Accepting request 642573 from home:scarabeus_iv:branches:network

- Update to 7.8p1: * no actual changes for the askpass - Format with spec-cleaner - Respect cflags - Use gtk3 rather than gtk2 which is being phased out - Remove the mention of the SLE12 in the README.SUSE - Install firewall rules only when really needed (<SLE15) - Version update to 7.8p1: * For most details see release notes file * ssh-keygen(1): write OpenSSH format private keys by default instead of using OpenSSL's PEM format - Rebase patches to apply on 7.8p1 release: * openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch * openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch * openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch * openssh-7.7p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch * openssh-7.7p1-audit.patch * openssh-7.7p1-openssl_1.1.0.patch * openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch * openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch * openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch * openssh-7.7p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch * openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch * openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch * openssh-7.7p1-seed-prng.patch * openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch * openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch - Dropped patches: OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/642573 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=153
2018-10-17 08:57:56 +00:00 · 2018-10-17 08:57:56 +00:00 · 7bccbbd821
commit 7bccbbd821
parent f56a5ff67f
45 changed files with 15985 additions and 359 deletions
--- a/README.SUSE
+++ b/README.SUSE
@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
-This is OpenSSH version 7.2p2 for SLE12
-
 There are following changes in default settings of ssh client and server:

 * Accepting and sending of locale environment variables in protocol 2 is
  enabled.

-* PAM authentication is enabled.
+* PAM authentication is enabled and mostly even required, do not turn it off.

 * root authentiation with password is enabled by default (PermitRootLogin yes).
  NOTE: this has security implications and is only done in order to not change
@ -26,4 +24,3 @@ There are following changes in default settings of ssh client and server:
  ssh_config and sshd_config manual pages.

 For more information on differences in SUSE OpenSSH package see README.FIPS
-
--- a/README.kerberos
+++ b/README.kerberos
@ -3,9 +3,6 @@ for Kerberos-related names. These DNS lookups were problematic
 for dialup users because they would lead to excessive delays
 if DNS was not reachable.

-In order to disable these lookups, I had to change the default
-configuration, disabling GSSAPI authentication.
-
 If you do use Kerberos, please make sure you edit the server and
 client configuration files as follows:

