to this file.
+For private key conversion, the private and public components of
+the key will be stored in
+.Pa outfile
+and
+.Pa outfile.pub ,
+respectively.
+Note that since every key must be stored in a separate file, you
+cannot use this option when you specify several input files.
+.It Fl f
+When converting a key file, and the output file already exists,
+.Nm
+will ask the user whether to overwrite the file. Using this option
+forces overwriting.
+.El
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+.Nm
+was contributed by Olaf Kirch.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Rs
+.%A J. Galbraith
+.%A R. Thayer
+.%T "SECSH Public Key File Format"
+.%N draft-ietf-secsh-publickeyfile-01.txt
+.%D March 2001
+.%O work in progress material
+.Re
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.c b/openssh-6.6p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.c
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
+/*
+ * SSH v1 to v2 RSA key converter.
+ *
+ * Instead of a manpage:
+ *
+ * ssh-keyconverter ~/.ssh/identity
+ * will put the old RSA key in ~/.ssh/id_rsa and id_rsa.pub
+ * If a "-o foofah" is given, the keys will be written to
+ * foofah and foofah.pub, respectively.
+ *
+ * ssh-keyconverter ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+ * will convert all old RSA keys and add them to the
+ * input file. The -o foofah option will direct
+ * output to a different file.
+ * (Note that it's harmless to specify the same file
+ * as input and output, as ssh-keyconverter will ignore
+ * any v2 keys, and output is always appended, never
+ * replacing the original file).
+ *
+ * To compile:
+ *
+ * gcc -g -Wall -o ssh-keyconverter converter.c \
+ * -L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh \
+ * -lpam -ldl -lwrap -lutil -lz -lnsl \
+ * -Wl,-Bstatic -lcrypto -Wl,-dy
+ *
+ * Enjoy. --okir
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <getopt.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+#define TYPE_KEY 0
+#define TYPE_AUTHKEYS 1
+
+#define PASSPHRASE_ATTEMPTS 3
+
+static int opt_verbose = 0;
+static int opt_force = 0;
+
+static void convert(int, const char *, const char *);
+static void convert_private_key(const char *, const char *);
+static void convert_authorized_keys(const char *, const char *);
+static int fileok(const char *, char *, size_t);
+static int guess_type(const char *);
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int opt_type = -1;
+ char *opt_outfile = NULL;
+ int c;
+
+ while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "afko:")) != -1) {
+ switch (c) {
+ case 'a':
+ opt_type = TYPE_AUTHKEYS;
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ opt_force = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'k':
+ opt_type = TYPE_KEY;
+ break;
+ case 'o':
+ opt_outfile = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'v':
+ opt_verbose++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "usage: ssh-keyconvert [-a | -k] "
+ "[-o filename] [-v] ...\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Warning, nanny code follows */
+#if 0
+ if (opt_outfile && (argc - optind) > 1 && opt_type != TYPE_AUTHKEY) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Output file ambiguous: more than two "
+ "input files given. Abort.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (optind == argc) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Missing input file(s).\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ for (; optind < argc; optind++) {
+ char *name = argv[optind];
+ int type;
+
+ if ((type = opt_type) < 0)
+ type = guess_type(name);
+ convert(type, name, opt_outfile);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+convert(int type, const char *iname, const char *oname)
+{
+ if (type == TYPE_KEY) {
+ convert_private_key(iname, oname);
+ } else if (type == TYPE_AUTHKEYS) {
+ convert_authorized_keys(iname, oname);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Conversion type not yet implemented.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+convert_private_key(const char *iname, const char *oname)
+{
+ char prompt[1024], privname[PATH_MAX], pubname[PATH_MAX];
+ char *comment = NULL, *passphrase;
+ Key *key = NULL, *pk = NULL;
+ int i;
+ FILE *pf = NULL;
+
+ passphrase = xstrdup("");
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
+ "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ",iname);
+ for (i = 0; !key && i < PASSPHRASE_ATTEMPTS; i++) {
+ if (i) {
+ /* Zap old pass phrase */
+ memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+ free(passphrase);
+
+ /* Get a pass phrase from the user */
+ passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+ }
+ key = key_load_private(iname, passphrase, &comment);
+ if (!key && i)
+ printf("Bad passphrase, please try again.\n");
+ }
+
+ if (oname != NULL) {
+ strcpy(privname, oname);
+ } else {
+ const char *s;
+
+ if ((s = strrchr(iname, '/')) != NULL) {
+ int n = s + 1 - iname;
+
+ strncpy(privname, iname, n);
+ privname[n++] = '\0';
+ }
+ strcat(privname, "id_rsa");
+ }
+
+ if (!fileok("private", privname, sizeof(privname)))
+ goto out;
+
+ sprintf(pubname, "%s.pub", privname);
+ if (!fileok("public", pubname, sizeof(pubname)))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* "convert" from RSA1 to RSA */
+ key->type = KEY_RSA;
+ pk = key_from_private(key);
+
+ /* Now write the key in earnest */
+ if (!key_save_private(key, privname, passphrase, comment)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Failed to save private key to %s: %m.\n", privname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!(pf = fopen(pubname, "w"))) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Failed to save public key to %s: %m.\n", pubname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!key_write(pk, pf)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Failed to save public key to %s: %m.\n", pubname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (comment)
+ fprintf(pf, " %s\n", comment);
+
+out:
+ memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+ free(passphrase);
+ if (key)
+ key_free(key);
+ if (pk)
+ key_free(pk);
+ if (pf)
+ fclose(pf);
+}
+
+static void
+convert_authorized_keys(const char *iname, const char *oname)
+{
+ char line[1024];
+ FILE *ifp, *ofp;
+ Key *key;
+
+ if (!(ifp = fopen(iname, "r"))) {
+ perror(iname);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (oname == NULL)
+ oname = iname;
+
+ if (!strcmp(oname, "-")) {
+ ofp = stdout;
+ } else {
+ if ((ofp = fopen(oname, "a")) == NULL) {
+ perror(oname);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+ setlinebuf(ofp);
+
+#define whitespace(c) ((c) == ' ' || (c) == '\t')
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), ifp) != NULL) {
+ char *cp = line, *options = NULL;
+
+ while (whitespace(*cp))
+ cp++;
+ if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+ continue;
+
+ key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ if (key_read(key, &cp) != 1) {
+ /* Skip options, if any */
+ int quoted = 0;
+
+ options = cp;
+ for (; *cp && (quoted || !whitespace(*cp)); cp++) {
+ if (cp[0] == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+ ++cp;
+ else if (*cp == '"')
+ quoted = !quoted;
+ }
+ if (quoted)
+ goto next;
+ *cp++ = '\0';
+ while (whitespace(*cp))
+ cp++;
+ if (key_read(key, &cp) != 1)
+ goto next;
+ }
+
+ if (options)
+ fprintf(ofp, "%s ", options);
+ /* "convert" from RSA1 to RSA */
+ key->type = KEY_RSA;
+ key_write(key, ofp);
+ fputs(cp, ofp);
+ key_free(key);
+
+ next:
+ ;
+ }
+}
+
+/* if file exists, ask user whether to overwrite it */
+static int
+fileok(const char *what, char *filename, size_t size)
+{
+ char buffer[PATH_MAX];
+ int n;
+
+checkagain:
+ if (access(filename, F_OK) < 0)
+ return 1;
+ printf("%s key file %s already exists.\n", what, filename);
+ if (opt_force) {
+ printf("Overwriting because of -f option...\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+tryagain:
+ printf("Please enter a different filename, "
+ "or return to overwrite: ");
+ fflush(stdout);
+
+ n = read(0, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
+ if (n <= 0)
+ printf("\n");
+ if (n < 0) {
+ perror("read failed");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (n == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "EOF from standard input. Bye.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ buffer[n] = '\0';
+ while (n && buffer[n-1] == '\n')
+ buffer[--n] = '\0';
+ if (n == 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (n >= size) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Filename too long.\n");
+ goto tryagain;
+ }
+ strcpy(filename, buffer);
+ goto checkagain;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Guess the type of file to be converted.
+ * XXX: should look at the file; v1 key files
+ * start with "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE"
+ */
+static int
+guess_type(const char *name)
+{
+ printf("%s... ", name);
+ if (strstr(name, "identity")) {
+ printf("looks like a key file\n");
+ return TYPE_KEY;
+ }
+ if (strstr(name, "authorized_keys")) {
+ printf("looks like an authorized_keys file\n");
+ return TYPE_AUTHKEYS;
+ }
+
+ if (opt_verbose)
+ printf("unable to identify.");
+ fprintf(stderr, "Please specify the file type for %s. Abort.\n", name);
+ exit(1);
+}

2805
openssh-6.6p1-ldap.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

28
openssh-6.6p1-login_options.patch
View File

@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
# login-pam cannot handle the option terminator "--" as login from util-linux
# (this is correct behaviour considering its man-page), hence use option which
# selects the compile-time branch in the code which doesn't use the terminator
#
# bnc#833605
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/configure.ac b/openssh-6.6p1/configure.ac
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/configure.ac
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/configure.ac
@@ -719,16 +719,18 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
;;
*-*-linux*)
no_dev_ptmx=1
use_pie=auto
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
+ AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT], [1],
+ [Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--")])
AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1],
[Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"],
[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM],
[Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported"
if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.])

