Accepting request 547144 from home:pcerny:factory

temporarily downgrading to 7.2p2 to run tests on additional 7.2p2 patches

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/547144
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=124

openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  9130c9e19c8a076a7f6f214070283cd3e0326894
+Correctly parse DISPLAY variable for cases where it contains an IPv6 address
+(which should - but not always is - in (square) brackets).
+
+bnc#847710 - https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=847710
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c b/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
+@@ -4049,18 +4049,19 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 		/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
+ 		return sock;
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Check if it is a unix domain socket.  Unix domain displays are in
+ 	 * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s]
+ 	 */
++	cp = strrchr(display, ':');
+ 	if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 ||
+-	    display[0] == ':') {
++	    (display[0] == ':' && ((cp - display) < 2)) ) {
+ 		/* Connect to the unix domain socket. */
+ 		if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
+ 			error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
+ 			    display);
+ 			return -1;
+ 		}
+ 		/* Create a socket. */
+ 		sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number);
+@@ -4068,30 +4069,39 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 			return -1;
+ 
+ 		/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
+ 		return sock;
+ 	}
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Connect to an inet socket.  The DISPLAY value is supposedly
+ 	 * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address.
++	 * Note that IPv6 numberic addresses contain colons (e.g. ::1:0)
+ 	 */
+ 	strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf));
+-	cp = strchr(buf, ':');
++	cp = strrchr(buf, ':');
+ 	if (!cp) {
+ 		error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 	*cp = 0;
+ 	/* buf now contains the host name.  But first we parse the display number. */
+ 	if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
+ 		error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
+ 		    display);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	
++	/* Remove brackets surrounding IPv6 addresses if there are any. */
++	if (buf[0] == '[' && (cp = strchr(buf, ']'))) {
++		*cp = 0;
++		cp = buf + 1;
++	} else {
++		cp = buf;
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* Look up the host address */
+ 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 	hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ 	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
+ 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+ 		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,

openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  c004421528bc443fa9a56db1123005c92014e6b3
+# Parent  7197d7a6b7c90566c68e980b5f8b937c183e79d0
 # enable trusted X11 forwarding by default in both sshd and sshsystem-wide
 # configuration
 # bnc#50836 (was suse #35836)
 Enable Trusted X11 forwarding by default, since the security benefits of
 having it disabled are negligible these days with XI2 being widely used.
 
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
 @@ -12,19 +12,30 @@
  # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
  # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
@@ -33,18 +33,18 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
 +# expire after twenty minutes after remote login.
 +    ForwardX11Trusted yes
 +
+ #   RhostsRSAAuthentication no
+ #   RSAAuthentication yes
  #   PasswordAuthentication yes
  #   HostbasedAuthentication no
  #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
  #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
  #   BatchMode no
  #   CheckHostIP yes
- #   AddressFamily any
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
- #   ConnectTimeout 0
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
+@@ -94,17 +94,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
-@@ -80,17 +80,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
  # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
  # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
  # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
  #PrintLastLog yes
  #TCPKeepAlive yes
  #UseLogin no
- #PermitUserEnvironment no
+ #UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox

openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  a9e60634acb905a830a0f57ece296781ab08d0fb
+Do not throw away already open sockets for X11 forwarding if another socket
+family is not available for bind()
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c b/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
+@@ -3938,16 +3938,25 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+ 				sock_set_v6only(sock);
+ 			if (x11_use_localhost)
+ 				channel_set_reuseaddr(sock);
+ 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ 				debug2("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno));
+ 				close(sock);
+ 
++				/* do not remove successfully opened
++				 * sockets if the request failed because
++				 * the protocol IPv4/6 is not available
++				 * (e.g. IPv6 may be disabled while being
++				 * supported)
++				 */
++				if (EADDRNOTAVAIL == errno)
++    					continue;
++
+ 				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
+ 					close(socks[n]);
+ 				}
+ 				num_socks = 0;
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+ 			socks[num_socks++] = sock;
+ 			if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)

openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  e7bdbc5ea8971599466becf01bff12b9fcb5df3e
+Enable the seccomp-bpf sandbox on more architectures
+
+upstream commit: b9c50614eba9d90939b2b119b6e1b7e03b462278 (7.3p1)
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 8 13:59:13 2016 +1000
+
+    whitelist more architectures for seccomp-bpf
+
+    bz#2590 - testing and patch from Jakub Jelen
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+@@ -818,16 +818,40 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
+ 		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
+ 		;;
+ 	arm*-*)
+ 		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
+ 		;;
+ 	aarch64*-*)
+ 		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
+ 		;;
++	s390x-*)
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X
++		;;
++	s390-*)
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390
++		;;
++	powerpc64-*)
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64
++		;;
++	powerpc64le-*)
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE
++		;;
++	mips-*)
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS
++		;;
++	mipsel-*)
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL
++		;;
++	mips64-*)
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64
++		;;
++	mips64el-*)
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64
++		;;
+ 	esac
+ 	if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
+ 		AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"])
+ 		AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch],
+ 		    [Specify the system call convention in use])
+ 	else
+ 		AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported])
+ 	fi

openssh-7.2p2-allow_DSS_by_default.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  d33bce122aa351a56ce457be35feda52171f9088
+Enable DSS authentication by default to maintain compatibility with older
+versions.
+
+bsc#983784
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h b/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h
+@@ -94,21 +94,23 @@
+ #define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \
+ 	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
+ 	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
+ 
+ #define	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG	\
+ 	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
+ 	"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ 	"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ 	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
+ 	"ssh-ed25519," \
+ 	"rsa-sha2-512," \
+ 	"rsa-sha2-256," \
+-	"ssh-rsa"
++	"ssh-rsa," \
++	"ssh-dss"
+ 
+ /* the actual algorithms */
+ 
+ #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
+ 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
+ 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \
+ 	AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
+@@ -887,19 +887,19 @@ Alternately if the specified value begin
+ character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
+ instead of replacing them.
+ The default for this option is:
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified
+ to prefer their algorithms.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using the
+ .Fl Q
+ option of
+@@ -1325,19 +1325,19 @@ Alternately if the specified value begin
+ character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
+ instead of replacing it.
+ The default for this option is:
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The
+ .Fl Q
+ option of
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ may be used to list supported key types.
+ .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+@@ -651,19 +651,19 @@ Alternately if the specified value begin
+ character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
+ instead of replacing them.
+ The default for this option is:
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The
+ .Fl Q
+ option of
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ may be used to list supported key types.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+@@ -743,19 +743,19 @@ environment variable.
+ Specifies the host key algorithms
+ that the server offers.
+ The default for this option is:
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using the
+ .Fl Q
+ option of
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ with an argument of
+ .Dq key .

openssh-7.2p2-allow_root_password_login.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  c43ae523939377778762e81743b77b3c75eb4bd1
+Allow root login with password by default. While less secure than upstream
+default of forbidding access to the root account with a password, we are
+temporarily introducing this change to keep the default used in older OpenSSH
+versions shipped with SLE.
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+@@ -233,17 +233,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE);
+ 	if (options->server_key_bits == -1)
+ 		options->server_key_bits = 1024;
+ 	if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
+ 		options->login_grace_time = 120;
+ 	if (options->key_regeneration_time == -1)
+ 		options->key_regeneration_time = 3600;
+ 	if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
+-		options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
++		options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_YES;
+ 	if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
+ 		options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
+ 	if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
+ 		options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
+ 	if (options->print_motd == -1)
+ 		options->print_motd = 1;
+ 	if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
+ 		options->print_lastlog = 1;
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+@@ -36,17 +36,17 @@
+ # Logging
+ # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
+ #SyslogFacility AUTH
+ #LogLevel INFO
+ 
+ # Authentication:
+ 
+ #LoginGraceTime 2m
+-#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
++#PermitRootLogin yes
+ #StrictModes yes
+ #MaxAuthTries 6
+ #MaxSessions 10
+ 
+ #RSAAuthentication yes
+ #PubkeyAuthentication yes
+ 
+ # The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+@@ -710,17 +710,17 @@ DESCRIPTION
+              restrictions and permit any forwarding requests.  An argument of
+              M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests.  By
+              default all port forwarding requests are permitted.
+ 
+      PermitRootLogin
+              Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1).  The argument
+              must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\without-passwordM-bM-^@M-^],
+              M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is
+-             M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^].
++             M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+ 
+              If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^] or
+              M-bM-^@M-^\without-passwordM-bM-^@M-^], password and keyboard-interactive
+              authentication are disabled for root.
+ 
+              If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^], root login with
+              public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the
+              command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1213,17 +1213,17 @@ Specifies whether root can log in using
+ The argument must be
+ .Dq yes ,
+ .Dq prohibit-password ,
+ .Dq without-password ,
+ .Dq forced-commands-only ,
+ or
+ .Dq no .
+ The default is
+-.Dq prohibit-password .
++.Dq yes .
+ .Pp
+ If this option is set to
+ .Dq prohibit-password
+ or
+ .Dq without-password ,
+ password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root.
+ .Pp
+ If this option is set to

openssh-7.2p2-audit_fixes.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  fdc9167221e501a9f4db5343cf8cadc31e13fd56
+Various auditing fixes to be merged into the RH-originated patch.
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c b/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c
+@@ -371,20 +371,26 @@ ssh_packet_start_discard(struct ssh *ssh
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
+ 
+ int
+ ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+-	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
++	struct session_state *state;
+ 	struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
+ 	socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
+ 
++	/* auditing might get here without valid connection structure when
++	 * destroying sensitive data on exit and thus aborting disgracefully */
++	if ((!ssh) || (!(ssh->state)))
++		return 0;
++	state = ssh->state;
++
+ 	/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
+ 	if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ 	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ 	if (getpeername(state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
+ 	    &fromlen) < 0)
+ 		return 0;

openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  e6ff441d171012183f7bd37cb7399473e8376acd
+Audit PRNG re-seeding
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c
+@@ -504,9 +504,15 @@ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char 
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
++
++void
++audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
+ #endif /* BSM */
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c
+@@ -402,9 +402,31 @@ audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(cons
+ 	}
+ 	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
+ 			buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
+ 	audit_close(audit_fd);
+ 	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ 	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ 		error("cannot write into audit");
+ }
++
++void
++audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
++{
++	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=prng_seed kind=server bytes=%li source=%s ", bytes, rf);
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
++					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
++			error("cannot open audit");
++		return;
++	}
++	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE_USER,
++			buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		error("cannot write into audit");
++}
+ #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c
+@@ -304,10 +304,16 @@ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char 
+ /*
+  * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
+  */
+ void
+ audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
+ {
+ 	debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
+ }
++
++void
++audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
++{
++	debug("audit PRNG seed euid %d bytes %li source %s", geteuid(), bytes, rf);
++}
+ # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h
+@@ -69,10 +69,11 @@ void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
+ void	audit_unsupported(int);
+ void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
+ void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
+ void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void	audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
+ void	audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void	audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
++void	audit_linux_prng_seed(long, const char *);
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+@@ -1421,16 +1421,19 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 					if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
+ 						maxfd = startup_p[0];
+ 					startups++;
+ 					break;
+ 				}
+ 			if(!(--re_seeding_counter)) {
+ 				re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
+ 				linux_seed();
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++				audit_linux_prng_seed(rand_bytes, rand_file);
++#endif
+ 			}
+ 
+ 			/*
+ 			 * Got connection.  Fork a child to handle it, unless
+ 			 * we are in debugging mode.
+ 			 */
+ 			if (debug_flag) {
+ 				/*

openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  724c9ea86fe2c4a1f0e0d3aba168357ab1b2c3aa
+# Parent  0bfb5dd4b190b546a3e40a59483b2b2884a47c39
 block SIGALRM while logging through syslog to prevent deadlocks
 (through grace_alarm_handler())
 
 bnc#57354
 
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/log.c b/openssh-7.6p1/log.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/log.c b/openssh-7.2p2/log.c
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/log.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/log.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/log.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/log.c
 @@ -46,16 +46,17 @@
  #include <syslog.h>
  #include <unistd.h>
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/log.c b/openssh-7.6p1/log.c
  static char *argv0;
  static log_handler_fn *log_handler;
  static void *log_handler_ctx;
-@@ -396,16 +397,17 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, 
+@@ -383,16 +384,17 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, 
  {
  #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
  	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
@@ -44,18 +44,19 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/log.c b/openssh-7.6p1/log.c
  
  	switch (level) {
  	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
-@@ -455,20 +457,28 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, 
+@@ -441,20 +443,29 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, 
+ 		tmp_handler = log_handler;
  		log_handler = NULL;
  		tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);
  		log_handler = tmp_handler;
  	} else if (log_on_stderr) {
- 		snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%.*s\r\n",
+ 		snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%s\r\n", fmtbuf);
- 		    (int)sizeof msgbuf - 3, fmtbuf);
  		(void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf));
  	} else {
-+		/* Prevent a race between the grace_alarm which writes a
++		/* Prevent a race between the grace_alarm
-+		 * log message and terminates and main sshd code that leads
++		* which writes a log message and terminates
-+		 * to deadlock as syslog is not async safe.
++		* and main sshd code that leads to deadlock 
++		* as syslog is not async safe.
 +		*/ 
 +		sigemptyset(&nset);
 +		sigaddset(&nset, SIGALRM);

openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-ctr.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  cb502e7e796ac9289a571167a97ad9ec91562efb
+CAVS test for OpenSSH's own CTR encryption mode implementation
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+@@ -21,16 +21,17 @@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+ 
+ DESTDIR=
+ VPATH=@srcdir@
+ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
+ ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
++CAVSTEST_CTR=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+ STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
+ TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
+ 
+ PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
+ 	-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
+ 	-D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
+@@ -59,16 +60,18 @@ SED=@SED@
+ ENT=@ENT@
+ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
+ LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ 
+ TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 
++TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
++
+ LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh_api.o \
+ 	ssherr.o \
+ 	sshbuf.o \
+ 	sshkey.o \
+ 	sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
+ 	sshbuf-misc.o \
+ 	sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \
+@@ -190,16 +193,20 @@ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+ sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ 
+ sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+ 
++# FIPS tests
++cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-ctr.o
++	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
++
+ # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
+ logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+ $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
+ 	if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
+ 		manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
+ 	else \
+@@ -310,16 +317,17 @@ install-files:
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
++	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-ctr.c b/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-ctr.c
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-ctr.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
++/*
++ *
++ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
++ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
++ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
++ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/param.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <ctype.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++
++/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
++#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
++
++void
++usage(void)
++{
++	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
++	    "                    --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
++	    "                    [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
++	    "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
++	    "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
++	exit(1);
++}
++
++void *
++fromhex(char *hex, size_t * len)
++{
++	unsigned char *bin;
++	char *p;
++	size_t n = 0;
++	int shift = 4;
++	unsigned char out = 0;
++	unsigned char *optr;
++
++	bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex) / 2);
++	optr = bin;
++
++	for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
++		unsigned char c;
++
++		c = *p;
++		if (isspace(c))
++			continue;
++
++		if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
++			c = c - '0';
++		} else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
++			c = c - 'A' + 10;
++		} else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
++			c = c - 'a' + 10;
++		} else {
++			/* truncate on nonhex cipher */
++			break;
++		}
++
++		out |= c << shift;
++		shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
++
++		if (shift) {
++			*(optr++) = out;
++			out = 0;
++			++n;
++		}
++	}
++
++	*len = n;
++	return bin;
++}
++
++#define READ_CHUNK 4096
++#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
++char *
++read_stdin(void)
++{
++	char *buf;
++	size_t n, total = 0;
++
++	buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
++
++	do {
++		n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
++		if (n < READ_CHUNK)	/* terminate on short read */
++			break;
++
++		total += n;
++		buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
++	} while (total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
++	return buf;
++}
++
++int
++main(int argc, char *argv[])
++{
++
++	struct sshcipher *c;
++	struct sshcipher_ctx cc;
++	char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
++	char *hexkey = NULL;
++	char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
++	char *hexdata = NULL;
++	char *p;
++	int i;
++	int encrypt = 1;
++	void *key;
++	size_t keylen;
++	void *iv;
++	size_t ivlen;
++	void *data;
++	size_t datalen;
++	void *outdata;
++
++	for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
++		if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
++			algo = argv[++i];
++		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
++			hexkey = argv[++i];
++		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
++			++i;
++			if (argv[i] == NULL) {
++				usage();
++			}
++			if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
++				encrypt = 1;
++			} else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
++				encrypt = 0;
++			} else {
++				usage();
++			}
++		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
++			hexiv = argv[++i];
++		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
++			hexdata = argv[++i];
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
++		usage();
++	}
++
++	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
++
++	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
++	if (c == NULL) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
++		return 2;
++	}
++
++	if (hexdata == NULL) {
++		hexdata = read_stdin();
++	} else {
++		hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
++	}
++
++	key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
++
++	if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
++		return 2;
++	}
++
++	iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
++
++	if (ivlen != 16) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
++		return 2;
++	}
++
++	data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
++
++	if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
++		return 2;
++	}
++
++	cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt);
++
++	free(key);
++	free(iv);
++
++	outdata = malloc(datalen);
++	if (outdata == NULL) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
++		return 2;
++	}
++
++	cipher_crypt(&cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0);
++
++	free(data);
++
++	cipher_cleanup(&cc);
++
++	for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
++		printf("%02X", (unsigned char) *p);
++	}
++
++	free(outdata);
++
++	printf("\n");
++	return 0;
++}

openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-kdf.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,469 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  f9ffcfb88e5a9d611a61aee3571050dea67e363e
+CAVS test for KDF implementation in OpenSSH
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+@@ -22,16 +22,17 @@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+ DESTDIR=
+ VPATH=@srcdir@
+ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
+ ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ CAVSTEST_CTR=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr
++CAVSTEST_KDF=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-kdf
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+ STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
+ TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
+ 
+ PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
+ 	-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
+ 	-D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
+@@ -60,17 +61,17 @@ SED=@SED@
+ ENT=@ENT@
+ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
+ LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ 
+ TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+-TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh_api.o \
+ 	ssherr.o \
+ 	sshbuf.o \
+ 	sshkey.o \
+ 	sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
+ 	sshbuf-misc.o \
+@@ -197,16 +198,19 @@ sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss
+ 
+ sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+ 
+ # FIPS tests
+ cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-ctr.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
++cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-kdf.o
++	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-kdf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
++
+ # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
+ logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+ $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
+ 	if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
+ 		manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
+ 	else \
+@@ -318,16 +322,17 @@ install-files:
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
++	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-kdf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-kdf.c
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-kdf.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
++ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
++ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
++ *    written permission.
++ *
++ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
++ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
++ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
++ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
++ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
++ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
++ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
++ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
++ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
++ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
++ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
++ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
++ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
++ * DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++
++static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
++{
++	if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
++		return (hex - 48);
++	if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
++		return (hex - 55);
++	if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
++		return (hex - 87);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Convert hex representation into binary string
++ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
++ * @hexlen length of hex
++ * @bin output buffer with binary data
++ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
++ *	   half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
++ */
++static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
++		    unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
++{
++	size_t i = 0;
++	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
++		bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
++		bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
++	}
++}
++
++/*
++ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
++ * and convert hex into bin
++ *
++ * Caller must free bin
++ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
++ * @hexlen length of hex
++ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
++ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
++ *
++ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
++ */
++static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
++			 unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
++{
++	unsigned char *out = NULL;
++	size_t outlen = 0;
++
++	if (!hexlen)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
++
++	out = calloc(1, outlen);
++	if (!out)
++		return -errno;
++
++	hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
++	*bin = out;
++	*binlen = outlen;
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
++				 '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
++static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
++				 '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
++static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
++{
++	if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
++		return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
++	return 'X';
++}
++
++/*
++ * Convert binary string into hex representation
++ * @bin input buffer with binary data
++ * @binlen length of bin
++ * @hex output buffer to store hex data
++ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
++ *	   twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
++ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
++ */
++static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
++		    char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
++{
++	size_t i = 0;
++	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
++		hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
++		hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
++	}
++}
++
++struct kdf_cavs {
++	unsigned char *K;
++	size_t Klen;
++	unsigned char *H;
++	size_t Hlen;
++	unsigned char *session_id;
++	size_t session_id_len;
++
++	unsigned int iv_len;
++	unsigned int ek_len;
++	unsigned int ik_len;
++};
++
++static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
++{
++	int ret = 0;
++	struct kex kex;
++    struct ssh ssh;
++	BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
++	int mode = 0;
++	struct newkeys *keys_client;
++	struct newkeys *keys_server;
++
++#define HEXOUTLEN 500
++	char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
++
++	memset(&ssh, 0, sizeof(struct ssh));
++	memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
++    ssh.kex = &kex;
++
++	Kbn = BN_new();
++	BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
++	if (!Kbn) {
++		printf("cannot convert K into BIGNUM\n");
++		ret = 1;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	kex.session_id = test->session_id;
++	kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
++
++	/* setup kex */
++
++	/* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
++	switch (test->ik_len) {
++		case 20:
++			kex.hash_alg = 2;
++			break;
++		case 32:
++			kex.hash_alg = 3;
++			break;
++		case 48:
++			kex.hash_alg = 4;
++			break;
++		case 64:
++			kex.hash_alg = 5;
++			break;
++		default:
++			printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
++			ret = 1;
++			goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* implement choose_enc */
++	for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
++		kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
++		if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
++			printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
++			ret = 1;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
++		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
++		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
++		kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
++	}
++
++	/* implement kex_choose_conf */
++	kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
++	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
++		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
++	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
++		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
++	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
++		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
++
++	/* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
++	 * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
++	kex.server = 1;
++
++	/* do it */
++	kex_derive_keys_bn(&ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kbn);
++
++	keys_client = ssh.kex->newkeys[0];
++	keys_server = ssh.kex->newkeys[1];
++
++	/* get data */
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(keys_client->enc.iv, (size_t)keys_client->enc.iv_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
++
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(keys_server->enc.iv, (size_t)keys_server->enc.iv_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
++
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(keys_client->enc.key, (size_t)keys_client->enc.key_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
++	
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(keys_server->enc.key, (size_t)keys_server->enc.key_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
++
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(keys_client->mac.key, (size_t)keys_client->mac.key_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
++	
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(keys_server->mac.key, (size_t)keys_server->mac.key_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
++
++	free(keys_client);
++	free(keys_server);
++
++out:
++	if (Kbn)
++		BN_free(Kbn);
++	if (kex.newkeys[0])
++		free(kex.newkeys[0]);
++	if (kex.newkeys[1])
++		free(kex.newkeys[1]);
++	return ret;
++}
++
++static void usage(void)
++{
++	fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
++}
++
++/*
++ * Test command example:
++ * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
++ *
++ * Expected result for example:
++ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
++ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
++ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
++ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
++ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
++ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
++ */
++int main(int argc, char *argv[])
++{
++	struct kdf_cavs test;
++	int ret = 1;
++	int opt = 0;
++
++	memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
++	while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
++	{
++		size_t len = 0;
++		switch(opt)
++		{
++			/*
++			 * CAVS K is MPINT
++			 * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
++			 * following transformations already happened):
++			 * 	1. cut off first four bytes
++			 * 	2. if most significant bit of value is
++			 *	   1, prepend 0 byte
++			 */
++			case 'K':
++				len = strlen(optarg);
++				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
++						    &test.K, &test.Klen);
++				if (ret)
++					goto out;
++				break;
++			case 'H':
++				len = strlen(optarg);
++				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
++						    &test.H, &test.Hlen);
++				if (ret)
++					goto out;
++				break;
++			case 's':
++				len = strlen(optarg);
++				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
++						    &test.session_id,
++						    &test.session_id_len);
++				if (ret)
++					goto out;
++				break;
++			case 'i':
++				test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
++				break;
++			case 'e':
++				test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
++				break;
++			case 'm':
++				test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
++				break;
++			default:
++				usage();
++				goto out;
++		}
++	}
++
++	ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
++
++out:
++	if (test.session_id)
++		free(test.session_id);
++	if (test.K)
++		free(test.K);
++	if (test.H)
++		free(test.H);
++	return ret;
++
++}

openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  4821397c95e57962905e6d47554bef9e4ea57483
+disable run-time check for OpenSSL ABI by version number as that is not a
+reliable indicator of ABI changes and doesn't make much sense in a
+distribution package
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+@@ -4663,16 +4663,29 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth],
+ 		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ 			AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1],
+ 				[Define if you have BSD auth support])
+ 			BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes
+ 		fi
+ 	]
+ )
+ 
++# Whether we are using distribution (Open)SSL, so no runtime checks are necessary
++DISTRO_SSL=no
++AC_ARG_WITH([distro-ssl],
++	[  --with-distro-ssl       Disable runtime OpenSSL version checks (good for distributions)],
++	[
++		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++			AC_DEFINE([DISTRO_SSL], [1],
++                      [Define if you are using distribution SSL library and don;t expect its API/ABI to change])
++			DISTRO_SSL=yes
++		fi
++	]
++)
++
+ # Where to place sshd.pid
+ piddir=/var/run
+ # make sure the directory exists
+ if test ! -d $piddir ; then
+ 	piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
+ 	case $piddir in
+ 		NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
+ 	esac
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c b/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
+@@ -209,19 +209,21 @@ rexec_recv_rng_seed(Buffer *m)
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
+ 
+ void
+ seed_rng(void)
+ {
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ 	unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
+ #endif
++#ifndef DISTRO_SSL
+ 	if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()))
+ 		fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
+ 		    "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
++#endif
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ 	if (RAND_status() == 1) {
+ 		debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)

openssh-7.2p2-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  a5b0f249f564de9c9efd023c6430f607d9861acd
+# Parent  7b5f436e0026923299fdd1994f8da8fd9948be7c
 
 Raise minimal size of DH group parameters to 2048 bits like upstream did in
 7.2. 1024b values are believed to be in breaking range for state adversaries
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ compliant) parameters.
 CVE-2015-4000 (LOGJAM)
 bsc#932483
 
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/dh.c b/openssh-7.6p1/dh.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/dh.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/dh.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c
 @@ -37,16 +37,18 @@
  #include <limits.h>
  
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/dh.c b/openssh-7.6p1/dh.c
  	const char *errstr = NULL;
  	long long n;
  
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/dh.h b/openssh-7.6p1/dh.h
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/dh.h
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/dh.h
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h
-@@ -45,16 +45,17 @@ int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
+@@ -43,16 +43,17 @@ int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
  int	 dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);
  
  u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
@@ -55,23 +55,23 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/dh.h b/openssh-7.6p1/dh.h
   * Specifies the internal structure of the prime modulus.
   */
  #define MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN		(0)
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexc.c b/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexc.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexc.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexc.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c
 @@ -46,29 +46,32 @@
+ #include "packet.h"
  #include "dh.h"
  #include "ssh2.h"
  #include "compat.h"
  #include "dispatch.h"
  #include "ssherr.h"
  #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "misc.h"
  
 +/* import from dh.c */
 +extern int dh_grp_min;
 +
- static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, void *);
  
  int
  kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
@@ -87,12 +87,12 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexc.c b/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexc.c
  	kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
  	kex->nbits = nbits;
  	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE)
- 		kex->nbits = MINIMUM(kex->nbits, 4096);
+ 		kex->nbits = MIN(kex->nbits, 4096);
  	/* New GEX request */
  	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
-@@ -103,16 +106,22 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
+@@ -104,16 +107,22 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
  		goto out;
  	}
  	if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, p)) != 0 ||
@@ -115,30 +115,30 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexc.c b/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexc.c
  		goto out;
  	}
  	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexs.c b/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexs.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexs.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexs.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c
 @@ -49,16 +49,19 @@
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
  #include "ssh-gss.h"
  #endif
  #include "monitor_wrap.h"
  #include "dispatch.h"
  #include "ssherr.h"
  #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "misc.h"
  
 +/* import from dh.c */
 +extern int dh_grp_min;
 +
- static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, void *);
  
  int
  kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh)
  {
  	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST,
  	    &input_kex_dh_gex_request);
-@@ -77,23 +80,29 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int
+@@ -78,23 +81,29 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int
  	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 ||
@@ -147,15 +147,15 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexs.c b/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexs.c
  	kex->nbits = nbits;
  	kex->min = min;
  	kex->max = max;
--	min = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
+-	min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
-+	min = MAXIMUM(dh_grp_min, min);
++	min = MAX(dh_grp_min, min);
- 	max = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
+ 	max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
--	nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
+-	nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
-+	nbits = MAXIMUM(dh_grp_min, nbits);
++	nbits = MAX(dh_grp_min, nbits);
- 	nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
+ 	nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
  
  	if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min ||
- 	    kex->max < kex->nbits || kex->max < DH_GRP_MIN) {
+ 	    kex->max < kex->nbits) {
 +		if (kex->nbits < kex->min && kex->nbits >= DH_GRP_MIN_RFC)
 +			logit("DH parameter requested by the client (%d bits) "
 +			    "is considered insecure. "
@@ -170,10 +170,10 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexs.c b/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexs.c
  	kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
  	if (kex->dh == NULL) {
  		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "no matching DH grp found");
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
-@@ -61,16 +61,17 @@
+@@ -56,16 +56,17 @@
  #include "misc.h"
  #include "readconf.h"
  #include "match.h"
@@ -191,14 +191,14 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c
     #  2. user-specific file
     #  3. system-wide file
     # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
-@@ -161,17 +162,18 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -148,17 +149,18 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
  	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
  	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
  	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
  	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
  	oHashKnownHosts,
- 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice,
+ 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
- 	oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand,
  	oVisualHostKey,
 -	oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
 +	oKexAlgorithms, oKexDHMin,
@@ -207,18 +207,18 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c
  	oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
  	oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
  	oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
- 	oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oProxyJump,
+ 	oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes,
- 	oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
+ 	oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
  } OpCodes;
  
-@@ -283,16 +285,17 @@ static struct {
+@@ -260,16 +262,17 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "include", oInclude },
+ 	{ "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts },
  	{ "tunnel", oTunnel },
  	{ "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice },
  	{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
  	{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
- 	{ "remotecommand", oRemoteCommand },
  	{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
+ 	{ "useroaming", oDeprecated },
  	{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
 +	{ "kexdhmin", oKexDHMin },
  	{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
@@ -229,11 +229,11 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c
  	{ "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname },
  	{ "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots },
  	{ "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs },
-@@ -304,16 +307,19 @@ static struct {
+@@ -280,16 +283,19 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys },
  	{ "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes },
  	{ "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
  	{ "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
- 	{ "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
  
  	{ NULL, oBadOption }
  };
@@ -249,9 +249,9 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c
  void
  add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
  {
-@@ -1206,16 +1212,20 @@ parse_int:
+@@ -1157,16 +1163,20 @@ parse_int:
- 		if (*arg != '-' &&
+ 			    filename, linenum);
- 		    !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ 		if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
  			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
  			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
  		if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
@@ -269,62 +269,63 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c
  		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
  			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
  			    filename, linenum);
- 		if (*arg != '-' &&
+ 		if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
-@@ -1803,16 +1813,17 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+@@ -1664,16 +1674,17 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
- 	options->port = -1;
  	options->address_family = -1;
  	options->connection_attempts = -1;
  	options->connection_timeout = -1;
  	options->number_of_password_prompts = -1;
+ 	options->cipher = -1;
  	options->ciphers = NULL;
  	options->macs = NULL;
  	options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
 +	options->kex_dhmin = -1;
  	options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
+ 	options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
  	options->num_identity_files = 0;
  	options->num_certificate_files = 0;
  	options->hostname = NULL;
  	options->host_key_alias = NULL;
  	options->proxy_command = NULL;
- 	options->jump_user = NULL;
+ 	options->user = NULL;
- 	options->jump_host = NULL;
+@@ -1805,16 +1816,23 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
-@@ -1951,16 +1962,23 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 	if (options->port == -1)
- 		options->port = 0;	/* Filled in ssh_connect. */
- 	if (options->address_family == -1)
  		options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
  	if (options->connection_attempts == -1)
  		options->connection_attempts = 1;
  	if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1)
  		options->number_of_password_prompts = 3;
+ 	/* Selected in ssh_login(). */
+ 	if (options->cipher == -1)
+ 		options->cipher = SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET;
 +	if (options->kex_dhmin == -1)
 +		options->kex_dhmin = DH_GRP_MIN_RFC;
 +	else {
-+		options->kex_dhmin = MAXIMUM(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC);
++		options->kex_dhmin = MAX(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC);
-+		options->kex_dhmin = MINIMUM(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX);
++		options->kex_dhmin = MIN(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX);
 +	}
 +	dh_grp_min = options->kex_dhmin;
  	/* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
+ 	if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ 		options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
  	if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1)
  		options->add_keys_to_agent = 0;
  	if (options->num_identity_files == 0) {
- 		add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0);
+ 		if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
- 		add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0);
+ 			add_identity_file(options, "~/",
- #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h
- 		add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0);
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.h b/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.h
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.h
+@@ -69,16 +69,17 @@ typedef struct {
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.h
-@@ -64,16 +64,17 @@ typedef struct {
- 	int     connection_timeout;	/* Max time (seconds) before
  					 * aborting connection attempt */
  	int     number_of_password_prompts;	/* Max number of password
  						 * prompts. */
+ 	int     cipher;		/* Cipher to use. */
  	char   *ciphers;	/* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */
  	char   *macs;		/* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */
  	char   *hostkeyalgorithms;	/* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */
  	char   *kex_algorithms;	/* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
 +	int     kex_dhmin;	/* minimum bit length of the DH group parameter */
+ 	int	protocol;	/* Protocol in order of preference. */
  	char   *hostname;	/* Real host to connect. */
  	char   *host_key_alias;	/* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
  	char   *proxy_command;	/* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
@@ -332,10 +333,9 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.h b/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.h
  	int     escape_char;	/* Escape character; -2 = none */
  
  	u_int	num_system_hostfiles;	/* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */
- 	char   *system_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES];
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
 @@ -52,16 +52,20 @@
  #include "channels.h"
  #include "groupaccess.h"
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
  extern int use_privsep;
  extern Buffer cfg;
  
-@@ -129,16 +133,17 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions 
+@@ -134,16 +138,17 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions 
  	options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1;
  	options->num_allow_users = 0;
  	options->num_deny_users = 0;
@@ -367,6 +367,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
  	options->macs = NULL;
  	options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
 +	options->kex_dhmin = -1;
+ 	options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
  	options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1;
  	options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1;
  	options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
@@ -374,8 +375,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
  	options->max_startups_begin = -1;
  	options->max_startups_rate = -1;
  	options->max_startups = -1;
- 	options->max_authtries = -1;
+@@ -199,16 +204,23 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
-@@ -195,16 +200,24 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  	int i;
  
  	/* Portable-specific options */
@@ -387,20 +387,19 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
 +	if (options->kex_dhmin == -1)
 +		options->kex_dhmin = DH_GRP_MIN_RFC;
 +	else {
-+		options->kex_dhmin = MAXIMUM(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC);
++		options->kex_dhmin = MAX(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC);
-+		options->kex_dhmin = MINIMUM(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX);
++		options->kex_dhmin = MIN(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX);
 +	}
 +	dh_grp_min = options->kex_dhmin;
-+
  	/* Standard Options */
+ 	if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ 		options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
  	if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
  		/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
+ 		if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
  			options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
- 		    _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE;
+ 			    _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE;
- 		options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
+@@ -423,17 +435,18 @@ typedef enum {
- 		    _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE;
- #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-@@ -414,17 +427,18 @@ typedef enum {
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
  	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
  	sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
@@ -415,12 +414,12 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
  	sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
  	sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
  	sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
- 	sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
+ 	sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash,
- 	sExposeAuthInfo,
+ 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
- 	sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
  } ServerOpCodes;
  
-@@ -553,16 +567,17 @@ static struct {
+ #define SSHCFG_GLOBAL	0x01	/* allowed in main section of sshd_config */
+@@ -561,16 +574,17 @@ static struct {
  	{ "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -438,9 +437,9 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
  	{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL },
-@@ -1502,16 +1517,20 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+@@ -1481,16 +1495,20 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		if (*arg != '-' &&
+ 			    filename, linenum);
- 		    !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ 		if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
  			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
  			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
  		if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
@@ -451,17 +450,17 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
 +		intptr = &options->kex_dhmin;
 +		goto parse_int;
 +
- 	case sSubsystem:
+ 	case sProtocol:
- 		if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) {
+ 		intptr = &options->protocol;
- 			fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.",
- 			    filename, linenum);
- 		}
  		arg = strdelim(&cp);
  		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
-@@ -2285,16 +2304,17 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 		value = proto_spec(arg);
- #endif
+ 		if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.",
+@@ -2247,16 +2265,17 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sKeyRegenerationTime, o->key_regeneration_time);
  	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
  	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
  	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
@@ -474,13 +473,13 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly,
- 	    o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h
+@@ -88,16 +88,17 @@ typedef struct {
-@@ -93,16 +93,17 @@ typedef struct {
  	int	permit_user_rc;	/* If false, deny ~/.ssh/rc execution */
  	int     strict_modes;	/* If true, require string home dir modes. */
  	int     tcp_keep_alive;	/* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
@@ -490,17 +489,17 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h
  	char   *macs;		/* Supported SSH2 macs. */
  	char   *kex_algorithms;	/* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
 +	int     kex_dhmin;	/* minimum bit length of the DH group parameter */
+ 	int	protocol;	/* Supported protocol versions. */
  	struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts;	/* forwarding options */
  	SyslogFacility log_facility;	/* Facility for system logging. */
  	LogLevel log_level;	/* Level for system logging. */
+ 	int     rhosts_rsa_authentication;	/* If true, permit rhosts RSA
+ 						 * authentication. */
  	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */
  	int     hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */
- 	char   *hostbased_key_types;	/* Key types allowed for hostbased */
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
- 	char   *hostkeyalgorithms;	/* SSH2 server key types */
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
- 	int     pubkey_authentication;	/* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
 @@ -12,16 +12,21 @@
  # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
  # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
@@ -523,17 +522,17 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
  # should not forward X11 connections to your local X11-display for
  # security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the
  # remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.0 b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.0
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.0
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.0
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0
-@@ -584,16 +584,33 @@ DESCRIPTION
+@@ -606,16 +606,33 @@ DESCRIPTION
                     ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
                     diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
                     diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
                     diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
  
               The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
-              obtained using "ssh -Q kex".
+              obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\kexM-bM-^@M-^].
  
 +     KexDHMin
 +             Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group
@@ -556,22 +555,22 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.0 b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.0
               Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after
               successfully connecting to the server.  The command string
               extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's
-              shell.  Arguments to LocalCommand accept the tokens described in
+              shell.  The following escape character substitutions will be
-              the TOKENS section.
+              performed: M-bM-^@M-^X%dM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user's home directory), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote host
- 
+              name), M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y (local host name), M-bM-^@M-^X%nM-bM-^@M-^Y (host name as provided on the
-              The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the
+              command line), M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote port), M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote user name) or
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.5 b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.5
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.5
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.5
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
-@@ -1016,16 +1016,32 @@ curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libs
+@@ -1092,16 +1092,32 @@ diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
- ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
- diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
  .Ed
  .Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using the
- .Qq ssh -Q kex .
+ .Fl Q
+ option of
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ with an argument of
+ .Dq kex .
 +.It Cm KexDHMin
 +Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group
 +parameter p.
@@ -593,16 +592,16 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.5 b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.5
  connecting to the server.
  The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
  the user's shell.
- Arguments to
+ The following escape character substitutions will be performed:
- .Cm LocalCommand
+ .Ql %d
- accept the tokens described in the
+ (local user's home directory),
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
-@@ -15,16 +15,21 @@
+@@ -21,16 +21,21 @@
- #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+ # HostKey for protocol version 1
- #ListenAddress ::
+ #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
- 
+ # HostKeys for protocol version 2
  #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
  #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
  #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
@@ -613,25 +612,25 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
 +# Upstream default is identical to setting this to 2048.
 +#KexDHMin 1024
 +
+ # Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key
+ #KeyRegenerationInterval 1h
+ #ServerKeyBits 1024
+ 
  # Ciphers and keying
  #RekeyLimit default none
  
  # Logging
- #SyslogFacility AUTH
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
- #LogLevel INFO
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
- 
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
- # Authentication:
+@@ -539,16 +539,33 @@ DESCRIPTION
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
+                    curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
-@@ -532,16 +532,33 @@ DESCRIPTION
-                    curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
                     ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
                     diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
                     diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
  
               The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
-              obtained using "ssh -Q kex".
+              obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\kexM-bM-^@M-^].
  
 +     KexDHMin
 +             Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group
@@ -650,26 +649,26 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
 +             resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken)
 +             counterparty.
 +
-      ListenAddress
+      KeyRegenerationInterval
-              Specifies the local addresses sshd(8) should listen on.  The
+              In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically
-              following forms may be used:
+              regenerated after this many seconds (if it has been used).  The
+              purpose of regeneration is to prevent decrypting captured
+              sessions by later breaking into the machine and stealing the
+              keys.  The key is never stored anywhere.  If the value is 0, the
+              key is never regenerated.  The default is 3600 (seconds).
  