@ -19,4 +16,3 @@ client configuration files as follows:
 	    ... lots of other options ...
 	    GSSAPIAuthentication yes
 	    GSSAPIDelegateCredentials yes
-
--- a/cavs_driver-ssh.pl
+++ b/cavs_driver-ssh.pl
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#!/usr/bin/perl
 #
 # CAVS test driver for OpenSSH
 #
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  8df645ca39d64de025d8838c5713812e72308c92
+Correctly parse DISPLAY variable for cases where it contains an IPv6 address
+(which should - but not always is - in (square) brackets).
+
+bnc#847710 - https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=847710
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/channels.c b/openssh-7.7p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.7p1/channels.c
+++ openssh-7.7p1/channels.c
+@@ -4590,33 +4590,42 @@ x11_connect_display(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 			return -1;
+ 
+ 		/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
+ 		return sock;
+ 	}
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Connect to an inet socket.  The DISPLAY value is supposedly
+ 	 * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address.
+	 * Note that IPv6 numeric addresses contain colons (e.g. ::1:0)
+ 	 */
+ 	strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf));
+-	cp = strchr(buf, ':');
+	cp = strrchr(buf, ':');
+ 	if (!cp) {
+ 		error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 	*cp = 0;
+ 	/*
+ 	 * buf now contains the host name.  But first we parse the
+ 	 * display number.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
+ 		error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
+ 		    display);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+	
+	/* Remove brackets surrounding IPv6 addresses if there are any. */
+	if (buf[0] == '[' && (cp = strchr(buf, ']'))) {
+		*cp = 0;
+		cp = buf + 1;
+	} else {
+		cp = buf;
+	}
+ 
+ 	/* Look up the host address */
+ 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 	hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
+ 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ 	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
+ 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+ 		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-SUSE_patches.tar.gz
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-SUSE_patches.tar.gz
@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:87754e4234f7ed87e145cc61ea4c1e71121dd0ff10e28e86336f95033b8f7300
-size 147974
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  d25c96855fd67e997e25ec1198d953af33eb289c
+# enable trusted X11 forwarding by default in both sshd and sshsystem-wide
+# configuration
+# bnc#50836 (was suse #35836)
+Enable Trusted X11 forwarding by default, since the security benefits of
+having it disabled are negligible these days with XI2 being widely used.
+
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh_config
+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config
+@@ -17,9 +17,20 @@
+ # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
+ # ssh_config(5) man page.
+ 
+-# Host *
+Host *
+ #   ForwardAgent no
+ #   ForwardX11 no
+
+# If you do not trust your remote host (or its administrator), you
+# should not forward X11 connections to your local X11-display for
+# security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the
+# remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your
+# keystrokes as you type, just like any other X11 client could do.
+# Set this to "no" here for global effect or in your own ~/.ssh/config
+# file if you want to have the remote X11 authentification data to 
+# expire after twenty minutes after remote login.
+    ForwardX11Trusted yes
+
+ #   PasswordAuthentication yes
+ #   HostbasedAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config
+++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config
+@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+ #AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ #GatewayPorts no
+-#X11Forwarding no
+X11Forwarding yes
+ #X11DisplayOffset 10
+ #X11UseLocalhost yes
+ #PermitTTY yes
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  44592f09f090e74432f608084069d30d808fda69
+Do not throw away already open sockets for X11 forwarding if another socket
+family is not available for bind()
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/channels.c b/openssh-7.7p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.7p1/channels.c
+++ openssh-7.7p1/channels.c
+@@ -4421,16 +4421,23 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh,
+ 			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+ 				sock_set_v6only(sock);
+ 			if (x11_use_localhost)
+ 				set_reuseaddr(sock);
+ 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ 				debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__,
+ 				    port, strerror(errno));
+ 				close(sock);
+				/* do not remove successfully opened sockets if
+				 * the request failed because the protocol
+				 * IPv4/6 is not available (e.g. IPv6 may be
+				 * disabled while being supported)
+				 */
+				if (EADDRNOTAVAIL == errno)
+    					continue;
+ 				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
+ 					close(socks[n]);
+ 				num_socks = 0;
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+ 			socks[num_socks++] = sock;
+ 			if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
+ 				break;
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-allow_root_password_login.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-allow_root_password_login.patch
@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  3bf0158be93bd08d60a30a320650ea7f9844ef50
+Allow root login with password by default. While less secure than upstream
+default of forbidding access to the root account with a password, we are
+temporarily introducing this change to keep the default used in older OpenSSH
+versions shipped with SLE.
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.7p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.7p1/servconf.c
+++ openssh-7.7p1/servconf.c
+@@ -265,17 +265,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+ 	if (options->listen_addrs == NULL)
+ 		add_listen_addr(options, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ 	if (options->pid_file == NULL)
+ 		options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE);
+ 	if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
+ 		options->login_grace_time = 120;
+ 	if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
+-		options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
+		options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_YES;
+ 	if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
+ 		options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
+ 	if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
+ 		options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
+ 	if (options->print_motd == -1)
+ 		options->print_motd = 1;
+ 	if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
+ 		options->print_lastlog = 1;
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config
+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config
+@@ -24,17 +24,17 @@
+ 
+ # Logging
+ #SyslogFacility AUTH
+ #LogLevel INFO
+ 
+ # Authentication:
+ 
+ #LoginGraceTime 2m
+-#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
+#PermitRootLogin yes
+ #StrictModes yes
+ #MaxAuthTries 6
+ #MaxSessions 10
+ 
+ #PubkeyAuthentication yes
+ 
+ # The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
+ # but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0
+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0
+@@ -709,17 +709,17 @@ DESCRIPTION
+              none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests.  The
+              wildcard M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or
+              ports, respectively.  By default all port forwarding requests are
+              permitted.
+ 
+      PermitRootLogin
+              Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1).  The argument
+              must be yes, prohibit-password, forced-commands-only, or no.  The
+-             default is prohibit-password.
+             default is yes.
+ 
+              If this option is set to prohibit-password (or its deprecated
+              alias, without-password), password and keyboard-interactive
+              authentication are disabled for root.
+ 
+              If this option is set to forced-commands-only, root login with
+              public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the
+              command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5
+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1220,17 +1220,17 @@ Specifies whether root can log in using
+ .Xr ssh 1 .
+ The argument must be
+ .Cm yes ,
+ .Cm prohibit-password ,
+ .Cm forced-commands-only ,
+ or
+ .Cm no .
+ The default is
+-.Cm prohibit-password .
+.Cm yes .
+ .Pp
+ If this option is set to
+ .Cm prohibit-password
+ (or its deprecated alias,
+ .Cm without-password ) ,
+ password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root.
+ .Pp
+ If this option is set to
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-audit.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-audit.patch
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-blocksigalrm.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-blocksigalrm.patch
@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  2e66b48b2212113d9897a58aaada67557b7c4f35
+block SIGALRM while logging through syslog to prevent deadlocks
+(through grace_alarm_handler())
+
+bnc#57354
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/log.c b/openssh-7.7p1/log.c
+--- openssh-7.7p1/log.c
+++ openssh-7.7p1/log.c
+@@ -46,16 +46,17 @@
+ #include <syslog.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+ # include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+#include <signal.h>
+ 
+ static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ static int log_on_stderr = 1;
+ static int log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO;
+ static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
+ static char *argv0;
+ static log_handler_fn *log_handler;
+ static void *log_handler_ctx;
+@@ -396,16 +397,17 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, 
+ {
+ #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+ 	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+ #endif
+ 	char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
+ 	char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
+ 	char *txt = NULL;
+ 	int pri = LOG_INFO;
+	sigset_t nset, oset;
+ 	int saved_errno = errno;
+ 	log_handler_fn *tmp_handler;
+ 
+ 	if (level > log_level)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	switch (level) {
+ 	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
+@@ -455,20 +457,28 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, 
+ 		log_handler = NULL;
+ 		tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);
+ 		log_handler = tmp_handler;
+ 	} else if (log_on_stderr) {
+ 		snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%.*s\r\n",
+ 		    (int)sizeof msgbuf - 3, fmtbuf);
+ 		(void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf));
+ 	} else {
+		/* Prevent a race between the grace_alarm which writes a
+		 * log message and terminates and main sshd code that leads
+		 * to deadlock as syslog is not async safe.
+		 */ 
+		sigemptyset(&nset);
+		sigaddset(&nset, SIGALRM);
+		sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
+ #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+ 		openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
+ 		syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
+ 		closelog_r(&sdata);
+ #else
+ 		openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
+ 		syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
+ 		closelog();
+ #endif
+		sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
+ 	}
+ 	errno = saved_errno;
+ }
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch
@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  cc1022edba2c5eeb0facba08468f65afc2466b63
+CAVS test for OpenSSH's own CTR encryption mode implementation
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in
+++ openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in
+@@ -19,16 +19,17 @@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+ 
+ DESTDIR=
+ VPATH=@srcdir@
+ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
+ ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+CAVSTEST_CTR=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+ STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
+ TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
+ 
+ PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
+ 	-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
+ 	-D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
+@@ -57,16 +58,18 @@ ENT=@ENT@
+ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
+ LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
+ 
+ TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
+
+ XMSS_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh-xmss.o \
+ 	sshkey-xmss.o \
+ 	xmss_commons.o \
+ 	xmss_fast.o \
+ 	xmss_hash.o \
+ 	xmss_hash_address.o \
+ 	xmss_wots.o
+@@ -199,16 +202,20 @@ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+ sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ 
+ sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+ 
+# FIPS tests
+cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-ctr.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
+ # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
+ logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+ $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
+ 	if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
+ 		manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
+ 	else \
+@@ -339,16 +346,17 @@ install-files:
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/cavstest-ctr.c b/openssh-7.7p1/cavstest-ctr.c
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
+++ openssh-7.7p1/cavstest-ctr.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+/*
+ *
+ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
+ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+
+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
+	    "                    --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
+	    "                    [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
+	    "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
+	    "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+void *
+fromhex(char *hex, size_t * len)
+{
+	unsigned char *bin;
+	char *p;
+	size_t n = 0;
+	int shift = 4;
+	unsigned char out = 0;
+	unsigned char *optr;
+
+	bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex) / 2);
+	optr = bin;
+
+	for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
+		unsigned char c;
+
+		c = *p;
+		if (isspace(c))
+			continue;
+
+		if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
+			c = c - '0';
+		} else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
+			c = c - 'A' + 10;
+		} else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
+			c = c - 'a' + 10;
+		} else {
+			/* truncate on nonhex cipher */
+			break;
+		}
+
+		out |= c << shift;
+		shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
+
+		if (shift) {
+			*(optr++) = out;
+			out = 0;
+			++n;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*len = n;
+	return bin;
+}
+
+#define READ_CHUNK 4096
+#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
+char *
+read_stdin(void)
+{
+	char *buf;
+	size_t n, total = 0;
+
+	buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
+
+	do {
+		n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
+		if (n < READ_CHUNK)	/* terminate on short read */
+			break;
+
+		total += n;
+		buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
+	} while (total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
+	return buf;
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+
+	struct sshcipher *c;
+	struct sshcipher_ctx cc;
+	struct sshcipher_ctx *ccp;
+	char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
+	char *hexkey = NULL;
+	char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
+	char *hexdata = NULL;
+	char *p;
+	int i;
+	int encrypt = 1;
+	void *key;
+	size_t keylen;
+	void *iv;
+	size_t ivlen;
+	void *data;
+	size_t datalen;
+	void *outdata;
+
+	for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
+		if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
+			algo = argv[++i];
+		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
+			hexkey = argv[++i];
+		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
+			++i;
+			if (argv[i] == NULL) {
+				usage();
+			}
+			if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
+				encrypt = 1;
+			} else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
+				encrypt = 0;
+			} else {
+				usage();
+			}
+		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
+			hexiv = argv[++i];
+		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
+			hexdata = argv[++i];
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
+		usage();
+	}
+
+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+
+	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	if (hexdata == NULL) {
+		hexdata = read_stdin();
+	} else {
+		hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
+	}
+
+	key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
+
+	if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
+
+	if (ivlen != 16) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
+
+	if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	ccp = &cc;
+	cipher_init(&ccp, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt);
+
+	free(key);
+	free(iv);
+
+	outdata = malloc(datalen);
+	if (outdata == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	cipher_crypt(&cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0);
+
+	free(data);
+
+	cipher_free(&cc);
+
+	for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
+		printf("%02X", (unsigned char) *p);
+	}
+
+	free(outdata);
+
+	printf("\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/cipher.c b/openssh-7.7p1/cipher.c
+--- openssh-7.7p1/cipher.c
+++ openssh-7.7p1/cipher.c
+@@ -49,25 +49,16 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ 
+ #include "fips.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ 
+-struct sshcipher_ctx {
+-	int	plaintext;
+-	int	encrypt;
+-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp;
+-	struct chachapoly_ctx cp_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
+-	struct aesctr_ctx ac_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
+-	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+-};
+-
+ struct sshcipher {
+ 	char	*name;
+ 	u_int	block_size;
+ 	u_int	key_len;
+ 	u_int	iv_len;		/* defaults to block_size */
+ 	u_int	auth_len;
+ 	u_int	flags;
+ #define CFLAG_CBC		(1<<0)
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/cipher.h b/openssh-7.7p1/cipher.h
+--- openssh-7.7p1/cipher.h
+++ openssh-7.7p1/cipher.h
+@@ -41,17 +41,25 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
+ #include "cipher-aesctr.h"
+ 
+ #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT		1
+ #define CIPHER_DECRYPT		0
+ 
+ struct sshcipher;
+-struct sshcipher_ctx;
+struct sshcipher_ctx {
+	int	plaintext;
+	int	encrypt;
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp;
+	struct chachapoly_ctx cp_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
+	struct aesctr_ctx ac_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
+	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+};
+
+ 
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
+ const char *cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
+ int	 ciphers_valid(const char *);
+ char	*cipher_alg_list(char, int);
+ int	 cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **, const struct sshcipher *,
+     const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, int);
+ int	 cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *,
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
@ -0,0 +1,474 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  1e1d5a2ab8bddfc800f570755f9ea1addcc878c1
+CAVS test for KDF implementation in OpenSSH
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in
+++ openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in
+@@ -20,16 +20,17 @@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+ DESTDIR=
+ VPATH=@srcdir@
+ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
+ ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ CAVSTEST_CTR=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr
+CAVSTEST_KDF=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-kdf
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+ STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
+ TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
+ 
+ PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
+ 	-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
+ 	-D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
+@@ -58,17 +59,17 @@ ENT=@ENT@
+ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
+ LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
+ 
+ TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+-TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
+TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ XMSS_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh-xmss.o \
+ 	sshkey-xmss.o \
+ 	xmss_commons.o \
+ 	xmss_fast.o \
+ 	xmss_hash.o \
+ 	xmss_hash_address.o \
+@@ -206,16 +207,19 @@ sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss
+ 
+ sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+ 
+ # FIPS tests
+ cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-ctr.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-kdf.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-kdf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
+ # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
+ logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+ $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
+ 	if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
+ 		manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
+ 	else \
+@@ -347,16 +351,17 @@ install-files:
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/cavstest-kdf.c b/openssh-7.7p1/cavstest-kdf.c
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
+++ openssh-7.7p1/cavstest-kdf.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
+ *    written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
+ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
+ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
+ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
+ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+ * DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+
+static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
+{
+	if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
+		return (hex - 48);
+	if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
+		return (hex - 55);
+	if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
+		return (hex - 87);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert hex representation into binary string
+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
+ * @hexlen length of hex
+ * @bin output buffer with binary data
+ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
+ *	   half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
+ */
+static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
+		    unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
+{
+	size_t i = 0;
+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
+		bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
+		bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
+ * and convert hex into bin
+ *
+ * Caller must free bin
+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
+ * @hexlen length of hex
+ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
+ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
+ *
+ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
+ */
+static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
+			 unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
+{
+	unsigned char *out = NULL;
+	size_t outlen = 0;
+
+	if (!hexlen)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
+
+	out = calloc(1, outlen);
+	if (!out)
+		return -errno;
+
+	hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
+	*bin = out;
+	*binlen = outlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
+				 '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
+static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
+				 '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
+static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
+{
+	if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
+		return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
+	return 'X';
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert binary string into hex representation
+ * @bin input buffer with binary data
+ * @binlen length of bin
+ * @hex output buffer to store hex data
+ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
+ *	   twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
+ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
+ */
+static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
+		    char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
+{
+	size_t i = 0;
+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
+		hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
+		hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
+	}
+}
+
+struct kdf_cavs {
+	unsigned char *K;
+	size_t Klen;
+	unsigned char *H;
+	size_t Hlen;
+	unsigned char *session_id;
+	size_t session_id_len;
+
+	unsigned int iv_len;
+	unsigned int ek_len;
+	unsigned int ik_len;
+};
+
+static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	struct kex kex;
+	BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
+	int mode = 0;
+	struct newkeys *keys_client;
+	struct newkeys *keys_server;
+       struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
+
+#define HEXOUTLEN 500
+	char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
+
+	memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
+
+	Kbn = BN_new();
+	BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
+	if (!Kbn) {
+		printf("cannot convert K into BIGNUM\n");
+		ret = 1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	kex.session_id = test->session_id;
+	kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
+
+	/* setup kex */
+
+	/* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
+	switch (test->ik_len) {
+		case 20:
+			kex.hash_alg = 2;
+			break;
+		case 32:
+			kex.hash_alg = 3;
+			break;
+		case 48:
+			kex.hash_alg = 4;
+			break;
+		case 64:
+			kex.hash_alg = 5;
+			break;
+		default:
+			printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
+			ret = 1;
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* implement choose_enc */
+	for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
+		kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
+		if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
+			printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
+			ret = 1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
+		kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
+	}
+
+	/* implement kex_choose_conf */
+	kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
+
+	/* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
+	 * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
+	kex.server = 1;
+
+	/* do it */
+       if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL){
+	   printf("Allocation error\n");
+	   goto out;
+	}
+ 	ssh->kex = &kex;
+	kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kbn);
+
+	keys_client = kex.newkeys[0];
+	keys_server = kex.newkeys[1];
+
+	/* get data */
+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+	bin2hex(keys_client->enc.iv, (size_t)keys_client->enc.iv_len,
+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+	printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
+
+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+	bin2hex(keys_server->enc.iv, (size_t)keys_server->enc.iv_len,
+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+	printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
+
+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+	bin2hex(keys_client->enc.key, (size_t)keys_client->enc.key_len,
+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+	printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
+	
+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+	bin2hex(keys_server->enc.key, (size_t)keys_server->enc.key_len,
+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+	printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
+
+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+	bin2hex(keys_client->mac.key, (size_t)keys_client->mac.key_len,
+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+	printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
+	
+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+	bin2hex(keys_server->mac.key, (size_t)keys_server->mac.key_len,
+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+	printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
+
+	free(keys_client);
+	free(keys_server);
+
+out:
+	if (Kbn)
+		BN_free(Kbn);
+	if (ssh)
+		ssh_packet_close(ssh);
+	if (kex.newkeys[0])
+		free(kex.newkeys[0]);
+	if (kex.newkeys[1])
+		free(kex.newkeys[1]);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test command example:
+ * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
+ *
+ * Expected result for example:
+ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
+ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
+ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
+ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
+ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
+ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
+ */
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	struct kdf_cavs test;
+	int ret = 1;
+	int opt = 0;
+
+	memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
+	while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
+	{
+		size_t len = 0;
+		switch(opt)
+		{
+			/*
+			 * CAVS K is MPINT
+			 * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
+			 * following transformations already happened):
+			 * 	1. cut off first four bytes
+			 * 	2. if most significant bit of value is
+			 *	   1, prepend 0 byte
+			 */
+			case 'K':
+				len = strlen(optarg);
+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
+						    &test.K, &test.Klen);
+				if (ret)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case 'H':
+				len = strlen(optarg);
+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
+						    &test.H, &test.Hlen);
+				if (ret)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case 's':
+				len = strlen(optarg);
+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
+						    &test.session_id,
+						    &test.session_id_len);
+				if (ret)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case 'i':
+				test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
+				break;
+			case 'e':
+				test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
+				break;
+			case 'm':
+				test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
+				break;
+			default:
+				usage();
+				goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
+
+out:
+	if (test.session_id)
+		free(test.session_id);
+	if (test.K)
+		free(test.K);
+	if (test.H)
+		free(test.H);
+	return ret;
+
+}
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  b13da8c3e99081cb92ab226d2c512241a82cd0d5
+disable run-time check for OpenSSL ABI by version number as that is not a
+reliable indicator of ABI changes and doesn't make much sense in a
+distribution package
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/configure.ac b/openssh-7.7p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-7.7p1/configure.ac
+++ openssh-7.7p1/configure.ac
+@@ -4895,16 +4895,29 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth],
+ 		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ 			AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1],
+ 				[Define if you have BSD auth support])
+ 			BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes
+ 		fi
+ 	]
+ )
+ 
+# Whether we are using distribution (Open)SSL, so no runtime checks are necessary
+DISTRO_SSL=no
+AC_ARG_WITH([distro-ssl],
+	[  --with-distro-ssl       Disable runtime OpenSSL version checks (good for distributions)],
+	[
+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE([DISTRO_SSL], [1],
+                      [Define if you are using distribution SSL library and don;t expect its API/ABI to change])
+			DISTRO_SSL=yes
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+ # Where to place sshd.pid
+ piddir=/var/run
+ # make sure the directory exists
+ if test ! -d $piddir ; then
+ 	piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
+ 	case $piddir in
+ 		NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
+ 	esac
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/entropy.c b/openssh-7.7p1/entropy.c
+--- openssh-7.7p1/entropy.c
+++ openssh-7.7p1/entropy.c
+@@ -209,19 +209,21 @@ rexec_recv_rng_seed(Buffer *m)
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
+ 
+ void
+ seed_rng(void)
+ {
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ 	unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
+ #endif
+#ifndef DISTRO_SSL
+ 	if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()))
+ 		fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
+ 		    "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
+#endif
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ 	if (RAND_status() == 1) {
+ 		debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  681914438b1a02c1940d19204138e9b8eacfda7b
+
+Raise minimal size of DH group parameters to 2048 bits like upstream did in
+7.2. 1024b values are believed to be in breaking range for state adversaries
+and the default moduli shipped with openssh have been around long enough to
+make it more likely for them to be broken.
+
+Also provide an option that allows the client to accept shorter (RFC4419
+compliant) parameters.
+
+CVE-2015-4000 (LOGJAM)
+bsc#932483
+
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/dh.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/dh.c
+++ openssh-7.8p1/dh.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ 
+int dh_grp_min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+
+ static int
+ parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg)
+ {
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/dh.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/dh.h
+++ openssh-7.8p1/dh.h
+@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
+  * Max value from RFC4419.
+  * Miniumum increased in light of DH precomputation attacks.
+  */
+#define DH_GRP_MIN_RFC	1024
+ #define DH_GRP_MIN	2048
+ #define DH_GRP_MAX	8192
+ 
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/kexgexc.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/kexgexc.c
+++ openssh-7.8p1/kexgexc.c
+@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ 
+/* import from dh.c */
+extern int dh_grp_min;
+
+ static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ 
+@@ -63,7 +66,7 @@ kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
+ 
+-	kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+	kex->min = dh_grp_min;
+ 	kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+ 	kex->nbits = nbits;
+ 	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE)
+@@ -108,6 +111,12 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
+ 		goto out;
+ 	if ((bits = BN_num_bits(p)) < 0 ||
+ 	    (u_int)bits < kex->min || (u_int)bits > kex->max) {
+		if ((u_int)bits < kex->min && (u_int)bits >= DH_GRP_MIN_RFC)
+			logit("DH parameter offered by the server (%d bits) "
+			    "is considered insecure. "
+			    "You can lower the accepted the minimum "
+			    "via the KexDHMin option.",
+			    bits);
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/kexgexs.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/kexgexs.c
+++ openssh-7.8p1/kexgexs.c
+@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ 
+/* import from dh.c */
+extern int dh_grp_min;
+
+ static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ 
+@@ -82,13 +85,19 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int
+ 	kex->nbits = nbits;
+ 	kex->min = min;
+ 	kex->max = max;
+-	min = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
+	min = MAXIMUM(dh_grp_min, min);
+ 	max = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
+-	nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
+	nbits = MAXIMUM(dh_grp_min, nbits);
+ 	nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
+ 
+ 	if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min ||
+ 	    kex->max < kex->nbits || kex->max < DH_GRP_MIN) {
+		if (kex->nbits < kex->min && kex->nbits >= DH_GRP_MIN_RFC)
+			logit("DH parameter requested by the client (%d bits) "
+			    "is considered insecure. "
+			    "You can lower the accepted minimum "
+			    "via the KexDHMin option.",
+			    kex->nbits);
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/readconf.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/readconf.c
+++ openssh-7.8p1/readconf.c
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
+ #include "uidswap.h"
+ #include "myproposal.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+ 
+ /* Format of the configuration file:
+ 
+@@ -167,7 +168,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice,
+ 	oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand,
+ 	oVisualHostKey,
+-	oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
+	oKexAlgorithms, oKexDHMin, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
+ 	oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
+ 	oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
+ 	oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
+@@ -291,6 +292,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "remotecommand", oRemoteCommand },
+ 	{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
+ 	{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
+	{ "kexdhmin", oKexDHMin },
+ 	{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
+ 	{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
+ 	{ "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass },
+@@ -312,6 +314,9 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ NULL, oBadOption }
+ };
+ 
+/* import from dh.c */
+extern int dh_grp_min;
+
+ /*
+  * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options.  Never returns if there is an
+  * error.
+@@ -1206,6 +1211,10 @@ parse_int:
+ 			options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+ 
+	case oKexDHMin:
+		intptr = &options->kex_dhmin;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+ 	case oHostKeyAlgorithms:
+ 		charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
+ parse_keytypes:
+@@ -1835,6 +1844,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ 	options->ciphers = NULL;
+ 	options->macs = NULL;
+ 	options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
+	options->kex_dhmin = -1;
+ 	options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
+ 	options->num_identity_files = 0;
+ 	options->num_certificate_files = 0;
+@@ -1988,6 +1998,13 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 		options->connection_attempts = 1;
+ 	if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1)
+ 		options->number_of_password_prompts = 3;
+	if (options->kex_dhmin == -1)
+		options->kex_dhmin = DH_GRP_MIN;
+	else {
+		options->kex_dhmin = MAXIMUM(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC);
+		options->kex_dhmin = MINIMUM(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX);
+	}
+	dh_grp_min = options->kex_dhmin;
+ 	/* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
+ 	if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1)
+ 		options->add_keys_to_agent = 0;
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/readconf.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/readconf.h
+++ openssh-7.8p1/readconf.h
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	char   *macs;		/* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */
+ 	char   *hostkeyalgorithms;	/* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */
+ 	char   *kex_algorithms;	/* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
+	int     kex_dhmin;	/* minimum bit length of the DH group parameter */
+ 	char   *hostname;	/* Real host to connect. */
+ 	char   *host_key_alias;	/* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
+ 	char   *proxy_command;	/* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.c
+++ openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c
+@@ -64,6 +64,10 @@
+ #include "auth.h"
+ #include "myproposal.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+
+/* import from dh.c */
+extern int dh_grp_min;
+ 
+ static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
+     const char *, int);
+@@ -146,6 +150,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->ciphers = NULL;
+ 	options->macs = NULL;
+ 	options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
+	options->kex_dhmin = -1;
+ 	options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1;
