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Accepting request 551548 from home:pcerny:factory

Browse Source 
- upgrade to 7.6p1
  see main package changelog for details

- Replace references to /var/adm/fillup-templates with new 
  %_fillupdir macro (boo#1069468)

- Update to vanilla 7.6p1
  Most important changes (more details below):
  * complete removal of the ancient SSHv1 protocol
  * sshd(8) cannot run without privilege separation
  * removal of suport for arcfourm blowfish and CAST ciphers
    and RIPE-MD160 HMAC
  * refuse RSA keys shorter than 1024 bits
  Distilled upstream log:
- OpenSSH 7.3
  ---- Security
  * sshd(8): Mitigate a potential denial-of-service attack
    against the system's crypt(3) function via sshd(8). An
    attacker could send very long passwords that would cause
    excessive CPU use in crypt(3). sshd(8) now refuses to accept
    password authentication requests of length greater than 1024
    characters. Independently reported by Tomas Kuthan (Oracle),
    Andres Rojas and Javier Nieto.
  * sshd(8): Mitigate timing differences in password
    authentication that could be used to discern valid from
    invalid account names when long passwords were sent and
    particular password hashing algorithms are in use on the
    server. CVE-2016-6210, reported by EddieEzra.Harari at
    verint.com
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix observable timing weakness in the CBC

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/551548
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=127
This commit is contained in:
Petr Cerny 2017-12-05 12:47:07 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
parent ad9209ae06
commit b813991fe5
69 changed files with 2061 additions and 17112 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

184
cavs_driver-ssh.pl
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@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env perl
#
# CAVS test driver for OpenSSH
#
# Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
#
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
#
# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
#
# NO WARRANTY
#
# BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
# FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN
# OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
# PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS
# TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE
# PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
# REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
#
# IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
# WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
# REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
# INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
# OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
# TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
# YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
# PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
# POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
#
use strict;
use warnings;
use IPC::Open2;
# Executing a program by feeding STDIN and retrieving
# STDOUT
# $1: data string to be piped to the app on STDIN
# rest: program and args
# returns: STDOUT of program as string
sub pipe_through_program($@) {
my $in = shift;
my @args = @_;
my ($CO, $CI);
my $pid = open2($CO, $CI, @args);
my $out = "";
my $len = length($in);
my $first = 1;
while (1) {
my $rin = "";
my $win = "";
# Output of prog is FD that we read
vec($rin,fileno($CO),1) = 1;
# Input of prog is FD that we write
# check for $first is needed because we can have NULL input
# that is to be written to the app
if ( $len > 0 || $first) {
(vec($win,fileno($CI),1) = 1);
$first=0;
}
# Let us wait for 100ms
my $nfound = select(my $rout=$rin, my $wout=$win, undef, 0.1);
if ( $wout ) {
my $written = syswrite($CI, $in, $len);
die "broken pipe" if !defined $written;
$len -= $written;
substr($in, 0, $written) = "";
if ($len <= 0) {
close $CI or die "broken pipe: $!";
}
}
if ( $rout ) {
my $tmp_out = "";
my $bytes_read = sysread($CO, $tmp_out, 4096);
$out .= $tmp_out;
last if ($bytes_read == 0);
}
}
close $CO or die "broken pipe: $!";
waitpid $pid, 0;
return $out;
}
# Parser of CAVS test vector file
# $1: Test vector file
# $2: Output file for test results
# return: nothing
sub parse($$) {
my $infile = shift;
my $outfile = shift;
my $out = "";
my $K = "";
my $H = "";
my $session_id = "";
my $ivlen = 0;
my $eklen = "";
my $iklen = "";
open(IN, "<$infile");
while(<IN>) {
my $line = $_;
chomp($line);
$line =~ s/\r//;
if ($line =~ /\[SHA-1\]/) {
$iklen = 20;
} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-256\]/) {
$iklen = 32;
} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-384\]/) {
$iklen = 48;
} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-512\]/) {
$iklen = 64;
} elsif ($line =~ /^\[IV length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
$ivlen = $1;
$ivlen = $ivlen / 8;
} elsif ($line =~ /^\[encryption key length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
$eklen = $1;
$eklen = $eklen / 8;
} elsif ($line =~ /^K\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
$K = $1;
$K = substr($K, 8);
$K = "00" . $K;
} elsif ($line =~ /^H\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
$H = $1;
} elsif ($line =~ /^session_id\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
$session_id = $1;
}
$out .= $line . "\n";
if ($K ne "" && $H ne "" && $session_id ne "" &&
$ivlen ne "" && $eklen ne "" && $iklen > 0) {
$out .= pipe_through_program("", "@LIBEXECDIR@/ssh/cavstest-kdf -H $H -K $K -s $session_id -i $ivlen -e $eklen -m $iklen");
$K = "";
$H = "";
$session_id = "";
}
}
close IN;
$out =~ s/\n/\r\n/g; # make it a dos file
open(OUT, ">$outfile") or die "Cannot create output file $outfile: $?";
print OUT $out;
close OUT;
}
############################################################
#
# let us pretend to be C :-)
sub main() {
my $infile=$ARGV[0];
die "Error: Test vector file $infile not found" if (! -f $infile);
my $outfile = $infile;
# let us add .rsp regardless whether we could strip .req
$outfile =~ s/\.req$//;
$outfile .= ".rsp";
if (-f $outfile) {
die "Output file $outfile could not be removed: $?"
unless unlink($outfile);
}
print STDERR "Performing tests from source file $infile with results stored in destination file $outfile\n";
# Do the job
parse($infile, $outfile);
}
###########################################
# Call it
main();
1;

72
openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
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@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 9130c9e19c8a076a7f6f214070283cd3e0326894
Correctly parse DISPLAY variable for cases where it contains an IPv6 address
(which should - but not always is - in (square) brackets).
bnc#847710 - https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=847710
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c b/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
@@ -4049,18 +4049,19 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
return sock;
}
#endif
/*
* Check if it is a unix domain socket. Unix domain displays are in
* one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s]
*/
+ cp = strrchr(display, ':');
if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 ||
- display[0] == ':') {
+ (display[0] == ':' && ((cp - display) < 2)) ) {
/* Connect to the unix domain socket. */
if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
display);
return -1;
}
/* Create a socket. */
sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number);
@@ -4068,30 +4069,39 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
return -1;
/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
return sock;
}
/*
* Connect to an inet socket. The DISPLAY value is supposedly
* hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address.
+ * Note that IPv6 numberic addresses contain colons (e.g. ::1:0)
*/
strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf));
- cp = strchr(buf, ':');
+ cp = strrchr(buf, ':');
if (!cp) {
error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display);
return -1;
}
*cp = 0;
/* buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the display number. */
if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
display);
return -1;
}
+
+ /* Remove brackets surrounding IPv6 addresses if there are any. */
+ if (buf[0] == '[' && (cp = strchr(buf, ']'))) {
+ *cp = 0;
+ cp = buf + 1;
+ } else {
+ cp = buf;
+ }
/* Look up the host address */
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,

34
openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
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@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent a9e60634acb905a830a0f57ece296781ab08d0fb
Do not throw away already open sockets for X11 forwarding if another socket
family is not available for bind()
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c b/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
@@ -3938,16 +3938,25 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
sock_set_v6only(sock);
if (x11_use_localhost)
channel_set_reuseaddr(sock);
if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
debug2("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
+ /* do not remove successfully opened
+ * sockets if the request failed because
+ * the protocol IPv4/6 is not available
+ * (e.g. IPv6 may be disabled while being
+ * supported)
+ */
+ if (EADDRNOTAVAIL == errno)
+ continue;
+
for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
close(socks[n]);
}
num_socks = 0;
break;
}
socks[num_socks++] = sock;
if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)

56
openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch
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@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent e7bdbc5ea8971599466becf01bff12b9fcb5df3e
Enable the seccomp-bpf sandbox on more architectures
upstream commit: b9c50614eba9d90939b2b119b6e1b7e03b462278 (7.3p1)
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Fri Jul 8 13:59:13 2016 +1000
whitelist more architectures for seccomp-bpf
bz#2590 - testing and patch from Jakub Jelen
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
@@ -818,16 +818,40 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
;;
arm*-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
;;
aarch64*-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
;;
+ s390x-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X
+ ;;
+ s390-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390
+ ;;
+ powerpc64-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64
+ ;;
+ powerpc64le-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE
+ ;;
+ mips-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS
+ ;;
+ mipsel-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL
+ ;;
+ mips64-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64
+ ;;
+ mips64el-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64
+ ;;
esac
if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch],
[Specify the system call convention in use])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported])
fi

129
openssh-7.2p2-allow_DSS_by_default.patch
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@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent d33bce122aa351a56ce457be35feda52171f9088
Enable DSS authentication by default to maintain compatibility with older
versions.
bsc#983784
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h b/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h
@@ -94,21 +94,23 @@
#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
"ssh-ed25519," \
"rsa-sha2-512," \
"rsa-sha2-256," \
- "ssh-rsa"
+ "ssh-rsa," \
+ "ssh-dss"
/* the actual algorithms */
#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \
AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
@@ -887,19 +887,19 @@ Alternately if the specified value begin
character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
.Ed
.Pp
If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified
to prefer their algorithms.
.Pp
The list of available key types may also be obtained using the
.Fl Q
option of
@@ -1325,19 +1325,19 @@ Alternately if the specified value begin
character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
instead of replacing it.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
.Ed
.Pp
The
.Fl Q
option of
.Xr ssh 1
may be used to list supported key types.
.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
@@ -651,19 +651,19 @@ Alternately if the specified value begin
character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
.Ed
.Pp
The
.Fl Q
option of
.Xr ssh 1
may be used to list supported key types.
.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
@@ -743,19 +743,19 @@ environment variable.
Specifies the host key algorithms
that the server offers.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key types may also be obtained using the
.Fl Q
option of
.Xr ssh 1
with an argument of
.Dq key .

95
openssh-7.2p2-allow_root_password_login.patch
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@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent c43ae523939377778762e81743b77b3c75eb4bd1
Allow root login with password by default. While less secure than upstream
default of forbidding access to the root account with a password, we are
temporarily introducing this change to keep the default used in older OpenSSH
versions shipped with SLE.
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
@@ -233,17 +233,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE);
if (options->server_key_bits == -1)
options->server_key_bits = 1024;
if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
options->login_grace_time = 120;
if (options->key_regeneration_time == -1)
options->key_regeneration_time = 3600;
if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
- options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
+ options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_YES;
if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
if (options->print_motd == -1)
options->print_motd = 1;
if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
options->print_lastlog = 1;
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
@@ -36,17 +36,17 @@
# Logging
# obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
#SyslogFacility AUTH
#LogLevel INFO
# Authentication:
#LoginGraceTime 2m
-#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
+#PermitRootLogin yes
#StrictModes yes
#MaxAuthTries 6
#MaxSessions 10
#RSAAuthentication yes
#PubkeyAuthentication yes
# The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
@@ -710,17 +710,17 @@ DESCRIPTION
restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of
M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. By
default all port forwarding requests are permitted.
PermitRootLogin
Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1). The argument
must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\without-passwordM-bM-^@M-^],
M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is
- M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^].
+ M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^] or
M-bM-^@M-^\without-passwordM-bM-^@M-^], password and keyboard-interactive
authentication are disabled for root.
If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^], root login with
public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the
command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
@@ -1213,17 +1213,17 @@ Specifies whether root can log in using
The argument must be
.Dq yes ,
.Dq prohibit-password ,
.Dq without-password ,
.Dq forced-commands-only ,
or
.Dq no .
The default is
-.Dq prohibit-password .
+.Dq yes .
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Dq prohibit-password
or
.Dq without-password ,
password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root.
.Pp
If this option is set to

3239
openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch
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35
openssh-7.2p2-audit_fixes.patch
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@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent fdc9167221e501a9f4db5343cf8cadc31e13fd56
Various auditing fixes to be merged into the RH-originated patch.
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c b/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c
@@ -371,20 +371,26 @@ ssh_packet_start_discard(struct ssh *ssh
return 0;
}
/* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
int
ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh)
{
- struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ struct session_state *state;
struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
+ /* auditing might get here without valid connection structure when
+ * destroying sensitive data on exit and thus aborting disgracefully */
+ if ((!ssh) || (!(ssh->state)))
+ return 0;
+ state = ssh->state;
+
/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out)
return 1;
fromlen = sizeof(from);
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
if (getpeername(state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
&fromlen) < 0)
return 0;

116
openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch
View File

@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent e6ff441d171012183f7bd37cb7399473e8376acd
Audit PRNG re-seeding
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c
@@ -504,9 +504,15 @@ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char
/* not implemented */
}
void
audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
{
/* not implemented */
}
+
+void
+audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
#endif /* BSM */
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c
@@ -402,9 +402,31 @@ audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(cons
}
audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
audit_close(audit_fd);
/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
error("cannot write into audit");
}
+
+void
+audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
+{
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=prng_seed kind=server bytes=%li source=%s ", bytes, rf);
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ error("cannot open audit");
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE_USER,
+ buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ error("cannot write into audit");
+}
#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c
@@ -304,10 +304,16 @@ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char
/*
* This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
*/
void
audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
{
debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
}
+
+void
+audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
+{
+ debug("audit PRNG seed euid %d bytes %li source %s", geteuid(), bytes, rf);
+}
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h
@@ -69,10 +69,11 @@ void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
void audit_unsupported(int);
void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
void audit_unsupported_body(int);
void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
void audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
void audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
+void audit_linux_prng_seed(long, const char *);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
@@ -1421,16 +1421,19 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
maxfd = startup_p[0];
startups++;
break;
}
if(!(--re_seeding_counter)) {
re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
linux_seed();
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_linux_prng_seed(rand_bytes, rand_file);
+#endif
}
/*
* Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
* we are in debugging mode.
*/
if (debug_flag) {
/*

300
openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-ctr.patch
View File

@ -1,300 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent cb502e7e796ac9289a571167a97ad9ec91562efb
CAVS test for OpenSSH's own CTR encryption mode implementation
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
@@ -21,16 +21,17 @@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
DESTDIR=
VPATH=@srcdir@
SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+CAVSTEST_CTR=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr
PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
@@ -59,16 +60,18 @@ SED=@SED@
ENT=@ENT@
XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
MANFMT=@MANFMT@
TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
+TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
+
LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
ssh_api.o \
ssherr.o \
sshbuf.o \
sshkey.o \
sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
sshbuf-misc.o \
sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \
@@ -190,16 +193,20 @@ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+# FIPS tests
+cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-ctr.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
# test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
$(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
else \
@@ -310,16 +317,17 @@ install-files:
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-ctr.c b/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-ctr.c
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-ctr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+/*
+ *
+ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
+ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+
+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
+ " --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
+ " [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
+ "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
+ "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+void *
+fromhex(char *hex, size_t * len)
+{
+ unsigned char *bin;
+ char *p;
+ size_t n = 0;
+ int shift = 4;
+ unsigned char out = 0;
+ unsigned char *optr;
+
+ bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex) / 2);
+ optr = bin;
+
+ for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
+ unsigned char c;
+
+ c = *p;
+ if (isspace(c))
+ continue;
+
+ if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
+ c = c - '0';
+ } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
+ c = c - 'A' + 10;
+ } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
+ c = c - 'a' + 10;
+ } else {
+ /* truncate on nonhex cipher */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ out |= c << shift;
+ shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
+
+ if (shift) {
+ *(optr++) = out;
+ out = 0;
+ ++n;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *len = n;
+ return bin;
+}
+
+#define READ_CHUNK 4096
+#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
+char *
+read_stdin(void)
+{
+ char *buf;
+ size_t n, total = 0;
+
+ buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
+
+ do {
+ n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
+ if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */
+ break;
+
+ total += n;
+ buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
+ } while (total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
+ return buf;
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+
+ struct sshcipher *c;
+ struct sshcipher_ctx cc;
+ char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
+ char *hexkey = NULL;
+ char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
+ char *hexdata = NULL;
+ char *p;
+ int i;
+ int encrypt = 1;
+ void *key;
+ size_t keylen;
+ void *iv;
+ size_t ivlen;
+ void *data;
+ size_t datalen;
+ void *outdata;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
+ if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
+ algo = argv[++i];
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
+ hexkey = argv[++i];
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
+ ++i;
+ if (argv[i] == NULL) {
+ usage();
+ }
+ if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
+ encrypt = 1;
+ } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
+ encrypt = 0;
+ } else {
+ usage();
+ }
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
+ hexiv = argv[++i];
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
+ hexdata = argv[++i];
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
+ usage();
+ }
+
+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+
+ c = cipher_by_name(algo);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ if (hexdata == NULL) {
+ hexdata = read_stdin();
+ } else {
+ hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
+ }
+
+ key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
+
+ if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
+
+ if (ivlen != 16) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
+
+ if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt);
+
+ free(key);
+ free(iv);
+
+ outdata = malloc(datalen);
+ if (outdata == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ cipher_crypt(&cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0);
+
+ free(data);
+
+ cipher_cleanup(&cc);
+
+ for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
+ printf("%02X", (unsigned char) *p);
+ }
+
+ free(outdata);
+
+ printf("\n");
+ return 0;
+}

469
openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-kdf.patch
View File

@ -1,469 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent f9ffcfb88e5a9d611a61aee3571050dea67e363e
CAVS test for KDF implementation in OpenSSH
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
@@ -22,16 +22,17 @@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
DESTDIR=
VPATH=@srcdir@
SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
CAVSTEST_CTR=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr
+CAVSTEST_KDF=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-kdf
PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
@@ -60,17 +61,17 @@ SED=@SED@
ENT=@ENT@
XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
MANFMT=@MANFMT@
TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
-TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
+TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT)
LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
ssh_api.o \
ssherr.o \
sshbuf.o \
sshkey.o \
sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
sshbuf-misc.o \
@@ -197,16 +198,19 @@ sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss
sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
# FIPS tests
cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-ctr.o
$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-kdf.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ cavstest-kdf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
# test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
$(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
else \
@@ -318,16 +322,17 @@ install-files:
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-kdf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-kdf.c
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-kdf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
+ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
+ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
+ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
+ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+ * DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+
+static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
+{
+ if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
+ return (hex - 48);
+ if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
+ return (hex - 55);
+ if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
+ return (hex - 87);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert hex representation into binary string
+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
+ * @hexlen length of hex
+ * @bin output buffer with binary data
+ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
+ * half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
+ */
+static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
+ unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
+{
+ size_t i = 0;
+ size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
+ bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
+ bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
+ * and convert hex into bin
+ *
+ * Caller must free bin
+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
+ * @hexlen length of hex
+ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
+ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
+ *
+ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
+ */
+static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
+ unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
+{
+ unsigned char *out = NULL;
+ size_t outlen = 0;
+
+ if (!hexlen)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
+
+ out = calloc(1, outlen);
+ if (!out)
+ return -errno;
+
+ hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
+ *bin = out;
+ *binlen = outlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
+ '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
+static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
+ '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
+static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
+{
+ if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
+ return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
+ return 'X';
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert binary string into hex representation
+ * @bin input buffer with binary data
+ * @binlen length of bin
+ * @hex output buffer to store hex data
+ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
+ * twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
+ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
+ */
+static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
+ char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
+{
+ size_t i = 0;
+ size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
+ hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
+ hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
+ }
+}
+
+struct kdf_cavs {
+ unsigned char *K;
+ size_t Klen;
+ unsigned char *H;
+ size_t Hlen;
+ unsigned char *session_id;
+ size_t session_id_len;
+
+ unsigned int iv_len;
+ unsigned int ek_len;
+ unsigned int ik_len;
+};
+
+static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct kex kex;
+ struct ssh ssh;
+ BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
+ int mode = 0;
+ struct newkeys *keys_client;
+ struct newkeys *keys_server;
+
+#define HEXOUTLEN 500
+ char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
+
+ memset(&ssh, 0, sizeof(struct ssh));
+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
+ ssh.kex = &kex;
+
+ Kbn = BN_new();
+ BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
+ if (!Kbn) {
+ printf("cannot convert K into BIGNUM\n");
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ kex.session_id = test->session_id;
+ kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
+
+ /* setup kex */
+
+ /* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
+ switch (test->ik_len) {
+ case 20:
+ kex.hash_alg = 2;
+ break;
+ case 32:
+ kex.hash_alg = 3;
+ break;
+ case 48:
+ kex.hash_alg = 4;
+ break;
+ case 64:
+ kex.hash_alg = 5;
+ break;
+ default:
+ printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* implement choose_enc */
+ for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
+ kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
+ if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
+ printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
+ kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
+ kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
+ kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
+ }
+
+ /* implement kex_choose_conf */
+ kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
+ if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
+ kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
+ if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
+ kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
+ if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
+ kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
+
+ /* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
+ * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
+ kex.server = 1;
+
+ /* do it */
+ kex_derive_keys_bn(&ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kbn);
+
+ keys_client = ssh.kex->newkeys[0];
+ keys_server = ssh.kex->newkeys[1];
+
+ /* get data */
+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+ bin2hex(keys_client->enc.iv, (size_t)keys_client->enc.iv_len,
+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+ printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
+
+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+ bin2hex(keys_server->enc.iv, (size_t)keys_server->enc.iv_len,
+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+ printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
+
+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+ bin2hex(keys_client->enc.key, (size_t)keys_client->enc.key_len,
+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+ printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
+
+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+ bin2hex(keys_server->enc.key, (size_t)keys_server->enc.key_len,
+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+ printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
+
+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+ bin2hex(keys_client->mac.key, (size_t)keys_client->mac.key_len,
+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+ printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
+
+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+ bin2hex(keys_server->mac.key, (size_t)keys_server->mac.key_len,
+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+ printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
+
+ free(keys_client);
+ free(keys_server);
+
+out:
+ if (Kbn)
+ BN_free(Kbn);
+ if (kex.newkeys[0])
+ free(kex.newkeys[0]);
+ if (kex.newkeys[1])
+ free(kex.newkeys[1]);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test command example:
+ * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
+ *
+ * Expected result for example:
+ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
+ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
+ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
+ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
+ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
+ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
+ */
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ struct kdf_cavs test;
+ int ret = 1;
+ int opt = 0;
+
+ memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
+ while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
+ {
+ size_t len = 0;
+ switch(opt)
+ {
+ /*
+ * CAVS K is MPINT
+ * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
+ * following transformations already happened):
+ * 1. cut off first four bytes
+ * 2. if most significant bit of value is
+ * 1, prepend 0 byte
+ */
+ case 'K':
+ len = strlen(optarg);
+ ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
+ &test.K, &test.Klen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case 'H':
+ len = strlen(optarg);
+ ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
+ &test.H, &test.Hlen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ len = strlen(optarg);
+ ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
+ &test.session_id,
+ &test.session_id_len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
+ break;
+ case 'e':
+ test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
+ break;
+ case 'm':
+ test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage();
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
+
+out:
+ if (test.session_id)
+ free(test.session_id);
+ if (test.K)
+ free(test.K);
+ if (test.H)
+ free(test.H);
+ return ret;
+
+}