24
openssh-6.6p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
View File

@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
# Do not write a PID file when not daemonizing (e.g. when running from systemd)
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
@@ -1994,17 +1994,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
/*
* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
* is setup and the listen sockets are bound
*/
- if (!debug_flag) {
+ if (!(debug_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
if (f == NULL) {
error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
} else {
fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
fclose(f);

28
openssh-6.6p1-saveargv-fix.patch
View File

@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
# related to bnc#49845, upstream bug #529
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
@@ -1405,17 +1405,21 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv));
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
saved_argv[i] = NULL;
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
- av = saved_argv;
+
+ av = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * (saved_argc + 1));
+ for (i = 0; i < saved_argc; i++)
+ av[i] = xstrdup(saved_argv[i]);
+ av[i] = NULL;
#endif
if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();

29
openssh-6.6p1-seccomp_getuid.patch
View File

@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent bde6f1a808f345e141a976ebc3e37903c81a09cb
add 'getuid' syscall to list of allowed ones to prevent the sanboxed thread
from being killed by the seccomp filter
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -85,16 +85,20 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)),
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0),
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
/* Load the syscall number for checking. */
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
SC_DENY(open, EACCES),
SC_ALLOW(getpid),
+ SC_ALLOW(getuid),
+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
+ SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
+#endif
SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
#ifdef __NR_time /* not defined on EABI ARM */
SC_ALLOW(time),
#endif
SC_ALLOW(read),
SC_ALLOW(write),
SC_ALLOW(close),

28
openssh-6.6p1-seccomp_stat.patch
View File

@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 8c8249d4e830ade9dfa1d2294c6218bbe439cb4a
Allow the stat() syscall for OpenSSL re-seed patch
(which causes OpenSSL use stat() on some file)
bnc#912436
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -97,16 +97,17 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
#ifdef __NR_time /* not defined on EABI ARM */
SC_ALLOW(time),
#endif
SC_ALLOW(read),
SC_ALLOW(write),
SC_ALLOW(close),
+ SC_ALLOW(stat),
#ifdef __NR_shutdown /* not defined on archs that go via socketcall(2) */
SC_ALLOW(shutdown),
#endif
SC_ALLOW(brk),
SC_ALLOW(poll),
#ifdef __NR__newselect
SC_ALLOW(_newselect),
#else

542
openssh-6.6p1-seed-prng.patch
View File

@ -1,542 +0,0 @@
# extended support for (re-)seeding the OpenSSL PRNG from /dev/random
# bnc#703221, FATE#312172
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
@@ -504,9 +504,15 @@ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char
/* not implemented */
}
void
audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
{
/* not implemented */
}
+
+void
+audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
#endif /* BSM */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
@@ -398,9 +398,31 @@ audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(cons
}
audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
audit_close(audit_fd);
/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
error("cannot write into audit");
}
+
+void
+audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
+{
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=prng_seed kind=server bytes=%li source=%s ", bytes, rf);
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ error("cannot open audit");
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE_USER,
+ buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ error("cannot write into audit");
+}
#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
@@ -304,10 +304,16 @@ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char
/*
* This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
*/
void
audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
{
debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
}
+
+void
+audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
+{
+ debug("audit PRNG seed euid %d bytes %li source %s", geteuid(), bytes, rf);
+}
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
@@ -63,10 +63,11 @@ void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
void audit_unsupported(int);
void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
void audit_unsupported_body(int);
void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
void audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
void audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
+void audit_linux_prng_seed(long, const char *);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c b/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
@@ -45,16 +45,17 @@
#include "ssh.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "buffer.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h"
/*
* Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding:
* If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from
* /dev/random), then collect RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes of randomness from
* PRNGd.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
@@ -229,11 +230,14 @@ seed_rng(void)
}
if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");
RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
+
+ linux_seed();
+
if (RAND_status() != 1)
fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
}
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
@@ -15,17 +15,17 @@ AR=@AR@
RANLIB=@RANLIB@
INSTALL=@INSTALL@
LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha2.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o explicit_bzero.o
COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
.c.o:
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
all: libopenbsd-compat.a
$(COMPAT): ../config.h
$(OPENBSD): ../config.h
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
+ * (c) 2011 Petr Cerny <pcerny@suse.cz>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "defines.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+
+#define RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT 6L
+#define RNG_ENV_VAR "SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG"
+
+long rand_bytes = 0;
+char *rand_file = NULL;
+
+static void
+linux_seed_init(void)
+{
+ long elen = 0;
+ char *env = getenv(RNG_ENV_VAR);
+
+ if (env) {
+ errno = 0;
+ elen = strtol(env, NULL, 10);
+ if (errno) {
+ debug("bogus value in the %s environment variable, using default %li\n",
+ RNG_ENV_VAR, RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (elen)
+ rand_file = "/dev/random";
+ else
+ rand_file = "/dev/urandom";
+
+ rand_bytes = MAX(elen, RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+void
+linux_seed(void)
+{
+ long len;
+ if (!rand_file)
+ linux_seed_init();
+
+ errno = 0;
+ len = RAND_load_file(rand_file, rand_bytes);
+ if (len != rand_bytes) {
+ if (errno)
+ fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", random, strerror(errno));
+ else
+ fatal ("EOF reading %s", random);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
@@ -14,16 +14,20 @@
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef _PORT_LINUX_H
#define _PORT_LINUX_H
+extern long rand_bytes;
+extern char *rand_file;
+void linux_seed(void);
+
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
#endif
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.1 b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.1
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.1
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.1
@@ -156,16 +156,30 @@ or related script.
(Note that on some machines it
may be necessary to redirect the input from
.Pa /dev/null
to make this work.)
.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
Identifies the path of a
.Ux Ns -domain
socket used to communicate with the agent.
+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
.El
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.1 b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.1
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.1
@@ -196,16 +196,33 @@ Contains the protocol version 2 ED25519
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt
.Ux Ns -domain
sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.1 b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.1
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -827,16 +827,33 @@ on all machines
where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/moduli
Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
The file format is described in
.Xr moduli 5 .
.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr moduli 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Rs
.%R RFC 4716
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keysign.8 b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keysign.8
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keysign.8
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keysign.8
@@ -75,16 +75,33 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authe
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
information corresponding with the private keys above.
.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh HISTORY
.Nm
first appeared in
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.1 b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.1
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.1
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.1
@@ -1304,16 +1304,30 @@ reads
and adds lines of the format
.Dq VARNAME=value
to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to
change their environment.
For more information, see the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa ~/.rhosts
This file is used for host-based authentication (see above).
On some machines this file may need to be
world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
because
.Xr sshd 8
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
@@ -946,16 +946,33 @@ and not group or world-writable.
.It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
Contains the process ID of the
.Nm
listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
started last).
The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
@@ -50,16 +50,18 @@
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h"
+
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
@@ -218,16 +220,23 @@ struct {
Key **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */
Key **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */
int have_ssh1_key;
int have_ssh2_key;
u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
} sensitive_data;
/*
+ * Every RESEED_AFTERth connection triggers call to linux_seed() to re-seed the
+ * random pool.
+ */
+#define RESEED_AFTER 100
+static int re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
+
+/*
* Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
* Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
*/
static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
@@ -1322,16 +1331,21 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
maxfd = startup_p[0];
startups++;
break;
}
+ if(!(--re_seeding_counter)) {
+ re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
+ linux_seed();
+ audit_linux_prng_seed(rand_bytes, rand_file);
+ }
/*
* Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
* we are in debugging mode.
*/
if (debug_flag) {
/*
* In debugging mode. Close the listening

44
openssh-6.6p1-send_locale.patch
View File

@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
# send locales in default configuration
# bnc#65747
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
@@ -58,9 +58,14 @@ ForwardX11Trusted yes
# ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
# Set this to 'yes' to enable support for the deprecated 'gssapi' authentication
# mechanism to OpenSSH 3.8p1. The newer 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism is included
# in this release. The use of 'gssapi' is deprecated due to the presence of
# potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which 'gssapi-with-mic' is not susceptible to.
# GSSAPIEnableMITMAttack no
+# This enables sending locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see ssh_config(5).
+SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
+SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
+SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
+
# RekeyLimit 1G 1h
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
@@ -127,14 +127,19 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox # Defaul
#VersionAddendum none
# no default banner path
#Banner none
# override default of no subsystems
Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
+# This enables accepting locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see sshd_config(5).
+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
+
# Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
#Match User anoncvs
# X11Forwarding no
# AllowTcpForwarding no
# PermitTTY no
# ForceCommand cvs server

155
openssh-6.6p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch
View File