-                    ListenAddress host|IPv4_addr|IPv6_addr
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-                    ListenAddress host|IPv4_addr:port
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-                    ListenAddress [host|IPv6_addr]:port
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
- 
+@@ -895,16 +895,32 @@ diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
-@@ -893,16 +893,32 @@ The default is:
- curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
- ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
- diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
  .Ed
  .Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using the
- .Qq ssh -Q kex .
+ .Fl Q
+ option of
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ with an argument of
+ .Dq kex .
 +.It Cm KexDHMin
 +Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group
 +parameter p.
@@ -686,11 +685,11 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
 +security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last
 +resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken)
 +counterparty.
- .It Cm ListenAddress
+ .It Cm KeyRegenerationInterval
- Specifies the local addresses
+ In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated
- .Xr sshd 8
+ after this many seconds (if it has been used).
- should listen on.
+ The purpose of regeneration is to prevent
- The following forms may be used:
+ decrypting captured sessions by later breaking into the machine and
- .Pp
+ stealing the keys.
- .Bl -item -offset indent -compact
+ The key is never stored anywhere.
- .It
+ If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated.

openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  e4886597a8984ae1594b6866fe1b232370b23529
+# posix threads are generally not supported nor safe
+# (see upstream log from 2005-05-24)
+# --used to be called '-pam-fix3'
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
+@@ -782,17 +782,19 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
+ 			}
+ 			if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ 				if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||
+ 				    (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ 				    options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+ 					fatal("Internal error: PAM auth "
+ 					    "succeeded when it should have "
+ 					    "failed");
++#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+ 				import_environments(&buffer);
++#endif
+ 				*num = 0;
+ 				**echo_on = 0;
+ 				ctxt->pam_done = 1;
+ 				free(msg);
+ 				return (0);
+ 			}
+ 			error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg,
+ 			    sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",

openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  f19426f2fa9c634474e635bf33b86acea0518f6d
+fix paths and references in sshd man pages
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
+@@ -901,17 +901,17 @@ See
+ If this file exists,
+ .Nm
+ refuses to let anyone except root log in.
+ The contents of the file
+ are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
+ refused.
+ The file should be world-readable.
+ .Pp
+-.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
++.It Pa /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv
+ This file is used in exactly the same way as
+ .Pa hosts.equiv ,
+ but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+ rlogin/rsh.
+ .Pp
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+@@ -981,17 +981,17 @@ The content of this file is not sensitiv
+ .Xr scp 1 ,
+ .Xr sftp 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+ .Xr chroot 2 ,
+-.Xr login.conf 5 ,
++.Xr login.defs 5 ,
+ .Xr moduli 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+ .Xr inetd 8 ,
+ .Xr sftp-server 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+ Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+@@ -370,18 +370,17 @@ for details).
+ The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before
+ authentication is allowed.
+ If the argument is
+ .Dq none
+ then no banner is displayed.
+ By default, no banner is displayed.
+ .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
+-PAM or through authentication styles supported in
+-.Xr login.conf 5 )
++PAM)
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
+ .It Cm ChrootDirectory
+ Specifies the pathname of a directory to
+ .Xr chroot 2
+ to after authentication.
+ At session startup
+ .Xr sshd 8
+@@ -766,17 +765,17 @@ and
+ .Pa .shosts
+ files will not be used in
+ .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+ or
+ .Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+ .Pp
+ .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+ and
+-.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
++.Pa /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv
+ are still used.
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
+ .It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts
+ Specifies whether
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ should ignore the user's
+ .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts

openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  980f301b2920c09b30577dd722546bca85d25fc1
+# force PAM in defaullt install (this was removed from upstream in 3.8p1)
+# bnc#46749
+# --used to be called '-pam-fix2'
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+@@ -64,17 +64,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ #HostbasedAuthentication no
+ # Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for
+ # RhostsRSAAuthentication and HostbasedAuthentication
+ #IgnoreUserKnownHosts no
+ # Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
+ #IgnoreRhosts yes
+ 
+ # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
+-#PasswordAuthentication yes
++PasswordAuthentication no
+ #PermitEmptyPasswords no
+ 
+ # Change to no to disable s/key passwords
+ #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
+ 
+ # Kerberos options
+ #KerberosAuthentication no
+ #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+@@ -89,17 +89,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+ # be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
+ # PasswordAuthentication.  Depending on your PAM configuration,
+ # PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
+ # the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+-#UsePAM no
++UsePAM yes
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+ #AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ #GatewayPorts no
+ X11Forwarding yes
+ #X11DisplayOffset 10
+ #X11UseLocalhost yes
+ #PermitTTY yes

openssh-7.2p2-fips_fixes.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  cb502e7e796ac9289a571167a97ad9ec91562efb
+Silent warnings about unsupported KEX algorithms - synchronize behaviour with
+that of MAC and cipher checking code paths.
+
+bsc#1006166
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
+@@ -192,17 +192,20 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 
+ 	if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
++			/* do not complain here - MACs and ciphers checks
++			 * are silent here
+ 			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
++			 */
+ 			free(s);
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names);
+ 	free(s);
+ 	return 1;
+ }

openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  e2f9b3303b4a4ed5d0e5f01009dd1ebea166890d
+Suggest command line for removal of offending keys from known_hosts file
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c
+@@ -1086,16 +1086,21 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ 				    ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
+ 		}
+ 		/* The host key has changed. */
+ 		warn_changed_key(host_key);
+ 		error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
+ 		    user_hostfiles[0]);
+ 		error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
+ 		    host_found->file, host_found->line);
++		error("You can use following command to remove the offending key:");
++		if (host_found->file)
++			error("ssh-keygen -R %s -f %s", host, host_found->file);
++		else
++			error("ssh-keygen -R %s", host);
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
+ 		 * to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
+ 		 */
+ 		if (options.strict_host_key_checking) {
+ 			error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
+ 			    "requested strict checking.", type, host);

openssh-7.2p2-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch

@@ -1,24 +1,24 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  e4a7e5799420a3d4b8047c5984c75c4bd4331951
+# Parent  f7ba2081f120bd1e44dbe68737c898f078725aab
 # -- uset do be called '-xauthlocalhostname'
 handle hostname changes when forwarding X
 
 bnc#98627
 
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/session.c b/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
-@@ -953,17 +953,17 @@ copy_environment_blacklist(char **source
+@@ -1154,17 +1154,17 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char ***
+ 		debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
+ 		child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
  
- void
+ 		free(var_name);
- copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
+ 	}
- {
- 	copy_environment_blacklist(source, env, envsize, NULL);
  }
  
  static char **
--do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+-do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
-+do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell, int *env_size)
++do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell, int *env_size)
  {
  	char buf[256];
  	u_int i, envsize;
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/session.c b/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
  #if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
  	char *path = NULL;
  #endif
-@@ -1142,25 +1142,27 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
+@@ -1341,25 +1341,27 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
  		read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
  	}
  	if (debug_flag) {
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/session.c b/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
  
  	do_xauth =
  	    s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
-@@ -1205,22 +1207,30 @@ do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shel
+@@ -1404,22 +1406,30 @@ do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shel
  			    "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
  			    options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
  			    s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
@@ -87,25 +87,25 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/session.c b/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
  }
  
  static void
-@@ -1461,16 +1471,17 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1681,16 +1691,17 @@ child_close_fds(void)
   * ids, and executing the command or shell.
   */
  #define ARGV_MAX 10
  void
- do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
  {
  	extern char **environ;
  	char **env;
 +	int env_size;
  	char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
- 	const char *shell, *shell0;
+ 	const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL;
  	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
  	int r = 0;
  
  	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
  	destroy_sensitive_data();
- 	packet_clear_keys();
+ 
-@@ -1522,17 +1533,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+@@ -1747,17 +1758,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
  	 * legal, and means /bin/sh.
  	 */
  	shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
@@ -114,18 +114,17 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/session.c b/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
  	 * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
  	 * even if shell is overridden from login.conf
  	 */
--	env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell);
+-	env = do_setup_env(s, shell);
-+	env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell, &env_size);
++	env = do_setup_env(s, shell, &env_size);
  
  #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
  	shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
  #endif
  
- 	/*
+ 	/* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */
- 	 * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
+ 	if (options.use_login)
- 	 * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
+ 		hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
-@@ -1586,17 +1597,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+@@ -1816,17 +1827,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 			    strerror(errno));
  		}
  		if (r)
  			exit(1);
@@ -133,6 +132,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/session.c b/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
  
  	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
  
+ 	if (!options.use_login)
 -		do_rc_files(s, shell);
 +		do_rc_files(s, shell, env, &env_size);
  

openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  0f00e960e1069c6a6eec975cc184171343701077
+
+Do not import PAM environment variables when using login, since it may have
+security implications.
+
+CVE-2015-8325
+bsc#975865
+
+Backport of upstream commit 85bdcd7c92fe7ff133bbc4e10a65c91810f88755
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
+@@ -1351,17 +1351,17 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
+ 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
+ 		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Pull in any environment variables that may have
+ 	 * been set by PAM.
+ 	 */
+-	if (options.use_pam) {
++	if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login) {
+ 		char **p;
+ 
+ 		p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
+ 		copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
+ 		free_pam_environment(p);
+ 
+ 		p = fetch_pam_environment();
+ 		copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);

openssh-7.2p2-keep_slogin.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  7c29b31d3502bbf5b80e01f8d1db8b2733a3c7f4
+Add slogin back to the distribution, since it might be used downstreams
+
+Revert of cupstream commit 69fead5d7cdaa73bdece9fcba80f8e8e70b90346
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+@@ -354,16 +354,20 @@ install-files:
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+ 	if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \
+ 		$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8 ; \
+ 		$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap.conf.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh-ldap.conf.5 ; \
+ 	fi
++	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
++	ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
++	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
++	ln -s ./ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
+ 
+ install-sysconf:
+ 	if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) ]; then \
+ 		$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir); \
+ 	fi
+ 	@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \
+ 		$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \
+ 	else \
+@@ -415,16 +419,17 @@ uninstallall:	uninstall
+ 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
+ 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
+ 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
+ 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
+ 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)
+ 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
+ 
+ uninstall:
++	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
+@@ -440,16 +445,17 @@ uninstall:
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8
++	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
+ 
+ regress-prep:
+ 	[ -d `pwd`/regress ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress
+ 	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests
+ 	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper ] || \
+ 		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper
+ 	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf ] || \
+ 		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf

openssh-7.2p2-kex_resource_depletion.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  5d3b620e9c7c42bfb1d8f24eb7e0645a55d967fa
+Prevent memory depletion during key exchange
+
+CVE-2016-8858
+bsc#1005480
+
+upstream commit ec165c392ca54317dbe3064a8c200de6531e89ad
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
+@@ -523,16 +523,17 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t se
+ 	u_int i;
+ 	size_t dlen;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+ 	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
+ 	if (kex == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
+ 	ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 
+ 	/* discard packet */
+ 	for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
+ 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0)
+ 			return r;

openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  b26f93cf21e4cfff1212ad2e61696ad099cfaf5e
+# Parent  79c00e0f450c33b3f545ef104112b55186290e2c
 # set uid for functions that use it to seek in lastlog and wtmp files
 # bnc#18024 (was suse #3024)
 
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshlogin.c b/openssh-7.6p1/sshlogin.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshlogin.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshlogin.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c
 @@ -129,16 +129,17 @@ record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty,
  {
  	struct logininfo *li;

openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  9888bc3f536eab9f528d9c96e5e8a2501ed168f5
+Limit accepted passwords length to prevent DoS by resource consumption
+(via crypt() eating CPU cycles).
+
+CVE-2016-6515
+bsc#992533
+
+upstream commit: fcd135c9df440bcd2d5870405ad3311743d78d97
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
+@@ -61,16 +61,18 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ extern login_cap_t *lc;
+ #endif
+ 
+ 
+ #define DAY		(24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
+ #define TWO_WEEKS	(2L * 7 * DAY)	/* 2 weeks in seconds */
+ 
++#define MAX_PASSWORD_LEN	1024
++
+ void
+ disable_forwarding(void)
+ {
+ 	no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ 	no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ 	no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -82,16 +84,19 @@ int
+ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ {
+ 	struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw;
+ 	int result, ok = authctxt->valid;
+ #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+ 	static int expire_checked = 0;
+ #endif
+ 
++	if (strlen(password) > MAX_PASSWORD_LEN)
++		return 0;
++
+ #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ 	if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
+ 		ok = 0;
+ #endif
+ 	if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef KRB5

openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  b86c2190c93aeaf958c22fc7b224dcaf87100288
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  b262fd34c8ecd55e93d457b3ca5593abce716856
+# login-pam cannot handle the option terminator "--" as login from util-linux
+# (this is correct behaviour considering its man-page), hence use option which
+# selects the compile-time branch in the code which doesn't use the terminator
+#
+# bnc#833605
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+@@ -770,16 +770,18 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
+ 	AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
+ 	;;
+ *-*-linux*)
+ 	no_dev_ptmx=1
+ 	use_pie=auto
+ 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ 	check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
++	AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT], [1],
++		[Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--")])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1],
+ 		[Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"],
+ 		[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM],
+ 		[Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported"
+ 		if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.])

openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  4011d0f5c00b663976c9940dc4ef79642605cf90
+Do not write a PID file when not daemonizing (e.g. when running from systemd)
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+@@ -2107,17 +2107,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+ 		signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+ 		signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
+ 		 * is setup and the listen sockets are bound
+ 		 */
+-		if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) {
++		if (!no_daemon_flag && options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) {
+ 			FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
+ 
+ 			if (f == NULL) {
+ 				error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
+ 				    options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
+ 			} else {
+ 				fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
+ 				fclose(f);

openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  ee0459c1b5173da57f9b3a6e62b232dcf9b3a029
+# Parent  ac7f843cd7ebec413691d51823cdc67b611abdff
 new option UsePAMCheckLocks to enforce checking for locked accounts while
 UsePAM is used
 
 bnc#708678, FATE#312033
 
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/auth.c b/openssh-7.6p1/auth.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/auth.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/auth.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
-@@ -105,17 +105,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+@@ -104,17 +104,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
  	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
  #endif
  
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/auth.c b/openssh-7.6p1/auth.c
  #endif /* USE_SHADOW */
  
  	/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
-@@ -125,17 +125,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+@@ -124,17 +124,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
  #ifdef USE_LIBIAF
  		passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
  #else
@@ -46,9 +46,9 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/auth.c b/openssh-7.6p1/auth.c
  #endif
  #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
  		if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
 @@ -69,16 +69,17 @@ extern Buffer cfg;
  
  void
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
  	options->num_queued_listens = 0;
  	options->listen_addrs = NULL;
  	options->address_family = -1;
-@@ -191,16 +192,18 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -195,16 +196,18 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
  void
  fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  {
@@ -80,13 +80,13 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
 +		options->use_pam_check_locks = 0;
  
  	/* Standard Options */
+ 	if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ 		options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
  	if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
  		/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
+ 		if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
  			options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
- 		    _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE;
+@@ -391,17 +394,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- 		options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
- 		    _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE;
-@@ -382,17 +385,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  #endif
  
  }
@@ -98,14 +98,14 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
 -	sUsePAM,
 +	sUsePAM, sUsePAMChecklocks,
  	/* Standard Options */
- 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+ 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime,
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ 	sKeyRegenerationTime, sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
  	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
  	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
  	sKerberosGetAFSToken,
  	sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
  	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
-@@ -433,18 +436,20 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -441,18 +444,20 @@ typedef enum {
  static struct {
  	const char *name;
  	ServerOpCodes opcode;
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
  	{ "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },		/* alias */
  	{ "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1040,16 +1045,19 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+@@ -1005,16 +1010,19 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
  		}
  	}
  
@@ -146,10 +146,10 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
  		/* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
  		if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
  			return 0;
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
-@@ -168,16 +168,17 @@ typedef struct {
+@@ -167,16 +167,17 @@ typedef struct {
  					 */
  
  	u_int num_authkeys_files;	/* Files containing public keys */
@@ -162,22 +162,22 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h
  
  	int	permit_tun;
  
- 	char   **permitted_opens;
+ 	int	num_permitted_opens;
- 	u_int   num_permitted_opens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */
  
  	char   *chroot_directory;
  	char   *revoked_keys_file;
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
+ 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
-@@ -901,16 +901,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+@@ -946,16 +946,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
  
               Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an
               equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable
               either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
  
               If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
-              non-root user.  The default is no.
+              non-root user.  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
  
 +     UsePAMCheckLocks
 +             When set to ``yes'', the checks whether the account has been
@@ -187,18 +187,18 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
 +             to set up the session and some PAM modules will not check whether
 +             the account is locked in this scenario). The default is ``no''.
 +
-      VersionAddendum
+      UsePrivilegeSeparation
-              Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH
+              Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an
-              protocol banner sent by the server upon connection.  The default
+              unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic.
-              is none.
+              After successful authentication, another process will be created
- 
+              that has the privilege of the authenticated user.  The goal of
-      X11DisplayOffset
+              privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by
-              Specifies the first display number available for sshd(8)'s X11
+              containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes.  The
-              forwarding.  This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11
+              argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\sandboxM-bM-^@M-^].  If
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1496,16 +1496,28 @@ or
+@@ -1578,16 +1578,28 @@ or
  .Pp
  If
  .Cm UsePAM
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
  .Xr sshd 8
  as a non-root user.
  The default is
- .Cm no .
+ .Dq no .
 +.It Cm UsePAMCheckLocks
 +When set to 
 +.Dq yes
@@ -219,11 +219,11 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
 +modules will not check whether the account is locked in this scenario). The
 +default is 
 +.Dq no .
- .It Cm VersionAddendum
+ .It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
- Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
+ Specifies whether
- sent by the server upon connection.
+ .Xr sshd 8
- The default is
+ separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process
- .Cm none .
+ to deal with incoming network traffic.
- .It Cm X11DisplayOffset
+ After successful authentication, another process will be created that has
- Specifies the first display number available for
+ the privilege of the authenticated user.
- .Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
+ The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege

openssh-7.2p2-prevent_private_key_leakage.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  e2a8c999f737bca97bbc330ce6683de842ba195e
+Pre-allocare buffer for private keys data to prevent leaking of sensitive data
+via heap.
+
+CVE-2016-10011
+bsc#1016369
+
+backported upstream commit 54d022026aae4f53fa74cc636e4a032d9689b64d
+backported upstream commit a9c746088787549bb5b1ae3add7d06a1b6d93d5e
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/authfile.c b/openssh-7.2p2/authfile.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/authfile.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/authfile.c
+@@ -95,23 +95,35 @@ sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, 
+ 
+ /* Load a key from a fd into a buffer */
+ int
+ sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob)
+ {
+ 	u_char buf[1024];
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	struct stat st;
+-	int r;
++	int r, dontmax = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ 	if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
+ 	    st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
++	/*
++	 * Pre-allocate the buffer used for the key contents and clamp its
++	 * maximum size. This ensures that key contents are never leaked via
++	 * implicit realloc() in the sshbuf code.
++	 */
++	if ((st.st_mode & S_IFREG) == 0 || st.st_size <= 0) {
++		st.st_size = 64*1024; /* 64k should be enough for anyone :) */
++		dontmax = 1;
++	}
++	if ((r = sshbuf_allocate(blob, st.st_size)) != 0 ||
++	    (dontmax && (r = sshbuf_set_max_size(blob, st.st_size)) != 0))
++		return r;
+ 	for (;;) {
+ 		if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) {
+ 			if (errno == EPIPE)
+ 				break;
+ 			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0)
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.c
+@@ -311,63 +311,73 @@ sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf
+ 	SSHBUF_TELL("check");
+ 	/* Check that len is reasonable and that max_size + available < len */
+ 	if (len > buf->max_size || buf->max_size - len < buf->size - buf->off)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp)
++sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+ 	size_t rlen, need;
+ 	u_char *dp;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	if (dpp != NULL)
+-		*dpp = NULL;
+-
+-	SSHBUF_DBG(("reserve buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
++	SSHBUF_DBG(("allocate buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If the requested allocation appended would push us past max_size
+ 	 * then pack the buffer, zeroing buf->off.
+ 	 */
+ 	sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, buf->size + len > buf->max_size);
+-	SSHBUF_TELL("reserve");
+-	if (len + buf->size > buf->alloc) {
+-		/*
+-		 * Prefer to alloc in SSHBUF_SIZE_INC units, but
+-		 * allocate less if doing so would overflow max_size.
+-		 */
+-		need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc;
+-		rlen = roundup(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
+-		SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen));
+-		if (rlen > buf->max_size)
+-			rlen = buf->alloc + need;
+-		SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen));
+-		if ((dp = realloc(buf->d, rlen)) == NULL) {
+-			SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail"));
+-			if (dpp != NULL)
+-				*dpp = NULL;
+-			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		}
+-		buf->alloc = rlen;
+-		buf->cd = buf->d = dp;
+-		if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) < 0) {
+-			/* shouldn't fail */
+-			if (dpp != NULL)
+-				*dpp = NULL;
+-			return r;
+-		}
++	SSHBUF_TELL("allocate");
++	if (len + buf->size <= buf->alloc)
++		return 0; /* already have it. */
++
++	/*
++	 * Prefer to alloc in SSHBUF_SIZE_INC units, but
++	 * allocate less if doing so would overflow max_size.
++	 */
++	need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc;
++	rlen = roundup(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
++	SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen));
++	if (rlen > buf->max_size)
++		rlen = buf->alloc + need;
++	SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen));
++	if ((dp = realloc(buf->d, rlen)) == NULL) {
++		SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail"));
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 	}
++	buf->alloc = rlen;
++	buf->cd = buf->d = dp;
++	if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) < 0) {
++		/* shouldn't fail */
++		return r;
++	}
++	SSHBUF_TELL("done");
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp)
++{
++	u_char *dp;
++	int r;
++
++	if (dpp != NULL)
++		*dpp = NULL;
++
++	SSHBUF_DBG(("reserve buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
++	if ((r = sshbuf_allocate(buf, len)) != 0)
++		return r;
++
+ 	dp = buf->d + buf->size;
+ 	buf->size += len;
+-	SSHBUF_TELL("done");
+ 	if (dpp != NULL)
+ 		*dpp = dp;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.h
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.h
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.h
+@@ -134,16 +134,24 @@ u_char *sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct 
+  * Check whether a reservation of size len will succeed in buf
+  * Safer to use than direct comparisons again sshbuf_avail as it copes
+  * with unsigned overflows correctly.
+  * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+  */
+ int	sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
+ 
+ /*
++ * Preallocates len additional bytes in buf.
++ * Useful for cases where the caller knows how many bytes will ultimately be
++ * required to avoid realloc in the buffer code.
++ * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
++ */
++int	sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
++
++/*
+  * Reserve len bytes in buf.
+  * Returns 0 on success and a pointer to the first reserved byte via the
+  * optional dpp parameter or a negative * SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+  */
+ int	sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Consume len bytes from the start of buf

openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  4a254abf4ef391358257310ad2fe15c9e12dee34
+Prevent user enumeration through password processing timing
+CVE-2016-6210
+bsc#989363
+
+non-PAM part:
+upstream commit: 9286875a73b2de7736b5e50692739d314cd8d9dc
+
+PAM part:
+upstream commit: 283b97ff33ea2c641161950849931bd578de6946
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
+@@ -227,17 +227,16 @@ static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NUL
+ static int sshpam_err = 0;
+ static int sshpam_authenticated = 0;
+ static int sshpam_session_open = 0;
+ static int sshpam_cred_established = 0;
+ static int sshpam_account_status = -1;
+ static char **sshpam_env = NULL;
+ static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL;
+ static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
+-static char badpw[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
+ 
+ /* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
+ #ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
+ static char **
+ pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh)
+ {
+ 	/*
+ 	 * XXX - If necessary, we can still support envrionment passing
+@@ -807,22 +806,45 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
+ 			free(msg);
+ 			ctxt->pam_done = -1;
+ 			return (-1);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	return (-1);
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied.
++ * Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that
++ * vary processing time in proportion to password length.
++ */
++static char *
++fake_password(const char *wire_password)
++{
++	const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
++	char *ret = NULL;
++	size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0;
++
++	if (l >= INT_MAX)
++		fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
++
++	ret = xmalloc(l + 1);
++	for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
++		ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
++	ret[i] = '\0';
++	return ret;
++}
++
+ /* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */
+ static int
+ sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
+ {
+ 	Buffer buffer;
+ 	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
++	char *fake;
+ 
+ 	debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num);
+ 	switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
+ 	case 1:
+ 		sshpam_authenticated = 1;
+ 		return (0);
+ 	case 0:
+ 		break;
+@@ -833,18 +855,21 @@ sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, cha
+ 		error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num);
+ 		return (-1);
+ 	}
+ 	buffer_init(&buffer);
+ 	if (sshpam_authctxt->valid &&
+ 	    (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
+ 	    options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
+ 		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
+-	else
+-		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, badpw);
++	else {
++		fake = fake_password(*resp);
++		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, fake);
++		free(fake);
++	}
+ 	if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, &buffer) == -1) {
+ 		buffer_free(&buffer);
+ 		return (-1);
+ 	}
+ 	buffer_free(&buffer);
+ 	return (1);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1178,41 +1203,43 @@ static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { s
+ /*
+  * Attempt password authentication via PAM
+  */
+ int
+ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ {
+ 	int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
+ 	    PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
++	char *fake = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL)
+ 		fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to "
+ 		    "initialise.", __func__);
+ 
+ 	sshpam_password = password;
+ 	sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted
+ 	 * by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking
+ 	 * information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail).
+ 	 */
+ 	if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ 	    options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+-		sshpam_password = badpw;
++		sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password);
+ 
+ 	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+ 	    (const void *)&passwd_conv);
+ 	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ 		fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__,
+ 		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ 
+ 	sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
+ 	sshpam_password = NULL;
++	free(fake);
+ 	if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
+ 		debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
+ 		    authctxt->user);
+ 		return 1;
+ 	} else {
+ 		debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s",
+ 		    authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user",
+ 		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
+@@ -188,28 +188,32 @@ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, cons
+ 		return (auth_close(as));
+ 	}
+ }
+ #elif !defined(CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD)
+ int
+ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ {
+ 	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+-	char *encrypted_password;
++	char *encrypted_password, *salt = NULL;
+ 
+ 	/* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
+ 	char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
+ 
+ 	/* Check for users with no password. */
+ 	if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
+ 		return (1);
+ 
+-	/* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
+-	encrypted_password = xcrypt(password,
+-	    (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx");
++	/*
++	 * Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt, or pass a
++	 * NULL and let xcrypt pick one.
++	 */
++	if (authctxt->valid && pw_password[0] && pw_password[1])
++		salt = pw_password;
++	encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, salt);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
+ 	 * are identical.
+ 	 */
+ 	return encrypted_password != NULL &&
+ 	    strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0;
+ }
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
+@@ -20,16 +20,17 @@
+  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+  */
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
++#include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ 
+ # if defined(HAVE_CRYPT_H) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+ #  include <crypt.h>
+ # endif
+ 
+ # ifdef __hpux
+@@ -57,21 +58,54 @@
+ #  include "md5crypt.h"
+ # endif
+ 
+ # if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(HAVE_CRYPT) && defined(HAVE_DES_CRYPT)
+ #  include <openssl/des.h>
+ #  define crypt DES_crypt
+ # endif
+ 
++/*
++ * Pick an appropriate password encryption type and salt for the running
++ * system.
++ */
++static const char *
++pick_salt(void)
++{
++	struct passwd *pw;
++	char *passwd, *p;
++	size_t typelen;
++	static char salt[32];
++
++	if (salt[0] != '\0')
++		return salt;
++	strlcpy(salt, "xx", sizeof(salt));
++	if ((pw = getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
++		return salt;
++	passwd = shadow_pw(pw);
++	if (passwd[0] != '$' || (p = strrchr(passwd + 1, '$')) == NULL)
++		return salt;  /* no $, DES */
++	typelen = p - passwd + 1;
++	strlcpy(salt, passwd, MIN(typelen, sizeof(salt)));
++	explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
++	return salt;
++}
++
+ char *
+ xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt)
+ {
+ 	char *crypted;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * If we don't have a salt we are encrypting a fake password for
++	 * for timing purposes.  Pick an appropriate salt.
++	 */
++	if (salt == NULL)
++		salt = pick_salt();
++
+ # ifdef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
+         if (is_md5_salt(salt))
+                 crypted = md5_crypt(password, salt);
+         else
+                 crypted = crypt(password, salt);
+ # elif defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+ 	if (iscomsec())
+                 crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);

openssh-7.2p2-pts_names_formatting.patch

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  6dd892b74f13d258dc1bb3a70db7397dfb46c5e0
+# Parent  787bc0aab11e5a7b6510c8dbf771958743ca25b0
 # use same lines naming as utempter (prevents problems with using different
 # formats in ?tmp? files)
 # --used to be called '-pts'
 
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/loginrec.c b/openssh-7.6p1/loginrec.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c b/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/loginrec.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/loginrec.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c
 @@ -541,17 +541,17 @@ getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
  /*
   * 'line' string utility functions

openssh-7.2p2-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch

@@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  2c6d52d1229cbfd1cd4b7b356bb649470df4d3b3
+# Parent  18c2690afd988b9cb0fd0fa927d02cf5336dce9c
 # --used to be called '-xauth'
 try to remove xauth cookies on logout
 
 bnc#98815
 
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/session.c b/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
-@@ -2294,16 +2294,44 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *
+@@ -2540,16 +2540,44 @@ session_close(Session *s)
  	u_int i;
  
  	verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
  	    s->pw->pw_name,
- 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
- 	    ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ 	    get_remote_port(),
  	    s->self);
  
 +	if ((s->display != NULL) && (s->auth_proto != NULL) &&

openssh-7.2p2-restrict_pkcs11-modules.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  22de9aeddbde2b36da9c23475cfa5dcd42e95287
+whitelist paths for loading of PKCS#11 modules in ssh-agent
+
+CVE-2016-10009
+bsc#1016366
+
+upstream commit 786d5994da79151180cb14a6cf157ebbba61c0cc
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
+@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
+-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.62 2015/11/15 23:54:15 jmc Exp $
++.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.63 2016/11/30 03:07:37 djm Exp $
+ .\"
+ .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ .\"                    All rights reserved
+ .\"
+ .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ .\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+@@ -29,29 +29,30 @@
+ .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ .\"
+-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 15 2015 $
++.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2016 $
+ .Dt SSH-AGENT 1
+ .Os
+ .Sh NAME
+ .Nm ssh-agent
+ .Nd authentication agent
+ .Sh SYNOPSIS
+ .Nm ssh-agent
+ .Op Fl c | s
+ .Op Fl \&Dd
+ .Op Fl a Ar bind_address
+ .Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+ .Op Fl t Ar life
++.Op Fl P Ar pkcs11_whitelist
+ .Op Ar command Op Ar arg ...
+ .Nm ssh-agent
+ .Op Fl c | s
+ .Fl k
+ .Sh DESCRIPTION
+ .Nm
+ is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication
+ (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519).
+@@ -116,16 +117,28 @@ Valid options are:
+ and
+ .Dq sha256 .
+ The default is
+ .Dq sha256 .
+ .It Fl k
+ Kill the current agent (given by the
+ .Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
+ environment variable).
++.It Fl P
++Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 shared libraries
++that may be added using the
++.Fl s
++option to
++.Xr ssh-add 1 .
++The default is to allow loading PKCS#11 libraries from
++.Dq /usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/* .
++PKCS#11 libraries that do not match the whitelist will be refused.
++See PATTERNS in
++.Xr ssh_config 5
++for a description of pattern-list syntax.
+ .It Fl s
+ Generate Bourne shell commands on
+ .Dv stdout .
+ This is the default if
+ .Ev SHELL
+ does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
+ .It Fl t Ar life
+ Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent.
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.c b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -78,25 +78,30 @@
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "match.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+ #if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H)
+ #include <sys/prctl.h>	/* For prctl() and PR_SET_DUMPABLE */
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifndef DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST
++# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/*"
++#endif
++
+ typedef enum {
+ 	AUTH_UNUSED,
+ 	AUTH_SOCKET,
+ 	AUTH_CONNECTION
+ } sock_type;
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+ 	int fd;
+@@ -134,16 +139,19 @@ time_t parent_alive_interval = 0;
+ 
+ /* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */
+ pid_t cleanup_pid = 0;
+ 
+ /* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
+ char socket_name[PATH_MAX];
+ char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
+ 
++/* PKCS#11 path whitelist */
++static char *pkcs11_whitelist;
++
+ /* locking */
+ #define LOCK_SIZE	32
+ #define LOCK_SALT_SIZE	16
+ #define LOCK_ROUNDS	1
+ int locked = 0;
+ char lock_passwd[LOCK_SIZE];
+ char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE];
+ 
+@@ -736,17 +744,17 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e, u_int type
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 	sshbuf_free(msg);
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ static void
+ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+ {
+-	char *provider = NULL, *pin;
++	char *provider = NULL, *pin, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
+ 	int r, i, version, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
+ 	u_int seconds;
+ 	time_t death = 0;
+ 	u_char type;
+ 	struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
+ 	Identity *id;
+ 	Idtab *tab;
+ 
+@@ -768,29 +776,40 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
+ 			confirm = 1;
+ 			break;
+ 		default:
+ 			error("process_add_smartcard_key: "
+ 			    "Unknown constraint type %d", type);
+ 			goto send;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
++		verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
++		    provider, strerror(errno));
++		goto send;
++	}
++	if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, pkcs11_whitelist, 0) != 1) {
++		verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
++		    "provider not whitelisted", canonical_provider);
++		goto send;
++	}
++	debug("%s: add %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
+ 	if (lifetime && !death)
+ 		death = monotime() + lifetime;
+ 
+-	count = pkcs11_add_provider(provider, pin, &keys);
++	count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ 		k = keys[i];
+ 		version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
+ 		tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+ 		if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
+ 			id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
+ 			id->key = k;
+-			id->provider = xstrdup(provider);
+-			id->comment = xstrdup(provider); /* XXX */
++			id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
++			id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider); /* XXX */
+ 			id->death = death;
+ 			id->confirm = confirm;
+ 			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+ 			tab->nentries++;
+ 			success = 1;
+ 		} else {
+ 			sshkey_free(k);
+ 		}
+@@ -1171,17 +1190,17 @@ check_parent_exists(void)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ usage(void)
+ {
+ 	fprintf(stderr,
+ 	    "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
+-	    "                 [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
++	    "                 [-P pkcs11_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
+ 	    "       ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
+ 	exit(1);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ main(int ac, char **av)
+ {
+ 	int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
+@@ -1215,31 +1234,36 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+ 	seed_rng();
+ 
+-	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:t:")) != -1) {
++	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:P:t:")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (ch) {
+ 		case 'E':
+ 			fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
+ 			if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
+ 				fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'c':
+ 			if (s_flag)
+ 				usage();
+ 			c_flag++;
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'k':
+ 			k_flag++;
+ 			break;
++		case 'P':
++			if (pkcs11_whitelist != NULL)
++				fatal("-P option already specified");
++			pkcs11_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg);
++			break;
+ 		case 's':
+ 			if (c_flag)
+ 				usage();
+ 			s_flag++;
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'd':
+ 			if (d_flag || D_flag)
+ 				usage();
+@@ -1264,16 +1288,19 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	ac -= optind;
+ 	av += optind;
+ 
+ 	if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag))
+ 		usage();
+ 
++	if (pkcs11_whitelist == NULL)
++		pkcs11_whitelist = xstrdup(DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST);
++
+ 	if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
+ 		shell = getenv("SHELL");
+ 		if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
+ 		    strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
+ 			c_flag = 1;
+ 	}
+ 	if (k_flag) {
+ 		const char *errstr = NULL;
+@@ -1411,17 +1438,17 @@ skip:
+ 		parent_alive_interval = 10;
+ 	idtab_init();
+ 	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ 	signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
+ 	signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
+ 	signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
+ 	nalloc = 0;
+ 
+-	if (pledge("stdio cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1)
++	if (pledge("stdio rpath cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1)
+ 		fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
+ 	platform_pledge_agent();
+ 
+ 	while (1) {
+ 		prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp);
+ 		result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp);
+ 		saved_errno = errno;
+ 		if (parent_alive_interval != 0)

openssh-7.2p2-s390_OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11_syscalls.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  bb92b9f037cc3686a669cd84caa44a2716f34058
+Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 14:27:34 -0300
+
+[PATCH 0/3] Allow syscalls for openssl engines
+From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+To: openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org
+In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
+and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
+implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
+crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
+this is only need on s390 architecture.
+
+The EP11 crypto card also needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
+specific argument.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+
+related to bsc#1016709
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -150,16 +150,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW(stat),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_exit
+ 	SC_ALLOW(exit),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_exit_group
+ 	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(flock),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getpgid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getpid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getuid),
+@@ -180,16 +183,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getuid),
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid32 /* not defined on x86_64 */
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
+ #endif
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(ipc),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_madvise
+ 	SC_ALLOW(madvise),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_mmap
+ 	SC_ALLOW(mmap),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_mmap2
+ 	SC_ALLOW(mmap2),
+@@ -233,16 +239,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ #ifdef __NR_socketcall
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_ioctl
+ #ifdef __s390__
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
++	/* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
++	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Default deny */
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
+ };
+ 
+ static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = {

openssh-7.2p2-s390_hw_crypto_syscalls.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  6d8637bec747de081eccba9874f640dcbc4fbb68
+This patch enables specific ioctl calls for ICA crypto card on s390
+platform. Without this patch, users using the IBMCA engine are not able
+to perform ssh login as the filter blocks the communication with the
+crypto card.
+
+Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+
+bsc#1016709
+
+Upstreamed as:
+5f1596e11d55539678c41f68aed358628d33d86f
+58b8cfa2a062b72139d7229ae8de567f55776f24
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -54,42 +54,53 @@
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stddef.h>  /* for offsetof */
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++#include <endian.h>
++
++#ifdef __s390__
++#include <asm/zcrypt.h>
++#endif
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ 
+ /* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */
+ #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL
+ 
+ /* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */
+ #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+ # undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL
+ # define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
+ #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
+ 
+ /* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
++#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
++#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)])
++#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
++#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)]) + sizeof(uint32_t)
++#else
++#error "Unknown endianness"
++#endif
+ #define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
+ 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno))
+ #define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \
+ 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
+ #define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
+ 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 4), \
+-	/* load first syscall argument */ \
+-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+-	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)])), \
++	/* load the syscall argument to check into accumulator */ \
++	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, LO_ARG(_arg_nr)), \
+ 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_arg_val), 0, 1), \
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
+ 	/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+ 		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
+ 
+ /* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */
+ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+@@ -217,16 +228,23 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW(time),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_write
+ 	SC_ALLOW(write),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_socketcall
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_ioctl
++#ifdef __s390__
++	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
++	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
++	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
++#endif
++#endif
+ 
+ 	/* Default deny */
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
+ };
+ 
+ static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = {
+ 	.len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])),
+ 	.filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns,

openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_geteuid.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  b07f00d5d805c043f5bdc7b8cf6701d924879fa6
+Add the 'geteuid' syscall to allowed list, since it may becalled on the
+mainframes when OpenSSL is using hardware crypto accelerator via libica
+(via ibmica)
+
+bsc#1004258
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -148,16 +148,22 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getuid),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid32
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid
++	SC_ALLOW(geteuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(geteuid32),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+ 	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_madvise
+ 	SC_ALLOW(madvise),

openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  d75417bf0f4d50cabd84299773bab4ac68f68caa
+add 'getuid' syscall to list of allowed ones to prevent the sanboxed thread
+from being killed by the seccomp filter
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -142,16 +142,22 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getpgid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getpid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid
++	SC_ALLOW(getuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+ 	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_madvise
+ 	SC_ALLOW(madvise),

openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  2153c4af090728c778931d2fad72d4b260294122
+Allow the stat() syscall for OpenSSL re-seed patch
+(which causes OpenSSL use stat() on some file)
+
+bnc#912436
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -130,16 +130,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW(brk),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
+ 	SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_close
+ 	SC_ALLOW(close),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_stat
++	SC_ALLOW(stat),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_exit
+ 	SC_ALLOW(exit),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_exit_group
+ 	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getpgid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getpgid),

openssh-7.2p2-secure_unix_sockets_forwarding.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  4e1fd41aaa9cafe8f7b07868ac38ed4dbdf594aa
+Do not allow unix socket when running without privilege separation to prevent
+privilege escalation through a socket created with root: ownership.
+
+CVE-2016-10010
+bsc#1016368
+
+backported upstream commit b737e4d7433577403a31cff6614f6a1b0b5e22f4
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/serverloop.c b/openssh-7.2p2/serverloop.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/serverloop.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/serverloop.c
+@@ -990,17 +990,17 @@ server_request_direct_streamlocal(void)
+ 	originator_port = packet_get_int();
+ 	packet_check_eom();
+ 
+ 	debug("server_request_direct_streamlocal: originator %s port %d, target %s",
+ 	    originator, originator_port, target);
+ 
+ 	/* XXX fine grained permissions */
+ 	if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
+-	    !no_port_forwarding_flag) {
++	    !no_port_forwarding_flag && use_privsep) {
+ 		c = channel_connect_to_path(target,
+ 		    "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
+ 	} else {
+ 		logit("refused streamlocal port forward: "
+ 		    "originator %s port %d, target %s",
+ 		    originator, originator_port, target);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1274,17 +1274,17 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_
+ 
+ 		memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+ 		fwd.listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ 		debug("server_input_global_request: streamlocal-forward listen path %s",
+ 		    fwd.listen_path);
+ 
+ 		/* check permissions */
+ 		if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0
+-		    || no_port_forwarding_flag) {
++		    || no_port_forwarding_flag || !use_privsep) {
+ 			success = 0;
+ 			packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding.");
+ 		} else {
+ 			/* Start listening on the socket */
+ 			success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(
+ 			    &fwd, NULL, &options.fwd_opts);
+ 		}
+ 		free(fwd.listen_path);