64
openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
View File

@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 4821397c95e57962905e6d47554bef9e4ea57483
disable run-time check for OpenSSL ABI by version number as that is not a
reliable indicator of ABI changes and doesn't make much sense in a
distribution package
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
@@ -4663,16 +4663,29 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth],
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1],
[Define if you have BSD auth support])
BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes
fi
]
)
+# Whether we are using distribution (Open)SSL, so no runtime checks are necessary
+DISTRO_SSL=no
+AC_ARG_WITH([distro-ssl],
+ [ --with-distro-ssl Disable runtime OpenSSL version checks (good for distributions)],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([DISTRO_SSL], [1],
+ [Define if you are using distribution SSL library and don;t expect its API/ABI to change])
+ DISTRO_SSL=yes
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
# Where to place sshd.pid
piddir=/var/run
# make sure the directory exists
if test ! -d $piddir ; then
piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
case $piddir in
NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
esac
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c b/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
@@ -209,19 +209,21 @@ rexec_recv_rng_seed(Buffer *m)
#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
void
seed_rng(void)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
#endif
+#ifndef DISTRO_SSL
if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()))
fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
"have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
if (RAND_status() == 1) {
debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
return;
}
if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)

1317
openssh-7.2p2-disable_preauth_compression.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

29
openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch
View File

@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent e4886597a8984ae1594b6866fe1b232370b23529
# posix threads are generally not supported nor safe
# (see upstream log from 2005-05-24)
# --used to be called '-pam-fix3'
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
@@ -782,17 +782,19 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
}
if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||
(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
fatal("Internal error: PAM auth "
"succeeded when it should have "
"failed");
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
import_environments(&buffer);
+#endif
*num = 0;
**echo_on = 0;
ctxt->pam_done = 1;
free(msg);
return (0);
}
error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg,
sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",

87
openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch
View File

@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent f19426f2fa9c634474e635bf33b86acea0518f6d
fix paths and references in sshd man pages
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
@@ -901,17 +901,17 @@ See
If this file exists,
.Nm
refuses to let anyone except root log in.
The contents of the file
are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
refused.
The file should be world-readable.
.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv
This file is used in exactly the same way as
.Pa hosts.equiv ,
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
@@ -981,17 +981,17 @@ The content of this file is not sensitiv
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
.Xr chroot 2 ,
-.Xr login.conf 5 ,
+.Xr login.defs 5 ,
.Xr moduli 5 ,
.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
.Xr inetd 8 ,
.Xr sftp-server 8
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
@@ -370,18 +370,17 @@ for details).
The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before
authentication is allowed.
If the argument is
.Dq none
then no banner is displayed.
By default, no banner is displayed.
.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
-PAM or through authentication styles supported in
-.Xr login.conf 5 )
+PAM)
The default is
.Dq yes .
.It Cm ChrootDirectory
Specifies the pathname of a directory to
.Xr chroot 2
to after authentication.
At session startup
.Xr sshd 8
@@ -766,17 +765,17 @@ and
.Pa .shosts
files will not be used in
.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
or
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
.Pp
.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
and
-.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
+.Pa /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv
are still used.
The default is
.Dq yes .
.It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should ignore the user's
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts

47
openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
View File

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 980f301b2920c09b30577dd722546bca85d25fc1
# force PAM in defaullt install (this was removed from upstream in 3.8p1)
# bnc#46749
# --used to be called '-pam-fix2'
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
@@ -64,17 +64,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
#HostbasedAuthentication no
# Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for
# RhostsRSAAuthentication and HostbasedAuthentication
#IgnoreUserKnownHosts no
# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
#IgnoreRhosts yes
# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
-#PasswordAuthentication yes
+PasswordAuthentication no
#PermitEmptyPasswords no
# Change to no to disable s/key passwords
#ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
# Kerberos options
#KerberosAuthentication no
#KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
@@ -89,17 +89,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
# be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
# PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration,
# PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
# the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
-#UsePAM no
+UsePAM yes
#AllowAgentForwarding yes
#AllowTcpForwarding yes
#GatewayPorts no
X11Forwarding yes
#X11DisplayOffset 10
#X11UseLocalhost yes
#PermitTTY yes

31
openssh-7.2p2-fips_fixes.patch
View File

@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent cb502e7e796ac9289a571167a97ad9ec91562efb
Silent warnings about unsupported KEX algorithms - synchronize behaviour with
that of MAC and cipher checking code paths.
bsc#1006166
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
@@ -192,17 +192,20 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
return 0;
if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
return 0;
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
+ /* do not complain here - MACs and ciphers checks
+ * are silent here
error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+ */
free(s);
return 0;
}
}
debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names);
free(s);
return 1;
}

3963
openssh-7.2p2-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

29
openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch
View File

@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent e2f9b3303b4a4ed5d0e5f01009dd1ebea166890d
Suggest command line for removal of offending keys from known_hosts file
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c
@@ -1086,16 +1086,21 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
}
/* The host key has changed. */
warn_changed_key(host_key);
error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
user_hostfiles[0]);
error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
host_found->file, host_found->line);
+ error("You can use following command to remove the offending key:");
+ if (host_found->file)
+ error("ssh-keygen -R %s -f %s", host, host_found->file);
+ else
+ error("ssh-keygen -R %s", host);
/*
* If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
* to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
*/
if (options.strict_host_key_checking) {
error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
"requested strict checking.", type, host);

33
openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch
View File

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 0f00e960e1069c6a6eec975cc184171343701077
Do not import PAM environment variables when using login, since it may have
security implications.
CVE-2015-8325
bsc#975865
Backport of upstream commit 85bdcd7c92fe7ff133bbc4e10a65c91810f88755
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
@@ -1351,17 +1351,17 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
/*
* Pull in any environment variables that may have
* been set by PAM.
*/
- if (options.use_pam) {
+ if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login) {
char **p;
p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
free_pam_environment(p);
p = fetch_pam_environment();
copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);

66
openssh-7.2p2-keep_slogin.patch
View File

@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 7c29b31d3502bbf5b80e01f8d1db8b2733a3c7f4
Add slogin back to the distribution, since it might be used downstreams
Revert of cupstream commit 69fead5d7cdaa73bdece9fcba80f8e8e70b90346
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
@@ -354,16 +354,20 @@ install-files:
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8 ; \
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap.conf.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh-ldap.conf.5 ; \
fi
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
+ ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
+ ln -s ./ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
install-sysconf:
if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) ]; then \
$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir); \
fi
@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \
else \
@@ -415,16 +419,17 @@ uninstallall: uninstall
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
uninstall:
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
@@ -440,16 +445,17 @@ uninstall:
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
regress-prep:
[ -d `pwd`/regress ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress
[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests
[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper ] || \
mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper
[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf ] || \
mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf

30
openssh-7.2p2-kex_resource_depletion.patch
View File

@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 5d3b620e9c7c42bfb1d8f24eb7e0645a55d967fa
Prevent memory depletion during key exchange
CVE-2016-8858
bsc#1005480
upstream commit ec165c392ca54317dbe3064a8c200de6531e89ad
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
@@ -523,16 +523,17 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t se
u_int i;
size_t dlen;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
if (kex == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
return r;
/* discard packet */
for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0)
return r;

2838
openssh-7.2p2-ldap.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

52
openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch
View File

@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 9888bc3f536eab9f528d9c96e5e8a2501ed168f5
Limit accepted passwords length to prevent DoS by resource consumption
(via crypt() eating CPU cycles).
CVE-2016-6515
bsc#992533
upstream commit: fcd135c9df440bcd2d5870405ad3311743d78d97
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
@@ -61,16 +61,18 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
extern login_cap_t *lc;
#endif
#define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
#define TWO_WEEKS (2L * 7 * DAY) /* 2 weeks in seconds */
+#define MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 1024
+
void
disable_forwarding(void)
{
no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
}
@@ -82,16 +84,19 @@ int
auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
{
struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw;
int result, ok = authctxt->valid;
#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
static int expire_checked = 0;
#endif
+ if (strlen(password) > MAX_PASSWORD_LEN)
+ return 0;
+
#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
ok = 0;
#endif
if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
return 0;
#ifdef KRB5

32
openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch
View File

@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent b86c2190c93aeaf958c22fc7b224dcaf87100288
# HG changeset patch
# Parent b262fd34c8ecd55e93d457b3ca5593abce716856
# login-pam cannot handle the option terminator "--" as login from util-linux
# (this is correct behaviour considering its man-page), hence use option which
# selects the compile-time branch in the code which doesn't use the terminator
#
# bnc#833605
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
@@ -770,16 +770,18 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
;;
*-*-linux*)
no_dev_ptmx=1
use_pie=auto
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
+ AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT], [1],
+ [Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--")])
AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1],
[Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"],
[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM],
[Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported"
if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.])

26
openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
View File

@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 4011d0f5c00b663976c9940dc4ef79642605cf90
Do not write a PID file when not daemonizing (e.g. when running from systemd)
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
@@ -2107,17 +2107,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
/*
* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
* is setup and the listen sockets are bound
*/
- if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) {
+ if (!no_daemon_flag && options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) {
FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
if (f == NULL) {
error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
} else {
fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
fclose(f);

188
openssh-7.2p2-prevent_private_key_leakage.patch
View File

@ -1,188 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent e2a8c999f737bca97bbc330ce6683de842ba195e
Pre-allocare buffer for private keys data to prevent leaking of sensitive data
via heap.
CVE-2016-10011
bsc#1016369
backported upstream commit 54d022026aae4f53fa74cc636e4a032d9689b64d
backported upstream commit a9c746088787549bb5b1ae3add7d06a1b6d93d5e
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/authfile.c b/openssh-7.2p2/authfile.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/authfile.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/authfile.c
@@ -95,23 +95,35 @@ sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key,
/* Load a key from a fd into a buffer */
int
sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob)
{
u_char buf[1024];
size_t len;
struct stat st;
- int r;
+ int r, dontmax = 0;
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ /*
+ * Pre-allocate the buffer used for the key contents and clamp its
+ * maximum size. This ensures that key contents are never leaked via
+ * implicit realloc() in the sshbuf code.
+ */
+ if ((st.st_mode & S_IFREG) == 0 || st.st_size <= 0) {
+ st.st_size = 64*1024; /* 64k should be enough for anyone :) */
+ dontmax = 1;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_allocate(blob, st.st_size)) != 0 ||
+ (dontmax && (r = sshbuf_set_max_size(blob, st.st_size)) != 0))
+ return r;
for (;;) {
if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) {
if (errno == EPIPE)
break;
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0)
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.c
@@ -311,63 +311,73 @@ sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf
SSHBUF_TELL("check");
/* Check that len is reasonable and that max_size + available < len */
if (len > buf->max_size || buf->max_size - len < buf->size - buf->off)
return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
return 0;
}
int
-sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp)
+sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
{
size_t rlen, need;
u_char *dp;
int r;
- if (dpp != NULL)
- *dpp = NULL;
-
- SSHBUF_DBG(("reserve buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("allocate buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) != 0)
return r;
/*
* If the requested allocation appended would push us past max_size
* then pack the buffer, zeroing buf->off.
*/
sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, buf->size + len > buf->max_size);
- SSHBUF_TELL("reserve");
- if (len + buf->size > buf->alloc) {
- /*
- * Prefer to alloc in SSHBUF_SIZE_INC units, but
- * allocate less if doing so would overflow max_size.
- */
- need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc;
- rlen = roundup(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
- SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen));
- if (rlen > buf->max_size)
- rlen = buf->alloc + need;
- SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen));
- if ((dp = realloc(buf->d, rlen)) == NULL) {
- SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail"));
- if (dpp != NULL)
- *dpp = NULL;
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- }
- buf->alloc = rlen;
- buf->cd = buf->d = dp;
- if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) < 0) {
- /* shouldn't fail */
- if (dpp != NULL)
- *dpp = NULL;
- return r;
- }
+ SSHBUF_TELL("allocate");
+ if (len + buf->size <= buf->alloc)
+ return 0; /* already have it. */
+
+ /*
+ * Prefer to alloc in SSHBUF_SIZE_INC units, but
+ * allocate less if doing so would overflow max_size.
+ */
+ need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc;
+ rlen = roundup(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen));
+ if (rlen > buf->max_size)
+ rlen = buf->alloc + need;
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen));
+ if ((dp = realloc(buf->d, rlen)) == NULL) {
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail"));
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
+ buf->alloc = rlen;
+ buf->cd = buf->d = dp;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) < 0) {
+ /* shouldn't fail */
+ return r;
+ }
+ SSHBUF_TELL("done");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp)
+{
+ u_char *dp;
+ int r;
+
+ if (dpp != NULL)
+ *dpp = NULL;
+
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("reserve buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_allocate(buf, len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
dp = buf->d + buf->size;
buf->size += len;
- SSHBUF_TELL("done");
if (dpp != NULL)
*dpp = dp;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
{
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.h
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.h
@@ -134,16 +134,24 @@ u_char *sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct
* Check whether a reservation of size len will succeed in buf
* Safer to use than direct comparisons again sshbuf_avail as it copes
* with unsigned overflows correctly.
* Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
/*
+ * Preallocates len additional bytes in buf.
+ * Useful for cases where the caller knows how many bytes will ultimately be
+ * required to avoid realloc in the buffer code.
+ * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
+
+/*
* Reserve len bytes in buf.
* Returns 0 on success and a pointer to the first reserved byte via the
* optional dpp parameter or a negative * SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp);
/*
* Consume len bytes from the start of buf

264
openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch
View File

@ -1,264 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 4a254abf4ef391358257310ad2fe15c9e12dee34
Prevent user enumeration through password processing timing
CVE-2016-6210
bsc#989363
non-PAM part:
upstream commit: 9286875a73b2de7736b5e50692739d314cd8d9dc
PAM part:
upstream commit: 283b97ff33ea2c641161950849931bd578de6946
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
@@ -227,17 +227,16 @@ static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NUL
static int sshpam_err = 0;
static int sshpam_authenticated = 0;
static int sshpam_session_open = 0;
static int sshpam_cred_established = 0;
static int sshpam_account_status = -1;
static char **sshpam_env = NULL;
static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL;
static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
-static char badpw[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
/* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
#ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
static char **
pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh)
{
/*
* XXX - If necessary, we can still support envrionment passing
@@ -807,22 +806,45 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
free(msg);
ctxt->pam_done = -1;
return (-1);
}
}
return (-1);
}
+/*
+ * Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied.
+ * Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that
+ * vary processing time in proportion to password length.
+ */
+static char *
+fake_password(const char *wire_password)
+{
+ const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
+ char *ret = NULL;
+ size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0;
+
+ if (l >= INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
+
+ ret = xmalloc(l + 1);
+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
+ ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
+ ret[i] = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */
static int
sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
{
Buffer buffer;
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
+ char *fake;
debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num);
switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
case 1:
sshpam_authenticated = 1;
return (0);
case 0:
break;
@@ -833,18 +855,21 @@ sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, cha
error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num);
return (-1);
}
buffer_init(&buffer);
if (sshpam_authctxt->valid &&
(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
- else
- buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, badpw);
+ else {
+ fake = fake_password(*resp);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, fake);
+ free(fake);
+ }
if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, &buffer) == -1) {
buffer_free(&buffer);
return (-1);
}
buffer_free(&buffer);
return (1);
}
@@ -1178,41 +1203,43 @@ static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { s
/*
* Attempt password authentication via PAM
*/
int
sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
{
int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
+ char *fake = NULL;
if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL)
fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to "
"initialise.", __func__);
sshpam_password = password;
sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
/*
* If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted
* by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking
* information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail).
*/
if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
- sshpam_password = badpw;
+ sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password);
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
(const void *)&passwd_conv);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__,
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
sshpam_password = NULL;
+ free(fake);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
authctxt->user);
return 1;
} else {
debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s",
authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
@@ -188,28 +188,32 @@ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, cons
return (auth_close(as));
}
}
#elif !defined(CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD)
int
sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
{
struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
- char *encrypted_password;
+ char *encrypted_password, *salt = NULL;
/* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
/* Check for users with no password. */
if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
return (1);
- /* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
- encrypted_password = xcrypt(password,
- (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx");
+ /*
+ * Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt, or pass a
+ * NULL and let xcrypt pick one.
+ */
+ if (authctxt->valid && pw_password[0] && pw_password[1])
+ salt = pw_password;
+ encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, salt);
/*
* Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
* are identical.
*/
return encrypted_password != NULL &&
strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0;
}
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
@@ -20,16 +20,17 @@
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <pwd.h>
# if defined(HAVE_CRYPT_H) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
# include <crypt.h>
# endif
# ifdef __hpux
@@ -57,21 +58,54 @@
# include "md5crypt.h"
# endif
# if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(HAVE_CRYPT) && defined(HAVE_DES_CRYPT)
# include <openssl/des.h>
# define crypt DES_crypt
# endif
+/*
+ * Pick an appropriate password encryption type and salt for the running
+ * system.
+ */
+static const char *
+pick_salt(void)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ char *passwd, *p;
+ size_t typelen;
+ static char salt[32];
+
+ if (salt[0] != '\0')
+ return salt;
+ strlcpy(salt, "xx", sizeof(salt));
+ if ((pw = getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
+ return salt;
+ passwd = shadow_pw(pw);
+ if (passwd[0] != '$' || (p = strrchr(passwd + 1, '$')) == NULL)
+ return salt; /* no $, DES */
+ typelen = p - passwd + 1;
+ strlcpy(salt, passwd, MIN(typelen, sizeof(salt)));
+ explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
+ return salt;
+}
+
char *
xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt)
{
char *crypted;
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a salt we are encrypting a fake password for
+ * for timing purposes. Pick an appropriate salt.
+ */
+ if (salt == NULL)
+ salt = pick_salt();
+
# ifdef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
if (is_md5_salt(salt))
crypted = md5_crypt(password, salt);
else
crypted = crypt(password, salt);
# elif defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
if (iscomsec())
crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);

297
openssh-7.2p2-restrict_pkcs11-modules.patch
View File

@ -1,297 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 22de9aeddbde2b36da9c23475cfa5dcd42e95287
whitelist paths for loading of PKCS#11 modules in ssh-agent
CVE-2016-10009
bsc#1016366
upstream commit 786d5994da79151180cb14a6cf157ebbba61c0cc
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.62 2015/11/15 23:54:15 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.63 2016/11/30 03:07:37 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
@@ -29,29 +29,30 @@
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 15 2015 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2016 $
.Dt SSH-AGENT 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-agent
.Nd authentication agent
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh-agent
.Op Fl c | s
.Op Fl \&Dd
.Op Fl a Ar bind_address
.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
.Op Fl t Ar life
+.Op Fl P Ar pkcs11_whitelist
.Op Ar command Op Ar arg ...
.Nm ssh-agent
.Op Fl c | s
.Fl k
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication
(RSA, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519).
@@ -116,16 +117,28 @@ Valid options are:
and
.Dq sha256 .
The default is
.Dq sha256 .
.It Fl k
Kill the current agent (given by the
.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
environment variable).
+.It Fl P
+Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 shared libraries
+that may be added using the
+.Fl s
+option to
+.Xr ssh-add 1 .
+The default is to allow loading PKCS#11 libraries from
+.Dq /usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/* .
+PKCS#11 libraries that do not match the whitelist will be refused.
+See PATTERNS in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for a description of pattern-list syntax.
.It Fl s
Generate Bourne shell commands on
.Dv stdout .
This is the default if
.Ev SHELL
does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
.It Fl t Ar life
Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent.
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.c b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.c
@@ -78,25 +78,30 @@
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "match.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H)
#include <sys/prctl.h> /* For prctl() and PR_SET_DUMPABLE */
#endif
+#ifndef DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST
+# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/*"
+#endif
+
typedef enum {
AUTH_UNUSED,
AUTH_SOCKET,
AUTH_CONNECTION
} sock_type;
typedef struct {
int fd;
@@ -134,16 +139,19 @@ time_t parent_alive_interval = 0;
/* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */
pid_t cleanup_pid = 0;
/* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
char socket_name[PATH_MAX];
char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
+/* PKCS#11 path whitelist */
+static char *pkcs11_whitelist;
+
/* locking */
#define LOCK_SIZE 32
#define LOCK_SALT_SIZE 16
#define LOCK_ROUNDS 1
int locked = 0;
char lock_passwd[LOCK_SIZE];
char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE];
@@ -736,17 +744,17 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e, u_int type
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
static void
process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
- char *provider = NULL, *pin;
+ char *provider = NULL, *pin, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
int r, i, version, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
u_int seconds;
time_t death = 0;
u_char type;
struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
Identity *id;
Idtab *tab;
@@ -768,29 +776,40 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
confirm = 1;
break;
default:
error("process_add_smartcard_key: "
"Unknown constraint type %d", type);
goto send;
}
}
+ if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
+ verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
+ provider, strerror(errno));
+ goto send;
+ }
+ if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, pkcs11_whitelist, 0) != 1) {
+ verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
+ "provider not whitelisted", canonical_provider);
+ goto send;
+ }
+ debug("%s: add %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
if (lifetime && !death)
death = monotime() + lifetime;
- count = pkcs11_add_provider(provider, pin, &keys);
+ count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
k = keys[i];
version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
tab = idtab_lookup(version);
if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
id->key = k;
- id->provider = xstrdup(provider);
- id->comment = xstrdup(provider); /* XXX */
+ id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
+ id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider); /* XXX */
id->death = death;
id->confirm = confirm;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
tab->nentries++;
success = 1;
} else {
sshkey_free(k);
}
@@ -1171,17 +1190,17 @@ check_parent_exists(void)
}
}
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
- " [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
+ " [-P pkcs11_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
" ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
exit(1);
}
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
@@ -1215,31 +1234,36 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
#endif
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
seed_rng();
- while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:t:")) != -1) {
+ while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:P:t:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'E':
fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'c':
if (s_flag)
usage();
c_flag++;
break;
case 'k':
k_flag++;
break;
+ case 'P':
+ if (pkcs11_whitelist != NULL)
+ fatal("-P option already specified");
+ pkcs11_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg);
+ break;
case 's':
if (c_flag)
usage();
s_flag++;
break;
case 'd':
if (d_flag || D_flag)
usage();
@@ -1264,16 +1288,19 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
}
}
ac -= optind;
av += optind;
if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag))
usage();
+ if (pkcs11_whitelist == NULL)
+ pkcs11_whitelist = xstrdup(DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST);
+
if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
shell = getenv("SHELL");
if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
c_flag = 1;
}
if (k_flag) {
const char *errstr = NULL;
@@ -1411,17 +1438,17 @@ skip:
parent_alive_interval = 10;
idtab_init();
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
nalloc = 0;
- if (pledge("stdio cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1)
+ if (pledge("stdio rpath cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
platform_pledge_agent();
while (1) {
prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp);
result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp);
saved_errno = errno;
if (parent_alive_interval != 0)