@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
# additional option for sftp-server to force file mode for new files
# FATE#312774
# http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2010-November/029044.html
# http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=128896838930893
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.8 b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.8
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.8
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.8
@@ -33,16 +33,17 @@
.Bk -words
.Op Fl ehR
.Op Fl d Ar start_directory
.Op Fl f Ar log_facility
.Op Fl l Ar log_level
.Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
.Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
.Op Fl u Ar umask
+.Op Fl m Ar force_file_permissions
.Ek
.Nm
.Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
to stdout and expects client requests from stdin.
.Nm
@@ -133,16 +134,20 @@ Places this instance of
into a read-only mode.
Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change
the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
.It Fl u Ar umask
Sets an explicit
.Xr umask 2
to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
user's default mask.
+.It Fl m Ar force_file_permissions
+Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
+of the default or client requested mode. Numeric values include:
+777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc. Option -u is ineffective if -m is set.
.El
.Pp
For logging to work,
.Nm
must be able to access
.Pa /dev/log .
Use of
.Nm
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
@@ -75,16 +75,20 @@ static u_int version;
static int init_done;
/* Disable writes */
static int readonly;
/* Requests that are allowed/denied */
static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist;
+/* Force file permissions */
+int permforce = 0;
+long permforcemode;
+
/* portable attributes, etc. */
typedef struct Stat Stat;
struct Stat {
char *name;
char *long_name;
Attrib attrib;
};
@@ -670,16 +674,20 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
int handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
name = get_string(NULL);
pflags = get_int(); /* portable flags */
debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
a = get_attrib();
flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a->perm : 0666;
+ if (permforce == 1) {
+ mode = permforcemode;
+ (void)umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
+ }
logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
if (readonly &&
((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY ||
(flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) {
verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
} else {
@@ -1425,17 +1433,18 @@ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i)
static void
sftp_server_usage(void)
{
extern char *__progname;
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
"[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
- "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
+ "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n\t"
+ "[-m force_file_permissions]\n",
" %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
__progname, __progname);
exit(1);
}
int
sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
{
@@ -1450,17 +1459,17 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
extern char *__progname;
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
- "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
+ "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'Q':
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n");
exit(1);
}
for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name);
@@ -1510,16 +1519,23 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
case 'u':
errno = 0;
mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0))
fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
break;
+ case 'm':
+ permforce = 1;
+ permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
+ if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
+ cp == optarg || (permforcemode == 0 && errno != 0))
+ fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
+ break;
case 'h':
default:
sftp_server_usage();
}
}
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);

373
openssh-6.6p1-sftp_homechroot.patch
View File

@ -1,373 +0,0 @@
# run sftp sessions inside a chroot
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
@@ -120,16 +120,18 @@ int do_exec(Session *, const char *);
void do_login(Session *, const char *);
#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
static void do_pre_login(Session *s);
#endif
void do_child(Session *, const char *);
void do_motd(void);
int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
+int chroot_no_tree = 0;
+
static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *);
static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *);
static int session_pty_req(Session *);
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern char *__progname;
@@ -827,16 +829,21 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
"subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys);
} else if (command == NULL) {
snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell");
} else {
/* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */
snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command");
}
+ if ((s->is_subsystem != SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) && chroot_no_tree) {
+ logit("You aren't welcomed, go away!");
+ exit (1);
+ }
+
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
tty = s->tty;
if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
tty += 5;
}
verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d",
session_type,
@@ -1463,67 +1470,132 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
fputs(buf, stderr);
fclose(f);
}
exit(254);
}
/*
+ * Test if filesystem is mounted nosuid and nodev
+ */
+
+static void
+test_nosuid (char * path, dev_t fs)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ struct stat st;
+ char buf[4096], *s, *on, *mountpoint, *opt;
+ int nodev, nosuid;
+
+ if (!(f = popen ("/bin/mount", "r")))
+ fatal ("%s: popen(\"/bin/mount\", \"r\"): %s",
+ __func__, strerror (errno));
+ for (;;) {
+ s = fgets (buf, sizeof (buf), f);
+ if (ferror (f))
+ fatal ("%s: read from popen: %s", __func__,
+ strerror (errno));
+ if (!s) {
+ pclose (f);
+ fatal ("cannot find filesystem with the chroot directory");
+ }
+ (void) strtok (buf, " ");
+ on = strtok (NULL, " ");
+ if (strcmp (on, "on")) {
+ pclose (f);
+ fatal ("bad format of mount output");
+ }
+ mountpoint = strtok (NULL, " ");
+ if (memcmp (path, mountpoint, strlen (mountpoint)))
+ continue;
+ if (stat(mountpoint, &st) != 0) {
+ pclose (f);
+ fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
+ mountpoint, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (fs != st.st_dev)
+ continue;
+ nodev = nosuid = 0;
+ for (opt = strtok (NULL, "("); opt; opt = strtok (NULL, " ,)")) {
+ if (!strcmp (opt, "nodev"))
+ nodev = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp (opt, "nosuid"))
+ nosuid = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp (opt, "noexec"))
+ nosuid = 1;
+ if (nodev && nosuid) {
+ pclose (f);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ fatal ("chroot into directory without nodev and either noexec or nosuid");
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components
* must be root-owned directories with strict permissions.
*/
static void
safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
{
const char *cp;
char component[MAXPATHLEN];
struct stat st;
+ int last;
if (*path != '/')
fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
fatal("chroot path too long");
/*
* Descend the path, checking that each component is a
* root-owned directory with strict permissions.
*/
for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
- if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
+ if (((last = ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL))))
strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
else {
cp++;
memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
component[cp - path] = '\0';
}
debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component);
if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
component, strerror(errno));
- if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
+ if ((st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) && !(last && st.st_uid == uid))
fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
"directory %s\"%s\"",
cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
-
+ }
+ setenv ("TZ", "/etc/localtime", 0);
+ tzset();
+
+ if (st.st_uid) {
+ test_nosuid(path, st.st_dev);
+ ++chroot_no_tree;
}
if (chdir(path) == -1)
fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
"%s", path, strerror(errno));
if (chroot(path) == -1)
fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
if (chdir("/") == -1)
fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
+
verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path);
}
/* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
void
do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
{
char *chroot_path, *tmp;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-chrootenv.h b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-chrootenv.h
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-chrootenv.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F Chadima. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef CHROOTENV_H
+#define CHROOTENV_H
+
+extern int chroot_no_tree;
+
+#endif
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-common.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-common.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-common.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-common.c
@@ -42,16 +42,17 @@
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-chrootenv.h"
/* Clear contents of attributes structure */
void
attrib_clear(Attrib *a)
{
a->flags = 0;
a->size = 0;
a->uid = 0;
@@ -193,23 +194,23 @@ ls_file(const char *name, const struct s
int ulen, glen, sz = 0;
struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime);
char *user, *group;
char buf[1024], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1];
char sbuf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
time_t now;
strmode(st->st_mode, mode);
- if (!remote) {
+ if (!remote && !chroot_no_tree) {
user = user_from_uid(st->st_uid, 0);
} else {
snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid);
user = ubuf;
}
- if (!remote) {
+ if (!remote && !chroot_no_tree) {
group = group_from_gid(st->st_gid, 0);
} else {
snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid);
group = gbuf;
}
if (ltime != NULL) {
now = time(NULL);
if (now - (365*24*60*60)/2 < st->st_mtime &&
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server-main.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
@@ -17,21 +17,24 @@
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#include <time.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "misc.h"
+int chroot_no_tree = 0;
+
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(i);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp.c
@@ -109,16 +109,18 @@ struct complete_ctx {
char **remote_pathp;
};
int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
extern char *__progname;
+int chroot_no_tree = 0;
+
/* Separators for interactive commands */
#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
/* ls flags */
#define LS_LONG_VIEW 0x0001 /* Full view ala ls -l */
#define LS_SHORT_VIEW 0x0002 /* Single row view ala ls -1 */
#define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW 0x0004 /* Long view with numeric uid/gid */
#define LS_NAME_SORT 0x0008 /* Sort by name (default) */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0
@@ -189,16 +189,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
session this requires at least a shell, typically sh(1), and
basic /dev nodes such as null(4), zero(4), stdin(4), stdout(4),
stderr(4), arandom(4) and tty(4) devices. For file transfer
sessions using ``sftp'', no additional configuration of the
environment is necessary if the in-process sftp server is used,
though sessions which use logging do require /dev/log inside the
chroot directory (see sftp-server(8) for details).
+ In the special case when only sftp is used, not ssh nor scp, it
+ is possible to use ChrootDirectory %h or ChrootDirectory
+ /some/path/%u. The file system containing this directory must be
+ mounted with options nodev and either nosuid or noexec. The owner
+ of the directory should be the user. The ownership of the other
+ components of the path must fulfill the usual conditions. No adi-
+ tional files are required to be present in the directory.
+
The default is not to chroot(2).
Ciphers
Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2. Multiple
ciphers must be comma-separated. The supported ciphers are:
``3des-cbc'', ``aes128-cbc'', ``aes192-cbc'', ``aes256-cbc'',
``aes128-ctr'', ``aes192-ctr'', ``aes256-ctr'',
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
@@ -324,16 +324,27 @@ For file transfer sessions using
no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the
in-process sftp server is used,
though sessions which use logging do require
.Pa /dev/log
inside the chroot directory (see
.Xr sftp-server 8
for details).
.Pp
+In the special case when only sftp is used, not ssh nor scp,
+it is possible to use
+.Cm ChrootDirectory
+%h or
+.Cm ChrootDirectory
+/some/path/%u. The file system containing this directory must be
+mounted with options nodev and either nosuid or noexec. The owner of the
+directory should be the user. The ownership of the other components of the path
+must fulfill the usual conditions. No aditional files are required to be present
+in the directory.
+.Pp
The default is not to
.Xr chroot 2 .
.It Cm Ciphers
Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2.
Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
The supported ciphers are:
.Pp
.Dq 3des-cbc ,

