Accepting request 433780 from network

- remaining patches that were still missing
  since the update to 7.2p2 (FATE#319675):
  [openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch]
- fix forwarding with IPv6 addresses in DISPLAY (bnc#847710)
  [openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch]
- ignore PAM environment when using login
  (bsc#975865, CVE-2015-8325)
  [openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch]
- limit accepted password length (prevents possible DoS)
  (bsc#992533, CVE-2016-6515)
  [openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch]
- Prevent user enumeration through the timing of password
  processing (bsc#989363, CVE-2016-6210)
  [openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch]
- Add auditing for PRNG re-seeding
  [openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch] (forwarded request 433779 from pcerny)

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/433780
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=108

README.FIPS

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+Notes on FIPS mode and OpenSSH
+
+---
+
+SUSE OpenSSH comes with FIPS 140-2 support, and certain versions have been
+certified as FIPS compliant by NIST. Apart from other things, this standard
+puts restrictions on cryptographic algorithms that may be used.
+
+Important notice: FIPS is not only a matter of functionality. If you want to
+claim having a FIPS certified service, you *must* use the certified binaries.
+Even binaries built from the same sources in the same environment and running
+on a certified system, yet from a package lacking the certification, are
+formally not considered to be fulfilling the requirements.
+
+The certified binaries (ssh, sshd, sftp-server) perform mandatory selfcheck at
+startup and proceed only when the checks succeed (non-certified binaries may
+skip the check). These checks require the cryptographic hashes contained in the
+openssh-fips subpackage.
+
+The FIPS mode for OpenSSH is enabled in two ways - either:
+
+1) /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled contains a single character '1' - this is a
+system-wide setting controlled bu the fips kernel parameter; or
+
+2) the environment variable SSH_FORCE_FIPS - if set (to any value), the
+binaries behave as if they were running on a system in FIPS mode.
+
+Since FIPS 140-2 only allows use of certain cryptographic algorithms, both the
+client and server will fail if they are requested to use non-approved
+algorithms while in FIPS mode. This means that working configurations for FIPS
+mode form a proper subset of all working (generic) configurations. Some
+configurations may even prevent the binaries from starting at all.
+
+This however should be viewed in the context of FIPS being a security policy
+tool - it is not of much use to run the same system both in FIPS mode and
+outside of it, since that would defeat the main purpose of FIPS having
+guaranteeing standardised minimum restrictions on cryptographic algorithms
+(and thus on the overall security of the system).
+
+Unless you specify what cryptographic algorithms you wish to use, both the
+client and server should work out of the box in FIPS mode.
+
+For sshd, you can use the `-t` option to check whether the configuration file
+is working. Setting the above mentioned environment variable allows testing of
+behaviour in FIPS mode (checksum files for both OpenSSH and OpenSSL must be
+installed).
+
+In addition to cryptographic algorithms restrictions, sshd performs periodic
+PRNG re-seeding. The seed is read from entropy source either /dev/urandom or
+/dev/random. By default, the former is used, unless the environment variable
+SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG is set to a non-zero value or the binary is running in FIPS
+mode. This has two important implications:
+
+1) the selected entropy source must be available, i.e. when running in a
+changeroot the device files need to be present there.
+
+2) /dev/random is a blocking interface - unless enough randomness is available,
+the process stops until the entropy pool is replenished. Thus on systems where
+a long running processes are expected, one should make sure there is always
+enough entropy for sshd. Sporadically this may also cause sshd to aborted,
+since some versions of OpenSSL (the underlying cryptographic engine) don't
+handle gracefully being interrupted while trying to read entropy from the
+system source.
+

openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  8c4cb20b9633595de68131224b2d434e8dc41e17
+Correctly parse DISPLAY variable for cases where it contains an IPv6 address
+(which should - but not always is - in (square) brackets).
+
+bnc#847710 - https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=847710
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c b/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
+@@ -4049,18 +4049,19 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 		/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
+ 		return sock;
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Check if it is a unix domain socket.  Unix domain displays are in
+ 	 * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s]
+ 	 */
++	cp = strrchr(display, ':');
+ 	if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 ||
+-	    display[0] == ':') {
++	    (display[0] == ':' && ((cp - display) < 2)) ) {
+ 		/* Connect to the unix domain socket. */
+ 		if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
+ 			error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
+ 			    display);
+ 			return -1;
+ 		}
+ 		/* Create a socket. */
+ 		sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number);
+@@ -4068,30 +4069,39 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 			return -1;
+ 
+ 		/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
+ 		return sock;
+ 	}
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Connect to an inet socket.  The DISPLAY value is supposedly
+ 	 * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address.
++	 * Note that IPv6 numberic addresses contain colons (e.g. ::1:0)
+ 	 */
+ 	strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf));
+-	cp = strchr(buf, ':');
++	cp = strrchr(buf, ':');
+ 	if (!cp) {
+ 		error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 	*cp = 0;
+ 	/* buf now contains the host name.  But first we parse the display number. */
+ 	if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
+ 		error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
+ 		    display);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	
++	/* Remove brackets surrounding IPv6 addresses if there are any. */
++	if (buf[0] == '[' && (cp = strchr(buf, ']'))) {
++		*cp = 0;
++		cp = buf + 1;
++	} else {
++		cp = buf;
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* Look up the host address */
+ 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 	hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ 	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
+ 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+ 		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,

openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  48bbbfeff186061b7fd4795bff15f15f571e2c8f
+# Parent  7197d7a6b7c90566c68e980b5f8b937c183e79d0
 # enable trusted X11 forwarding by default in both sshd and sshsystem-wide
 # configuration
 # bnc#50836 (was suse #35836)

openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  28e8840bbf49c6e603bf2b55a08ed9050a60f9fb
+Do not throw away already open sockets for X11 forwarding if another socket
+family is not available for bind()
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c b/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
+@@ -3937,22 +3937,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 			}
+ 			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+ 				sock_set_v6only(sock);
+ 			if (x11_use_localhost)
+ 				channel_set_reuseaddr(sock);
+ 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ 				debug2("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno));
+ 				close(sock);
+-
++				continue;
++				/* do not remove successfully opened sockets
+ 				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
+ 					close(socks[n]);
+ 				}
+ 				num_socks = 0;
+ 				break;
++				*/
+ 			}
+ 			socks[num_socks++] = sock;
+ 			if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
+ 				break;
+ 		}
+ 		freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ 		if (num_socks > 0)
+ 			break;

openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  e7bdbc5ea8971599466becf01bff12b9fcb5df3e
+Enable the seccomp-bpf sandbox on more architectures
+
+upstream commit: b9c50614eba9d90939b2b119b6e1b7e03b462278 (7.3p1)
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 8 13:59:13 2016 +1000
+
+    whitelist more architectures for seccomp-bpf
+
+    bz#2590 - testing and patch from Jakub Jelen
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+@@ -818,16 +818,40 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
+ 		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
+ 		;;
+ 	arm*-*)
+ 		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
+ 		;;
+ 	aarch64*-*)
+ 		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
+ 		;;
++	s390x-*)
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X
++		;;
++	s390-*)
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390
++		;;
++	powerpc64-*)
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64
++		;;
++	powerpc64le-*)
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE
++		;;
++	mips-*)
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS
++		;;
++	mipsel-*)
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL
++		;;
++	mips64-*)
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64
++		;;
++	mips64el-*)
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64
++		;;
+ 	esac
+ 	if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
+ 		AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"])
+ 		AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch],
+ 		    [Specify the system call convention in use])
+ 	else
+ 		AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported])
+ 	fi

openssh-7.2p2-allow_DSS_by_default.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  2730f36bee0d6e141d8391b414a702e1add5a853
+# Parent  d33bce122aa351a56ce457be35feda52171f9088
 Enable DSS authentication by default to maintain compatibility with older
 versions.
 

openssh-7.2p2-allow_root_password_login.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  8cf6984812ab2211ce60c0a9156892b3a7ee3aaf
+# Parent  c43ae523939377778762e81743b77b3c75eb4bd1
 Allow root login with password by default. While less secure than upstream
 default of forbidding access to the root account with a password, we are
 temporarily introducing this change to keep the default used in older OpenSSH

openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  3aad88a155050008275527c0624ae6fa05d0cdad
+Audit PRNG re-seeding
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c
+@@ -504,9 +504,15 @@ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char 
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
++
++void
++audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
+ #endif /* BSM */
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c
+@@ -402,9 +402,31 @@ audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(cons
+ 	}
+ 	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
+ 			buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
+ 	audit_close(audit_fd);
+ 	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ 	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ 		error("cannot write into audit");
+ }
++
++void
++audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
++{
++	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=prng_seed kind=server bytes=%li source=%s ", bytes, rf);
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
++					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
++			error("cannot open audit");
++		return;
++	}
++	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE_USER,
++			buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		error("cannot write into audit");
++}
+ #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c
+@@ -304,10 +304,16 @@ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char 
+ /*
+  * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
+  */
+ void
+ audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
+ {
+ 	debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
+ }
++
++void
++audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
++{
++	debug("audit PRNG seed euid %d bytes %li source %s", geteuid(), bytes, rf);
++}
+ # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h
+@@ -69,10 +69,11 @@ void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
+ void	audit_unsupported(int);
+ void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
+ void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
+ void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void	audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
+ void	audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void	audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
++void	audit_linux_prng_seed(long, const char *);
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+@@ -1421,16 +1421,19 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 					if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
+ 						maxfd = startup_p[0];
+ 					startups++;
+ 					break;
+ 				}
+ 			if(!(--re_seeding_counter)) {
+ 				re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
+ 				linux_seed();
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++				audit_linux_prng_seed(rand_bytes, rand_file);
++#endif
+ 			}
+ 
+ 			/*
+ 			 * Got connection.  Fork a child to handle it, unless
+ 			 * we are in debugging mode.
+ 			 */
+ 			if (debug_flag) {
+ 				/*

openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  5469eb754184144e42c341ccc038309e2880cadc
+# Parent  0bfb5dd4b190b546a3e40a59483b2b2884a47c39
 block SIGALRM while logging through syslog to prevent deadlocks
 (through grace_alarm_handler())
 

openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  16c4937db837ab7cdbe0422b81de0e7a9a8479cd
+disable run-time check for OpenSSL ABI by version number as that is not a
+reliable indicator of ABI changes and doesn't make much sense in a
+distribution package
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+@@ -4639,16 +4639,29 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth],
+ 		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ 			AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1],
+ 				[Define if you have BSD auth support])
+ 			BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes
+ 		fi
+ 	]
+ )
+ 
++# Whether we are using distribution (Open)SSL, so no runtime checks are necessary
++DISTRO_SSL=no
++AC_ARG_WITH([distro-ssl],
++	[  --with-distro-ssl       Disable runtime OpenSSL version checks (good for distributions)],
++	[
++		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++			AC_DEFINE([DISTRO_SSL], [1],
++                      [Define if you are using distribution SSL library and don;t expect its API/ABI to change])
++			DISTRO_SSL=yes
++		fi
++	]
++)
++
+ # Where to place sshd.pid
+ piddir=/var/run
+ # make sure the directory exists
+ if test ! -d $piddir ; then
+ 	piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
+ 	case $piddir in
+ 		NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
+ 	esac
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c b/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
+@@ -209,19 +209,21 @@ rexec_recv_rng_seed(Buffer *m)
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
+ 
+ void
+ seed_rng(void)
+ {
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ 	unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
+ #endif
++#ifndef DISTRO_SSL
+ 	if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()))
+ 		fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
+ 		    "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
++#endif
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ 	if (RAND_status() == 1) {
+ 		debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)

openssh-7.2p2-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  c40dce555117c740f3df867e9fc2b07b64b3ad96
+# Parent  7b5f436e0026923299fdd1994f8da8fd9948be7c
 
 Raise minimal size of DH group parameters to 2048 bits like upstream did in
 7.2. 1024b values are believed to be in breaking range for state adversaries

openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  2aa634b7522f34ddbd380c96df4e750df0608604
+# Parent  e4886597a8984ae1594b6866fe1b232370b23529
 # posix threads are generally not supported nor safe
 # (see upstream log from 2005-05-24)
 # --used to be called '-pam-fix3'

openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  bbb49b3f344cf24e9bbd7eb7a7c40fea21be77eb
+# Parent  f19426f2fa9c634474e635bf33b86acea0518f6d
 fix paths and references in sshd man pages
 
 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8

openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  477d43e9a3889d36b58ff19cf3cb9583e1abf9ce
+# Parent  980f301b2920c09b30577dd722546bca85d25fc1
 # force PAM in defaullt install (this was removed from upstream in 3.8p1)
 # bnc#46749
 # --used to be called '-pam-fix2'

openssh-7.2p2-fips.patch

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  0dee2a3f80c2db73903388815fb4e311c8588a15
+# Parent  3e1393b771d6430ae09ae30741a3b9b382e3e041
 FIPS 140-2 compliance. Perform selftests on start and use only FIPS approved
 algorithms.
 
 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
-@@ -87,17 +87,17 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+@@ -87,17 +87,18 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
  	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
  	ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
  	poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
  	kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
  	kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
 -	platform-pledge.o
-+	platform-pledge.o fips.o
++	platform-pledge.o \
++	fips.o
  
  SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
  	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o

openssh-7.2p2-gssapi_key_exchange.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  c2049622cf75dbab61a8f49b53a13dc1de6695fd
+# Parent  84a6252b7ac18855cf188e5911bdf8a757d4460a
 GSSAPI Key Exchange implementation
 
 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ChangeLog.gssapi b/openssh-7.2p2/ChangeLog.gssapi
@@ -136,14 +136,14 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 -	kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
 +	kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o kexgssc.o \
 +	kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o kexgsss.o \
- 	platform-pledge.o fips.o
+ 	platform-pledge.o \
+ 	fips.o
  
  SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
  	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o
  
  SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
  	audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
- 	sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \
 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-krb5.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-krb5.c
 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-krb5.c
 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-krb5.c

openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  605a6220fcc2c96e9196681fe480fab16b505ee1
+Suggest command line for removal of offending keys from known_hosts file
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c
+@@ -1086,16 +1086,21 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ 				    ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
+ 		}
+ 		/* The host key has changed. */
+ 		warn_changed_key(host_key);
+ 		error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
+ 		    user_hostfiles[0]);
+ 		error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
+ 		    host_found->file, host_found->line);
++		error("You can use following command to remove all keys for this IP:");
++		if (host_found->file)
++			error("ssh-keygen -R %s -f %s", hostname, host_found->file);
++		else
++			error("ssh-keygen -R %s", hostname);
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
+ 		 * to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
+ 		 */
+ 		if (options.strict_host_key_checking) {
+ 			error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
+ 			    "requested strict checking.", type, host);

openssh-7.2p2-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  b5245fb016a3b83611d4b4ae0c1fe3423cadd6fe
+# Parent  f7ba2081f120bd1e44dbe68737c898f078725aab
 # -- uset do be called '-xauthlocalhostname'
 handle hostname changes when forwarding X
 

openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  cb9be7363a9f32133f0d105d515149dd77cc8cd3
+
+Do not import PAM environment variables when using login, since it may have
+security implications.
+
+CVE-2015-8325
+bsc#975865
+
+Backport of upstream commit 85bdcd7c92fe7ff133bbc4e10a65c91810f88755
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
+@@ -1351,17 +1351,17 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
+ 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
+ 		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Pull in any environment variables that may have
+ 	 * been set by PAM.
+ 	 */
+-	if (options.use_pam) {
++	if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login) {
+ 		char **p;
+ 
+ 		p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
+ 		copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
+ 		free_pam_environment(p);
+ 
+ 		p = fetch_pam_environment();
+ 		copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);

openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  2ee086fa64dd40d0d50b13fa3a784717bfdd7e4b
+# Parent  79c00e0f450c33b3f545ef104112b55186290e2c
 # set uid for functions that use it to seek in lastlog and wtmp files
 # bnc#18024 (was suse #3024)
 

openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  e351203d2784230a3b56b8e3dd6955403ed10ca4
+Limit accepted passwords length to prevent DoS by resource consumption
+(via crypt() eating CPU cycles).
+
+CVE-2016-6515
+bsc#992533
+
+upstream commit: fcd135c9df440bcd2d5870405ad3311743d78d97
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
+@@ -61,16 +61,18 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ extern login_cap_t *lc;
+ #endif
+ 
+ 
+ #define DAY		(24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
+ #define TWO_WEEKS	(2L * 7 * DAY)	/* 2 weeks in seconds */
+ 
++#define MAX_PASSWORD_LEN	1024
++
+ void
+ disable_forwarding(void)
+ {
+ 	no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ 	no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ 	no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -82,16 +84,19 @@ int
+ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ {
+ 	struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw;
+ 	int result, ok = authctxt->valid;
+ #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+ 	static int expire_checked = 0;
+ #endif
+ 
++	if (strlen(password) > MAX_PASSWORD_LEN)
++		return 0;
++
+ #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ 	if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
+ 		ok = 0;
+ #endif
+ 	if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef KRB5

openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  295ae9c5f5da12d273f3b91e90145b449984a7dc
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  b262fd34c8ecd55e93d457b3ca5593abce716856
+# login-pam cannot handle the option terminator "--" as login from util-linux
+# (this is correct behaviour considering its man-page), hence use option which
+# selects the compile-time branch in the code which doesn't use the terminator
+#
+# bnc#833605
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+@@ -770,16 +770,18 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
+ 	AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
+ 	;;
+ *-*-linux*)
+ 	no_dev_ptmx=1
+ 	use_pie=auto
+ 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ 	check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
++	AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT], [1],
++		[Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--")])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1],
+ 		[Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"],
+ 		[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM],
+ 		[Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported"
+ 		if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.])

openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  7ce81a30bb196401c63782b646d8a6d511ddec4b
+Do not write a PID file when not daemonizing (e.g. when running from systemd)
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+@@ -2107,17 +2107,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+ 		signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+ 		signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
+ 		 * is setup and the listen sockets are bound
+ 		 */
+-		if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) {
++		if (!no_daemon_flag && options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) {
+ 			FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
+ 
+ 			if (f == NULL) {
+ 				error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
+ 				    options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
+ 			} else {
+ 				fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
+ 				fclose(f);

openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  5b217a9abc32fa963a125ae29c766c015db53bde
+# Parent  ac7f843cd7ebec413691d51823cdc67b611abdff
 new option UsePAMCheckLocks to enforce checking for locked accounts while
 UsePAM is used
 

openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  323ac0fc20b1d5e9bf7037e020adfd760dd2d5f2
+Prevent user enumeration through password processing timing
+CVE-2016-6210
+bsc#989363
+
+non-PAM part:
+upstream commit: 9286875a73b2de7736b5e50692739d314cd8d9dc
+
+PAM part:
+upstream commit: 283b97ff33ea2c641161950849931bd578de6946
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
+@@ -227,17 +227,16 @@ static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NUL
+ static int sshpam_err = 0;
+ static int sshpam_authenticated = 0;
+ static int sshpam_session_open = 0;
+ static int sshpam_cred_established = 0;
+ static int sshpam_account_status = -1;
+ static char **sshpam_env = NULL;
+ static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL;
+ static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
+-static char badpw[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
+ 
+ /* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
+ #ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
+ static char **
+ pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh)
+ {
+ 	/*
+ 	 * XXX - If necessary, we can still support envrionment passing
+@@ -807,22 +806,45 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
+ 			free(msg);
+ 			ctxt->pam_done = -1;
+ 			return (-1);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	return (-1);
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied.
++ * Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that
++ * vary processing time in proportion to password length.
++ */
++static char *
++fake_password(const char *wire_password)
++{
++	const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
++	char *ret = NULL;
++	size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0;
++
++	if (l >= INT_MAX)
++		fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
++
++	ret = xmalloc(l + 1);
++	for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
++		ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
++	ret[i] = '\0';
++	return ret;
++}
++
+ /* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */
+ static int
+ sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
+ {
+ 	Buffer buffer;
+ 	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
++	char *fake;
+ 
+ 	debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num);
+ 	switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
+ 	case 1:
+ 		sshpam_authenticated = 1;
+ 		return (0);
+ 	case 0:
+ 		break;
+@@ -833,18 +855,21 @@ sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, cha
+ 		error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num);
+ 		return (-1);
+ 	}
+ 	buffer_init(&buffer);
+ 	if (sshpam_authctxt->valid &&
+ 	    (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
+ 	    options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
+ 		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
+-	else
+-		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, badpw);
++	else {
++		fake = fake_password(*resp);
++		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, fake);
++		free(fake);
++	}
+ 	if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, &buffer) == -1) {
+ 		buffer_free(&buffer);
+ 		return (-1);
+ 	}
+ 	buffer_free(&buffer);
+ 	return (1);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1178,41 +1203,43 @@ static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { s
+ /*
+  * Attempt password authentication via PAM
+  */
+ int
+ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ {
+ 	int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
+ 	    PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
++	char *fake = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL)
+ 		fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to "
+ 		    "initialise.", __func__);
+ 
+ 	sshpam_password = password;
+ 	sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted
+ 	 * by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking
+ 	 * information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail).
+ 	 */
+ 	if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ 	    options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+-		sshpam_password = badpw;
++		sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password);
+ 
+ 	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+ 	    (const void *)&passwd_conv);
+ 	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ 		fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__,
+ 		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ 
+ 	sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
+ 	sshpam_password = NULL;
++	free(fake);
+ 	if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
+ 		debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
+ 		    authctxt->user);
+ 		return 1;
+ 	} else {
+ 		debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s",
+ 		    authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user",
+ 		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
+@@ -188,28 +188,32 @@ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, cons
+ 		return (auth_close(as));
+ 	}
+ }
+ #elif !defined(CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD)
+ int
+ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ {
+ 	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+-	char *encrypted_password;
++	char *encrypted_password, *salt = NULL;
+ 
+ 	/* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
+ 	char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
+ 
+ 	/* Check for users with no password. */
+ 	if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
+ 		return (1);
+ 
+-	/* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
+-	encrypted_password = xcrypt(password,
+-	    (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx");
++	/*
++	 * Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt, or pass a
++	 * NULL and let xcrypt pick one.
++	 */
++	if (authctxt->valid && pw_password[0] && pw_password[1])
++		salt = pw_password;
++	encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, salt);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
+ 	 * are identical.
+ 	 */
+ 	return encrypted_password != NULL &&
+ 	    strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0;
+ }
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
+@@ -20,16 +20,17 @@
+  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+  */
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
++#include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ 
+ # if defined(HAVE_CRYPT_H) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+ #  include <crypt.h>
+ # endif
+ 
+ # ifdef __hpux
+@@ -57,21 +58,54 @@
+ #  include "md5crypt.h"
+ # endif
+ 
+ # if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(HAVE_CRYPT) && defined(HAVE_DES_CRYPT)
+ #  include <openssl/des.h>
+ #  define crypt DES_crypt
+ # endif
+ 
++/*
++ * Pick an appropriate password encryption type and salt for the running
++ * system.
++ */
++static const char *
++pick_salt(void)
++{
++	struct passwd *pw;
++	char *passwd, *p;
++	size_t typelen;
++	static char salt[32];
++
++	if (salt[0] != '\0')
++		return salt;
++	strlcpy(salt, "xx", sizeof(salt));
++	if ((pw = getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
++		return salt;
++	passwd = shadow_pw(pw);
++	if (passwd[0] != '$' || (p = strrchr(passwd + 1, '$')) == NULL)
++		return salt;  /* no $, DES */
++	typelen = p - passwd + 1;
++	strlcpy(salt, passwd, MIN(typelen, sizeof(salt)));
++	explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
++	return salt;
++}
++
+ char *
+ xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt)
+ {
+ 	char *crypted;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * If we don't have a salt we are encrypting a fake password for
++	 * for timing purposes.  Pick an appropriate salt.
++	 */
++	if (salt == NULL)
++		salt = pick_salt();
++
+ # ifdef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
+         if (is_md5_salt(salt))
+                 crypted = md5_crypt(password, salt);
+         else
+                 crypted = crypt(password, salt);
+ # elif defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+ 	if (iscomsec())
+                 crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);