82
openssh-7.2p2-s390_OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11_syscalls.patch
View File

@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent bb92b9f037cc3686a669cd84caa44a2716f34058
Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 14:27:34 -0300
[PATCH 0/3] Allow syscalls for openssl engines
From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org
In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
this is only need on s390 architecture.
The EP11 crypto card also needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
specific argument.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
related to bsc#1016709
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -150,16 +150,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
SC_ALLOW(stat),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_exit
SC_ALLOW(exit),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_exit_group
SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
#endif
+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
+ SC_ALLOW(flock),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpgid
SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpid
SC_ALLOW(getpid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getuid
SC_ALLOW(getuid),
@@ -180,16 +183,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
SC_ALLOW(getuid),
#ifdef __NR_getuid32 /* not defined on x86_64 */
SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
#endif
#endif
+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
+ SC_ALLOW(ipc),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_madvise
SC_ALLOW(madvise),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_mmap
SC_ALLOW(mmap),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_mmap2
SC_ALLOW(mmap2),
@@ -233,16 +239,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
#ifdef __NR_socketcall
SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_ioctl
#ifdef __s390__
SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
+ /* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
+ SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
#endif
#endif
/* Default deny */
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
};
static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = {

100
openssh-7.2p2-s390_hw_crypto_syscalls.patch
View File

@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 6d8637bec747de081eccba9874f640dcbc4fbb68
This patch enables specific ioctl calls for ICA crypto card on s390
platform. Without this patch, users using the IBMCA engine are not able
to perform ssh login as the filter blocks the communication with the
crypto card.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
bsc#1016709
Upstreamed as:
5f1596e11d55539678c41f68aed358628d33d86f
58b8cfa2a062b72139d7229ae8de567f55776f24
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -54,42 +54,53 @@
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stddef.h> /* for offsetof */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#include <endian.h>
+
+#ifdef __s390__
+#include <asm/zcrypt.h>
+#endif
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
/* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */
#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL
/* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */
#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
# undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL
# define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
/* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
+#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)])
+#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
+#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)]) + sizeof(uint32_t)
+#else
+#error "Unknown endianness"
+#endif
#define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno))
#define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
#define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 4), \
- /* load first syscall argument */ \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)])), \
+ /* load the syscall argument to check into accumulator */ \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, LO_ARG(_arg_nr)), \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_arg_val), 0, 1), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
/* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */
static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
@@ -217,16 +228,23 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
SC_ALLOW(time),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_write
SC_ALLOW(write),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_socketcall
SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_ioctl
+#ifdef __s390__
+ SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
+ SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
+ SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
+#endif
+#endif
/* Default deny */
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
};
static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = {
.len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])),
.filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns,

34
openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_geteuid.patch
View File

@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent b07f00d5d805c043f5bdc7b8cf6701d924879fa6
Add the 'geteuid' syscall to allowed list, since it may becalled on the
mainframes when OpenSSL is using hardware crypto accelerator via libica
(via ibmica)
bsc#1004258
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -148,16 +148,22 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
SC_ALLOW(getpid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getuid
SC_ALLOW(getuid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getuid32
SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
+ SC_ALLOW(geteuid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
+ SC_ALLOW(geteuid32),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_getrandom
SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_madvise
SC_ALLOW(madvise),

31
openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch
View File

@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent d75417bf0f4d50cabd84299773bab4ac68f68caa
add 'getuid' syscall to list of allowed ones to prevent the sanboxed thread
from being killed by the seccomp filter
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -142,16 +142,22 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpgid
SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpid
SC_ALLOW(getpid),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getuid
+ SC_ALLOW(getuid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
+ SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_getrandom
SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_madvise
SC_ALLOW(madvise),

30
openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch
View File

@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 2153c4af090728c778931d2fad72d4b260294122
Allow the stat() syscall for OpenSSL re-seed patch
(which causes OpenSSL use stat() on some file)
bnc#912436
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -130,16 +130,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
SC_ALLOW(brk),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_close
SC_ALLOW(close),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_stat
+ SC_ALLOW(stat),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_exit
SC_ALLOW(exit),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_exit_group
SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpgid
SC_ALLOW(getpgid),

107
openssh-7.2p2-secure_unix_sockets_forwarding.patch
View File

@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 49d9204835f069a6b628e7bf4ed53baf81f8bf91
Do not allow unix socket when running without privilege separation to prevent
privilege escalation through a socket created with root: ownership.
CVE-2016-10010
bsc#1016368
bsc#1051559
backported upstream commits
b737e4d7433577403a31cff6614f6a1b0b5e22f4
51045869fa084cdd016fdd721ea760417c0a3bf3
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/serverloop.c b/openssh-7.2p2/serverloop.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/serverloop.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/serverloop.c
@@ -979,28 +979,32 @@ server_request_direct_tcpip(void)
}
static Channel *
server_request_direct_streamlocal(void)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *target, *originator;
u_short originator_port;
+ struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+
+ if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
+ fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");
target = packet_get_string(NULL);
originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
originator_port = packet_get_int();
packet_check_eom();
debug("server_request_direct_streamlocal: originator %s port %d, target %s",
originator, originator_port, target);
/* XXX fine grained permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
- !no_port_forwarding_flag) {
+ !no_port_forwarding_flag && (pw->pw_uid == 0 || use_privsep)) {
c = channel_connect_to_path(target,
"direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
} else {
logit("refused streamlocal port forward: "
"originator %s port %d, target %s",
originator, originator_port, target);
}
@@ -1212,29 +1216,29 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct sshbu
static int
server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
char *rtype;
int want_reply;
int r, success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0;
struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
+ struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+
+ if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
+ fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");
rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
want_reply = packet_get_char();
debug("server_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply);
/* -R style forwarding */
if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) {
- struct passwd *pw;
struct Forward fwd;
- pw = the_authctxt->pw;
- if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
- fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL);
fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int();
debug("server_input_global_request: tcpip-forward listen %s port %d",
fwd.listen_host, fwd.listen_port);
/* check permissions */
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 ||
@@ -1274,19 +1278,20 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL);
debug("server_input_global_request: streamlocal-forward listen path %s",
fwd.listen_path);
/* check permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0
- || no_port_forwarding_flag) {
+ || no_port_forwarding_flag || (pw->pw_uid != 0 && !use_privsep)) {
success = 0;
- packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding.");
+ packet_send_debug("Server has disabled "
+ "streamlocal forwarding.");
} else {
/* Start listening on the socket */
success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(
&fwd, NULL, &options.fwd_opts);
}
free(fwd.listen_path);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) {
struct Forward fwd;

157
openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch
View File

@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 7b45c4f3fef6836db00c5b198736cce17290c5cd
additional option for sftp-server to force file mode for new files
FATE#312774
http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2010-November/029044.html
http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=128896838930893
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
@@ -33,16 +33,17 @@
.Bk -words
.Op Fl ehR
.Op Fl d Ar start_directory
.Op Fl f Ar log_facility
.Op Fl l Ar log_level
.Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
.Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
.Op Fl u Ar umask
+.Op Fl m Ar force_file_permissions
.Ek
.Nm
.Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
to stdout and expects client requests from stdin.
.Nm
@@ -133,16 +134,20 @@ Places this instance of
into a read-only mode.
Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change
the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
.It Fl u Ar umask
Sets an explicit
.Xr umask 2
to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
user's default mask.
+.It Fl m Ar force_file_permissions
+Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
+of the default or client requested mode. Numeric values include:
+777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc. Option -u is ineffective if -m is set.
.El
.Pp
On some systems,
.Nm
must be able to access
.Pa /dev/log
for logging to work, and use of
.Nm
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
@@ -73,16 +73,20 @@ static u_int version;
static int init_done;
/* Disable writes */
static int readonly;
/* Requests that are allowed/denied */
static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist;
+/* Force file permissions */
+int permforce = 0;
+long permforcemode;
+
/* portable attributes, etc. */
typedef struct Stat Stat;
struct Stat {
char *name;
char *long_name;
Attrib attrib;
};
@@ -687,16 +691,20 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
(r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
+ if (permforce == 1) {
+ mode = permforcemode;
+ (void)umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
+ }
logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
if (readonly &&
((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY ||
(flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) {
verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
} else {
@@ -1489,17 +1497,18 @@ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i)
static void
sftp_server_usage(void)
{
extern char *__progname;
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
"[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
- "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
+ "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n\t"
+ "[-m force_file_permissions]\n"
" %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
__progname, __progname);
exit(1);
}
int
sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
{
@@ -1515,17 +1524,17 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
- "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
+ "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'Q':
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n");
exit(1);
}
for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name);
@@ -1575,16 +1584,23 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
case 'u':
errno = 0;
mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0))
fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
break;
+ case 'm':
+ permforce = 1;
+ permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
+ if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
+ cp == optarg || (permforcemode == 0 && errno != 0))
+ fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
+ break;
case 'h':
default:
sftp_server_usage();
}
}
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);

366
openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch
View File

@ -1,366 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent fc81df6f2bf393e45e703c89976c3a0fe6e0a273
run sftp sessions inside a chroot
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
@@ -123,16 +123,18 @@ int do_exec(Session *, const char *);
void do_login(Session *, const char *);
#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
static void do_pre_login(Session *s);
#endif
void do_child(Session *, const char *);
void do_motd(void);
int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
+int chroot_no_tree = 0;
+
static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *);
static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *);
static int session_pty_req(Session *);
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern char *__progname;
@@ -838,16 +840,21 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
"subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys);
} else if (command == NULL) {
snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell");
} else {
/* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */
snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command");
}
+ if ((s->is_subsystem != SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) && chroot_no_tree) {
+ logit("You aren't welcomed, go away!");
+ exit (1);
+ }
+
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
tty = s->tty;
if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
tty += 5;
}
verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
session_type,
@@ -1492,58 +1499,123 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
fputs(buf, stderr);
fclose(f);
}
exit(254);
}
/*
+ * Test if filesystem is mounted nosuid and nodev
+ */
+
+static void
+test_nosuid (char * path, dev_t fs)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ struct stat st;
+ char buf[4096], *s, *on, *mountpoint, *opt;
+ int nodev, nosuid;
+
+ if (!(f = popen ("/bin/mount", "r")))
+ fatal ("%s: popen(\"/bin/mount\", \"r\"): %s",
+ __func__, strerror (errno));
+ for (;;) {
+ s = fgets (buf, sizeof (buf), f);
+ if (ferror (f))
+ fatal ("%s: read from popen: %s", __func__,
+ strerror (errno));
+ if (!s) {
+ pclose (f);
+ fatal ("cannot find filesystem with the chroot directory");
+ }
+ (void) strtok (buf, " ");
+ on = strtok (NULL, " ");
+ if (strcmp (on, "on")) {
+ pclose (f);
+ fatal ("bad format of mount output");
+ }
+ mountpoint = strtok (NULL, " ");
+ if (memcmp (path, mountpoint, strlen (mountpoint)))
+ continue;
+ if (stat(mountpoint, &st) != 0) {
+ pclose (f);
+ fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
+ mountpoint, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (fs != st.st_dev)
+ continue;
+ nodev = nosuid = 0;
+ for (opt = strtok (NULL, "("); opt; opt = strtok (NULL, " ,)")) {
+ if (!strcmp (opt, "nodev"))
+ nodev = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp (opt, "nosuid"))
+ nosuid = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp (opt, "noexec"))
+ nosuid = 1;
+ if (nodev && nosuid) {
+ pclose (f);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ fatal ("chroot into directory without nodev and either noexec or nosuid");
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components
* must be root-owned directories with strict permissions.
*/
static void
safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
{
const char *cp;
char component[PATH_MAX];
struct stat st;
+ int last;
if (*path != '/')
fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
fatal("chroot path too long");
/*
* Descend the path, checking that each component is a
* root-owned directory with strict permissions.
*/
for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
- if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
+ if (last = ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL))
strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
else {
cp++;
memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
component[cp - path] = '\0';
}
debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component);
if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
component, strerror(errno));
- if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
+ if ((st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) && !(last && st.st_uid == uid))
fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
"directory %s\"%s\"",
cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
}
+ setenv ("TZ", "/etc/localtime", 0);
+ tzset();
+
+ if (st.st_uid) {
+ test_nosuid(path, st.st_dev);
+ ++chroot_no_tree;
+ }
if (chdir(path) == -1)
fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
"%s", path, strerror(errno));
if (chroot(path) == -1)
fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
if (chdir("/") == -1)
fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s",
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-chrootenv.h b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-chrootenv.h
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-chrootenv.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F Chadima. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef CHROOTENV_H
+#define CHROOTENV_H
+
+extern int chroot_no_tree;
+
+#endif
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-common.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-common.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-common.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-common.c
@@ -43,16 +43,17 @@
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-chrootenv.h"
/* Clear contents of attributes structure */
void
attrib_clear(Attrib *a)
{
a->flags = 0;
a->size = 0;
a->uid = 0;
@@ -216,23 +217,23 @@ ls_file(const char *name, const struct s
int ulen, glen, sz = 0;
struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime);
char *user, *group;
char buf[1024], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1];
char sbuf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
time_t now;
strmode(st->st_mode, mode);
- if (!remote) {
+ if (!remote && !chroot_no_tree) {
user = user_from_uid(st->st_uid, 0);
} else {
snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid);
user = ubuf;
}
- if (!remote) {
+ if (!remote && !chroot_no_tree) {
group = group_from_gid(st->st_gid, 0);
} else {
snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid);
group = gbuf;
}
if (ltime != NULL) {
now = time(NULL);
if (now - (365*24*60*60)/2 < st->st_mtime &&
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server-main.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server-main.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server-main.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server-main.c
@@ -17,22 +17,25 @@
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+//#include <time.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
+int chroot_no_tree = 0;
+
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(i);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
@@ -112,16 +112,18 @@ struct complete_ctx {
char **remote_pathp;
};
int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
extern char *__progname;
+int chroot_no_tree = 0;
+
/* Separators for interactive commands */
#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
/* ls flags */
#define LS_LONG_VIEW 0x0001 /* Full view ala ls -l */
#define LS_SHORT_VIEW 0x0002 /* Single row view ala ls -1 */
#define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW 0x0004 /* Long view with numeric uid/gid */
#define LS_NAME_SORT 0x0008 /* Sort by name (default) */
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
@@ -251,16 +251,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
directory on some operating systems (see sftp-server(8) for
details).
For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
prevented from modification by other processes on the system
(especially those outside the jail). Misconfiguration can lead
to unsafe environments which sshd(8) cannot detect.
+ In the special case when only sftp is used, not ssh nor scp, it
+ is possible to use ChrootDirectory %h or ChrootDirectory
+ /some/path/%u. The file system containing this directory must be
+ mounted with options nodev and either nosuid or noexec. The owner
+ of the directory should be the user. The ownership of the other
+ components of the path must fulfill the usual conditions. No adi-
+ tional files are required to be present in the directory.
+
The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^], indicating not to chroot(2).
Ciphers
Specifies the ciphers allowed. Multiple ciphers must be comma-
separated. If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
@@ -424,16 +424,27 @@ for details).
.Pp
For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially
those outside the jail).
Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which
.Xr sshd 8
cannot detect.
.Pp
+In the special case when only sftp is used, not ssh nor scp,
+it is possible to use
+.Cm ChrootDirectory
+%h or
+.Cm ChrootDirectory
+/some/path/%u. The file system containing this directory must be
+mounted with options nodev and either nosuid or noexec. The owner of the
+directory should be the user. The ownership of the other components of the path
+must fulfill the usual conditions. No aditional files are required to be present
+in the directory.
+.Pp
The default is
.Dq none ,
indicating not to
.Xr chroot 2 .
.It Cm Ciphers
Specifies the ciphers allowed.
Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
If the specified value begins with a

130
openssh-7.2p2-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch
View File

@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent af7fb4f9e794f639262d9847e95c52a74017aaaf
Put back sftp client diagnostic messages in batch mode
bsc#1023275
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.0
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.0
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.0
@@ -162,16 +162,19 @@ DESCRIPTION
VerifyHostKeyDNS
-P port
Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
-p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
original files transferred.
+ -Q Not-so-quiet batch mode: forces printing of diagnostic messages
+ in batch mode.
+
-q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
diagnostic messages from ssh(1).
-R num_requests
Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed but will
increase memory usage. The default is 64 outstanding requests.
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.1
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.1
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.1
@@ -251,16 +251,19 @@ For full details of the options listed b
.It UserKnownHostsFile
.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
.El
.It Fl P Ar port
Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
.It Fl p
Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
original files transferred.
+.It Fl Q
+Not-so-quiet batch mode: forces printing of diagnostic messages
+in batch mode.
.It Fl q
Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
diagnostic messages from
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl R Ar num_requests
Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed
but will increase memory usage.
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp.c
@@ -79,16 +79,18 @@ FILE* infile;
/* Are we in batchfile mode? */
int batchmode = 0;
/* PID of ssh transport process */
static pid_t sshpid = -1;
/* Suppress diagnositic messages */
int quiet = 0;
+/* Force diagnositic messages in batch mode */
+int loud = 0;
/* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */
int showprogress = 1;
/* When this option is set, we always recursively download/upload directories */
int global_rflag = 0;
/* When this option is set, we resume download or upload if possible */
@@ -2263,32 +2265,35 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no");
addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no");
addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes");
ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
infile = stdin;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
- "1246afhpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:P:R:")) != -1) {
+ "1246afhpQqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:P:R:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
/* Passed through to ssh(1) */
case '4':
case '6':
case 'C':
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
break;
/* Passed through to ssh(1) with argument */
case 'F':
case 'c':
case 'i':
case 'o':
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
break;
+ case 'Q':
+ loud = 1;
+ break;
case 'q':
ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
quiet = 1;
showprogress = 0;
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
break;
case 'P':
addargs(&args, "-oPort %s", optarg);
@@ -2360,16 +2365,18 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
ssh_program = optarg;
replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
break;
case 'h':
default:
usage();
}
}
+ if (batchmode && loud)
+ quiet = 0;
if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO))
showprogress = 0;
log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
if (sftp_direct == NULL) {
if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2))

87
openssh-7.2p2-ssh_case_insensitive_host_matching.patch
View File

@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 1b99f71db584917a37c5e9140bf63dcb860e8b59
Match hostnames in a case-insensitive manner.
bsc#1017099
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
@@ -526,16 +526,17 @@ execute_in_shell(const char *cmd)
* Parse and execute a Match directive.
*/
static int
match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw,
const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, int post_canon,
const char *filename, int linenum)
{
char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria;
+ char *hostlc;
const char *ruser;
int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate;
char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
/*
* Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we
* must be prepared to use default values.
*/
@@ -546,16 +547,20 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
} else if (options->hostname != NULL) {
/* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */
host = percent_expand(options->hostname,
"h", host_arg, (char *)NULL);
} else {
host = xstrdup(host_arg);
}
+ /* match_hostname() requires the hostname to be lowercase */
+ hostlc = xstrdup(host);
+ lowercase(hostlc);
+
debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s",
cp, host, original_host);
while ((oattrib = attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
criteria = NULL;
this_result = 1;
if ((negate = attrib[0] == '!'))
attrib++;
/* criteria "all" and "canonical" have no argument */
@@ -584,18 +589,18 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
}
/* All other criteria require an argument */
if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
result = -1;
goto out;
}
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
- criteria = xstrdup(host);
- r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1;
+ criteria = xstrdup(hostlc);
+ r = match_hostname(hostlc, arg) == 1;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) {
criteria = xstrdup(original_host);
r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
@@ -658,16 +663,17 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
error("One or more attributes required for Match");
result = -1;
goto out;
}
out:
if (result != -1)
debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
*condition = cp;
+ free(hostlc);
free(host);
return result;
}
/* Check and prepare a domain name: removes trailing '.' and lowercases */
static void
valid_domain(char *name, const char *filename, int linenum)
{