3
openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz
View File

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:48c1f0664b4534875038004cc4f3555b8329c2a81c1df48db5c517800de203bb
size 1282502

14
openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz.asc
View File

@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (OpenBSD)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=H2K/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

20
openssh-6.6p1-X11-forwarding.patch → openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
View File

@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent e75958369c26f618744c229ef1a9925d8ccb1dcb
# enable trusted X11 forwarding by default in both sshd and sshsystem-wide # enable trusted X11 forwarding by default in both sshd and sshsystem-wide
# configuration # configuration
# bnc#50836 (was suse #35836) # bnc#50836 (was suse #35836)
Enable Trusted X11 forwarding by default, since the security benefits of
having it disabled are negligible these days with XI2 being widely used.
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config --- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
@@ -12,19 +12,30 @@ @@ -12,19 +12,30 @@
# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
@ -26,7 +30,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
+# keystrokes as you type, just like any other X11 client could do. +# keystrokes as you type, just like any other X11 client could do.
+# Set this to "no" here for global effect or in your own ~/.ssh/config +# Set this to "no" here for global effect or in your own ~/.ssh/config
+# file if you want to have the remote X11 authentification data to +# file if you want to have the remote X11 authentification data to
+# expire after two minutes after remote login. +# expire after twenty minutes after remote login.
+ ForwardX11Trusted yes + ForwardX11Trusted yes
+ +
# RhostsRSAAuthentication no # RhostsRSAAuthentication no
@ -37,9 +41,9 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
# GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
# BatchMode no # BatchMode no
# CheckHostIP yes # CheckHostIP yes
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config --- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
@@ -94,17 +94,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys @@ -94,17 +94,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
@ -58,4 +62,4 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
#PrintLastLog yes #PrintLastLog yes
#TCPKeepAlive yes #TCPKeepAlive yes
#UseLogin no #UseLogin no
UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox # Default for new installations. #UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox

95
openssh-7.2p2-allow_root_password_login.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent dff5e86b989543049cc51bb57e75a63c1942cda3
Allow root login with password by default. While less secure than upstream
default of forbidding access to the root account with a password, we are
temporarily introducing this change to keep the default used in older OpenSSH
versions shipped with SLE.
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
@@ -233,17 +233,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE);
if (options->server_key_bits == -1)
options->server_key_bits = 1024;
if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
options->login_grace_time = 120;
if (options->key_regeneration_time == -1)
options->key_regeneration_time = 3600;
if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
- options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
+ options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_YES;
if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
if (options->print_motd == -1)
options->print_motd = 1;
if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
options->print_lastlog = 1;
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
@@ -36,17 +36,17 @@
# Logging
# obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
#SyslogFacility AUTH
#LogLevel INFO
# Authentication:
#LoginGraceTime 2m
-#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
+#PermitRootLogin yes
#StrictModes yes
#MaxAuthTries 6
#MaxSessions 10
#RSAAuthentication yes
#PubkeyAuthentication yes
# The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
@@ -710,17 +710,17 @@ DESCRIPTION
restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of
M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. By
default all port forwarding requests are permitted.
PermitRootLogin
Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1). The argument
must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\without-passwordM-bM-^@M-^],
M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is
- M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^].
+ M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^] or
M-bM-^@M-^\without-passwordM-bM-^@M-^], password and keyboard-interactive
authentication are disabled for root.
If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^], root login with
public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the
command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
@@ -1213,17 +1213,17 @@ Specifies whether root can log in using
The argument must be
.Dq yes ,
.Dq prohibit-password ,
.Dq without-password ,
.Dq forced-commands-only ,
or
.Dq no .
The default is
-.Dq prohibit-password .
+.Dq yes .
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Dq prohibit-password
or
.Dq without-password ,
password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root.
.Pp
If this option is set to

23
openssh-6.6p1-blocksigalrm.patch → openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch
View File

@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
# block SIGALRM while logging through syslog to prevent deadlocks (through # HG changeset patch
# grace_alarm_handler) # Parent a80e23747c8fbba7302c5a7ccb6b206d96093e42
# bnc#57354 block SIGALRM while logging through syslog to prevent deadlocks
(through grace_alarm_handler())
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/log.c b/openssh-6.6p1/log.c bnc#57354
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/log.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/log.c diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/log.c b/openssh-7.2p2/log.c
@@ -47,16 +47,17 @@ --- a/openssh-7.2p2/log.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/log.c
@@ -46,16 +46,17 @@
#include <syslog.h>
#include <unistd.h> #include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h> #include <errno.h>
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
# include <vis.h> # include <vis.h>
#endif #endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h" #include "log.h"
+#include <signal.h> +#include <signal.h>
@ -23,7 +26,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/log.c b/openssh-6.6p1/log.c
static char *argv0; static char *argv0;
static log_handler_fn *log_handler; static log_handler_fn *log_handler;
static void *log_handler_ctx; static void *log_handler_ctx;
@@ -384,16 +385,17 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, @@ -383,16 +384,17 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt,
{ {
#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT; struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
@ -41,7 +44,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/log.c b/openssh-6.6p1/log.c
switch (level) { switch (level) {
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL: case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
@@ -442,20 +444,29 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, @@ -441,20 +443,29 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt,
tmp_handler = log_handler; tmp_handler = log_handler;
log_handler = NULL; log_handler = NULL;
tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx); tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);

