Accepting request 563834 from network

- Replace forgotten references to /var/adm/fillup-templates with new %_fillupdir macro (boo#1069468) - tighten configuration access rights (forwarded request 563833 from pcerny) OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/563834 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=112
2018-01-16 08:41:33 +00:00 · 2018-01-16 08:41:33 +00:00 · 97dc338ae5
commit 97dc338ae5
parent b071b0b1fc d8a13def71
56 changed files with 695 additions and 18831 deletions
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  9130c9e19c8a076a7f6f214070283cd3e0326894
-Correctly parse DISPLAY variable for cases where it contains an IPv6 address
-(which should - but not always is - in (square) brackets).
-
-bnc#847710 - https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=847710
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c b/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
-@@ -4049,18 +4049,19 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 		/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
- 		return sock;
- 	}
- #endif
- 	/*
- 	 * Check if it is a unix domain socket.  Unix domain displays are in
- 	 * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s]
- 	 */
-+	cp = strrchr(display, ':');
- 	if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 ||
-	    display[0] == ':') {
-+	    (display[0] == ':' && ((cp - display) < 2)) ) {
- 		/* Connect to the unix domain socket. */
- 		if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
- 			error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
- 			    display);
- 			return -1;
- 		}
- 		/* Create a socket. */
- 		sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number);
-@@ -4068,30 +4069,39 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 			return -1;
- 
- 		/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
- 		return sock;
- 	}
- 	/*
- 	 * Connect to an inet socket.  The DISPLAY value is supposedly
- 	 * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address.
-+	 * Note that IPv6 numberic addresses contain colons (e.g. ::1:0)
- 	 */
- 	strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf));
-	cp = strchr(buf, ':');
-+	cp = strrchr(buf, ':');
- 	if (!cp) {
- 		error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 	*cp = 0;
- 	/* buf now contains the host name.  But first we parse the display number. */
- 	if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
- 		error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
- 		    display);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-+	
-+	/* Remove brackets surrounding IPv6 addresses if there are any. */
-+	if (buf[0] == '[' && (cp = strchr(buf, ']'))) {
-+		*cp = 0;
-+		cp = buf + 1;
-+	} else {
-+		cp = buf;
-+	}
- 
- 	/* Look up the host address */
- 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 	hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
- 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- 	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
- 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
- 		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  7197d7a6b7c90566c68e980b5f8b937c183e79d0
-# enable trusted X11 forwarding by default in both sshd and sshsystem-wide
-# configuration
-# bnc#50836 (was suse #35836)
-Enable Trusted X11 forwarding by default, since the security benefits of
-having it disabled are negligible these days with XI2 being widely used.
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
-@@ -12,19 +12,30 @@
- # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
- # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
- # configuration file, and defaults at the end.
- 
- # Site-wide defaults for some commonly used options.  For a comprehensive
- # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
- # ssh_config(5) man page.
- 
-# Host *
-+Host *
- #   ForwardAgent no
- #   ForwardX11 no
-+
-+# If you do not trust your remote host (or its administrator), you
-+# should not forward X11 connections to your local X11-display for
-+# security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the
-+# remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your
-+# keystrokes as you type, just like any other X11 client could do.
-+# Set this to "no" here for global effect or in your own ~/.ssh/config
-+# file if you want to have the remote X11 authentification data to 
-+# expire after twenty minutes after remote login.
-+    ForwardX11Trusted yes
-+
- #   RhostsRSAAuthentication no
- #   RSAAuthentication yes
- #   PasswordAuthentication yes
- #   HostbasedAuthentication no
- #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
- #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
- #   BatchMode no
- #   CheckHostIP yes
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
-@@ -94,17 +94,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
- #UsePAM no
- 
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes
- #AllowTcpForwarding yes
- #GatewayPorts no
-#X11Forwarding no
-+X11Forwarding yes
- #X11DisplayOffset 10
- #X11UseLocalhost yes
- #PermitTTY yes
- #PrintMotd yes
- #PrintLastLog yes
- #TCPKeepAlive yes
- #UseLogin no
- #UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  2afee80335d5ef7efcf64f3a797e9b10ce0de4ae
-Do not throw away already open sockets for X11 forwarding if another socket
-family is not available for bind()
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c b/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
-@@ -3937,22 +3937,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 			}
- 			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
- 				sock_set_v6only(sock);
- 			if (x11_use_localhost)
- 				channel_set_reuseaddr(sock);
- 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
- 				debug2("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno));
- 				close(sock);
-
-+				continue;
-+				/* do not remove successfully opened sockets
- 				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
- 					close(socks[n]);
- 				}
- 				num_socks = 0;
- 				break;
-+				*/
- 			}
- 			socks[num_socks++] = sock;
- 			if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
- 				break;
- 		}
- 		freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- 		if (num_socks > 0)
- 			break;
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch
@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  e7bdbc5ea8971599466becf01bff12b9fcb5df3e
-Enable the seccomp-bpf sandbox on more architectures
-
-upstream commit: b9c50614eba9d90939b2b119b6e1b7e03b462278 (7.3p1)
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date:   Fri Jul 8 13:59:13 2016 +1000
-
-    whitelist more architectures for seccomp-bpf
-
-    bz#2590 - testing and patch from Jakub Jelen
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
-@@ -818,16 +818,40 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
- 		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
- 		;;
- 	arm*-*)
- 		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
- 		;;
- 	aarch64*-*)
- 		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
- 		;;
-+	s390x-*)
-+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X
-+		;;
-+	s390-*)
-+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390
-+		;;
-+	powerpc64-*)
-+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64
-+		;;
-+	powerpc64le-*)
-+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE
-+		;;
-+	mips-*)
-+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS
-+		;;
-+	mipsel-*)
-+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL
-+		;;
-+	mips64-*)
-+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64
-+		;;
-+	mips64el-*)
-+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64
-+		;;
- 	esac
- 	if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
- 		AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"])
- 		AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch],
- 		    [Specify the system call convention in use])
- 	else
- 		AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported])
- 	fi
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-allow_DSS_by_default.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-allow_DSS_by_default.patch
@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  d33bce122aa351a56ce457be35feda52171f9088
-Enable DSS authentication by default to maintain compatibility with older
-versions.
-
-bsc#983784
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h b/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h
-@@ -94,21 +94,23 @@
- #define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \
- 	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
- 	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
- 
- #define	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG	\
- 	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
- 	"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- 	"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- 	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
- 	"ssh-ed25519," \
- 	"rsa-sha2-512," \
- 	"rsa-sha2-256," \
-	"ssh-rsa"
-+	"ssh-rsa," \
-+	"ssh-dss"
- 
- /* the actual algorithms */
- 
- #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
- 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
- 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \
- 	AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
-@@ -887,19 +887,19 @@ Alternately if the specified value begin
- character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
- instead of replacing them.
- The default for this option is:
- .Bd -literal -offset 3n
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-+ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
-+ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
- .Ed
- .Pp
- If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified
- to prefer their algorithms.
- .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using the
- .Fl Q
- option of
-@@ -1325,19 +1325,19 @@ Alternately if the specified value begin
- character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
- instead of replacing it.
- The default for this option is:
- .Bd -literal -offset 3n
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-+ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
-+ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
- .Ed
- .Pp
- The
- .Fl Q
- option of
- .Xr ssh 1
- may be used to list supported key types.
- .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-@@ -651,19 +651,19 @@ Alternately if the specified value begin
- character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
- instead of replacing them.
- The default for this option is:
- .Bd -literal -offset 3n
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-+ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
-+ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
- .Ed
- .Pp
- The
- .Fl Q
- option of
- .Xr ssh 1
- may be used to list supported key types.
- .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
-@@ -743,19 +743,19 @@ environment variable.
- Specifies the host key algorithms
- that the server offers.
- The default for this option is:
- .Bd -literal -offset 3n
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-+ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
-+ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
- .Ed
- .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using the
- .Fl Q
- option of
- .Xr ssh 1
- with an argument of
- .Dq key .
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-allow_root_password_login.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-allow_root_password_login.patch
@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  c43ae523939377778762e81743b77b3c75eb4bd1
-Allow root login with password by default. While less secure than upstream
-default of forbidding access to the root account with a password, we are
-temporarily introducing this change to keep the default used in older OpenSSH
-versions shipped with SLE.
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
-@@ -233,17 +233,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- 		options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE);
- 	if (options->server_key_bits == -1)
- 		options->server_key_bits = 1024;
- 	if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
- 		options->login_grace_time = 120;
- 	if (options->key_regeneration_time == -1)
- 		options->key_regeneration_time = 3600;
- 	if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
-		options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
-+		options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_YES;
- 	if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
- 		options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
- 	if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
- 		options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
- 	if (options->print_motd == -1)
- 		options->print_motd = 1;
- 	if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
- 		options->print_lastlog = 1;
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
-@@ -36,17 +36,17 @@
- # Logging
- # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
- #SyslogFacility AUTH
- #LogLevel INFO
- 
- # Authentication:
- 
- #LoginGraceTime 2m
-#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
-+#PermitRootLogin yes
- #StrictModes yes
- #MaxAuthTries 6
- #MaxSessions 10
- 
- #RSAAuthentication yes
- #PubkeyAuthentication yes
- 
- # The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
-@@ -710,17 +710,17 @@ DESCRIPTION
-              restrictions and permit any forwarding requests.  An argument of
-              M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests.  By
-              default all port forwarding requests are permitted.
- 
-      PermitRootLogin
-              Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1).  The argument
-              must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\without-passwordM-bM-^@M-^],
-              M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is
-             M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^].
-+             M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
- 
-              If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^] or
-              M-bM-^@M-^\without-passwordM-bM-^@M-^], password and keyboard-interactive
-              authentication are disabled for root.
- 
-              If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^], root login with
-              public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the
-              command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1213,17 +1213,17 @@ Specifies whether root can log in using
- The argument must be
- .Dq yes ,
- .Dq prohibit-password ,
- .Dq without-password ,
- .Dq forced-commands-only ,
- or
- .Dq no .
- The default is
-.Dq prohibit-password .
-+.Dq yes .
- .Pp
- If this option is set to
- .Dq prohibit-password
- or
- .Dq without-password ,
- password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root.
- .Pp
- If this option is set to
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-audit_fixes.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-audit_fixes.patch
@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  51a3a8eab1493a799c5a9df95e8e757f872886d0
-Various auditing fixes to be merged into the RH-originated patch.
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c b/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c
-@@ -375,16 +375,20 @@ ssh_packet_start_discard(struct ssh *ssh
- 
- int
- ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh)
- {
- 	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
- 	struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
- 	socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
- 
-+    /* auditing might get here without valid connection structure when
-+     * destroying sensitive data on exit and thus aborting disgracefully */
-+	if (!ssh)
-+		return 0;
- 	/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
- 	if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out)
- 		return 1;
- 	fromlen = sizeof(from);
- 	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- 	if (getpeername(state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
- 	    &fromlen) < 0)
- 		return 0;
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch
@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  e6ff441d171012183f7bd37cb7399473e8376acd
-Audit PRNG re-seeding
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c
-@@ -504,9 +504,15 @@ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char 
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
- 
- void
- audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
- {
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
-+
-+void
-+audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
- #endif /* BSM */
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c
-@@ -402,9 +402,31 @@ audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(cons
- 	}
- 	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
- 			buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
- 	audit_close(audit_fd);
- 	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
- 	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
- 		error("cannot write into audit");
- }
-+
-+void
-+audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
-+{
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=prng_seed kind=server bytes=%li source=%s ", bytes, rf);
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
-+					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			error("cannot open audit");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE_USER,
-+			buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		error("cannot write into audit");
-+}
- #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c
-@@ -304,10 +304,16 @@ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char 
- /*
-  * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
-  */
- void
- audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
- {
- 	debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
- }
-+
-+void
-+audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
-+{
-+	debug("audit PRNG seed euid %d bytes %li source %s", geteuid(), bytes, rf);
-+}
- # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h
-@@ -69,10 +69,11 @@ void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
- void	audit_unsupported(int);
- void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
- void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
- void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- void	audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
- void	audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
- void	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- void	audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
-+void	audit_linux_prng_seed(long, const char *);
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
-@@ -1421,16 +1421,19 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 					if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
- 						maxfd = startup_p[0];
- 					startups++;
- 					break;
- 				}
- 			if(!(--re_seeding_counter)) {
- 				re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
- 				linux_seed();
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+				audit_linux_prng_seed(rand_bytes, rand_file);
-+#endif
- 			}
- 
- 			/*
- 			 * Got connection.  Fork a child to handle it, unless
- 			 * we are in debugging mode.
- 			 */
- 			if (debug_flag) {
- 				/*
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch
@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  0bfb5dd4b190b546a3e40a59483b2b2884a47c39
-block SIGALRM while logging through syslog to prevent deadlocks
-(through grace_alarm_handler())
-
-bnc#57354
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/log.c b/openssh-7.2p2/log.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/log.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/log.c
-@@ -46,16 +46,17 @@
- #include <syslog.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <errno.h>
- #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
- # include <vis.h>
- #endif
- 
- #include "log.h"
-+#include <signal.h>
- 
- static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
- static int log_on_stderr = 1;
- static int log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO;
- static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
- static char *argv0;
- static log_handler_fn *log_handler;
- static void *log_handler_ctx;
-@@ -383,16 +384,17 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, 
- {
- #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
- 	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
- #endif
- 	char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
- 	char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
- 	char *txt = NULL;
- 	int pri = LOG_INFO;
-+	sigset_t nset, oset;
- 	int saved_errno = errno;
- 	log_handler_fn *tmp_handler;
- 
- 	if (level > log_level)
- 		return;
- 
- 	switch (level) {
- 	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
-@@ -441,20 +443,29 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, 
- 		tmp_handler = log_handler;
- 		log_handler = NULL;
- 		tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);
- 		log_handler = tmp_handler;
- 	} else if (log_on_stderr) {
- 		snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%s\r\n", fmtbuf);
- 		(void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf));
- 	} else {
-+		/* Prevent a race between the grace_alarm
-+		* which writes a log message and terminates
-+		* and main sshd code that leads to deadlock 
-+		* as syslog is not async safe.
-+		*/ 
-+		sigemptyset(&nset);
-+		sigaddset(&nset, SIGALRM);
-+		sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
- #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
- 		openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
- 		syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
- 		closelog_r(&sdata);
- #else
- 		openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
- 		syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
- 		closelog();
- #endif
-+		sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
- 	}
- 	errno = saved_errno;
- }
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-ctr.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-ctr.patch
@ -1,300 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  cb502e7e796ac9289a571167a97ad9ec91562efb
-CAVS test for OpenSSH's own CTR encryption mode implementation
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
-@@ -21,16 +21,17 @@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
- 
- DESTDIR=
- VPATH=@srcdir@
- SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
- ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
- SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
- SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
-+CAVSTEST_CTR=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
- STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
- TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
- 
- PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
- 	-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
- 	-D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
-@@ -59,16 +60,18 @@ SED=@SED@
- ENT=@ENT@
- XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
- LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
- EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- MANFMT=@MANFMT@
- 
- TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 
-+TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
-+
- LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
- 	ssh_api.o \
- 	ssherr.o \
- 	sshbuf.o \
- 	sshkey.o \
- 	sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
- 	sshbuf-misc.o \
- 	sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \
-@@ -190,16 +193,20 @@ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
- sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
- 
- sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
- 
-+# FIPS tests
-+cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-ctr.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-+
- # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
- logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
- $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
- 	if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
- 		manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
- 	else \
-@@ -310,16 +317,17 @@ install-files:
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-ctr.c b/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-ctr.c
-new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-ctr.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
-+/*
-+ *
-+ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
-+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
-+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
-+ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/param.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <ctype.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+
-+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
-+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-+
-+void
-+usage(void)
-+{
-+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
-+	    "                    --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
-+	    "                    [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
-+	    "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
-+	    "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
-+	exit(1);
-+}
-+
-+void *
-+fromhex(char *hex, size_t * len)
-+{
-+	unsigned char *bin;
-+	char *p;
-+	size_t n = 0;
-+	int shift = 4;
-+	unsigned char out = 0;
-+	unsigned char *optr;
-+
-+	bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex) / 2);
-+	optr = bin;
-+
-+	for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
-+		unsigned char c;
-+
-+		c = *p;
-+		if (isspace(c))
-+			continue;
-+
-+		if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
-+			c = c - '0';
-+		} else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
-+			c = c - 'A' + 10;
-+		} else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
-+			c = c - 'a' + 10;
-+		} else {
-+			/* truncate on nonhex cipher */
-+			break;
-+		}
-+
-+		out |= c << shift;
-+		shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
-+
-+		if (shift) {
-+			*(optr++) = out;
-+			out = 0;
-+			++n;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	*len = n;
-+	return bin;
-+}
-+
-+#define READ_CHUNK 4096
-+#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
-+char *
-+read_stdin(void)
-+{
-+	char *buf;
-+	size_t n, total = 0;
-+
-+	buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
-+
-+	do {
-+		n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
-+		if (n < READ_CHUNK)	/* terminate on short read */
-+			break;
-+
-+		total += n;
-+		buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
-+	} while (total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
-+	return buf;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+main(int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+
-+	struct sshcipher *c;
-+	struct sshcipher_ctx cc;
-+	char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
-+	char *hexkey = NULL;
-+	char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
-+	char *hexdata = NULL;
-+	char *p;
-+	int i;
-+	int encrypt = 1;
-+	void *key;
-+	size_t keylen;
-+	void *iv;
-+	size_t ivlen;
-+	void *data;
-+	size_t datalen;
-+	void *outdata;
-+
-+	for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
-+		if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
-+			algo = argv[++i];
-+		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
-+			hexkey = argv[++i];
-+		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
-+			++i;
-+			if (argv[i] == NULL) {
-+				usage();
-+			}
-+			if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
-+				encrypt = 1;
-+			} else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
-+				encrypt = 0;
-+			} else {
-+				usage();
-+			}
-+		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
-+			hexiv = argv[++i];
-+		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
-+			hexdata = argv[++i];
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
-+		usage();
-+	}
-+
-+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
-+
-+	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
-+	if (c == NULL) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (hexdata == NULL) {
-+		hexdata = read_stdin();
-+	} else {
-+		hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
-+	}
-+
-+	key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
-+
-+	if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
-+
-+	if (ivlen != 16) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
-+
-+	if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt);
-+
-+	free(key);
-+	free(iv);
-+
-+	outdata = malloc(datalen);
-+	if (outdata == NULL) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	cipher_crypt(&cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0);
-+
-+	free(data);
-+
-+	cipher_cleanup(&cc);
-+
-+	for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
-+		printf("%02X", (unsigned char) *p);
-+	}
-+
-+	free(outdata);
-+
-+	printf("\n");
-+	return 0;
-+}
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-kdf.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-kdf.patch
@ -1,469 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  f9ffcfb88e5a9d611a61aee3571050dea67e363e
-CAVS test for KDF implementation in OpenSSH
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
-@@ -22,16 +22,17 @@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
- DESTDIR=
- VPATH=@srcdir@
- SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
- ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
- SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
- SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- CAVSTEST_CTR=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr
-+CAVSTEST_KDF=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-kdf
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
- STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
- TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
- 
- PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
- 	-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
- 	-D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
-@@ -60,17 +61,17 @@ SED=@SED@
- ENT=@ENT@
- XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
- LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
- EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- MANFMT=@MANFMT@
- 
- TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 
-TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT)
- 
- LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
- 	ssh_api.o \
- 	ssherr.o \
- 	sshbuf.o \
- 	sshkey.o \
- 	sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
- 	sshbuf-misc.o \
-@@ -197,16 +198,19 @@ sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss
- 
- sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
- 
- # FIPS tests
- cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-ctr.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-+cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-kdf.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-kdf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-+
- # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
- logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
- $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
- 	if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
- 		manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
- 	else \
-@@ -318,16 +322,17 @@ install-files:
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-kdf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-kdf.c
-new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-kdf.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
-+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
-+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
-+ *    written permission.