32
openssh-7.2p2-stricter_readonly_sftp.patch
View File

@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 70f144cf46b999eed1eebda70cb27cadc4e49b82
Stricter checking for write actions in read-only mode in the stfp server
CVE-2017-15906
bsc#1065000
backoported upstream commit 4d827f0d75a53d3952288ab882efbddea7ffadfe
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
@@ -700,18 +700,18 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
if (permforce == 1) {
mode = permforcemode;
(void)umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
}
logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
if (readonly &&
- ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY ||
- (flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) {
+ ((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY ||
+ (flags & (O_CREAT|O_TRUNC)) != 0)) {
verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
} else {
fd = open(name, flags, mode);
if (fd < 0) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
} else {
handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, flags, NULL);

433
openssh-7.2p2-tcpwrappers.patch
View File

@ -1,433 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 9e5f1fd5b5e2c3d8416cb2e2e539f43d8f1f173b
Forward port TCP wrappers support (libwrap) from OpenSSH 6.6p1. Make it
run-time switchable through the new UseTCPWrappers option for sshd.
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
@@ -1501,16 +1501,72 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([skey],
function takes 4 arguments (NetBSD)])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
]
)
+# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
+TCPW_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers],
+ [ --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+ if test -n "${withval}" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ else
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi
+ if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
+ else
+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi
+ LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap])
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <tcpd.h>
+int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
+ ]], [[
+ hosts_access(0);
+ ]])], [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1],
+ [Define if you want
+ TCP Wrappers support])
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
+ TCPW_MSG="yes"
+ ], [
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
+
+ ])
+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
# Check whether user wants to use ldns
LDNS_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
[ --with-ldns[[=PATH]] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
@@ -5159,16 +5215,17 @@ echo " sshd superuser user PATH
fi
echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
+echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
echo " systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
@@ -173,16 +173,17 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
options->authorized_principals_command = NULL;
options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL;
options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
options->version_addendum = NULL;
options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+ options->use_tcpwrappers = -1;
}
/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
static int
option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
{
return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0;
}
@@ -392,16 +393,19 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
options->fingerprint_hash =
fips_correct_dgst(options->fingerprint_hash);
+ if (options->use_tcpwrappers == -1) {
+ options->use_tcpwrappers = 0;
+ }
assemble_algorithms(options);
/* Turn privilege separation and sandboxing on by default */
if (use_privsep == -1)
use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON;
#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
@@ -471,16 +475,17 @@ typedef enum {
sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
sKexAlgorithms, sKexDHMin,
sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash,
+ sUseTCPWrappers,
sDeprecated, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of sshd_config */
#define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */
#define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
/* Textual representation of the tokens. */
@@ -622,16 +627,17 @@ static struct {
{ "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "usetcpwrappers", sUseTCPWrappers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
};
static struct {
int val;
char *text;
} tunmode_desc[] = {
{ SSH_TUNMODE_NO, "no" },
@@ -1245,16 +1251,20 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
case sHostbasedAuthentication:
intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly:
intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only;
goto parse_flag;
+ case sUseTCPWrappers:
+ intptr = &options->use_tcpwrappers;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
case sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes:
charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types;
parse_keytypes:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
@@ -2400,16 +2410,17 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseTCPWrappers, o->use_tcpwrappers);
/* string arguments */
dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT);
dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC);
dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
@@ -196,16 +196,17 @@ typedef struct {
int rekey_interval;
char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */
u_int num_auth_methods;
char *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
int fingerprint_hash;
+ int use_tcpwrappers;
} ServerOptions;
/* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
struct connection_info {
const char *user;
const char *host; /* possibly resolved hostname */
const char *address; /* remote address */
const char *laddress; /* local address */
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
@@ -875,16 +875,22 @@ This file should be writable only by roo
can, but need not be, world-readable.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
Contains initialization routines to be run before
the user's home directory becomes accessible.
This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
readable by anyone else.
.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
+.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
+Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
+Further details are described in
+.Xr hosts_access 5 .
+.Pp
.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
This file is for host-based authentication (see
.Xr ssh 1 ) .
It should only be writable by root.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/moduli
Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange"
key exchange method.
@@ -998,16 +1004,17 @@ be blocked until enough entropy is avail
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
.Xr chroot 2 ,
+.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
.Xr login.defs 5 ,
.Xr moduli 5 ,
.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
.Xr inetd 8 ,
.Xr sftp-server 8
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
@@ -132,16 +132,23 @@
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "fips.h"
#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
#endif
+#ifdef LIBWRAP
+#include <tcpd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+int allow_severity;
+int deny_severity;
+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
+
#ifndef O_NOCTTY
#define O_NOCTTY 0
#endif
/* Re-exec fds */
#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
@@ -2298,16 +2305,37 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
* the socket goes away.
*/
remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
#endif
+#ifdef LIBWRAP
+ if (options.use_tcpwrappers) {
+ allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
+ deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
+ /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+ struct request_info req;
+
+ request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
+ fromhost(&req);
+
+ if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
+ debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
+ refuse(&req);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
+
/* Log the connection. */
laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d",
remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, get_local_port());
free(laddr);
#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
/*
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
@@ -120,16 +120,17 @@ X11Forwarding yes
#ClientAliveInterval 0
#ClientAliveCountMax 3
#UseDNS no
#PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
#MaxStartups 10:30:100
#PermitTunnel no
#ChrootDirectory none
#VersionAddendum none
+#UseTCPWrappers yes
# no default banner path
#Banner none
# override default of no subsystems
Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
# This enables accepting locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see sshd_config(5).
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
@@ -1008,16 +1008,27 @@ DESCRIPTION
that has the privilege of the authenticated user. The goal of
privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by
containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes. The
argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\sandboxM-bM-^@M-^]. If
UsePrivilegeSeparation is set to M-bM-^@M-^\sandboxM-bM-^@M-^] then the pre-
authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional
restrictions. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\sandboxM-bM-^@M-^].
+ UseTCPWrappers
+ When set to "yes" , TCP wrappers (libwrap) are used to determine
+ whether a connection from a remote system should be allowed as
+ specified in hosts_accept(5). The default is "yes".
+
+ Warning: This functionality has been backported for backward
+ compatibility and should be avoided, since libwrap pulls in a
+ whole load of security issues. Moving to sshd's internal host
+ matching is highly recommended - see the Match keyword for
+ details.
+
VersionAddendum
Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH
protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default
is M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^].
X11DisplayOffset
Specifies the first display number available for sshd(8)'s X11
forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
@@ -1657,16 +1657,32 @@ or
If
.Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
is set to
.Dq sandbox
then the pre-authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional
restrictions.
The default is
.Dq sandbox .
+.It Cm UseTCPWrappers
+When set to
+.Dq yes
+, TCP wrappers (libwrap) are used to determine whether a connection from a
+remote system should be allowed as specified in
+.Xr hosts_accept 5 .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+
+.Em Warning: This functionality has been backported for backward \
+compatibility and should be avoided, since libwrap pulls in a whole load of \
+security issues.
+Moving to sshd's internal host matching is highly
+recommended - see the
+.Cm Match
+keyword for details.
.It Cm VersionAddendum
Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
sent by the server upon connection.
The default is
.Dq none .
.It Cm X11DisplayOffset
Specifies the first display number available for
.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's

175
openssh-7.2p2-verify_CIDR_address_ranges.patch
View File

@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 1b2dad1b57b086d094fe09327fcf1c490475a7cd
Check for invalid CIDR adress masks.
bsc#1005893
backported upstream commit: 010359b32659f455fddd2bd85fd7cc4d7a3b994a (7.4)
backported upstream commit: 1a6f9d2e2493d445cd9ee496e6e3c2a2f283f66a
backported upstream commit: fe06b68f824f8f55670442fb31f2c03526dd326c
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
@@ -95,16 +95,17 @@ int auth_debug_init;
* Otherwise true is returned.
*/
int
allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
{
struct stat st;
const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
u_int i;
+ int r;
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
struct spwd *spw = NULL;
#endif
/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
return 0;
@@ -183,31 +184,41 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
}
/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
- if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
- options.deny_users[i])) {
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) {
+ r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+ options.deny_users[i]);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ fatal("Invalid DenyUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
+ options.deny_users[i]);
+ } else if (r != 0) {
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
"because listed in DenyUsers",
pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
+ }
}
/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
- if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
- options.allow_users[i]))
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) {
+ r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+ options.allow_users[i]);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ fatal("Invalid AllowUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
+ options.allow_users[i]);
+ } else if (r == 1)
break;
+ }
/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
"not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
}
if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/match.c b/openssh-7.2p2/match.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/match.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/match.c
@@ -186,41 +186,50 @@ match_hostname(const char *host, const c
* successful match.
*/
int
match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
const char *patterns)
{
int mhost, mip;
- /* error in ipaddr match */
if ((mip = addr_match_list(ipaddr, patterns)) == -2)
- return -1;
- else if (mip == -1) /* negative ip address match */
- return 0;
+ return -1; /* error in ipaddr match */
+ else if (host == NULL || ipaddr == NULL || mip == -1)
+ return 0; /* negative ip address match, or testing pattern */
/* negative hostname match */
if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns)) == -1)
return 0;
/* no match at all */
if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
- * match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern
+ * Match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern.
+ * If user, host and ipaddr are all NULL then validate pattern/
+ * Returns -1 on invalid pattern, 0 on no match, 1 on match.
*/
int
match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
const char *pattern)
{
char *p, *pat;
int ret;
+ /* test mode */
+ if (user == NULL && host == NULL && ipaddr == NULL) {
+ if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) != NULL &&
+ match_host_and_ip(NULL, NULL, p + 1) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if ((p = strchr(pattern,'@')) == NULL)
return match_pattern(user, pattern);
pat = xstrdup(pattern);
p = strchr(pat, '@');
*p++ = '\0';
if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1)
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
@@ -1462,28 +1462,34 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
goto parse_multistate;
case sAllowUsers:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
fatal("%s line %d: too many allow users.",
filename, linenum);
+ if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: invalid AllowUsers pattern: "
+ "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg);
if (!*activep)
continue;
options->allow_users[options->num_allow_users++] =
xstrdup(arg);
}
break;
case sDenyUsers:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (options->num_deny_users >= MAX_DENY_USERS)
fatal("%s line %d: too many deny users.",
filename, linenum);
+ if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: invalid DenyUsers pattern: "
+ "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg);
if (!*activep)
continue;
options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] =
xstrdup(arg);
}
break;
case sAllowGroups:

3
openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz
View File

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:a72781d1a043876a224ff1b0032daa4094d87565a68528759c1c2cab5482548c
size 1499808

14
openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz.asc
View File

@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
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22
openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch → openssh-7.6p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
View File

@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
# HG changeset patch # HG changeset patch
# Parent 7197d7a6b7c90566c68e980b5f8b937c183e79d0 # Parent c004421528bc443fa9a56db1123005c92014e6b3
# enable trusted X11 forwarding by default in both sshd and sshsystem-wide # enable trusted X11 forwarding by default in both sshd and sshsystem-wide
# configuration # configuration
# bnc#50836 (was suse #35836) # bnc#50836 (was suse #35836)
Enable Trusted X11 forwarding by default, since the security benefits of Enable Trusted X11 forwarding by default, since the security benefits of
having it disabled are negligible these days with XI2 being widely used. having it disabled are negligible these days with XI2 being widely used.
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config --- a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
@@ -12,19 +12,30 @@ @@ -12,19 +12,30 @@
# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
@ -33,18 +33,18 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
+# expire after twenty minutes after remote login. +# expire after twenty minutes after remote login.
+ ForwardX11Trusted yes + ForwardX11Trusted yes
+ +
# RhostsRSAAuthentication no
# RSAAuthentication yes
# PasswordAuthentication yes # PasswordAuthentication yes
# HostbasedAuthentication no # HostbasedAuthentication no
# GSSAPIAuthentication no # GSSAPIAuthentication no
# GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
# BatchMode no # BatchMode no
# CheckHostIP yes # CheckHostIP yes
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config # AddressFamily any
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config # ConnectTimeout 0
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
@@ -94,17 +94,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys --- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
@@ -80,17 +80,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
#PrintLastLog yes #PrintLastLog yes
#TCPKeepAlive yes #TCPKeepAlive yes
#UseLogin no #UseLogin no
#UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox #PermitUserEnvironment no

95
openssh-7.6p1-allow_root_password_login.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent af43d436bc7fe818dd976c923ad99b89051eb299
Allow root login with password by default. While less secure than upstream
default of forbidding access to the root account with a password, we are
temporarily introducing this change to keep the default used in older OpenSSH
versions shipped with SLE.
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
@@ -218,17 +218,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
if (options->listen_addrs == NULL)
add_listen_addr(options, NULL, 0);
if (options->pid_file == NULL)
options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE);
if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
options->login_grace_time = 120;
if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
- options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
+ options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_YES;
if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
if (options->print_motd == -1)
options->print_motd = 1;
if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
options->print_lastlog = 1;
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
@@ -25,17 +25,17 @@
# Logging
#SyslogFacility AUTH
#LogLevel INFO
# Authentication:
#LoginGraceTime 2m
-#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
+#PermitRootLogin yes
#StrictModes yes
#MaxAuthTries 6
#MaxSessions 10
#PubkeyAuthentication yes
# The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
# but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
@@ -696,17 +696,17 @@ DESCRIPTION
none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. The
wildcard M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or
ports, respectively. By default all port forwarding requests are
permitted.
PermitRootLogin
Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1). The argument
must be yes, prohibit-password, without-password,
- forced-commands-only, or no. The default is prohibit-password.
+ forced-commands-only, or no. The default is yes.
If this option is set to prohibit-password or without-password,
password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for
root.
If this option is set to forced-commands-only, root login with
public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the
command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
@@ -1188,17 +1188,17 @@ Specifies whether root can log in using
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm prohibit-password ,
.Cm without-password ,
.Cm forced-commands-only ,
or
.Cm no .
The default is
-.Cm prohibit-password .
+.Cm yes .
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Cm prohibit-password
or
.Cm without-password ,
password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root.
.Pp
If this option is set to

23
openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch → openssh-7.6p1-blocksigalrm.patch
View File

@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
# HG changeset patch # HG changeset patch
# Parent 0bfb5dd4b190b546a3e40a59483b2b2884a47c39 # Parent 724c9ea86fe2c4a1f0e0d3aba168357ab1b2c3aa
block SIGALRM while logging through syslog to prevent deadlocks block SIGALRM while logging through syslog to prevent deadlocks
(through grace_alarm_handler()) (through grace_alarm_handler())
bnc#57354 bnc#57354
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/log.c b/openssh-7.2p2/log.c diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/log.c b/openssh-7.6p1/log.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/log.c --- a/openssh-7.6p1/log.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/log.c +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/log.c
@@ -46,16 +46,17 @@ @@ -46,16 +46,17 @@
#include <syslog.h> #include <syslog.h>
#include <unistd.h> #include <unistd.h>
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/log.c b/openssh-7.2p2/log.c
static char *argv0; static char *argv0;
static log_handler_fn *log_handler; static log_handler_fn *log_handler;
static void *log_handler_ctx; static void *log_handler_ctx;
@@ -383,16 +384,17 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, @@ -396,16 +397,17 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt,
{ {
#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT; struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
@ -44,19 +44,18 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/log.c b/openssh-7.2p2/log.c
switch (level) { switch (level) {
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL: case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
@@ -441,20 +443,29 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, @@ -455,20 +457,28 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt,
tmp_handler = log_handler;
log_handler = NULL; log_handler = NULL;
tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx); tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);
log_handler = tmp_handler; log_handler = tmp_handler;
} else if (log_on_stderr) { } else if (log_on_stderr) {
snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%s\r\n", fmtbuf); snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%.*s\r\n",
(int)sizeof msgbuf - 3, fmtbuf);
(void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf)); (void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf));
} else { } else {
+ /* Prevent a race between the grace_alarm + /* Prevent a race between the grace_alarm which writes a
+ * which writes a log message and terminates + * log message and terminates and main sshd code that leads
+ * and main sshd code that leads to deadlock + * to deadlock as syslog is not async safe.
+ * as syslog is not async safe.
+ */ + */
+ sigemptyset(&nset); + sigemptyset(&nset);
+ sigaddset(&nset, SIGALRM); + sigaddset(&nset, SIGALRM);

