From f716c85e713a732d49d9c63e95e84a46c233f7fa6499a70bb732b9dddead3b91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hans Petter Jansson Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2023 01:39:20 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Accepting request 1113799 from home:kukuk:branches:network - Disable SLP by default for Factory and ALP (bsc#1214884) OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1113799 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=253 --- openssh.changes | 5 +++++ openssh.spec | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/openssh.changes b/openssh.changes index 087e2d3..771ff28 100644 --- a/openssh.changes +++ b/openssh.changes @@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ Tue Oct 24 10:56:31 UTC 2023 - Dominique Leuenberger - Add cb4ed12f.patch: Fix build using zlib 1.3. The check expected a version in the form a.b.c[.d], which no longer matches 1.3. +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Sep 27 06:28:57 UTC 2023 - Thorsten Kukuk + +- Disable SLP by default for Factory and ALP (bsc#1214884) + ------------------------------------------------------------------- Fri Jul 21 02:48:58 UTC 2023 - Simon Lees diff --git a/openssh.spec b/openssh.spec index 0fa5302..f39e348 100644 --- a/openssh.spec +++ b/openssh.spec @@ -349,8 +349,10 @@ install -m 644 %{SOURCE15} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/sshd install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_localstatedir}/lib/sshd install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config.d install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config.d +%if 0%{?suse_version} < 1600 install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/ install -m 644 %{SOURCE5} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/ +%endif install -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE10} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/sshd.service ln -s service %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_fillupdir} @@ -500,8 +502,10 @@ test -f /etc/ssh/ssh_config.rpmsave && mv -v /etc/ssh/ssh_config.rpmsave /etc/ss %attr(0444,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* %attr(0444,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server +%if 0%{?suse_version} < 1600 %dir %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d %config %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/ssh.reg +%endif %{_fillupdir}/sysconfig.ssh %if 0%{?suse_version} < 1550 %dir %{_fwdir} From 977808494839287569fdc8345d1441687f52db73508170c5775b3e02238a90f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hans Petter Jansson Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2023 01:54:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Accepting request 1133932 from home:hpjansson:branches:network Added openssh-cve-2023-48795.patch OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1133932 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=254 --- openssh-cve-2023-48795.patch | 399 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ openssh.changes | 7 + openssh.spec | 1 + 3 files changed, 407 insertions(+) create mode 100644 openssh-cve-2023-48795.patch diff --git a/openssh-cve-2023-48795.patch b/openssh-cve-2023-48795.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef1a6b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-cve-2023-48795.patch @@ -0,0 +1,399 @@ +Index: openssh-9.3p2/PROTOCOL +=================================================================== +--- openssh-9.3p2.orig/PROTOCOL ++++ openssh-9.3p2/PROTOCOL +@@ -104,6 +104,25 @@ http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh. + + This is identical to curve25519-sha256 as later published in RFC8731. + ++1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension ++ ++OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under ++a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the ++RFC8305 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the ++SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append ++"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server ++may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". ++ ++When endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm ++name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to ++the the protocol: ++ ++a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or ++ out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the ++ connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT. ++b) At each SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the packet sequence number ++ to zero. ++ + 2. Connection protocol changes + + 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com" +Index: openssh-9.3p2/kex.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-9.3p2.orig/kex.c ++++ openssh-9.3p2/kex.c +@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ + #include "fips.h" + + /* prototype */ +-static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *); ++static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq); + static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + + static const char * const proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { +@@ -261,6 +261,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names) + return 1; + } + ++/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */ ++static int ++has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs) ++{ ++ char *cp; ++ ++ if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ free(cp); ++ return 1; ++} ++ + /* + * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process. + * Caller must free returned string. +@@ -268,7 +280,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names) + char * + kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b) + { +- char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m; ++ char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p; + size_t len; + + if (a == NULL || *a == '\0') +@@ -285,10 +297,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char + } + strlcpy(ret, a, len); + for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { +- if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) { +- free(m); ++ if (has_any_alg(ret, p)) + continue; /* Algorithm already present */ +- } + if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len || + strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) { + free(tmp); +@@ -441,15 +451,23 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh + const char *defpropclient[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; + const char **defprop = ssh->kex->server ? defpropserver : defpropclient; + u_int i; ++ char *cp; + + if (prop == NULL) + fatal_f("proposal missing"); + ++ /* Append EXT_INFO signalling to KexAlgorithms */ ++ if (kexalgos == NULL) ++ kexalgos = defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ if ((cp = kex_names_cat(kexalgos, ssh->kex->server ? ++ "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" : ++ "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("kex_names_cat"); ++ + for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { + switch(i) { + case PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS: +- prop[i] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, +- kexalgos ? kexalgos : defprop[i]); ++ prop[i] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, cp); + break; + case PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS: + case PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC: +@@ -470,6 +488,7 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh + prop[i] = xstrdup(defprop[i]); + } + } ++ free(cp); + } + + void +@@ -573,7 +592,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t s + { + int r; + +- error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); ++ /* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */ ++ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) { ++ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: " ++ "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq); ++ } ++ error_f("type %u seq %u", type, seq); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) +@@ -651,7 +675,7 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t s + if (ninfo >= 1024) { + error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected " + "<=1024, received %u", ninfo); +- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; ++ return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh); + } + for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) { + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0) +@@ -767,7 +791,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t se + error_f("no kex"); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error); + ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0) + return r; +@@ -803,7 +827,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t se + if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)) + if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) + return r; +- if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0) ++ if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0) + return