-+ *
-+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
-+ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
-+ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
-+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
-+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
-+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
-+ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
-+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
-+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
-+ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
-+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
-+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
-+ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
-+ * DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+
-+static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
-+{
-+	if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 48);
-+	if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 55);
-+	if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 87);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Convert hex representation into binary string
-+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
-+ * @hexlen length of hex
-+ * @bin output buffer with binary data
-+ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
-+ *	   half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
-+ */
-+static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
-+		    unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
-+{
-+	size_t i = 0;
-+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
-+		bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
-+		bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
-+ * and convert hex into bin
-+ *
-+ * Caller must free bin
-+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
-+ * @hexlen length of hex
-+ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
-+ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
-+ *
-+ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
-+ */
-+static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
-+			 unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
-+{
-+	unsigned char *out = NULL;
-+	size_t outlen = 0;
-+
-+	if (!hexlen)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
-+
-+	out = calloc(1, outlen);
-+	if (!out)
-+		return -errno;
-+
-+	hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
-+	*bin = out;
-+	*binlen = outlen;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
-+				 '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
-+static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
-+				 '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
-+static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
-+{
-+	if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
-+		return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
-+	return 'X';
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Convert binary string into hex representation
-+ * @bin input buffer with binary data
-+ * @binlen length of bin
-+ * @hex output buffer to store hex data
-+ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
-+ *	   twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
-+ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
-+ */
-+static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
-+		    char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
-+{
-+	size_t i = 0;
-+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
-+		hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
-+		hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+struct kdf_cavs {
-+	unsigned char *K;
-+	size_t Klen;
-+	unsigned char *H;
-+	size_t Hlen;
-+	unsigned char *session_id;
-+	size_t session_id_len;
-+
-+	unsigned int iv_len;
-+	unsigned int ek_len;
-+	unsigned int ik_len;
-+};
-+
-+static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
-+{
-+	int ret = 0;
-+	struct kex kex;
-+    struct ssh ssh;
-+	BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
-+	int mode = 0;
-+	struct newkeys *keys_client;
-+	struct newkeys *keys_server;
-+
-+#define HEXOUTLEN 500
-+	char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
-+
-+	memset(&ssh, 0, sizeof(struct ssh));
-+	memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
-+    ssh.kex = &kex;
-+
-+	Kbn = BN_new();
-+	BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
-+	if (!Kbn) {
-+		printf("cannot convert K into BIGNUM\n");
-+		ret = 1;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	kex.session_id = test->session_id;
-+	kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
-+
-+	/* setup kex */
-+
-+	/* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
-+	switch (test->ik_len) {
-+		case 20:
-+			kex.hash_alg = 2;
-+			break;
-+		case 32:
-+			kex.hash_alg = 3;
-+			break;
-+		case 48:
-+			kex.hash_alg = 4;
-+			break;
-+		case 64:
-+			kex.hash_alg = 5;
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
-+			ret = 1;
-+			goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* implement choose_enc */
-+	for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
-+		kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
-+		if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
-+			printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
-+			ret = 1;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* implement kex_choose_conf */
-+	kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
-+
-+	/* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
-+	 * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
-+	kex.server = 1;
-+
-+	/* do it */
-+	kex_derive_keys_bn(&ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kbn);
-+
-+	keys_client = ssh.kex->newkeys[0];
-+	keys_server = ssh.kex->newkeys[1];
-+
-+	/* get data */
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(keys_client->enc.iv, (size_t)keys_client->enc.iv_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(keys_server->enc.iv, (size_t)keys_server->enc.iv_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(keys_client->enc.key, (size_t)keys_client->enc.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(keys_server->enc.key, (size_t)keys_server->enc.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(keys_client->mac.key, (size_t)keys_client->mac.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(keys_server->mac.key, (size_t)keys_server->mac.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+	free(keys_client);
-+	free(keys_server);
-+
-+out:
-+	if (Kbn)
-+		BN_free(Kbn);
-+	if (kex.newkeys[0])
-+		free(kex.newkeys[0]);
-+	if (kex.newkeys[1])
-+		free(kex.newkeys[1]);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+static void usage(void)
-+{
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Test command example:
-+ * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
-+ *
-+ * Expected result for example:
-+ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
-+ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
-+ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
-+ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
-+ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
-+ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
-+ */
-+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+	struct kdf_cavs test;
-+	int ret = 1;
-+	int opt = 0;
-+
-+	memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
-+	while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
-+	{
-+		size_t len = 0;
-+		switch(opt)
-+		{
-+			/*
-+			 * CAVS K is MPINT
-+			 * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
-+			 * following transformations already happened):
-+			 * 	1. cut off first four bytes
-+			 * 	2. if most significant bit of value is
-+			 *	   1, prepend 0 byte
-+			 */
-+			case 'K':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.K, &test.Klen);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 'H':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.H, &test.Hlen);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 's':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.session_id,
-+						    &test.session_id_len);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 'i':
-+				test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			case 'e':
-+				test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			case 'm':
-+				test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				usage();
-+				goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
-+
-+out:
-+	if (test.session_id)
-+		free(test.session_id);
-+	if (test.K)
-+		free(test.K);
-+	if (test.H)
-+		free(test.H);
-+	return ret;
-+
-+}
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  4821397c95e57962905e6d47554bef9e4ea57483
-disable run-time check for OpenSSL ABI by version number as that is not a
-reliable indicator of ABI changes and doesn't make much sense in a
-distribution package
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
-@@ -4663,16 +4663,29 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth],
- 		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- 			AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1],
- 				[Define if you have BSD auth support])
- 			BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes
- 		fi
- 	]
- )
- 
-+# Whether we are using distribution (Open)SSL, so no runtime checks are necessary
-+DISTRO_SSL=no
-+AC_ARG_WITH([distro-ssl],
-+	[  --with-distro-ssl       Disable runtime OpenSSL version checks (good for distributions)],
-+	[
-+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-+			AC_DEFINE([DISTRO_SSL], [1],
-+                      [Define if you are using distribution SSL library and don;t expect its API/ABI to change])
-+			DISTRO_SSL=yes
-+		fi
-+	]
-+)
-+
- # Where to place sshd.pid
- piddir=/var/run
- # make sure the directory exists
- if test ! -d $piddir ; then
- 	piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
- 	case $piddir in
- 		NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
- 	esac
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c b/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
-@@ -209,19 +209,21 @@ rexec_recv_rng_seed(Buffer *m)
- #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
- 
- void
- seed_rng(void)
- {
- #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
- 	unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
- #endif
-+#ifndef DISTRO_SSL
- 	if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()))
- 		fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
- 		    "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
-+#endif
- 
- #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
- 	if (RAND_status() == 1) {
- 		debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
- 		return;
- 	}
- 
- 	if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-disable_preauth_compression.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-disable_preauth_compression.patch
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
@ -1,695 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  7b5f436e0026923299fdd1994f8da8fd9948be7c
-
-Raise minimal size of DH group parameters to 2048 bits like upstream did in
-7.2. 1024b values are believed to be in breaking range for state adversaries
-and the default moduli shipped with openssh have been around long enough to
-make it more likely for them to be broken.
-
-Also provide an option that allows the client to accept shorter (RFC4419
-compliant) parameters.
-
-CVE-2015-4000 (LOGJAM)
-bsc#932483
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c
-@@ -37,16 +37,18 @@
- #include <limits.h>
- 
- #include "dh.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
- 
-+int dh_grp_min = DH_GRP_MIN;
-+
- static int
- parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg)
- {
- 	char *cp, *arg;
- 	char *strsize, *gen, *prime;
- 	const char *errstr = NULL;
- 	long long n;
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h
-@@ -43,16 +43,17 @@ int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
- int	 dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);
- 
- u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
- 
- /*
-  * Max value from RFC4419.
-  * Miniumum increased in light of DH precomputation attacks.
-  */
-+#define DH_GRP_MIN_RFC	1024
- #define DH_GRP_MIN	2048
- #define DH_GRP_MAX	8192
- 
- /*
-  * Values for "type" field of moduli(5)
-  * Specifies the internal structure of the prime modulus.
-  */
- #define MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN		(0)
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c
-@@ -46,29 +46,32 @@
- #include "packet.h"
- #include "dh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
- #include "compat.h"
- #include "dispatch.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- 
-+/* import from dh.c */
-+extern int dh_grp_min;
-+
- static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- 
- int
- kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
- {
- 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
- 	int r;
- 	u_int nbits;
- 
- 	nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
- 
-	kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
-+	kex->min = dh_grp_min;
- 	kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
- 	kex->nbits = nbits;
- 	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE)
- 		kex->nbits = MIN(kex->nbits, 4096);
- 	/* New GEX request */
- 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
-@@ -104,16 +107,22 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, p)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, g)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
- 	if ((bits = BN_num_bits(p)) < 0 ||
- 	    (u_int)bits < kex->min || (u_int)bits > kex->max) {
-+		if ((u_int)bits < kex->min && (u_int)bits >= DH_GRP_MIN_RFC)
-+			logit("DH parameter offered by the server (%d bits) "
-+			    "is considered insecure. "
-+			    "You can lower the accepted the minimum "
-+			    "via the KexDHMin option.",
-+			    bits);
- 		r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 	if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c
-@@ -49,16 +49,19 @@
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- #endif
- #include "monitor_wrap.h"
- #include "dispatch.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- 
-+/* import from dh.c */
-+extern int dh_grp_min;
-+
- static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- 
- int
- kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh)
- {
- 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST,
- 	    &input_kex_dh_gex_request);
-@@ -78,23 +81,29 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int
- 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
- 	kex->nbits = nbits;
- 	kex->min = min;
- 	kex->max = max;
-	min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
-+	min = MAX(dh_grp_min, min);
- 	max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
-	nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
-+	nbits = MAX(dh_grp_min, nbits);
- 	nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
- 
- 	if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min ||
- 	    kex->max < kex->nbits) {
-+		if (kex->nbits < kex->min && kex->nbits >= DH_GRP_MIN_RFC)
-+			logit("DH parameter requested by the client (%d bits) "
-+			    "is considered insecure. "
-+			    "You can lower the accepted minimum "
-+			    "via the KexDHMin option.",
-+			    kex->nbits);
- 		r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
- 	/* Contact privileged parent */
- 	kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
- 	if (kex->dh == NULL) {
- 		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "no matching DH grp found");
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
-@@ -56,16 +56,17 @@
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "readconf.h"
- #include "match.h"
- #include "kex.h"
- #include "mac.h"
- #include "uidswap.h"
- #include "myproposal.h"
- #include "digest.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
- 
- /* Format of the configuration file:
- 
-    # Configuration data is parsed as follows:
-    #  1. command line options
-    #  2. user-specific file
-    #  3. system-wide file
-    # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
-@@ -148,17 +149,18 @@ typedef enum {
- 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
- 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
- 	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
- 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
- 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
- 	oHashKnownHosts,
- 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
- 	oVisualHostKey,
-	oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
-+	oKexAlgorithms, oKexDHMin,
-+	oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
- 	oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
- 	oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
- 	oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
- 	oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
- 	oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes,
- 	oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
- } OpCodes;
- 
-@@ -260,16 +262,17 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts },
- 	{ "tunnel", oTunnel },
- 	{ "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice },
- 	{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
- 	{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
- 	{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
- 	{ "useroaming", oDeprecated },
- 	{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
-+	{ "kexdhmin", oKexDHMin },
- 	{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
- 	{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
- 	{ "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass },
- 	{ "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains },
- 	{ "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal },
- 	{ "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname },
- 	{ "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots },
- 	{ "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs },
-@@ -280,16 +283,19 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys },
- 	{ "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes },
- 	{ "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
- 	{ "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
- 
- 	{ NULL, oBadOption }
- };
- 
-+/* import from dh.c */
-+extern int dh_grp_min;
-+
- /*
-  * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options.  Never returns if there is an
-  * error.
-  */
- 
- void
- add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
- {
-@@ -1157,16 +1163,20 @@ parse_int:
- 			    filename, linenum);
- 		if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
- 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
- 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
- 		if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
- 			options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
- 		break;
- 
-+	case oKexDHMin:
-+		intptr = &options->kex_dhmin;
-+		goto parse_int;
-+
- 	case oHostKeyAlgorithms:
- 		charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
- parse_keytypes:
- 		arg = strdelim(&s);
- 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
- 			    filename, linenum);
- 		if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
-@@ -1664,16 +1674,17 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
- 	options->address_family = -1;
- 	options->connection_attempts = -1;
- 	options->connection_timeout = -1;
- 	options->number_of_password_prompts = -1;
- 	options->cipher = -1;
- 	options->ciphers = NULL;
- 	options->macs = NULL;
- 	options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
-+	options->kex_dhmin = -1;
- 	options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
- 	options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
- 	options->num_identity_files = 0;
- 	options->num_certificate_files = 0;
- 	options->hostname = NULL;
- 	options->host_key_alias = NULL;
- 	options->proxy_command = NULL;
- 	options->user = NULL;
-@@ -1805,16 +1816,23 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 		options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
- 	if (options->connection_attempts == -1)
- 		options->connection_attempts = 1;
- 	if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1)
- 		options->number_of_password_prompts = 3;
- 	/* Selected in ssh_login(). */
- 	if (options->cipher == -1)
- 		options->cipher = SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET;
-+	if (options->kex_dhmin == -1)
-+		options->kex_dhmin = DH_GRP_MIN_RFC;
-+	else {
-+		options->kex_dhmin = MAX(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC);
-+		options->kex_dhmin = MIN(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX);
-+	}
-+	dh_grp_min = options->kex_dhmin;
- 	/* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
- 	if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
- 		options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
- 	if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1)
- 		options->add_keys_to_agent = 0;
- 	if (options->num_identity_files == 0) {
- 		if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
- 			add_identity_file(options, "~/",
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h
-@@ -69,16 +69,17 @@ typedef struct {
- 					 * aborting connection attempt */
- 	int     number_of_password_prompts;	/* Max number of password
- 						 * prompts. */
- 	int     cipher;		/* Cipher to use. */
- 	char   *ciphers;	/* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */
- 	char   *macs;		/* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */
- 	char   *hostkeyalgorithms;	/* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */
- 	char   *kex_algorithms;	/* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
-+	int     kex_dhmin;	/* minimum bit length of the DH group parameter */
- 	int	protocol;	/* Protocol in order of preference. */
- 	char   *hostname;	/* Real host to connect. */
- 	char   *host_key_alias;	/* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
- 	char   *proxy_command;	/* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
- 	char   *user;		/* User to log in as. */
- 	int     escape_char;	/* Escape character; -2 = none */
- 
- 	u_int	num_system_hostfiles;	/* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
-@@ -52,16 +52,20 @@
- #include "channels.h"
- #include "groupaccess.h"
- #include "canohost.h"
- #include "packet.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
- #include "myproposal.h"
- #include "digest.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+
-+/* import from dh.c */
-+extern int dh_grp_min;
- 
- static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
- static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
- 
- /* Use of privilege separation or not */
- extern int use_privsep;
- extern Buffer cfg;
- 
-@@ -134,16 +138,17 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions 
- 	options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1;
- 	options->num_allow_users = 0;
- 	options->num_deny_users = 0;
- 	options->num_allow_groups = 0;
- 	options->num_deny_groups = 0;
- 	options->ciphers = NULL;
- 	options->macs = NULL;
- 	options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
-+	options->kex_dhmin = -1;
- 	options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
- 	options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1;
- 	options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1;
- 	options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
- 	options->num_subsystems = 0;
- 	options->max_startups_begin = -1;
- 	options->max_startups_rate = -1;
- 	options->max_startups = -1;
-@@ -199,16 +204,23 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- 	int i;
- 
- 	/* Portable-specific options */
- 	if (options->use_pam == -1)
- 		options->use_pam = 0;
- 	if (options->use_pam_check_locks == -1)
- 		options->use_pam_check_locks = 0;
- 
-+	if (options->kex_dhmin == -1)
-+		options->kex_dhmin = DH_GRP_MIN_RFC;
-+	else {
-+		options->kex_dhmin = MAX(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC);
-+		options->kex_dhmin = MIN(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX);
-+	}
-+	dh_grp_min = options->kex_dhmin;
- 	/* Standard Options */
- 	if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
- 		options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
- 	if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
- 		/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
- 		if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
- 			options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
- 			    _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE;
-@@ -423,17 +435,18 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
- 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
- 	sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
- 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
- 	sHostCertificate,
- 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
- 	sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
-	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
-+	sKexAlgorithms, sKexDHMin,
-+	sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
- 	sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
- 	sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
- 	sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
- 	sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash,
- 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
- } ServerOpCodes;
- 
- #define SSHCFG_GLOBAL	0x01	/* allowed in main section of sshd_config */
-@@ -561,16 +574,17 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "kexdhmin", sKexDHMin },
- 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL },
-@@ -1481,16 +1495,20 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 			    filename, linenum);
- 		if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
- 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
- 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
- 		if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
- 			options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
- 		break;
- 
-+	case sKexDHMin:
-+		intptr = &options->kex_dhmin;
-+		goto parse_int;
-+
- 	case sProtocol:
- 		intptr = &options->protocol;
- 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
- 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- 		value = proto_spec(arg);
- 		if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
- 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.",
-@@ -2247,16 +2265,17 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sKeyRegenerationTime, o->key_regeneration_time);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
- 	dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
-+	dump_cfg_int(sKexDHMin, o->kex_dhmin);
- 
- 	/* formatted integer arguments */
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly,
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
-@@ -88,16 +88,17 @@ typedef struct {
- 	int	permit_user_rc;	/* If false, deny ~/.ssh/rc execution */
- 	int     strict_modes;	/* If true, require string home dir modes. */
- 	int     tcp_keep_alive;	/* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
- 	int	ip_qos_interactive;	/* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
- 	int	ip_qos_bulk;		/* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
- 	char   *ciphers;	/* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */
- 	char   *macs;		/* Supported SSH2 macs. */
- 	char   *kex_algorithms;	/* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
-+	int     kex_dhmin;	/* minimum bit length of the DH group parameter */
- 	int	protocol;	/* Supported protocol versions. */
- 	struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts;	/* forwarding options */
- 	SyslogFacility log_facility;	/* Facility for system logging. */
- 	LogLevel log_level;	/* Level for system logging. */
- 	int     rhosts_rsa_authentication;	/* If true, permit rhosts RSA
- 						 * authentication. */
- 	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */
- 	int     hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
-@@ -12,16 +12,21 @@
- # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
- # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
- # configuration file, and defaults at the end.
- 
- # Site-wide defaults for some commonly used options.  For a comprehensive
- # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
- # ssh_config(5) man page.
- 
-+# Minimum accepted size of the DH parameter p. By default this is set to 1024
-+# to maintain compatibility with RFC4419, but should be set higher.
-+# Upstream default is identical to setting this to 2048.
-+#KexDHMin 1024
-+
- Host *
- #   ForwardAgent no
- #   ForwardX11 no
- 
- # If you do not trust your remote host (or its administrator), you
- # should not forward X11 connections to your local X11-display for
- # security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the
- # remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0
-@@ -606,16 +606,33 @@ DESCRIPTION
-                    ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
-                    diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
-                    diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
-                    diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
- 
-              The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
-              obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\kexM-bM-^@M-^].