345
openssh-7.2p2-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 7e46491ef372d47617499c58acf2ea66216858d2
Raise minimal size of DH group parameters to 2048 bits like upstream did in
7.2. 1024b values are believed to be in breaking range for state adversaries
and the default moduli shipped with openssh have been around long enough to
make it more likely for them to be broken.
Also provide an option that allows the client to accept shorter (RFC4419
compliant) parameters.
CVE-2015-4000 (LOGJAM)
bsc#932483
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c
@@ -37,16 +37,18 @@
#include <limits.h>
#include "dh.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
+int dh_grp_min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+
static int
parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg)
{
char *cp, *arg;
char *strsize, *gen, *prime;
const char *errstr = NULL;
long long n;
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h
@@ -43,16 +43,17 @@ int dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);
u_int dh_estimate(int);
/*
* Max value from RFC4419.
* Miniumum increased in light of DH precomputation attacks.
*/
+#define DH_GRP_MIN_RFC 1024
#define DH_GRP_MIN 2048
#define DH_GRP_MAX 8192
/*
* Values for "type" field of moduli(5)
* Specifies the internal structure of the prime modulus.
*/
#define MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN (0)
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c
@@ -46,29 +46,32 @@
#include "packet.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
+/* import from dh.c */
+extern int dh_grp_min;
+
static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, void *);
static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, void *);
int
kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
u_int nbits;
nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
- kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+ kex->min = dh_grp_min;
kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
kex->nbits = nbits;
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE)
kex->nbits = MIN(kex->nbits, 4096);
/* New GEX request */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
@@ -104,16 +107,22 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, g)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((bits = BN_num_bits(p)) < 0 ||
(u_int)bits < kex->min || (u_int)bits > kex->max) {
+ if (bits < kex->min && bits >= DH_GRP_MIN_RFC)
+ logit("DH parameter offered by the server (%d bits) "
+ "is considered insecure. "
+ "You can lower the accepted the minimum "
+ "via the KexDHMin option.",
+ bits);
r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
goto out;
}
if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
@@ -56,16 +56,17 @@
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "digest.h"
+#include "dh.h"
/* Format of the configuration file:
# Configuration data is parsed as follows:
# 1. command line options
# 2. user-specific file
# 3. system-wide file
# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
@@ -148,17 +149,18 @@ typedef enum {
oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
oHashKnownHosts,
oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
oVisualHostKey,
- oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
+ oKexAlgorithms, oKexDHMin,
+ oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes,
oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
} OpCodes;
@@ -260,16 +262,17 @@ static struct {
{ "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts },
{ "tunnel", oTunnel },
{ "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice },
{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
{ "useroaming", oDeprecated },
{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
+ { "kexdhmin", oKexDHMin },
{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
{ "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass },
{ "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains },
{ "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal },
{ "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname },
{ "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots },
{ "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs },
@@ -280,16 +283,19 @@ static struct {
{ "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys },
{ "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes },
{ "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
{ "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
{ NULL, oBadOption }
};
+/* import from dh.c */
+extern int dh_grp_min;
+
/*
* Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an
* error.
*/
void
add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
{
@@ -1157,16 +1163,20 @@ parse_int:
filename, linenum);
if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
break;
+ case oKexDHMin:
+ intptr = &options->kex_dhmin;
+ goto parse_int;
+
case oHostKeyAlgorithms:
charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
parse_keytypes:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
@@ -1664,16 +1674,17 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
options->address_family = -1;
options->connection_attempts = -1;
options->connection_timeout = -1;
options->number_of_password_prompts = -1;
options->cipher = -1;
options->ciphers = NULL;
options->macs = NULL;
options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ options->kex_dhmin = -1;
options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
options->num_identity_files = 0;
options->num_certificate_files = 0;
options->hostname = NULL;
options->host_key_alias = NULL;
options->proxy_command = NULL;
options->user = NULL;
@@ -1805,16 +1816,23 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
if (options->connection_attempts == -1)
options->connection_attempts = 1;
if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1)
options->number_of_password_prompts = 3;
/* Selected in ssh_login(). */
if (options->cipher == -1)
options->cipher = SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET;
+ if (options->kex_dhmin == -1)
+ options->kex_dhmin = DH_GRP_MIN;
+ else {
+ options->kex_dhmin = MAX(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC);
+ options->kex_dhmin = MIN(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX);
+ }
+ dh_grp_min = options->kex_dhmin;
/* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1)
options->add_keys_to_agent = 0;
if (options->num_identity_files == 0) {
if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
add_identity_file(options, "~/",
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h
@@ -69,16 +69,17 @@ typedef struct {
* aborting connection attempt */
int number_of_password_prompts; /* Max number of password
* prompts. */
int cipher; /* Cipher to use. */
char *ciphers; /* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */
char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */
char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */
char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
+ int kex_dhmin; /* minimum bit length of the DH group parameter */
int protocol; /* Protocol in order of preference. */
char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */
char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
char *user; /* User to log in as. */
int escape_char; /* Escape character; -2 = none */
u_int num_system_hostfiles; /* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0
@@ -606,16 +606,29 @@ DESCRIPTION
ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\kexM-bM-^@M-^].
+ KexDHMin
+ Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group parameter p.
+ As per RFC4419, this is 1024 bits however, this has increasingly
+ been seen as insecure, which prompted the change to 2048 bits.
+ Setting this option allows the client to accept parameters shorter
+ than the current minimum, down to the RFC specified 1024 bits.
+ Using this option may be needed when connecting to servers that
+ only know short DH group parameters.
+
+ Note that using this option can severly impact security and thus
+ should be viewed as a temporary fix of last resort and all efforts
+ should be made to fix the server.
+
LocalCommand
Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after
successfully connecting to the server. The command string
extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's
shell. The following escape character substitutions will be
performed: M-bM-^@M-^X%dM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user's home directory), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote host
name), M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y (local host name), M-bM-^@M-^X%nM-bM-^@M-^Y (host name as provided on the
command line), M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote port), M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote user name) or
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
@@ -1092,16 +1092,28 @@ diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using the
.Fl Q
option of
.Xr ssh 1
with an argument of
.Dq kex .
+.It Cm KexDHMin
+Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group parameter p.
+As per RFC4419, this is 1024 bits however, this has increasingly
+been seen as insecure, which prompted the change to 2048 bits.
+Setting this option allows the client to accept parameters shorter
+than the current minimum, down to the RFC specified 1024 bits.
+Using this option may be needed when connecting to servers that
+only know short DH group parameters.
+
+Note that using this option can severly impact security and thus
+should be viewed as a temporary fix of last resort and all efforts
+should be made to fix the server.
.It Cm LocalCommand
Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully
connecting to the server.
The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
the user's shell.
The following escape character substitutions will be performed:
.Ql %d
(local user's home directory),

10
openssh-6.6p1-pam-fix3.patch → openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch
View File

@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 779a907d59d4907d10a8f0b3f52a38d8bdf115b6
# posix threads are generally not supported nor safe # posix threads are generally not supported nor safe
# (see upstream log from 2005-05-24) # (see upstream log from 2005-05-24)
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-pam.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-pam.c diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-pam.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-pam.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
@@ -781,17 +781,19 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha @@ -782,17 +782,19 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
} }
if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) { if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid || if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||

34
openssh-6.6p1-eal3.patch → openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch
View File

@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
# fix paths and references in sshd man pages # HG changeset patch
# Parent 8a9b47df710e3a0bbea4af0f9274bb175944a8a9
fix paths and references in sshd man pages
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
@@ -875,17 +875,17 @@ See @@ -901,17 +901,17 @@ See
If this file exists, If this file exists,
.Nm .Nm
refuses to let anyone except root log in. refuses to let anyone except root log in.
@ -22,7 +24,8 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
@@ -956,17 +956,17 @@ The content of this file is not sensitiv @@ -981,17 +981,17 @@ The content of this file is not sensitiv
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr sftp 1 , .Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
@ -30,7 +33,6 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 , .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
.Xr chroot 2 , .Xr chroot 2 ,
.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
-.Xr login.conf 5 , -.Xr login.conf 5 ,
+.Xr login.defs 5 , +.Xr login.defs 5 ,
.Xr moduli 5 , .Xr moduli 5 ,
@ -41,19 +43,19 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
@@ -278,18 +278,17 @@ The contents of the specified file are s @@ -370,18 +370,17 @@ for details).
The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before
authentication is allowed. authentication is allowed.
If the argument is If the argument is
.Dq none .Dq none
then no banner is displayed. then no banner is displayed.
This option is only available for protocol version 2.
By default, no banner is displayed. By default, no banner is displayed.
.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
-PAM or though authentication styles supported in -PAM or through authentication styles supported in
-.Xr login.conf 5 ) -.Xr login.conf 5 )
+PAM) +PAM)
The default is The default is
@ -62,9 +64,9 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
Specifies the pathname of a directory to Specifies the pathname of a directory to
.Xr chroot 2 .Xr chroot 2
to after authentication. to after authentication.
All components of the pathname must be root-owned directories that are At session startup
not writable by any other user or group. .Xr sshd 8
@@ -576,17 +575,17 @@ and @@ -766,17 +765,17 @@ and
.Pa .shosts .Pa .shosts
files will not be used in files will not be used in
.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication

8
openssh-6.6p1-pam-fix2.patch → openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
View File

@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 40536816550c893d5ee67f90f3a917e79f73a163
# force PAM in defaullt install (this was removed from upstream in 3.8p1) # force PAM in defaullt install (this was removed from upstream in 3.8p1)
# bnc#46749 # bnc#46749
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config --- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
@@ -64,17 +64,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys @@ -64,17 +64,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
#HostbasedAuthentication no #HostbasedAuthentication no
# Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for # Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for

27
openssh-6.6p1-xauthlocalhostname.patch → openssh-7.2p2-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
View File

@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
# handle hostname changes when forwarding X # HG changeset patch
# bnc#98627 # Parent d5e9457ee640bdd816edb9c67792cddb00c229b9
handle hostname changes when forwarding X
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c bnc#98627
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
@@ -1146,17 +1146,17 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char *** --- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
@@ -1154,17 +1154,17 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char ***
debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val); debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val); child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
@ -23,7 +26,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN) #if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
char *path = NULL; char *path = NULL;
#endif #endif
@@ -1333,25 +1333,27 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she @@ -1341,25 +1341,27 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf); read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
} }
if (debug_flag) { if (debug_flag) {
@ -52,7 +55,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
do_xauth = do_xauth =
s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL; s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
@@ -1395,22 +1397,30 @@ do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shel @@ -1404,22 +1406,30 @@ do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shel
"%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n", "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
options.xauth_location, s->auth_display, options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
@ -83,7 +86,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
} }
static void static void
@@ -1664,16 +1674,17 @@ child_close_fds(void) @@ -1681,16 +1691,17 @@ child_close_fds(void)
* ids, and executing the command or shell. * ids, and executing the command or shell.
*/ */
#define ARGV_MAX 10 #define ARGV_MAX 10
@ -101,7 +104,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
destroy_sensitive_data(); destroy_sensitive_data();
@@ -1730,17 +1741,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command @@ -1747,17 +1758,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
* legal, and means /bin/sh. * legal, and means /bin/sh.
*/ */
shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell; shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
@ -120,8 +123,8 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
/* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */ /* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */
if (options.use_login) if (options.use_login)
hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
@@ -1799,17 +1810,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command @@ -1816,17 +1827,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
strerror(errno)); }
if (r) if (r)
exit(1); exit(1);
} }

10
openssh-6.6p1-lastlog.patch → openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch
View File