r; + + if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL) +@@ -1082,20 +1106,14 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], + return (1); + } + +-/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */ + static int +-has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs) ++kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext) + { +- char *cp; +- +- if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL) +- return 0; +- free(cp); +- return 1; ++ return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext); + } + + static int +-kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) ++kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq) + { + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + struct newkeys *newkeys; +@@ -1120,13 +1138,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) + sprop=peer; + } + +- /* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */ +- if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) { +- char *ext; +- +- ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL); +- kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL); +- free(ext); ++ /* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */ ++ if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) { ++ if (kex->server) { ++ kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c"); ++ kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer, ++ "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com"); ++ } else { ++ kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer, ++ "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com"); ++ } ++ if (kex->kex_strict) { ++ debug3_f("will use strict KEX ordering"); ++ if (seq != 0) ++ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, ++ "strict KEX violation: " ++ "KEXINIT was not the first packet"); ++ } + } + + /* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */ +Index: openssh-9.3p2/kex.h +=================================================================== +--- openssh-9.3p2.orig/kex.h ++++ openssh-9.3p2/kex.h +@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ struct kex { + u_int kex_type; + char *server_sig_algs; + int ext_info_c; ++ int kex_strict; + struct sshbuf *my; + struct sshbuf *peer; + struct sshbuf *client_version; +Index: openssh-9.3p2/packet.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-9.3p2.orig/packet.c ++++ openssh-9.3p2/packet.c +@@ -1236,6 +1236,11 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh + state->p_send.bytes += len; + sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); + ++ if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) { ++ debug_f("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr); ++ state->p_send.seqnr = 0; ++ } ++ + if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) + r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT); + else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side) +@@ -1364,8 +1369,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u + /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */ + for (;;) { + /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */ +- r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); +- if (r != 0) ++ if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0) + break; + /* If we got a packet, return it. */ + if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE) +@@ -1649,6 +1630,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0) + goto out; + } ++ + if (seqnr_p != NULL) + *seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr; + if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) +@@ -1718,6 +1700,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u + #endif + /* reset for next packet */ + state->packlen = 0; ++ if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) { ++ debug_f("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr); ++ state->p_read.seqnr = 0; ++ } + + if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0) + return r; +@@ -1738,10 +1724,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *s + r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); + if (r != 0) + return r; +- if (*typep) { +- state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; +- DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); ++ if (*typep == 0) { ++ /* no message ready */ ++ return 0; + } ++ state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; ++ DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); ++ ++ /* Always process disconnect messages */ ++ if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) ++ return r; ++ /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */ ++ do_log2(ssh->state->server_side && ++ reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ? ++ SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, ++ "Received disconnect from %s port %d:" ++ "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ++ ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg); ++ free(msg); ++ return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial ++ * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed ++ * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate ++ * protocol errors. ++ */ ++ if (ssh->kex != NULL && ++ (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) ++ return 0; ++ /* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */ + switch (*typep) { + case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE: + debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE"); +@@ -1756,19 +1771,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *s + debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); + free(msg); + break; +- case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: +- if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 || +- (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) +- return r; +- /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */ +- do_log2(ssh->state->server_side && +- reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ? +- SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, +- "Received disconnect from %s port %d:" +- "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), +- ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg); +- free(msg); +- return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; + case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED: + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0) + return r; +@@ -2300,6 +2302,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 || +@@ -2462,6 +2465,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct k + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 || +@@ -2790,6 +2794,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const + vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); + va_end(args); + ++ debug2_f("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || +Index: openssh-9.3p2/sshconnect2.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-9.3p2.orig/sshconnect2.c ++++ openssh-9.3p2/sshconnect2.c +@@ -420,7 +420,6 @@ struct cauthmethod { + }; + + static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +-static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +@@ -540,7 +539,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const cha + + ssh->authctxt = &authctxt; + ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error); +- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept); + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success); /* loop until success */ + pubkey_cleanup(ssh); +@@ -591,12 +590,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, + return r; + } + +-static int +-input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh) +-{ +- return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh); +-} +- + void + userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist) + { +@@ -675,6 +668,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32 + free(authctxt->methoddata); + authctxt->methoddata = NULL; + authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */ ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error); + return 0; + } + diff --git a/openssh.changes b/openssh.changes index 771ff28..998f00e 100644 --- a/openssh.changes +++ b/openssh.changes @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue Dec 19 01:42:55 UTC 2023 - Hans Petter Jansson + +- Added openssh-cve-2023-48795.patch (bsc#1217950, CVE-2023-48795). + This mitigates a prefix truncation attack that could be used to + undermine channel security. + ------------------------------------------------------------------- Fri Nov 3 10:44:14 UTC 2023 - Johannes Segitz diff --git a/openssh.spec b/openssh.spec index f39e348..c844338 100644 --- a/openssh.spec +++ b/openssh.spec @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ Patch103: openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch Patch104: openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch Patch105: openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch Patch106: openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch +Patch107: openssh-cve-2023-48795.patch BuildRequires: audit-devel BuildRequires: automake BuildRequires: groff