- 
-+     KexDHMin
-+             Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group
-+             parameter p.
-+
-+             As per RFC4419, this is 1024 bits, however this has increasingly
-+             been seen as insecure, which prompted the change to 2048 bits.
-+             Setting this option allows the client to accept parameters shorter
-+             than the current minimum, down to the RFC specified 1024 bits.
-+             Using this option may be needed when connecting to servers that
-+             only know short DH group parameters.
-+
-+             Note, that while by default this option is set to 1024 to maintain
-+             maximum backward compatibility, using it can severly impact
-+             security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last
-+             resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken)
-+             counterparty.
-+
-      LocalCommand
-              Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after
-              successfully connecting to the server.  The command string
-              extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's
-              shell.  The following escape character substitutions will be
-              performed: M-bM-^@M-^X%dM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user's home directory), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote host
-              name), M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y (local host name), M-bM-^@M-^X%nM-bM-^@M-^Y (host name as provided on the
-              command line), M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote port), M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote user name) or
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
-@@ -1092,16 +1092,32 @@ diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
- .Ed
- .Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using the
- .Fl Q
- option of
- .Xr ssh 1
- with an argument of
- .Dq kex .
-+.It Cm KexDHMin
-+Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group
-+parameter p.
-+.Pp
-+As per RFC4419, this is 1024 bits, however this has increasingly
-+been seen as insecure, which prompted the change to 2048 bits.
-+Setting this option allows the client to accept parameters shorter
-+than the current minimum, down to the RFC specified 1024 bits.
-+Using this option may be needed when connecting to servers that
-+only know short DH group parameters.
-+.Pp
-+Note, that while by default this option is set to 1024 to maintain
-+maximum backward compatibility, using it can severly impact
-+security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last
-+resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken)
-+counterparty.
- .It Cm LocalCommand
- Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully
- connecting to the server.
- The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
- the user's shell.
- The following escape character substitutions will be performed:
- .Ql %d
- (local user's home directory),
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
-@@ -21,16 +21,21 @@
- # HostKey for protocol version 1
- #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
- # HostKeys for protocol version 2
- #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
- #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
- #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
- #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
- 
-+# Minimum accepted size of the DH parameter p. By default this is set to 1024
-+# to maintain compatibility with RFC4419, but should be set higher.
-+# Upstream default is identical to setting this to 2048.
-+#KexDHMin 1024
-+
- # Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key
- #KeyRegenerationInterval 1h
- #ServerKeyBits 1024
- 
- # Ciphers and keying
- #RekeyLimit default none
- 
- # Logging
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
-@@ -539,16 +539,33 @@ DESCRIPTION
-                    curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
-                    ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
-                    diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
-                    diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
- 
-              The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
-              obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\kexM-bM-^@M-^].
- 
-+     KexDHMin
-+             Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group
-+             parameter p.
-+
-+             As per RFC4419, this is 1024 bits, however this has increasingly
-+             been seen as insecure, which prompted the change to 2048 bits.
-+             Setting this option allows the server to accept parameters shorter
-+             than the current minimum, down to the RFC specified 1024 bits.
-+             Using this option may be needed when some of the connectiong
-+             clients only know short DH group parameters.
-+
-+             Note, that while by default this option is set to 1024 to maintain
-+             maximum backward compatibility, using it can severly impact
-+             security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last
-+             resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken)
-+             counterparty.
-+
-      KeyRegenerationInterval
-              In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically
-              regenerated after this many seconds (if it has been used).  The
-              purpose of regeneration is to prevent decrypting captured
-              sessions by later breaking into the machine and stealing the
-              keys.  The key is never stored anywhere.  If the value is 0, the
-              key is never regenerated.  The default is 3600 (seconds).
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-@@ -895,16 +895,32 @@ diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
- .Ed
- .Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using the
- .Fl Q
- option of
- .Xr ssh 1
- with an argument of
- .Dq kex .
-+.It Cm KexDHMin
-+Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group
-+parameter p.
-+.Pp
-+As per RFC4419, this is 1024 bits, however this has increasingly
-+been seen as insecure, which prompted the change to 2048 bits.
-+Setting this option allows the server to accept parameters shorter
-+than the current minimum, down to the RFC specified 1024 bits.
-+Using this option may be needed when some of the connectiong
-+clients only know short DH group parameters.
-+.Pp
-+Note, that while by default this option is set to 1024 to maintain
-+maximum backward compatibility, using it can severly impact
-+security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last
-+resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken)
-+counterparty.
- .It Cm KeyRegenerationInterval
- In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated
- after this many seconds (if it has been used).
- The purpose of regeneration is to prevent
- decrypting captured sessions by later breaking into the machine and
- stealing the keys.
- The key is never stored anywhere.
- If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated.
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch
@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  e4886597a8984ae1594b6866fe1b232370b23529
-# posix threads are generally not supported nor safe
-# (see upstream log from 2005-05-24)
-# --used to be called '-pam-fix3'
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
-@@ -782,17 +782,19 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
- 			}
- 			if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
- 				if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||
- 				    (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
- 				    options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
- 					fatal("Internal error: PAM auth "
- 					    "succeeded when it should have "
- 					    "failed");
-+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
- 				import_environments(&buffer);
-+#endif
- 				*num = 0;
- 				**echo_on = 0;
- 				ctxt->pam_done = 1;
- 				free(msg);
- 				return (0);
- 			}
- 			error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg,
- 			    sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch
@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  f19426f2fa9c634474e635bf33b86acea0518f6d
-fix paths and references in sshd man pages
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
-@@ -901,17 +901,17 @@ See
- If this file exists,
- .Nm
- refuses to let anyone except root log in.
- The contents of the file
- are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
- refused.
- The file should be world-readable.
- .Pp
-.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
-+.It Pa /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv
- This file is used in exactly the same way as
- .Pa hosts.equiv ,
- but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
- rlogin/rsh.
- .Pp
- .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
- .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
- .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
-@@ -981,17 +981,17 @@ The content of this file is not sensitiv
- .Xr scp 1 ,
- .Xr sftp 1 ,
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
- .Xr chroot 2 ,
-.Xr login.conf 5 ,
-+.Xr login.defs 5 ,
- .Xr moduli 5 ,
- .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
- .Xr inetd 8 ,
- .Xr sftp-server 8
- .Sh AUTHORS
- OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
- ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
- Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-@@ -370,18 +370,17 @@ for details).
- The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before
- authentication is allowed.
- If the argument is
- .Dq none
- then no banner is displayed.
- By default, no banner is displayed.
- .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
- Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
-PAM or through authentication styles supported in
-.Xr login.conf 5 )
-+PAM)
- The default is
- .Dq yes .
- .It Cm ChrootDirectory
- Specifies the pathname of a directory to
- .Xr chroot 2
- to after authentication.
- At session startup
- .Xr sshd 8
-@@ -766,17 +765,17 @@ and
- .Pa .shosts
- files will not be used in
- .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
- or
- .Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
- .Pp
- .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
- and
-.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
-+.Pa /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv
- are still used.
- The default is
- .Dq yes .
- .It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts
- Specifies whether
- .Xr sshd 8
- should ignore the user's
- .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  980f301b2920c09b30577dd722546bca85d25fc1
-# force PAM in defaullt install (this was removed from upstream in 3.8p1)
-# bnc#46749
-# --used to be called '-pam-fix2'
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
-@@ -64,17 +64,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- #HostbasedAuthentication no
- # Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for
- # RhostsRSAAuthentication and HostbasedAuthentication
- #IgnoreUserKnownHosts no
- # Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
- #IgnoreRhosts yes
- 
- # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
-#PasswordAuthentication yes
-+PasswordAuthentication no
- #PermitEmptyPasswords no
- 
- # Change to no to disable s/key passwords
- #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
- 
- # Kerberos options
- #KerberosAuthentication no
- #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
-@@ -89,17 +89,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
- # be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
- # PasswordAuthentication.  Depending on your PAM configuration,
- # PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
- # the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
- # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
-#UsePAM no
-+UsePAM yes
- 
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes
- #AllowTcpForwarding yes
- #GatewayPorts no
- X11Forwarding yes
- #X11DisplayOffset 10
- #X11UseLocalhost yes
- #PermitTTY yes
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-fips.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-fips.patch
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch
@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  e2f9b3303b4a4ed5d0e5f01009dd1ebea166890d
-Suggest command line for removal of offending keys from known_hosts file
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c
-@@ -1086,16 +1086,21 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
- 				    ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
- 		}
- 		/* The host key has changed. */
- 		warn_changed_key(host_key);
- 		error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
- 		    user_hostfiles[0]);
- 		error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
- 		    host_found->file, host_found->line);
-+		error("You can use following command to remove the offending key:");
-+		if (host_found->file)
-+			error("ssh-keygen -R %s -f %s", host, host_found->file);
-+		else
-+			error("ssh-keygen -R %s", host);
- 
- 		/*
- 		 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
- 		 * to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
- 		 */
- 		if (options.strict_host_key_checking) {
- 			error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
- 			    "requested strict checking.", type, host);
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  f7ba2081f120bd1e44dbe68737c898f078725aab
-# -- uset do be called '-xauthlocalhostname'
-handle hostname changes when forwarding X
-
-bnc#98627
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
-@@ -1154,17 +1154,17 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char ***
- 		debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
- 		child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
- 
- 		free(var_name);
- 	}
- }
- 
- static char **
-do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
-+do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell, int *env_size)
- {
- 	char buf[256];
- 	u_int i, envsize;
- 	char **env, *laddr;
- 	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
- #if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
- 	char *path = NULL;
- #endif
-@@ -1341,25 +1341,27 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
- 		read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
- 	}
- 	if (debug_flag) {
- 		/* dump the environment */
- 		fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
- 		for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
- 			fprintf(stderr, "  %.200s\n", env[i]);
- 	}
-+
-+	*env_size = envsize;
- 	return env;
- }
- 
- /*
-  * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found
-  * first in this order).
-  */
- static void
-do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell)
-+do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell, char **env, int *env_size)
- {
- 	FILE *f = NULL;
- 	char cmd[1024];
- 	int do_xauth;
- 	struct stat st;
- 
- 	do_xauth =
- 	    s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
-@@ -1404,22 +1406,30 @@ do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shel
- 			    "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
- 			    options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
- 			    s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
- 		}
- 		snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -",
- 		    options.xauth_location);
- 		f = popen(cmd, "w");
- 		if (f) {
-+			char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
-+		    
- 			fprintf(f, "remove %s\n",
- 			    s->auth_display);
- 			fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n",
- 			    s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
- 			    s->auth_data);
- 			pclose(f);
-+			if (gethostname(hostname,sizeof(hostname)) >= 0)
-+			    child_set_env(&env,env_size,"XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME",
-+					  hostname);
-+			else
-+			    debug("Cannot set up XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME %s\n",
-+				  strerror(errno));
- 		} else {
- 			fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
- 			    cmd);
- 		}
- 	}
- }
- 
- static void
-@@ -1681,16 +1691,17 @@ child_close_fds(void)
-  * ids, and executing the command or shell.
-  */
- #define ARGV_MAX 10
- void
- do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
- {
- 	extern char **environ;
- 	char **env;
-+	int env_size;
- 	char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
- 	const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL;
- 	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
- 	int r = 0;
- 
- 	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
- 	destroy_sensitive_data();
- 
-@@ -1747,17 +1758,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 	 * legal, and means /bin/sh.
- 	 */
- 	shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
- 	 * even if shell is overridden from login.conf
- 	 */
-	env = do_setup_env(s, shell);
-+	env = do_setup_env(s, shell, &env_size);
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- 	shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
- #endif
- 
- 	/* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */
- 	if (options.use_login)
- 		hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
-@@ -1816,17 +1827,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 		}
- 		if (r)
- 			exit(1);
- 	}
- 
- 	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
- 
- 	if (!options.use_login)
-		do_rc_files(s, shell);
-+		do_rc_files(s, shell, env, &env_size);
- 
- 	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
- 	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
- 
- 	if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) {
- 		printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n");
- 		fflush(NULL);
- 		exit(1);
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch
@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  0f00e960e1069c6a6eec975cc184171343701077
-
-Do not import PAM environment variables when using login, since it may have
-security implications.
-
-CVE-2015-8325
-bsc#975865
-
-Backport of upstream commit 85bdcd7c92fe7ff133bbc4e10a65c91810f88755
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
-@@ -1351,17 +1351,17 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
- 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
- 		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
- #endif
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	/*
- 	 * Pull in any environment variables that may have
- 	 * been set by PAM.
- 	 */
-	if (options.use_pam) {
-+	if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login) {
- 		char **p;
- 
- 		p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
- 		copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
- 		free_pam_environment(p);
- 
- 		p = fetch_pam_environment();
- 		copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-keep_slogin.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-keep_slogin.patch
@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  7c29b31d3502bbf5b80e01f8d1db8b2733a3c7f4
-Add slogin back to the distribution, since it might be used downstreams
-
-Revert of cupstream commit 69fead5d7cdaa73bdece9fcba80f8e8e70b90346
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
-@@ -354,16 +354,20 @@ install-files:
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
- 	if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8 ; \
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap.conf.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh-ldap.conf.5 ; \
- 	fi
-+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
-+	ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
-+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
-+	ln -s ./ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
- 
- install-sysconf:
- 	if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) ]; then \
- 		$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir); \
- 	fi
- 	@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \
- 	else \
-@@ -415,16 +419,17 @@ uninstallall:	uninstall
- 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
- 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
- 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
- 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
- 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)
- 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
- 
- uninstall:
-+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
- 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
- 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
- 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
- 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
- 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
- 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
- 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
-@@ -440,16 +445,17 @@ uninstall:
- 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
- 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
- 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
- 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
- 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
- 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
- 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
- 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8
-+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
- 
- regress-prep:
- 	[ -d `pwd`/regress ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress
- 	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests
- 	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper ] || \
- 		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper
- 	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf ] || \
- 		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-kex_resource_depletion.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-kex_resource_depletion.patch
@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  5d3b620e9c7c42bfb1d8f24eb7e0645a55d967fa
-Prevent memory depletion during key exchange
-
-CVE-2016-8858
-bsc#1005480
-
-upstream commit ec165c392ca54317dbe3064a8c200de6531e89ad
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
-@@ -523,16 +523,17 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t se
- 	u_int i;
- 	size_t dlen;
- 	int r;
- 
- 	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
- 	if (kex == NULL)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
-+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
- 	ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
- 		return r;
- 
- 	/* discard packet */
- 	for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
- 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0)
- 			return r;
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  79c00e0f450c33b3f545ef104112b55186290e2c
-# set uid for functions that use it to seek in lastlog and wtmp files
-# bnc#18024 (was suse #3024)
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c
-@@ -129,16 +129,17 @@ record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty,
- {
- 	struct logininfo *li;
- 
- 	/* save previous login details before writing new */
- 	store_lastlog_message(user, uid);
- 
- 	li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, tty);
- 	login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen);
-+	li->uid = uid;
- 	login_login(li);
- 	login_free_entry(li);
- }
- 
- #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
- void
- record_utmp_only(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user,
- 		 const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen)
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-ldap.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-ldap.patch
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch
@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  9888bc3f536eab9f528d9c96e5e8a2501ed168f5
-Limit accepted passwords length to prevent DoS by resource consumption
-(via crypt() eating CPU cycles).
-
-CVE-2016-6515
-bsc#992533
-
-upstream commit: fcd135c9df440bcd2d5870405ad3311743d78d97
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
-@@ -61,16 +61,18 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
- #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- extern login_cap_t *lc;
- #endif
- 
- 
- #define DAY		(24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
- #define TWO_WEEKS	(2L * 7 * DAY)	/* 2 weeks in seconds */
- 
-+#define MAX_PASSWORD_LEN	1024
-+
- void
- disable_forwarding(void)
- {
- 	no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
- 	no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
- 	no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
- }
- 
-@@ -82,16 +84,19 @@ int
- auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- {
- 	struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw;
- 	int result, ok = authctxt->valid;
- #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
- 	static int expire_checked = 0;
- #endif
- 
-+	if (strlen(password) > MAX_PASSWORD_LEN)
-+		return 0;
-+
- #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- 	if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
- 		ok = 0;
- #endif
- 	if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
- 		return 0;
- 
- #ifdef KRB5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch
@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  b86c2190c93aeaf958c22fc7b224dcaf87100288
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  b262fd34c8ecd55e93d457b3ca5593abce716856
-# login-pam cannot handle the option terminator "--" as login from util-linux
-# (this is correct behaviour considering its man-page), hence use option which
-# selects the compile-time branch in the code which doesn't use the terminator
-#
-# bnc#833605
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
-@@ -770,16 +770,18 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
- 	AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
- 	AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
- 	;;
- *-*-linux*)
- 	no_dev_ptmx=1
- 	use_pie=auto
- 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
- 	check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
-+	AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT], [1],
-+		[Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--")])
- 	AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1],
- 		[Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY])
- 	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"],
- 		[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
- 	AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
- 	AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM],
- 		[Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported"
- 		if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.])