+ 	options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1;
+ 	options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
+@@ -263,6 +268,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	if (options->use_pam_check_locks == -1)
+ 		options->use_pam_check_locks = 0;
+ 
+	if (options->kex_dhmin == -1)
+		options->kex_dhmin = DH_GRP_MIN;
+	else {
+		options->kex_dhmin = MAXIMUM(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC);
+		options->kex_dhmin = MINIMUM(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX);
+	}
+	dh_grp_min = options->kex_dhmin;
+
+ 	/* Standard Options */
+ 	if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
+ 		/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
+@@ -490,7 +503,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sHostCertificate,
+ 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+ 	sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
+-	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
+	sKexAlgorithms, sKexDHMin, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
+ 	sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
+ 	sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
+ 	sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
+@@ -631,6 +644,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "kexdhmin", sKexDHMin },
+ 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
+@@ -1726,6 +1740,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 			options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+ 
+	case sKexDHMin:
+		intptr = &options->kex_dhmin;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+ 	case sSubsystem:
+ 		if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) {
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.",
+@@ -2540,6 +2558,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
+ 	dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
+	dump_cfg_int(sKexDHMin, o->kex_dhmin);
+ 
+ 	/* formatted integer arguments */
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login);
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/servconf.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.h
+++ openssh-7.8p1/servconf.h
+@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	char   *ciphers;	/* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */
+ 	char   *macs;		/* Supported SSH2 macs. */
+ 	char   *kex_algorithms;	/* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
+	int     kex_dhmin;	/* minimum bit length of the DH group parameter */
+ 	struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts;	/* forwarding options */
+ 	SyslogFacility log_facility;	/* Facility for system logging. */
+ 	LogLevel log_level;	/* Level for system logging. */
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh_config
+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config
+@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@
+ # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
+ # ssh_config(5) man page.
+ 
+# Minimum accepted size of the DH parameter p. By default this is set to 1024
+# to maintain compatibility with RFC4419, but should be set higher.
+# Upstream default is identical to setting this to 2048.
+#KexDHMin 1024
+
+ Host *
+ #   ForwardAgent no
+ #   ForwardX11 no
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config.0
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh_config.0
+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config.0
+@@ -595,6 +595,23 @@ DESCRIPTION
+              The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
+              obtained using "ssh -Q kex".
+ 
+     KexDHMin
+             Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group
+             parameter p.
+
+             As per RFC4419, this is 1024 bits, however this has increasingly
+             been seen as insecure, which prompted the change to 2048 bits.
+             Setting this option allows the client to accept parameters shorter
+             than the current minimum, down to the RFC specified 1024 bits.
+             Using this option may be needed when connecting to servers that
+             only know short DH group parameters.
+
+             Note, that while by default this option is set to 1024 to maintain
+             maximum backward compatibility, using it can severly impact
+             security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last
+             resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken)
+             counterparty.
+
+      LocalCommand
+              Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after
+              successfully connecting to the server.  The command string
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh_config.5
+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config.5
+@@ -1025,6 +1025,22 @@ diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q kex .
+.It Cm KexDHMin
+Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group
+parameter p.
+.Pp
+As per RFC4419, this is 1024 bits, however this has increasingly
+been seen as insecure, which prompted the change to 2048 bits.
+Setting this option allows the client to accept parameters shorter
+than the current minimum, down to the RFC specified 1024 bits.
+Using this option may be needed when connecting to servers that
+only know short DH group parameters.
+.Pp
+Note, that while by default this option is set to 1024 to maintain
+maximum backward compatibility, using it can severly impact
+security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last
+resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken)
+counterparty.
+ .It Cm LocalCommand
+ Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully
+ connecting to the server.
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config
+++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config
+@@ -19,6 +19,13 @@
+ #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+ #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+ 
+# Minimum accepted size of the DH parameter p. The default, which replicates
+# upstream behaviour, is 2048. To maintain compatibility with RFC4419 it should
+# be set to 1024.
+# You will also need to add a HostKey directive to load a DSA key (typically
+# located in /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key), which is not loaded by default.
+#KexDHMin 2048
+
+ # Ciphers and keying
+ #RekeyLimit default none
+ 
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.0
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config.0
+++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.0
+@@ -545,6 +545,23 @@ DESCRIPTION
+              The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
+              obtained using "ssh -Q kex".
+ 
+     KexDHMin
+             Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group
+             parameter p.
+
+             As per RFC4419, this is 1024 bits, however this has increasingly
+             been seen as insecure, which prompted the change to 2048 bits.
+             Setting this option allows the server to accept parameters shorter
+             than the current minimum, down to the RFC specified 1024 bits.
+             Using this option may be needed when some of the connectiong
+             clients only know short DH group parameters.
+
+             Note, that while by default this option is set to 1024 to maintain
+             maximum backward compatibility, using it can severly impact
+             security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last
+             resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken)
+             counterparty.
+
+      ListenAddress
+              Specifies the local addresses sshd(8) should listen on.  The
+              following forms may be used:
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config.5
+++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.5
+@@ -912,6 +912,22 @@ diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hel
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q kex .
+.It Cm KexDHMin
+Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group
+parameter p.
+.Pp
+As per RFC4419, this is 1024 bits, however this has increasingly
+been seen as insecure, which prompted the change to 2048 bits.
+Setting this option allows the server to accept parameters shorter
+than the current minimum, down to the RFC specified 1024 bits.
+Using this option may be needed when some of the connectiong
+clients only know short DH group parameters.
+.Pp
+Note, that while by default this option is set to 1024 to maintain
+maximum backward compatibility, using it can severly impact
+security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last
+resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken)
+counterparty.
+ .It Cm ListenAddress
+ Specifies the local addresses
+ .Xr sshd 8
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-eal3.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-eal3.patch
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  8fd4e445c3a5c823568661a4f71b064cbcb217a9
+fix paths and references in sshd man pages
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in
+++ openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in
+@@ -127,17 +127,18 @@ MANTYPE		= @MANTYPE@
+ CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out
+ CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli
+ 
+ PATHSUBS	= \
+ 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \
+ 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \
+ 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \
+ 	-e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \
+-	-e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \
+	-e 's|login\.conf|login.defs|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/ssh/shosts.equiv|g' \
+ 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \
+ 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|g' \
+ 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \
+ 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \
+ 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key|g' \
+ 	-e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \
+ 	-e 's|/etc/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
+ 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  5c1e122e31b601de64d81085294216af33f31aed
+# force PAM in defaullt install (this was removed from upstream in 3.8p1)
+# bnc#46749
+# --used to be called '-pam-fix2'
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config
+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config
+@@ -74,17 +74,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+ # be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
+ # PasswordAuthentication.  Depending on your PAM configuration,
+ # PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
+ # the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+-#UsePAM no
+UsePAM yes
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+ #AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ #GatewayPorts no
+ X11Forwarding yes
+ #X11DisplayOffset 10
+ #X11UseLocalhost yes
+ #PermitTTY yes
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
@ -0,0 +1,479 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  e9b69da9a0f8dca923f8fc2836b38fe6590c791a
+#
+# Simple implementation of FIPS 140-2 selfchecks. Use OpenSSL to generate and
+# verify checksums of binaries. Any hash iused in OpenSSH can be used (MD5 would
+# obviously be a poor choice, since OpenSSL would barf and abort immediately in
+# FIPS mode). SHA-2 seems to be a reasonable choice.
+#
+# The logic of the checks is as follows: decide whether FIPS mode is mandated
+# (either by checking /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled or envoroinment variable
+# SSH_FORCE_FIPS. In FIPS mode, checksums are required to match (inability to
+# retrieve pre-calculated hash is a fatal error). In non-FIPS mode the checks
+# still must be performed, unless the hashes are not installed. Thus if the hash
+# file is not found (or the hash matches), proceed in non-FIPS mode and abort
+# otherwise.
+
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/fips-check.c
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
+++ openssh-7.8p1/fips-check.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "fips.h"
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#define PROC_NAME_LEN	64
+
+static const char *argv0;
+
+void
+print_help_exit(int ev)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s <-c|-w> <file> <checksum_file>\n", argv0);
+	fprintf(stderr, "	-c  verify hash of 'file' against hash in 'checksum_file'\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "	-w  write hash of 'file' into 'checksum_file'\n");
+	exit(ev);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    fips_ssh_init();
+	return 0;
+}
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/fips.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/fips.c
+++ openssh-7.8p1/fips.c
+@@ -35,33 +35,296 @@
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ 
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+ 
+ /* import from dh.c */
+ extern int dh_grp_min;
+ 
+ static int fips_state = -1;
+ 
+/* calculates HMAC of contents of a file given by filename using the hash
+ * algorithm specified by FIPS_HMAC_EVP in fips.h and placing the result into
+ * newly allacated memory - remember to free it when not needed anymore */
+ static int
+-fips_check_required_env(void)
+hmac_file(const char *filename, u_char **hmac_out)
+{
+	int check = -1;
+	int fd;
+	struct stat fs;
+	void *hmap;
+	unsigned char *hmac;
+	unsigned char *hmac_rv = NULL;
+
+	hmac = xmalloc(FIPS_HMAC_LEN);
+
+	fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+	if (-1 == fd)
+		goto bail_out;
+
+	if (-1 == fstat(fd, &fs))
+		goto bail_out;
+
+	hmap = mmap(NULL, fs.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
+
+	if ((void *)(-1) != hmap) {
+		hmac_rv = HMAC(FIPS_HMAC_EVP(), FIPS_HMAC_KEY
+		    , strlen(FIPS_HMAC_KEY), hmap, fs.st_size, hmac, NULL);
+		check = CHECK_OK;
+		munmap(hmap, fs.st_size);
+	}
+	close(fd);
+
+bail_out:
+	if (hmac_rv) {
+		check = CHECK_OK;
+		*hmac_out = hmac;
+	} else {
+		check = CHECK_FAIL;
+		*hmac_out = NULL;
+		free(hmac);
+	}
+	return check;
+}
+
+/* find pathname of binary of process with PID pid. exe is buffer expected to
+ * be capable of holding at least max_pathlen characters
+ */
+static int
+get_executable_path(pid_t pid, char *exe, int max_pathlen)
+{
+	char exe_sl[PROC_EXE_PATH_LEN];
+	int n;
+	int rv = -1;
+
+	n = snprintf(exe_sl, sizeof(exe_sl), "/proc/%u/exe", pid);
+	if ((n <= 10) || (n >= max_pathlen)) {
+		fatal("error compiling filename of link to executable");
+	}
+
+	exe[0] = 0;
+	n = readlink(exe_sl, exe, max_pathlen);
+	/* the file doesn't need to exist - procfs might not be mounted in
+	 * chroot */
+	if (n == -1) {
+		rv = CHECK_MISSING;
+	} else {
+		if (n < max_pathlen) {
+			exe[n] = 0;
+			rv = CHECK_OK;
+		} else {
+			rv = CHECK_FAIL;
+		}
+	}
+	return rv;
+}
+
+/* Read HMAC from file chk, allocating enough memory to hold the HMAC and
+ * return it in *hmac.
+ * Remember to free() it when it's not needed anymore.
+ */
+static int
+read_hmac(const char *chk, u_char **hmac)
+{
+	int check = -1;
+	int fdh, n;
+	u_char *hmac_in;
+
+	*hmac = NULL;
+
+	fdh = open(chk, O_RDONLY);
+	if (-1 == fdh) {
+		switch (errno) {
+			case ENOENT:
+				check = CHECK_MISSING;
+				debug("fips: checksum file %s is missing\n", chk);
+				break;
+			default:
+				check = CHECK_FAIL;
+				debug("fips: ckecksum file %s not accessible\n", chk);
+				break;
+
+		}
+		goto bail_out;
+	}
+
+	hmac_in = xmalloc(FIPS_HMAC_LEN);
+
+	n = read(fdh, (void *)hmac_in, FIPS_HMAC_LEN);
+	if (FIPS_HMAC_LEN != n) {
+		debug("fips: unable to read whole checksum from checksum file\n");
+		free (hmac_in);
+		check = CHECK_FAIL;
+	} else {
+		check = CHECK_OK;
+		*hmac = hmac_in;
+	}
+bail_out:
+	return check;
+}
+
+static int
+fips_hmac_self(void)
+{
+	int check = -1;
+	u_char *hmac = NULL, *hmac_chk = NULL;
+	char *exe, *chk;
+
+	exe = xmalloc(PATH_MAX);
+	chk = xmalloc(PATH_MAX);
+
+	/* we will need to add the suffix and the null terminator */
+	check = get_executable_path(getpid(), exe
+		    , PATH_MAX - strlen(CHECKSUM_SUFFIX) - 1);
+	if (CHECK_OK != check)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	strncpy(chk, exe, PATH_MAX);
+	strlcat(chk, CHECKSUM_SUFFIX, PATH_MAX);
+
+	check = read_hmac(chk, &hmac_chk);
+	if (CHECK_OK != check)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	check = hmac_file(exe, &hmac);
+	if (CHECK_OK != check)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	check = memcmp(hmac, hmac_chk, FIPS_HMAC_LEN);
+	if (0 == check) {
+		check = CHECK_OK;
+		debug("fips: checksum matches\n");
+	} else {
+		check = CHECK_FAIL;
+		debug("fips: checksum mismatch!\n");
+	}
+
+cleanup:
+	free(hmac);
+	free(hmac_chk);
+	free(chk);
+	free(exe);
+
+	return check;
+}
+
+static int
+fips_check_required_proc(void)
+ {
+ 	int fips_required = 0;
+-	char *env = getenv(SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV);
+	int fips_fd;
+	char fips_sys = 0;
+ 
+-	if (env) {
+-		errno = 0;
+-		fips_required = strtol(env, NULL, 10);
+-		if (errno) {
+-			debug("bogus value in the %s environment variable, ignoring\n"
+-			    , SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV);
+-			fips_required = 0;
+-		} else
+-			fips_required = 1;
+	struct stat dummy;
+	if (-1 == stat(FIPS_PROC_PATH, &dummy)) {
+		switch (errno) {
+			case ENOENT:
+			case ENOTDIR:
+				break;
+			default:
+				fatal("Check for system-wide FIPS mode is required and %s cannot"
+				    " be accessed for reason other than non-existence - aborting"
+				    , FIPS_PROC_PATH);
+				break;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (-1 == (fips_fd = open(FIPS_PROC_PATH, O_RDONLY)))
+			fatal("Check for system-wide FIPS mode is required and %s cannot"
+			    " be opened for reading - aborting"
+			    , FIPS_PROC_PATH);
+		if (1 > read(fips_fd, &fips_sys, 1))
+			fatal("Check for system-wide FIPS mode is required and %s doesn't"
+			    " return at least one character - aborting"
+			    , FIPS_PROC_PATH);
+		close(fips_sys);
+		switch (fips_sys) {
+			case '0':
+			case '1':
+				fips_required = fips_sys - '0';
+				break;
+			default:
+				fatal("Bogus character %c found in %s - aborting"
+				    , fips_sys, FIPS_PROC_PATH);
+		}
+ 	}
+ 	return fips_required;
+ }
+ 
+static int
+fips_check_required_env(void)
+{
+	return (NULL != getenv(SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV));
+}
+
+static int
+fips_required(void)
+{
+	int fips_requests = 0;
+	fips_requests += fips_check_required_proc();
+	fips_requests += fips_check_required_env();
+	return fips_requests;
+}
+
+/* check whether FIPS mode is required and perform selfchecksum/selftest */
+void
+fips_ssh_init(void)
+{
+	int checksum;
+
+	checksum = fips_hmac_self();
+
+	if (fips_required()) {
+		switch (checksum) {
+			case CHECK_OK:
+				debug("fips: mandatory checksum ok");
+				break;
+			case CHECK_FAIL:
+				fatal("fips: mandatory checksum failed - aborting");
+				break;
+			case CHECK_MISSING:
+				fatal("fips: mandatory checksum data missing - aborting");
+				break;
+			default:
+				fatal("Fatal error: internal error at %s:%u"
+				    , __FILE__, __LINE__);
+				break;
+		}
+		fips_state = FIPS_mode_set(1);
+		if (1 != fips_state) {
+			ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+			u_long err = ERR_get_error();
+			error("fips: OpenSSL error %lx: %s"
+			    , err, ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
+			fatal("fips: unable to set OpenSSL into FIPS mode - aborting");
+		}
+	} else {
+		switch (checksum) {
+			case CHECK_OK:
+				debug("fips: checksum ok");
+				break;
+			case CHECK_FAIL:
+				fatal("fips: checksum failed - aborting");
+				break;
+			case CHECK_MISSING:
+				debug("fips: checksum data missing, but not required - continuing non-FIPS");
+				break;
+			default:
+				fatal("Fatal error: internal error at %s:%u",
+				    __FILE__, __LINE__);
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+	return;
+}
+
+ int
+ fips_mode(void)
+ {
+@@ -234,4 +497,3 @@ fips_dh_grp_min(void)
+ 	}
+ 	return dh;
+ }
+-
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/fips.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/fips.h
+++ openssh-7.8p1/fips.h
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2012 Petr Cerny.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2012-2014 Petr Cerny.  All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -27,6 +27,15 @@
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ 
+ #define SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV	"SSH_FORCE_FIPS"
+#define FIPS_PROC_PATH		"/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled"