openssh-7.2p2-seed-prng.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  6ece65e11f754d75dd33d72b6f8e487a9d047f2e
+# extended support for (re-)seeding the OpenSSL PRNG from /dev/random
+# bnc#703221, FATE#312172
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c b/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
+@@ -49,16 +49,17 @@
+ 
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "atomicio.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "buffer.h"
++#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding:
+  * If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from
+  * /dev/random), then collect RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes of randomness from
+  * PRNGd.
+  */
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+@@ -224,16 +225,19 @@ seed_rng(void)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
+ 		fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");
+ 	RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
+ 	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+ 
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
++
++	linux_seed();
++
+ 	if (RAND_status() != 1)
+ 		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
+ }
+ 
+ #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 
+ /* Handled in arc4random() */
+ void
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+@@ -15,17 +15,17 @@ AR=@AR@
+ RANLIB=@RANLIB@
+ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+ LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
+ 
+ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o reallocarray.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha1.o sha2.o rmd160.o md5.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o explicit_bzero.o
+ 
+ COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o kludge-fd_set.o
+ 
+-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
++PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+ 
+ .c.o:
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+ 
+ all: libopenbsd-compat.a
+ 
+ $(COMPAT): ../config.h
+ $(OPENBSD): ../config.h
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
++ *           (c) 2011 Petr Cerny <pcerny@suse.cz>
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++#include "defines.h"
++
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <openssl/rand.h>
++
++#include "log.h"
++#include "port-linux.h"
++#include "fips.h"
++
++#define RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT	6L
++#define RNG_ENV_VAR		"SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG"
++
++long rand_bytes = 0;
++char *rand_file = NULL;
++
++static void
++linux_seed_init(void)
++{
++	long elen = 0;
++	char *env = getenv(RNG_ENV_VAR);
++
++	if (env) {
++		errno = 0;
++		elen = strtol(env, NULL, 10);
++		if (errno) {
++			elen = RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT;
++			debug("bogus value in the %s environment variable, "
++				"using %li bytes from /dev/random\n",
++				RNG_ENV_VAR, RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT);
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (elen || fips_mode())
++		rand_file = "/dev/random";
++	else
++		rand_file = "/dev/urandom";
++
++	rand_bytes = MAX(elen, RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT);
++}
++
++void
++linux_seed(void)
++{
++	long len;
++	if (!rand_file)
++		linux_seed_init();
++
++	errno = 0;
++	len = RAND_load_file(rand_file, rand_bytes);
++	if (len != rand_bytes) {
++		if (errno)
++			fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", rand_file, strerror(errno));
++		else
++			fatal ("EOF reading %s", rand_file);
++	}
++}
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -14,16 +14,20 @@
+  * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+  * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+  */
+ 
+ #ifndef _PORT_LINUX_H
+ #define _PORT_LINUX_H
+ 
++extern long rand_bytes;
++extern char *rand_file;
++void linux_seed(void);
++
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-add.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-add.1
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-add.1
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-add.1
+@@ -166,16 +166,30 @@ or related script.
+ (Note that on some machines it
+ may be necessary to redirect the input from
+ .Pa /dev/null
+ to make this work.)
+ .It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ Identifies the path of a
+ .Ux Ns -domain
+ socket used to communicate with the agent.
++.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .El
+ .Sh FILES
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
+ Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+ Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
+@@ -196,16 +196,33 @@ line terminates.
+ .Sh FILES
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds
+ .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt
+ .Ux Ns -domain
+ sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
+ These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
+ The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
+ .El
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.1
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.1
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.1
+@@ -841,16 +841,33 @@ on all machines
+ where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
+ There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
+ .Pp
+ .It Pa /etc/moduli
+ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
+ The file format is described in
+ .Xr moduli 5 .
+ .El
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+ .Xr moduli 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ .Rs
+ .%R RFC 4716
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keysign.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keysign.8
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keysign.8
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keysign.8
+@@ -75,16 +75,33 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authe
+ .Pp
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
+ If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
+ information corresponding with the private keys above.
+ .El
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ .Sh HISTORY
+ .Nm
+ first appeared in
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.1
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.1
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.1
+@@ -1411,16 +1411,30 @@ reads
+ and adds lines of the format
+ .Dq VARNAME=value
+ to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to
+ change their environment.
+ For more information, see the
+ .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+ option in
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 .
++.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .Sh FILES
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+ .It Pa ~/.rhosts
+ This file is used for host-based authentication (see above).
+ On some machines this file may need to be
+ world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
+ because
+ .Xr sshd 8
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
+@@ -972,16 +972,33 @@ and not group or world-writable.
+ .It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
+ Contains the process ID of the
+ .Nm
+ listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
+ concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
+ started last).
+ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+ .El
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr scp 1 ,
+ .Xr sftp 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+@@ -50,16 +50,18 @@
+ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+ # include <sys/stat.h>
+ #endif
+ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+ # include <sys/time.h>
+ #endif
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
++#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h"
++
+ #include <sys/wait.h>
+ 
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <netdb.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+ #include <paths.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -209,16 +211,23 @@ struct {
+ 	Key	**host_pubkeys;		/* all public host keys */
+ 	Key	**host_certificates;	/* all public host certificates */
+ 	int	have_ssh1_key;
+ 	int	have_ssh2_key;
+ 	u_char	ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+ } sensitive_data;
+ 
+ /*
++ * Every RESEED_AFTERth connection triggers call to linux_seed() to re-seed the
++ * random pool.
++ */
++#define RESEED_AFTER    100
++static int re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
++
++/*
+  * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
+  * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
+  */
+ static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
+ 
+ /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
+ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
+ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
+@@ -1343,16 +1352,20 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 			for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
+ 				if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
+ 					startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
+ 					if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
+ 						maxfd = startup_p[0];
+ 					startups++;
+ 					break;
+ 				}
++			if(!(--re_seeding_counter)) {
++				re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
++				linux_seed();
++			}
+ 
+ 			/*
+ 			 * Got connection.  Fork a child to handle it, unless
+ 			 * we are in debugging mode.
+ 			 */
+ 			if (debug_flag) {
+ 				/*
+ 				 * In debugging mode.  Close the listening

openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  f258e8b7fc48a4b0f60fc436dc9ec72423a11bfc
+# Parent  dfcac093fca4d826a806b9d1c0bdc26e7ae8ee8e
 send locales in default configuration
 bnc#65747
 
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
 @@ -26,16 +26,21 @@ Host *
  # security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the
  # remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your
@@ -20,18 +20,18 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
 +    SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
 +    SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
 +
+ #   RhostsRSAAuthentication no
+ #   RSAAuthentication yes
  #   PasswordAuthentication yes
  #   HostbasedAuthentication no
  #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
  #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
  #   BatchMode no
  #   CheckHostIP yes
- #   AddressFamily any
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
- #   ConnectTimeout 0
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
+@@ -120,14 +120,19 @@ X11Forwarding yes
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
-@@ -105,14 +105,19 @@ X11Forwarding yes
  #VersionAddendum none
  
  # no default banner path

openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  7b45c4f3fef6836db00c5b198736cce17290c5cd
+additional option for sftp-server to force file mode for new files
+FATE#312774
+http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2010-November/029044.html
+http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=128896838930893
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
+@@ -33,16 +33,17 @@
+ .Bk -words
+ .Op Fl ehR
+ .Op Fl d Ar start_directory
+ .Op Fl f Ar log_facility
+ .Op Fl l Ar log_level
+ .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
+ .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
+ .Op Fl u Ar umask
++.Op Fl m Ar force_file_permissions
+ .Ek
+ .Nm
+ .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
+ .Sh DESCRIPTION
+ .Nm
+ is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
+ to stdout and expects client requests from stdin.
+ .Nm
+@@ -133,16 +134,20 @@ Places this instance of
+ into a read-only mode.
+ Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change
+ the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
+ .It Fl u Ar umask
+ Sets an explicit
+ .Xr umask 2
+ to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
+ user's default mask.
++.It Fl m Ar force_file_permissions
++Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
++of the default or client requested mode.  Numeric values include:
++777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Option -u is ineffective if -m is set.
+ .El
+ .Pp
+ On some systems,
+ .Nm
+ must be able to access
+ .Pa /dev/log
+ for logging to work, and use of
+ .Nm
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
+@@ -73,16 +73,20 @@ static u_int version;
+ static int init_done;
+ 
+ /* Disable writes */
+ static int readonly;
+ 
+ /* Requests that are allowed/denied */
+ static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist;
+ 
++/* Force file permissions */
++int permforce = 0;
++long permforcemode;
++
+ /* portable attributes, etc. */
+ typedef struct Stat Stat;
+ 
+ struct Stat {
+ 	char *name;
+ 	char *long_name;
+ 	Attrib attrib;
+ };
+@@ -687,16 +691,20 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
+ 	    (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+ 	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
+ 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
+ 	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
++	if (permforce == 1) {
++		mode = permforcemode;
++		(void)umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
++	}
+ 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
+ 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
+ 	if (readonly &&
+ 	    ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY ||
+ 	    (flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) {
+ 		verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
+ 		status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
+ 	} else {
+@@ -1489,17 +1497,18 @@ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i)
+ static void
+ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ {
+ 	extern char *__progname;
+ 
+ 	fprintf(stderr,
+ 	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
+ 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
+-	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
++	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n\t"
++	    "[-m force_file_permissions]\n"
+ 	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
+ 	    __progname, __progname);
+ 	exit(1);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
+ {
+@@ -1515,17 +1524,17 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, 
+ 
+ 	ssh_malloc_init();	/* must be called before any mallocs */
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+ 	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 
+ 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+ 
+ 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+-	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
++	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (ch) {
+ 		case 'Q':
+ 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
+ 				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n");
+ 				exit(1);
+ 			}
+ 			for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
+ 				printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name);
+@@ -1575,16 +1584,23 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, 
+ 		case 'u':
+ 			errno = 0;
+ 			mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
+ 			if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
+ 			    cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0))
+ 				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
+ 			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
+ 			break;
++		case 'm':
++			permforce = 1;
++			permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
++			if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
++				cp == optarg || (permforcemode == 0 && errno != 0))
++				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
++			break;
+ 		case 'h':
+ 		default:
+ 			sftp_server_usage();
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 

openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  fc81df6f2bf393e45e703c89976c3a0fe6e0a273
+run sftp sessions inside a chroot
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
+@@ -123,16 +123,18 @@ int	do_exec(Session *, const char *);
+ void	do_login(Session *, const char *);
+ #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+ static void	do_pre_login(Session *s);
+ #endif
+ void	do_child(Session *, const char *);
+ void	do_motd(void);
+ int	check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
+ 
++int	chroot_no_tree = 0;
++
+ static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *);
+ static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *);
+ 
+ static int session_pty_req(Session *);
+ 
+ /* import */
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern char *__progname;
+@@ -838,16 +840,21 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		    "subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys);
+ 	} else if (command == NULL) {
+ 		snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell");
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */
+ 		snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command");
+ 	}
+ 
++	if ((s->is_subsystem != SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) && chroot_no_tree) {
++		logit("You aren't welcomed, go away!");
++		exit (1);
++	}
++
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ 		tty = s->tty;
+ 		if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+ 			tty += 5;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+ 	    session_type,
+@@ -1492,58 +1499,123 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
+  		while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
+  			fputs(buf, stderr);
+  		fclose(f);
+  	}
+ 	exit(254);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
++ * Test if filesystem is mounted nosuid and nodev
++ */
++
++static void
++test_nosuid (char * path, dev_t fs)
++{
++	FILE *f;
++	struct stat st;
++	char buf[4096], *s, *on, *mountpoint, *opt;
++	int nodev, nosuid;
++
++	if (!(f = popen ("/bin/mount", "r")))
++		fatal ("%s: popen(\"/bin/mount\", \"r\"): %s",
++		    __func__, strerror (errno));
++	for (;;) {
++		s = fgets (buf, sizeof (buf), f);
++		if (ferror (f))
++			fatal ("%s: read from popen: %s", __func__,
++			    strerror (errno));
++		if (!s) {
++			pclose (f);
++			fatal ("cannot find filesystem with the chroot directory");
++		}
++		(void) strtok (buf, " ");
++		on = strtok (NULL, " ");
++		if (strcmp (on, "on")) {
++			pclose (f);
++			fatal ("bad format of mount output");
++		}
++		mountpoint = strtok (NULL, " ");
++		if (memcmp (path, mountpoint, strlen (mountpoint)))
++			continue;
++		if (stat(mountpoint, &st) != 0) {
++			pclose (f);
++			fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
++			    mountpoint, strerror(errno));
++		}
++		if (fs != st.st_dev)
++			continue;
++		nodev = nosuid = 0;
++		for (opt = strtok (NULL, "("); opt; opt = strtok (NULL, " ,)")) {
++			if (!strcmp (opt, "nodev"))
++				nodev = 1;
++			else if (!strcmp (opt, "nosuid"))
++				nosuid = 1;
++			else if (!strcmp (opt, "noexec"))
++				nosuid = 1;
++			if (nodev && nosuid) {
++				pclose (f);
++				return;
++			}
++		}
++		fatal ("chroot into directory without nodev and either noexec or nosuid");
++	}
++}
++
++/*
+  * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components
+  * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions.
+  */
+ static void
+ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
+ {
+ 	const char *cp;
+ 	char component[PATH_MAX];
+ 	struct stat st;
++	int last;
+ 
+ 	if (*path != '/')
+ 		fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
+ 	if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
+ 		fatal("chroot path too long");
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Descend the path, checking that each component is a
+ 	 * root-owned directory with strict permissions.
+ 	 */
+ 	for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
+-		if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
++		if (last = ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL))
+ 			strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
+ 		else {
+ 			cp++;
+ 			memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
+ 			component[cp - path] = '\0';
+ 		}
+ 	
+ 		debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component);
+ 
+ 		if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
+ 			fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
+ 			    component, strerror(errno));
+-		if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
++		if ((st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) && !(last && st.st_uid == uid))
+ 			fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
+ 			    "directory %s\"%s\"", 
+ 			    cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
+ 		if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
+ 			fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
+ 			    cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
+ 
+ 	}
++	setenv ("TZ", "/etc/localtime", 0);
++	tzset();
++
++	if (st.st_uid) {
++		test_nosuid(path, st.st_dev);
++		++chroot_no_tree;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (chdir(path) == -1)
+ 		fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
+ 		    "%s", path, strerror(errno));
+ 	if (chroot(path) == -1)
+ 		fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
+ 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
+ 		fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s",
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-chrootenv.h b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-chrootenv.h
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-chrootenv.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F Chadima.  All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++#ifndef CHROOTENV_H
++#define CHROOTENV_H
++
++extern int	chroot_no_tree;
++
++#endif
++
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-common.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-common.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-common.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-common.c
+@@ -43,16 +43,17 @@
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ 
+ #include "sftp.h"
+ #include "sftp-common.h"
++#include "sftp-chrootenv.h"
+ 
+ /* Clear contents of attributes structure */
+ void
+ attrib_clear(Attrib *a)
+ {
+ 	a->flags = 0;
+ 	a->size = 0;
+ 	a->uid = 0;
+@@ -216,23 +217,23 @@ ls_file(const char *name, const struct s
+ 	int ulen, glen, sz = 0;
+ 	struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime);
+ 	char *user, *group;
+ 	char buf[1024], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1];
+ 	char sbuf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+ 	time_t now;
+ 
+ 	strmode(st->st_mode, mode);
+-	if (!remote) {
++	if (!remote && !chroot_no_tree) {
+ 		user = user_from_uid(st->st_uid, 0);
+ 	} else {
+ 		snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid);
+ 		user = ubuf;
+ 	}
+-	if (!remote) {
++	if (!remote && !chroot_no_tree) {
+ 		group = group_from_gid(st->st_gid, 0);
+ 	} else {
+ 		snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid);
+ 		group = gbuf;
+ 	}
+ 	if (ltime != NULL) {
+ 		now = time(NULL);
+ 		if (now - (365*24*60*60)/2 < st->st_mtime &&
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server-main.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server-main.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server-main.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server-main.c
+@@ -17,22 +17,25 @@
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++//#include <time.h>
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "sftp.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ 
++int chroot_no_tree = 0;
++
+ void
+ cleanup_exit(int i)
+ {
+ 	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(i);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ main(int argc, char **argv)
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
+@@ -112,16 +112,18 @@ struct complete_ctx {
+ 	char **remote_pathp;
+ };
+ 
+ int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
+     int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
+ 
+ extern char *__progname;
+ 
++int chroot_no_tree = 0;
++
+ /* Separators for interactive commands */
+ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+ 
+ /* ls flags */
+ #define LS_LONG_VIEW	0x0001	/* Full view ala ls -l */
+ #define LS_SHORT_VIEW	0x0002	/* Single row view ala ls -1 */
+ #define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW	0x0004	/* Long view with numeric uid/gid */
+ #define LS_NAME_SORT	0x0008	/* Sort by name (default) */
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+@@ -251,16 +251,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
+              directory on some operating systems (see sftp-server(8) for
+              details).
+ 
+              For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
+              prevented from modification by other processes on the system
+              (especially those outside the jail).  Misconfiguration can lead
+              to unsafe environments which sshd(8) cannot detect.
+ 
++             In the special case when only sftp is used, not ssh nor scp, it
++             is possible to use ChrootDirectory %h or ChrootDirectory
++             /some/path/%u. The file system containing this directory must be
++             mounted with options nodev and either nosuid or noexec. The owner
++             of the directory should be the user. The ownership of the other
++             components of the path must fulfill the usual conditions. No adi-
++             tional files are required to be present in the directory.
++
+              The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^], indicating not to chroot(2).
+ 
+      Ciphers
+              Specifies the ciphers allowed.  Multiple ciphers must be comma-
+              separated.  If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
+              then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+              instead of replacing them.
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+@@ -424,16 +424,27 @@ for details).
+ .Pp
+ For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
+ prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially
+ those outside the jail).
+ Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ cannot detect.
+ .Pp
++In the special case when only sftp is used, not ssh nor scp,
++it is possible to use
++.Cm ChrootDirectory
++%h or
++.Cm ChrootDirectory
++/some/path/%u. The file system containing this directory must be
++mounted with options nodev and either nosuid or noexec. The owner of the
++directory should be the user. The ownership of the other components of the path
++must fulfill the usual conditions. No aditional files are required to be present
++in the directory.
++.Pp
+ The default is
+ .Dq none ,
+ indicating not to
+ .Xr chroot 2 .
+ .It Cm Ciphers
+ Specifies the ciphers allowed.
+ Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified value begins with a

openssh-7.2p2-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  af7fb4f9e794f639262d9847e95c52a74017aaaf
+Put back sftp client diagnostic messages in batch mode
+
+bsc#1023275
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.0
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.0
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.0
+@@ -162,16 +162,19 @@ DESCRIPTION
+                    VerifyHostKeyDNS
+ 
+      -P port
+              Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
+ 
+      -p      Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
+              original files transferred.
+ 
++     -Q      Not-so-quiet batch mode: forces printing of diagnostic messages
++             in batch mode.
++
+      -q      Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
+              diagnostic messages from ssh(1).
+ 
+      -R num_requests
+              Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
+              Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed but will
+              increase memory usage.  The default is 64 outstanding requests.
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.1
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.1
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.1
+@@ -251,16 +251,19 @@ For full details of the options listed b
+ .It UserKnownHostsFile
+ .It VerifyHostKeyDNS
+ .El
+ .It Fl P Ar port
+ Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
+ .It Fl p
+ Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
+ original files transferred.
++.It Fl Q
++Not-so-quiet batch mode: forces printing of diagnostic messages
++in batch mode.
+ .It Fl q
+ Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
+ diagnostic messages from
+ .Xr ssh 1 .
+ .It Fl R Ar num_requests
+ Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
+ Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed
+ but will increase memory usage.
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
+@@ -79,16 +79,18 @@ FILE* infile;
+ /* Are we in batchfile mode? */
+ int batchmode = 0;
+ 
+ /* PID of ssh transport process */
+ static pid_t sshpid = -1;
+ 
+ /* Suppress diagnositic messages */
+ int quiet = 0;
++/* Force diagnositic messages in batch mode */
++int loud = 0;
+ 
+ /* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */
+ int showprogress = 1;
+ 
+ /* When this option is set, we always recursively download/upload directories */
+ int global_rflag = 0;
+ 
+ /* When this option is set, we resume download or upload if possible */
+@@ -2263,32 +2265,35 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no");
+ 	addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no");
+ 	addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes");
+ 
+ 	ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ 	infile = stdin;
+ 
+ 	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+-	    "1246afhpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:P:R:")) != -1) {
++	    "1246afhpQqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:P:R:")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (ch) {
+ 		/* Passed through to ssh(1) */
+ 		case '4':
+ 		case '6':
+ 		case 'C':
+ 			addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
+ 			break;
+ 		/* Passed through to ssh(1) with argument */
+ 		case 'F':
+ 		case 'c':
+ 		case 'i':
+ 		case 'o':
+ 			addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
+ 			addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
+ 			break;
++		case 'Q':
++			loud = 1;
++			break;
+ 		case 'q':
+ 			ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+ 			quiet = 1;
+ 			showprogress = 0;
+ 			addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'P':
+ 			addargs(&args, "-oPort %s", optarg);
+@@ -2360,16 +2365,18 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 			ssh_program = optarg;
+ 			replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'h':
+ 		default:
+ 			usage();
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	if (batchmode && loud)
++		quiet = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO))
+ 		showprogress = 0;
+ 
+ 	log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+ 
+ 	if (sftp_direct == NULL) {
+ 		if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2))