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  4011d0f5c00b663976c9940dc4ef79642605cf90
-Do not write a PID file when not daemonizing (e.g. when running from systemd)
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
-@@ -2107,17 +2107,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
- 		signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
- 		signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
- 
- 		/*
- 		 * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
- 		 * is setup and the listen sockets are bound
- 		 */
-		if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) {
-+		if (!no_daemon_flag && options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) {
- 			FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
- 
- 			if (f == NULL) {
- 				error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
- 				    options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
- 			} else {
- 				fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
- 				fclose(f);
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch
@ -1,229 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  ac7f843cd7ebec413691d51823cdc67b611abdff
-new option UsePAMCheckLocks to enforce checking for locked accounts while
-UsePAM is used
-
-bnc#708678, FATE#312033
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
-@@ -104,17 +104,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
- 	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
- #endif
- 
- 	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
- 	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
- 		return 0;
- 
- #ifdef USE_SHADOW
-	if (!options.use_pam)
-+	if (!options.use_pam || options.use_pam_check_locks)
- 		spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
- #ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
- 	if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
- 		return 0;
- #endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
- #endif /* USE_SHADOW */
- 
- 	/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
-@@ -124,17 +124,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
- #ifdef USE_LIBIAF
- 		passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
- #else
- 		passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
- #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
- #endif
- 
- 	/* check for locked account */
-	if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
-+	if ((!options.use_pam || options.use_pam_check_locks) && passwd && *passwd) {
- 		int locked = 0;
- 
- #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
- 		if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
- 			 locked = 1;
- #endif
- #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
- 		if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
-@@ -69,16 +69,17 @@ extern Buffer cfg;
- 
- void
- initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- {
- 	memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options));
- 
- 	/* Portable-specific options */
- 	options->use_pam = -1;
-+	options->use_pam_check_locks = -1;
- 
- 	/* Standard Options */
- 	options->num_ports = 0;
- 	options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
- 	options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL;
- 	options->num_queued_listens = 0;
- 	options->listen_addrs = NULL;
- 	options->address_family = -1;
-@@ -195,16 +196,18 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
- void
- fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- {
- 	int i;
- 
- 	/* Portable-specific options */
- 	if (options->use_pam == -1)
- 		options->use_pam = 0;
-+	if (options->use_pam_check_locks == -1)
-+		options->use_pam_check_locks = 0;
- 
- 	/* Standard Options */
- 	if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
- 		options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
- 	if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
- 		/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
- 		if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
- 			options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
-@@ -391,17 +394,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- #endif
- 
- }
- 
- /* Keyword tokens. */
- typedef enum {
- 	sBadOption,		/* == unknown option */
- 	/* Portable-specific options */
-	sUsePAM,
-+	sUsePAM, sUsePAMChecklocks,
- 	/* Standard Options */
- 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime,
- 	sKeyRegenerationTime, sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
- 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
- 	sKerberosGetAFSToken,
- 	sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
-@@ -441,18 +444,20 @@ typedef enum {
- static struct {
- 	const char *name;
- 	ServerOpCodes opcode;
- 	u_int flags;
- } keywords[] = {
- 	/* Portable-specific options */
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	{ "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "usepamchecklocks", sUsePAMChecklocks, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #else
- 	{ "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "usepamchecklocks", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
- 	{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	/* Standard Options */
- 	{ "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },		/* alias */
- 	{ "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1005,16 +1010,19 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		}
- 	}
- 
- 	switch (opcode) {
- 	/* Portable-specific options */
- 	case sUsePAM:
- 		intptr = &options->use_pam;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-+	case sUsePAMChecklocks:
-+		intptr = &options->use_pam_check_locks;
-+		goto parse_flag;
- 
- 	/* Standard Options */
- 	case sBadOption:
- 		return -1;
- 	case sPort:
- 		/* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
- 		if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
- 			return 0;
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
-@@ -167,16 +167,17 @@ typedef struct {
- 					 */
- 
- 	u_int num_authkeys_files;	/* Files containing public keys */
- 	char   *authorized_keys_files[MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES];
- 
- 	char   *adm_forced_command;
- 
- 	int	use_pam;		/* Enable auth via PAM */
-+	int	use_pam_check_locks;	/* internally check for locked accounts even when using PAM */
- 
- 	int	permit_tun;
- 
- 	int	num_permitted_opens;
- 
- 	char   *chroot_directory;
- 	char   *revoked_keys_file;
- 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
-@@ -946,16 +946,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
- 
-              Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an
-              equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable
-              either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
- 
-              If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
-              non-root user.  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
- 
-+     UsePAMCheckLocks
-+             When set to ``yes'', the checks whether the account has been
-+             locked with `passwd -l' are performed even when PAM authentication
-+             is enabled via UsePAM.  This is to ensure that it is not possible
-+             to log in with e.g. a public key (in such a case PAM is used only
-+             to set up the session and some PAM modules will not check whether
-+             the account is locked in this scenario). The default is ``no''.
-+
-      UsePrivilegeSeparation
-              Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an
-              unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic.
-              After successful authentication, another process will be created
-              that has the privilege of the authenticated user.  The goal of
-              privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by
-              containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes.  The
-              argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\sandboxM-bM-^@M-^].  If
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1578,16 +1578,28 @@ or
- .Pp
- If
- .Cm UsePAM
- is enabled, you will not be able to run
- .Xr sshd 8
- as a non-root user.
- The default is
- .Dq no .
-+.It Cm UsePAMCheckLocks
-+When set to 
-+.Dq yes
-+, the checks whether the account has been locked with
-+.Pa passwd -l
-+are performed even when PAM authentication is enabled via 
-+.Cm UsePAM .
-+This is to ensure that it is not possible to log in with e.g. a
-+public key (in such a case PAM is used only to set up the session and some PAM
-+modules will not check whether the account is locked in this scenario). The
-+default is 
-+.Dq no .
- .It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
- Specifies whether
- .Xr sshd 8
- separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process
- to deal with incoming network traffic.
- After successful authentication, another process will be created that has
- the privilege of the authenticated user.
- The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-prevent_private_key_leakage.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-prevent_private_key_leakage.patch
@ -1,188 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  e2a8c999f737bca97bbc330ce6683de842ba195e
-Pre-allocare buffer for private keys data to prevent leaking of sensitive data
-via heap.
-
-CVE-2016-10011
-bsc#1016369
-
-backported upstream commit 54d022026aae4f53fa74cc636e4a032d9689b64d
-backported upstream commit a9c746088787549bb5b1ae3add7d06a1b6d93d5e
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/authfile.c b/openssh-7.2p2/authfile.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/authfile.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/authfile.c
-@@ -95,23 +95,35 @@ sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, 
- 
- /* Load a key from a fd into a buffer */
- int
- sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob)
- {
- 	u_char buf[1024];
- 	size_t len;
- 	struct stat st;
-	int r;
-+	int r, dontmax = 0;
- 
- 	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- 	if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
- 	    st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-+	/*
-+	 * Pre-allocate the buffer used for the key contents and clamp its
-+	 * maximum size. This ensures that key contents are never leaked via
-+	 * implicit realloc() in the sshbuf code.
-+	 */
-+	if ((st.st_mode & S_IFREG) == 0 || st.st_size <= 0) {
-+		st.st_size = 64*1024; /* 64k should be enough for anyone :) */
-+		dontmax = 1;
-+	}
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_allocate(blob, st.st_size)) != 0 ||
-+	    (dontmax && (r = sshbuf_set_max_size(blob, st.st_size)) != 0))
-+		return r;
- 	for (;;) {
- 		if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) {
- 			if (errno == EPIPE)
- 				break;
- 			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0)
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.c
-@@ -311,63 +311,73 @@ sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf
- 	SSHBUF_TELL("check");
- 	/* Check that len is reasonable and that max_size + available < len */
- 	if (len > buf->max_size || buf->max_size - len < buf->size - buf->off)
- 		return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
- int
-sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp)
-+sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
- {
- 	size_t rlen, need;
- 	u_char *dp;
- 	int r;
- 
-	if (dpp != NULL)
-		*dpp = NULL;
-
-	SSHBUF_DBG(("reserve buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
-+	SSHBUF_DBG(("allocate buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) != 0)
- 		return r;
- 	/*
- 	 * If the requested allocation appended would push us past max_size
- 	 * then pack the buffer, zeroing buf->off.
- 	 */
- 	sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, buf->size + len > buf->max_size);
-	SSHBUF_TELL("reserve");
-	if (len + buf->size > buf->alloc) {
-		/*
-		 * Prefer to alloc in SSHBUF_SIZE_INC units, but
-		 * allocate less if doing so would overflow max_size.
-		 */
-		need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc;
-		rlen = roundup(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
-		SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen));
-		if (rlen > buf->max_size)
-			rlen = buf->alloc + need;
-		SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen));
-		if ((dp = realloc(buf->d, rlen)) == NULL) {
-			SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail"));
-			if (dpp != NULL)
-				*dpp = NULL;
-			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-		}
-		buf->alloc = rlen;
-		buf->cd = buf->d = dp;
-		if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) < 0) {
-			/* shouldn't fail */
-			if (dpp != NULL)
-				*dpp = NULL;
-			return r;
-		}
-+	SSHBUF_TELL("allocate");
-+	if (len + buf->size <= buf->alloc)
-+		return 0; /* already have it. */
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Prefer to alloc in SSHBUF_SIZE_INC units, but
-+	 * allocate less if doing so would overflow max_size.
-+	 */
-+	need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc;
-+	rlen = roundup(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
-+	SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen));
-+	if (rlen > buf->max_size)
-+		rlen = buf->alloc + need;
-+	SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen));
-+	if ((dp = realloc(buf->d, rlen)) == NULL) {
-+		SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail"));
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 	}
-+	buf->alloc = rlen;
-+	buf->cd = buf->d = dp;
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) < 0) {
-+		/* shouldn't fail */
-+		return r;
-+	}
-+	SSHBUF_TELL("done");
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp)
-+{
-+	u_char *dp;
-+	int r;
-+
-+	if (dpp != NULL)
-+		*dpp = NULL;
-+
-+	SSHBUF_DBG(("reserve buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_allocate(buf, len)) != 0)
-+		return r;
-+
- 	dp = buf->d + buf->size;
- 	buf->size += len;
-	SSHBUF_TELL("done");
- 	if (dpp != NULL)
- 		*dpp = dp;
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
- int
- sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
- {
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.h
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.h
-@@ -134,16 +134,24 @@ u_char *sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct 
-  * Check whether a reservation of size len will succeed in buf
-  * Safer to use than direct comparisons again sshbuf_avail as it copes
-  * with unsigned overflows correctly.
-  * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
-  */
- int	sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
- 
- /*
-+ * Preallocates len additional bytes in buf.
-+ * Useful for cases where the caller knows how many bytes will ultimately be
-+ * required to avoid realloc in the buffer code.
-+ * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
-+ */
-+int	sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
-+
-+/*
-  * Reserve len bytes in buf.
-  * Returns 0 on success and a pointer to the first reserved byte via the
-  * optional dpp parameter or a negative * SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
-  */
- int	sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp);
- 
- /*
-  * Consume len bytes from the start of buf
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch
@ -1,264 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  4a254abf4ef391358257310ad2fe15c9e12dee34
-Prevent user enumeration through password processing timing
-CVE-2016-6210
-bsc#989363
-
-non-PAM part:
-upstream commit: 9286875a73b2de7736b5e50692739d314cd8d9dc
-
-PAM part:
-upstream commit: 283b97ff33ea2c641161950849931bd578de6946
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
-@@ -227,17 +227,16 @@ static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NUL
- static int sshpam_err = 0;
- static int sshpam_authenticated = 0;
- static int sshpam_session_open = 0;
- static int sshpam_cred_established = 0;
- static int sshpam_account_status = -1;
- static char **sshpam_env = NULL;
- static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL;
- static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
-static char badpw[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
- 
- /* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
- #ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
- static char **
- pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh)
- {
- 	/*
- 	 * XXX - If necessary, we can still support envrionment passing
-@@ -807,22 +806,45 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
- 			free(msg);
- 			ctxt->pam_done = -1;
- 			return (-1);
- 		}
- 	}
- 	return (-1);
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied.
-+ * Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that
-+ * vary processing time in proportion to password length.
-+ */
-+static char *
-+fake_password(const char *wire_password)
-+{
-+	const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
-+	char *ret = NULL;
-+	size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0;
-+
-+	if (l >= INT_MAX)
-+		fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
-+
-+	ret = xmalloc(l + 1);
-+	for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
-+		ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
-+	ret[i] = '\0';
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
- /* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */
- static int
- sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
- {
- 	Buffer buffer;
- 	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
-+	char *fake;
- 
- 	debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num);
- 	switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
- 	case 1:
- 		sshpam_authenticated = 1;
- 		return (0);
- 	case 0:
- 		break;
-@@ -833,18 +855,21 @@ sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, cha
- 		error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num);
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 	buffer_init(&buffer);
- 	if (sshpam_authctxt->valid &&
- 	    (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
- 	    options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
- 		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
-	else
-		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, badpw);
-+	else {
-+		fake = fake_password(*resp);
-+		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, fake);
-+		free(fake);
-+	}
- 	if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, &buffer) == -1) {
- 		buffer_free(&buffer);
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 	buffer_free(&buffer);
- 	return (1);
- }
- 
-@@ -1178,41 +1203,43 @@ static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { s
- /*
-  * Attempt password authentication via PAM
-  */
- int
- sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- {
- 	int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
- 	    PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
-+	char *fake = NULL;
- 
- 	if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL)
- 		fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to "
- 		    "initialise.", __func__);
- 
- 	sshpam_password = password;
- 	sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted
- 	 * by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking
- 	 * information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail).
- 	 */
- 	if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
- 	    options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
-		sshpam_password = badpw;
-+		sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password);
- 
- 	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
- 	    (const void *)&passwd_conv);
- 	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
- 		fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__,
- 		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
- 
- 	sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
- 	sshpam_password = NULL;
-+	free(fake);
- 	if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
- 		debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
- 		    authctxt->user);
- 		return 1;
- 	} else {
- 		debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s",
- 		    authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user",
- 		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
-@@ -188,28 +188,32 @@ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, cons
- 		return (auth_close(as));
- 	}
- }
- #elif !defined(CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD)
- int
- sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- {
- 	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
-	char *encrypted_password;
-+	char *encrypted_password, *salt = NULL;
- 
- 	/* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
- 	char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
- 
- 	/* Check for users with no password. */
- 	if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
- 		return (1);
- 
-	/* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
-	encrypted_password = xcrypt(password,
-	    (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx");
-+	/*
-+	 * Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt, or pass a
-+	 * NULL and let xcrypt pick one.
-+	 */
-+	if (authctxt->valid && pw_password[0] && pw_password[1])
-+		salt = pw_password;
-+	encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, salt);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
- 	 * are identical.
- 	 */
- 	return encrypted_password != NULL &&
- 	    strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0;
- }
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
-@@ -20,16 +20,17 @@
-  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-  */
- 
- #include "includes.h"
- 
- #include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <string.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
- 
- # if defined(HAVE_CRYPT_H) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
- #  include <crypt.h>
- # endif
- 
- # ifdef __hpux
-@@ -57,21 +58,54 @@
- #  include "md5crypt.h"
- # endif
- 
- # if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(HAVE_CRYPT) && defined(HAVE_DES_CRYPT)
- #  include <openssl/des.h>
- #  define crypt DES_crypt
- # endif
- 
-+/*
-+ * Pick an appropriate password encryption type and salt for the running
-+ * system.
-+ */
-+static const char *
-+pick_salt(void)
-+{
-+	struct passwd *pw;
-+	char *passwd, *p;
-+	size_t typelen;
-+	static char salt[32];
-+
-+	if (salt[0] != '\0')
-+		return salt;
-+	strlcpy(salt, "xx", sizeof(salt));
-+	if ((pw = getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
-+		return salt;
-+	passwd = shadow_pw(pw);
-+	if (passwd[0] != '$' || (p = strrchr(passwd + 1, '$')) == NULL)
-+		return salt;  /* no $, DES */
-+	typelen = p - passwd + 1;
-+	strlcpy(salt, passwd, MIN(typelen, sizeof(salt)));
-+	explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
-+	return salt;
-+}
-+
- char *
- xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt)
- {
- 	char *crypted;
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * If we don't have a salt we are encrypting a fake password for
-+	 * for timing purposes.  Pick an appropriate salt.
-+	 */
-+	if (salt == NULL)
-+		salt = pick_salt();
-+
- # ifdef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
-         if (is_md5_salt(salt))
-                 crypted = md5_crypt(password, salt);
-         else
-                 crypted = crypt(password, salt);
- # elif defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
- 	if (iscomsec())
-                 crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-pts_names_formatting.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-pts_names_formatting.patch
@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  787bc0aab11e5a7b6510c8dbf771958743ca25b0
-# use same lines naming as utempter (prevents problems with using different
-# formats in ?tmp? files)
-# --used to be called '-pts'
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c b/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c
-@@ -541,17 +541,17 @@ getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
- /*
-  * 'line' string utility functions
-  *
-  * These functions process the 'line' string into one of three forms:
-  *
-  * 1. The full filename (including '/dev')
-  * 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev')
-  * 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00
- *                               /dev/pts/1  -> ts/1 )
-+ *                               /dev/pts/1  -> /1 )
-  *
-  * Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when
-  * attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is
-  * performed by one application - say, sshd - so as long as the choice
-  * uniquely identifies a terminal it's ok.
-  */
- 
- 
-@@ -602,16 +602,20 @@ line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *s
- 	/* Always skip prefix if present */
- 	if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
- 		src += 5;
- 
- #ifdef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY
- 	if (strncmp(src, "tty", 3) == 0)
- 		src += 3;
- #endif
-+	if (strncmp(src, "pts/", 4) == 0) {
-+		src += 3;
-+		if (strlen(src) > 4) src++;
-+	}
- 
- 	len = strlen(src);
- 
- 	if (len > 0) {
- 		if (((int)len - dstsize) > 0)
- 			src +=  ((int)len - dstsize);
- 
- 		/* note: _don't_ change this to strlcpy */
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  18c2690afd988b9cb0fd0fa927d02cf5336dce9c
-# --used to be called '-xauth'
-try to remove xauth cookies on logout
-
-bnc#98815
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
-@@ -2540,16 +2540,44 @@ session_close(Session *s)
- 	u_int i;
- 
- 	verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
- 	    s->pw->pw_name,
- 	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
- 	    get_remote_port(),
- 	    s->self);
- 
-+	if ((s->display != NULL) && (s->auth_proto != NULL) &&
-+	    (s->auth_data != NULL) && (options.xauth_location != NULL)) {
-+		pid_t pid;
-+		FILE *f;
-+		char cmd[1024];
-+		struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
-+
-+		if (!(pid = fork())) {
-+			permanently_set_uid(pw);
-+
-+			/* Remove authority data from .Xauthority if appropriate. */
-+			debug("Running %.500s remove %.100s\n",
-+			    options.xauth_location, s->auth_display);
-+
-+			snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "unset XAUTHORITY && HOME=\"%.200s\" %s -q -",
-+                     	    s->pw->pw_dir, options.xauth_location);
-+            		f = popen(cmd, "w");
-+			if (f) {
-+				fprintf(f, "remove %s\n", s->auth_display);
-+				pclose(f);
-+			} else
-+				error("Could not run %s\n", cmd);
-+			exit(0);
-+		} else if (pid > 0) {
-+			waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- 		session_pty_cleanup(s);
- 	free(s->term);
- 	free(s->display);
- 	free(s->x11_chanids);
- 	free(s->auth_display);
- 	free(s->auth_data);
- 	free(s->auth_proto);
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-restrict_pkcs11-modules.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-restrict_pkcs11-modules.patch
@ -1,297 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  22de9aeddbde2b36da9c23475cfa5dcd42e95287
-whitelist paths for loading of PKCS#11 modules in ssh-agent
-
-CVE-2016-10009
-bsc#1016366
-
-upstream commit 786d5994da79151180cb14a6cf157ebbba61c0cc
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
-@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.62 2015/11/15 23:54:15 jmc Exp $
-+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.63 2016/11/30 03:07:37 djm Exp $
- .\"
- .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- .\"                    All rights reserved
- .\"
- .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- .\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
-@@ -29,29 +29,30 @@
- .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 15 2015 $
-+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2016 $
- .Dt SSH-AGENT 1
- .Os
- .Sh NAME
- .Nm ssh-agent
- .Nd authentication agent
- .Sh SYNOPSIS
- .Nm ssh-agent
- .Op Fl c | s
- .Op Fl \&Dd
- .Op Fl a Ar bind_address
- .Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
- .Op Fl t Ar life
-+.Op Fl P Ar pkcs11_whitelist
- .Op Ar command Op Ar arg ...
- .Nm ssh-agent
- .Op Fl c | s
- .Fl k
- .Sh DESCRIPTION
- .Nm
- is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication
- (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519).
-@@ -116,16 +117,28 @@ Valid options are:
- and
- .Dq sha256 .
- The default is
- .Dq sha256 .
- .It Fl k
- Kill the current agent (given by the
- .Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
- environment variable).
-+.It Fl P
-+Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 shared libraries
-+that may be added using the
-+.Fl s
-+option to
-+.Xr ssh-add 1 .
-+The default is to allow loading PKCS#11 libraries from
-+.Dq /usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/* .
-+PKCS#11 libraries that do not match the whitelist will be refused.
-+See PATTERNS in
-+.Xr ssh_config 5
-+for a description of pattern-list syntax.
- .It Fl s
- Generate Bourne shell commands on
- .Dv stdout .
- This is the default if
- .Ev SHELL
- does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
- .It Fl t Ar life
- Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent.