+
+#define PROC_EXE_PATH_LEN	64
+#define CHECKSUM_SUFFIX		".hmac"
+#define FIPS_HMAC_KEY		"HMAC_KEY:OpenSSH-FIPS@SLE"
+#define FIPS_HMAC_EVP		EVP_sha256
+#define FIPS_HMAC_LEN		32
+
+void	 fips_ssh_init(void);
+ 
+ typedef enum {
+ 	FIPS_FILTER_CIPHERS,
+@@ -34,6 +43,12 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	FIPS_FILTER_KEX_ALGS
+ } fips_filters;
+ 
+typedef enum {
+	CHECK_OK = 0,
+	CHECK_FAIL,
+	CHECK_MISSING
+} fips_checksum_status;
+
+ int	 fips_mode(void);
+ int	 fips_correct_dgst(int);
+ int	 fips_dgst_min(void);
+@@ -42,4 +57,3 @@ enum fp_type	 fips_correct_fp_type(enum
+ int	 fips_filter_crypto(char **, fips_filters);
+ 
+ #endif
+-
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/sftp-server.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sftp-server.c
+++ openssh-7.8p1/sftp-server.c
+@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
+ #include "sftp.h"
+ #include "sftp-common.h"
+ 
+#include "fips.h"
+
+ /* Our verbosity */
+ static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+ 
+@@ -1509,6 +1511,9 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 	extern char *optarg;
+ 	extern char *__progname;
+ 
+	/* initialize fips */
+	fips_ssh_init();
+
+ 	ssh_malloc_init();	/* must be called before any mallocs */
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+ 	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh.c
+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh.c
+@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@
+ #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+#include "fips.h"
+
+ extern char *__progname;
+ 
+ /* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */
+@@ -593,6 +595,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
+ 	u_char conn_hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ 
+    /* initialize fips - can go before ssh_malloc_init(), since that is a
+     * OpenBSD-only thing (as of OpenSSH 7.6p1) */
+	fips_ssh_init();
+
+ 	ssh_malloc_init();	/* must be called before any mallocs */
+ 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ 	sanitise_stdfd();
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd.c
+++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd.c
+@@ -1486,6 +1486,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt;
+ 	struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
+ 
+    /* initialize fips - can go before ssh_malloc_init(), since that is a
+     * OpenBSD-only thing (as of OpenSSH 7.6p1) */
+	fips_ssh_init();
+
+ 	ssh_malloc_init();	/* must be called before any mallocs */
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-host_ident.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-host_ident.patch
@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  0f731d0b541b8a919d24ac91098f560a49712822
+Suggest command line for removal of offending keys from known_hosts file
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sshconnect.c b/openssh-7.7p1/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh-7.7p1/sshconnect.c
+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshconnect.c
+@@ -1147,16 +1147,21 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ 		}
+ 		/* The host key has changed. */
+ 		warn_changed_key(host_key);
+ 		error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
+ 		    user_hostfiles[0]);
+ 		error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu",
+ 		    sshkey_type(host_found->key),
+ 		    host_found->file, host_found->line);
+		error("You can use following command to remove the offending key:");
+		if (host_found->file)
+			error("ssh-keygen -R %s -f %s", host, host_found->file);
+		else
+			error("ssh-keygen -R %s", host);
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
+ 		 * to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
+ 		 */
+ 		if (options.strict_host_key_checking !=
+ 		    SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) {
+ 			error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  5e19a205fa03584bb0d829ecbba7495ce1899b65
+# -- uset do be called '-xauthlocalhostname'
+handle hostname changes when forwarding X
+
+bnc#98627
+
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/session.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/session.c
+++ openssh-7.8p1/session.c
+@@ -1009,7 +1009,7 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char ***
+ }
+ 
+ static char **
+-do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell, int *env_size)
+ {
+ 	char buf[256];
+ 	size_t n;
+@@ -1213,6 +1213,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
+ 		for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
+ 			fprintf(stderr, "  %.200s\n", env[i]);
+ 	}
+
+	*env_size = envsize;
+ 	return env;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1221,7 +1223,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
+  * first in this order).
+  */
+ static void
+-do_rc_files(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+do_rc_files(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell, char **env, int *env_size)
+ {
+ 	FILE *f = NULL;
+ 	char cmd[1024];
+@@ -1276,12 +1278,20 @@ do_rc_files(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s,
+ 		    options.xauth_location);
+ 		f = popen(cmd, "w");
+ 		if (f) {
+			char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+
+ 			fprintf(f, "remove %s\n",
+ 			    s->auth_display);
+ 			fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n",
+ 			    s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
+ 			    s->auth_data);
+ 			pclose(f);
+			if (gethostname(hostname,sizeof(hostname)) >= 0)
+			    child_set_env(&env,env_size,"XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME",
+					  hostname);
+			else
+			    debug("Cannot set up XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME %s\n",
+				  strerror(errno));
+ 		} else {
+ 			fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+ 			    cmd);
+@@ -1534,6 +1544,7 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+ {
+ 	extern char **environ;
+ 	char **env;
+	int env_size;
+ 	char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
+ 	const char *shell, *shell0;
+ 	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+@@ -1591,7 +1602,7 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+ 	 * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
+ 	 * even if shell is overridden from login.conf
+ 	 */
+-	env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell);
+	env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell, &env_size);
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ 	shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
+@@ -1655,7 +1666,7 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+ 
+ 	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ 
+-	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
+	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell, env, &env_size);
+ 
+ 	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
+ 	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  bad0c8b3b8d72abb6960ed85b57ee42352371738
+Do not write a PID file when not daemonizing (e.g. when running from systemd)
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sshd.c b/openssh-7.7p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.7p1/sshd.c
+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd.c
+@@ -1996,17 +1996,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+ 		signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+ 		signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
+ 		 * is setup and the listen sockets are bound
+ 		 */
+-		if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) {
+		if (!no_daemon_flag && options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) {
+ 			FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
+ 
+ 			if (f == NULL) {
+ 				error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
+ 				    options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
+ 			} else {
+ 				fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
+ 				fclose(f);
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-openssl_1.1.0.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-openssl_1.1.0.patch
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch
@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  089f4fba0112d410a1bfa74398941f076681d446
+new option UsePAMCheckLocks to enforce checking for locked accounts while
+UsePAM is used
+
+bnc#708678, FATE#312033
+
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/auth.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth.c
+++ openssh-7.8p1/auth.c
+@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_SHADOW
+-	if (!options.use_pam)
+	if (!options.use_pam || options.use_pam_check_locks)
+ 		spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
+ #ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
+ 	if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
+@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* check for locked account */
+-	if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
+	if ((!options.use_pam || options.use_pam_check_locks) && passwd && *passwd) {
+ 		int locked = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.c
+++ openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 
+ 	/* Portable-specific options */
+ 	options->use_pam = -1;
+	options->use_pam_check_locks = -1;
+ 
+ 	/* Standard Options */
+ 	options->num_ports = 0;
+@@ -259,6 +260,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	/* Portable-specific options */
+ 	if (options->use_pam == -1)
+ 		options->use_pam = 0;
+	if (options->use_pam_check_locks == -1)
+		options->use_pam_check_locks = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* Standard Options */
+ 	if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
+@@ -459,7 +462,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ typedef enum {
+ 	sBadOption,		/* == unknown option */
+ 	/* Portable-specific options */
+-	sUsePAM,
+	sUsePAM, sUsePAMChecklocks,
+ 	/* Standard Options */
+ 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+@@ -509,8 +512,10 @@ static struct {
+ 	/* Portable-specific options */
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	{ "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "usepamchecklocks", sUsePAMChecklocks, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "usepamchecklocks", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	/* Standard Options */
+@@ -1250,6 +1255,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 	case sUsePAM:
+ 		intptr = &options->use_pam;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+	case sUsePAMChecklocks:
+		intptr = &options->use_pam_check_locks;
+		goto parse_flag;
+ 
+ 	/* Standard Options */
+ 	case sBadOption:
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/servconf.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.h
+++ openssh-7.8p1/servconf.h
+@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	char   *adm_forced_command;
+ 
+ 	int	use_pam;		/* Enable auth via PAM */
+	int	use_pam_check_locks;	/* internally check for locked accounts even when using PAM */
+ 
+ 	int	permit_tun;
+ 
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.0
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config.0
+++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.0
+@@ -961,6 +961,14 @@ DESCRIPTION
+              If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
+              non-root user.  The default is no.
+ 
+     UsePAMCheckLocks
+             When set to ``yes'', the checks whether the account has been
+             locked with `passwd -l' are performed even when PAM authentication
+             is enabled via UsePAM.  This is to ensure that it is not possible
+             to log in with e.g. a public key (in such a case PAM is used only
+             to set up the session and some PAM modules will not check whether
+             the account is locked in this scenario). The default is ``no''.
+
+      VersionAddendum
+              Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH
+              protocol banner sent by the server upon connection.  The default
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config.5
+++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1613,6 +1613,18 @@ is enabled, you will not be able to run
+ as a non-root user.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
+.It Cm UsePAMCheckLocks
+When set to 
+.Dq yes
+, the checks whether the account has been locked with
+.Pa passwd -l
+are performed even when PAM authentication is enabled via 
+.Cm UsePAM .
+This is to ensure that it is not possible to log in with e.g. a
+public key (in such a case PAM is used only to set up the session and some PAM
+modules will not check whether the account is locked in this scenario). The
+default is 
+.Dq no .
+ .It Cm VersionAddendum
+ Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
+ sent by the server upon connection.
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-pts_names_formatting.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-pts_names_formatting.patch
@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  7cd948c83939479d1ba88a3161991cb561306f3f
+# use same lines naming as utempter (prevents problems with using different
+# formats in ?tmp? files)
+# --used to be called '-pts'
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/loginrec.c b/openssh-7.7p1/loginrec.c
+--- openssh-7.7p1/loginrec.c
+++ openssh-7.7p1/loginrec.c
+@@ -541,17 +541,17 @@ getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+ /*
+  * 'line' string utility functions
+  *
+  * These functions process the 'line' string into one of three forms:
+  *
+  * 1. The full filename (including '/dev')
+  * 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev')
+  * 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00
+- *                               /dev/pts/1  -> ts/1 )
+ *                               /dev/pts/1  -> /1 )
+  *
+  * Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when
+  * attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is
+  * performed by one application - say, sshd - so as long as the choice
+  * uniquely identifies a terminal it's ok.
+  */
+ 
+ 
+@@ -602,16 +602,20 @@ line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *s
+ 	/* Always skip prefix if present */
+ 	if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+ 		src += 5;
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY
+ 	if (strncmp(src, "tty", 3) == 0)
+ 		src += 3;
+ #endif
+	if (strncmp(src, "pts/", 4) == 0) {
+		src += 3;
+		if (strlen(src) > 4) src++;
+	}
+ 
+ 	len = strlen(src);
+ 
+ 	if (len > 0) {
+ 		if (((int)len - dstsize) > 0)
+ 			src +=  ((int)len - dstsize);
+ 
+ 		/* note: _don't_ change this to strlcpy */
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  a60c0d88667efe0a64c030168950b69476af1622
+# --used to be called '-xauth'
+try to remove xauth cookies on logout
+
+bnc#98815
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/session.c b/openssh-7.7p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.7p1/session.c
+++ openssh-7.7p1/session.c
+@@ -2302,16 +2302,44 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *
+ 	u_int i;
+ 
+ 	verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+ 	    s->pw->pw_name,
+ 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 	    ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ 	    s->self);
+ 
+	if ((s->display != NULL) && (s->auth_proto != NULL) &&
+	    (s->auth_data != NULL) && (options.xauth_location != NULL)) {
+		pid_t pid;
+		FILE *f;
+		char cmd[1024];
+		struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
+
+		if (!(pid = fork())) {
+			permanently_set_uid(pw);
+
+			/* Remove authority data from .Xauthority if appropriate. */
+			debug("Running %.500s remove %.100s\n",
+			    options.xauth_location, s->auth_display);
+
+			snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "unset XAUTHORITY && HOME=\"%.200s\" %s -q -",
+                     	    s->pw->pw_dir, options.xauth_location);
+            		f = popen(cmd, "w");
+			if (f) {
+				fprintf(f, "remove %s\n", s->auth_display);
+				pclose(f);
+			} else
+				error("Could not run %s\n", cmd);
+			exit(0);
+		} else if (pid > 0) {
+			waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+		}
+	}
+
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ 		session_pty_cleanup(s);
+ 	free(s->term);
+ 	free(s->display);
+ 	free(s->x11_chanids);
+ 	free(s->auth_display);
+ 	free(s->auth_data);
+ 	free(s->auth_proto);
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ioctl_s390_EP11.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ioctl_s390_EP11.patch
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  a7b18fdd68dba10349e59a9085fd822343311f45
+Patch from IBM enabling use of EP11 hw crypto accelerator, submitted upstreams:
+
+From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+To: openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Enable specific ioctl call for EP11 crypto card (s390)
+Date: Tue,  9 May 2017 14:27:15 -0300
+
+The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
+specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -248,16 +248,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
+ 	SC_DENY(__NR_socketcall, EACCES),
+ #endif
+ #if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__)
+ 	/* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
+	/* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
+ #endif
+ #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
+ 	/*
+ 	 * On Linux x32, the clock_gettime VDSO falls back to the
+ 	 * x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g.
+ 	 * https://bugs.debian.org/849923
+ 	 */
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT),
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ipc_flock.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ipc_flock.patch
@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  9d38b7292619a6d5faf554b1a88888fdfa535de7
+Patch from IBM enabling the use of OpenCryptoki, submitted upstreams:
+
+From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+To: openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Allow flock and ipc syscall for s390 architecture
+Date: Tue,  9 May 2017 14:27:13 -0300
+
+In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
+and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
+implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
+crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
+this is only need on s390 architecture.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -167,16 +167,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_geteuid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_geteuid32
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
+ #endif
+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
+#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getpgid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getpid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
+@@ -185,16 +188,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid32
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
+ #endif
+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
+#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_madvise
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_mmap
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_mmap2
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap2),
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_stat.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_stat.patch
@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  5034ae16f6a5c9c7151d931dc1cce2a541fe010e
+Allow the stat() syscall for OpenSSL re-seed patch
+(which causes OpenSSL use stat() on some file)
+
+bnc#912436
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -224,16 +224,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_select),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_shutdown
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask),
+ #endif
+#ifdef __NR_stat
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_stat),
+#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_time
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_time),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_write
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_write),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_socketcall
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-seed-prng.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-seed-prng.patch
@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  e655fcb8e89d19ce9e954d6fc330e5e3e093a848
+# extended support for (re-)seeding the OpenSSL PRNG from /dev/random
+# bnc#703221, FATE#312172