openssh-7.2p2-pts_names_formatting.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  870f97b01b9ed00bac9ff0b8014a998434a6161b
+# Parent  787bc0aab11e5a7b6510c8dbf771958743ca25b0
 # use same lines naming as utempter (prevents problems with using different
 # formats in ?tmp? files)
 # --used to be called '-pts'

openssh-7.2p2-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  07998e381c9867b8b6f7b9205261811934bef40f
+# Parent  18c2690afd988b9cb0fd0fa927d02cf5336dce9c
 # --used to be called '-xauth'
 try to remove xauth cookies on logout
 

openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  3582dd949a01d8eca2816986ca4bc0c87c96bed3
+# Parent  c66097e5e31cd607bf2206b2da95730cce518b7a
 add 'getuid' syscall to list of allowed ones to prevent the sanboxed thread
 from being killed by the seccomp filter
 

openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  d3afe6b01f8769713bde6c175e29a50412799e27
+# Parent  def949a57b8101691c79ecce6366cc7ae1685b07
 Allow the stat() syscall for OpenSSL re-seed patch
 (which causes OpenSSL use stat() on some file)
 

openssh-7.2p2-seed-prng.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  36ab4b78afea8cea4e3bed1291a49ba05cbb9115
+# Parent  6ece65e11f754d75dd33d72b6f8e487a9d047f2e
 # extended support for (re-)seeding the OpenSSL PRNG from /dev/random
 # bnc#703221, FATE#312172
 

openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  505927e61d1a7848f0003adb3619cc726b8e5d15
+# Parent  dfcac093fca4d826a806b9d1c0bdc26e7ae8ee8e
 send locales in default configuration
 bnc#65747
 

openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  efa850d8312ceef224dbec0f2ae1002201afabd9
+additional option for sftp-server to force file mode for new files
+FATE#312774
+http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2010-November/029044.html
+http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=128896838930893
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
+@@ -33,16 +33,17 @@
+ .Bk -words
+ .Op Fl ehR
+ .Op Fl d Ar start_directory
+ .Op Fl f Ar log_facility
+ .Op Fl l Ar log_level
+ .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
+ .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
+ .Op Fl u Ar umask
++.Op Fl m Ar force_file_permissions
+ .Ek
+ .Nm
+ .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
+ .Sh DESCRIPTION
+ .Nm
+ is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
+ to stdout and expects client requests from stdin.
+ .Nm
+@@ -133,16 +134,20 @@ Places this instance of
+ into a read-only mode.
+ Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change
+ the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
+ .It Fl u Ar umask
+ Sets an explicit
+ .Xr umask 2
+ to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
+ user's default mask.
++.It Fl m Ar force_file_permissions
++Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
++of the default or client requested mode.  Numeric values include:
++777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Option -u is ineffective if -m is set.
+ .El
+ .Pp
+ On some systems,
+ .Nm
+ must be able to access
+ .Pa /dev/log
+ for logging to work, and use of
+ .Nm
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
+@@ -73,16 +73,20 @@ static u_int version;
+ static int init_done;
+ 
+ /* Disable writes */
+ static int readonly;
+ 
+ /* Requests that are allowed/denied */
+ static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist;
+ 
++/* Force file permissions */
++int permforce = 0;
++long permforcemode;
++
+ /* portable attributes, etc. */
+ typedef struct Stat Stat;
+ 
+ struct Stat {
+ 	char *name;
+ 	char *long_name;
+ 	Attrib attrib;
+ };
+@@ -687,16 +691,20 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
+ 	    (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+ 	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
+ 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
+ 	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
++	if (permforce == 1) {
++		mode = permforcemode;
++		(void)umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
++	}
+ 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
+ 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
+ 	if (readonly &&
+ 	    ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY ||
+ 	    (flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) {
+ 		verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
+ 		status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
+ 	} else {
+@@ -1489,17 +1497,18 @@ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i)
+ static void
+ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ {
+ 	extern char *__progname;
+ 
+ 	fprintf(stderr,
+ 	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
+ 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
+-	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
++	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n\t"
++	    "[-m force_file_permissions]\n"
+ 	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
+ 	    __progname, __progname);
+ 	exit(1);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
+ {
+@@ -1515,17 +1524,17 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, 
+ 
+ 	ssh_malloc_init();	/* must be called before any mallocs */
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+ 	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 
+ 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+ 
+ 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+-	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
++	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (ch) {
+ 		case 'Q':
+ 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
+ 				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n");
+ 				exit(1);
+ 			}
+ 			for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
+ 				printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name);
+@@ -1575,16 +1584,23 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, 
+ 		case 'u':
+ 			errno = 0;
+ 			mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
+ 			if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
+ 			    cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0))
+ 				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
+ 			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
+ 			break;
++		case 'm':
++			permforce = 1;
++			permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
++			if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
++				cp == optarg || (permforcemode == 0 && errno != 0))
++				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
++			break;
+ 		case 'h':
+ 		default:
+ 			sftp_server_usage();
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 

openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  9b1033f35a6cb173fbc13416065ed40c4b14e656
+run sftp sessions inside a chroot
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
+@@ -123,16 +123,18 @@ int	do_exec(Session *, const char *);
+ void	do_login(Session *, const char *);
+ #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+ static void	do_pre_login(Session *s);
+ #endif
+ void	do_child(Session *, const char *);
+ void	do_motd(void);
+ int	check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
+ 
++int	chroot_no_tree = 0;
++
+ static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *);
+ static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *);
+ 
+ static int session_pty_req(Session *);
+ 
+ /* import */
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern char *__progname;
+@@ -838,16 +840,21 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		    "subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys);
+ 	} else if (command == NULL) {
+ 		snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell");
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */
+ 		snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command");
+ 	}
+ 
++	if ((s->is_subsystem != SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) && chroot_no_tree) {
++		logit("You aren't welcomed, go away!");
++		exit (1);
++	}
++
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ 		tty = s->tty;
+ 		if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+ 			tty += 5;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+ 	    session_type,
+@@ -1492,58 +1499,123 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
+  		while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
+  			fputs(buf, stderr);
+  		fclose(f);
+  	}
+ 	exit(254);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
++ * Test if filesystem is mounted nosuid and nodev
++ */
++
++static void
++test_nosuid (char * path, dev_t fs)
++{
++	FILE *f;
++	struct stat st;
++	char buf[4096], *s, *on, *mountpoint, *opt;
++	int nodev, nosuid;
++
++	if (!(f = popen ("/bin/mount", "r")))
++		fatal ("%s: popen(\"/bin/mount\", \"r\"): %s",
++		    __func__, strerror (errno));
++	for (;;) {
++		s = fgets (buf, sizeof (buf), f);
++		if (ferror (f))
++			fatal ("%s: read from popen: %s", __func__,
++			    strerror (errno));
++		if (!s) {
++			pclose (f);
++			fatal ("cannot find filesystem with the chroot directory");
++		}
++		(void) strtok (buf, " ");
++		on = strtok (NULL, " ");
++		if (strcmp (on, "on")) {
++			pclose (f);
++			fatal ("bad format of mount output");
++		}
++		mountpoint = strtok (NULL, " ");
++		if (memcmp (path, mountpoint, strlen (mountpoint)))
++			continue;
++		if (stat(mountpoint, &st) != 0) {
++			pclose (f);
++			fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
++			    mountpoint, strerror(errno));
++		}
++		if (fs != st.st_dev)
++			continue;
++		nodev = nosuid = 0;
++		for (opt = strtok (NULL, "("); opt; opt = strtok (NULL, " ,)")) {
++			if (!strcmp (opt, "nodev"))
++				nodev = 1;
++			else if (!strcmp (opt, "nosuid"))
++				nosuid = 1;
++			else if (!strcmp (opt, "noexec"))
++				nosuid = 1;
++			if (nodev && nosuid) {
++				pclose (f);
++				return;
++			}
++		}
++		fatal ("chroot into directory without nodev and either noexec or nosuid");
++	}
++}
++
++/*
+  * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components
+  * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions.
+  */
+ static void
+ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
+ {
+ 	const char *cp;
+ 	char component[PATH_MAX];
+ 	struct stat st;
++	int last;
+ 
+ 	if (*path != '/')
+ 		fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
+ 	if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
+ 		fatal("chroot path too long");
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Descend the path, checking that each component is a
+ 	 * root-owned directory with strict permissions.
+ 	 */
+ 	for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
+-		if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
++		if (last = ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL))
+ 			strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
+ 		else {
+ 			cp++;
+ 			memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
+ 			component[cp - path] = '\0';
+ 		}
+ 	
+ 		debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component);
+ 
+ 		if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
+ 			fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
+ 			    component, strerror(errno));
+-		if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
++		if ((st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) && !(last && st.st_uid == uid))
+ 			fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
+ 			    "directory %s\"%s\"", 
+ 			    cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
+ 		if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
+ 			fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
+ 			    cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
+ 
+ 	}
++	setenv ("TZ", "/etc/localtime", 0);
++	tzset();
++
++	if (st.st_uid) {
++		test_nosuid(path, st.st_dev);
++		++chroot_no_tree;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (chdir(path) == -1)
+ 		fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
+ 		    "%s", path, strerror(errno));
+ 	if (chroot(path) == -1)
+ 		fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
+ 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
+ 		fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s",
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-chrootenv.h b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-chrootenv.h
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-chrootenv.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F Chadima.  All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++#ifndef CHROOTENV_H
++#define CHROOTENV_H
++
++extern int	chroot_no_tree;
++
++#endif
++
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-common.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-common.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-common.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-common.c
+@@ -43,16 +43,17 @@
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ 
+ #include "sftp.h"
+ #include "sftp-common.h"
++#include "sftp-chrootenv.h"
+ 
+ /* Clear contents of attributes structure */
+ void
+ attrib_clear(Attrib *a)
+ {
+ 	a->flags = 0;
+ 	a->size = 0;
+ 	a->uid = 0;
+@@ -216,23 +217,23 @@ ls_file(const char *name, const struct s
+ 	int ulen, glen, sz = 0;
+ 	struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime);
+ 	char *user, *group;
+ 	char buf[1024], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1];
+ 	char sbuf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+ 	time_t now;
+ 
+ 	strmode(st->st_mode, mode);
+-	if (!remote) {
++	if (!remote && !chroot_no_tree) {
+ 		user = user_from_uid(st->st_uid, 0);
+ 	} else {
+ 		snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid);
+ 		user = ubuf;
+ 	}
+-	if (!remote) {
++	if (!remote && !chroot_no_tree) {
+ 		group = group_from_gid(st->st_gid, 0);
+ 	} else {
+ 		snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid);
+ 		group = gbuf;
+ 	}
+ 	if (ltime != NULL) {
+ 		now = time(NULL);
+ 		if (now - (365*24*60*60)/2 < st->st_mtime &&
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server-main.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server-main.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server-main.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server-main.c
+@@ -17,22 +17,25 @@
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++//#include <time.h>
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "sftp.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ 
++int chroot_no_tree = 0;
++
+ void
+ cleanup_exit(int i)
+ {
+ 	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(i);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ main(int argc, char **argv)
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
+@@ -112,16 +112,18 @@ struct complete_ctx {
+ 	char **remote_pathp;
+ };
+ 
+ int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
+     int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
+ 
+ extern char *__progname;
+ 
++int chroot_no_tree = 0;
++
+ /* Separators for interactive commands */
+ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+ 
+ /* ls flags */
+ #define LS_LONG_VIEW	0x0001	/* Full view ala ls -l */
+ #define LS_SHORT_VIEW	0x0002	/* Single row view ala ls -1 */
+ #define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW	0x0004	/* Long view with numeric uid/gid */
+ #define LS_NAME_SORT	0x0008	/* Sort by name (default) */
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+@@ -251,16 +251,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
+              directory on some operating systems (see sftp-server(8) for
+              details).
+ 
+              For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
+              prevented from modification by other processes on the system
+              (especially those outside the jail).  Misconfiguration can lead
+              to unsafe environments which sshd(8) cannot detect.
+ 
++             In the special case when only sftp is used, not ssh nor scp, it
++             is possible to use ChrootDirectory %h or ChrootDirectory
++             /some/path/%u. The file system containing this directory must be
++             mounted with options nodev and either nosuid or noexec. The owner
++             of the directory should be the user. The ownership of the other
++             components of the path must fulfill the usual conditions. No adi-
++             tional files are required to be present in the directory.
++
+              The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^], indicating not to chroot(2).
+ 
+      Ciphers
+              Specifies the ciphers allowed.  Multiple ciphers must be comma-
+              separated.  If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
+              then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+              instead of replacing them.
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+@@ -424,16 +424,27 @@ for details).
+ .Pp
+ For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
+ prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially
+ those outside the jail).
+ Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ cannot detect.
+ .Pp
++In the special case when only sftp is used, not ssh nor scp,
++it is possible to use
++.Cm ChrootDirectory
++%h or
++.Cm ChrootDirectory
++/some/path/%u. The file system containing this directory must be
++mounted with options nodev and either nosuid or noexec. The owner of the
++directory should be the user. The ownership of the other components of the path
++must fulfill the usual conditions. No aditional files are required to be present
++in the directory.
++.Pp
+ The default is
+ .Dq none ,
+ indicating not to
+ .Xr chroot 2 .
+ .It Cm Ciphers
+ Specifies the ciphers allowed.
+ Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified value begins with a