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.c b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.c
-@@ -78,25 +78,30 @@
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
- #include "compat.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "digest.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
-+#include "match.h"
- 
- #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
- #endif
- 
- #if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H)
- #include <sys/prctl.h>	/* For prctl() and PR_SET_DUMPABLE */
- #endif
- 
-+#ifndef DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST
-+# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/*"
-+#endif
-+
- typedef enum {
- 	AUTH_UNUSED,
- 	AUTH_SOCKET,
- 	AUTH_CONNECTION
- } sock_type;
- 
- typedef struct {
- 	int fd;
-@@ -134,16 +139,19 @@ time_t parent_alive_interval = 0;
- 
- /* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */
- pid_t cleanup_pid = 0;
- 
- /* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
- char socket_name[PATH_MAX];
- char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
- 
-+/* PKCS#11 path whitelist */
-+static char *pkcs11_whitelist;
-+
- /* locking */
- #define LOCK_SIZE	32
- #define LOCK_SALT_SIZE	16
- #define LOCK_ROUNDS	1
- int locked = 0;
- char lock_passwd[LOCK_SIZE];
- char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE];
- 
-@@ -736,17 +744,17 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e, u_int type
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 	sshbuf_free(msg);
- }
- 
- #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- static void
- process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
- {
-	char *provider = NULL, *pin;
-+	char *provider = NULL, *pin, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
- 	int r, i, version, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
- 	u_int seconds;
- 	time_t death = 0;
- 	u_char type;
- 	struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
- 	Identity *id;
- 	Idtab *tab;
- 
-@@ -768,29 +776,40 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
- 			confirm = 1;
- 			break;
- 		default:
- 			error("process_add_smartcard_key: "
- 			    "Unknown constraint type %d", type);
- 			goto send;
- 		}
- 	}
-+	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
-+		verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
-+		    provider, strerror(errno));
-+		goto send;
-+	}
-+	if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, pkcs11_whitelist, 0) != 1) {
-+		verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
-+		    "provider not whitelisted", canonical_provider);
-+		goto send;
-+	}
-+	debug("%s: add %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
- 	if (lifetime && !death)
- 		death = monotime() + lifetime;
- 
-	count = pkcs11_add_provider(provider, pin, &keys);
-+	count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys);
- 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- 		k = keys[i];
- 		version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
- 		tab = idtab_lookup(version);
- 		if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
- 			id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
- 			id->key = k;
-			id->provider = xstrdup(provider);
-			id->comment = xstrdup(provider); /* XXX */
-+			id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
-+			id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider); /* XXX */
- 			id->death = death;
- 			id->confirm = confirm;
- 			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
- 			tab->nentries++;
- 			success = 1;
- 		} else {
- 			sshkey_free(k);
- 		}
-@@ -1171,17 +1190,17 @@ check_parent_exists(void)
- 	}
- }
- 
- static void
- usage(void)
- {
- 	fprintf(stderr,
- 	    "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
-	    "                 [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
-+	    "                 [-P pkcs11_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
- 	    "       ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
- 	exit(1);
- }
- 
- int
- main(int ac, char **av)
- {
- 	int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
-@@ -1215,31 +1234,36 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- #endif
- 
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
- 	seed_rng();
- 
-	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:t:")) != -1) {
-+	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:P:t:")) != -1) {
- 		switch (ch) {
- 		case 'E':
- 			fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
- 			if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
- 				fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
- 			break;
- 		case 'c':
- 			if (s_flag)
- 				usage();
- 			c_flag++;
- 			break;
- 		case 'k':
- 			k_flag++;
- 			break;
-+		case 'P':
-+			if (pkcs11_whitelist != NULL)
-+				fatal("-P option already specified");
-+			pkcs11_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg);
-+			break;
- 		case 's':
- 			if (c_flag)
- 				usage();
- 			s_flag++;
- 			break;
- 		case 'd':
- 			if (d_flag || D_flag)
- 				usage();
-@@ -1264,16 +1288,19 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		}
- 	}
- 	ac -= optind;
- 	av += optind;
- 
- 	if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag))
- 		usage();
- 
-+	if (pkcs11_whitelist == NULL)
-+		pkcs11_whitelist = xstrdup(DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST);
-+
- 	if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
- 		shell = getenv("SHELL");
- 		if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
- 		    strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
- 			c_flag = 1;
- 	}
- 	if (k_flag) {
- 		const char *errstr = NULL;
-@@ -1411,17 +1438,17 @@ skip:
- 		parent_alive_interval = 10;
- 	idtab_init();
- 	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
- 	signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
- 	signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
- 	signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
- 	nalloc = 0;
- 
-	if (pledge("stdio cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1)
-+	if (pledge("stdio rpath cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1)
- 		fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
- 	platform_pledge_agent();
- 
- 	while (1) {
- 		prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp);
- 		result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp);
- 		saved_errno = errno;
- 		if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-s390_OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11_syscalls.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-s390_OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11_syscalls.patch
@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  bb92b9f037cc3686a669cd84caa44a2716f34058
-Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 14:27:34 -0300
-
-[PATCH 0/3] Allow syscalls for openssl engines
-From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-To: openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org
-In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
-and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
-implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
-crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
-this is only need on s390 architecture.
-
-The EP11 crypto card also needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
-specific argument.
-
-Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-
-related to bsc#1016709
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -150,16 +150,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- 	SC_ALLOW(stat),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_exit
- 	SC_ALLOW(exit),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_exit_group
- 	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
- #endif
-+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
-+	SC_ALLOW(flock),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getpgid
- 	SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_getpid
- 	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_getuid
- 	SC_ALLOW(getuid),
-@@ -180,16 +183,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- 	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
- #endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 	SC_ALLOW(getuid),
- #ifdef __NR_getuid32 /* not defined on x86_64 */
- 	SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
- #endif
- #endif
-+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
-+	SC_ALLOW(ipc),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_madvise
- 	SC_ALLOW(madvise),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_mmap
- 	SC_ALLOW(mmap),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_mmap2
- 	SC_ALLOW(mmap2),
-@@ -233,16 +239,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- #ifdef __NR_socketcall
- 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_ioctl
- #ifdef __s390__
- 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
- 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
- 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
-+	/* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
-+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
- #endif
- #endif
- 
- 	/* Default deny */
- 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
- };
- 
- static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = {
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-s390_hw_crypto_syscalls.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-s390_hw_crypto_syscalls.patch
@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  6d8637bec747de081eccba9874f640dcbc4fbb68
-This patch enables specific ioctl calls for ICA crypto card on s390
-platform. Without this patch, users using the IBMCA engine are not able
-to perform ssh login as the filter blocks the communication with the
-crypto card.
-
-Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-
-bsc#1016709
-
-Upstreamed as:
-5f1596e11d55539678c41f68aed358628d33d86f
-58b8cfa2a062b72139d7229ae8de567f55776f24
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -54,42 +54,53 @@
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <signal.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stddef.h>  /* for offsetof */
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
-+#include <endian.h>
-+
-+#ifdef __s390__
-+#include <asm/zcrypt.h>
-+#endif
- 
- #include "log.h"
- #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- 
- /* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */
- #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL
- 
- /* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */
- #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
- # undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL
- # define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
- #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
- 
- /* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
-+#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
-+#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)])
-+#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
-+#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)]) + sizeof(uint32_t)
-+#else
-+#error "Unknown endianness"
-+#endif
- #define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
- 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
- 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno))
- #define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \
- 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
- 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
- #define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
- 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 4), \
-	/* load first syscall argument */ \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
-	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)])), \
-+	/* load the syscall argument to check into accumulator */ \
-+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, LO_ARG(_arg_nr)), \
- 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_arg_val), 0, 1), \
- 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
- 	/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
- 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
- 		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
- 
- /* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */
- static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
-@@ -217,16 +228,23 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- 	SC_ALLOW(time),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_write
- 	SC_ALLOW(write),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_socketcall
- 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_ioctl
-+#ifdef __s390__
-+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
-+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
-+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
-+#endif
-+#endif
- 
- 	/* Default deny */
- 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
- };
- 
- static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = {
- 	.len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])),
- 	.filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns,
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_geteuid.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_geteuid.patch
@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  b07f00d5d805c043f5bdc7b8cf6701d924879fa6
-Add the 'geteuid' syscall to allowed list, since it may becalled on the
-mainframes when OpenSSL is using hardware crypto accelerator via libica
-(via ibmica)
-
-bsc#1004258
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -148,16 +148,22 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- 	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_getuid
- 	SC_ALLOW(getuid),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_getuid32
- 	SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(geteuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(geteuid32),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- 	SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
- 	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_madvise
- 	SC_ALLOW(madvise),
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch
@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  d75417bf0f4d50cabd84299773bab4ac68f68caa
-add 'getuid' syscall to list of allowed ones to prevent the sanboxed thread
-from being killed by the seccomp filter
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -142,16 +142,22 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- 	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_getpgid
- 	SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_getpid
- 	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(getuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- 	SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
- 	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_madvise
- 	SC_ALLOW(madvise),
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch
@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  2153c4af090728c778931d2fad72d4b260294122
-Allow the stat() syscall for OpenSSL re-seed patch
-(which causes OpenSSL use stat() on some file)
-
-bnc#912436
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -130,16 +130,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- 	SC_ALLOW(brk),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
- 	SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_close
- 	SC_ALLOW(close),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_stat
-+	SC_ALLOW(stat),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_exit
- 	SC_ALLOW(exit),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_exit_group
- 	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_getpgid
- 	SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-secure_unix_sockets_forwarding.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-secure_unix_sockets_forwarding.patch
@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  4e1fd41aaa9cafe8f7b07868ac38ed4dbdf594aa
-Do not allow unix socket when running without privilege separation to prevent
-privilege escalation through a socket created with root: ownership.
-
-CVE-2016-10010
-bsc#1016368
-
-backported upstream commit b737e4d7433577403a31cff6614f6a1b0b5e22f4
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/serverloop.c b/openssh-7.2p2/serverloop.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/serverloop.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/serverloop.c
-@@ -990,17 +990,17 @@ server_request_direct_streamlocal(void)
- 	originator_port = packet_get_int();
- 	packet_check_eom();
- 
- 	debug("server_request_direct_streamlocal: originator %s port %d, target %s",
- 	    originator, originator_port, target);
- 
- 	/* XXX fine grained permissions */
- 	if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
-	    !no_port_forwarding_flag) {
-+	    !no_port_forwarding_flag && use_privsep) {
- 		c = channel_connect_to_path(target,
- 		    "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
- 	} else {
- 		logit("refused streamlocal port forward: "
- 		    "originator %s port %d, target %s",
- 		    originator, originator_port, target);
- 	}
- 
-@@ -1274,17 +1274,17 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_
- 
- 		memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
- 		fwd.listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL);
- 		debug("server_input_global_request: streamlocal-forward listen path %s",
- 		    fwd.listen_path);
- 
- 		/* check permissions */
- 		if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0
-		    || no_port_forwarding_flag) {
-+		    || no_port_forwarding_flag || !use_privsep) {
- 			success = 0;
- 			packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding.");
- 		} else {
- 			/* Start listening on the socket */
- 			success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(
- 			    &fwd, NULL, &options.fwd_opts);
- 		}
- 		free(fwd.listen_path);
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-seed-prng.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-seed-prng.patch
@ -1,461 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  6ece65e11f754d75dd33d72b6f8e487a9d047f2e
-# extended support for (re-)seeding the OpenSSL PRNG from /dev/random
-# bnc#703221, FATE#312172
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c b/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
-@@ -49,16 +49,17 @@
- 
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "atomicio.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "buffer.h"
-+#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h"
- 
- /*
-  * Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding:
-  * If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from
-  * /dev/random), then collect RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes of randomness from
-  * PRNGd.
-  */
- #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
-@@ -224,16 +225,19 @@ seed_rng(void)
- 	}
- 
- 	if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
- 		fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");
- 	RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
- 	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
- 
- #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
-+
-+	linux_seed();
-+
- 	if (RAND_status() != 1)
- 		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
- }
- 
- #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 
- /* Handled in arc4random() */
- void
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
-@@ -15,17 +15,17 @@ AR=@AR@
- RANLIB=@RANLIB@
- INSTALL=@INSTALL@
- LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
- 
- OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o reallocarray.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha1.o sha2.o rmd160.o md5.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o explicit_bzero.o
- 
- COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o kludge-fd_set.o
- 
-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
-+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
- 
- .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
- 
- all: libopenbsd-compat.a
- 
- $(COMPAT): ../config.h
- $(OPENBSD): ../config.h
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
-new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
-+ *           (c) 2011 Petr Cerny <pcerny@suse.cz>
-+ *
-+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-+ *
-+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+#include "defines.h"
-+
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "port-linux.h"
-+#include "fips.h"
-+
-+#define RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT	6L
-+#define RNG_ENV_VAR		"SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG"
-+
-+long rand_bytes = 0;
-+char *rand_file = NULL;
-+
-+static void
-+linux_seed_init(void)
-+{
-+	long elen = 0;
-+	char *env = getenv(RNG_ENV_VAR);
-+
-+	if (env) {
-+		errno = 0;
-+		elen = strtol(env, NULL, 10);
-+		if (errno) {
-+			elen = RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT;
-+			debug("bogus value in the %s environment variable, "
-+				"using %li bytes from /dev/random\n",
-+				RNG_ENV_VAR, RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	if (elen || fips_mode())
-+		rand_file = "/dev/random";
-+	else
-+		rand_file = "/dev/urandom";
-+
-+	rand_bytes = MAX(elen, RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+linux_seed(void)
-+{
-+	long len;
-+	if (!rand_file)
-+		linux_seed_init();
-+
-+	errno = 0;
-+	len = RAND_load_file(rand_file, rand_bytes);
-+	if (len != rand_bytes) {
-+		if (errno)
-+			fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", rand_file, strerror(errno));
-+		else
-+			fatal ("EOF reading %s", rand_file);
-+	}
-+}
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-@@ -14,16 +14,20 @@
-  * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-  * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-  */
- 
- #ifndef _PORT_LINUX_H
- #define _PORT_LINUX_H
- 
-+extern long rand_bytes;
-+extern char *rand_file;
-+void linux_seed(void);
-+
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- #endif
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-add.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-add.1
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-add.1
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-add.1
-@@ -166,16 +166,30 @@ or related script.
- (Note that on some machines it
- may be necessary to redirect the input from
- .Pa /dev/null
- to make this work.)
- .It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
- Identifies the path of a
- .Ux Ns -domain
- socket used to communicate with the agent.
-+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .El
- .Sh FILES
- .Bl -tag -width Ds
- .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
- Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
- .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
- Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
- .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
-@@ -196,16 +196,33 @@ line terminates.
- .Sh FILES
- .Bl -tag -width Ds
- .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt
- .Ux Ns -domain
- sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
- These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
- The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
- .Xr sshd 8
- .Sh AUTHORS
- OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
- ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.1
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.1
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.1
-@@ -841,16 +841,33 @@ on all machines
- where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
- There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
- .Pp
- .It Pa /etc/moduli
- Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
- The file format is described in
- .Xr moduli 5 .
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
- .Xr moduli 5 ,
- .Xr sshd 8
- .Rs
- .%R RFC 4716
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keysign.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keysign.8
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keysign.8
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keysign.8
-@@ -75,16 +75,33 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authe
- .Pp
- .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
- .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
- .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub
- .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
- If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
- information corresponding with the private keys above.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
- .Xr ssh_config 5 ,
- .Xr sshd 8
- .Sh HISTORY
- .Nm
- first appeared in
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.1
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.1
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.1
-@@ -1411,16 +1411,30 @@ reads
- and adds lines of the format
- .Dq VARNAME=value
- to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to
- change their environment.
- For more information, see the
- .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
- option in
- .Xr sshd_config 5 .
-+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .Sh FILES
- .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
- .It Pa ~/.rhosts
- This file is used for host-based authentication (see above).
- On some machines this file may need to be
- world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
- because
- .Xr sshd 8
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
-@@ -972,16 +972,33 @@ and not group or world-writable.
- .It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
- Contains the process ID of the
- .Nm
- listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
- concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
- started last).
- The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr scp 1 ,
- .Xr sftp 1 ,
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
-@@ -50,16 +50,18 @@
- #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
- # include <sys/stat.h>
- #endif
- #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
- # include <sys/time.h>
- #endif
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-+#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h"
-+
- #include <sys/wait.h>
- 
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
- #include <netdb.h>
- #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
- #include <paths.h>
- #endif
-@@ -209,16 +211,23 @@ struct {
- 	Key	**host_pubkeys;		/* all public host keys */
- 	Key	**host_certificates;	/* all public host certificates */
- 	int	have_ssh1_key;
- 	int	have_ssh2_key;
- 	u_char	ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
- } sensitive_data;
- 
- /*
-+ * Every RESEED_AFTERth connection triggers call to linux_seed() to re-seed the
-+ * random pool.
-+ */
-+#define RESEED_AFTER    100
-+static int re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
-+
-+/*
-  * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
-  * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
-  */
- static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
- 
- /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
- static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
- static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
-@@ -1343,16 +1352,20 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 			for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
- 				if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
- 					startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
- 					if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
- 						maxfd = startup_p[0];
- 					startups++;
- 					break;
- 				}
-+			if(!(--re_seeding_counter)) {
-+				re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
-+				linux_seed();
-+			}
- 
- 			/*
- 			 * Got connection.  Fork a child to handle it, unless
- 			 * we are in debugging mode.
- 			 */
- 			if (debug_flag) {
- 				/*
- 				 * In debugging mode.  Close the listening
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch
@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  dfcac093fca4d826a806b9d1c0bdc26e7ae8ee8e
-send locales in default configuration
-bnc#65747
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
-@@ -26,16 +26,21 @@ Host *
- # security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the
- # remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your
- # keystrokes as you type, just like any other X11 client could do.
- # Set this to "no" here for global effect or in your own ~/.ssh/config
- # file if you want to have the remote X11 authentification data to 
- # expire after twenty minutes after remote login.
-     ForwardX11Trusted yes
- 
-+# This enables sending locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see ssh_config(5).
-+    SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+    SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+    SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
-+
- #   RhostsRSAAuthentication no
- #   RSAAuthentication yes
- #   PasswordAuthentication yes
- #   HostbasedAuthentication no
- #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
- #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
- #   BatchMode no
- #   CheckHostIP yes
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
-@@ -120,14 +120,19 @@ X11Forwarding yes
- #VersionAddendum none
- 
- # no default banner path
- #Banner none
- 
- # override default of no subsystems
- Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
- 
-+# This enables accepting locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see sshd_config(5).
-+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
-+
- # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
- #Match User anoncvs
- #	X11Forwarding no
- #	AllowTcpForwarding no
- #	PermitTTY no
- #	ForceCommand cvs server
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch
@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  7b45c4f3fef6836db00c5b198736cce17290c5cd
-additional option for sftp-server to force file mode for new files
-FATE#312774
-http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2010-November/029044.html
-http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=128896838930893
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
-@@ -33,16 +33,17 @@
- .Bk -words
- .Op Fl ehR
- .Op Fl d Ar start_directory
- .Op Fl f Ar log_facility
- .Op Fl l Ar log_level
- .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
- .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
- .Op Fl u Ar umask
-+.Op Fl m Ar force_file_permissions
- .Ek
- .Nm
- .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
- .Sh DESCRIPTION
- .Nm
- is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
- to stdout and expects client requests from stdin.
- .Nm
-@@ -133,16 +134,20 @@ Places this instance of
- into a read-only mode.
- Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change
- the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
- .It Fl u Ar umask
- Sets an explicit
- .Xr umask 2
- to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
- user's default mask.
-+.It Fl m Ar force_file_permissions
-+Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
-+of the default or client requested mode.  Numeric values include:
-+777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Option -u is ineffective if -m is set.
- .El
- .Pp
- On some systems,
- .Nm
- must be able to access
- .Pa /dev/log
- for logging to work, and use of
- .Nm
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
-@@ -73,16 +73,20 @@ static u_int version;
- static int init_done;
- 
- /* Disable writes */
- static int readonly;
- 
- /* Requests that are allowed/denied */
- static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist;
- 
-+/* Force file permissions */
-+int permforce = 0;
-+long permforcemode;
-+
- /* portable attributes, etc. */
- typedef struct Stat Stat;
- 
- struct Stat {
- 	char *name;
- 	char *long_name;
- 	Attrib attrib;
- };
-@@ -687,16 +691,20 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
- 	    (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
- 	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
- 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
- 	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
-+	if (permforce == 1) {
-+		mode = permforcemode;
-+		(void)umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
-+	}
- 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
- 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
- 	if (readonly &&
- 	    ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY ||
- 	    (flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) {
- 		verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
- 		status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
- 	} else {
-@@ -1489,17 +1497,18 @@ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i)
- static void
- sftp_server_usage(void)
- {
- 	extern char *__progname;
- 
- 	fprintf(stderr,
- 	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
- 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
-	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
-+	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n\t"
-+	    "[-m force_file_permissions]\n"
- 	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
- 	    __progname, __progname);
- 	exit(1);
- }
- 
- int
- sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
- {
-@@ -1515,17 +1524,17 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, 
- 
- 	ssh_malloc_init();	/* must be called before any mallocs */
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
- 	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
- 
- 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
- 
- 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
-	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
-+	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
- 		switch (ch) {
- 		case 'Q':
- 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
- 				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n");
- 				exit(1);
- 			}
- 			for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
- 				printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name);
-@@ -1575,16 +1584,23 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, 
- 		case 'u':
- 			errno = 0;
- 			mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
- 			if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
- 			    cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0))
- 				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
- 			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
- 			break;
-+		case 'm':
-+			permforce = 1;
-+			permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
-+			if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
-+				cp == optarg || (permforcemode == 0 && errno != 0))
-+				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
-+			break;
- 		case 'h':
- 		default:
- 			sftp_server_usage();
- 		}
- 	}
- 
- 	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
- 
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch
@ -1,366 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  fc81df6f2bf393e45e703c89976c3a0fe6e0a273
-run sftp sessions inside a chroot
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
-@@ -123,16 +123,18 @@ int	do_exec(Session *, const char *);
- void	do_login(Session *, const char *);
- #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
- static void	do_pre_login(Session *s);
- #endif
- void	do_child(Session *, const char *);
- void	do_motd(void);
- int	check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
- 
-+int	chroot_no_tree = 0;
-+
- static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *);
- static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *);
- 
- static int session_pty_req(Session *);
- 
- /* import */
- extern ServerOptions options;
- extern char *__progname;
-@@ -838,16 +840,21 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 		    "subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys);
- 	} else if (command == NULL) {
- 		snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell");
- 	} else {
- 		/* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */
- 		snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command");
- 	}
- 
-+	if ((s->is_subsystem != SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) && chroot_no_tree) {
-+		logit("You aren't welcomed, go away!");
-+		exit (1);
-+	}
-+
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- 		tty = s->tty;
- 		if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
- 			tty += 5;
- 	}
- 
- 	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
- 	    session_type,
-@@ -1492,58 +1499,123 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
-  		while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
-  			fputs(buf, stderr);
-  		fclose(f);
-  	}
- 	exit(254);
- }
- 
- /*
-+ * Test if filesystem is mounted nosuid and nodev
-+ */
-+
-+static void
-+test_nosuid (char * path, dev_t fs)
-+{
-+	FILE *f;
-+	struct stat st;
-+	char buf[4096], *s, *on, *mountpoint, *opt;
-+	int nodev, nosuid;
-+
-+	if (!(f = popen ("/bin/mount", "r")))
-+		fatal ("%s: popen(\"/bin/mount\", \"r\"): %s",
-+		    __func__, strerror (errno));
-+	for (;;) {
-+		s = fgets (buf, sizeof (buf), f);
-+		if (ferror (f))
-+			fatal ("%s: read from popen: %s", __func__,
-+			    strerror (errno));
-+		if (!s) {
-+			pclose (f);
-+			fatal ("cannot find filesystem with the chroot directory");
-+		}
-+		(void) strtok (buf, " ");
-+		on = strtok (NULL, " ");
-+		if (strcmp (on, "on")) {
-+			pclose (f);
-+			fatal ("bad format of mount output");
-+		}
-+		mountpoint = strtok (NULL, " ");
-+		if (memcmp (path, mountpoint, strlen (mountpoint)))
-+			continue;
-+		if (stat(mountpoint, &st) != 0) {
-+			pclose (f);
-+			fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
-+			    mountpoint, strerror(errno));
-+		}
-+		if (fs != st.st_dev)
-+			continue;
-+		nodev = nosuid = 0;
-+		for (opt = strtok (NULL, "("); opt; opt = strtok (NULL, " ,)")) {
-+			if (!strcmp (opt, "nodev"))
-+				nodev = 1;
-+			else if (!strcmp (opt, "nosuid"))
-+				nosuid = 1;
-+			else if (!strcmp (opt, "noexec"))
-+				nosuid = 1;
-+			if (nodev && nosuid) {
-+				pclose (f);
-+				return;
-+			}
-+		}
-+		fatal ("chroot into directory without nodev and either noexec or nosuid");
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-  * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components
-  * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions.
-  */
- static void
- safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
- {
- 	const char *cp;
- 	char component[PATH_MAX];
- 	struct stat st;
-+	int last;
- 
- 	if (*path != '/')
- 		fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
- 	if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
- 		fatal("chroot path too long");
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Descend the path, checking that each component is a
- 	 * root-owned directory with strict permissions.
- 	 */
- 	for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
-		if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
-+		if (last = ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL))
- 			strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
- 		else {
- 			cp++;
- 			memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
- 			component[cp - path] = '\0';
- 		}
- 	
- 		debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component);
- 
- 		if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
- 			fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
- 			    component, strerror(errno));
-		if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
-+		if ((st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) && !(last && st.st_uid == uid))
- 			fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
- 			    "directory %s\"%s\"", 
- 			    cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
- 		if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
- 			fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
- 			    cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
- 
- 	}
-+	setenv ("TZ", "/etc/localtime", 0);
-+	tzset();
-+
-+	if (st.st_uid) {
-+		test_nosuid(path, st.st_dev);
-+		++chroot_no_tree;
-+	}
- 
- 	if (chdir(path) == -1)
- 		fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
- 		    "%s", path, strerror(errno));
- 	if (chroot(path) == -1)
- 		fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
- 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
- 		fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s",
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-chrootenv.h b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-chrootenv.h
-new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-chrootenv.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F Chadima.  All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+#ifndef CHROOTENV_H
-+#define CHROOTENV_H
-+
-+extern int	chroot_no_tree;
-+
-+#endif
-+
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-common.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-common.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-common.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-common.c
-@@ -43,16 +43,17 @@
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "log.h"
- 
- #include "sftp.h"
- #include "sftp-common.h"
-+#include "sftp-chrootenv.h"
- 
- /* Clear contents of attributes structure */
- void
- attrib_clear(Attrib *a)
- {
- 	a->flags = 0;
- 	a->size = 0;
- 	a->uid = 0;
-@@ -216,23 +217,23 @@ ls_file(const char *name, const struct s
- 	int ulen, glen, sz = 0;
- 	struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime);
- 	char *user, *group;
- 	char buf[1024], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1];
- 	char sbuf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
- 	time_t now;
- 
- 	strmode(st->st_mode, mode);
-	if (!remote) {
-+	if (!remote && !chroot_no_tree) {
- 		user = user_from_uid(st->st_uid, 0);
- 	} else {
- 		snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid);
- 		user = ubuf;
- 	}
-	if (!remote) {
-+	if (!remote && !chroot_no_tree) {
- 		group = group_from_gid(st->st_gid, 0);
- 	} else {
- 		snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid);
- 		group = gbuf;
- 	}
- 	if (ltime != NULL) {
- 		now = time(NULL);
- 		if (now - (365*24*60*60)/2 < st->st_mtime &&
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server-main.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server-main.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server-main.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server-main.c
-@@ -17,22 +17,25 @@
- 
- #include "includes.h"
- 
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
-+//#include <time.h>
- 
- #include "log.h"
- #include "sftp.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- 
-+int chroot_no_tree = 0;
-+
- void
- cleanup_exit(int i)
- {
- 	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(i);
- }
- 
- int
- main(int argc, char **argv)
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
-@@ -112,16 +112,18 @@ struct complete_ctx {
- 	char **remote_pathp;
- };
- 
- int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
-     int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
- 
- extern char *__progname;
- 
-+int chroot_no_tree = 0;
-+
- /* Separators for interactive commands */
- #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
- 
- /* ls flags */
- #define LS_LONG_VIEW	0x0001	/* Full view ala ls -l */
- #define LS_SHORT_VIEW	0x0002	/* Single row view ala ls -1 */
- #define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW	0x0004	/* Long view with numeric uid/gid */
- #define LS_NAME_SORT	0x0008	/* Sort by name (default) */
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
-@@ -251,16 +251,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
-              directory on some operating systems (see sftp-server(8) for
-              details).
- 
-              For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
-              prevented from modification by other processes on the system
-              (especially those outside the jail).  Misconfiguration can lead
-              to unsafe environments which sshd(8) cannot detect.
- 
-+             In the special case when only sftp is used, not ssh nor scp, it
-+             is possible to use ChrootDirectory %h or ChrootDirectory
-+             /some/path/%u. The file system containing this directory must be
-+             mounted with options nodev and either nosuid or noexec. The owner
-+             of the directory should be the user. The ownership of the other
-+             components of the path must fulfill the usual conditions. No adi-
-+             tional files are required to be present in the directory.
-+
-              The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^], indicating not to chroot(2).
- 
-      Ciphers
-              Specifies the ciphers allowed.  Multiple ciphers must be comma-
-              separated.  If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
-              then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
-              instead of replacing them.
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-@@ -424,16 +424,27 @@ for details).
- .Pp
- For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
- prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially
- those outside the jail).
- Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which
- .Xr sshd 8
- cannot detect.
- .Pp
-+In the special case when only sftp is used, not ssh nor scp,
-+it is possible to use
-+.Cm ChrootDirectory
-+%h or
-+.Cm ChrootDirectory
-+/some/path/%u. The file system containing this directory must be
-+mounted with options nodev and either nosuid or noexec. The owner of the
-+directory should be the user. The ownership of the other components of the path
-+must fulfill the usual conditions. No aditional files are required to be present
-+in the directory.
-+.Pp
- The default is
- .Dq none ,
- indicating not to
- .Xr chroot 2 .
- .It Cm Ciphers
- Specifies the ciphers allowed.
- Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
- If the specified value begins with a
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-ssh_case_insensitive_host_matching.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-ssh_case_insensitive_host_matching.patch
@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  1b99f71db584917a37c5e9140bf63dcb860e8b59
-Match hostnames in a case-insensitive manner.
-
-bsc#1017099
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
-@@ -526,16 +526,17 @@ execute_in_shell(const char *cmd)
-  * Parse and execute a Match directive.
-  */
- static int
- match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw,
-     const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, int post_canon,
-     const char *filename, int linenum)
- {
- 	char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria;
-+	char *hostlc;
- 	const char *ruser;
- 	int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate;
- 	char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we
- 	 * must be prepared to use default values.
- 	 */
-@@ -546,16 +547,20 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
- 	} else if (options->hostname != NULL) {
- 		/* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */
- 		host = percent_expand(options->hostname,
- 		    "h", host_arg, (char *)NULL);
- 	} else {
- 		host = xstrdup(host_arg);
- 	}
- 
-+	/* match_hostname() requires the hostname to be lowercase */
-+	hostlc = xstrdup(host);
-+	lowercase(hostlc);
-+
- 	debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s",
- 	    cp, host, original_host);
- 	while ((oattrib = attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
- 		criteria = NULL;
- 		this_result = 1;
- 		if ((negate = attrib[0] == '!'))
- 			attrib++;
- 		/* criteria "all" and "canonical" have no argument */
-@@ -584,18 +589,18 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
- 		}
- 		/* All other criteria require an argument */
- 		if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
- 			error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
- 			result = -1;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
- 		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
-			criteria = xstrdup(host);
-			r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1;
-+			criteria = xstrdup(hostlc);
-+			r = match_hostname(hostlc, arg) == 1;
- 			if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
- 				this_result = result = 0;
- 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) {
- 			criteria = xstrdup(original_host);
- 			r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1;
- 			if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
- 				this_result = result = 0;
- 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
-@@ -658,16 +663,17 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
- 		error("One or more attributes required for Match");
- 		result = -1;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-  out:
- 	if (result != -1)
- 		debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
- 	*condition = cp;
-+	free(hostlc);
- 	free(host);
- 	return result;
- }
- 
- /* Check and prepare a domain name: removes trailing '.' and lowercases */
- static void
- valid_domain(char *name, const char *filename, int linenum)
- {
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-verify_CIDR_address_ranges.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-verify_CIDR_address_ranges.patch
@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  1b2dad1b57b086d094fe09327fcf1c490475a7cd
-Check for invalid CIDR adress masks.
-bsc#1005893
-
-backported upstream commit: 010359b32659f455fddd2bd85fd7cc4d7a3b994a (7.4)
-backported upstream commit: 1a6f9d2e2493d445cd9ee496e6e3c2a2f283f66a
-backported upstream commit: fe06b68f824f8f55670442fb31f2c03526dd326c
-
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
-@@ -95,16 +95,17 @@ int auth_debug_init;
-  * Otherwise true is returned.
-  */
- int
- allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
- {
- 	struct stat st;
- 	const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
- 	u_int i;
-+	int r;
- #ifdef USE_SHADOW
- 	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
- #endif
- 
- 	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
- 	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
- 		return 0;
- 
-@@ -183,31 +184,41 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
- 	if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
- 	    options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
- 		hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
- 		ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
- 	}
- 
- 	/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
- 	if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
-		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
-			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
-			    options.deny_users[i])) {
-+		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) {
-+			r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
-+			    options.deny_users[i]);
-+			if (r < 0) {
-+				fatal("Invalid DenyUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
-+				    options.deny_users[i]);
-+			} else if (r != 0) {
- 				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
- 				    "because listed in DenyUsers",
- 				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
- 				return 0;
- 			}
-+		}
- 	}
- 	/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
- 	if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
-		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
-			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
-			    options.allow_users[i]))
-+		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) {
-+			r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
-+			    options.allow_users[i]);
-+			if (r < 0) {
-+				fatal("Invalid AllowUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
-+				    options.allow_users[i]);
-+			} else if (r == 1)
- 				break;
-+		}
- 		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
- 		if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
- 			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
- 			    "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
- 			return 0;
- 		}
- 	}
- 	if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/match.c b/openssh-7.2p2/match.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/match.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/match.c
-@@ -186,41 +186,50 @@ match_hostname(const char *host, const c
-  * successful match.
-  */
- int
- match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
-     const char *patterns)
- {
- 	int mhost, mip;
- 
-	/* error in ipaddr match */
- 	if ((mip = addr_match_list(ipaddr, patterns)) == -2)
-		return -1;
-	else if (mip == -1) /* negative ip address match */
-		return 0;
-+		return -1; /* error in ipaddr match */
-+	else if (host == NULL || ipaddr == NULL || mip == -1)
-+		return 0; /* negative ip address match, or testing pattern */
- 
- 	/* negative hostname match */
- 	if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns)) == -1)
- 		return 0;
- 	/* no match at all */
- 	if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0)
- 		return 0;
- 	return 1;
- }
- 
- /*
- * match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern
-+ * Match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern.
-+ * If user, host and ipaddr are all NULL then validate pattern/
-+ * Returns -1 on invalid pattern, 0 on no match, 1 on match.
-  */
- int
- match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
-     const char *pattern)
- {
- 	char *p, *pat;
- 	int ret;
- 
-+	/* test mode */
-+	if (user == NULL && host == NULL && ipaddr == NULL) {
-+		if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) != NULL &&
-+		    match_host_and_ip(NULL, NULL, p + 1) < 0)
-+			return -1;
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	if ((p = strchr(pattern,'@')) == NULL)
- 		return match_pattern(user, pattern);
- 
- 	pat = xstrdup(pattern);
- 	p = strchr(pat, '@');
- 	*p++ = '\0';
- 
- 	if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1)
-diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
-+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
-@@ -1462,28 +1462,34 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
- 		goto parse_multistate;
- 
- 	case sAllowUsers:
- 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- 			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
- 				fatal("%s line %d: too many allow users.",
- 				    filename, linenum);
-+			if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1)
-+				fatal("%s line %d: invalid AllowUsers pattern: "
-+				    "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg);
- 			if (!*activep)
- 				continue;
- 			options->allow_users[options->num_allow_users++] =
- 			    xstrdup(arg);
- 		}
- 		break;
- 
- 	case sDenyUsers:
- 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- 			if (options->num_deny_users >= MAX_DENY_USERS)
- 				fatal("%s line %d: too many deny users.",
- 				    filename, linenum);
-+			if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1)
-+				fatal("%s line %d: invalid DenyUsers pattern: "
-+				    "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg);
- 			if (!*activep)
- 				continue;
- 			options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] =
- 			    xstrdup(arg);
- 		}
- 		break;
- 
- 	case sAllowGroups:
--- a/openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz
@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:a72781d1a043876a224ff1b0032daa4094d87565a68528759c1c2cab5482548c
-size 1499808
--- a/openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz.asc
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz.asc
@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
-Version: GnuPG v2
-
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-/yp9OdZr99JcQqIFEpWs9WG93JxBbRBUif6OdymV3JAGJxfrpA0a0EPbiCNedxkY
-TB+XZ53ydKx0s9Gv3k2wFfpT4VOIXvlrcPgYyTs7SVbigvT6TomNyK3TUfMQemN6
-rTP4qt4b74cXne7zfcmr/Axmr3+xg1LybJn4L1IIH7TWAjj5dhPHJwqLRw3owaFB
-Y8I+5ViCHGNCsBiil8oBOgdg09BITriL76Xs9WEY7+hC+FP/A286ggPDi+De3GPK
-L7nB1FZgfo3gCGGJVVAH1i8P/ZZEedJHo/AXAYlNax7g6ZDkfmzt1KaVNhtoNvI=
-=yfYj
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-SUSE_patches.tar.gz
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1-SUSE_patches.tar.gz
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:99ff2a08373933a9a4205908a13079d9cc66aad0475ff12c7ae0fda96801f634
+size 77379
--- a/openssh-7.6p1.tar.gz
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1.tar.gz
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a323caeeddfe145baaa0db16e98d784b1fbc7dd436a6bf1f479dfd5cd1d21723
+size 1489788
--- a/openssh-7.6p1.tar.gz.asc
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1.tar.gz.asc
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+iQHDBAABCgAdFiEEWcIRjtIG2SfmZ+vj0+X1a22SDTAFAlnTtXUACgkQ0+X1a22S
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+PdbtsSdw8ZHtakkoNHiqQD+mwy+FXY5QcN7IUEX2/E0hKx0wou1S/36j8k89UQf8
+Jbntg31N4EUOQ0fRwuxdRkHSUrJJpPgwWO4XgHw4u9yghsOCYr+X9Pa1+LCtL4PE
+o4+08UoD92VORzRETH5Cbtv1XmdUWrpHVHUjVORTgYxVgXbbnoDuzxfsrbfJRRLE
+NBsFxodltDxfdljL27PReBqpneWBxNJd6ruaY5wYxhu1qTEcszCGXuSd583TJ49b
+hhkWrk5+knErwFdDbtOy+l3L1pvxXvuyIuWl/aXaoVSPDwtPFui94Dl2G7QbSeEb
+PQDWU6PReeP+SRsMyYJSoxwgbZIzaQ==
+=K6iy
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--- a/openssh-askpass-gnome.spec
+++ b/openssh-askpass-gnome.spec
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #
 # spec file for package openssh-askpass-gnome
 #
-# Copyright (c) 2017 SUSE LINUX GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
+# Copyright (c) 2018 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
 #
 # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties
 # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ BuildRequires:  openssl-devel
 BuildRequires:  pam-devel
 BuildRequires:  tcpd-devel
 BuildRequires:  update-desktop-files
-Version:        7.2p2
+Version:        7.6p1
 Release:        0
 Requires:       openssh = %{version}
 Summary:        A GNOME-Based Passphrase Dialog for OpenSSH
--- a/openssh.changes
+++ b/openssh.changes
@ -1,3 +1,647 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Fri Jan 12 12:38:09 UTC 2018 - pcerny@suse.com
+
+- Replace forgotten references to /var/adm/fillup-templates
+  with new %_fillupdir macro (boo#1069468)
+- tighten configuration access rights
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Fri Jan 12 00:38:37 CET 2018 - pcerny@suse.com
+
+- Update to vanilla 7.6p1
+  Most important changes (more details below):
+  * complete removal of the ancient SSHv1 protocol
+  * sshd(8) cannot run without privilege separation
+  * removal of suport for arcfourm blowfish and CAST ciphers
+    and RIPE-MD160 HMAC
+  * refuse RSA keys shorter than 1024 bits
+  Distilled upstream log:
+- OpenSSH 7.3
+  ---- Security
+  * sshd(8): Mitigate a potential denial-of-service attack
+    against the system's crypt(3) function via sshd(8). An
+    attacker could send very long passwords that would cause
+    excessive CPU use in crypt(3). sshd(8) now refuses to accept
+    password authentication requests of length greater than 1024
+    characters. Independently reported by Tomas Kuthan (Oracle),
+    Andres Rojas and Javier Nieto.