@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 9b5b0f2772591aaeb0ecd4c982a9d64242ed6c8b
# set uid for functions that use it to seek in lastlog and wtmp files # set uid for functions that use it to seek in lastlog and wtmp files
# bnc#18024 (was suse #3024) # bnc#18024 (was suse #3024)
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshlogin.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshlogin.c diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshlogin.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshlogin.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c
@@ -128,16 +128,17 @@ record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty, @@ -129,16 +129,17 @@ record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty,
{ {
struct logininfo *li; struct logininfo *li;

75
openssh-6.6p1-pam-check-locks.patch → openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch
View File

@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
# new option UsePAMCheckLocks to enforce checking for locked accounts while # HG changeset patch
# UsePAM is used # Parent 9b211a1de83fa39e4b7bb36c8bd1b5fdc2bd8085
# bnc#708678, FATE#312033 new option UsePAMCheckLocks to enforce checking for locked accounts while
UsePAM is used
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c bnc#708678, FATE#312033
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
@@ -103,17 +103,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) --- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
@@ -104,17 +104,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
struct spwd *spw = NULL; struct spwd *spw = NULL;
#endif #endif
@ -24,7 +27,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c
#endif /* USE_SHADOW */ #endif /* USE_SHADOW */
/* grab passwd field for locked account check */ /* grab passwd field for locked account check */
@@ -123,17 +123,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) @@ -124,17 +124,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF #ifdef USE_LIBIAF
passwd = get_iaf_password(pw); passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
#else #else
@ -43,10 +46,10 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c
#endif #endif
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX, if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
@@ -66,16 +66,17 @@ extern Buffer cfg; @@ -69,16 +69,17 @@ extern Buffer cfg;
void void
initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
@ -60,16 +63,16 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
/* Standard Options */ /* Standard Options */
options->num_ports = 0; options->num_ports = 0;
options->ports_from_cmdline = 0; options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL;
options->num_queued_listens = 0;
options->listen_addrs = NULL; options->listen_addrs = NULL;
options->address_family = -1; options->address_family = -1;
options->num_host_key_files = 0; @@ -195,16 +196,18 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
options->num_host_cert_files = 0;
@@ -157,16 +158,18 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
}
void void
fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
{ {
int i;
/* Portable-specific options */ /* Portable-specific options */
if (options->use_pam == -1) if (options->use_pam == -1)
options->use_pam = 0; options->use_pam = 0;
@ -83,7 +86,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */ /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
@@ -317,17 +320,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption @@ -391,17 +394,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
#endif #endif
} }
@ -95,14 +98,14 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
- sUsePAM, - sUsePAM,
+ sUsePAM, sUsePAMChecklocks, + sUsePAM, sUsePAMChecklocks,
/* Standard Options */ /* Standard Options */
sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime, sKeyRegenerationTime, sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime,
sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sKeyRegenerationTime, sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication, sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosGetAFSToken,
sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication, sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
@@ -362,18 +365,20 @@ typedef enum { @@ -441,18 +444,20 @@ typedef enum {
static struct { static struct {
const char *name; const char *name;
ServerOpCodes opcode; ServerOpCodes opcode;
@ -123,7 +126,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
{ "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ { "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
{ "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -870,16 +875,19 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions @@ -1005,16 +1010,19 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
} }
} }
@ -143,10 +146,10 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
/* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */ /* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
if (options->ports_from_cmdline) if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
return 0; return 0;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h --- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
@@ -160,16 +160,17 @@ typedef struct { @@ -167,16 +167,17 @@ typedef struct {
*/ */
u_int num_authkeys_files; /* Files containing public keys */ u_int num_authkeys_files; /* Files containing public keys */
@ -164,17 +167,17 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h
char *chroot_directory; char *chroot_directory;
char *revoked_keys_file; char *revoked_keys_file;
char *trusted_user_ca_keys; char *trusted_user_ca_keys;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
@@ -728,16 +728,24 @@ DESCRIPTION @@ -946,16 +946,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an
equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable
either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication. either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
non-root user. The default is ``no''. non-root user. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+ UsePAMCheckLocks + UsePAMCheckLocks
+ When set to ``yes'', the checks whether the account has been + When set to ``yes'', the checks whether the account has been
@ -191,11 +194,11 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0
that has the privilege of the authenticated user. The goal of that has the privilege of the authenticated user. The goal of
privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by
containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes. The containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes. The
default is ``yes''. If UsePrivilegeSeparation is set to argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\sandboxM-bM-^@M-^]. If
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
@@ -1214,16 +1214,28 @@ or @@ -1578,16 +1578,28 @@ or
.Pp .Pp
If If
.Cm UsePAM .Cm UsePAM

12
openssh-6.6p1-pts.patch → openssh-7.2p2-pts_names_formatting.patch
View File

@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 94fb9a9ff763462af43304fc73c2913a07829226
# use same lines naming as utempter (prevents problems with using different # use same lines naming as utempter (prevents problems with using different
# formats in ?tmp? files) # formats in ?tmp? files)
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/loginrec.c b/openssh-6.6p1/loginrec.c diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c b/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/loginrec.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/loginrec.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c
@@ -538,17 +538,17 @@ getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li) @@ -541,17 +541,17 @@ getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
/* /*
* 'line' string utility functions * 'line' string utility functions
* *
@ -23,7 +25,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/loginrec.c b/openssh-6.6p1/loginrec.c
*/ */
@@ -599,16 +599,20 @@ line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *s @@ -602,16 +602,20 @@ line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *s
/* Always skip prefix if present */ /* Always skip prefix if present */
if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
src += 5; src += 5;

37
openssh-6.6p1-xauth.patch → openssh-7.2p2-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
View File

@ -1,24 +1,23 @@
# try to remove xauth cookies on logout # HG changeset patch
# bnc#98815 # Parent c7d5ac7548d3bc695559aee7e28569e422b6aadf
try to remove xauth cookies on logout
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c bnc#98815
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
@@ -2510,18 +2510,50 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta
if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
chan_write_failed(c);
}
void diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
session_close(Session *s) --- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
{ +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
@@ -2540,16 +2540,44 @@ session_close(Session *s)
u_int i; u_int i;
+ int do_xauth;
debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid); verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+ s->pw->pw_name,
+ do_xauth = (s->display != NULL) && (s->auth_proto != NULL) && (s->auth_data != NULL); get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) { get_remote_port(),
s->self);
+ if ((s->display != NULL) && (s->auth_proto != NULL) &&
+ (s->auth_data != NULL) && (options.xauth_location != NULL)) {
+ pid_t pid; + pid_t pid;
+ FILE *f; + FILE *f;
+ char cmd[1024]; + char cmd[1024];
@ -41,9 +40,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
+ error("Could not run %s\n", cmd); + error("Could not run %s\n", cmd);
+ exit(0); + exit(0);
+ } else if (pid > 0) { + } else if (pid > 0) {
+ int status; + waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+
+ waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
+ } + }
+ } + }
+ +

31
openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 4f03a27aa55b0beebf232844353779e182cd2497
add 'getuid' syscall to list of allowed ones to prevent the sanboxed thread
from being killed by the seccomp filter
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -142,16 +142,22 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpgid
SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpid
SC_ALLOW(getpid),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getuid
+ SC_ALLOW(getuid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
+ SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_getrandom
SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_madvise
SC_ALLOW(madvise),

30
openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 51a94ce61ff5c6908d747d8bc5806e18c6f5c114
Allow the stat() syscall for OpenSSL re-seed patch
(which causes OpenSSL use stat() on some file)
bnc#912436
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -130,16 +130,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
SC_ALLOW(brk),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_close
SC_ALLOW(close),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_stat
+ SC_ALLOW(stat),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_exit
SC_ALLOW(exit),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_exit_group
SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpgid
SC_ALLOW(getpgid),

53
openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent fdeedfd2266d642837d86b9b7b3cdc6c00e9535d
send locales in default configuration
bnc#65747
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
@@ -26,16 +26,21 @@ Host *
# security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the
# remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your
# keystrokes as you type, just like any other X11 client could do.
# Set this to "no" here for global effect or in your own ~/.ssh/config
# file if you want to have the remote X11 authentification data to
# expire after twenty minutes after remote login.
ForwardX11Trusted yes
+# This enables sending locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see ssh_config(5).
+ SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
+ SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
+ SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
+
# RhostsRSAAuthentication no
# RSAAuthentication yes
# PasswordAuthentication yes
# HostbasedAuthentication no
# GSSAPIAuthentication no
# GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
# BatchMode no
# CheckHostIP yes
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
@@ -120,14 +120,19 @@ X11Forwarding yes
#VersionAddendum none
# no default banner path
#Banner none
# override default of no subsystems
Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
+# This enables accepting locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see sshd_config(5).
+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
+
# Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
#Match User anoncvs
# X11Forwarding no
# AllowTcpForwarding no
# PermitTTY no
# ForceCommand cvs server

3
openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:a72781d1a043876a224ff1b0032daa4094d87565a68528759c1c2cab5482548c
size 1499808