+
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/entropy.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/entropy.c
+++ openssh-7.8p1/entropy.c
+@@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
+ 	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+ 
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
+
+	linux_seed();
+
+ 	if (RAND_status() != 1)
+ 		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
+ }
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+++ openssh-7.8p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ COMPAT=	arc4random.o \
+ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
+ 	port-irix.o \
+ 	port-linux.o \
+	port-linux-prng.o \
+ 	port-solaris.o \
+ 	port-net.o \
+ 	port-uw.o
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
+++ openssh-7.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
+ *           (c) 2011 Petr Cerny <pcerny@suse.cz>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "defines.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+#include "fips.h"
+
+#define RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT	6L
+#define RNG_ENV_VAR		"SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG"
+
+long rand_bytes = 0;
+char *rand_file = NULL;
+
+static void
+linux_seed_init(void)
+{
+	long elen = 0;
+	char *env = getenv(RNG_ENV_VAR);
+
+	if (env) {
+		errno = 0;
+		elen = strtol(env, NULL, 10);
+		if (errno) {
+			elen = RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT;
+			debug("bogus value in the %s environment variable, "
+				"using %li bytes from /dev/random\n",
+				RNG_ENV_VAR, RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (elen || fips_mode())
+		rand_file = "/dev/random";
+	else
+		rand_file = "/dev/urandom";
+
+	rand_bytes = MAX(elen, RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+void
+linux_seed(void)
+{
+	long len;
+	if (!rand_file)
+		linux_seed_init();
+
+	errno = 0;
+	len = RAND_load_file(rand_file, rand_bytes);
+	if (len != rand_bytes) {
+		if (errno)
+			fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", rand_file, strerror(errno));
+		else
+			fatal ("EOF reading %s", rand_file);
+	}
+}
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+++ openssh-7.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@
+ #ifndef _PORT_LINUX_H
+ #define _PORT_LINUX_H
+ 
+extern long rand_bytes;
+extern char *rand_file;
+void linux_seed(void);
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh-add.1
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-add.1
+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh-add.1
+@@ -172,6 +172,20 @@ to make this work.)
+ Identifies the path of a
+ .Ux Ns -domain
+ socket used to communicate with the agent.
+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the 
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .El
+ .Sh FILES
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh-agent.1
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-agent.1
+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh-agent.1
+@@ -214,6 +214,23 @@ sockets used to contain the connection t
+ These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
+ The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
+ .El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the 
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh-keygen.1
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-keygen.1
+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh-keygen.1
+@@ -869,6 +869,23 @@ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for
+ The file format is described in
+ .Xr moduli 5 .
+ .El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the 
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh-keysign.8
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-keysign.8
+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh-keysign.8
+@@ -80,6 +80,23 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authe
+ If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
+ information corresponding with the private keys above.
+ .El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the 
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh.1
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh.1
+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh.1
+@@ -1432,6 +1432,20 @@ For more information, see the
+ .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+ option in
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the 
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .Sh FILES
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+ .It Pa ~/.rhosts
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd.8
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd.8
+++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd.8
+@@ -966,6 +966,23 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c
+ started last).
+ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+ .El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the 
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
+Minimum is 6 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr scp 1 ,
+ .Xr sftp 1 ,
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd.c
+++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd.c
+@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@
+ #endif
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h"
+
+ #include <sys/wait.h>
+ 
+ #include <errno.h>
+@@ -208,6 +210,13 @@ struct {
+ 	int		have_ssh2_key;
+ } sensitive_data;
+ 
+/*
+ * Every RESEED_AFTERth connection triggers call to linux_seed() to re-seed the
+ * random pool.
+ */
+#define RESEED_AFTER    100
+static int re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
+
+ /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
+ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
+ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
+@@ -1252,6 +1261,10 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 					startups++;
+ 					break;
+ 				}
+			if(!(--re_seeding_counter)) {
+				re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
+				linux_seed();
+			}
+ 
+ 			/*
+ 			 * Got connection.  Fork a child to handle it, unless
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-send_locale.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-send_locale.patch
@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  db426aecefd1f4f8a7f9b9b6e8936cd8dd2f17fa
+send locales in default configuration
+bnc#65747
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config b/openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config
+--- openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config
+++ openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config
+@@ -26,16 +26,21 @@ Host *
+ # security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the
+ # remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your
+ # keystrokes as you type, just like any other X11 client could do.
+ # Set this to "no" here for global effect or in your own ~/.ssh/config
+ # file if you want to have the remote X11 authentification data to 
+ # expire after twenty minutes after remote login.
+     ForwardX11Trusted yes
+ 
+# This enables sending locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see ssh_config(5).
+    SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
+    SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
+    SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
+
+ #   PasswordAuthentication yes
+ #   HostbasedAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
+ #   BatchMode no
+ #   CheckHostIP yes
+ #   AddressFamily any
+ #   ConnectTimeout 0
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config
+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config
+@@ -104,14 +104,19 @@ X11Forwarding yes
+ #VersionAddendum none
+ 
+ # no default banner path
+ #Banner none
+ 
+ # override default of no subsystems
+ Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
+ 
+# This enables accepting locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see sshd_config(5).
+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
+
+ # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+ #Match User anoncvs
+ #	X11Forwarding no
+ #	AllowTcpForwarding no
+ #	PermitTTY no
+ #	ForceCommand cvs server
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch
@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  37bba3ff816d9ab93ddcf23389a4eb29d7716006
+additional option for sftp-server to force file mode for new files
+FATE#312774
+http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2010-November/029044.html
+http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=128896838930893
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sftp-server.8 b/openssh-7.7p1/sftp-server.8
+--- openssh-7.7p1/sftp-server.8
+++ openssh-7.7p1/sftp-server.8
+@@ -33,16 +33,17 @@
+ .Bk -words
+ .Op Fl ehR
+ .Op Fl d Ar start_directory
+ .Op Fl f Ar log_facility
+ .Op Fl l Ar log_level
+ .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
+ .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
+ .Op Fl u Ar umask
+.Op Fl m Ar force_file_permissions
+ .Ek
+ .Nm
+ .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
+ .Sh DESCRIPTION
+ .Nm
+ is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
+ to stdout and expects client requests from stdin.
+ .Nm
+@@ -133,16 +134,20 @@ Places this instance of
+ into a read-only mode.
+ Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change
+ the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
+ .It Fl u Ar umask
+ Sets an explicit
+ .Xr umask 2
+ to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
+ user's default mask.
+.It Fl m Ar force_file_permissions
+Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
+of the default or client requested mode.  Numeric values include:
+777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Option -u is ineffective if -m is set.
+ .El
+ .Pp
+ On some systems,
+ .Nm
+ must be able to access
+ .Pa /dev/log
+ for logging to work, and use of
+ .Nm
+diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sftp-server.c b/openssh-7.7p1/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-7.7p1/sftp-server.c
+++ openssh-7.7p1/sftp-server.c
+@@ -71,16 +71,20 @@ static u_int version;
+ static int init_done;
+ 
+ /* Disable writes */
+ static int readonly;
+ 
+ /* Requests that are allowed/denied */
+ static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist;
+ 
+/* Force file permissions */
+int permforce = 0;
+long permforcemode;
+
+ /* portable attributes, etc. */
+ typedef struct Stat Stat;
+ 
+ struct Stat {
+ 	char *name;
+ 	char *long_name;
+ 	Attrib attrib;
+ };
+@@ -685,16 +689,20 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
+ 	    (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+ 	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
+ 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
+ 	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
+	if (permforce == 1) {
+		mode = permforcemode;
+		(void)umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
+	}
+ 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
+ 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
+ 	if (readonly &&
+ 	    ((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY ||
+ 	    (flags & (O_CREAT|O_TRUNC)) != 0)) {
+ 		verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
+ 		status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
+ 	} else {
+@@ -1487,17 +1495,18 @@ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i)
+ static void
+ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ {
+ 	extern char *__progname;
+ 
+ 	fprintf(stderr,
+ 	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
+ 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
+-	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
+	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n\t"
+	    "[-m force_file_permissions]\n"
+ 	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
+ 	    __progname, __progname);
+ 	exit(1);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
+ {
+@@ -1516,17 +1525,17 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, 
+ 
+ 	ssh_malloc_init();	/* must be called before any mallocs */
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+ 	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 
+ 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+ 
+ 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+-	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
+	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (ch) {
+ 		case 'Q':
+ 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
+ 				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n");
+ 				exit(1);
+ 			}
+ 			for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
+ 				printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name);
+@@ -1576,16 +1585,23 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, 
+ 		case 'u':
+ 			errno = 0;
+ 			mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
+ 			if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
+ 			    cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0))
+ 				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
+ 			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
+ 			break;
+		case 'm':
+			permforce = 1;
+			permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
+			if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
+				cp == optarg || (permforcemode == 0 && errno != 0))
+				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
+			break;
+ 		case 'h':
+ 		default:
+ 			sftp_server_usage();
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch
@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  60bdbe6dd8d6bc011883472363d56e1d97f68835
+Put back sftp client diagnostic messages in batch mode
+
+bsc#1023275
+
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/sftp.0
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sftp.0
+++ openssh-7.8p1/sftp.0
+@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+      -p      Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
+              original files transferred.
+ 
+     -Q      Not-so-quiet batch mode: forces printing of diagnostic messages
+             in batch mode.
+
+      -q      Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
+              diagnostic messages from ssh(1).
+ 
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/sftp.1
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sftp.1
+++ openssh-7.8p1/sftp.1
+@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ Specifies the port to connect to on the
+ .It Fl p
+ Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
+ original files transferred.
+.It Fl Q
+Not-so-quiet batch mode: forces printing of diagnostic messages
+in batch mode.
+ .It Fl q
+ Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
+ diagnostic messages from
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/sftp.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sftp.c
+++ openssh-7.8p1/sftp.c
+@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ static volatile pid_t sshpid = -1;
+ /* Suppress diagnositic messages */
+ int quiet = 0;
+ 
+/* Force diagnositic messages in batch mode */
+int loud = 0;
+
+ /* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */
+ int showprogress = 1;
+ 
+@@ -2373,7 +2376,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	infile = stdin;
+ 
+ 	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+-	    "1246afhpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:P:R:")) != -1) {
+	    "1246afhpQqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:P:R:")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (ch) {
+ 		/* Passed through to ssh(1) */
+ 		case '4':
+@@ -2389,6 +2392,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 			addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
+ 			addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
+ 			break;
+		case 'Q':
+			loud = 1;
+			break;
+ 		case 'q':
+ 			ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+ 			quiet = 1;
+@@ -2472,6 +2478,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 			usage();
+ 		}
+ 	}
+	if (batchmode && loud)
+		quiet = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO))
+ 		showprogress = 0;
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch
@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  d296e85dc414b8cd1b4b55ad03d8216feb26531a
+Send signals to systemd to prevent various race conditions
+bsc#1048367
+
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/configure.ac
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/configure.ac
+++ openssh-7.8p1/configure.ac
+@@ -4378,6 +4378,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+ 
+# Check whether user wants systemd support
+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
+	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
+		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
+			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
+				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
+				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
+				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
+				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
+				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
+			else
+				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+			fi
+		fi
+	fi ]
+)
+
+
+ # Looking for programs, paths and files
+ 
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+@@ -5183,6 +5207,7 @@ echo "                   libldns support
+ echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+ echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
+ echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
+echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
+ echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd.c
+++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd.c
+@@ -87,6 +87,10 @@
+ #include <prot.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
+#endif
+
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -308,6 +312,10 @@ sighup_handler(int sig)
+ static void
+ sighup_restart(void)
+ {
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
+	/* Signal systemd that we are reloading */
+	sd_notify(0, "RELOADING=1");
+#endif
+ 	logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
+ 	if (options.pid_file != NULL)
+ 		unlink(options.pid_file);
+@@ -1995,6 +2003,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
+		/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
+		sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
+#endif
+
+ 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+ 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
+ 		    &newsock, config_s);
--- a/openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz
@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:d73be7e684e99efcd024be15a30bffcbe41b012b2f7b3c9084aed621775e6b8f
-size 1536900
--- a/openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz.asc
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz.asc
@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
-
-iQHDBAABCgAdFiEEWcIRjtIG2SfmZ+vj0+X1a22SDTAFAlrBwh4ACgkQ0+X1a22S
-DTCqGwyAgQuR+5b6dAEK3PV3WnzuPSJ8KKnw3/HlqQw40QfWotVOX4+On3+yOYy+
-txjAWkbocjHa5/6IzKVU0y9GD3A0H7XwJAwjqqQg3pKD3kXyl7Lz5nkwWWICN0z+
-fU8HUwJv3SOhilD7XRZqWHUfSL69AR5CbYPraurMQWDNwHY0i4n3vDFp1WrSJx8q
-mcSgAEwucKavr3+PDm0MbmYINAqgqn1USVDalGy8U6ICnCyzXvu4o8gMuiGGwwKR
-Jlt2zCs5CBnF2LAaFgawwNh6NO/TOLvvNrW3zUm3s3DzLKqYtl4Jfs39Coii9LEE
-PqF8YFhgbzm+JPPe9/k5zBSEZOWwkzu33cXm7nC1rypt4PQVZLB8BvRE5HXE9QOx
-xpGi+BFVeMIMqjsW+nOAAdl4S+FNtzR/OABAhwRveLGMPMFRQ9/GqN5B1L9Wezut
-V/6SUUzQUyf5Kn6Gjo+ktJB1i7ufPTLSjH9eYjS/7Fn5cMdjF5iezOAzp3FNWXln
-cDZzHkVgrwqYqTKkekDFTwJD+q/QJQ==
-=gz3x
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--- a/openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz
+++ b/openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:1a484bb15152c183bb2514e112aa30dd34138c3cfb032eee5490a66c507144ca
+size 1548026
--- a/openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz.asc
+++ b/openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz.asc
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+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+=ZiYm
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--- a/openssh-askpass-gnome.changes
+++ b/openssh-askpass-gnome.changes
@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Tue Oct  9 10:52:15 UTC 2018 - Tomáš Chvátal <tchvatal@suse.com>
+
+- Update to 7.8p1:
+  * no actual changes for the askpass
+- Format with spec-cleaner
+- Respect cflags
+- Use gtk3 rather than gtk2 which is being phased out
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Mon May 21 15:19:03 UTC 2018 - pcerny@suse.com