openssh-7.2p2-ssh_case_insensitive_host_matching.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  1b99f71db584917a37c5e9140bf63dcb860e8b59
+Match hostnames in a case-insensitive manner.
+
+bsc#1017099
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
+@@ -526,16 +526,17 @@ execute_in_shell(const char *cmd)
+  * Parse and execute a Match directive.
+  */
+ static int
+ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw,
+     const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, int post_canon,
+     const char *filename, int linenum)
+ {
+ 	char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria;
++	char *hostlc;
+ 	const char *ruser;
+ 	int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate;
+ 	char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we
+ 	 * must be prepared to use default values.
+ 	 */
+@@ -546,16 +547,20 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
+ 	} else if (options->hostname != NULL) {
+ 		/* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */
+ 		host = percent_expand(options->hostname,
+ 		    "h", host_arg, (char *)NULL);
+ 	} else {
+ 		host = xstrdup(host_arg);
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* match_hostname() requires the hostname to be lowercase */
++	hostlc = xstrdup(host);
++	lowercase(hostlc);
++
+ 	debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s",
+ 	    cp, host, original_host);
+ 	while ((oattrib = attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
+ 		criteria = NULL;
+ 		this_result = 1;
+ 		if ((negate = attrib[0] == '!'))
+ 			attrib++;
+ 		/* criteria "all" and "canonical" have no argument */
+@@ -584,18 +589,18 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
+ 		}
+ 		/* All other criteria require an argument */
+ 		if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
+ 			error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
+ 			result = -1;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
+-			criteria = xstrdup(host);
+-			r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1;
++			criteria = xstrdup(hostlc);
++			r = match_hostname(hostlc, arg) == 1;
+ 			if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
+ 				this_result = result = 0;
+ 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) {
+ 			criteria = xstrdup(original_host);
+ 			r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1;
+ 			if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
+ 				this_result = result = 0;
+ 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
+@@ -658,16 +663,17 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
+ 		error("One or more attributes required for Match");
+ 		result = -1;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+  out:
+ 	if (result != -1)
+ 		debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
+ 	*condition = cp;
++	free(hostlc);
+ 	free(host);
+ 	return result;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Check and prepare a domain name: removes trailing '.' and lowercases */
+ static void
+ valid_domain(char *name, const char *filename, int linenum)
+ {

openssh-7.2p2-stricter_readonly_sftp.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  70f144cf46b999eed1eebda70cb27cadc4e49b82
+Stricter checking for write actions in read-only mode in the stfp server
+CVE-2017-15906
+bsc#1065000
+
+backoported upstream commit 4d827f0d75a53d3952288ab882efbddea7ffadfe
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
+@@ -700,18 +700,18 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
+ 	if (permforce == 1) {
+ 		mode = permforcemode;
+ 		(void)umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
+ 	}
+ 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
+ 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
+ 	if (readonly &&
+-	    ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY ||
+-	    (flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) {
++	    ((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY ||
++	    (flags & (O_CREAT|O_TRUNC)) != 0)) {
+ 		verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
+ 		status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
+ 	} else {
+ 		fd = open(name, flags, mode);
+ 		if (fd < 0) {
+ 			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ 		} else {
+ 			handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, flags, NULL);

openssh-7.2p2-systemd-notify.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  1ba8782c9cf18b104779c751839f3a2575c87954
+Send signals to systemd to prevent various race conditions
+bsc#1048367
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+@@ -4326,16 +4326,40 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ 		LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+ 
+ 	fi
+ 	]
+ )
+ AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+ 
++# Check whether user wants systemd support
++SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
++AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
++	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
++	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
++		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
++			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
++			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
++				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
++				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
++				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
++				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
++				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
++				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
++				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
++			else
++				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
++			fi
++		fi
++	fi ]
++)
++
++
+ # Looking for programs, paths and files
+ 
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+ AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-path],
+ 	[  --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)],
+ 	[
+ 		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+ 		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+@@ -5140,16 +5164,17 @@ echo "                 KerberosV support
+ echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
+ echo "                 Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
+ echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
+ echo "              MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
+ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+ echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+ echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
+ echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
++echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
+ echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+ echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
+ echo "             Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
+ 
+ echo ""
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+@@ -82,16 +82,20 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+ #include <sys/security.h>
+ #include <prot.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
++#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
++#endif
++
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh1.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+ #include "rsa.h"
+ #include "sshpty.h"
+ #include "packet.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+@@ -328,16 +332,20 @@ sighup_handler(int sig)
+ 
+ /*
+  * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
+  * Restarts the server.
+  */
+ static void
+ sighup_restart(void)
+ {
++#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
++	/* Signal systemd that we are reloading */
++	sd_notify(0, "RELOADING=1");
++#endif
+ 	logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
+ 	platform_pre_restart();
+ 	close_listen_socks();
+ 	close_startup_pipes();
+ 	alarm(0);  /* alarm timer persists across exec */
+ 	signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */
+ 	execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
+ 	logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
+@@ -2119,16 +2127,21 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 				error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
+ 				    options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
+ 			} else {
+ 				fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
+ 				fclose(f);
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
++		/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
++		sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
++#endif
++
+ 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+ 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
+ 		    &newsock, config_s);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* This is the child processing a new connection. */
+ 	setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
+ 

openssh-7.2p2-tcpwrappers.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,433 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  20564b2e34b780c138dbd876c800dd5f28c91c23
+Forward port TCP wrappers support (libwrap) from OpenSSH 6.6p1. Make it
+run-time switchable through the new UseTCPWrappers option for sshd.
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+@@ -1501,16 +1501,72 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([skey],
+ 					function takes 4 arguments (NetBSD)])],
+ 			[
+ 				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ 			])
+ 		fi
+ 	]
+ )
+ 
++# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
++TCPW_MSG="no"
++AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers],
++	[  --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)],
++	[
++		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++			saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
++			saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
++			saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
++			if test -n "${withval}" && \
++			    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
++				if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
++					if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
++						LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
++					else
++						LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
++					fi
++				else
++					if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
++						LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
++					else
++						LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
++					fi
++				fi
++				if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
++					CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
++				else
++					CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
++				fi
++			fi
++			LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
++			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap])
++			AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/socket.h>
++#include <netinet/in.h>
++#include <tcpd.h>
++int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
++				]], [[
++	hosts_access(0);
++				]])], [
++					AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
++					AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1],
++						[Define if you want
++						TCP Wrappers support])
++					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
++					TCPW_MSG="yes"
++				], [
++					AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
++				
++			])
++			LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
++		fi
++	]
++)
++
+ # Check whether user wants to use ldns
+ LDNS_MSG="no"
+ AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
+ 	[  --with-ldns[[=PATH]]      Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)],
+     [
+         if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ 
+ 			if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
+@@ -5159,16 +5215,17 @@ echo "          sshd superuser user PATH
+ fi
+ echo "                    Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
+ echo "                       PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
+ echo "                   OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
+ echo "                 KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
+ echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
+ echo "                 Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
+ echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
++echo "              TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
+ echo "              MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
+ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+ echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+ echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
+ echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
+ echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
+ echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+@@ -173,16 +173,17 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions 
+ 	options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
+ 	options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
+ 	options->authorized_principals_command = NULL;
+ 	options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL;
+ 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+ 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
+ 	options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
++	options->use_tcpwrappers = -1;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
+ static int
+ option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
+ {
+ 	return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0;
+ }
+@@ -392,16 +393,19 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
+ 		options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
+ 	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
+ 		options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
+ 	if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
+ 		options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+ 	options->fingerprint_hash =
+ 		fips_correct_dgst(options->fingerprint_hash);
++	if (options->use_tcpwrappers == -1) {
++		options->use_tcpwrappers = 0;
++	}
+ 
+ 	assemble_algorithms(options);
+ 
+ 	/* Turn privilege separation and sandboxing on by default */
+ 	if (use_privsep == -1)
+ 		use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON;
+ 
+ #define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
+@@ -471,16 +475,17 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+ 	sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
+ 	sKexAlgorithms, sKexDHMin,
+ 	sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
+ 	sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
+ 	sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
+ 	sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
+ 	sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash,
++	sUseTCPWrappers,
+ 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
+ } ServerOpCodes;
+ 
+ #define SSHCFG_GLOBAL	0x01	/* allowed in main section of sshd_config */
+ #define SSHCFG_MATCH	0x02	/* allowed inside a Match section */
+ #define SSHCFG_ALL	(SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
+ 
+ /* Textual representation of the tokens. */
+@@ -622,16 +627,17 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "usetcpwrappers", sUseTCPWrappers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ static struct {
+ 	int val;
+ 	char *text;
+ } tunmode_desc[] = {
+ 	{ SSH_TUNMODE_NO, "no" },
+@@ -1245,16 +1251,20 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 	case sHostbasedAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
+ 	case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly:
+ 		intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sUseTCPWrappers:
++		intptr = &options->use_tcpwrappers;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes:
+ 		charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types;
+  parse_keytypes:
+ 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
+@@ -2400,16 +2410,17 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseTCPWrappers, o->use_tcpwrappers);
+ 
+ 	/* string arguments */
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
+@@ -196,16 +196,17 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int	rekey_interval;
+ 
+ 	char   *version_addendum;	/* Appended to SSH banner */
+ 
+ 	u_int	num_auth_methods;
+ 	char   *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
+ 
+ 	int	fingerprint_hash;
++	int	use_tcpwrappers;
+ }       ServerOptions;
+ 
+ /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
+ struct connection_info {
+ 	const char *user;
+ 	const char *host;	/* possibly resolved hostname */
+ 	const char *address; 	/* remote address */
+ 	const char *laddress;	/* local address */
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
+@@ -875,16 +875,22 @@ This file should be writable only by roo
+ can, but need not be, world-readable.
+ .Pp
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+ Contains initialization routines to be run before
+ the user's home directory becomes accessible.
+ This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
+ readable by anyone else.
+ .Pp
++.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
++.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
++Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
++Further details are described in
++.Xr hosts_access 5 .
++.Pp
+ .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+ This file is for host-based authentication (see
+ .Xr ssh 1 ) .
+ It should only be writable by root.
+ .Pp
+ .It Pa /etc/moduli
+ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange"
+ key exchange method.
+@@ -998,16 +1004,17 @@ be blocked until enough entropy is avail
+ .Xr scp 1 ,
+ .Xr sftp 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+ .Xr chroot 2 ,
++.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
+ .Xr login.defs 5 ,
+ .Xr moduli 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+ .Xr inetd 8 ,
+ .Xr sftp-server 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+@@ -132,16 +132,23 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ 
+ #include "fips.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+ #include <Security/AuthSession.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef LIBWRAP
++#include <tcpd.h>
++#include <syslog.h>
++int allow_severity;
++int deny_severity;
++#endif /* LIBWRAP */
++
+ #ifndef O_NOCTTY
+ #define O_NOCTTY	0
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* Re-exec fds */
+ #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD	(STDERR_FILENO + 1)
+ #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD		(STDERR_FILENO + 2)
+ #define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD		(STDERR_FILENO + 3)
+@@ -2298,16 +2305,37 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	 * the socket goes away.
+ 	 */
+ 	remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 	audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef LIBWRAP
++	if (options.use_tcpwrappers) {
++		allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
++		deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
++		/* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
++		if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
++			struct request_info req;
++
++			request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
++			fromhost(&req);
++
++			if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
++				debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
++				refuse(&req);
++				/* NOTREACHED */
++				fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
++			}
++		}
++	}
++#endif /* LIBWRAP */
++
+ 	/* Log the connection. */
+ 	laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
+ 	verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d",
+ 	    remote_ip, remote_port, laddr,  get_local_port());
+ 	free(laddr);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+ 	/*
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+@@ -120,16 +120,17 @@ X11Forwarding yes
+ #ClientAliveInterval 0
+ #ClientAliveCountMax 3
+ #UseDNS no
+ #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
+ #MaxStartups 10:30:100
+ #PermitTunnel no
+ #ChrootDirectory none
+ #VersionAddendum none
++#UseTCPWrappers yes
+ 
+ # no default banner path
+ #Banner none
+ 
+ # override default of no subsystems
+ Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
+ 
+ # This enables accepting locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see sshd_config(5).
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+@@ -1008,16 +1008,27 @@ DESCRIPTION
+              that has the privilege of the authenticated user.  The goal of
+              privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by
+              containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes.  The
+              argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\sandboxM-bM-^@M-^].  If
+              UsePrivilegeSeparation is set to M-bM-^@M-^\sandboxM-bM-^@M-^] then the pre-
+              authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional
+              restrictions.  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\sandboxM-bM-^@M-^].
+ 
++     UseTCPWrappers
++             When set to "yes" , TCP wrappers (libwrap) are used to determine
++             whether a connection from a remote system should be allowed as
++             specified in hosts_accept(5).  The default is "yes".
++
++             Warning: This functionality has been backported for backward
++             compatibility and should be avoided, since libwrap pulls in a
++             whole load of security issues.  Moving to sshd's internal host
++             matching is highly recommended - see the Match keyword for
++             details.
++
+      VersionAddendum
+              Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH
+              protocol banner sent by the server upon connection.  The default
+              is M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^].
+ 
+      X11DisplayOffset
+              Specifies the first display number available for sshd(8)'s X11
+              forwarding.  This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1657,16 +1657,32 @@ or
+ If
+ .Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
+ is set to
+ .Dq sandbox
+ then the pre-authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional
+ restrictions.
+ The default is
+ .Dq sandbox .
++.It Cm UseTCPWrappers
++When set to
++.Dq yes
++, TCP wrappers (libwrap) are used to determine whether a connection from a
++remote system should be allowed as specified in
++.Xr hosts_accept 5 .
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++
++.Em Warning: This functionality has been backported for backward \
++compatibility and should be avoided, since libwrap pulls in a whole load of \
++security issues.
++Moving to sshd's internal host matching is highly
++recommended - see the
++.Cm Match
++keyword for details.
+ .It Cm VersionAddendum
+ Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
+ sent by the server upon connection.
+ The default is
+ .Dq none .
+ .It Cm X11DisplayOffset
+ Specifies the first display number available for
+ .Xr sshd 8 Ns 's

openssh-7.2p2-verify_CIDR_address_ranges.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  1b2dad1b57b086d094fe09327fcf1c490475a7cd
+Check for invalid CIDR adress masks.
+bsc#1005893
+
+backported upstream commit: 010359b32659f455fddd2bd85fd7cc4d7a3b994a (7.4)
+backported upstream commit: 1a6f9d2e2493d445cd9ee496e6e3c2a2f283f66a
+backported upstream commit: fe06b68f824f8f55670442fb31f2c03526dd326c
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
+@@ -95,16 +95,17 @@ int auth_debug_init;
+  * Otherwise true is returned.
+  */
+ int
+ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+ {
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
+ 	u_int i;
++	int r;
+ #ifdef USE_SHADOW
+ 	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
+ 	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+@@ -183,31 +184,41 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+ 	if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
+ 	    options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
+ 		hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+ 		ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
+ 	if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
+-		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
+-			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+-			    options.deny_users[i])) {
++		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) {
++			r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
++			    options.deny_users[i]);
++			if (r < 0) {
++				fatal("Invalid DenyUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
++				    options.deny_users[i]);
++			} else if (r != 0) {
+ 				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+ 				    "because listed in DenyUsers",
+ 				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
+ 				return 0;
+ 			}
++		}
+ 	}
+ 	/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
+ 	if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
+-		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
+-			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+-			    options.allow_users[i]))
++		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) {
++			r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
++			    options.allow_users[i]);
++			if (r < 0) {
++				fatal("Invalid AllowUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
++				    options.allow_users[i]);
++			} else if (r == 1)
+ 				break;
++		}
+ 		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
+ 		if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
+ 			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
+ 			    "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/match.c b/openssh-7.2p2/match.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/match.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/match.c
+@@ -186,41 +186,50 @@ match_hostname(const char *host, const c
+  * successful match.
+  */
+ int
+ match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
+     const char *patterns)
+ {
+ 	int mhost, mip;
+ 
+-	/* error in ipaddr match */
+ 	if ((mip = addr_match_list(ipaddr, patterns)) == -2)
+-		return -1;
+-	else if (mip == -1) /* negative ip address match */
+-		return 0;
++		return -1; /* error in ipaddr match */
++	else if (host == NULL || ipaddr == NULL || mip == -1)
++		return 0; /* negative ip address match, or testing pattern */
+ 
+ 	/* negative hostname match */
+ 	if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns)) == -1)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	/* no match at all */
+ 	if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+- * match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern
++ * Match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern.
++ * If user, host and ipaddr are all NULL then validate pattern/
++ * Returns -1 on invalid pattern, 0 on no match, 1 on match.
+  */
+ int
+ match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
+     const char *pattern)
+ {
+ 	char *p, *pat;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
++	/* test mode */
++	if (user == NULL && host == NULL && ipaddr == NULL) {
++		if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) != NULL &&
++		    match_host_and_ip(NULL, NULL, p + 1) < 0)
++			return -1;
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	if ((p = strchr(pattern,'@')) == NULL)
+ 		return match_pattern(user, pattern);
+ 
+ 	pat = xstrdup(pattern);
+ 	p = strchr(pat, '@');
+ 	*p++ = '\0';
+ 
+ 	if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1)
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+@@ -1462,28 +1462,34 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
+ 		goto parse_multistate;
+ 
+ 	case sAllowUsers:
+ 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ 			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
+ 				fatal("%s line %d: too many allow users.",
+ 				    filename, linenum);
++			if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1)
++				fatal("%s line %d: invalid AllowUsers pattern: "
++				    "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg);
+ 			if (!*activep)
+ 				continue;
+ 			options->allow_users[options->num_allow_users++] =
+ 			    xstrdup(arg);
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	case sDenyUsers:
+ 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ 			if (options->num_deny_users >= MAX_DENY_USERS)
+ 				fatal("%s line %d: too many deny users.",
+ 				    filename, linenum);
++			if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1)
++				fatal("%s line %d: invalid DenyUsers pattern: "
++				    "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg);
+ 			if (!*activep)
+ 				continue;
+ 			options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] =
+ 			    xstrdup(arg);
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	case sAllowGroups:

openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a72781d1a043876a224ff1b0032daa4094d87565a68528759c1c2cab5482548c
+size 1499808

openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz.asc

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+Version: GnuPG v2
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+=yfYj
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

openssh-7.6p1-allow_root_password_login.patch

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  af43d436bc7fe818dd976c923ad99b89051eb299
-Allow root login with password by default. While less secure than upstream
-default of forbidding access to the root account with a password, we are
-temporarily introducing this change to keep the default used in older OpenSSH
-versions shipped with SLE.
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
-@@ -218,17 +218,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- 		options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
- 	if (options->listen_addrs == NULL)
- 		add_listen_addr(options, NULL, 0);
- 	if (options->pid_file == NULL)
- 		options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE);
- 	if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
- 		options->login_grace_time = 120;
- 	if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
--		options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
-+		options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_YES;
- 	if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
- 		options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
- 	if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
- 		options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
- 	if (options->print_motd == -1)
- 		options->print_motd = 1;
- 	if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
- 		options->print_lastlog = 1;
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
-@@ -25,17 +25,17 @@
- 
- # Logging
- #SyslogFacility AUTH
- #LogLevel INFO
- 
- # Authentication:
- 
- #LoginGraceTime 2m
--#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
-+#PermitRootLogin yes
- #StrictModes yes
- #MaxAuthTries 6
- #MaxSessions 10
- 
- #PubkeyAuthentication yes
- 
- # The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
- # but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
-@@ -696,17 +696,17 @@ DESCRIPTION
-              none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests.  The
-              wildcard M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or
-              ports, respectively.  By default all port forwarding requests are
-              permitted.
- 
-      PermitRootLogin
-              Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1).  The argument
-              must be yes, prohibit-password, without-password,
--             forced-commands-only, or no.  The default is prohibit-password.
-+             forced-commands-only, or no.  The default is yes.
- 
-              If this option is set to prohibit-password or without-password,
-              password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for
-              root.
- 
-              If this option is set to forced-commands-only, root login with
-              public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the
-              command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1188,17 +1188,17 @@ Specifies whether root can log in using
- The argument must be
- .Cm yes ,
- .Cm prohibit-password ,
- .Cm without-password ,
- .Cm forced-commands-only ,
- or
- .Cm no .
- The default is
--.Cm prohibit-password .
-+.Cm yes .
- .Pp
- If this option is set to
- .Cm prohibit-password
- or
- .Cm without-password ,
- password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root.
- .Pp
- If this option is set to