10
openssh-askpass-gnome.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Sun Apr 17 23:27:51 UTC 2016 - pcerny@suse.com
- upgrade to 7.2p2
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Feb 10 13:28:56 UTC 2015 - pcerny@suse.com
- changing license to 2-clause BSD to match source
------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Apr 11 21:50:51 UTC 2014 - pcerny@suse.com Fri Apr 11 21:50:51 UTC 2014 - pcerny@suse.com

4
openssh-askpass-gnome.spec
View File

@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ BuildRequires: openssl-devel
BuildRequires: pam-devel BuildRequires: pam-devel
BuildRequires: tcpd-devel BuildRequires: tcpd-devel
BuildRequires: update-desktop-files BuildRequires: update-desktop-files
Version: 6.6p1 Version: 7.2p2
Release: 0 Release: 0
Requires: openssh = %{version} Requires: openssh = %{version}
Summary: A GNOME-Based Passphrase Dialog for OpenSSH Summary: A GNOME-Based Passphrase Dialog for OpenSSH
License: BSD-3-Clause License: BSD-2-Clause
Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH
Url: http://www.openssh.com/ Url: http://www.openssh.com/
%define _name openssh %define _name openssh

37
openssh.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,40 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon May 30 00:30:16 UTC 2016 - pcerny@suse.com
- enable trusted X11 forwarding by default
[-X11_trusted_forwarding]
- set UID for lastlog properly [-lastlog]
- enable use of PAM by default [-enable_PAM_by_default]
- copy command line arguments properly [-saveargv-fix]
- do not use pthreads in PAM code [-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM]
- fix paths in documentation [-eal3]
- prevent race consitions triggered by SIGALRM [-blocksigalrm]
- do send and accept locale environment variables by default
[-send_locale]
- handle hostnames changes during X forwarding
[-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X]
- try to remove xauth cookies on exit
[-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit]
- properly format pts names for ?tmp? log files
[-pts_names_formatting]
- check locked accounts when using PAM [-pam_check_locks]
- chenge default PermitRootLogin to 'yes' to prevent unwanted
surprises on updates from older versions.
See README.SUSE for details
[-allow_root_password_login]
- Disable DH parameters under 2048 bits by default and allow
lowering the limit back to the RFC 4419 specified minimum
through an option (bsc#932483, bsc#948902)
[-disable_short_DH_parameters]
- Add getuid() and stat() syscalls to the seccomp filter
(bsc#912436)
[-seccomp_getuid, -seccomp_stat]
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri May 27 23:27:51 UTC 2016 - pcerny@suse.com
- upgrade to 7.2p2 - upstream package without any SUSE patches
------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Apr 29 15:56:38 UTC 2016 - pcerny@suse.com Fri Apr 29 15:56:38 UTC 2016 - pcerny@suse.com

75
openssh.keyring
View File

@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: GnuPG v2
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-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