--- a/openssh-askpass-gnome.spec
+++ b/openssh-askpass-gnome.spec
@ -12,23 +12,22 @@
 # license that conforms to the Open Source Definition (Version 1.9)
 # published by the Open Source Initiative.

-# Please submit bugfixes or comments via http://bugs.opensuse.org/
+# Please submit bugfixes or comments via https://bugs.opensuse.org/
 #


 %define _name openssh
 Name:           openssh-askpass-gnome
-BuildRequires:  gtk2-devel
-Version:        7.7p1
+Version:        7.8p1
 Release:        0
-Requires:       %{_name} = %{version}
 Summary:        A GNOME-Based Passphrase Dialog for OpenSSH
 License:        BSD-2-Clause
 Group:          Productivity/Networking/SSH
-Url:            http://www.openssh.com/
+URL:            http://www.openssh.com/
 Source:         http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/%{_name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 Source42:       http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/%{_name}-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
-BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
+BuildRequires:  gtk3-devel
+Requires:       %{_name} = %{version}

 %description
 SSH (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and
@ -40,14 +39,14 @@ GNOME-based passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.

 %build
 cd contrib
-make %{?_smp_mflags} gnome-ssh-askpass2
+export CFLAGS="%{optflags}"
+make %{?_smp_mflags} gnome-ssh-askpass3

 %install
 install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/
-install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2 %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass3 %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass

 %files
-%defattr(-,root,root)
 %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass

--- a/openssh.changes
+++ b/openssh.changes
@ -1,3 +1,80 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Wed Oct 17 08:42:12 UTC 2018 - Tomáš Chvátal <tchvatal@suse.com>
+
+- Remove the mention of the SLE12 in the README.SUSE
+- Install firewall rules only when really needed (<SLE15)
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Tue Oct  9 12:32:12 UTC 2018 - Tomáš Chvátal <tchvatal@suse.com>
+
+- Version update to 7.8p1:
+  * For most details see release notes file
+  * ssh-keygen(1): write OpenSSH format private keys by default
+    instead of using OpenSSL's PEM format
+- Rebase patches to apply on 7.8p1 release:
+  * openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-audit.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-openssl_1.1.0.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-seed-prng.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
+- Dropped patches:
+  * openssh-7.7p1-lastlog.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-blocksigalrm.patch 
+- Do not use env in script cavs_driver-ssh.pl
+- Added pam_keyinit to pam configuration file [bsc#1081947]
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Tue Oct  9 11:01:40 UTC 2018 - Tomáš Chvátal <tchvatal@suse.com>
+
+- Format with spec-cleaner
+- Reduce conditionals to support SLE12+ only
+- Split out bundled patches to be normal patches applied over
+  the package (use -p1 for patches):
+  * openssh-7.7p1-allow_root_password_login.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-lastlog.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-eal3.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-blocksigalrm.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-send_locale.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-pts_names_formatting.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_getuid.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_geteuid.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_stat.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ipc_flock.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ioctl_s390_EP11.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-seed-prng.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-audit.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-openssl_1.1.0.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-host_ident.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
+  * openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Tue Sep 18 09:22:23 UTC 2018 - schwab@suse.de

@ -1628,6 +1705,7 @@ Mon Mar 31 01:22:21 UTC 2014 - pcerny@suse.com

 - FIPS checks during ssh client and daemon startup
  (-fips-checks.patch)
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Tue Mar 25 10:07:18 UTC 2014 - idonmez@suse.com

--- a/openssh.spec
+++ b/openssh.spec
@ -12,97 +12,39 @@
 # license that conforms to the Open Source Definition (Version 1.9)
 # published by the Open Source Initiative.

-# Please submit bugfixes or comments via http://bugs.opensuse.org/
+# Please submit bugfixes or comments via https://bugs.opensuse.org/
 #


-#Compat macro for new _fillupdir macro introduced in Nov 2017
-%if ! %{defined _fillupdir}
-  %define _fillupdir /var/adm/fillup-templates
-%endif
-
-%if 0%{suse_version} >= 1100
-%define has_fw_dir 1
-%else
-%define has_fw_dir 0
-%endif
-
-%if 0%{suse_version} >= 1110
-%define has_libselinux 1
-%else
-%define has_libselinux 0
-%endif
-
-%if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1130
-%define needs_all_dirs 1
-%else
-%define needs_all_dirs 0
-%endif
-
-%if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1140
-%define needs_libedit 1
-%else
-%define needs_libedit 0
-%endif
-
-%if 0%{?suse_version} > 1220
-%define uses_systemd 1
-%else
-%define uses_systemd 0
-%endif
-
 %define sandbox_seccomp 0
 %ifnarch ppc
-%if 0%{?suse_version} > 1220
 %define sandbox_seccomp 1
 %endif
-%endif
-
 %if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1500
-%define use_tirpc 1
+%bcond_with susefirewall
+%bcond_without tirpc
+%else
+%bcond_without susefirewall
+%bcond_with tirpc
 %endif
-
 %define _fwdir   %{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/SuSEfirewall2.d
 %define _fwdefdir   %{_fwdir}/services
 %define _appdefdir  %( grep "configdirspec=" $( which xmkmf ) | sed -r 's,^[^=]+=.*-I(.*)/config.*$,\\1/app-defaults,' )
-%{!?_initddir:%global _initddir %{_initrddir}}
-
+%define CHECKSUM_SUFFIX .hmac
+%define CHECKSUM_HMAC_KEY "HMAC_KEY:OpenSSH-FIPS@SLE"
+#Compat macro for new _fillupdir macro introduced in Nov 2017
+%if ! %{defined _fillupdir}
+  %define _fillupdir %{_localstatedir}/adm/fillup-templates
+%endif
 Name:           openssh
-BuildRequires:  audit-devel
-BuildRequires:  autoconf
-BuildRequires:  groff
-BuildRequires:  zlib-devel
-BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(krb5)
-%if %{needs_libedit}
-BuildRequires:  libedit-devel
-%endif
-%if %{has_libselinux}
-BuildRequires:  libselinux-devel
-%endif
-BuildRequires:  openldap2-devel
-BuildRequires:  openssl-devel
-BuildRequires:  pam-devel
-%if 0%{?use_tirpc}
-BuildRequires:  libtirpc-devel
-%endif
-%if %{uses_systemd}
-BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(libsystemd)
-BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(systemd)
-%{?systemd_requires}
-%endif
-PreReq:         pwdutils %{fillup_prereq} coreutils
-%if ! %{uses_systemd}
-PreReq:         %{insserv_prereq}
-%endif
-Version:        7.7p1
+Version:        7.8p1
 Release:        0
 Summary:        Secure Shell Client and Server (Remote Login Program)
 License:        BSD-2-Clause AND MIT
 Group:          Productivity/Networking/SSH
-Url:            http://www.openssh.com/
-Source:         http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
-Source42:       http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
-Source1:        sshd.init
+URL:            http://www.openssh.com/
+Source0:        http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
+Source1:        http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
 Source2:        sshd.pamd
 Source3:        README.SUSE
 Source4:        README.kerberos
@ -114,15 +56,61 @@ Source9:        sshd-gen-keys-start
 Source10:       sshd.service
 Source11:       README.FIPS
 Source12:       cavs_driver-ssh.pl
-Source100:      openssh-%{version}-SUSE_patches.tar.gz
-BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
-Conflicts:      nonfreessh
+Patch0:         openssh-7.7p1-allow_root_password_login.patch
+Patch1:         openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
+Patch3:         openssh-7.7p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
+Patch4:         openssh-7.7p1-eal3.patch
+Patch5:         openssh-7.7p1-blocksigalrm.patch
+Patch6:         openssh-7.7p1-send_locale.patch
+Patch7:         openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
+Patch8:         openssh-7.7p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
+Patch9:         openssh-7.7p1-pts_names_formatting.patch
+Patch10:        openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch
+Patch11:        openssh-7.7p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
+Patch14:        openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_stat.patch
+Patch15:        openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ipc_flock.patch
+Patch16:        openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ioctl_s390_EP11.patch
+Patch17:        openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+Patch18:        openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch
+Patch19:        openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
+Patch20:        openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
+Patch21:        openssh-7.7p1-seed-prng.patch
+Patch22:        openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch
+Patch23:        openssh-7.7p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
+Patch24:        openssh-7.7p1-audit.patch
+Patch25:        openssh-7.7p1-openssl_1.1.0.patch
+Patch26:        openssh-7.7p1-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
+Patch27:        openssh-7.7p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
+Patch28:        openssh-7.7p1-host_ident.patch
+Patch29:        openssh-7.7p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch
+Patch30:        openssh-7.7p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
+Patch31:        openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
+Patch32:        openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
+Patch33:        openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch
+BuildRequires:  audit-devel
+BuildRequires:  autoconf
+BuildRequires:  groff
+BuildRequires:  libedit-devel
+BuildRequires:  libselinux-devel
+BuildRequires:  openldap2-devel
+BuildRequires:  openssl-devel
+BuildRequires:  pam-devel
+BuildRequires:  pkgconfig
+BuildRequires:  zlib-devel
+BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(krb5)
+BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(libsystemd)
+Requires(post): %fillup_prereq
+Requires(pre):  pwdutils
+Recommends:     %{name}-helpers = %{version}-%{release}
 Recommends:     audit
 Recommends:     xauth
-Recommends:     %{name}-helpers = %{version}-%{release}
-Conflicts:      %{name}-fips < %{version}-%{release} , %{name}-fips > %{version}-%{release}
-%define CHECKSUM_SUFFIX .hmac
-%define CHECKSUM_HMAC_KEY "HMAC_KEY:OpenSSH-FIPS@SLE"
+Conflicts:      %{name}-fips < %{version}-%{release}
+Conflicts:      %{name}-fips > %{version}-%{release}
+Conflicts:      nonfreessh
+%{?systemd_requires}
+%if %{with tirpc}
+BuildRequires:  libtirpc-devel
+%endif

 %description
 SSH (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into and executing commands
@ -133,7 +121,6 @@ hosts over an insecure network.
 xorg-x11 (X Window System) connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can
 also be forwarded over the secure channel.

-
 %package helpers
 Summary:        OpenSSH AuthorizedKeysCommand helpers
 Group:          Productivity/Networking/SSH
@ -142,19 +129,18 @@ Requires:       %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
 %description helpers
 Helper applications for OpenSSH which retrieve keys from various sources.

-
 %package fips
 Summary:        OpenSSH FIPS cryptomodule HMACs
 Group:          Productivity/Networking/SSH
 Requires:       %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
-Conflicts:      %{name} < %{version}-%{release} , %{name} > %{version}-%{release}
+Conflicts:      %{name} < %{version}-%{release}
+Conflicts:      %{name} > %{version}-%{release}
 Obsoletes:      %{name}-hmac

 %description fips
 Hashes that together with the main package form the FIPS certifiable
 cryptomodule.