openssh-7.6p1-eal3.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  9797aecac98b26573a295fd75128b7c68dfc5aad
-fix paths and references in sshd man pages
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.6p1/Makefile.in
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/Makefile.in
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/Makefile.in
-@@ -119,17 +119,18 @@ MANTYPE		= @MANTYPE@
- CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out
- CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli
- 
- PATHSUBS	= \
- 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \
- 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \
- 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \
- 	-e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \
--	-e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \
-+	-e 's|login\.conf|login.defs|g' \
-+	-e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/ssh/shosts.equiv|g' \
- 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \
- 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|g' \
- 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \
- 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \
- 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key|g' \
- 	-e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \
- 	-e 's|/etc/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
- 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \

openssh-7.6p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  d47e806f23ad0649ef38b24e8cb9d5617e5d5d15
-# force PAM in defaullt install (this was removed from upstream in 3.8p1)
-# bnc#46749
-# --used to be called '-pam-fix2'
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
-@@ -75,17 +75,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
- # be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
- # PasswordAuthentication.  Depending on your PAM configuration,
- # PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
- # the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
- # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
--#UsePAM no
-+UsePAM yes
- 
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes
- #AllowTcpForwarding yes
- #GatewayPorts no
- X11Forwarding yes
- #X11DisplayOffset 10
- #X11UseLocalhost yes
- #PermitTTY yes

openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_geteuid.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  85f3cd6c8291c7feb0c1e7a0a3645c130532d206
-Add the 'geteuid' syscall to allowed list, since it may becalled on the
-mainframes when OpenSSL is using hardware crypto accelerator via libica
-(via ibmica)
-
-bsc#1004258
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -161,16 +161,22 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_close),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_exit
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_exit_group
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getpgid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_getpid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),

openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_getuid.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  004731f82470b22b9bd563ef3216034cf00ba133
-add 'getuid' syscall to list of allowed ones to prevent the sanboxed thread
-from being killed by the seccomp filter
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -173,16 +173,22 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_madvise
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_mmap
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_mmap2
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap2),

openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_stat.patch

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  ddbb42a2825e7e837d7b0387b79a9542c7869174
-Allow the stat() syscall for OpenSSL re-seed patch
-(which causes OpenSSL use stat() on some file)
-
-bnc#912436
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- a/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -224,16 +224,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_select),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_shutdown
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_stat
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_stat),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_time
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_time),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_write
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_write),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_socketcall
- 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),

openssh-7.6p1.tar.gz

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:a323caeeddfe145baaa0db16e98d784b1fbc7dd436a6bf1f479dfd5cd1d21723
-size 1489788

openssh-7.6p1.tar.gz.asc

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openssh-askpass-gnome.changes

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Fri Nov  3 12:27:18 UTC 2017 - pcerny@suse.com
-
-- upgrade to 7.6p1
-  see main package changelog for details
-
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Mon Jul 25 13:45:53 UTC 2016 - meissner@suse.com
 

openssh-askpass-gnome.spec

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ BuildRequires:  openssl-devel
 BuildRequires:  pam-devel
 BuildRequires:  tcpd-devel
 BuildRequires:  update-desktop-files
-Version:        7.6p1
+Version:        7.2p2
 Release:        0
 Requires:       openssh = %{version}
 Summary:        A GNOME-Based Passphrase Dialog for OpenSSH

openssh.changes

@@ -1,581 +1,26 @@
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
-Thu Nov 23 13:38:52 UTC 2017 - rbrown@suse.com
+Fri Dec  1 13:18:24 UTC 2017 - pcerny@suse.com
 
-- Replace references to /var/adm/fillup-templates with new 
+- Silent complaints about unsupported key exchange methods
-  %_fillupdir macro (boo#1069468)
+  (bsc#1006166)
-
+  [openssh-7.2p2-fips_fixes.patch]
--------------------------------------------------------------------
+- Stricter checking of operations in read-only mode in sftp server
-Fri Nov  3 12:27:18 UTC 2017 - pcerny@suse.com
+  (CVE-2017-15906, bsc#1065000)
-
+  [openssh-7.2p2-stricter_readonly_sftp.patch]
-- Update to vanilla 7.6p1
+- Refine handling of sockets for X11 forwarding to remove
-  Most important changes (more details below):
+  reintroduced CVE-2008-1483 (bsc#1069509)
-  * complete removal of the ancient SSHv1 protocol
+- systemd integration to work around various race conditions
-  * sshd(8) cannot run without privilege separation
+  (bsc#1048367)
-  * removal of suport for arcfourm blowfish and CAST ciphers
+  [openssh-7.2p2-systemd-notify.patch]
-    and RIPE-MD160 HMAC
+- Add back support for TCP wrappers removed by the upgrade
-  * refuse RSA keys shorter than 1024 bits
+  to 7.2p2. TCP wrappers support will be dripped with the next
-  Distilled upstream log:
+  version upgrade.
-- OpenSSH 7.3
+  [openssh-7.2p2-tcpwrappers.patch]
-  ---- Security
+- fix regression of (bsc#823710)
-  * sshd(8): Mitigate a potential denial-of-service attack
+  [openssh-7.2p2-audit_fixes.patch]
-    against the system's crypt(3) function via sshd(8). An
+- new switch for printing diagnostic messages in sftp client's
-    attacker could send very long passwords that would cause
+  batch mode (bsc#1023275)
-    excessive CPU use in crypt(3). sshd(8) now refuses to accept
+  [openssh-7.2p2-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch]
-    password authentication requests of length greater than 1024
-    characters. Independently reported by Tomas Kuthan (Oracle),
-    Andres Rojas and Javier Nieto.
-  * sshd(8): Mitigate timing differences in password
-    authentication that could be used to discern valid from
-    invalid account names when long passwords were sent and
-    particular password hashing algorithms are in use on the
-    server. CVE-2016-6210, reported by EddieEzra.Harari at
-    verint.com
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix observable timing weakness in the CBC
-    padding oracle countermeasures. Reported by Jean Paul
-    Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin
-    Albrecht. Note that CBC ciphers are disabled by default and
-    only included for legacy compatibility.
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Improve operation ordering of MAC
-    verification for Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) mode transport MAC
-    algorithms to verify the MAC before decrypting any
-    ciphertext. This removes the possibility of timing
-    differences leaking facts about the plaintext, though no such
-    leakage has been observed.  Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele,
-    Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht.
-  * sshd(8): (portable only) Ignore PAM environment vars when
-    UseLogin=yes. If PAM is configured to read user-specified
-    environment variables and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, then a
-    hostile local user may attack /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or
-    similar environment variables set via PAM. CVE-2015-8325,
-    found by Shayan Sadigh.
-  ---- New Features
-  * ssh(1): Add a ProxyJump option and corresponding -J
-    command-line flag to allow simplified indirection through a
-    one or more SSH bastions or "jump hosts".
-  * ssh(1): Add an IdentityAgent option to allow specifying
-    specific agent sockets instead of accepting one from the
-    environment.
-  * ssh(1): Allow ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings to
-    be optionally overridden when using ssh -W. bz#2577
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Implement support for the IUTF8 terminal
-    mode as per draft-sgtatham-secsh-iutf8-00.
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for additional fixed
-    Diffie-Hellman 2K, 4K and 8K groups from
-    draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03.
-  * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sshd(8): support SHA256 and SHA512 RSA
-    signatures in certificates;
-  * ssh(1): Add an Include directive for ssh_config(5) files.
-  * ssh(1): Permit UTF-8 characters in pre-authentication banners
-    sent from the server. bz#2058
-  ---- Bugfixes
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Reduce the syslog level of some relatively
-    common protocol events from LOG_CRIT. bz#2585
-  * sshd(8): Refuse AuthenticationMethods="" in configurations
-    and accept AuthenticationMethods=any for the default
-    behaviour of not requiring multiple authentication. bz#2398
-  * sshd(8): Remove obsolete and misleading "POSSIBLE BREAK-IN
-    ATTEMPT!" message when forward and reverse DNS don't match.
-    bz#2585
-  * ssh(1): Close ControlPersist background process stderr except
-    in debug mode or when logging to syslog. bz#1988
-  * misc: Make PROTOCOL description for
-    direct-streamlocal@openssh.com channel open messages match
-    deployed code. bz#2529
-  * ssh(1): Deduplicate LocalForward and RemoteForward entries to
-    fix failures when both ExitOnForwardFailure and hostname
-    canonicalisation are enabled. bz#2562
-  * sshd(8): Remove fallback from moduli to obsolete "primes"
-    file that was deprecated in 2001. bz#2559.
-  * sshd_config(5): Correct description of UseDNS: it affects ssh
-    hostname processing for authorized_keys, not known_hosts;
-    bz#2554
-  * ssh(1): Fix authentication using lone certificate keys in an
-    agent without corresponding private keys on the filesystem.
-    bz#2550
-  * sshd(8): Send ClientAliveInterval pings when a time-based
-    RekeyLimit is set; previously keepalive packets were not
-    being sent. bz#2252
-  ---- Portability
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix compilation by automatically disabling
-    ciphers not supported by OpenSSL. bz#2466
-  * misc: Fix compilation failures on some versions of AIX's
-    compiler related to the definition of the VA_COPY macro.
-    bz#2589
-  * sshd(8): Whitelist more architectures to enable the
-    seccomp-bpf sandbox. bz#2590
-  * ssh-agent(1), sftp-server(8): Disable process tracing on
-    Solaris using setpflags(__PROC_PROTECT, ...). bz#2584
-  * sshd(8): On Solaris, don't call Solaris setproject() with
-    UsePAM=yes it's PAM's responsibility. bz#2425
-- OpenSSH 7.4
-  ---- Potentially-incompatible changes
-  * ssh(1): Remove 3des-cbc from the client's default proposal.
-    64-bit block ciphers are not safe in 2016 and we don't want
-    to wait until attacks like SWEET32 are extended to SSH. As
-    3des-cbc was the only mandatory cipher in the SSH RFCs, this
-    may cause problems connecting to older devices using the
-    default configuration, but it's highly likely that such
-    devices already need explicit configuration for key exchange
-    and hostkey algorithms already anyway.
-  * sshd(8): Remove support for pre-authentication compression.
-    Doing compression early in the protocol probably seemed
-    reasonable in the 1990s, but today it's clearly a bad idea in
-    terms of both cryptography (cf. multiple compression oracle
-    attacks in TLS) and attack surface. Pre-auth compression
-    support has been disabled by default for >10 years. Support
-    remains in the client.
-  * ssh-agent will refuse to load PKCS#11 modules outside a
-    whitelist of trusted paths by default. The path whitelist may
-    be specified at run-time.
-  * sshd(8): When a forced-command appears in both a certificate
-    and an authorized keys/principals command= restriction, sshd
-    will now refuse to accept the certificate unless they are
-    identical.  The previous (documented) behaviour of having the
-    certificate forced-command override the other could be a bit
-    confusing and error-prone.
-  * sshd(8): Remove the UseLogin configuration directive and
-    support for having /bin/login manage login sessions.
-  ---- Security
-  * ssh-agent(1): Will now refuse to load PKCS#11 modules from
-    paths outside a trusted whitelist (run-time configurable).
-    Requests to load modules could be passed via agent forwarding
-    and an attacker could attempt to load a hostile PKCS#11
-    module across the forwarded agent channel: PKCS#11 modules
-    are shared libraries, so this would result in code execution
-    on the system running the ssh-agent if the attacker has
-    control of the forwarded agent-socket (on the host running
-    the sshd server) and the ability to write to the filesystem
-    of the host running ssh-agent (usually the host running the
-    ssh client). Reported by Jann Horn of Project Zero.
-  * sshd(8): When privilege separation is disabled, forwarded
-    Unix- domain sockets would be created by sshd(8) with the
-    privileges of 'root' instead of the authenticated user. This
-    release refuses Unix-domain socket forwarding when privilege
-    separation is disabled (Privilege separation has been enabled
-    by default for 14 years).  Reported by Jann Horn of Project
-    Zero.
-  * sshd(8): Avoid theoretical leak of host private key material
-    to privilege-separated child processes via realloc() when
-    reading keys. No such leak was observed in practice for
-    normal-sized keys, nor does a leak to the child processes
-    directly expose key material to unprivileged users. Reported
-    by Jann Horn of Project Zero.
-  * sshd(8): The shared memory manager used by pre-authentication
-    compression support had a bounds checks that could be elided
-    by some optimising compilers. Additionally, this memory
-    manager was incorrectly accessible when pre-authentication
-    compression was disabled. This could potentially allow
-    attacks against the privileged monitor process from the
-    sandboxed privilege-separation process (a compromise of the
-    latter would be required first).  This release removes
-    support for pre-authentication compression from sshd(8).
-    Reported by Guido Vranken using the Stack unstable
-    optimisation identification tool
-    (http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/)
-  * sshd(8): Fix denial-of-service condition where an attacker
-    who sends multiple KEXINIT messages may consume up to 128MB
-    per connection. Reported by Shi Lei of Gear Team, Qihoo 360.
-  * sshd(8): Validate address ranges for AllowUser and DenyUsers
-    directives at configuration load time and refuse to accept
-    invalid ones. It was previously possible to specify invalid
-    CIDR address ranges (e.g. user@127.1.2.3/55) and these would
-    always match, possibly resulting in granting access where it
-    was not intended.  Reported by Laurence Parry.
-  ---- New Features
-  * ssh(1): Add a proxy multiplexing mode to ssh(1) inspired by
-    the version in PuTTY by Simon Tatham. This allows a
-    multiplexing client to communicate with the master process
-    using a subset of the SSH packet and channels protocol over a
-    Unix-domain socket, with the main process acting as a proxy
-    that translates channel IDs, etc.  This allows multiplexing
-    mode to run on systems that lack file- descriptor passing
-    (used by current multiplexing code) and potentially, in
-    conjunction with Unix-domain socket forwarding, with the
-    client and multiplexing master process on different machines.
-    Multiplexing proxy mode may be invoked using "ssh -O proxy
-    ..."
-  * sshd(8): Add a sshd_config DisableForwarding option that
-    disables X11, agent, TCP, tunnel and Unix domain socket
-    forwarding, as well as anything else we might implement in
-    the future. Like the 'restrict' authorized_keys flag, this is
-    intended to be a simple and future-proof way of restricting
-    an account.
-  * sshd(8), ssh(1): Support the "curve25519-sha256" key exchange
-    method. This is identical to the currently-supported method
-    named "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org".
-  * sshd(8): Improve handling of SIGHUP by checking to see if
-    sshd is already daemonised at startup and skipping the call
-    to daemon(3) if it is. This ensures that a SIGHUP restart of
-    sshd(8) will retain the same process-ID as the initial
-    execution. sshd(8) will also now unlink the PidFile prior to
-    SIGHUP restart and re-create it after a successful restart,
-    rather than leaving a stale file in the case of a
-    configuration error. bz#2641
-  * sshd(8): Allow ClientAliveInterval and ClientAliveCountMax
-    directives to appear in sshd_config Match blocks.
-  * sshd(8): Add %-escapes to AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand to
-    match those supported by AuthorizedKeysCommand (key, key
-    type, fingerprint, etc.) and a few more to provide access to
-    the contents of the certificate being offered.
-  * Added regression tests for string matching, address matching
-    and string sanitisation functions.
-  * Improved the key exchange fuzzer harness.
-  ---- Bugfixes
-  * ssh(1): Allow IdentityFile to successfully load and use
-    certificates that have no corresponding bare public key.
-    bz#2617 certificate id_rsa-cert.pub (and no id_rsa.pub).
-  * ssh(1): Fix public key authentication when multiple
-    authentication is in use and publickey is not just the first
-    method attempted. bz#2642
-  * regress: Allow the PuTTY interop tests to run unattended.
-    bz#2639
-  * ssh-agent(1), ssh(1): improve reporting when attempting to
-    load keys from PKCS#11 tokens with fewer useless log messages
-    and more detail in debug messages. bz#2610
-  * ssh(1): When tearing down ControlMaster connections, don't
-    pollute stderr when LogLevel=quiet.
-  * sftp(1): On ^Z wait for underlying ssh(1) to suspend before
-    suspending sftp(1) to ensure that ssh(1) restores the
-    terminal mode correctly if suspended during a password
-    prompt.
-  * ssh(1): Avoid busy-wait when ssh(1) is suspended during a
-    password prompt.
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Correctly report errors during sending of
-    ext- info messages.
-  * sshd(8): fix NULL-deref crash if sshd(8) received an out-of-
-    sequence NEWKEYS message.
-  * sshd(8): Correct list of supported signature algorithms sent
-    in the server-sig-algs extension. bz#2547
-  * sshd(8): Fix sending ext_info message if privsep is disabled.
-  * sshd(8): more strictly enforce the expected ordering of
-    privilege separation monitor calls used for authentication
-    and allow them only when their respective authentication
-    methods are enabled in the configuration
-  * sshd(8): Fix uninitialised optlen in getsockopt() call;
-    harmless on Unix/BSD but potentially crashy on Cygwin.
-  * Fix false positive reports caused by explicit_bzero(3) not
-    being recognised as a memory initialiser when compiled with
-    -fsanitize-memory.
-  * sshd_config(5): Use 2001:db8::/32, the official IPv6 subnet
-    for configuration examples.
-  ---- Portability
-  * On environments configured with Turkish locales, fall back to
-    the C/POSIX locale to avoid errors in configuration parsing
-    caused by that locale's unique handling of the letters 'i'
-    and 'I'. bz#2643
-  * sftp-server(8), ssh-agent(1): Deny ptrace on OS X using
-    ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, ..)
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Unbreak AES-CTR ciphers on old (~0.9.8)
-    OpenSSL.
-  * Fix compilation for libcrypto compiled without RIPEMD160
-    support.
-  * contrib: Add a gnome-ssh-askpass3 with GTK+3 support. bz#2640
-  * sshd(8): Improve PRNG reseeding across privilege separation
-    and force libcrypto to obtain a high-quality seed before
-    chroot or sandboxing.
-  * All: Explicitly test for broken strnvis. NetBSD added an
-    strnvis and unfortunately made it incompatible with the
-    existing one in OpenBSD and Linux's libbsd (the former having
-    existed for over ten years). Try to detect this mess, and
-    assume the only safe option if we're cross compiling.
-- OpenSSH 7.5
-  ---- Potentially-incompatible changes
-  * This release deprecates the sshd_config
-    UsePrivilegeSeparation option, thereby making privilege
-    separation mandatory. Privilege separation has been on by
-    default for almost 15 years and sandboxing has been on by
-    default for almost the last five.
-  * The format of several log messages emitted by the packet code
-    has changed to include additional information about the user
-    and their authentication state. Software that monitors
-    ssh/sshd logs may need to account for these changes. For
-    example:
-   Connection closed by user x 1.1.1.1 port 1234 [preauth]
-   Connection closed by authenticating user x 10.1.1.1 port 1234
-   [preauth] Connection closed by invalid user x 1.1.1.1 port
-   1234 [preauth]
-   Affected messages include connection closure, timeout, remote
-   disconnection, negotiation failure and some other fatal
-   messages generated by the packet code.
-  * [Portable OpenSSH only] This version removes support for
-    building against OpenSSL versions prior to 1.0.1. OpenSSL
-    stopped supporting versions prior to 1.0.1 over 12 months ago
-    (i.e. they no longer receive fixes for security bugs).
-  ---- Security
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix weakness in CBC padding oracle
-    countermeasures that allowed a variant of the attack fixed in
-    OpenSSH 7.3 to proceed.  Note that the OpenSSH client
-    disables CBC ciphers by default, sshd offers them as
-    lowest-preference options and will remove them by default
-    entriely in the next release. Reported by Jean Paul
-    Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Martin Albrecht and Torben Hansen
-    of Royal Holloway, University of London.
-  * sftp-client(1): [portable OpenSSH only] On Cygwin, a client
-    making a recursive file transfer could be maniuplated by a
-    hostile server to perform a path-traversal attack. creating
-    or modifying files outside of the intended target directory.
-    Reported by Jann Horn of Google Project Zero.
-  ---- New Features
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Support "=-" syntax to easily remove methods
-    from algorithm lists, e.g. Ciphers=-*cbc. bz#2671
-  ---- Bugfixes
-  * sshd(1): Fix NULL dereference crash when key exchange start
-    messages are sent out of sequence.
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Allow form-feed characters to appear in
-    configuration files.
-  * sshd(8): Fix regression in OpenSSH 7.4 support for the
-    server-sig-algs extension, where SHA2 RSA signature methods
-    were not being correctly advertised. bz#2680
-  * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Fix a number of case-sensitivity bugs
-    in known_hosts processing. bz#2591 bz#2685
-  * ssh(1): Allow ssh to use certificates accompanied by a
-    private key file but no corresponding plain *.pub public key.
-    bz#2617
-  * ssh(1): When updating hostkeys using the UpdateHostKeys
-    option, accept RSA keys if HostkeyAlgorithms contains any RSA
-    keytype.  Previously, ssh could ignore RSA keys when only the
-    ssh-rsa-sha2-* methods were enabled in HostkeyAlgorithms and
-    not the old ssh-rsa method. bz#2650
-  * ssh(1): Detect and report excessively long configuration file
-    lines. bz#2651
-  * Merge a number of fixes found by Coverity and reported via
-    Redhat and FreeBSD. Includes fixes for some memory and file
-    descriptor leaks in error paths. bz#2687
-  * ssh-keyscan(1): Correctly hash hosts with a port number.
-    bz#2692
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): When logging long messages to stderr, don't
-    truncate "\r\n" if the length of the message exceeds the
-    buffer. bz#2688
-  * ssh(1): Fully quote [host]:port in generated ProxyJump/-J
-    command- line; avoid confusion over IPv6 addresses and shells
-    that treat square bracket characters specially.
-  * ssh-keygen(1): Fix corruption of known_hosts when running
-    "ssh-keygen -H" on a known_hosts containing already-hashed
-    entries.
-  * Fix various fallout and sharp edges caused by removing SSH
-    protocol 1 support from the server, including the server
-    banner string being incorrectly terminated with only \n
-    (instead of \r\n), confusing error messages from ssh-keyscan
-    bz#2583 and a segfault in sshd if protocol v.1 was enabled
-    for the client and sshd_config contained references to legacy
-    keys bz#2686.
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Free fd_set on connection timeout. bz#2683
-  * sshd(8): Fix Unix domain socket forwarding for root
-    (regression in OpenSSH 7.4).
-  * sftp(1): Fix division by zero crash in "df" output when
-    server returns zero total filesystem blocks/inodes.
-  * ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): Translate OpenSSL
-    errors encountered during key loading to more meaningful
-    error codes.  bz#2522 bz#2523
-  * ssh-keygen(1): Sanitise escape sequences in key comments sent
-    to printf but preserve valid UTF-8 when the locale supports
-    it; bz#2520
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Return reason for port forwarding failures
-    where feasible rather than always "administratively
-    prohibited". bz#2674
-  * sshd(8): Fix deadlock when AuthorizedKeysCommand or
-    AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand produces a lot of output and a
-    key is matched early. bz#2655
-  * Regression tests: several reliability fixes. bz#2654 bz#2658
-    bz#2659
-  * ssh(1): Fix typo in ~C error message for bad port forward
-    cancellation. bz#2672
-  * ssh(1): Show a useful error message when included config
-    files can't be opened; bz#2653
-  * sshd(8): Make sshd set GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck=yes as the
-    manual page (previously incorrectly) advertised. bz#2637
-  * sshd_config(5): Repair accidentally-deleted mention of %k
-    token in AuthorizedKeysCommand; bz#2656
-  * sshd(8): Remove vestiges of previously removed LOGIN_PROGRAM;
-    bz#2665
-  * ssh-agent(1): Relax PKCS#11 whitelist to include libexec and
-    common 32-bit compatibility library directories.
-  * sftp-client(1): Fix non-exploitable integer overflow in
-    SSH2_FXP_NAME response handling.
-  * ssh-agent(1): Fix regression in 7.4 of deleting
-    PKCS#11-hosted keys. It was not possible to delete them
-    except by specifying their full physical path. bz#2682
-  ---- Portability
-  * sshd(8): Avoid sandbox errors for Linux S390 systems using an
-    ICA crypto coprocessor.
-  * sshd(8): Fix non-exploitable weakness in seccomp-bpf sandbox
-    arg inspection.
-  * ssh(1): Fix X11 forwarding on OSX where X11 was being started
-    by launchd. bz#2341
-  * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sftp(1): Fix output truncation for
-    various that contain non-printable characters where the
-    codeset in use is ASCII.
-  * build: Fix builds that attempt to link a kerberised libldns.
-    bz#2603
-  * build: Fix compilation problems caused by unconditionally
-    defining _XOPEN_SOURCE in wide character detection.
-  * sshd(8): Fix sandbox violations for clock_gettime VSDO
-    syscall fallback on some Linux/X32 kernels. bz#2142
-- OpenSSH 7.6
-  ---- Potentially-incompatible changes
-  This release includes a number of changes that may affect
-  existing configurations:
-  * ssh(1): delete SSH protocol version 1 support, associated
-    configuration options and documentation.
-  * ssh(1)/sshd(8): remove support for the hmac-ripemd160 MAC.
-  * ssh(1)/sshd(8): remove support for the arcfour, blowfish and
-    CAST ciphers.
-  * Refuse RSA keys <1024 bits in length and improve reporting
-    for keys that do not meet this requirement.
-  * ssh(1): do not offer CBC ciphers by default.
-  ---- Security
-  * sftp-server(8): in read-only mode, sftp-server was
-    incorrectly permitting creation of zero-length files.
-    Reported by Michal Zalewski.
-  ---- New Features
-  * ssh(1): add RemoteCommand option to specify a command in the
-    ssh config file instead of giving it on the client's command
-    line. This allows the configuration file to specify the
-    command that will be executed on the remote host.
-  * sshd(8): add ExposeAuthInfo option that enables writing
-    details of the authentication methods used (including public
-    keys where applicable) to a file that is exposed via a
-    $SSH_USER_AUTH environment variable in the subsequent
-    session.
-  * ssh(1): add support for reverse dynamic forwarding. In this
-    mode, ssh will act as a SOCKS4/5 proxy and forward
-    connections to destinations requested by the remote SOCKS
-    client. This mode is requested using extended syntax for the
-    -R and RemoteForward options and, because it is implemented
-    solely at the client, does not require the server be updated
-    to be supported.
-  * sshd(8): allow LogLevel directive in sshd_config Match
-    blocks; bz#2717
-  * ssh-keygen(1): allow inclusion of arbitrary string or flag
-    certificate extensions and critical options.
-  * ssh-keygen(1): allow ssh-keygen to use a key held in
-    ssh-agent as a CA when signing certificates. bz#2377
-  * ssh(1)/sshd(8): allow IPQoS=none in ssh/sshd to not set an
-    explicit ToS/DSCP value and just use the operating system
-    default.
-  * ssh-add(1): added -q option to make ssh-add quiet on success.
-  * ssh(1): expand the StrictHostKeyChecking option with two new
-    settings. The first "accept-new" will automatically accept
-    hitherto-unseen keys but will refuse connections for changed
-    or invalid hostkeys. This is a safer subset of the current
-    behaviour of StrictHostKeyChecking=no. The second setting
-    "off", is a synonym for the current behaviour of
-    StrictHostKeyChecking=no: accept new host keys, and continue
-    connection for hosts with incorrect hostkeys. A future
-    release will change the meaning of StrictHostKeyChecking=no
-    to the behaviour of "accept-new". bz#2400
-  * ssh(1): add SyslogFacility option to ssh(1) matching the
-    equivalent option in sshd(8). bz#2705
-  ---- Bugfixes
-  * ssh(1): use HostKeyAlias if specified instead of hostname for
-    matching host certificate principal names; bz#2728
-  * sftp(1): implement sorting for globbed ls; bz#2649
-  * ssh(1): add a user@host prefix to client's "Permission
-    denied" messages, useful in particular when using "stacked"
-    connections (e.g. ssh -J) where it's not clear which host is
-    denying. bz#2720
-  * ssh(1): accept unknown EXT_INFO extension values that contain
-    \0 characters. These are legal, but would previously cause
-    fatal connection errors if received.
-  * ssh(1)/sshd(8): repair compression statistics printed at
-    connection exit
-  * sftp(1): print '?' instead of incorrect link count (that the
-    protocol doesn't provide) for remote listings. bz#2710
-  * ssh(1): return failure rather than fatal() for more cases
-    during session multiplexing negotiations. Causes the session
-    to fall back to a non-mux connection if they occur. bz#2707
-  * ssh(1): mention that the server may send debug messages to
-    explain public key authentication problems under some
-    circumstances; bz#2709
-  * Translate OpenSSL error codes to better report incorrect
-    passphrase errors when loading private keys; bz#2699
-  * sshd(8): adjust compatibility patterns for WinSCP to
-    correctly identify versions that implement only the legacy DH
-    group exchange scheme. bz#2748
-  * ssh(1): print the "Killed by signal 1" message only at
-    LogLevel verbose so that it is not shown at the default
-    level; prevents it from appearing during ssh -J and
-    equivalent ProxyCommand configs.  bz#1906, bz#2744
-  * ssh-keygen(1): when generating all hostkeys (ssh-keygen -A),
-    clobber existing keys if they exist but are zero length.
-    zero-length keys could previously be made if ssh-keygen
-    failed or was interrupted part way through generating them.
-    bz#2561
-  * ssh(1): fix pledge(2) violation in the escape sequence "~&"
-    used to place the current session in the background.
-  * ssh-keyscan(1): avoid double-close() on file descriptors;
-    bz#2734
-  * sshd(8): avoid reliance on shared use of pointers shared
-    between monitor and child sshd processes. bz#2704
-  * sshd_config(8): document available AuthenticationMethods;
-    bz#2453
-  * ssh(1): avoid truncation in some login prompts; bz#2768
-  * sshd(8): Fix various compilations failures, inc bz#2767
-  * ssh(1): make "--" before the hostname terminate argument
-    processing after the hostname too.
-  * ssh-keygen(1): switch from aes256-cbc to aes256-ctr for
-    encrypting new-style private keys. Fixes problems related to
-    private key handling for no-OpenSSL builds. bz#2754
-  * ssh(1): warn and do not attempt to use keys when the public
-    and private halves do not match. bz#2737
-  * sftp(1): don't print verbose error message when ssh
-    disconnects from under sftp. bz#2750
-  * sshd(8): fix keepalive scheduling problem: activity on a
-    forwarded port from preventing the keepalive from being sent;
-    bz#2756
-  * sshd(8): when started without root privileges, don't require
-    the privilege separation user or path to exist. Makes running
-    the regression tests easier without touching the filesystem.
-  * Make integrity.sh regression tests more robust against
-    timeouts.  bz#2658
-  * ssh(1)/sshd(8): correctness fix for channels implementation:
-    accept channel IDs greater than 0x7FFFFFFF.
-  ---- Portability
-  * sshd(9): drop two more privileges in the Solaris sandbox:
-    PRIV_DAX_ACCESS and PRIV_SYS_IB_INFO; bz#2723
-  * sshd(8): expose list of completed authentication methods to
-    PAM via the SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 PAM environment variable. bz#2408
-  * ssh(1)/sshd(8): fix several problems in the tun/tap
-    forwarding code, mostly to do with host/network byte order
-    confusion. bz#2735
-  * Add --with-cflags-after and --with-ldflags-after configure
-    flags to allow setting CFLAGS/LDFLAGS after configure has
-    completed. These are useful for setting sanitiser/fuzzing
-    options that may interfere with configure's operation.
-  * sshd(8): avoid Linux seccomp violations on ppc64le over the
-    socketcall syscall.
-  * Fix use of ldns when using ldns-config; bz#2697
-  * configure: set cache variables when cross-compiling. The
-    cross- compiling fallback message was saying it assumed the
-    test passed, but it wasn't actually set the cache variables
-    and this would cause later tests to fail.
-  * Add clang libFuzzer harnesses for public key parsing and
-    signature verification.
-- packaging:
-  * removal of all 7.2 patches
-  * first round of rebased patches:
-    [openssh-7.6p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch]
-    [openssh-7.6p1-allow_root_password_login.patch]
-    [openssh-7.6p1-blocksigalrm.patch]
-    [openssh-7.6p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch]
-    [openssh-7.6p1-eal3.patch]
-    [openssh-7.6p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch]
-    [openssh-7.6p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch]
-    [openssh-7.6p1-lastlog.patch]
-    [openssh-7.6p1-pam_check_locks.patch]
-    [openssh-7.6p1-pts_names_formatting.patch]
-    [openssh-7.6p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch]
-    [openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_geteuid.patch]
-    [openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_getuid.patch]
-    [openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_stat.patch]
-    [openssh-7.6p1-send_locale.patch]
-  * not rebased (obsoleted) patches (so far):
-    [openssh-7.2p2-saveargv-fix.diff]
-    [openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.diff]
-    [openssh-7.2p2-gssapimitm.diff]
-    [openssh-7.2p2-eal3_obsolete.diff]
-    [openssh-7.2p2-default_protocol.diff]
-    [openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch]
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Wed Oct 25 15:09:06 UTC 2017 - jsegitz@suse.com