+  * sshd(8): Mitigate timing differences in password
+    authentication that could be used to discern valid from
+    invalid account names when long passwords were sent and
+    particular password hashing algorithms are in use on the
+    server. CVE-2016-6210, reported by EddieEzra.Harari at
+    verint.com
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix observable timing weakness in the CBC
+    padding oracle countermeasures. Reported by Jean Paul
+    Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin
+    Albrecht. Note that CBC ciphers are disabled by default and
+    only included for legacy compatibility.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Improve operation ordering of MAC
+    verification for Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) mode transport MAC
+    algorithms to verify the MAC before decrypting any
+    ciphertext. This removes the possibility of timing
+    differences leaking facts about the plaintext, though no such
+    leakage has been observed.  Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele,
+    Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht.
+  * sshd(8): (portable only) Ignore PAM environment vars when
+    UseLogin=yes. If PAM is configured to read user-specified
+    environment variables and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, then a
+    hostile local user may attack /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or
+    similar environment variables set via PAM. CVE-2015-8325,
+    found by Shayan Sadigh.
+  ---- New Features
+  * ssh(1): Add a ProxyJump option and corresponding -J
+    command-line flag to allow simplified indirection through a
+    one or more SSH bastions or "jump hosts".
+  * ssh(1): Add an IdentityAgent option to allow specifying
+    specific agent sockets instead of accepting one from the
+    environment.
+  * ssh(1): Allow ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings to
+    be optionally overridden when using ssh -W. bz#2577
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Implement support for the IUTF8 terminal
+    mode as per draft-sgtatham-secsh-iutf8-00.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for additional fixed
+    Diffie-Hellman 2K, 4K and 8K groups from
+    draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03.
+  * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sshd(8): support SHA256 and SHA512 RSA
+    signatures in certificates;
+  * ssh(1): Add an Include directive for ssh_config(5) files.
+  * ssh(1): Permit UTF-8 characters in pre-authentication banners
+    sent from the server. bz#2058
+  ---- Bugfixes
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Reduce the syslog level of some relatively
+    common protocol events from LOG_CRIT. bz#2585
+  * sshd(8): Refuse AuthenticationMethods="" in configurations
+    and accept AuthenticationMethods=any for the default
+    behaviour of not requiring multiple authentication. bz#2398
+  * sshd(8): Remove obsolete and misleading "POSSIBLE BREAK-IN
+    ATTEMPT!" message when forward and reverse DNS don't match.
+    bz#2585
+  * ssh(1): Close ControlPersist background process stderr except
+    in debug mode or when logging to syslog. bz#1988
+  * misc: Make PROTOCOL description for
+    direct-streamlocal@openssh.com channel open messages match
+    deployed code. bz#2529
+  * ssh(1): Deduplicate LocalForward and RemoteForward entries to
+    fix failures when both ExitOnForwardFailure and hostname
+    canonicalisation are enabled. bz#2562
+  * sshd(8): Remove fallback from moduli to obsolete "primes"
+    file that was deprecated in 2001. bz#2559.
+  * sshd_config(5): Correct description of UseDNS: it affects ssh
+    hostname processing for authorized_keys, not known_hosts;
+    bz#2554
+  * ssh(1): Fix authentication using lone certificate keys in an
+    agent without corresponding private keys on the filesystem.
+    bz#2550
+  * sshd(8): Send ClientAliveInterval pings when a time-based
+    RekeyLimit is set; previously keepalive packets were not
+    being sent. bz#2252
+  ---- Portability
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix compilation by automatically disabling
+    ciphers not supported by OpenSSL. bz#2466
+  * misc: Fix compilation failures on some versions of AIX's
+    compiler related to the definition of the VA_COPY macro.
+    bz#2589
+  * sshd(8): Whitelist more architectures to enable the
+    seccomp-bpf sandbox. bz#2590
+  * ssh-agent(1), sftp-server(8): Disable process tracing on
+    Solaris using setpflags(__PROC_PROTECT, ...). bz#2584
+  * sshd(8): On Solaris, don't call Solaris setproject() with
+    UsePAM=yes it's PAM's responsibility. bz#2425
+- OpenSSH 7.4
+  ---- Potentially-incompatible changes
+  * ssh(1): Remove 3des-cbc from the client's default proposal.
+    64-bit block ciphers are not safe in 2016 and we don't want
+    to wait until attacks like SWEET32 are extended to SSH. As
+    3des-cbc was the only mandatory cipher in the SSH RFCs, this
+    may cause problems connecting to older devices using the
+    default configuration, but it's highly likely that such
+    devices already need explicit configuration for key exchange
+    and hostkey algorithms already anyway.
+  * sshd(8): Remove support for pre-authentication compression.
+    Doing compression early in the protocol probably seemed
+    reasonable in the 1990s, but today it's clearly a bad idea in
+    terms of both cryptography (cf. multiple compression oracle
+    attacks in TLS) and attack surface. Pre-auth compression
+    support has been disabled by default for >10 years. Support
+    remains in the client.
+  * ssh-agent will refuse to load PKCS#11 modules outside a
+    whitelist of trusted paths by default. The path whitelist may
+    be specified at run-time.
+  * sshd(8): When a forced-command appears in both a certificate
+    and an authorized keys/principals command= restriction, sshd
+    will now refuse to accept the certificate unless they are
+    identical.  The previous (documented) behaviour of having the
+    certificate forced-command override the other could be a bit
+    confusing and error-prone.
+  * sshd(8): Remove the UseLogin configuration directive and
+    support for having /bin/login manage login sessions.
+  ---- Security
+  * ssh-agent(1): Will now refuse to load PKCS#11 modules from
+    paths outside a trusted whitelist (run-time configurable).
+    Requests to load modules could be passed via agent forwarding
+    and an attacker could attempt to load a hostile PKCS#11
+    module across the forwarded agent channel: PKCS#11 modules
+    are shared libraries, so this would result in code execution
+    on the system running the ssh-agent if the attacker has
+    control of the forwarded agent-socket (on the host running
+    the sshd server) and the ability to write to the filesystem
+    of the host running ssh-agent (usually the host running the
+    ssh client). Reported by Jann Horn of Project Zero.
+  * sshd(8): When privilege separation is disabled, forwarded
+    Unix- domain sockets would be created by sshd(8) with the
+    privileges of 'root' instead of the authenticated user. This
+    release refuses Unix-domain socket forwarding when privilege
+    separation is disabled (Privilege separation has been enabled
+    by default for 14 years).  Reported by Jann Horn of Project
+    Zero.
+  * sshd(8): Avoid theoretical leak of host private key material
+    to privilege-separated child processes via realloc() when
+    reading keys. No such leak was observed in practice for
+    normal-sized keys, nor does a leak to the child processes
+    directly expose key material to unprivileged users. Reported
+    by Jann Horn of Project Zero.
+  * sshd(8): The shared memory manager used by pre-authentication
+    compression support had a bounds checks that could be elided
+    by some optimising compilers. Additionally, this memory
+    manager was incorrectly accessible when pre-authentication
+    compression was disabled. This could potentially allow
+    attacks against the privileged monitor process from the
+    sandboxed privilege-separation process (a compromise of the
+    latter would be required first).  This release removes
+    support for pre-authentication compression from sshd(8).
+    Reported by Guido Vranken using the Stack unstable
+    optimisation identification tool
+    (http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/)
+  * sshd(8): Fix denial-of-service condition where an attacker
+    who sends multiple KEXINIT messages may consume up to 128MB
+    per connection. Reported by Shi Lei of Gear Team, Qihoo 360.
+  * sshd(8): Validate address ranges for AllowUser and DenyUsers
+    directives at configuration load time and refuse to accept
+    invalid ones. It was previously possible to specify invalid
+    CIDR address ranges (e.g. user@127.1.2.3/55) and these would
+    always match, possibly resulting in granting access where it
+    was not intended.  Reported by Laurence Parry.
+  ---- New Features
+  * ssh(1): Add a proxy multiplexing mode to ssh(1) inspired by
+    the version in PuTTY by Simon Tatham. This allows a
+    multiplexing client to communicate with the master process
+    using a subset of the SSH packet and channels protocol over a
+    Unix-domain socket, with the main process acting as a proxy
+    that translates channel IDs, etc.  This allows multiplexing
+    mode to run on systems that lack file- descriptor passing
+    (used by current multiplexing code) and potentially, in
+    conjunction with Unix-domain socket forwarding, with the
+    client and multiplexing master process on different machines.
+    Multiplexing proxy mode may be invoked using "ssh -O proxy
+    ..."
+  * sshd(8): Add a sshd_config DisableForwarding option that
+    disables X11, agent, TCP, tunnel and Unix domain socket
+    forwarding, as well as anything else we might implement in
+    the future. Like the 'restrict' authorized_keys flag, this is
+    intended to be a simple and future-proof way of restricting
+    an account.
+  * sshd(8), ssh(1): Support the "curve25519-sha256" key exchange
+    method. This is identical to the currently-supported method
+    named "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org".
+  * sshd(8): Improve handling of SIGHUP by checking to see if
+    sshd is already daemonised at startup and skipping the call
+    to daemon(3) if it is. This ensures that a SIGHUP restart of
+    sshd(8) will retain the same process-ID as the initial
+    execution. sshd(8) will also now unlink the PidFile prior to
+    SIGHUP restart and re-create it after a successful restart,
+    rather than leaving a stale file in the case of a
+    configuration error. bz#2641
+  * sshd(8): Allow ClientAliveInterval and ClientAliveCountMax
+    directives to appear in sshd_config Match blocks.
+  * sshd(8): Add %-escapes to AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand to
+    match those supported by AuthorizedKeysCommand (key, key
+    type, fingerprint, etc.) and a few more to provide access to
+    the contents of the certificate being offered.
+  * Added regression tests for string matching, address matching
+    and string sanitisation functions.
+  * Improved the key exchange fuzzer harness.
+  ---- Bugfixes
+  * ssh(1): Allow IdentityFile to successfully load and use
+    certificates that have no corresponding bare public key.
+    bz#2617 certificate id_rsa-cert.pub (and no id_rsa.pub).
+  * ssh(1): Fix public key authentication when multiple
+    authentication is in use and publickey is not just the first
+    method attempted. bz#2642
+  * regress: Allow the PuTTY interop tests to run unattended.
+    bz#2639
+  * ssh-agent(1), ssh(1): improve reporting when attempting to
+    load keys from PKCS#11 tokens with fewer useless log messages
+    and more detail in debug messages. bz#2610
+  * ssh(1): When tearing down ControlMaster connections, don't
+    pollute stderr when LogLevel=quiet.
+  * sftp(1): On ^Z wait for underlying ssh(1) to suspend before
+    suspending sftp(1) to ensure that ssh(1) restores the
+    terminal mode correctly if suspended during a password
+    prompt.
+  * ssh(1): Avoid busy-wait when ssh(1) is suspended during a
+    password prompt.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Correctly report errors during sending of
+    ext- info messages.
+  * sshd(8): fix NULL-deref crash if sshd(8) received an out-of-
+    sequence NEWKEYS message.
+  * sshd(8): Correct list of supported signature algorithms sent
+    in the server-sig-algs extension. bz#2547
+  * sshd(8): Fix sending ext_info message if privsep is disabled.
+  * sshd(8): more strictly enforce the expected ordering of
+    privilege separation monitor calls used for authentication
+    and allow them only when their respective authentication
+    methods are enabled in the configuration
+  * sshd(8): Fix uninitialised optlen in getsockopt() call;
+    harmless on Unix/BSD but potentially crashy on Cygwin.
+  * Fix false positive reports caused by explicit_bzero(3) not
+    being recognised as a memory initialiser when compiled with
+    -fsanitize-memory.
+  * sshd_config(5): Use 2001:db8::/32, the official IPv6 subnet
+    for configuration examples.
+  ---- Portability
+  * On environments configured with Turkish locales, fall back to
+    the C/POSIX locale to avoid errors in configuration parsing
+    caused by that locale's unique handling of the letters 'i'
+    and 'I'. bz#2643
+  * sftp-server(8), ssh-agent(1): Deny ptrace on OS X using
+    ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, ..)
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Unbreak AES-CTR ciphers on old (~0.9.8)
+    OpenSSL.
+  * Fix compilation for libcrypto compiled without RIPEMD160
+    support.
+  * contrib: Add a gnome-ssh-askpass3 with GTK+3 support. bz#2640
+  * sshd(8): Improve PRNG reseeding across privilege separation
+    and force libcrypto to obtain a high-quality seed before
+    chroot or sandboxing.
+  * All: Explicitly test for broken strnvis. NetBSD added an
+    strnvis and unfortunately made it incompatible with the
+    existing one in OpenBSD and Linux's libbsd (the former having
+    existed for over ten years). Try to detect this mess, and
+    assume the only safe option if we're cross compiling.
+- OpenSSH 7.5
+  ---- Potentially-incompatible changes
+  * This release deprecates the sshd_config
+    UsePrivilegeSeparation option, thereby making privilege
+    separation mandatory. Privilege separation has been on by
+    default for almost 15 years and sandboxing has been on by
+    default for almost the last five.
+  * The format of several log messages emitted by the packet code
+    has changed to include additional information about the user
+    and their authentication state. Software that monitors
+    ssh/sshd logs may need to account for these changes. For
+    example:
+   Connection closed by user x 1.1.1.1 port 1234 [preauth]
+   Connection closed by authenticating user x 10.1.1.1 port 1234
+   [preauth] Connection closed by invalid user x 1.1.1.1 port
+   1234 [preauth]
+   Affected messages include connection closure, timeout, remote
+   disconnection, negotiation failure and some other fatal
+   messages generated by the packet code.
+  * [Portable OpenSSH only] This version removes support for
+    building against OpenSSL versions prior to 1.0.1. OpenSSL
+    stopped supporting versions prior to 1.0.1 over 12 months ago
+    (i.e. they no longer receive fixes for security bugs).
+  ---- Security
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix weakness in CBC padding oracle
+    countermeasures that allowed a variant of the attack fixed in
+    OpenSSH 7.3 to proceed.  Note that the OpenSSH client
+    disables CBC ciphers by default, sshd offers them as
+    lowest-preference options and will remove them by default
+    entriely in the next release. Reported by Jean Paul
+    Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Martin Albrecht and Torben Hansen
+    of Royal Holloway, University of London.
+  * sftp-client(1): [portable OpenSSH only] On Cygwin, a client
+    making a recursive file transfer could be maniuplated by a
+    hostile server to perform a path-traversal attack. creating
+    or modifying files outside of the intended target directory.
+    Reported by Jann Horn of Google Project Zero.
+  ---- New Features
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Support "=-" syntax to easily remove methods
+    from algorithm lists, e.g. Ciphers=-*cbc. bz#2671
+  ---- Bugfixes
+  * sshd(1): Fix NULL dereference crash when key exchange start
+    messages are sent out of sequence.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Allow form-feed characters to appear in
+    configuration files.
+  * sshd(8): Fix regression in OpenSSH 7.4 support for the
+    server-sig-algs extension, where SHA2 RSA signature methods
+    were not being correctly advertised. bz#2680
+  * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Fix a number of case-sensitivity bugs
+    in known_hosts processing. bz#2591 bz#2685
+  * ssh(1): Allow ssh to use certificates accompanied by a
+    private key file but no corresponding plain *.pub public key.
+    bz#2617
+  * ssh(1): When updating hostkeys using the UpdateHostKeys
+    option, accept RSA keys if HostkeyAlgorithms contains any RSA
+    keytype.  Previously, ssh could ignore RSA keys when only the
+    ssh-rsa-sha2-* methods were enabled in HostkeyAlgorithms and
+    not the old ssh-rsa method. bz#2650
+  * ssh(1): Detect and report excessively long configuration file
+    lines. bz#2651
+  * Merge a number of fixes found by Coverity and reported via
+    Redhat and FreeBSD. Includes fixes for some memory and file
+    descriptor leaks in error paths. bz#2687
+  * ssh-keyscan(1): Correctly hash hosts with a port number.
+    bz#2692
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): When logging long messages to stderr, don't
+    truncate "\r\n" if the length of the message exceeds the
+    buffer. bz#2688
+  * ssh(1): Fully quote [host]:port in generated ProxyJump/-J
+    command- line; avoid confusion over IPv6 addresses and shells
+    that treat square bracket characters specially.
+  * ssh-keygen(1): Fix corruption of known_hosts when running
+    "ssh-keygen -H" on a known_hosts containing already-hashed
+    entries.
+  * Fix various fallout and sharp edges caused by removing SSH
+    protocol 1 support from the server, including the server
+    banner string being incorrectly terminated with only \n
+    (instead of \r\n), confusing error messages from ssh-keyscan
+    bz#2583 and a segfault in sshd if protocol v.1 was enabled
+    for the client and sshd_config contained references to legacy
+    keys bz#2686.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Free fd_set on connection timeout. bz#2683
+  * sshd(8): Fix Unix domain socket forwarding for root
+    (regression in OpenSSH 7.4).
