Accepting request 500282 from network

- require OpenSSL < 1.1 where that one is a default (forwarded request 500281 from pcerny) OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/500282 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=110
2017-06-03 23:48:33 +00:00 · 2017-06-03 23:48:33 +00:00 · e2b87ac074
commit e2b87ac074
parent 1c742905ef a1a66bf54b
37 changed files with 3389 additions and 90 deletions
--- a/README.SUSE
+++ b/README.SUSE
@ -22,5 +22,8 @@ There are following changes in default settings of ssh client and server:
  - the size of DSA keys is limited by the standard to 1024 bits which cannot
  be considered safe any more.

+* Accepting all RFC4419 specified DH group parameters. See KexDHMin in
+  ssh_config and sshd_config manual pages.
+
 For more information on differences in SUSE OpenSSH package see README.FIPS

--- a/README.kerberos
+++ b/README.kerberos
@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-
 This version of the Kerbros/GSSAPI support avoids DNS lookups
 for Kerberos-related names. These DNS lookups were problematic
 for dialup users because they would lead to excessive delays
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  8c4cb20b9633595de68131224b2d434e8dc41e17
+# Parent  9130c9e19c8a076a7f6f214070283cd3e0326894
 Correctly parse DISPLAY variable for cases where it contains an IPv6 address
 (which should - but not always is - in (square) brackets).

--- a/openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  28e8840bbf49c6e603bf2b55a08ed9050a60f9fb
+# Parent  2afee80335d5ef7efcf64f3a797e9b10ce0de4ae
 Do not throw away already open sockets for X11 forwarding if another socket
 family is not available for bind()

--- a/openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch
@ -1,22 +1,20 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  af5c4026e36e7aa181c164d2eca72b7e2a8a897a
+# Parent  83f18171bc2394ccd39fb176fe110b529da83a78
 Extended auditing through the Linux Auditing subsystem

 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
-@@ -88,17 +88,18 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- 	ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
- 	poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
+@@ -94,16 +94,17 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
 	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o hmac.o \
 	sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \
 	kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
 	kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o kexgssc.o \
 	kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o kexgsss.o \
- 	platform-pledge.o \
-	fips.o
-+	fips.o \
-+	auditstub.o
+ 	platform-pledge.o
+ 
+ LIBSSH_OBJS += fips.o
+LIBSSH_OBJS += auditstub.o
 
 SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
 	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o
@ -2433,8 +2431,8 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/packet.h b/openssh-7.2p2/packet.h
 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -157,16 +157,22 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- 	SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
+@@ -163,16 +163,22 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW(geteuid32),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_getrandom
 	SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-audit_fixes.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-audit_fixes.patch
@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  51a3a8eab1493a799c5a9df95e8e757f872886d0
+Various auditing fixes to be merged into the RH-originated patch.
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c b/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c
+@@ -375,16 +375,20 @@ ssh_packet_start_discard(struct ssh *ssh
+ 
+ int
+ ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ 	struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
+ 	socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
+ 
+    /* auditing might get here without valid connection structure when
+     * destroying sensitive data on exit and thus aborting disgracefully */
+	if (!ssh)
+		return 0;
+ 	/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
+ 	if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ 	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ 	if (getpeername(state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
+ 	    &fromlen) < 0)
+ 		return 0;
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  3aad88a155050008275527c0624ae6fa05d0cdad
+# Parent  e6ff441d171012183f7bd37cb7399473e8376acd
 Audit PRNG re-seeding