openssh.changes

@@ -1,3 +1,43 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Thu Sep 29 23:27:49 UTC 2016 - pcerny@suse.com
+
+- remaining patches that were still missing
+  since the update to 7.2p2 (FATE#319675):
+- allow X forwarding over IPv4 when IPv6 sockets is not available
+  [openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch]
+- do not write PID file when not daemonizing
+  [openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch]
+- use correct options when invoking login
+  [openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch]
+- helper application for retrieving users' public keys from
+  an LDAP server
+  [openssh-7.2p2-ldap.patch]
+- allow forcing permissions over sftp
+  [openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch]
+- do not perform run-time checks for OpenSSL API/ABI change
+  [openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch]
+- suggest commands for cleaning known hosts file
+  [openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch]
+- sftp home chroot patch
+  [openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch]
+- ssh sessions auditing
+  [openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch]
+- enable seccomp sandbox on additional architectures
+  [openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch]
+- fix forwarding with IPv6 addresses in DISPLAY (bnc#847710)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch]
+- ignore PAM environment when using login
+  (bsc#975865, CVE-2015-8325)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch]
+- limit accepted password length (prevents possible DoS)
+  (bsc#992533, CVE-2016-6515)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch]
+- Prevent user enumeration through the timing of password
+  processing (bsc#989363, CVE-2016-6210)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch]
+- Add auditing for PRNG re-seeding
+  [openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch]
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Fri Sep 16 12:45:11 UTC 2016 - pcerny@suse.com
 

openssh.spec

@@ -53,11 +53,9 @@
 %endif
 
 %define sandbox_seccomp 0
-%ifarch %ix86 x86_64
 %if 0%{?suse_version} > 1220
 %define sandbox_seccomp 1
 %endif
-%endif
 
 %define _fwdir   %{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/SuSEfirewall2.d
 %define _fwdefdir   %{_fwdir}/services
@@ -88,7 +86,10 @@ BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(systemd)
 %{?systemd_requires}
 %endif
 BuildRequires:  tcpd-devel
-PreReq:         pwdutils %{insserv_prereq} %{fillup_prereq} coreutils
+PreReq:         pwdutils %{fillup_prereq} coreutils
+%if ! %{uses_systemd}
+PreReq:         %{insserv_prereq}
+%endif
 Version:        7.2p2
 Release:        0
 Summary:        Secure Shell Client and Server (Remote Login Program)
@@ -128,6 +129,21 @@ Patch15:        openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch
 Patch16:        openssh-7.2p2-fips.patch
 Patch17:        openssh-7.2p2-seed-prng.patch
 Patch18:        openssh-7.2p2-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
+Patch19:        openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch
+Patch20:        openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch
+Patch21:        openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch
+Patch22:        openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
+Patch23:        openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
+Patch24:        openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch
+Patch25:        openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch
+Patch26:        openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch
+Patch27:        openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
+Patch28:        openssh-7.2p2-ldap.patch
+Patch29:        openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch
+Patch30:        openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
+Patch31:        openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch
+Patch32:        openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch
+Patch33:        openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch
 BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
 Conflicts:      nonfreessh
 Recommends:     audit
@@ -198,14 +214,29 @@ FIPS140 CAVS tests related parts of the OpenSSH package
 %patch16 -p2
 %patch17 -p2
 %patch18 -p2
+%patch19 -p2
+%patch20 -p2
+%patch21 -p2
+%patch22 -p2
+%patch23 -p2
+%patch24 -p2
+%patch25 -p2
+%patch26 -p2
+%patch27 -p2
+%patch28 -p2
+%patch29 -p2
+%patch30 -p2
+%patch31 -p2
+%patch32 -p2
+%patch33 -p2
 cp %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE4} %{SOURCE11} .
 
 %build
-#### set libexec dir in the LDAP patch
+# set libexec dir in the LDAP patch
-###sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \
+sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \
-###    $( grep -Rl @LIBEXECDIR@ \
+    $( grep -Rl @LIBEXECDIR@ \
-###        $( grep "^+++" %{PATCH40} | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' )
+        $( grep "^+++" %{PATCH28} | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' )
-###    )
+    )
 
 autoreconf -fiv
 %ifarch s390 s390x %sparc
@@ -271,7 +302,7 @@ install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_initddir}
 %if %{uses_systemd}
 install -m 0755 %{SOURCE1} .
 install -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE10} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/sshd.service
-ln -s /usr/sbin/service %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd
+ln -s /sbin/service %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd
 %else
 install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE1} %{buildroot}%{_initddir}/sshd
 install -m 0644 %{SOURCE10} .
@@ -376,7 +407,7 @@ rpm -q openssh-fips >& /dev/null && DISABLE_RESTART_ON_UPDATE=yes
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh
-###%exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
+%exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/*
 %attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/*
 %attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/*
@@ -395,10 +426,10 @@ rpm -q openssh-fips >& /dev/null && DISABLE_RESTART_ON_UPDATE=yes
 %files helpers
 %defattr(-,root,root)
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
-###%verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ldap.conf
+%verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ldap.conf
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh
-###%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
-###%doc HOWTO.ldap-keys openssh-lpk-openldap.schema openssh-lpk-sun.schema
+%doc HOWTO.ldap-keys openssh-lpk-openldap.schema openssh-lpk-sun.schema
 
 %files fips
 %defattr(-,root,root)