343
openssh-7.2p2-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch → openssh-7.6p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
# HG changeset patch # HG changeset patch
# Parent 7b5f436e0026923299fdd1994f8da8fd9948be7c # Parent a5b0f249f564de9c9efd023c6430f607d9861acd
Raise minimal size of DH group parameters to 2048 bits like upstream did in Raise minimal size of DH group parameters to 2048 bits like upstream did in
7.2. 1024b values are believed to be in breaking range for state adversaries 7.2. 1024b values are believed to be in breaking range for state adversaries
@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ compliant) parameters.
CVE-2015-4000 (LOGJAM) CVE-2015-4000 (LOGJAM)
bsc#932483 bsc#932483
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/dh.c b/openssh-7.6p1/dh.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c --- a/openssh-7.6p1/dh.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/dh.c
@@ -37,16 +37,18 @@ @@ -37,16 +37,18 @@
#include <limits.h> #include <limits.h>
@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c
const char *errstr = NULL; const char *errstr = NULL;
long long n; long long n;
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/dh.h b/openssh-7.6p1/dh.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h --- a/openssh-7.6p1/dh.h
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/dh.h
@@ -43,16 +43,17 @@ int dh_gen_key(DH *, int); @@ -45,16 +45,17 @@ int dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *); int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);
u_int dh_estimate(int); u_int dh_estimate(int);
@ -55,23 +55,23 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h
* Specifies the internal structure of the prime modulus. * Specifies the internal structure of the prime modulus.
*/ */
#define MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN (0) #define MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN (0)
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexc.c b/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexc.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c --- a/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexc.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexc.c
@@ -46,29 +46,32 @@ @@ -46,29 +46,32 @@
#include "packet.h"
#include "dh.h" #include "dh.h"
#include "ssh2.h" #include "ssh2.h"
#include "compat.h" #include "compat.h"
#include "dispatch.h" #include "dispatch.h"
#include "ssherr.h" #include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
+/* import from dh.c */ +/* import from dh.c */
+extern int dh_grp_min; +extern int dh_grp_min;
+ +
static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, void *); static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, void *); static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int int
kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
@ -87,12 +87,12 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c
kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX; kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
kex->nbits = nbits; kex->nbits = nbits;
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE) if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE)
kex->nbits = MIN(kex->nbits, 4096); kex->nbits = MINIMUM(kex->nbits, 4096);
/* New GEX request */ /* New GEX request */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 || if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
@@ -104,16 +107,22 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32 @@ -103,16 +106,22 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
goto out; goto out;
} }
if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, p)) != 0 || if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, p)) != 0 ||
@ -115,30 +115,30 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c
goto out; goto out;
} }
p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */ p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexs.c b/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexs.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c --- a/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexs.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/kexgexs.c
@@ -49,16 +49,19 @@ @@ -49,16 +49,19 @@
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h" #include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif #endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "dispatch.h" #include "dispatch.h"
#include "ssherr.h" #include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
+/* import from dh.c */ +/* import from dh.c */
+extern int dh_grp_min; +extern int dh_grp_min;
+ +
static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, void *); static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, void *); static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int int
kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh)
{ {
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST,
&input_kex_dh_gex_request); &input_kex_dh_gex_request);
@@ -78,23 +81,29 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int @@ -77,23 +80,29 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 || if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 ||
@ -147,15 +147,15 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c
kex->nbits = nbits; kex->nbits = nbits;
kex->min = min; kex->min = min;
kex->max = max; kex->max = max;
- min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); - min = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
+ min = MAX(dh_grp_min, min); + min = MAXIMUM(dh_grp_min, min);
max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); max = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
- nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); - nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
+ nbits = MAX(dh_grp_min, nbits); + nbits = MAXIMUM(dh_grp_min, nbits);
nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min || if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min ||
kex->max < kex->nbits) { kex->max < kex->nbits || kex->max < DH_GRP_MIN) {
+ if (kex->nbits < kex->min && kex->nbits >= DH_GRP_MIN_RFC) + if (kex->nbits < kex->min && kex->nbits >= DH_GRP_MIN_RFC)
+ logit("DH parameter requested by the client (%d bits) " + logit("DH parameter requested by the client (%d bits) "
+ "is considered insecure. " + "is considered insecure. "
@ -170,10 +170,10 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c
kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
if (kex->dh == NULL) { if (kex->dh == NULL) {
sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "no matching DH grp found"); sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "no matching DH grp found");
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c --- a/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.c
@@ -56,16 +56,17 @@ @@ -61,16 +61,17 @@
#include "misc.h" #include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h" #include "readconf.h"
#include "match.h" #include "match.h"
@ -191,14 +191,14 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
# 2. user-specific file # 2. user-specific file
# 3. system-wide file # 3. system-wide file
# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
@@ -148,17 +149,18 @@ typedef enum { @@ -161,17 +162,18 @@ typedef enum {
oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
oHashKnownHosts, oHashKnownHosts,
oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oTunnel, oTunnelDevice,
oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand,
oVisualHostKey, oVisualHostKey,
- oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass, - oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
+ oKexAlgorithms, oKexDHMin, + oKexAlgorithms, oKexDHMin,
@ -207,18 +207,18 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs, oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys, oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes, oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oProxyJump,
oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
} OpCodes; } OpCodes;
@@ -260,16 +262,17 @@ static struct { @@ -283,16 +285,17 @@ static struct {
{ "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts }, { "include", oInclude },
{ "tunnel", oTunnel }, { "tunnel", oTunnel },
{ "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice }, { "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice },
{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand }, { "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand }, { "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
{ "remotecommand", oRemoteCommand },
{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey }, { "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
{ "useroaming", oDeprecated },
{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms }, { "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
+ { "kexdhmin", oKexDHMin }, + { "kexdhmin", oKexDHMin },
{ "ipqos", oIPQoS }, { "ipqos", oIPQoS },
@ -229,11 +229,11 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
{ "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname }, { "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname },
{ "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots }, { "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots },
{ "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs }, { "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs },
@@ -280,16 +283,19 @@ static struct { @@ -304,16 +307,19 @@ static struct {
{ "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys },
{ "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes }, { "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes },
{ "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes }, { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
{ "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown }, { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
{ "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
{ NULL, oBadOption } { NULL, oBadOption }
}; };
@ -249,9 +249,9 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
void void
add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
{ {
@@ -1157,16 +1163,20 @@ parse_int: @@ -1206,16 +1212,20 @@ parse_int:
filename, linenum); if (*arg != '-' &&
if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>"); filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL) if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
@ -269,63 +269,62 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
if (!arg || *arg == '\0') if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum); filename, linenum);
if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) if (*arg != '-' &&
@@ -1664,16 +1674,17 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) @@ -1803,16 +1813,17 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
options->port = -1;
options->address_family = -1; options->address_family = -1;
options->connection_attempts = -1; options->connection_attempts = -1;
options->connection_timeout = -1; options->connection_timeout = -1;
options->number_of_password_prompts = -1; options->number_of_password_prompts = -1;
options->cipher = -1;
options->ciphers = NULL; options->ciphers = NULL;
options->macs = NULL; options->macs = NULL;
options->kex_algorithms = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ options->kex_dhmin = -1; + options->kex_dhmin = -1;
options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL; options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
options->num_identity_files = 0; options->num_identity_files = 0;
options->num_certificate_files = 0; options->num_certificate_files = 0;
options->hostname = NULL; options->hostname = NULL;
options->host_key_alias = NULL; options->host_key_alias = NULL;
options->proxy_command = NULL; options->proxy_command = NULL;
options->user = NULL; options->jump_user = NULL;
@@ -1805,16 +1816,23 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) options->jump_host = NULL;
@@ -1951,16 +1962,23 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
if (options->port == -1)
options->port = 0; /* Filled in ssh_connect. */
if (options->address_family == -1)
options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
if (options->connection_attempts == -1) if (options->connection_attempts == -1)
options->connection_attempts = 1; options->connection_attempts = 1;
if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1) if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1)
options->number_of_password_prompts = 3; options->number_of_password_prompts = 3;
/* Selected in ssh_login(). */
if (options->cipher == -1)
options->cipher = SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET;
+ if (options->kex_dhmin == -1) + if (options->kex_dhmin == -1)
+ options->kex_dhmin = DH_GRP_MIN_RFC; + options->kex_dhmin = DH_GRP_MIN_RFC;
+ else { + else {
+ options->kex_dhmin = MAX(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC); + options->kex_dhmin = MAXIMUM(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC);
+ options->kex_dhmin = MIN(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX); + options->kex_dhmin = MINIMUM(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX);
+ } + }
+ dh_grp_min = options->kex_dhmin; + dh_grp_min = options->kex_dhmin;
/* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */ /* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1)
options->add_keys_to_agent = 0; options->add_keys_to_agent = 0;
if (options->num_identity_files == 0) { if (options->num_identity_files == 0) {
if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0);
add_identity_file(options, "~/", add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0);
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0);
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.h b/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.h
@@ -69,16 +69,17 @@ typedef struct { --- a/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.h
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/readconf.h
@@ -64,16 +64,17 @@ typedef struct {
int connection_timeout; /* Max time (seconds) before
* aborting connection attempt */ * aborting connection attempt */
int number_of_password_prompts; /* Max number of password int number_of_password_prompts; /* Max number of password
* prompts. */ * prompts. */
int cipher; /* Cipher to use. */
char *ciphers; /* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */ char *ciphers; /* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */
char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */ char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */
char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */ char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */
char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */ char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
+ int kex_dhmin; /* minimum bit length of the DH group parameter */ + int kex_dhmin; /* minimum bit length of the DH group parameter */
int protocol; /* Protocol in order of preference. */
char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */ char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */
char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */ char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */ char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
@ -333,9 +332,10 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h
int escape_char; /* Escape character; -2 = none */ int escape_char; /* Escape character; -2 = none */
u_int num_system_hostfiles; /* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */ u_int num_system_hostfiles; /* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c char *system_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES];
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c --- a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
@@ -52,16 +52,20 @@ @@ -52,16 +52,20 @@
#include "channels.h" #include "channels.h"
#include "groupaccess.h" #include "groupaccess.h"
@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
extern int use_privsep; extern int use_privsep;
extern Buffer cfg; extern Buffer cfg;
@@ -134,16 +138,17 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions @@ -129,16 +133,17 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1; options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1;
options->num_allow_users = 0; options->num_allow_users = 0;
options->num_deny_users = 0; options->num_deny_users = 0;
@ -367,7 +367,6 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
options->macs = NULL; options->macs = NULL;
options->kex_algorithms = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ options->kex_dhmin = -1; + options->kex_dhmin = -1;
options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1; options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1;
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1;
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
@ -375,7 +374,8 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
options->max_startups_begin = -1; options->max_startups_begin = -1;
options->max_startups_rate = -1; options->max_startups_rate = -1;
options->max_startups = -1; options->max_startups = -1;
@@ -199,16 +204,23 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption options->max_authtries = -1;
@@ -195,16 +200,24 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
int i; int i;
/* Portable-specific options */ /* Portable-specific options */
@ -387,19 +387,20 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+ if (options->kex_dhmin == -1) + if (options->kex_dhmin == -1)
+ options->kex_dhmin = DH_GRP_MIN_RFC; + options->kex_dhmin = DH_GRP_MIN_RFC;
+ else { + else {
+ options->kex_dhmin = MAX(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC); + options->kex_dhmin = MAXIMUM(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC);
+ options->kex_dhmin = MIN(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX); + options->kex_dhmin = MINIMUM(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX);
+ } + }
+ dh_grp_min = options->kex_dhmin; + dh_grp_min = options->kex_dhmin;
+
/* Standard Options */ /* Standard Options */
if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) { if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */ /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
_PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE; _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE;
@@ -423,17 +435,18 @@ typedef enum { options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
@@ -414,17 +427,18 @@ typedef enum {
sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
@ -414,12 +415,12 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC, sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink, sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
sDeprecated, sUnsupported sExposeAuthInfo,
sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes; } ServerOpCodes;
#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of sshd_config */ @@ -553,16 +567,17 @@ static struct {
@@ -561,16 +574,17 @@ static struct {
{ "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL },
@ -437,9 +438,9 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -1481,16 +1495,20 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions @@ -1502,16 +1517,20 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
filename, linenum); if (*arg != '-' &&
if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>"); filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL) if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
@ -450,17 +451,17 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+ intptr = &options->kex_dhmin; + intptr = &options->kex_dhmin;
+ goto parse_int; + goto parse_int;
+ +
case sProtocol: case sSubsystem:
intptr = &options->protocol; if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) {
fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.",
filename, linenum);
}
arg = strdelim(&cp); arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0') if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
value = proto_spec(arg); @@ -2285,16 +2304,17 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) #endif
fatal("%s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.",
@@ -2247,16 +2265,17 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time); dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
dump_cfg_int(sKeyRegenerationTime, o->key_regeneration_time);
dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset); dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries); dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions); dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
@ -473,13 +474,13 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly,
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h --- a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h
@@ -88,16 +88,17 @@ typedef struct { +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h
@@ -93,16 +93,17 @@ typedef struct {
int permit_user_rc; /* If false, deny ~/.ssh/rc execution */ int permit_user_rc; /* If false, deny ~/.ssh/rc execution */
int strict_modes; /* If true, require string home dir modes. */ int strict_modes; /* If true, require string home dir modes. */
int tcp_keep_alive; /* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */ int tcp_keep_alive; /* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
@ -489,17 +490,17 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
char *macs; /* Supported SSH2 macs. */ char *macs; /* Supported SSH2 macs. */
char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */ char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
+ int kex_dhmin; /* minimum bit length of the DH group parameter */ + int kex_dhmin; /* minimum bit length of the DH group parameter */
int protocol; /* Supported protocol versions. */
struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */ struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */
SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */ SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */
LogLevel log_level; /* Level for system logging. */ LogLevel log_level; /* Level for system logging. */
int rhosts_rsa_authentication; /* If true, permit rhosts RSA
* authentication. */
int hostbased_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */ int hostbased_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */
int hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */ int hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config char *hostbased_key_types; /* Key types allowed for hostbased */
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types */
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config int pubkey_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
@@ -12,16 +12,21 @@ @@ -12,16 +12,21 @@
# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
@ -522,17 +523,17 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
# should not forward X11 connections to your local X11-display for # should not forward X11 connections to your local X11-display for
# security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the # security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the
# remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your # remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0 diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.0 b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.0
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0 --- a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.0
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0 +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.0
@@ -606,16 +606,33 @@ DESCRIPTION @@ -584,16 +584,33 @@ DESCRIPTION
ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\kexM-bM-^@M-^]. obtained using "ssh -Q kex".
+ KexDHMin + KexDHMin
+ Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group + Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group
@ -555,22 +556,22 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0
Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after
successfully connecting to the server. The command string successfully connecting to the server. The command string
extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's
shell. The following escape character substitutions will be shell. Arguments to LocalCommand accept the tokens described in
performed: M-bM-^@M-^X%dM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user's home directory), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote host the TOKENS section.
name), M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y (local host name), M-bM-^@M-^X%nM-bM-^@M-^Y (host name as provided on the
command line), M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote port), M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote user name) or The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.5 b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 --- a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.5
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config.5
@@ -1092,16 +1092,32 @@ diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 @@ -1016,16 +1016,32 @@ curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libs
ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
.Ed .Ed
.Pp .Pp
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using the The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
.Fl Q .Qq ssh -Q kex .
option of
.Xr ssh 1
with an argument of
.Dq kex .
+.It Cm KexDHMin +.It Cm KexDHMin
+Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group +Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group
+parameter p. +parameter p.
@ -592,16 +593,16 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
connecting to the server. connecting to the server.
The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
the user's shell. the user's shell.
The following escape character substitutions will be performed: Arguments to
.Ql %d .Cm LocalCommand
(local user's home directory), accept the tokens described in the
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config --- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
@@ -21,16 +21,21 @@ @@ -15,16 +15,21 @@
# HostKey for protocol version 1 #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key #ListenAddress ::
# HostKeys for protocol version 2
#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
@ -612,25 +613,25 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+# Upstream default is identical to setting this to 2048. +# Upstream default is identical to setting this to 2048.
+#KexDHMin 1024 +#KexDHMin 1024
+ +
# Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key
#KeyRegenerationInterval 1h
#ServerKeyBits 1024
# Ciphers and keying # Ciphers and keying
#RekeyLimit default none #RekeyLimit default none
# Logging # Logging
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 #SyslogFacility AUTH
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 #LogLevel INFO
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
@@ -539,16 +539,33 @@ DESCRIPTION # Authentication:
curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
@@ -532,16 +532,33 @@ DESCRIPTION
curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\kexM-bM-^@M-^]. obtained using "ssh -Q kex".
+ KexDHMin + KexDHMin
+ Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group + Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group
@ -649,26 +650,26 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+ resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken) + resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken)
+ counterparty. + counterparty.
+ +
KeyRegenerationInterval ListenAddress
In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically Specifies the local addresses sshd(8) should listen on. The
regenerated after this many seconds (if it has been used). The following forms may be used:
purpose of regeneration is to prevent decrypting captured
sessions by later breaking into the machine and stealing the
keys. The key is never stored anywhere. If the value is 0, the
key is never regenerated. The default is 3600 (seconds).
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 ListenAddress host|IPv4_addr|IPv6_addr
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 ListenAddress host|IPv4_addr:port
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 ListenAddress [host|IPv6_addr]:port
@@ -895,16 +895,32 @@ diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
@@ -893,16 +893,32 @@ The default is:
curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
.Ed .Ed
.Pp .Pp
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using the The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
.Fl Q .Qq ssh -Q kex .
option of
.Xr ssh 1
with an argument of
.Dq kex .
+.It Cm KexDHMin +.It Cm KexDHMin
+Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group +Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group
+parameter p. +parameter p.
@ -685,11 +686,11 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last +security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last
+resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken) +resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken)
+counterparty. +counterparty.
.It Cm KeyRegenerationInterval .It Cm ListenAddress
In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated Specifies the local addresses
after this many seconds (if it has been used). .Xr sshd 8
The purpose of regeneration is to prevent should listen on.
decrypting captured sessions by later breaking into the machine and The following forms may be used:
stealing the keys. .Pp
The key is never stored anywhere. .Bl -item -offset indent -compact
If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated. .It

27
openssh-7.6p1-eal3.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 9797aecac98b26573a295fd75128b7c68dfc5aad
fix paths and references in sshd man pages
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.6p1/Makefile.in
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/Makefile.in
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/Makefile.in
@@ -119,17 +119,18 @@ MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@
CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out
CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli
PATHSUBS = \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \
-e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \
- -e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \
+ -e 's|login\.conf|login.defs|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/ssh/shosts.equiv|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key|g' \
-e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \
-e 's|/etc/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \

28
openssh-7.6p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent d47e806f23ad0649ef38b24e8cb9d5617e5d5d15
# force PAM in defaullt install (this was removed from upstream in 3.8p1)
# bnc#46749
# --used to be called '-pam-fix2'
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
@@ -75,17 +75,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
# be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
# PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration,
# PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
# the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
-#UsePAM no
+UsePAM yes
#AllowAgentForwarding yes
#AllowTcpForwarding yes
#GatewayPorts no
X11Forwarding yes
#X11DisplayOffset 10
#X11UseLocalhost yes
#PermitTTY yes

950
openssh-7.2p2-fips.patch → openssh-7.6p1-fips.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

520
openssh-7.6p1-fips_checks.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,520 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 4ed7a1ce08460bfdb1ed5b57e6b45940eb7e7167
#
# Simple implementation of FIPS 140-2 selfchecks. Use OpenSSL to generate and
# verify checksums of binaries. Any hash iused in OpenSSH can be used (MD5 would
# obviously be a poor choice, since OpenSSL would barf and abort immediately in
# FIPS mode). SHA-2 seems to be a reasonable choice.
#
# The logic of the checks is as follows: decide whether FIPS mode is mandated
# (either by checking /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled or envoroinment variable
# SSH_FORCE_FIPS. In FIPS mode, checksums are required to match (inability to
# retrieve pre-calculated hash is a fatal error). In non-FIPS mode the checks
# still must be performed, unless the hashes are not installed. Thus if the hash
# file is not found (or the hash matches), proceed in non-FIPS mode and abort
# otherwise.
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/fips-check.c b/openssh-7.6p1/fips-check.c
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/fips-check.c
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "fips.h"
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#define PROC_NAME_LEN 64
+
+static const char *argv0;
+
+void
+print_help_exit(int ev)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s <-c|-w> <file> <checksum_file>\n", argv0);
+ fprintf(stderr, " -c verify hash of 'file' against hash in 'checksum_file'\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -w write hash of 'file' into 'checksum_file'\n");
+ exit(ev);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ fips_ssh_init();
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/fips.c b/openssh-7.6p1/fips.c
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/fips.c
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/fips.c
@@ -30,41 +30,304 @@
#include "dh.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
/* import from dh.c */
extern int dh_grp_min;
static int fips_state = -1;
+/* calculates HMAC of contents of a file given by filename using the hash
+ * algorithm specified by FIPS_HMAC_EVP in fips.h and placing the result into
+ * newly allacated memory - remember to free it when not needed anymore */
+static int
+hmac_file(const char *filename, u_char **hmac_out)
+{
+ int check = -1;
+ int fd;
+ struct stat fs;
+ void *hmap;
+ unsigned char *hmac;
+ unsigned char *hmac_rv = NULL;
+
+ hmac = xmalloc(FIPS_HMAC_LEN);
+
+ fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+ if (-1 == fd)
+ goto bail_out;
+
+ if (-1 == fstat(fd, &fs))
+ goto bail_out;
+
+ hmap = mmap(NULL, fs.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
+
+ if ((void *)(-1) != hmap) {
+ hmac_rv = HMAC(FIPS_HMAC_EVP(), FIPS_HMAC_KEY
+ , strlen(FIPS_HMAC_KEY), hmap, fs.st_size, hmac, NULL);
+ check = CHECK_OK;
+ munmap(hmap, fs.st_size);
+ }
+ close(fd);
+
+bail_out:
+ if (hmac_rv) {
+ check = CHECK_OK;
+ *hmac_out = hmac;
+ } else {
+ check = CHECK_FAIL;
+ *hmac_out = NULL;
+ free(hmac);
+ }
+ return check;
+}
+
+/* find pathname of binary of process with PID pid. exe is buffer expected to
+ * be capable of holding at least max_pathlen characters
+ */
+static int
+get_executable_path(pid_t pid, char *exe, int max_pathlen)
+{
+ char exe_sl[PROC_EXE_PATH_LEN];
+ int n;
+ int rv = -1;
+
+ n = snprintf(exe_sl, sizeof(exe_sl), "/proc/%u/exe", pid);
+ if ((n <= 10) || (n >= max_pathlen)) {
+ fatal("error compiling filename of link to executable");
+ }
+
+ exe[0] = 0;
+ n = readlink(exe_sl, exe, max_pathlen);
+ /* the file doesn't need to exist - procfs might not be mounted in
+ * chroot */
+ if (n == -1) {
+ rv = CHECK_MISSING;
+ } else {
+ if (n < max_pathlen) {
+ exe[n] = 0;
+ rv = CHECK_OK;
+ } else {
+ rv = CHECK_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Read HMAC from file chk, allocating enough memory to hold the HMAC and
+ * return it in *hmac.
+ * Remember to free() it when it's not needed anymore.
+ */
+static int
+read_hmac(const char *chk, u_char **hmac)
+{
+ int check = -1;
+ int fdh, n;
+ u_char *hmac_in;
+
+ *hmac = NULL;
+
+ fdh = open(chk, O_RDONLY);
+ if (-1 == fdh) {
+ switch (errno) {
+ case ENOENT:
+ check = CHECK_MISSING;
+ debug("fips: checksum file %s is missing\n", chk);
+ break;
+ default:
+ check = CHECK_FAIL;
+ debug("fips: ckecksum file %s not accessible\n", chk);
+ break;
+
+ }
+ goto bail_out;
+ }
+
+ hmac_in = xmalloc(FIPS_HMAC_LEN);
+
+ n = read(fdh, (void *)hmac_in, FIPS_HMAC_LEN);
+ if (FIPS_HMAC_LEN != n) {
+ debug("fips: unable to read whole checksum from checksum file\n");
+ free (hmac_in);
+ check = CHECK_FAIL;
+ } else {
+ check = CHECK_OK;
+ *hmac = hmac_in;
+ }
+bail_out:
+ return check;
+}
+
+static int
+fips_hmac_self(void)
+{
+ int check = -1;
+ u_char *hmac = NULL, *hmac_chk = NULL;
+ char *exe, *chk;
+
+ exe = xmalloc(PATH_MAX);
+ chk = xmalloc(PATH_MAX);
+
+ /* we will need to add the suffix and the null terminator */
+ check = get_executable_path(getpid(), exe
+ , PATH_MAX - strlen(CHECKSUM_SUFFIX) - 1);
+ if (CHECK_OK != check)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ strncpy(chk, exe, PATH_MAX);
+ strlcat(chk, CHECKSUM_SUFFIX, PATH_MAX);
+
+ check = read_hmac(chk, &hmac_chk);
+ if (CHECK_OK != check)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ check = hmac_file(exe, &hmac);
+ if (CHECK_OK != check)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ check = memcmp(hmac, hmac_chk, FIPS_HMAC_LEN);
+ if (0 == check) {
+ check = CHECK_OK;
+ debug("fips: checksum matches\n");
+ } else {
+ check = CHECK_FAIL;
+ debug("fips: checksum mismatch!\n");
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ free(hmac);
+ free(hmac_chk);
+ free(chk);
+ free(exe);
+
+ return check;
+}
+
+static int
+fips_check_required_proc(void)
+{
+ int fips_required = 0;
+ int fips_fd;
+ char fips_sys = 0;
+
+ struct stat dummy;
+ if (-1 == stat(FIPS_PROC_PATH, &dummy)) {
+ switch (errno) {
+ case ENOENT:
+ case ENOTDIR:
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Check for system-wide FIPS mode is required and %s cannot"
+ " be accessed for reason other than non-existence - aborting"
+ , FIPS_PROC_PATH);
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (-1 == (fips_fd = open(FIPS_PROC_PATH, O_RDONLY)))
+ fatal("Check for system-wide FIPS mode is required and %s cannot"
+ " be opened for reading - aborting"
+ , FIPS_PROC_PATH);
+ if (1 > read(fips_fd, &fips_sys, 1))
+ fatal("Check for system-wide FIPS mode is required and %s doesn't"
+ " return at least one character - aborting"
+ , FIPS_PROC_PATH);
+ close(fips_sys);
+ switch (fips_sys) {
+ case '0':
+ case '1':
+ fips_required = fips_sys - '0';
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Bogus character %c found in %s - aborting"
+ , fips_sys, FIPS_PROC_PATH);
+ }
+ }
+ return fips_required;
+}
+
static int
fips_check_required_env(void)
{
- int fips_required = 0;
- char *env = getenv(SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV);
+ return (NULL != getenv(SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV));
+}
+
+static int
+fips_required(void)
+{
+ int fips_requests = 0;
+ fips_requests += fips_check_required_proc();
+ fips_requests += fips_check_required_env();
+ return fips_requests;
+}
+
+/* check whether FIPS mode is required and perform selfchecksum/selftest */
+void
+fips_ssh_init(void)
+{
+ int checksum;
+
+ checksum = fips_hmac_self();
- if (env) {
- errno = 0;
- fips_required = strtol(env, NULL, 10);
- if (errno) {
- debug("bogus value in the %s environment variable, ignoring\n"
- , SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV);
- fips_required = 0;
- } else
- fips_required = 1;
- }
- return fips_required;
+ if (fips_required()) {
+ switch (checksum) {
+ case CHECK_OK:
+ debug("fips: mandatory checksum ok");
+ break;
+ case CHECK_FAIL:
+ fatal("fips: mandatory checksum failed - aborting");
+ break;
+ case CHECK_MISSING:
+ fatal("fips: mandatory checksum data missing - aborting");
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Fatal error: internal error at %s:%u"
+ , __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ break;
+ }
+ fips_state = FIPS_mode_set(1);
+ if (1 != fips_state) {
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ u_long err = ERR_get_error();
+ error("fips: OpenSSL error %lx: %s"
+ , err, ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
+ fatal("fips: unable to set OpenSSL into FIPS mode - aborting");
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch (checksum) {
+ case CHECK_OK:
+ debug("fips: checksum ok");
+ break;
+ case CHECK_FAIL:
+ fatal("fips: checksum failed - aborting");
+ break;
+ case CHECK_MISSING:
+ debug("fips: checksum data missing, but not required - continuing non-FIPS");
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Fatal error: internal error at %s:%u",
+ __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return;
}
int
fips_mode(void)
{
if (-1 == fips_state) {
fips_state = FIPS_mode();
if (fips_state)
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/fips.h b/openssh-7.6p1/fips.h
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/fips.h
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/fips.h
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2012 Petr Cerny. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2012-2014 Petr Cerny. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
@@ -22,23 +22,38 @@
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef FIPS_H
#define FIPS_H
#include "key.h"
#define SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV "SSH_FORCE_FIPS"
+#define FIPS_PROC_PATH "/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled"
+
+#define PROC_EXE_PATH_LEN 64
+#define CHECKSUM_SUFFIX ".hmac"
+#define FIPS_HMAC_KEY "HMAC_KEY:OpenSSH-FIPS@SLE"
+#define FIPS_HMAC_EVP EVP_sha256
+#define FIPS_HMAC_LEN 32
+
+void fips_ssh_init(void);
typedef enum {
FIPS_FILTER_CIPHERS,
FIPS_FILTER_MACS,
FIPS_FILTER_KEX_ALGS
} fips_filters;
+typedef enum {
+ CHECK_OK = 0,
+ CHECK_FAIL,
+ CHECK_MISSING
+} fips_checksum_status;
+
int fips_mode(void);
int fips_correct_dgst(int);
int fips_dgst_min(void);
int fips_dh_grp_min(void);
enum fp_type fips_correct_fp_type(enum fp_type);
int fips_filter_crypto(char **, fips_filters);
#endif
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sftp-server.c b/openssh-7.6p1/sftp-server.c
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/sftp-server.c
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sftp-server.c
@@ -46,16 +46,18 @@
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "fips.h"
+
/* Our verbosity */
static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
/* Our client */
static struct passwd *pw = NULL;
static char *client_addr = NULL;
/* input and output queue */
@@ -1504,16 +1506,19 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
ssize_t len, olen, set_size;
SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
char *cp, *homedir = NULL, buf[4*4096];
long mask;
extern char *optarg;
extern char *__progname;
+ /* initialize fips */
+ fips_ssh_init();
+
ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
"d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh.c b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh.c
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh.c
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh.c
@@ -518,16 +518,20 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
struct passwd *pw;
extern int optind, optreset;
extern char *optarg;
struct Forward fwd;
struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL;
struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
u_char conn_hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ /* initialize fips - can go before ssh_malloc_init(), since that is a
+ * OpenBSD-only thing (as of OpenSSH 7.6p1) */
+ fips_ssh_init();
+
ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c
@@ -1367,16 +1367,20 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
mode_t new_umask;
struct sshkey *key;
struct sshkey *pubkey;
int keytype;
Authctxt *authctxt;
struct connection_info *connection_info = get_connection_info(0, 0);
+ /* initialize fips - can go before ssh_malloc_init(), since that is a
+ * OpenBSD-only thing (as of OpenSSH 7.6p1) */
+ fips_ssh_init();
+
ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
#endif
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */

50
openssh-7.2p2-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch → openssh-7.6p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
View File

@ -1,24 +1,24 @@
# HG changeset patch # HG changeset patch
# Parent f7ba2081f120bd1e44dbe68737c898f078725aab # Parent e4a7e5799420a3d4b8047c5984c75c4bd4331951
# -- uset do be called '-xauthlocalhostname' # -- uset do be called '-xauthlocalhostname'
handle hostname changes when forwarding X handle hostname changes when forwarding X
bnc#98627 bnc#98627
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/session.c b/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c --- a/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
@@ -1154,17 +1154,17 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char *** @@ -953,17 +953,17 @@ copy_environment_blacklist(char **source
debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
free(var_name); void
} copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
{
copy_environment_blacklist(source, env, envsize, NULL);
} }
static char ** static char **
-do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell) -do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell, int *env_size) +do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell, int *env_size)
{ {
char buf[256]; char buf[256];
u_int i, envsize; u_int i, envsize;
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN) #if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
char *path = NULL; char *path = NULL;
#endif #endif
@@ -1341,25 +1341,27 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she @@ -1142,25 +1142,27 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf); read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
} }
if (debug_flag) { if (debug_flag) {
@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
do_xauth = do_xauth =
s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL; s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
@@ -1404,22 +1406,30 @@ do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shel @@ -1205,22 +1207,30 @@ do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shel
"%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n", "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
options.xauth_location, s->auth_display, options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
@ -87,25 +87,25 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
} }
static void static void
@@ -1681,16 +1691,17 @@ child_close_fds(void) @@ -1461,16 +1471,17 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
* ids, and executing the command or shell. * ids, and executing the command or shell.
*/ */
#define ARGV_MAX 10 #define ARGV_MAX 10
void void
do_child(Session *s, const char *command) do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
{ {
extern char **environ; extern char **environ;
char **env; char **env;
+ int env_size; + int env_size;
char *argv[ARGV_MAX]; char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL; const char *shell, *shell0;
struct passwd *pw = s->pw; struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
int r = 0; int r = 0;
/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
destroy_sensitive_data(); destroy_sensitive_data();
packet_clear_keys();
@@ -1747,17 +1758,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command @@ -1522,17 +1533,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
* legal, and means /bin/sh. * legal, and means /bin/sh.
*/ */
shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell; shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
@ -114,17 +114,18 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
* Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file, * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
* even if shell is overridden from login.conf * even if shell is overridden from login.conf
*/ */
- env = do_setup_env(s, shell); - env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell);
+ env = do_setup_env(s, shell, &env_size); + env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell, &env_size);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell); shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
#endif #endif
/* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */ /*
if (options.use_login) * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
@@ -1816,17 +1827,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command @@ -1586,17 +1597,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
strerror(errno));
} }
if (r) if (r)
exit(1); exit(1);
@ -132,7 +133,6 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
if (!options.use_login)
- do_rc_files(s, shell); - do_rc_files(s, shell);
+ do_rc_files(s, shell, env, &env_size); + do_rc_files(s, shell, env, &env_size);

8
openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch → openssh-7.6p1-lastlog.patch
View File

@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
# HG changeset patch # HG changeset patch
# Parent 79c00e0f450c33b3f545ef104112b55186290e2c # Parent b26f93cf21e4cfff1212ad2e61696ad099cfaf5e
# set uid for functions that use it to seek in lastlog and wtmp files # set uid for functions that use it to seek in lastlog and wtmp files
# bnc#18024 (was suse #3024) # bnc#18024 (was suse #3024)
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshlogin.c b/openssh-7.6p1/sshlogin.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c --- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshlogin.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshlogin.c
@@ -129,16 +129,17 @@ record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty, @@ -129,16 +129,17 @@ record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty,
{ {
struct logininfo *li; struct logininfo *li;

100
openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch → openssh-7.6p1-pam_check_locks.patch
View File

@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
# HG changeset patch # HG changeset patch
# Parent ac7f843cd7ebec413691d51823cdc67b611abdff # Parent ee0459c1b5173da57f9b3a6e62b232dcf9b3a029
new option UsePAMCheckLocks to enforce checking for locked accounts while new option UsePAMCheckLocks to enforce checking for locked accounts while
UsePAM is used UsePAM is used
bnc#708678, FATE#312033 bnc#708678, FATE#312033
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/auth.c b/openssh-7.6p1/auth.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c --- a/openssh-7.6p1/auth.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/auth.c
@@ -104,17 +104,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) @@ -105,17 +105,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
struct spwd *spw = NULL; struct spwd *spw = NULL;
#endif #endif
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
#endif /* USE_SHADOW */ #endif /* USE_SHADOW */
/* grab passwd field for locked account check */ /* grab passwd field for locked account check */
@@ -124,17 +124,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) @@ -125,17 +125,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF #ifdef USE_LIBIAF
passwd = get_iaf_password(pw); passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
#else #else
@ -46,9 +46,9 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
#endif #endif
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX, if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c --- a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.c
@@ -69,16 +69,17 @@ extern Buffer cfg; @@ -69,16 +69,17 @@ extern Buffer cfg;
void void
@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
options->num_queued_listens = 0; options->num_queued_listens = 0;
options->listen_addrs = NULL; options->listen_addrs = NULL;
options->address_family = -1; options->address_family = -1;
@@ -195,16 +196,18 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o) @@ -191,16 +192,18 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
void void
fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
{ {
@ -80,13 +80,13 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+ options->use_pam_check_locks = 0; + options->use_pam_check_locks = 0;
/* Standard Options */ /* Standard Options */
if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) { if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */ /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
@@ -391,17 +394,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE;
options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE;
@@ -382,17 +385,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
#endif #endif
} }
@ -98,14 +98,14 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
- sUsePAM, - sUsePAM,
+ sUsePAM, sUsePAMChecklocks, + sUsePAM, sUsePAMChecklocks,
/* Standard Options */ /* Standard Options */
sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime, sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
sKeyRegenerationTime, sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication, sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosGetAFSToken,
sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication, sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
@@ -441,18 +444,20 @@ typedef enum { @@ -433,18 +436,20 @@ typedef enum {
static struct { static struct {
const char *name; const char *name;
ServerOpCodes opcode; ServerOpCodes opcode;
@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
{ "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ { "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
{ "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -1005,16 +1010,19 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions @@ -1040,16 +1045,19 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
} }
} }
@ -146,10 +146,10 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
/* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */ /* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
if (options->ports_from_cmdline) if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
return 0; return 0;
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h --- a/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/servconf.h
@@ -167,16 +167,17 @@ typedef struct { @@ -168,16 +168,17 @@ typedef struct {
*/ */
u_int num_authkeys_files; /* Files containing public keys */ u_int num_authkeys_files; /* Files containing public keys */
@ -162,22 +162,22 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
int permit_tun; int permit_tun;
int num_permitted_opens; char **permitted_opens;
u_int num_permitted_opens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */
char *chroot_directory; char *chroot_directory;
char *revoked_keys_file; char *revoked_keys_file;
char *trusted_user_ca_keys; diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 --- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.0
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 @@ -901,16 +901,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
@@ -946,16 +946,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an
equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable
either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication. either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
non-root user. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. non-root user. The default is no.
+ UsePAMCheckLocks + UsePAMCheckLocks
+ When set to ``yes'', the checks whether the account has been + When set to ``yes'', the checks whether the account has been
@ -187,18 +187,18 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+ to set up the session and some PAM modules will not check whether + to set up the session and some PAM modules will not check whether
+ the account is locked in this scenario). The default is ``no''. + the account is locked in this scenario). The default is ``no''.
+ +
UsePrivilegeSeparation VersionAddendum
Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH
unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic. protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default
After successful authentication, another process will be created is none.
that has the privilege of the authenticated user. The goal of
privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by X11DisplayOffset
containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes. The Specifies the first display number available for sshd(8)'s X11
argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\sandboxM-bM-^@M-^]. If forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 --- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config.5
@@ -1578,16 +1578,28 @@ or @@ -1496,16 +1496,28 @@ or
.Pp .Pp
If If
.Cm UsePAM .Cm UsePAM
@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
.Xr sshd 8 .Xr sshd 8
as a non-root user. as a non-root user.
The default is The default is
.Dq no . .Cm no .
+.It Cm UsePAMCheckLocks +.It Cm UsePAMCheckLocks
+When set to +When set to
+.Dq yes +.Dq yes
@ -219,11 +219,11 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+modules will not check whether the account is locked in this scenario). The +modules will not check whether the account is locked in this scenario). The
+default is +default is
+.Dq no . +.Dq no .
.It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation .It Cm VersionAddendum
Specifies whether Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
.Xr sshd 8 sent by the server upon connection.
separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process The default is
to deal with incoming network traffic. .Cm none .
After successful authentication, another process will be created that has .It Cm X11DisplayOffset
the privilege of the authenticated user. Specifies the first display number available for
The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege .Xr sshd 8 Ns 's

8
openssh-7.2p2-pts_names_formatting.patch → openssh-7.6p1-pts_names_formatting.patch
View File

@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
# HG changeset patch # HG changeset patch
# Parent 787bc0aab11e5a7b6510c8dbf771958743ca25b0 # Parent 6dd892b74f13d258dc1bb3a70db7397dfb46c5e0
# use same lines naming as utempter (prevents problems with using different # use same lines naming as utempter (prevents problems with using different
# formats in ?tmp? files) # formats in ?tmp? files)
# --used to be called '-pts' # --used to be called '-pts'
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c b/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/loginrec.c b/openssh-7.6p1/loginrec.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c --- a/openssh-7.6p1/loginrec.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/loginrec.c
@@ -541,17 +541,17 @@ getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li) @@ -541,17 +541,17 @@ getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
/* /*
* 'line' string utility functions * 'line' string utility functions

14
openssh-7.2p2-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch → openssh-7.6p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
View File

@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
# HG changeset patch # HG changeset patch
# Parent 18c2690afd988b9cb0fd0fa927d02cf5336dce9c # Parent 2c6d52d1229cbfd1cd4b7b356bb649470df4d3b3
# --used to be called '-xauth' # --used to be called '-xauth'
try to remove xauth cookies on logout try to remove xauth cookies on logout
bnc#98815 bnc#98815
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/session.c b/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c --- a/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/session.c
@@ -2540,16 +2540,44 @@ session_close(Session *s) @@ -2294,16 +2294,44 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *
u_int i; u_int i;
verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d", verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
s->pw->pw_name, s->pw->pw_name,
get_remote_ipaddr(), ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
get_remote_port(), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
s->self); s->self);
+ if ((s->display != NULL) && (s->auth_proto != NULL) && + if ((s->display != NULL) && (s->auth_proto != NULL) &&

34
openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_geteuid.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 85f3cd6c8291c7feb0c1e7a0a3645c130532d206
Add the 'geteuid' syscall to allowed list, since it may becalled on the
mainframes when OpenSSL is using hardware crypto accelerator via libica
(via ibmica)
bsc#1004258
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -161,16 +161,22 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
SC_ALLOW(__NR_close),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_exit
SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_exit_group
SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpgid
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpid
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getrandom
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),

31
openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_getuid.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 004731f82470b22b9bd563ef3216034cf00ba133
add 'getuid' syscall to list of allowed ones to prevent the sanboxed thread
from being killed by the seccomp filter
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -173,16 +173,22 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getrandom
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getuid
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_madvise
SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_mmap
SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_mmap2
SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap2),

30
openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_stat.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent ddbb42a2825e7e837d7b0387b79a9542c7869174
Allow the stat() syscall for OpenSSL re-seed patch
(which causes OpenSSL use stat() on some file)
bnc#912436
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- a/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -224,16 +224,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
SC_ALLOW(__NR_select),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_shutdown
SC_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_stat
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_stat),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_time
SC_ALLOW(__NR_time),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_write
SC_ALLOW(__NR_write),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_socketcall
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),

120
openssh-7.2p2-seed-prng.patch → openssh-7.6p1-seed-prng.patch
View File

@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
# HG changeset patch # HG changeset patch
# Parent 6ece65e11f754d75dd33d72b6f8e487a9d047f2e # Parent e7721ed81bcf77756a79fbd04d377cc420a994cc
# extended support for (re-)seeding the OpenSSL PRNG from /dev/random # extended support for (re-)seeding the OpenSSL PRNG from /dev/random
# bnc#703221, FATE#312172 # bnc#703221, FATE#312172
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c b/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/entropy.c b/openssh-7.6p1/entropy.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c --- a/openssh-7.6p1/entropy.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/entropy.c
@@ -49,16 +49,17 @@ @@ -49,16 +49,17 @@
#include "ssh.h" #include "ssh.h"
@ -44,17 +44,17 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c b/openssh-7.2p2/entropy.c
/* Handled in arc4random() */ /* Handled in arc4random() */
void void
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in --- a/openssh-7.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
@@ -15,17 +15,17 @@ AR=@AR@ @@ -15,17 +15,17 @@ AR=@AR@
RANLIB=@RANLIB@ RANLIB=@RANLIB@
INSTALL=@INSTALL@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@ LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o reallocarray.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha1.o sha2.o rmd160.o md5.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o explicit_bzero.o OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o reallocarray.o realpath.o recallocarray.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha1.o sha2.o rmd160.o md5.o sigact.o strcasestr.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o explicit_bzero.o freezero.o
COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o kludge-fd_set.o COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-err.o bsd-getpagesize.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-malloc.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xcrypt.o kludge-fd_set.o
-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o -PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o +PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
@ -66,10 +66,10 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-co
$(COMPAT): ../config.h $(COMPAT): ../config.h
$(OPENBSD): ../config.h $(OPENBSD): ../config.h
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c b/openssh-7.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
new file mode 100644 new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null --- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/* +/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com> + * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
@ -152,10 +152,10 @@ new file mode 100644
+ fatal ("EOF reading %s", rand_file); + fatal ("EOF reading %s", rand_file);
+ } + }
+} +}
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openssh-7.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h --- a/openssh-7.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
@@ -14,16 +14,20 @@ @@ -12,16 +12,20 @@
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
@ -176,10 +176,10 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openssh-7.2p2/openbsd-c
void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
#endif #endif
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-add.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-add.1 diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh-add.1 b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh-add.1
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-add.1 --- a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh-add.1
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-add.1 +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh-add.1
@@ -166,16 +166,30 @@ or related script. @@ -167,16 +167,30 @@ or related script.
(Note that on some machines it (Note that on some machines it
may be necessary to redirect the input from may be necessary to redirect the input from
.Pa /dev/null .Pa /dev/null
@ -205,18 +205,18 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-add.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-add.1
.El .El
.Sh FILES .Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds .Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user. Contains the DSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1 Contains the ECDSA authentication identity of the user.
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1 .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1 diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh-agent.1 b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh-agent.1
@@ -196,16 +196,33 @@ line terminates. --- a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh-agent.1
@@ -209,16 +209,33 @@ line terminates.
.Sh FILES .Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds .Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
.Ux Ns -domain .Ux Ns -domain
sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent. sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
These sockets should only be readable by the owner. These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
@ -245,12 +245,12 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr sshd 8 .Xr sshd 8
.Sh AUTHORS .Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free .An -nosplit
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.1 diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh-keygen.1 b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh-keygen.1
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.1 --- a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.1 +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -841,16 +841,33 @@ on all machines @@ -863,16 +863,33 @@ on all machines
where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication. where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret. There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
.Pp .Pp
@ -284,9 +284,9 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.1
.Xr sshd 8 .Xr sshd 8
.Rs .Rs
.%R RFC 4716 .%R RFC 4716
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keysign.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keysign.8 diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh-keysign.8 b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh-keysign.8
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keysign.8 --- a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh-keysign.8
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keysign.8 +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh-keysign.8
@@ -75,16 +75,33 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authe @@ -75,16 +75,33 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authe
.Pp .Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
@ -321,10 +321,10 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keysign.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keysign.8
.Sh HISTORY .Sh HISTORY
.Nm .Nm
first appeared in first appeared in
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.1 diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh.1 b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh.1
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.1 --- a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh.1
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.1 +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh.1
@@ -1411,16 +1411,30 @@ reads @@ -1408,16 +1408,30 @@ reads
and adds lines of the format and adds lines of the format
.Dq VARNAME=value .Dq VARNAME=value
to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to
@ -355,10 +355,10 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.1
world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
because because
.Xr sshd 8 .Xr sshd 8
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8 diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd.8 b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd.8
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8 --- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd.8
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8 +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd.8
@@ -972,16 +972,33 @@ and not group or world-writable. @@ -929,16 +929,33 @@ and not group or world-writable.
.It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid .It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
Contains the process ID of the Contains the process ID of the
.Nm .Nm
@ -392,9 +392,9 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
.Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 , .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c --- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c
@@ -50,16 +50,18 @@ @@ -50,16 +50,18 @@
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h> # include <sys/stat.h>
@ -414,31 +414,31 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h> #include <paths.h>
#endif #endif
@@ -209,16 +211,23 @@ struct { @@ -195,16 +197,23 @@ int have_agent = 0;
Key **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */ */
Key **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */ struct {
int have_ssh1_key; struct sshkey **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
struct sshkey **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */
struct sshkey **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */
int have_ssh2_key; int have_ssh2_key;
u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
} sensitive_data; } sensitive_data;
/* +/*
+ * Every RESEED_AFTERth connection triggers call to linux_seed() to re-seed the + * Every RESEED_AFTERth connection triggers call to linux_seed() to re-seed the
+ * random pool. + * random pool.
+ */ + */
+#define RESEED_AFTER 100 +#define RESEED_AFTER 100
+static int re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER; +static int re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
+ +
+/*
* Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
* Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
*/
static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */ /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0; static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
@@ -1343,16 +1352,20 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
/* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
u_char session_id[16];
/* same for ssh2 */
@@ -1208,16 +1217,20 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) { if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0]; startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];