+  * sftp(1): Fix division by zero crash in "df" output when
+    server returns zero total filesystem blocks/inodes.
+  * ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): Translate OpenSSL
+    errors encountered during key loading to more meaningful
+    error codes.  bz#2522 bz#2523
+  * ssh-keygen(1): Sanitise escape sequences in key comments sent
+    to printf but preserve valid UTF-8 when the locale supports
+    it; bz#2520
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Return reason for port forwarding failures
+    where feasible rather than always "administratively
+    prohibited". bz#2674
+  * sshd(8): Fix deadlock when AuthorizedKeysCommand or
+    AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand produces a lot of output and a
+    key is matched early. bz#2655
+  * Regression tests: several reliability fixes. bz#2654 bz#2658
+    bz#2659
+  * ssh(1): Fix typo in ~C error message for bad port forward
+    cancellation. bz#2672
+  * ssh(1): Show a useful error message when included config
+    files can't be opened; bz#2653
+  * sshd(8): Make sshd set GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck=yes as the
+    manual page (previously incorrectly) advertised. bz#2637
+  * sshd_config(5): Repair accidentally-deleted mention of %k
+    token in AuthorizedKeysCommand; bz#2656
+  * sshd(8): Remove vestiges of previously removed LOGIN_PROGRAM;
+    bz#2665
+  * ssh-agent(1): Relax PKCS#11 whitelist to include libexec and
+    common 32-bit compatibility library directories.
+  * sftp-client(1): Fix non-exploitable integer overflow in
+    SSH2_FXP_NAME response handling.
+  * ssh-agent(1): Fix regression in 7.4 of deleting
+    PKCS#11-hosted keys. It was not possible to delete them
+    except by specifying their full physical path. bz#2682
+  ---- Portability
+  * sshd(8): Avoid sandbox errors for Linux S390 systems using an
+    ICA crypto coprocessor.
+  * sshd(8): Fix non-exploitable weakness in seccomp-bpf sandbox
+    arg inspection.
+  * ssh(1): Fix X11 forwarding on OSX where X11 was being started
+    by launchd. bz#2341
+  * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sftp(1): Fix output truncation for
+    various that contain non-printable characters where the
+    codeset in use is ASCII.
+  * build: Fix builds that attempt to link a kerberised libldns.
+    bz#2603
+  * build: Fix compilation problems caused by unconditionally
+    defining _XOPEN_SOURCE in wide character detection.
+  * sshd(8): Fix sandbox violations for clock_gettime VSDO
+    syscall fallback on some Linux/X32 kernels. bz#2142
+- OpenSSH 7.6
+  ---- Potentially-incompatible changes
+  This release includes a number of changes that may affect
+  existing configurations:
+  * ssh(1): delete SSH protocol version 1 support, associated
+    configuration options and documentation.
+  * ssh(1)/sshd(8): remove support for the hmac-ripemd160 MAC.
+  * ssh(1)/sshd(8): remove support for the arcfour, blowfish and
+    CAST ciphers.
+  * Refuse RSA keys <1024 bits in length and improve reporting
+    for keys that do not meet this requirement.
+  * ssh(1): do not offer CBC ciphers by default.
+  ---- Security
+  * sftp-server(8): in read-only mode, sftp-server was
+    incorrectly permitting creation of zero-length files.
+    Reported by Michal Zalewski.
+  ---- New Features
+  * ssh(1): add RemoteCommand option to specify a command in the
+    ssh config file instead of giving it on the client's command
+    line. This allows the configuration file to specify the
+    command that will be executed on the remote host.
+  * sshd(8): add ExposeAuthInfo option that enables writing
+    details of the authentication methods used (including public
+    keys where applicable) to a file that is exposed via a
+    $SSH_USER_AUTH environment variable in the subsequent
+    session.
+  * ssh(1): add support for reverse dynamic forwarding. In this
+    mode, ssh will act as a SOCKS4/5 proxy and forward
+    connections to destinations requested by the remote SOCKS
+    client. This mode is requested using extended syntax for the
+    -R and RemoteForward options and, because it is implemented
+    solely at the client, does not require the server be updated
+    to be supported.
+  * sshd(8): allow LogLevel directive in sshd_config Match
+    blocks; bz#2717
+  * ssh-keygen(1): allow inclusion of arbitrary string or flag
+    certificate extensions and critical options.
+  * ssh-keygen(1): allow ssh-keygen to use a key held in
+    ssh-agent as a CA when signing certificates. bz#2377
+  * ssh(1)/sshd(8): allow IPQoS=none in ssh/sshd to not set an
+    explicit ToS/DSCP value and just use the operating system
+    default.
+  * ssh-add(1): added -q option to make ssh-add quiet on success.
+  * ssh(1): expand the StrictHostKeyChecking option with two new
+    settings. The first "accept-new" will automatically accept
+    hitherto-unseen keys but will refuse connections for changed
+    or invalid hostkeys. This is a safer subset of the current
+    behaviour of StrictHostKeyChecking=no. The second setting
+    "off", is a synonym for the current behaviour of
+    StrictHostKeyChecking=no: accept new host keys, and continue
+    connection for hosts with incorrect hostkeys. A future
+    release will change the meaning of StrictHostKeyChecking=no
+    to the behaviour of "accept-new". bz#2400
+  * ssh(1): add SyslogFacility option to ssh(1) matching the
+    equivalent option in sshd(8). bz#2705
+  ---- Bugfixes
+  * ssh(1): use HostKeyAlias if specified instead of hostname for
+    matching host certificate principal names; bz#2728
+  * sftp(1): implement sorting for globbed ls; bz#2649
+  * ssh(1): add a user@host prefix to client's "Permission
+    denied" messages, useful in particular when using "stacked"
+    connections (e.g. ssh -J) where it's not clear which host is
+    denying. bz#2720
+  * ssh(1): accept unknown EXT_INFO extension values that contain
+    \0 characters. These are legal, but would previously cause
+    fatal connection errors if received.
+  * ssh(1)/sshd(8): repair compression statistics printed at
+    connection exit
+  * sftp(1): print '?' instead of incorrect link count (that the
+    protocol doesn't provide) for remote listings. bz#2710
+  * ssh(1): return failure rather than fatal() for more cases
+    during session multiplexing negotiations. Causes the session
+    to fall back to a non-mux connection if they occur. bz#2707
+  * ssh(1): mention that the server may send debug messages to
+    explain public key authentication problems under some
+    circumstances; bz#2709
+  * Translate OpenSSL error codes to better report incorrect
+    passphrase errors when loading private keys; bz#2699
+  * sshd(8): adjust compatibility patterns for WinSCP to
+    correctly identify versions that implement only the legacy DH
+    group exchange scheme. bz#2748
+  * ssh(1): print the "Killed by signal 1" message only at
+    LogLevel verbose so that it is not shown at the default
+    level; prevents it from appearing during ssh -J and
+    equivalent ProxyCommand configs.  bz#1906, bz#2744
+  * ssh-keygen(1): when generating all hostkeys (ssh-keygen -A),
+    clobber existing keys if they exist but are zero length.
+    zero-length keys could previously be made if ssh-keygen
+    failed or was interrupted part way through generating them.
+    bz#2561
+  * ssh(1): fix pledge(2) violation in the escape sequence "~&"
+    used to place the current session in the background.
+  * ssh-keyscan(1): avoid double-close() on file descriptors;
+    bz#2734
+  * sshd(8): avoid reliance on shared use of pointers shared
+    between monitor and child sshd processes. bz#2704
+  * sshd_config(8): document available AuthenticationMethods;
+    bz#2453
+  * ssh(1): avoid truncation in some login prompts; bz#2768
+  * sshd(8): Fix various compilations failures, inc bz#2767
+  * ssh(1): make "--" before the hostname terminate argument
+    processing after the hostname too.
+  * ssh-keygen(1): switch from aes256-cbc to aes256-ctr for
+    encrypting new-style private keys. Fixes problems related to
+    private key handling for no-OpenSSL builds. bz#2754
+  * ssh(1): warn and do not attempt to use keys when the public
+    and private halves do not match. bz#2737
+  * sftp(1): don't print verbose error message when ssh
+    disconnects from under sftp. bz#2750
+  * sshd(8): fix keepalive scheduling problem: activity on a
+    forwarded port from preventing the keepalive from being sent;
+    bz#2756
+  * sshd(8): when started without root privileges, don't require
+    the privilege separation user or path to exist. Makes running
+    the regression tests easier without touching the filesystem.
+  * Make integrity.sh regression tests more robust against
+    timeouts.  bz#2658
+  * ssh(1)/sshd(8): correctness fix for channels implementation:
+    accept channel IDs greater than 0x7FFFFFFF.
+  ---- Portability
+  * sshd(9): drop two more privileges in the Solaris sandbox:
+    PRIV_DAX_ACCESS and PRIV_SYS_IB_INFO; bz#2723
+  * sshd(8): expose list of completed authentication methods to
+    PAM via the SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 PAM environment variable. bz#2408
+  * ssh(1)/sshd(8): fix several problems in the tun/tap
+    forwarding code, mostly to do with host/network byte order
+    confusion. bz#2735
+  * Add --with-cflags-after and --with-ldflags-after configure
+    flags to allow setting CFLAGS/LDFLAGS after configure has
+    completed. These are useful for setting sanitiser/fuzzing
+    options that may interfere with configure's operation.
+  * sshd(8): avoid Linux seccomp violations on ppc64le over the
+    socketcall syscall.
+  * Fix use of ldns when using ldns-config; bz#2697
+  * configure: set cache variables when cross-compiling. The
+    cross- compiling fallback message was saying it assumed the
+    test passed, but it wasn't actually set the cache variables
+    and this would cause later tests to fail.
+  * Add clang libFuzzer harnesses for public key parsing and
+    signature verification.
+- packaging:
+  * moving patches into a separate archive
+  * first round of rebased patches:
+    [-X11_trusted_forwarding]
+    [-allow_root_password_login]
+    [-blocksigalrm]
+    [-cavstest-ctr]
+    [-cavstest-kdf]
+    [-disable_short_DH_parameters]
+    [-eal3]
+    [-enable_PAM_by_default]
+    [-fips]
+    [-fips_checks]
+    [-gssapi_key_exchange]
+    [-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X]
+    [-lastlog]
+    [-missing_headers]
+    [-pam_check_locks]
+    [-pts_names_formatting]
+    [-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit]
+    [-seccomp_geteuid]
+    [-seccomp_getuid]
+    [-seccomp_stat]
+    [-seed-prng]
+    [-send_locale]
+    [-systemd-notify]
+  * not rebased (obsoleted) patches (so far):
+    [-additional_seccomp_archs]
+    [-allow_DSS_by_default]
+    [-default_protocol]
+    [-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM]
+    [-eal3_obsolete]
+    [-gssapimitm]
+    [-saveargv-fix]
+  * obviously removing all standalone patch files:
+    [openssh-7.2p2-allow_root_password_login.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-allow_DSS_by_default.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-pts_names_formatting.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_geteuid.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-fips.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-ctr.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-kdf.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-seed-prng.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-gssapi_key_exchange.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-audit_fixes.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-ldap.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-keep_slogin.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-kex_resource_depletion.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-verify_CIDR_address_ranges.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-restrict_pkcs11-modules.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-prevent_private_key_leakage.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-secure_unix_sockets_forwarding.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-ssh_case_insensitive_host_matching.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-disable_preauth_compression.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-s390_hw_crypto_syscalls.patch]
+    [openssh-7.2p2-s390_OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11_syscalls.patch]
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Thu Nov 23 13:38:52 UTC 2017 - rbrown@suse.com
+
+- Replace references to /var/adm/fillup-templates with new 
+  %_fillupdir macro (boo#1069468)
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Wed Oct 25 15:09:06 UTC 2017 - jsegitz@suse.com

--- a/openssh.spec
+++ b/openssh.spec
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #
 # spec file for package openssh
 #
-# Copyright (c) 2017 SUSE LINUX GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
+# Copyright (c) 2018 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
 #
 # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties
 # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed
@ -16,6 +16,11 @@
 #


+#Compat macro for new _fillupdir macro introduced in Nov 2017
+%if ! %{defined _fillupdir}
+  %define _fillupdir /var/adm/fillup-templates
+%endif
+
 %if 0%{suse_version} >= 1100
 %define has_fw_dir 1
 %else
@ -85,6 +90,7 @@ BuildRequires:  libopenssl-1_0_0-devel
 BuildRequires:  openldap2-devel
 BuildRequires:  pam-devel
 %if %{uses_systemd}
+BuildRequires:  systemd-devel
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(systemd)
 %{?systemd_requires}
 %endif
@ -93,7 +99,7 @@ PreReq:         pwdutils %{fillup_prereq} coreutils
 %if ! %{uses_systemd}
 PreReq:         %{insserv_prereq}
 %endif
-Version:        7.2p2
+Version:        7.6p1
 Release:        0
 Summary:        Secure Shell Client and Server (Remote Login Program)
 License:        BSD-2-Clause and MIT
@ -113,54 +119,7 @@ Source9:        sshd-gen-keys-start
 Source10:       sshd.service
 Source11:       README.FIPS
 Source12:       cavs_driver-ssh.pl
-Patch00:        openssh-7.2p2-allow_root_password_login.patch
-Patch01:        openssh-7.2p2-allow_DSS_by_default.patch
-Patch02:        openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
-Patch03:        openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch
-Patch04:        openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
-Patch05:        openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch
-Patch06:        openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch
-Patch07:        openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch
-Patch08:        openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch
-Patch09:        openssh-7.2p2-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
-Patch10:        openssh-7.2p2-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
-Patch11:        openssh-7.2p2-pts_names_formatting.patch
-Patch12:        openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch
-Patch13:        openssh-7.2p2-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
-Patch14:        openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch
-Patch15:        openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_geteuid.patch
-Patch16:        openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch
-Patch17:        openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch
-Patch18:        openssh-7.2p2-fips.patch
-Patch19:        openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-ctr.patch
-Patch20:        openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-kdf.patch
-Patch21:        openssh-7.2p2-seed-prng.patch
-Patch22:        openssh-7.2p2-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
-Patch23:        openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch
-Patch24:        openssh-7.2p2-audit_fixes.patch
-Patch25:        openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch
-Patch26:        openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch
-Patch27:        openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
-Patch28:        openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
-Patch29:        openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch
-Patch30:        openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch
-Patch31:        openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch
-Patch32:        openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
-Patch33:        openssh-7.2p2-ldap.patch
-Patch34:        openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
-Patch35:        openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch
-Patch36:        openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch
-Patch37:        openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch
-Patch38:        openssh-7.2p2-keep_slogin.patch
-Patch39:        openssh-7.2p2-kex_resource_depletion.patch
-Patch40:        openssh-7.2p2-verify_CIDR_address_ranges.patch
-Patch41:        openssh-7.2p2-restrict_pkcs11-modules.patch
-Patch42:        openssh-7.2p2-prevent_private_key_leakage.patch
-Patch43:        openssh-7.2p2-secure_unix_sockets_forwarding.patch
-Patch44:        openssh-7.2p2-ssh_case_insensitive_host_matching.patch
-Patch45:        openssh-7.2p2-disable_preauth_compression.patch
-Patch46:        openssh-7.2p2-s390_hw_crypto_syscalls.patch
-Patch47:        openssh-7.2p2-s390_OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11_syscalls.patch
+Source100:      openssh-%{version}-SUSE_patches.tar.gz
 BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
 Conflicts:      nonfreessh
 Recommends:     audit
@ -211,64 +170,22 @@ FIPS140 CAVS tests related parts of the OpenSSH package


 %prep
-%setup -q
-%patch00 -p2
-%patch01 -p2
-%patch02 -p2
-%patch03 -p2
-%patch04 -p2
-%patch05 -p2
-%patch06 -p2
-%patch07 -p2
-%patch08 -p2
-%patch09 -p2
-%patch10 -p2
-%patch11 -p2
-%patch12 -p2
-%patch13 -p2
-%patch14 -p2
-%patch15 -p2
-%patch16 -p2
-%patch17 -p2
-%patch18 -p2
-%patch19 -p2
-%patch20 -p2
-%patch21 -p2
-%patch22 -p2
-%patch23 -p2
-%patch24 -p2
-%patch25 -p2
-%patch26 -p2
-%patch27 -p2
-%patch28 -p2
-%patch29 -p2
-%patch30 -p2
-%patch31 -p2
-%patch32 -p2
-%patch33 -p2
-%patch34 -p2
-%patch35 -p2
-%patch36 -p2
-%patch37 -p2
-%patch38 -p2
-%patch39 -p2
-%patch40 -p2
-%patch41 -p2
-%patch42 -p2
-%patch43 -p2
-%patch44 -p2
-%patch45 -p2
-%patch46 -p2
-%patch47 -p2
+%setup -q -b 100
 cp %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE4} %{SOURCE11} .
+# patch sources
+PATCH_DIR="../SUSE_patches"
+cat $PATCH_DIR/patch.series | while read p; do
+    printf ">> applying '$p'\n"
+    patch -p2 < "${PATCH_DIR}/$p"
+done
+
+#LDAP: # set libexec dir in the LDAP patch
+#LDAP: sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \
+#LDAP:     $( grep -Rl @LIBEXECDIR@ \
+#LDAP:         $( grep "^+++" %{PATCH33} | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' )
+#LDAP:     )

 %build
-# set libexec dir in the LDAP patch
-sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \
-    $( grep -Rl @LIBEXECDIR@ \
-        $( grep "^+++" %{PATCH33} | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' )
-    )
-
 autoreconf -fiv
 %ifarch s390 s390x %sparc
 PIEFLAGS="-fPIE"
@ -292,6 +209,7 @@ export LDFLAGS CFLAGS CXXFLAGS CPPFLAGS
 %endif
 %if %{uses_systemd}
    --with-pid-dir=/run \
+    --with-systemd \
 %endif
    --with-ssl-engine \
    --with-pam \
@ -339,8 +257,8 @@ install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE1} %{buildroot}%{_initddir}/sshd
 install -m 0644 %{SOURCE10} .
 ln -s ../..%{_initddir}/sshd %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd
 %endif
-install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}/var/adm/fillup-templates
-install -m 644 %{SOURCE8} %{buildroot}/var/adm/fillup-templates
+install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_fillupdir}
+install -m 644 %{SOURCE8} %{buildroot}%{_fillupdir}
 # install shell script to automate the process of adding your public key to a remote machine
 install -m 755 contrib/ssh-copy-id %{buildroot}%{_bindir}
 install -m 644 contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1
@ -449,7 +367,7 @@ rpm -q openssh-fips >& /dev/null && DISABLE_RESTART_ON_UPDATE=yes
 %attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/*
 %dir %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d
 %config %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/ssh.reg
-/var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh
+%{_fillupdir}/sysconfig.ssh
 %if %{has_fw_dir}
 %if %{needs_all_dirs}
 %dir %{_fwdir}
@ -461,10 +379,10 @@ rpm -q openssh-fips >& /dev/null && DISABLE_RESTART_ON_UPDATE=yes
 %files helpers
 %defattr(-,root,root)
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
-%verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ldap.conf
+#verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ldap.conf
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
-%doc HOWTO.ldap-keys openssh-lpk-openldap.schema openssh-lpk-sun.schema
+#attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
+#doc HOWTO.ldap-keys openssh-lpk-openldap.schema openssh-lpk-sun.schema

 %files fips
 %defattr(-,root,root)