207
openssh.spec
View File

@ -86,25 +86,19 @@ BuildRequires: pam-devel
%if %{uses_systemd} %if %{uses_systemd}
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(systemd) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(systemd)
%{?systemd_requires} %{?systemd_requires}
%else
PreReq: %{insserv_prereq}
%endif %endif
PreReq: pwdutils %{fillup_prereq} coreutils BuildRequires: tcpd-devel
Conflicts: nonfreessh PreReq: pwdutils %{insserv_prereq} %{fillup_prereq} coreutils
Recommends: xauth Version: 7.2p2
Recommends: %{name}-helpers
Version: 6.6p1
Release: 0 Release: 0
Summary: Secure Shell Client and Server (Remote Login Program) Summary: Secure Shell Client and Server (Remote Login Program)
License: BSD-3-Clause and MIT License: BSD-2-Clause and MIT
Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH
Url: http://www.openssh.com/ Url: http://www.openssh.com/
Source: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz Source: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
Source42: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
Source43: openssh.keyring
Source1: sshd.init Source1: sshd.init
Source2: sshd.pamd Source2: sshd.pamd
Source3: README.SuSE Source3: README.SUSE
Source4: README.kerberos Source4: README.kerberos
Source5: ssh.reg Source5: ssh.reg
Source6: ssh-askpass Source6: ssh-askpass
@ -112,49 +106,31 @@ Source7: sshd.fw
Source8: sysconfig.ssh Source8: sysconfig.ssh
Source9: sshd-gen-keys-start Source9: sshd-gen-keys-start
Source10: sshd.service Source10: sshd.service
Patch0: openssh-6.6p1-curve25519-6.6.1p1.patch Source11: README.FIPS
Patch1: openssh-6.6p1-key-converter.patch Source12: cavs_driver-ssh.pl
Patch2: openssh-6.6p1-X11-forwarding.patch Patch00: openssh-7.2p2-allow_root_password_login.patch
Patch3: openssh-6.6p1-lastlog.patch Patch01: openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
Patch4: openssh-6.6p1-pam-fix2.patch Patch02: openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch
Patch5: openssh-6.6p1-saveargv-fix.patch Patch03: openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
Patch6: openssh-6.6p1-pam-fix3.patch Patch04: openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch
Patch7: openssh-6.6p1-gssapimitm.patch Patch05: openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch
Patch8: openssh-6.6p1-eal3.patch Patch06: openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch
Patch9: openssh-6.6p1-blocksigalrm.patch Patch07: openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch
Patch10: openssh-6.6p1-send_locale.patch Patch08: openssh-7.2p2-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
Patch11: openssh-6.6p1-xauthlocalhostname.patch Patch09: openssh-7.2p2-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
Patch12: openssh-6.6p1-xauth.patch Patch10: openssh-7.2p2-pts_names_formatting.patch
Patch13: openssh-6.6p1-default-protocol.patch Patch11: openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch
Patch14: openssh-6.6p1-pts.patch Patch12: openssh-7.2p2-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
Patch15: openssh-6.6p1-pam-check-locks.patch Patch13: openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch
Patch16: openssh-6.6p1-fingerprint_hash.patch Patch14: openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch
Patch17: openssh-6.6p1-fips.patch
Patch18: openssh-6.6p1-audit1-remove_duplicit_audit.patch
Patch19: openssh-6.6p1-audit2-better_audit_of_user_actions.patch
Patch20: openssh-6.6p1-audit3-key_auth_usage.patch
Patch21: openssh-6.6p1-audit3-key_auth_usage-fips.patch
Patch22: openssh-6.6p1-audit4-kex_results.patch
Patch23: openssh-6.6p1-audit4-kex_results-fips.patch
Patch24: openssh-6.6p1-audit5-session_key_destruction.patch
Patch25: openssh-6.6p1-audit6-server_key_destruction.patch
Patch26: openssh-6.6p1-audit7-libaudit_compat.patch
Patch27: openssh-6.6p1-audit8-libaudit_dns_timeouts.patch
Patch28: openssh-6.6p1-seed-prng.patch
Patch29: openssh-6.6p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
Patch30: openssh-6.6p1-login_options.patch
Patch31: openssh-6.6p1-disable-openssl-abi-check.patch
Patch32: openssh-6.6p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
Patch33: openssh-6.6p1-host_ident.patch
Patch34: openssh-6.6p1-sftp_homechroot.patch
Patch35: openssh-6.6p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch
Patch36: openssh-6.6p1-seccomp_getuid.patch
Patch37: openssh-6.6p1-seccomp_stat.patch
Patch38: openssh-6.6p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
Patch39: openssh-6.6p1-fips-checks.patch
Patch40: openssh-6.6p1-ldap.patch
Patch41: CVE-2016-0777_CVE-2016-0778.patch
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
Conflicts: nonfreessh
Recommends: audit
Recommends: xauth
Recommends: %{name}-helpers = %{version}-%{release}
Conflicts: %{name}-fips < %{version}-%{release} , %{name}-fips > %{version}-%{release}
%define CHECKSUM_SUFFIX .hmac
%define CHECKSUM_HMAC_KEY "HMAC_KEY:OpenSSH-FIPS@SLE"
%description %description
SSH (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into and executing commands SSH (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into and executing commands
@ -169,76 +145,58 @@ also be forwarded over the secure channel.
%package helpers %package helpers
Summary: OpenSSH AuthorizedKeysCommand helpers Summary: OpenSSH AuthorizedKeysCommand helpers
Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH
Requires: openssh Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
%description helpers %description helpers
Helper applications for OpenSSH which retrieve keys from various sources. Helper applications for OpenSSH which retrieve keys from various sources.
%package fips %package fips
Summary: OpenSSH FIPS cryptomodule hashes Summary: OpenSSH FIPS cryptomodule HMACs
Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH
Requires: openssh Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
Conflicts: %{name} < %{version}-%{release} , %{name} > %{version}-%{release}
Obsoletes: %{name}-hmac
%description fips %description fips
Hashes that together with the main package form the FIPS certifiable Hashes that together with the main package form the FIPS certifiable
cryptomodule. cryptomodule.
%package cavs
Summary: OpenSSH FIPS cryptomodule CAVS tests
Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH
Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
%description cavs
FIPS140 CAVS tests related parts of the OpenSSH package
%prep %prep
%setup -q %setup -q
%patch0 -p2 %patch00 -p2
#patch1 -p2 %patch01 -p2
%patch2 -p2 %patch02 -p2
%patch3 -p2 %patch03 -p2
%patch4 -p2 %patch04 -p2
%patch5 -p2 %patch05 -p2
%patch6 -p2 %patch06 -p2
%patch7 -p2 %patch07 -p2
%patch8 -p2 %patch08 -p2
%patch9 -p2 %patch09 -p2
%patch10 -p2 %patch10 -p2
%patch11 -p2 %patch11 -p2
%patch12 -p2 %patch12 -p2
%patch13 -p2 %patch13 -p2
%patch14 -p2 %patch14 -p2
%patch15 -p2 cp %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE4} %{SOURCE11} .
%patch16 -p2
%patch17 -p2
%patch18 -p2
%patch19 -p2
%patch20 -p2
%patch21 -p2
%patch22 -p2
%patch23 -p2
%patch24 -p2
%patch25 -p2
%patch26 -p2
%if 0%{?suse_version} > 1310
%patch27 -p2
%endif
%patch28 -p2
%patch29 -p2
%patch30 -p2
%patch31 -p2
%patch32 -p2
%patch33 -p2
%patch34 -p2
%patch35 -p2
%patch36 -p2
%patch37 -p2
%patch38 -p2
%patch39 -p2
%patch40 -p2
%patch41 -p0
cp %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE4} .
%build %build
# set libexec dir in the LDAP patch #### set libexec dir in the LDAP patch
sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \ ###sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \
$( grep -Rl @LIBEXECDIR@ \ ### $( grep -Rl @LIBEXECDIR@ \
$( grep "^+++" %{PATCH40} | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' ) ### $( grep "^+++" %{PATCH40} | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' )
) ### )
autoreconf -fiv autoreconf -fiv
%ifarch s390 s390x %sparc %ifarch s390 s390x %sparc
@ -247,22 +205,17 @@ PIEFLAGS="-fPIE"
PIEFLAGS="-fpie" PIEFLAGS="-fpie"
%endif %endif
CFLAGS="%{optflags} $PIEFLAGS -fstack-protector" CFLAGS="%{optflags} $PIEFLAGS -fstack-protector"
#%if 0%{?suse_version} < 1230
#CFLAGS="-lrt $CFLAGS"
#%endif
CXXFLAGS="%{optflags} $PIEFLAGS -fstack-protector" CXXFLAGS="%{optflags} $PIEFLAGS -fstack-protector"
LDFLAGS="-pie -Wl,--as-needed" LDFLAGS="-pie -Wl,--as-needed"
#%if 0%{?suse_version} < 1230
#LDFLAGS="-lrt $LDFLAGS"
#%endif
#CPPFLAGS="%{optflags} -DUSE_INTERNAL_B64" #CPPFLAGS="%{optflags} -DUSE_INTERNAL_B64"
export LDFLAGS CFLAGS CXXFLAGS CPPFLAGS export LDFLAGS CFLAGS CXXFLAGS CPPFLAGS
./configure \ %configure \
--prefix=%{_prefix} \ --prefix=%{_prefix} \
--mandir=%{_mandir} \ --mandir=%{_mandir} \
--infodir=%{_infodir} \ --infodir=%{_infodir} \
--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
--libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/ssh \ --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/ssh \
--with-tcp-wrappers \
%if %{has_libselinux} %if %{has_libselinux}
--with-selinux \ --with-selinux \
%endif %endif
@ -330,6 +283,7 @@ install -m 644 %{SOURCE7} %{buildroot}%{_fwdefdir}/sshd
# askpass wrapper # askpass wrapper
sed -e "s,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir},g" < %{SOURCE6} > %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass sed -e "s,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir},g" < %{SOURCE6} > %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
sed -e "s,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir},g" < %{SOURCE12} > %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/cavs_driver-ssh.pl
rm -f %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/Ssh.bin rm -f %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/Ssh.bin
# sshd keys generator wrapper # sshd keys generator wrapper
install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE9} %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/sshd-gen-keys-start install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE9} %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/sshd-gen-keys-start
@ -342,13 +296,12 @@ install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE9} %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/sshd-gen-keys-start
# this shows up earlier because otherwise the %expand of # this shows up earlier because otherwise the %expand of
# the macro is too late. # the macro is too late.
%{expand:%%global __os_install_post {%__os_install_post %{expand:%%global __os_install_post {%__os_install_post
for b in \ for b in \
%{_bindir}/ssh \ %{_bindir}/ssh \
%{_sbindir}/sshd \ %{_sbindir}/sshd \
%{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server \ %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server \
; do ; do
( printf "\03"; openssl dgst -sha256 -binary < %{buildroot}$b ) > %{buildroot}$b.chk openssl dgst -sha256 -binary -hmac %{CHECKSUM_HMAC_KEY} < %{buildroot}$b > %{buildroot}$b%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
done done
}} }}
@ -376,6 +329,10 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g sshd -d /var/lib/sshd
%endif %endif
%postun %postun
# The openssh-fips trigger script for openssh will normally restart sshd once
# it gets installed, so only restart the service here is openssh-fips is not
# present
rpm -q openssh-fips >& /dev/null && DISABLE_RESTART_ON_UPDATE=yes
%if %{uses_systemd} %if %{uses_systemd}
%service_del_postun sshd.service %service_del_postun sshd.service
%else %else
@ -383,13 +340,17 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g sshd -d /var/lib/sshd
%{insserv_cleanup} %{insserv_cleanup}
%endif %endif
%triggerin -n openssh-fips -- %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
%restart_on_update sshd
%files %files
%defattr(-,root,root) %defattr(-,root,root)
%exclude %{_bindir}/*.chk %exclude %{_bindir}/ssh%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
%exclude %{_sbindir}/*.chk %exclude %{_sbindir}/sshd%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
%exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server.chk %exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
%exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/cavs*
%dir %attr(755,root,root) /var/lib/sshd %dir %attr(755,root,root) /var/lib/sshd
%doc README.SuSE README.kerberos ChangeLog OVERVIEW README TODO LICENCE CREDITS %doc README.SUSE README.kerberos README.FIPS ChangeLog OVERVIEW README TODO LICENCE CREDITS
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
%verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config %verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
@ -405,7 +366,7 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g sshd -d /var/lib/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/* %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/*
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/* %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/*
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh
%exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap* ###%exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/* %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/*
%attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/* %attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/*
%attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/* %attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/*
@ -424,15 +385,19 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g sshd -d /var/lib/sshd
%files helpers %files helpers
%defattr(-,root,root) %defattr(-,root,root)
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
%verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ldap.conf ###%verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ldap.conf
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap* ###%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
%doc HOWTO.ldap-keys openssh-lpk-openldap.schema openssh-lpk-sun.schema ###%doc HOWTO.ldap-keys openssh-lpk-openldap.schema openssh-lpk-sun.schema
%files fips %files fips
%defattr(-,root,root) %defattr(-,root,root)
%attr(0444,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh.chk %attr(0444,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
%attr(0444,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd.chk %attr(0444,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
%attr(0444,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server.chk %attr(0444,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
%files cavs
%defattr(-,root,root)
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/cavs*
%changelog %changelog

7
ssh-askpass
View File

@ -24,13 +24,6 @@ if [ -z "$SESSION" ] ; then
fi fi
fi fi
if [ -n "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] ; then
# Ensure that ssh can use the ssh support of the gpg-agent
case "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" in
*/S.gpg-agent.ssh) gpg-connect-agent /bye < /dev/null ;;
esac
fi
GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS="@LIBEXECDIR@/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass" GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS="@LIBEXECDIR@/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass"
KDE_SSH_ASKPASS="@LIBEXECDIR@/ssh/ksshaskpass" KDE_SSH_ASKPASS="@LIBEXECDIR@/ssh/ksshaskpass"
X11_SSH_ASKPASS="@LIBEXECDIR@/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass" X11_SSH_ASKPASS="@LIBEXECDIR@/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass"

6
sshd.init
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /bin/sh #! /bin/sh
# Copyright (c) 1995-2013 SuSE GmbH Nuernberg, Germany. # Copyright (c) 1995-2013 SUSE
# #
# Author: Jiri Smid <feedback@suse.de> # Author: Jiri Smid <feedback@suse.de>
# #
@ -39,12 +39,12 @@ SSHD_PIDFILE=/var/run/sshd.init.pid
# rc_reset clear local rc status (overall remains) # rc_reset clear local rc status (overall remains)
# rc_exit exit appropriate to overall rc status # rc_exit exit appropriate to overall rc status
soft_stop() { function soft_stop () {
echo -n "Shutting down the listening SSH daemon" echo -n "Shutting down the listening SSH daemon"
killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -TERM $SSHD_BIN killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -TERM $SSHD_BIN
} }
force_stop() { function force_stop () {
echo -n "Shutting down SSH daemon *with all active connections*" echo -n "Shutting down SSH daemon *with all active connections*"
trap '' TERM trap '' TERM
killall sshd 2>/dev/null killall sshd 2>/dev/null