-
 %package cavs
 Summary:        OpenSSH FIPS cryptomodule CAVS tests
 Group:          Productivity/Networking/SSH
@ -163,32 +149,21 @@ Requires:       %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
 %description cavs
 FIPS140 CAVS tests related parts of the OpenSSH package

-
 %prep
-%setup -q -b 100
+%setup -q
 cp %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE4} %{SOURCE11} .
-# patch sources
-PATCH_DIR="../SUSE_patches"
-cat $PATCH_DIR/patch.series | while read p; do
-%if %{suse_version} < 1330
-    if echo "$p" | grep openssl_1.1.0.patch ; then
-        printf ">> skipping '$p'"
-        continue
-    fi
-%endif
-    printf ">> applying '$p'\n"
-    patch -p2 < "${PATCH_DIR}/$p"
-done

-# set libexec dir in the LDAP patch
+%autopatch -p1
+
+#set libexec dir in the LDAP patch
 sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \
    $( grep -Rl @LIBEXECDIR@ \
-        $( grep "^+++" $PATCH_DIR/openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' )
+        $( grep "^+++" openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' )
    )

 %build
 autoreconf -fiv
-%ifarch s390 s390x %sparc
+%ifarch s390 s390x %{sparc}
 PIEFLAGS="-fPIE"
 %else
 PIEFLAGS="-fpie"
@ -196,26 +171,19 @@ PIEFLAGS="-fpie"
 CFLAGS="%{optflags} $PIEFLAGS -fstack-protector"
 CXXFLAGS="%{optflags} $PIEFLAGS -fstack-protector"
 LDFLAGS="-pie -Wl,--as-needed"
-#CPPFLAGS="%{optflags} -DUSE_INTERNAL_B64"
+#CPPFLAGS="% {optflags} -DUSE_INTERNAL_B64"
 export LDFLAGS CFLAGS CXXFLAGS CPPFLAGS
 %configure \
-    --prefix=%{_prefix} \
-    --mandir=%{_mandir} \
-    --infodir=%{_infodir} \
    --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
    --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/ssh \
    --with-tcp-wrappers \
-%if %{has_libselinux}
    --with-selinux \
-%endif
-%if %{uses_systemd}
    --with-pid-dir=/run \
    --with-systemd \
-%endif
    --with-ssl-engine \
    --with-pam \
    --with-kerberos5=%{_prefix} \
-    --with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \
+    --with-privsep-path=%{_localstatedir}/lib/empty \
 %if %{sandbox_seccomp}
    --with-sandbox=seccomp_filter \
 %else
@ -228,46 +196,32 @@ export LDFLAGS CFLAGS CXXFLAGS CPPFLAGS
    --with-audit=linux \
    --with-ldap \
    --with-xauth=%{_bindir}/xauth \
-%if %{needs_libedit}
    --with-libedit \
-%endif
    --with-ssh1 \
    --target=%{_target_cpu}-suse-linux \

 ### configure end
 make %{?_smp_mflags}

-#make %{?_smp_mflags} -C converter
-
 %install
-make install DESTDIR=%{buildroot}
-#make install DESTDIR=%{buildroot} -C converter
+%make_install

 install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d
-install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}/var/lib/sshd
+install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_localstatedir}/lib/sshd
 install -m 644 %{SOURCE2} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/sshd
 install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/
 install -m 644 %{SOURCE5} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/
-install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_initddir}
-%if %{uses_systemd}
-install -m 0755 %{SOURCE1} .
 install -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE10} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/sshd.service
-ln -s /sbin/service %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd
-%else
-install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE1} %{buildroot}%{_initddir}/sshd
-install -m 0644 %{SOURCE10} .
-ln -s ../..%{_initddir}/sshd %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd
-%endif
+ln -s service %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd
 install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_fillupdir}
 install -m 644 %{SOURCE8} %{buildroot}%{_fillupdir}
 # install shell script to automate the process of adding your public key to a remote machine
 install -m 755 contrib/ssh-copy-id %{buildroot}%{_bindir}
 install -m 644 contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1
-sed -i -e s@/usr/libexec@%{_libexecdir}@g %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
+sed -i -e s@%{_prefix}/libexec@%{_libexecdir}@g %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config

-%if %{has_fw_dir}
-#install firewall definitions format is described here:
-#%{_datadir}/SuSEfirewall2/services/TEMPLATE
+%if %{with susefirewall}
+#install firewall definitions
 mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_fwdefdir}
 install -m 644 %{SOURCE7} %{buildroot}%{_fwdefdir}/sshd
 %endif
@ -284,7 +238,7 @@ install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE9} %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/sshd-gen-keys-start
 # re-define the __os_install_post macro: the macro strips
 # the binaries and thereby invalidates any hashes created earlier.
 #
-# this shows up earlier because otherwise the %expand of
+# this shows up earlier because otherwise the % expand of
 # the macro is too late.
 %{expand:%%global __os_install_post {%__os_install_post
 for b in \
@ -299,52 +253,36 @@ done

 %pre
 getent group sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/groupadd -r sshd
-getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g sshd -d /var/lib/sshd -s /bin/false -c "SSH daemon" sshd
-%if %{uses_systemd}
+getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g sshd -d %{_localstatedir}/lib/sshd -s /bin/false -c "SSH daemon" sshd
 %service_add_pre sshd.service
-%endif

 %post
-%if %{uses_systemd}
 %{fillup_only -n ssh sshd}
 %service_add_post sshd.service
-%else
-%{fillup_and_insserv -n ssh sshd}
-%endif
-%set_permissions /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+%set_permissions %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config

 %preun
-%if %{uses_systemd}
 %service_del_preun sshd.service
-%else
-%stop_on_removal sshd
-%endif

 %postun
 # The openssh-fips trigger script for openssh will normally restart sshd once
 # it gets installed, so only restart the service here is openssh-fips is not
 # present
 rpm -q openssh-fips >& /dev/null && DISABLE_RESTART_ON_UPDATE=yes
-%if %{uses_systemd}
 %service_del_postun sshd.service
-%else
-%restart_on_update sshd
-%{insserv_cleanup}
-%endif

 %triggerin -n openssh-fips -- %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
 %restart_on_update sshd

 %verifyscript
-%verify_permissions -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+%verify_permissions -e %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config

 %files
-%defattr(-,root,root)
 %exclude %{_bindir}/ssh%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
 %exclude %{_sbindir}/sshd%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
 %exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
 %exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/cavs*
-%dir %attr(755,root,root) /var/lib/sshd
+%dir %attr(755,root,root) %{_localstatedir}/lib/sshd
 %license LICENCE
 %doc README.SUSE README.kerberos README.FIPS ChangeLog OVERVIEW README TODO CREDITS
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
@ -352,34 +290,23 @@ rpm -q openssh-fips >& /dev/null && DISABLE_RESTART_ON_UPDATE=yes
 %verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
 %verify(not mode) %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
 %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/sshd
-%if %{uses_systemd}
-%doc sshd.init
-%attr(0644,root,root) %config %{_unitdir}/sshd.service
-%else
-%attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_initddir}/sshd
-%doc sshd.service
-%endif
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd.service
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh
 %exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/*
-%attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/*
-%attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/*
-%attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/*
+%attr(0444,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/*
+%attr(0444,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/*
+%attr(0444,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/*
 %dir %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d
 %config %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/ssh.reg
 %{_fillupdir}/sysconfig.ssh
-%if %{has_fw_dir}
-%if %{needs_all_dirs}
-%dir %{_fwdir}
-%dir %{_fwdefdir}
-%endif
+%if %{with susefirewall}
 %config %{_fwdefdir}/sshd
 %endif

 %files helpers
-%defattr(-,root,root)
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
 %verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ldap.conf
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh
@ -387,13 +314,11 @@ rpm -q openssh-fips >& /dev/null && DISABLE_RESTART_ON_UPDATE=yes
 %doc HOWTO.ldap-keys openssh-lpk-openldap.schema openssh-lpk-sun.schema

 %files fips
-%defattr(-,root,root)
 %attr(0444,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
 %attr(0444,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
 %attr(0444,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}

 %files cavs
-%defattr(-,root,root)
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/cavs*

 %changelog
--- a/sshd.init
+++ b/sshd.init
@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
-#! /bin/sh
-# Copyright (c) 1995-2013 SUSE
-#
-# Author: Jiri Smid <feedback@suse.de>
-#
-# /etc/init.d/sshd
-#
-#   and symbolic its link
-#
-# /usr/sbin/rcsshd
-#
-### BEGIN INIT INFO
-# Provides: sshd
-# Required-Start: $network $remote_fs
-# Required-Stop: $network $remote_fs
-# Should-Start: haveged auditd
-# Default-Start: 3 5
-# Default-Stop: 0 1 2 6
-# Description: Start the sshd daemon
-### END INIT INFO
-
-SSHD_BIN=/usr/sbin/sshd
-test -x $SSHD_BIN || exit 5
-
-SSHD_SYSCONFIG=/etc/sysconfig/ssh
-test -r $SSHD_SYSCONFIG || exit 6
-. $SSHD_SYSCONFIG
-
-SSHD_PIDFILE=/var/run/sshd.init.pid
-
-. /etc/rc.status
-
-# Shell functions sourced from /etc/rc.status:
-#      rc_check         check and set local and overall rc status
-#      rc_status        check and set local and overall rc status
-#      rc_status -v     ditto but be verbose in local rc status
-#      rc_status -v -r  ditto and clear the local rc status
-#      rc_failed        set local and overall rc status to failed
-#      rc_reset         clear local rc status (overall remains)
-#      rc_exit          exit appropriate to overall rc status
-
-function soft_stop () {
-    echo -n "Shutting down the listening SSH daemon"
-    killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -TERM $SSHD_BIN
-}
-
-function force_stop () {
-    echo -n "Shutting down SSH daemon *with all active connections*"
-    trap '' TERM
-    killall sshd 2>/dev/null
-    trap - TERM
-}
-
-# First reset status of this service
-rc_reset
-
-case "$1" in
-    start)
-        /usr/sbin/sshd-gen-keys-start
-        echo -n "Starting SSH daemon"
-        ## Start daemon with startproc(8). If this fails
-        ## the echo return value is set appropriate.
-        startproc -f -p $SSHD_PIDFILE $SSHD_BIN $SSHD_OPTS -o "PidFile=$SSHD_PIDFILE" 
-
-        # Remember status and be verbose
-        rc_status -v
-        ;;
-    stop)
-        # If we're shutting down, kill active sshd connections so they're not
-        # left hanging.
-        runlevel=$(set -- $(runlevel); eval "echo \$$#")
-        if [ "x$runlevel" = x0 -o "x$runlevel" = x6 ] ; then
-            force_stop
-        else
-            soft_stop
-        fi
-        
-        # Remember status and be verbose
-        rc_status -v
-        ;;
-    soft-stop)
-        ## Stop the listener daemon process with killproc(8) and if this
-        ## fails set echo the echo return value.
-        soft_stop
-
-        # Remember status and be verbose
-        rc_status -v
-        ;;
-    force-stop)
-        ## stop all running ssh
-        force_stop
-
-        # Remember status and be verbose
-        rc_status -v
-        ;;
-    try-restart)
-        ## Stop the service and if this succeeds (i.e. the 
-        ## service was running before), start it again.
-        $0 status >/dev/null &&  $0 restart
-
-        # Remember status and be quiet
-        rc_status
-        ;;
-    restart)
-        ## Stop the service without closing live connections 
-        ## and start it again regardless of whether it was
-        ## running or not
-        $0 soft-stop
-        $0 start
-
-        # Remember status and be quiet
-        rc_status
-        ;;
-    force-reload|reload)
-        ## Signal the daemon to reload its config. Most daemons
-        ## do this on signal 1 (SIGHUP).
-        echo -n "Reload service sshd"
-
-        killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -HUP $SSHD_BIN
-
-        rc_status -v
-
-        ;;
-    status)
-        echo -n "Checking for service sshd "
-        ## Check status with checkproc(8), if process is running
-        ## checkproc will return with exit status 0.
-
-        # Status has a slightly different for the status command:
-        # 0 - service running
-        # 1 - service dead, but /var/run/  pid  file exists
-        # 2 - service dead, but /var/lock/ lock file exists
-        # 3 - service not running
-
-        checkproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE $SSHD_BIN
-
-        rc_status -v
-        ;;
-    probe)
-        ## Optional: Probe for the necessity of a reload,
-        ## give out the argument which is required for a reload.
-
-        test /etc/ssh/sshd_config -nt $SSHD_PIDFILE && echo reload
-        ;;
-    *)
-        echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|soft-stop|force-stop|status|try-restart|restart|force-reload|reload|probe}"
-        exit 1
-        ;;
-esac
-rc_exit
--- a/sshd.pamd
+++ b/sshd.pamd
@ -6,4 +6,5 @@ account     include     common-account
 password    include     common-password
 session     required    pam_loginuid.so
 session     include     common-session
-session  optional       pam_lastlog.so   silent noupdate showfailed
+session     optional    pam_lastlog.so   silent noupdate showfailed
+session     optional    pam_keyinit.so   force revoke