openssh.spec

@@ -16,11 +16,6 @@
 #
 
 
-#Compat macro for new _fillupdir macro introduced in Nov 2017
-%if ! %{defined _fillupdir}
-  %define _fillupdir /var/adm/fillup-templates
-%endif
-
 %if 0%{suse_version} >= 1100
 %define has_fw_dir 1
 %else
@@ -98,7 +93,7 @@ PreReq:         pwdutils %{fillup_prereq} coreutils
 %if ! %{uses_systemd}
 PreReq:         %{insserv_prereq}
 %endif
-Version:        7.6p1
+Version:        7.2p2
 Release:        0
 Summary:        Secure Shell Client and Server (Remote Login Program)
 License:        BSD-2-Clause and MIT
@@ -118,21 +113,58 @@ Source9:        sshd-gen-keys-start
 Source10:       sshd.service
 Source11:       README.FIPS
 Source12:       cavs_driver-ssh.pl
-Patch00:        openssh-7.6p1-allow_root_password_login.patch
+Patch00:        openssh-7.2p2-allow_root_password_login.patch
-Patch01:        openssh-7.6p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
+Patch01:        openssh-7.2p2-allow_DSS_by_default.patch
-Patch02:        openssh-7.6p1-lastlog.patch
+Patch02:        openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
-Patch03:        openssh-7.6p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
+Patch03:        openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch
-Patch04:        openssh-7.6p1-eal3.patch
+Patch04:        openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
-Patch05:        openssh-7.6p1-blocksigalrm.patch
+Patch05:        openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch
-Patch06:        openssh-7.6p1-send_locale.patch
+Patch06:        openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch
-Patch07:        openssh-7.6p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
+Patch07:        openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch
-Patch08:        openssh-7.6p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
+Patch08:        openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch
-Patch09:        openssh-7.6p1-pts_names_formatting.patch
+Patch09:        openssh-7.2p2-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
-Patch10:        openssh-7.6p1-pam_check_locks.patch
+Patch10:        openssh-7.2p2-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
-Patch11:        openssh-7.6p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
+Patch11:        openssh-7.2p2-pts_names_formatting.patch
-Patch12:        openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_getuid.patch
+Patch12:        openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch
-Patch13:        openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_geteuid.patch
+Patch13:        openssh-7.2p2-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
-Patch14:        openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_stat.patch
+Patch14:        openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch
+Patch15:        openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_geteuid.patch
+Patch16:        openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch
+Patch17:        openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch
+Patch18:        openssh-7.2p2-fips.patch
+Patch19:        openssh-7.2p2-fips_fixes.patch
+Patch21:        openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-ctr.patch
+Patch22:        openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-kdf.patch
+Patch23:        openssh-7.2p2-seed-prng.patch
+Patch24:        openssh-7.2p2-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
+Patch25:        openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch
+Patch26:        openssh-7.2p2-audit_fixes.patch
+Patch27:        openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch
+Patch28:        openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch
+Patch29:        openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
+Patch30:        openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
+Patch31:        openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch
+Patch32:        openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch
+Patch33:        openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch
+Patch34:        openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
+Patch35:        openssh-7.2p2-ldap.patch
+Patch36:        openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
+Patch37:        openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch
+Patch38:        openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch
+Patch39:        openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch
+Patch40:        openssh-7.2p2-keep_slogin.patch
+Patch41:        openssh-7.2p2-kex_resource_depletion.patch
+Patch42:        openssh-7.2p2-verify_CIDR_address_ranges.patch
+Patch43:        openssh-7.2p2-restrict_pkcs11-modules.patch
+Patch44:        openssh-7.2p2-prevent_private_key_leakage.patch
+Patch45:        openssh-7.2p2-secure_unix_sockets_forwarding.patch
+Patch46:        openssh-7.2p2-ssh_case_insensitive_host_matching.patch
+Patch47:        openssh-7.2p2-disable_preauth_compression.patch
+Patch48:        openssh-7.2p2-s390_hw_crypto_syscalls.patch
+Patch49:        openssh-7.2p2-s390_OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11_syscalls.patch
+Patch50:        openssh-7.2p2-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch
+Patch51:        openssh-7.2p2-stricter_readonly_sftp.patch
+Patch52:        openssh-7.2p2-tcpwrappers.patch
 BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
 Conflicts:      nonfreessh
 Recommends:     audit
@@ -199,14 +231,51 @@ FIPS140 CAVS tests related parts of the OpenSSH package
 %patch12 -p2
 %patch13 -p2
 %patch14 -p2
+%patch15 -p2
+%patch16 -p2
+%patch17 -p2
+%patch18 -p2
+%patch19 -p2
+%patch21 -p2
+%patch22 -p2
+%patch23 -p2
+%patch24 -p2
+%patch25 -p2
+%patch26 -p2
+%patch27 -p2
+%patch28 -p2
+%patch29 -p2
+%patch30 -p2
+%patch31 -p2
+%patch32 -p2
+%patch33 -p2
+%patch34 -p2
+%patch35 -p2
+%patch36 -p2
+%patch37 -p2
+%patch38 -p2
+%patch39 -p2
+%patch40 -p2
+%patch41 -p2
+%patch42 -p2
+%patch43 -p2
+%patch44 -p2
+%patch45 -p2
+%patch46 -p2
+%patch47 -p2
+%patch48 -p2
+%patch49 -p2
+%patch50 -p2
+%patch51 -p2
+%patch52 -p2
 cp %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE4} %{SOURCE11} .
 
 %build
-### TODO: # set libexec dir in the LDAP patch
+# set libexec dir in the LDAP patch
-### TODO: sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \
+sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \
-### TODO:     $( grep -Rl @LIBEXECDIR@ \
+    $( grep -Rl @LIBEXECDIR@ \
-### TODO:         $( grep "^+++" %{PATCH33} | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' )
+        $( grep "^+++" %{PATCH35} | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' )
-### TODO:     )
+    )
 
 autoreconf -fiv
 %ifarch s390 s390x %sparc
@@ -278,8 +347,8 @@ install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE1} %{buildroot}%{_initddir}/sshd
 install -m 0644 %{SOURCE10} .
 ln -s ../..%{_initddir}/sshd %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd
 %endif
-install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_fillupdir}
+install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}/var/adm/fillup-templates
-install -m 644 %{SOURCE8} %{buildroot}%{_fillupdir}
+install -m 644 %{SOURCE8} %{buildroot}/var/adm/fillup-templates
 # install shell script to automate the process of adding your public key to a remote machine
 install -m 755 contrib/ssh-copy-id %{buildroot}%{_bindir}
 install -m 644 contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1
@@ -388,7 +457,7 @@ rpm -q openssh-fips >& /dev/null && DISABLE_RESTART_ON_UPDATE=yes
 %attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/*
 %dir %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d
 %config %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/ssh.reg
-%{_fillupdir}/sysconfig.ssh
+/var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh
 %if %{has_fw_dir}
 %if %{needs_all_dirs}
 %dir %{_fwdir}
@@ -400,10 +469,10 @@ rpm -q openssh-fips >& /dev/null && DISABLE_RESTART_ON_UPDATE=yes
 %files helpers
 %defattr(-,root,root)
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
-#verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ldap.conf
+%verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ldap.conf
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh
-#attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
-#doc HOWTO.ldap-keys openssh-lpk-openldap.schema openssh-lpk-sun.schema
+%doc HOWTO.ldap-keys openssh-lpk-openldap.schema openssh-lpk-sun.schema
 
 %files fips
 %defattr(-,root,root)