 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-ctr.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-ctr.patch
@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  cb502e7e796ac9289a571167a97ad9ec91562efb
+CAVS test for OpenSSH's own CTR encryption mode implementation
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+@@ -21,16 +21,17 @@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+ 
+ DESTDIR=
+ VPATH=@srcdir@
+ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
+ ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+CAVSTEST_CTR=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+ STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
+ TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
+ 
+ PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
+ 	-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
+ 	-D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
+@@ -59,16 +60,18 @@ SED=@SED@
+ ENT=@ENT@
+ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
+ LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ 
+ TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
+
+ LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh_api.o \
+ 	ssherr.o \
+ 	sshbuf.o \
+ 	sshkey.o \
+ 	sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
+ 	sshbuf-misc.o \
+ 	sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \
+@@ -190,16 +193,20 @@ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+ sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ 
+ sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+ 
+# FIPS tests
+cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-ctr.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
+ # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
+ logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+ $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
+ 	if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
+ 		manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
+ 	else \
+@@ -310,16 +317,17 @@ install-files:
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-ctr.c b/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-ctr.c
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-ctr.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+/*
+ *
+ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
+ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+
+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
+	    "                    --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
+	    "                    [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
+	    "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
+	    "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+void *
+fromhex(char *hex, size_t * len)
+{
+	unsigned char *bin;
+	char *p;
+	size_t n = 0;
+	int shift = 4;
+	unsigned char out = 0;
+	unsigned char *optr;
+
+	bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex) / 2);
+	optr = bin;
+
+	for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
+		unsigned char c;
+
+		c = *p;
+		if (isspace(c))
+			continue;
+
+		if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
+			c = c - '0';
+		} else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
+			c = c - 'A' + 10;
+		} else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
+			c = c - 'a' + 10;
+		} else {
+			/* truncate on nonhex cipher */
+			break;
+		}
+
+		out |= c << shift;
+		shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
+
+		if (shift) {
+			*(optr++) = out;
+			out = 0;
+			++n;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*len = n;
+	return bin;
+}
+
+#define READ_CHUNK 4096
+#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
+char *
+read_stdin(void)
+{
+	char *buf;
+	size_t n, total = 0;
+
+	buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
+
+	do {
+		n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
+		if (n < READ_CHUNK)	/* terminate on short read */
+			break;
+
+		total += n;
+		buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
+	} while (total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
+	return buf;
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+
+	struct sshcipher *c;
+	struct sshcipher_ctx cc;
+	char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
+	char *hexkey = NULL;
+	char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
+	char *hexdata = NULL;
+	char *p;
+	int i;
+	int encrypt = 1;
+	void *key;
+	size_t keylen;
+	void *iv;
+	size_t ivlen;
+	void *data;
+	size_t datalen;
+	void *outdata;
+
+	for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
+		if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
+			algo = argv[++i];
+		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
+			hexkey = argv[++i];
+		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
+			++i;
+			if (argv[i] == NULL) {
+				usage();
+			}
+			if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
+				encrypt = 1;
+			} else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
+				encrypt = 0;
+			} else {
+				usage();
+			}
+		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
+			hexiv = argv[++i];
+		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
+			hexdata = argv[++i];
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
+		usage();
+	}
+
+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+
+	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	if (hexdata == NULL) {
+		hexdata = read_stdin();
+	} else {
+		hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
+	}
+
+	key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
+
+	if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
+
+	if (ivlen != 16) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
+
+	if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt);
+
+	free(key);
+	free(iv);
+
+	outdata = malloc(datalen);
+	if (outdata == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	cipher_crypt(&cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0);
+
+	free(data);
+
+	cipher_cleanup(&cc);
+
+	for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
+		printf("%02X", (unsigned char) *p);
+	}
+
+	free(outdata);
+
+	printf("\n");
+	return 0;
+}
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-kdf.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-kdf.patch
@ -0,0 +1,469 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  f9ffcfb88e5a9d611a61aee3571050dea67e363e
+CAVS test for KDF implementation in OpenSSH
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+@@ -22,16 +22,17 @@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+ DESTDIR=
+ VPATH=@srcdir@
+ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
+ ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ CAVSTEST_CTR=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr
+CAVSTEST_KDF=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-kdf
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+ STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
+ TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
+ 
+ PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
+ 	-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
+ 	-D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
+@@ -60,17 +61,17 @@ SED=@SED@
+ ENT=@ENT@
+ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
+ LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ 
+ TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+-TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
+TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh_api.o \
+ 	ssherr.o \
+ 	sshbuf.o \
+ 	sshkey.o \
+ 	sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
+ 	sshbuf-misc.o \
+@@ -197,16 +198,19 @@ sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss
+ 
+ sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+ 
+ # FIPS tests
+ cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-ctr.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-kdf.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-kdf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
+ # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
+ logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+ $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
+ 	if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
+ 		manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
+ 	else \
+@@ -318,16 +322,17 @@ install-files:
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-kdf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-kdf.c
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/cavstest-kdf.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
+ *    written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
+ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
+ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
+ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
+ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+ * DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+
+static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
+{
+	if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
+		return (hex - 48);
+	if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
+		return (hex - 55);
+	if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
+		return (hex - 87);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert hex representation into binary string
+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
+ * @hexlen length of hex
+ * @bin output buffer with binary data
+ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
+ *	   half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
+ */
+static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
+		    unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
+{
+	size_t i = 0;
+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
+		bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
+		bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
+ * and convert hex into bin
+ *
+ * Caller must free bin
+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
+ * @hexlen length of hex
+ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
+ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
+ *
+ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
+ */
+static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
+			 unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
+{
+	unsigned char *out = NULL;
+	size_t outlen = 0;
+
+	if (!hexlen)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
+
+	out = calloc(1, outlen);
+	if (!out)
+		return -errno;
+
+	hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
+	*bin = out;
+	*binlen = outlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
+				 '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
+static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
+				 '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
+static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
+{
+	if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
+		return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
+	return 'X';
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert binary string into hex representation
+ * @bin input buffer with binary data
+ * @binlen length of bin
+ * @hex output buffer to store hex data
+ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
+ *	   twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
+ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
+ */
+static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
+		    char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
+{
+	size_t i = 0;
+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
+		hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
+		hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
+	}
+}
+
+struct kdf_cavs {
+	unsigned char *K;
+	size_t Klen;
+	unsigned char *H;
+	size_t Hlen;
+	unsigned char *session_id;
+	size_t session_id_len;
+
+	unsigned int iv_len;
+	unsigned int ek_len;
+	unsigned int ik_len;
+};
+
+static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	struct kex kex;
+    struct ssh ssh;
+	BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
+	int mode = 0;
+	struct newkeys *keys_client;
+	struct newkeys *keys_server;
+
+#define HEXOUTLEN 500
+	char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
+
+	memset(&ssh, 0, sizeof(struct ssh));
+	memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
+    ssh.kex = &kex;
+
+	Kbn = BN_new();
+	BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
+	if (!Kbn) {
+		printf("cannot convert K into BIGNUM\n");
+		ret = 1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	kex.session_id = test->session_id;
+	kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
+
+	/* setup kex */
+
+	/* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
+	switch (test->ik_len) {
+		case 20:
+			kex.hash_alg = 2;
+			break;
+		case 32:
+			kex.hash_alg = 3;
+			break;
+		case 48:
+			kex.hash_alg = 4;
+			break;
+		case 64:
+			kex.hash_alg = 5;
+			break;
+		default:
+			printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
+			ret = 1;
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* implement choose_enc */
+	for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
+		kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
+		if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
+			printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
+			ret = 1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
+		kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
+	}
+
+	/* implement kex_choose_conf */
+	kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
+
+	/* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
+	 * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
+	kex.server = 1;
+
+	/* do it */
+	kex_derive_keys_bn(&ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kbn);
+
+	keys_client = ssh.kex->newkeys[0];
+	keys_server = ssh.kex->newkeys[1];
+
+	/* get data */
+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+	bin2hex(keys_client->enc.iv, (size_t)keys_client->enc.iv_len,
+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+	printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
+
+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+	bin2hex(keys_server->enc.iv, (size_t)keys_server->enc.iv_len,
+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+	printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
+
+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+	bin2hex(keys_client->enc.key, (size_t)keys_client->enc.key_len,
+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+	printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
+	
+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+	bin2hex(keys_server->enc.key, (size_t)keys_server->enc.key_len,
+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+	printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
+
+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+	bin2hex(keys_client->mac.key, (size_t)keys_client->mac.key_len,
+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+	printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
+	
+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+	bin2hex(keys_server->mac.key, (size_t)keys_server->mac.key_len,
+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+	printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
+
+	free(keys_client);
+	free(keys_server);
+
+out:
+	if (Kbn)
+		BN_free(Kbn);
+	if (kex.newkeys[0])
+		free(kex.newkeys[0]);
+	if (kex.newkeys[1])
+		free(kex.newkeys[1]);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test command example:
+ * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
+ *
+ * Expected result for example:
+ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
+ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
+ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
+ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
+ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
+ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
+ */
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	struct kdf_cavs test;
+	int ret = 1;
+	int opt = 0;
+
+	memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
+	while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
+	{
+		size_t len = 0;
+		switch(opt)
+		{
+			/*
+			 * CAVS K is MPINT
+			 * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
+			 * following transformations already happened):
+			 * 	1. cut off first four bytes
+			 * 	2. if most significant bit of value is
+			 *	   1, prepend 0 byte
+			 */
+			case 'K':
+				len = strlen(optarg);
+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
+						    &test.K, &test.Klen);
+				if (ret)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case 'H':
+				len = strlen(optarg);
+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
+						    &test.H, &test.Hlen);
+				if (ret)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case 's':
+				len = strlen(optarg);
+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
+						    &test.session_id,
+						    &test.session_id_len);
+				if (ret)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case 'i':
+				test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
+				break;
+			case 'e':
+				test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
+				break;
+			case 'm':
+				test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
+				break;
+			default:
+				usage();
+				goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
+
+out:
+	if (test.session_id)
+		free(test.session_id);
+	if (test.K)
+		free(test.K);
+	if (test.H)
+		free(test.H);
+	return ret;
+
+}
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  16c4937db837ab7cdbe0422b81de0e7a9a8479cd
+# Parent  4821397c95e57962905e6d47554bef9e4ea57483
 disable run-time check for OpenSSL ABI by version number as that is not a
 reliable indicator of ABI changes and doesn't make much sense in a
 distribution package
@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ distribution package
 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
-@@ -4639,16 +4639,29 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth],
+@@ -4663,16 +4663,29 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth],
 		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
 			AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1],
 				[Define if you have BSD auth support])
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-disable_preauth_compression.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-disable_preauth_compression.patch
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-fips.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-fips.patch
@ -1,24 +1,22 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  3e1393b771d6430ae09ae30741a3b9b382e3e041
+# Parent  5f2b8faa3b60de28124d9d4a44ffa2635d67f601
 FIPS 140-2 compliance. Perform selftests on start and use only FIPS approved
 algorithms.