20
openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch → openssh-7.6p1-send_locale.patch
View File

@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
# HG changeset patch # HG changeset patch
# Parent dfcac093fca4d826a806b9d1c0bdc26e7ae8ee8e # Parent f258e8b7fc48a4b0f60fc436dc9ec72423a11bfc
send locales in default configuration send locales in default configuration
bnc#65747 bnc#65747
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config --- a/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/ssh_config
@@ -26,16 +26,21 @@ Host * @@ -26,16 +26,21 @@ Host *
# security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the # security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the
# remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your # remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your
@ -20,18 +20,18 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
+ SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT + SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
+ SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL + SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
+ +
# RhostsRSAAuthentication no
# RSAAuthentication yes
# PasswordAuthentication yes # PasswordAuthentication yes
# HostbasedAuthentication no # HostbasedAuthentication no
# GSSAPIAuthentication no # GSSAPIAuthentication no
# GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
# BatchMode no # BatchMode no
# CheckHostIP yes # CheckHostIP yes
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config # AddressFamily any
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config # ConnectTimeout 0
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
@@ -120,14 +120,19 @@ X11Forwarding yes --- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd_config
@@ -105,14 +105,19 @@ X11Forwarding yes
#VersionAddendum none #VersionAddendum none
# no default banner path # no default banner path

32
openssh-7.2p2-systemd-notify.patch → openssh-7.6p1-systemd-notify.patch
View File

@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
# HG changeset patch # HG changeset patch
# Parent 1ba8782c9cf18b104779c751839f3a2575c87954 # Parent 47bd7a709835b11e8dbd8fdf8779a2281ed46120
Send signals to systemd to prevent various race conditions Send signals to systemd to prevent various race conditions
bsc#1048367 bsc#1048367
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/configure.ac b/openssh-7.6p1/configure.ac
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac --- a/openssh-7.6p1/configure.ac
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/configure.ac
@@ -4326,16 +4326,40 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5], @@ -4304,16 +4304,40 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
LIBS="$saved_LIBS" LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
fi fi
@ -47,12 +47,12 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
[ [
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
@@ -5140,16 +5164,17 @@ echo " KerberosV support @@ -5110,16 +5134,17 @@ echo " SELinux support
echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG" echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG" echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
echo " libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG" echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG" echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
@ -65,9 +65,9 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
echo "" echo ""
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c --- a/openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c +++ b/openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c
@@ -82,16 +82,20 @@ @@ -82,16 +82,20 @@
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif #endif
@ -83,13 +83,13 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+ +
#include "xmalloc.h" #include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h" #include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "ssh2.h" #include "ssh2.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "sshpty.h" #include "sshpty.h"
#include "packet.h" #include "packet.h"
#include "log.h" #include "log.h"
@@ -328,16 +332,20 @@ sighup_handler(int sig) #include "buffer.h"
#include "misc.h"
@@ -293,16 +297,20 @@ sighup_handler(int sig)
/* /*
* Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP. * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
@ -103,14 +103,14 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
+ sd_notify(0, "RELOADING=1"); + sd_notify(0, "RELOADING=1");
+#endif +#endif
logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
if (options.pid_file != NULL)
unlink(options.pid_file);
platform_pre_restart(); platform_pre_restart();
close_listen_socks(); close_listen_socks();
close_startup_pipes(); close_startup_pipes();
alarm(0); /* alarm timer persists across exec */ alarm(0); /* alarm timer persists across exec */
signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */ signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */
execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv); @@ -1878,16 +1886,21 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
@@ -2119,16 +2127,21 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s", error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
options.pid_file, strerror(errno)); options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
} else { } else {

3
openssh-7.6p1.tar.gz Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:a323caeeddfe145baaa0db16e98d784b1fbc7dd436a6bf1f479dfd5cd1d21723
size 1489788

14
openssh-7.6p1.tar.gz.asc Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQHDBAABCgAdFiEEWcIRjtIG2SfmZ+vj0+X1a22SDTAFAlnTtXUACgkQ0+X1a22S
DTCQxgx+MJ1JjIWwVjXUxwpFfjj4aBv5xSqiKqwzGgVjnlmwtpTn+tqdGiACts3K
46fh/8ujknJJ5lBIlWKBfqhKzC7A+gCBaFiLoXiad8Q3NIESbXGxRkuMe6jxFtR7
SHidUjRqmn1kLCy1TSkj8mqg0/UZ5UZAJcsldQTmEAnxFVbK1l8CLB7vn4rJnj+v
PdbtsSdw8ZHtakkoNHiqQD+mwy+FXY5QcN7IUEX2/E0hKx0wou1S/36j8k89UQf8
Jbntg31N4EUOQ0fRwuxdRkHSUrJJpPgwWO4XgHw4u9yghsOCYr+X9Pa1+LCtL4PE
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NBsFxodltDxfdljL27PReBqpneWBxNJd6ruaY5wYxhu1qTEcszCGXuSd583TJ49b
hhkWrk5+knErwFdDbtOy+l3L1pvxXvuyIuWl/aXaoVSPDwtPFui94Dl2G7QbSeEb
PQDWU6PReeP+SRsMyYJSoxwgbZIzaQ==
=K6iy
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

6
openssh-askpass-gnome.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Nov 3 12:27:18 UTC 2017 - pcerny@suse.com
- upgrade to 7.6p1
see main package changelog for details
------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Jul 25 13:45:53 UTC 2016 - meissner@suse.com Mon Jul 25 13:45:53 UTC 2016 - meissner@suse.com

2
openssh-askpass-gnome.spec
View File

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ BuildRequires: openssl-devel
BuildRequires: pam-devel BuildRequires: pam-devel
BuildRequires: tcpd-devel BuildRequires: tcpd-devel
BuildRequires: update-desktop-files BuildRequires: update-desktop-files
Version: 7.2p2 Version: 7.6p1
Release: 0 Release: 0
Requires: openssh = %{version} Requires: openssh = %{version}
Summary: A GNOME-Based Passphrase Dialog for OpenSSH Summary: A GNOME-Based Passphrase Dialog for OpenSSH

603
openssh.changes
View File

@ -1,28 +1,585 @@
------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Dec 1 13:18:24 UTC 2017 - pcerny@suse.com Thu Nov 23 13:38:52 UTC 2017 - rbrown@suse.com
- Silent complaints about unsupported key exchange methods - Replace references to /var/adm/fillup-templates with new
(bsc#1006166) %_fillupdir macro (boo#1069468)
[openssh-7.2p2-fips_fixes.patch]
- Stricter checking of operations in read-only mode in sftp server -------------------------------------------------------------------
(CVE-2017-15906, bsc#1065000) Fri Nov 3 12:27:18 UTC 2017 - pcerny@suse.com
[openssh-7.2p2-stricter_readonly_sftp.patch]
- Refine handling of sockets for X11 forwarding to remove - Update to vanilla 7.6p1
reintroduced CVE-2008-1483 (bsc#1069509) Most important changes (more details below):
- systemd integration to work around various race conditions * complete removal of the ancient SSHv1 protocol
(bsc#1048367) * sshd(8) cannot run without privilege separation
[openssh-7.2p2-systemd-notify.patch] * removal of suport for arcfourm blowfish and CAST ciphers
- Add back support for TCP wrappers removed by the upgrade and RIPE-MD160 HMAC
to 7.2p2. TCP wrappers support will be dripped with the next * refuse RSA keys shorter than 1024 bits
version upgrade. Distilled upstream log:
[openssh-7.2p2-tcpwrappers.patch] - OpenSSH 7.3
- fix regression in UNIX domain socket forwarding introduced ---- Security
by the fix for CVE-2016-10010 (bsc#1051559) * sshd(8): Mitigate a potential denial-of-service attack
- fix bug in auditing code (bsc#823710) against the system's crypt(3) function via sshd(8). An
[openssh-7.2p2-audit_fixes.patch] attacker could send very long passwords that would cause
- new switch for printing diagnostic messages in sftp client's excessive CPU use in crypt(3). sshd(8) now refuses to accept
batch mode (bsc#1023275) password authentication requests of length greater than 1024
[openssh-7.2p2-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch] characters. Independently reported by Tomas Kuthan (Oracle),
Andres Rojas and Javier Nieto.
* sshd(8): Mitigate timing differences in password
authentication that could be used to discern valid from
invalid account names when long passwords were sent and
particular password hashing algorithms are in use on the
server. CVE-2016-6210, reported by EddieEzra.Harari at
verint.com
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix observable timing weakness in the CBC
padding oracle countermeasures. Reported by Jean Paul
Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin
Albrecht. Note that CBC ciphers are disabled by default and
only included for legacy compatibility.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Improve operation ordering of MAC
verification for Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) mode transport MAC
algorithms to verify the MAC before decrypting any
ciphertext. This removes the possibility of timing
differences leaking facts about the plaintext, though no such
leakage has been observed. Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele,
Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht.
* sshd(8): (portable only) Ignore PAM environment vars when
UseLogin=yes. If PAM is configured to read user-specified
environment variables and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, then a
hostile local user may attack /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or
similar environment variables set via PAM. CVE-2015-8325,
found by Shayan Sadigh.
---- New Features
* ssh(1): Add a ProxyJump option and corresponding -J
command-line flag to allow simplified indirection through a
one or more SSH bastions or "jump hosts".
* ssh(1): Add an IdentityAgent option to allow specifying
specific agent sockets instead of accepting one from the
environment.
* ssh(1): Allow ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings to
be optionally overridden when using ssh -W. bz#2577
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Implement support for the IUTF8 terminal
mode as per draft-sgtatham-secsh-iutf8-00.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for additional fixed
Diffie-Hellman 2K, 4K and 8K groups from
draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03.
* ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sshd(8): support SHA256 and SHA512 RSA
signatures in certificates;
* ssh(1): Add an Include directive for ssh_config(5) files.
* ssh(1): Permit UTF-8 characters in pre-authentication banners
sent from the server. bz#2058
---- Bugfixes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Reduce the syslog level of some relatively
common protocol events from LOG_CRIT. bz#2585
* sshd(8): Refuse AuthenticationMethods="" in configurations
and accept AuthenticationMethods=any for the default
behaviour of not requiring multiple authentication. bz#2398
* sshd(8): Remove obsolete and misleading "POSSIBLE BREAK-IN
ATTEMPT!" message when forward and reverse DNS don't match.
bz#2585
* ssh(1): Close ControlPersist background process stderr except
in debug mode or when logging to syslog. bz#1988
* misc: Make PROTOCOL description for
direct-streamlocal@openssh.com channel open messages match
deployed code. bz#2529
* ssh(1): Deduplicate LocalForward and RemoteForward entries to
fix failures when both ExitOnForwardFailure and hostname
canonicalisation are enabled. bz#2562
* sshd(8): Remove fallback from moduli to obsolete "primes"
file that was deprecated in 2001. bz#2559.
* sshd_config(5): Correct description of UseDNS: it affects ssh
hostname processing for authorized_keys, not known_hosts;
bz#2554
* ssh(1): Fix authentication using lone certificate keys in an
agent without corresponding private keys on the filesystem.
bz#2550
* sshd(8): Send ClientAliveInterval pings when a time-based
RekeyLimit is set; previously keepalive packets were not
being sent. bz#2252
---- Portability
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix compilation by automatically disabling
ciphers not supported by OpenSSL. bz#2466
* misc: Fix compilation failures on some versions of AIX's
compiler related to the definition of the VA_COPY macro.
bz#2589
* sshd(8): Whitelist more architectures to enable the
seccomp-bpf sandbox. bz#2590
* ssh-agent(1), sftp-server(8): Disable process tracing on
Solaris using setpflags(__PROC_PROTECT, ...). bz#2584
* sshd(8): On Solaris, don't call Solaris setproject() with
UsePAM=yes it's PAM's responsibility. bz#2425
- OpenSSH 7.4
---- Potentially-incompatible changes
* ssh(1): Remove 3des-cbc from the client's default proposal.
64-bit block ciphers are not safe in 2016 and we don't want
to wait until attacks like SWEET32 are extended to SSH. As
3des-cbc was the only mandatory cipher in the SSH RFCs, this
may cause problems connecting to older devices using the
default configuration, but it's highly likely that such
devices already need explicit configuration for key exchange
and hostkey algorithms already anyway.
* sshd(8): Remove support for pre-authentication compression.
Doing compression early in the protocol probably seemed
reasonable in the 1990s, but today it's clearly a bad idea in
terms of both cryptography (cf. multiple compression oracle
attacks in TLS) and attack surface. Pre-auth compression
support has been disabled by default for >10 years. Support
remains in the client.
* ssh-agent will refuse to load PKCS#11 modules outside a
whitelist of trusted paths by default. The path whitelist may
be specified at run-time.
* sshd(8): When a forced-command appears in both a certificate
and an authorized keys/principals command= restriction, sshd
will now refuse to accept the certificate unless they are
identical. The previous (documented) behaviour of having the
certificate forced-command override the other could be a bit
confusing and error-prone.
* sshd(8): Remove the UseLogin configuration directive and
support for having /bin/login manage login sessions.
---- Security
* ssh-agent(1): Will now refuse to load PKCS#11 modules from
paths outside a trusted whitelist (run-time configurable).
Requests to load modules could be passed via agent forwarding
and an attacker could attempt to load a hostile PKCS#11
module across the forwarded agent channel: PKCS#11 modules
are shared libraries, so this would result in code execution
on the system running the ssh-agent if the attacker has
control of the forwarded agent-socket (on the host running
the sshd server) and the ability to write to the filesystem
of the host running ssh-agent (usually the host running the
ssh client). Reported by Jann Horn of Project Zero.
* sshd(8): When privilege separation is disabled, forwarded
Unix- domain sockets would be created by sshd(8) with the
privileges of 'root' instead of the authenticated user. This
release refuses Unix-domain socket forwarding when privilege
separation is disabled (Privilege separation has been enabled
by default for 14 years). Reported by Jann Horn of Project
Zero.
* sshd(8): Avoid theoretical leak of host private key material
to privilege-separated child processes via realloc() when
reading keys. No such leak was observed in practice for
normal-sized keys, nor does a leak to the child processes
directly expose key material to unprivileged users. Reported
by Jann Horn of Project Zero.
* sshd(8): The shared memory manager used by pre-authentication
compression support had a bounds checks that could be elided
by some optimising compilers. Additionally, this memory
manager was incorrectly accessible when pre-authentication
compression was disabled. This could potentially allow
attacks against the privileged monitor process from the
sandboxed privilege-separation process (a compromise of the
latter would be required first). This release removes
support for pre-authentication compression from sshd(8).
Reported by Guido Vranken using the Stack unstable
optimisation identification tool
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/)
* sshd(8): Fix denial-of-service condition where an attacker
who sends multiple KEXINIT messages may consume up to 128MB
per connection. Reported by Shi Lei of Gear Team, Qihoo 360.
* sshd(8): Validate address ranges for AllowUser and DenyUsers
directives at configuration load time and refuse to accept
invalid ones. It was previously possible to specify invalid
CIDR address ranges (e.g. user@127.1.2.3/55) and these would
always match, possibly resulting in granting access where it
was not intended. Reported by Laurence Parry.
---- New Features
* ssh(1): Add a proxy multiplexing mode to ssh(1) inspired by
the version in PuTTY by Simon Tatham. This allows a
multiplexing client to communicate with the master process
using a subset of the SSH packet and channels protocol over a
Unix-domain socket, with the main process acting as a proxy
that translates channel IDs, etc. This allows multiplexing
mode to run on systems that lack file- descriptor passing
(used by current multiplexing code) and potentially, in
conjunction with Unix-domain socket forwarding, with the
client and multiplexing master process on different machines.
Multiplexing proxy mode may be invoked using "ssh -O proxy
..."
* sshd(8): Add a sshd_config DisableForwarding option that
disables X11, agent, TCP, tunnel and Unix domain socket
forwarding, as well as anything else we might implement in
the future. Like the 'restrict' authorized_keys flag, this is
intended to be a simple and future-proof way of restricting
an account.
* sshd(8), ssh(1): Support the "curve25519-sha256" key exchange
method. This is identical to the currently-supported method
named "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org".
* sshd(8): Improve handling of SIGHUP by checking to see if
sshd is already daemonised at startup and skipping the call
to daemon(3) if it is. This ensures that a SIGHUP restart of
sshd(8) will retain the same process-ID as the initial
execution. sshd(8) will also now unlink the PidFile prior to
SIGHUP restart and re-create it after a successful restart,
rather than leaving a stale file in the case of a
configuration error. bz#2641
* sshd(8): Allow ClientAliveInterval and ClientAliveCountMax
directives to appear in sshd_config Match blocks.
* sshd(8): Add %-escapes to AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand to
match those supported by AuthorizedKeysCommand (key, key
type, fingerprint, etc.) and a few more to provide access to
the contents of the certificate being offered.
* Added regression tests for string matching, address matching
and string sanitisation functions.
* Improved the key exchange fuzzer harness.
---- Bugfixes
* ssh(1): Allow IdentityFile to successfully load and use
certificates that have no corresponding bare public key.
bz#2617 certificate id_rsa-cert.pub (and no id_rsa.pub).
* ssh(1): Fix public key authentication when multiple
authentication is in use and publickey is not just the first
method attempted. bz#2642
* regress: Allow the PuTTY interop tests to run unattended.
bz#2639
* ssh-agent(1), ssh(1): improve reporting when attempting to
load keys from PKCS#11 tokens with fewer useless log messages
and more detail in debug messages. bz#2610
* ssh(1): When tearing down ControlMaster connections, don't
pollute stderr when LogLevel=quiet.
* sftp(1): On ^Z wait for underlying ssh(1) to suspend before
suspending sftp(1) to ensure that ssh(1) restores the
terminal mode correctly if suspended during a password
prompt.
* ssh(1): Avoid busy-wait when ssh(1) is suspended during a
password prompt.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Correctly report errors during sending of
ext- info messages.
* sshd(8): fix NULL-deref crash if sshd(8) received an out-of-
sequence NEWKEYS message.
* sshd(8): Correct list of supported signature algorithms sent
in the server-sig-algs extension. bz#2547
* sshd(8): Fix sending ext_info message if privsep is disabled.
* sshd(8): more strictly enforce the expected ordering of
privilege separation monitor calls used for authentication
and allow them only when their respective authentication
methods are enabled in the configuration
* sshd(8): Fix uninitialised optlen in getsockopt() call;
harmless on Unix/BSD but potentially crashy on Cygwin.
* Fix false positive reports caused by explicit_bzero(3) not
being recognised as a memory initialiser when compiled with
-fsanitize-memory.
* sshd_config(5): Use 2001:db8::/32, the official IPv6 subnet
for configuration examples.
---- Portability
* On environments configured with Turkish locales, fall back to
the C/POSIX locale to avoid errors in configuration parsing
caused by that locale's unique handling of the letters 'i'
and 'I'. bz#2643
* sftp-server(8), ssh-agent(1): Deny ptrace on OS X using
ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, ..)
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Unbreak AES-CTR ciphers on old (~0.9.8)
OpenSSL.
* Fix compilation for libcrypto compiled without RIPEMD160
support.
* contrib: Add a gnome-ssh-askpass3 with GTK+3 support. bz#2640
* sshd(8): Improve PRNG reseeding across privilege separation
and force libcrypto to obtain a high-quality seed before
chroot or sandboxing.
* All: Explicitly test for broken strnvis. NetBSD added an
strnvis and unfortunately made it incompatible with the
existing one in OpenBSD and Linux's libbsd (the former having
existed for over ten years). Try to detect this mess, and
assume the only safe option if we're cross compiling.
- OpenSSH 7.5
---- Potentially-incompatible changes
* This release deprecates the sshd_config
UsePrivilegeSeparation option, thereby making privilege
separation mandatory. Privilege separation has been on by
default for almost 15 years and sandboxing has been on by
default for almost the last five.
* The format of several log messages emitted by the packet code
has changed to include additional information about the user
and their authentication state. Software that monitors
ssh/sshd logs may need to account for these changes. For
example:
Connection closed by user x 1.1.1.1 port 1234 [preauth]
Connection closed by authenticating user x 10.1.1.1 port 1234
[preauth] Connection closed by invalid user x 1.1.1.1 port
1234 [preauth]
Affected messages include connection closure, timeout, remote
disconnection, negotiation failure and some other fatal
messages generated by the packet code.
* [Portable OpenSSH only] This version removes support for
building against OpenSSL versions prior to 1.0.1. OpenSSL
stopped supporting versions prior to 1.0.1 over 12 months ago
(i.e. they no longer receive fixes for security bugs).
---- Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix weakness in CBC padding oracle
countermeasures that allowed a variant of the attack fixed in
OpenSSH 7.3 to proceed. Note that the OpenSSH client
disables CBC ciphers by default, sshd offers them as
lowest-preference options and will remove them by default
entriely in the next release. Reported by Jean Paul
Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Martin Albrecht and Torben Hansen
of Royal Holloway, University of London.
* sftp-client(1): [portable OpenSSH only] On Cygwin, a client
making a recursive file transfer could be maniuplated by a
hostile server to perform a path-traversal attack. creating
or modifying files outside of the intended target directory.
Reported by Jann Horn of Google Project Zero.
---- New Features
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Support "=-" syntax to easily remove methods
from algorithm lists, e.g. Ciphers=-*cbc. bz#2671
---- Bugfixes
* sshd(1): Fix NULL dereference crash when key exchange start
messages are sent out of sequence.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Allow form-feed characters to appear in
configuration files.
* sshd(8): Fix regression in OpenSSH 7.4 support for the
server-sig-algs extension, where SHA2 RSA signature methods
were not being correctly advertised. bz#2680
* ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Fix a number of case-sensitivity bugs
in known_hosts processing. bz#2591 bz#2685
* ssh(1): Allow ssh to use certificates accompanied by a
private key file but no corresponding plain *.pub public key.
bz#2617
* ssh(1): When updating hostkeys using the UpdateHostKeys
option, accept RSA keys if HostkeyAlgorithms contains any RSA
keytype. Previously, ssh could ignore RSA keys when only the
ssh-rsa-sha2-* methods were enabled in HostkeyAlgorithms and
not the old ssh-rsa method. bz#2650
* ssh(1): Detect and report excessively long configuration file
lines. bz#2651
* Merge a number of fixes found by Coverity and reported via
Redhat and FreeBSD. Includes fixes for some memory and file
descriptor leaks in error paths. bz#2687
* ssh-keyscan(1): Correctly hash hosts with a port number.
bz#2692
* ssh(1), sshd(8): When logging long messages to stderr, don't
truncate "\r\n" if the length of the message exceeds the
buffer. bz#2688
* ssh(1): Fully quote [host]:port in generated ProxyJump/-J
command- line; avoid confusion over IPv6 addresses and shells
that treat square bracket characters specially.
* ssh-keygen(1): Fix corruption of known_hosts when running
"ssh-keygen -H" on a known_hosts containing already-hashed
entries.
* Fix various fallout and sharp edges caused by removing SSH
protocol 1 support from the server, including the server
banner string being incorrectly terminated with only \n
(instead of \r\n), confusing error messages from ssh-keyscan
bz#2583 and a segfault in sshd if protocol v.1 was enabled
for the client and sshd_config contained references to legacy
keys bz#2686.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Free fd_set on connection timeout. bz#2683
* sshd(8): Fix Unix domain socket forwarding for root
(regression in OpenSSH 7.4).
* sftp(1): Fix division by zero crash in "df" output when
server returns zero total filesystem blocks/inodes.
* ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): Translate OpenSSL
errors encountered during key loading to more meaningful
error codes. bz#2522 bz#2523
* ssh-keygen(1): Sanitise escape sequences in key comments sent
to printf but preserve valid UTF-8 when the locale supports
it; bz#2520
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Return reason for port forwarding failures
where feasible rather than always "administratively
prohibited". bz#2674
* sshd(8): Fix deadlock when AuthorizedKeysCommand or
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand produces a lot of output and a
key is matched early. bz#2655
* Regression tests: several reliability fixes. bz#2654 bz#2658
bz#2659
* ssh(1): Fix typo in ~C error message for bad port forward
cancellation. bz#2672
* ssh(1): Show a useful error message when included config
files can't be opened; bz#2653
* sshd(8): Make sshd set GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck=yes as the
manual page (previously incorrectly) advertised. bz#2637
* sshd_config(5): Repair accidentally-deleted mention of %k
token in AuthorizedKeysCommand; bz#2656
* sshd(8): Remove vestiges of previously removed LOGIN_PROGRAM;
bz#2665
* ssh-agent(1): Relax PKCS#11 whitelist to include libexec and
common 32-bit compatibility library directories.
* sftp-client(1): Fix non-exploitable integer overflow in
SSH2_FXP_NAME response handling.
* ssh-agent(1): Fix regression in 7.4 of deleting
PKCS#11-hosted keys. It was not possible to delete them
except by specifying their full physical path. bz#2682
---- Portability
* sshd(8): Avoid sandbox errors for Linux S390 systems using an
ICA crypto coprocessor.
* sshd(8): Fix non-exploitable weakness in seccomp-bpf sandbox
arg inspection.
* ssh(1): Fix X11 forwarding on OSX where X11 was being started
by launchd. bz#2341
* ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sftp(1): Fix output truncation for
various that contain non-printable characters where the
codeset in use is ASCII.
* build: Fix builds that attempt to link a kerberised libldns.
bz#2603
* build: Fix compilation problems caused by unconditionally
defining _XOPEN_SOURCE in wide character detection.
* sshd(8): Fix sandbox violations for clock_gettime VSDO
syscall fallback on some Linux/X32 kernels. bz#2142
- OpenSSH 7.6
---- Potentially-incompatible changes
This release includes a number of changes that may affect
existing configurations:
* ssh(1): delete SSH protocol version 1 support, associated
configuration options and documentation.
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): remove support for the hmac-ripemd160 MAC.
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): remove support for the arcfour, blowfish and
CAST ciphers.
* Refuse RSA keys <1024 bits in length and improve reporting
for keys that do not meet this requirement.
* ssh(1): do not offer CBC ciphers by default.
---- Security
* sftp-server(8): in read-only mode, sftp-server was
incorrectly permitting creation of zero-length files.
Reported by Michal Zalewski.
---- New Features
* ssh(1): add RemoteCommand option to specify a command in the
ssh config file instead of giving it on the client's command
line. This allows the configuration file to specify the
command that will be executed on the remote host.
* sshd(8): add ExposeAuthInfo option that enables writing
details of the authentication methods used (including public
keys where applicable) to a file that is exposed via a
$SSH_USER_AUTH environment variable in the subsequent
session.
* ssh(1): add support for reverse dynamic forwarding. In this
mode, ssh will act as a SOCKS4/5 proxy and forward
connections to destinations requested by the remote SOCKS
client. This mode is requested using extended syntax for the
-R and RemoteForward options and, because it is implemented
solely at the client, does not require the server be updated
to be supported.
* sshd(8): allow LogLevel directive in sshd_config Match
blocks; bz#2717
* ssh-keygen(1): allow inclusion of arbitrary string or flag
certificate extensions and critical options.
* ssh-keygen(1): allow ssh-keygen to use a key held in
ssh-agent as a CA when signing certificates. bz#2377
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): allow IPQoS=none in ssh/sshd to not set an
explicit ToS/DSCP value and just use the operating system
default.
* ssh-add(1): added -q option to make ssh-add quiet on success.
* ssh(1): expand the StrictHostKeyChecking option with two new
settings. The first "accept-new" will automatically accept
hitherto-unseen keys but will refuse connections for changed
or invalid hostkeys. This is a safer subset of the current
behaviour of StrictHostKeyChecking=no. The second setting
"off", is a synonym for the current behaviour of
StrictHostKeyChecking=no: accept new host keys, and continue
connection for hosts with incorrect hostkeys. A future
release will change the meaning of StrictHostKeyChecking=no
to the behaviour of "accept-new". bz#2400
* ssh(1): add SyslogFacility option to ssh(1) matching the
equivalent option in sshd(8). bz#2705
---- Bugfixes
* ssh(1): use HostKeyAlias if specified instead of hostname for
matching host certificate principal names; bz#2728
* sftp(1): implement sorting for globbed ls; bz#2649
* ssh(1): add a user@host prefix to client's "Permission
denied" messages, useful in particular when using "stacked"
connections (e.g. ssh -J) where it's not clear which host is
denying. bz#2720
* ssh(1): accept unknown EXT_INFO extension values that contain
\0 characters. These are legal, but would previously cause
fatal connection errors if received.
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): repair compression statistics printed at
connection exit
* sftp(1): print '?' instead of incorrect link count (that the
protocol doesn't provide) for remote listings. bz#2710
* ssh(1): return failure rather than fatal() for more cases
during session multiplexing negotiations. Causes the session
to fall back to a non-mux connection if they occur. bz#2707
* ssh(1): mention that the server may send debug messages to
explain public key authentication problems under some
circumstances; bz#2709
* Translate OpenSSL error codes to better report incorrect
passphrase errors when loading private keys; bz#2699
* sshd(8): adjust compatibility patterns for WinSCP to
correctly identify versions that implement only the legacy DH
group exchange scheme. bz#2748
* ssh(1): print the "Killed by signal 1" message only at
LogLevel verbose so that it is not shown at the default
level; prevents it from appearing during ssh -J and
equivalent ProxyCommand configs. bz#1906, bz#2744
* ssh-keygen(1): when generating all hostkeys (ssh-keygen -A),
clobber existing keys if they exist but are zero length.
zero-length keys could previously be made if ssh-keygen
failed or was interrupted part way through generating them.
bz#2561
* ssh(1): fix pledge(2) violation in the escape sequence "~&"
used to place the current session in the background.
* ssh-keyscan(1): avoid double-close() on file descriptors;
bz#2734
* sshd(8): avoid reliance on shared use of pointers shared
between monitor and child sshd processes. bz#2704
* sshd_config(8): document available AuthenticationMethods;
bz#2453
* ssh(1): avoid truncation in some login prompts; bz#2768
* sshd(8): Fix various compilations failures, inc bz#2767
* ssh(1): make "--" before the hostname terminate argument
processing after the hostname too.
* ssh-keygen(1): switch from aes256-cbc to aes256-ctr for
encrypting new-style private keys. Fixes problems related to
private key handling for no-OpenSSL builds. bz#2754
* ssh(1): warn and do not attempt to use keys when the public
and private halves do not match. bz#2737
* sftp(1): don't print verbose error message when ssh
disconnects from under sftp. bz#2750
* sshd(8): fix keepalive scheduling problem: activity on a
forwarded port from preventing the keepalive from being sent;
bz#2756
* sshd(8): when started without root privileges, don't require
the privilege separation user or path to exist. Makes running
the regression tests easier without touching the filesystem.
* Make integrity.sh regression tests more robust against
timeouts. bz#2658
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): correctness fix for channels implementation:
accept channel IDs greater than 0x7FFFFFFF.
---- Portability
* sshd(9): drop two more privileges in the Solaris sandbox:
PRIV_DAX_ACCESS and PRIV_SYS_IB_INFO; bz#2723
* sshd(8): expose list of completed authentication methods to
PAM via the SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 PAM environment variable. bz#2408
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): fix several problems in the tun/tap
forwarding code, mostly to do with host/network byte order
confusion. bz#2735
* Add --with-cflags-after and --with-ldflags-after configure
flags to allow setting CFLAGS/LDFLAGS after configure has
completed. These are useful for setting sanitiser/fuzzing
options that may interfere with configure's operation.
* sshd(8): avoid Linux seccomp violations on ppc64le over the
socketcall syscall.
* Fix use of ldns when using ldns-config; bz#2697
* configure: set cache variables when cross-compiling. The
cross- compiling fallback message was saying it assumed the
test passed, but it wasn't actually set the cache variables
and this would cause later tests to fail.
* Add clang libFuzzer harnesses for public key parsing and
signature verification.
- packaging:
* removal of all 7.2 patches
* first round of rebased patches:
[openssh-7.6p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-allow_root_password_login.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-blocksigalrm.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-eal3.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-fips.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-fips_checks.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-lastlog.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-pam_check_locks.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-pts_names_formatting.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_geteuid.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_getuid.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_stat.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-seed-prng.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-send_locale.patch]
[openssh-7.6p1-systemd-notify.patch]
* not rebased (obsoleted) patches (so far):
[openssh-7.2p2-saveargv-fix.diff]
[openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.diff]
[openssh-7.2p2-gssapimitm.diff]
[openssh-7.2p2-eal3_obsolete.diff]
[openssh-7.2p2-default_protocol.diff]
[openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch]
------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Oct 25 15:09:06 UTC 2017 - jsegitz@suse.com Wed Oct 25 15:09:06 UTC 2017 - jsegitz@suse.com

165
openssh.spec
View File

@ -16,6 +16,11 @@
# #
#Compat macro for new _fillupdir macro introduced in Nov 2017
%if ! %{defined _fillupdir}
%define _fillupdir /var/adm/fillup-templates
%endif
%if 0%{suse_version} >= 1100 %if 0%{suse_version} >= 1100
%define has_fw_dir 1 %define has_fw_dir 1
%else %else
@ -94,7 +99,7 @@ PreReq: pwdutils %{fillup_prereq} coreutils
%if ! %{uses_systemd} %if ! %{uses_systemd}
PreReq: %{insserv_prereq} PreReq: %{insserv_prereq}
%endif %endif
Version: 7.2p2 Version: 7.6p1
Release: 0 Release: 0
Summary: Secure Shell Client and Server (Remote Login Program) Summary: Secure Shell Client and Server (Remote Login Program)
License: BSD-2-Clause and MIT License: BSD-2-Clause and MIT
@ -113,60 +118,28 @@ Source8: sysconfig.ssh
Source9: sshd-gen-keys-start Source9: sshd-gen-keys-start
Source10: sshd.service Source10: sshd.service
Source11: README.FIPS Source11: README.FIPS
Source12: cavs_driver-ssh.pl #Source12: cavs_driver-ssh.pl
Patch00: openssh-7.2p2-allow_root_password_login.patch Patch00: openssh-7.6p1-allow_root_password_login.patch
Patch01: openssh-7.2p2-allow_DSS_by_default.patch Patch01: openssh-7.6p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
Patch02: openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch Patch02: openssh-7.6p1-lastlog.patch
Patch03: openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch Patch03: openssh-7.6p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
Patch04: openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch Patch04: openssh-7.6p1-eal3.patch
Patch05: openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch Patch05: openssh-7.6p1-blocksigalrm.patch
Patch06: openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch Patch06: openssh-7.6p1-send_locale.patch
Patch07: openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch Patch07: openssh-7.6p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
Patch08: openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch Patch08: openssh-7.6p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
Patch09: openssh-7.2p2-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch Patch09: openssh-7.6p1-pts_names_formatting.patch
Patch10: openssh-7.2p2-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch Patch10: openssh-7.6p1-pam_check_locks.patch
Patch11: openssh-7.2p2-pts_names_formatting.patch Patch11: openssh-7.6p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
Patch12: openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch Patch12: openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_getuid.patch
Patch13: openssh-7.2p2-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch Patch13: openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_geteuid.patch
Patch14: openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch Patch14: openssh-7.6p1-seccomp_stat.patch
Patch15: openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_geteuid.patch Patch15: openssh-7.6p1-fips.patch
Patch16: openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch #Patch16: openssh-7.6p1-cavstest-ctr.patch
Patch17: openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch #Patch17: openssh-7.6p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
Patch18: openssh-7.2p2-fips.patch Patch18: openssh-7.6p1-fips_checks.patch
Patch19: openssh-7.2p2-fips_fixes.patch Patch19: openssh-7.6p1-seed-prng.patch
Patch21: openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-ctr.patch Patch20: openssh-7.6p1-systemd-notify.patch
Patch22: openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-kdf.patch
Patch23: openssh-7.2p2-seed-prng.patch
Patch24: openssh-7.2p2-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
Patch25: openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch
Patch26: openssh-7.2p2-audit_fixes.patch
Patch27: openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch
Patch28: openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch
Patch29: openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
Patch30: openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
Patch31: openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch
Patch32: openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch
Patch33: openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch
Patch34: openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
Patch35: openssh-7.2p2-ldap.patch
Patch36: openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
Patch37: openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch
Patch38: openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch
Patch39: openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch
Patch40: openssh-7.2p2-keep_slogin.patch
Patch41: openssh-7.2p2-kex_resource_depletion.patch
Patch42: openssh-7.2p2-verify_CIDR_address_ranges.patch
Patch43: openssh-7.2p2-restrict_pkcs11-modules.patch
Patch44: openssh-7.2p2-prevent_private_key_leakage.patch
Patch45: openssh-7.2p2-secure_unix_sockets_forwarding.patch
Patch46: openssh-7.2p2-ssh_case_insensitive_host_matching.patch
Patch47: openssh-7.2p2-disable_preauth_compression.patch
Patch48: openssh-7.2p2-s390_hw_crypto_syscalls.patch
Patch49: openssh-7.2p2-s390_OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11_syscalls.patch
Patch50: openssh-7.2p2-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch
Patch51: openssh-7.2p2-stricter_readonly_sftp.patch
Patch52: openssh-7.2p2-systemd-notify.patch
Patch53: openssh-7.2p2-tcpwrappers.patch
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
Conflicts: nonfreessh Conflicts: nonfreessh
Recommends: audit Recommends: audit
@ -207,13 +180,13 @@ Hashes that together with the main package form the FIPS certifiable
cryptomodule. cryptomodule.
%package cavs #%package cavs
Summary: OpenSSH FIPS cryptomodule CAVS tests #Summary: OpenSSH FIPS cryptomodule CAVS tests
Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH #Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH
Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release} #Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
#
%description cavs #%description cavs
FIPS140 CAVS tests related parts of the OpenSSH package #FIPS140 CAVS tests related parts of the OpenSSH package
%prep %prep
@ -234,51 +207,19 @@ FIPS140 CAVS tests related parts of the OpenSSH package
%patch13 -p2 %patch13 -p2
%patch14 -p2 %patch14 -p2
%patch15 -p2 %patch15 -p2
%patch16 -p2 #patch16 -p2
%patch17 -p2 #patch17 -p2
%patch18 -p2 %patch18 -p2
%patch19 -p2 %patch19 -p2
%patch21 -p2 %patch20 -p2
%patch22 -p2
%patch23 -p2
%patch24 -p2
%patch25 -p2
%patch26 -p2
%patch27 -p2
%patch28 -p2
%patch29 -p2
%patch30 -p2
%patch31 -p2
%patch32 -p2
%patch33 -p2
%patch34 -p2
%patch35 -p2
%patch36 -p2
%patch37 -p2
%patch38 -p2
%patch39 -p2
%patch40 -p2
%patch41 -p2
%patch42 -p2
%patch43 -p2
%patch44 -p2
%patch45 -p2
%patch46 -p2
%patch47 -p2
%patch48 -p2
%patch49 -p2
%patch50 -p2
%patch51 -p2
%patch52 -p2
%patch53 -p2
cp %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE4} %{SOURCE11} . cp %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE4} %{SOURCE11} .
%build %build
# set libexec dir in the LDAP patch ### TODO: # set libexec dir in the LDAP patch
sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \ ### TODO: sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \
$( grep -Rl @LIBEXECDIR@ \ ### TODO: $( grep -Rl @LIBEXECDIR@ \
$( grep "^+++" %{PATCH35} | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' ) ### TODO: $( grep "^+++" %{PATCH33} | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' )
) ### TODO: )
autoreconf -fiv autoreconf -fiv
%ifarch s390 s390x %sparc %ifarch s390 s390x %sparc
@ -351,8 +292,8 @@ install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE1} %{buildroot}%{_initddir}/sshd
install -m 0644 %{SOURCE10} . install -m 0644 %{SOURCE10} .
ln -s ../..%{_initddir}/sshd %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd ln -s ../..%{_initddir}/sshd %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd
%endif %endif
install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}/var/adm/fillup-templates install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_fillupdir}
install -m 644 %{SOURCE8} %{buildroot}/var/adm/fillup-templates install -m 644 %{SOURCE8} %{buildroot}%{_fillupdir}
# install shell script to automate the process of adding your public key to a remote machine # install shell script to automate the process of adding your public key to a remote machine
install -m 755 contrib/ssh-copy-id %{buildroot}%{_bindir} install -m 755 contrib/ssh-copy-id %{buildroot}%{_bindir}
install -m 644 contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1 install -m 644 contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1
@ -367,7 +308,7 @@ install -m 644 %{SOURCE7} %{buildroot}%{_fwdefdir}/sshd
# askpass wrapper # askpass wrapper
sed -e "s,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir},g" < %{SOURCE6} > %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass sed -e "s,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir},g" < %{SOURCE6} > %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
sed -e "s,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir},g" < %{SOURCE12} > %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/cavs_driver-ssh.pl #sed -e "s,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir},g" < %{SOURCE12} > %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/cavs_driver-ssh.pl
rm -f %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/Ssh.bin rm -f %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/Ssh.bin
# sshd keys generator wrapper # sshd keys generator wrapper
install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE9} %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/sshd-gen-keys-start install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE9} %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/sshd-gen-keys-start
@ -461,7 +402,7 @@ rpm -q openssh-fips >& /dev/null && DISABLE_RESTART_ON_UPDATE=yes
%attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/* %attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/*
%dir %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d %dir %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d
%config %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/ssh.reg %config %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/ssh.reg
/var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh %{_fillupdir}/sysconfig.ssh
%if %{has_fw_dir} %if %{has_fw_dir}
%if %{needs_all_dirs} %if %{needs_all_dirs}
%dir %{_fwdir} %dir %{_fwdir}
@ -473,10 +414,10 @@ rpm -q openssh-fips >& /dev/null && DISABLE_RESTART_ON_UPDATE=yes
%files helpers %files helpers
%defattr(-,root,root) %defattr(-,root,root)
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
%verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ldap.conf #verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ldap.conf
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap* #attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
%doc HOWTO.ldap-keys openssh-lpk-openldap.schema openssh-lpk-sun.schema #doc HOWTO.ldap-keys openssh-lpk-openldap.schema openssh-lpk-sun.schema
%files fips %files fips
%defattr(-,root,root) %defattr(-,root,root)
@ -484,8 +425,8 @@ rpm -q openssh-fips >& /dev/null && DISABLE_RESTART_ON_UPDATE=yes
%attr(0444,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX} %attr(0444,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
%attr(0444,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX} %attr(0444,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
%files cavs #files cavs
%defattr(-,root,root) #defattr(-,root,root)
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/cavs* #attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/cavs*
%changelog %changelog