 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
-@@ -87,17 +87,18 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- 	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
- 	ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
+@@ -89,16 +89,18 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
 	poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
 	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o hmac.o \
 	sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \
 	kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
 	kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
 	kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
-	platform-pledge.o
-+	platform-pledge.o \
-+	fips.o
+ 	platform-pledge.o
 
+LIBSSH_OBJS += fips.o
+
 SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
 	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o
 
@ -26,6 +24,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 	audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
 	sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \
 	auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \
+ 	auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-rsa.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-rsa.c
 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-rsa.c
 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-rsa.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  84a6252b7ac18855cf188e5911bdf8a757d4460a
+# Parent  df12d82287e3434a52c21a994b901302bd0c8064
 GSSAPI Key Exchange implementation

 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ChangeLog.gssapi b/openssh-7.2p2/ChangeLog.gssapi
@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ new file mode 100644
 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
-@@ -85,18 +85,18 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+@@ -89,18 +89,18 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
 	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
 	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
@ -136,14 +136,14 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 -	kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
 +	kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o kexgssc.o \
 +	kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o kexgsss.o \
- 	platform-pledge.o \
- 	fips.o
+ 	platform-pledge.o
+ 
+ LIBSSH_OBJS += fips.o
 
 SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
 	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o
 
 SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
- 	audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-krb5.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-krb5.c
 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-krb5.c
 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-krb5.c
@ -1279,8 +1279,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/gss-serv.c b/openssh-7.2p2/gss-serv.c
 +	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
 +}
 +#endif
- 
-	return (ctx->major);
+
 +void
 +ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
 +	int ok;
@ -1302,7 +1301,8 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/gss-serv.c b/openssh-7.2p2/gss-serv.c
 +		return;
 +
 +	debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
-+
+ 
+-	return (ctx->major);
 +	/* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
 +	 * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
 +	 * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  605a6220fcc2c96e9196681fe480fab16b505ee1
+# Parent  e2f9b3303b4a4ed5d0e5f01009dd1ebea166890d
 Suggest command line for removal of offending keys from known_hosts file

 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c
@ -14,11 +14,11 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshconnect.c
 		    user_hostfiles[0]);
 		error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
 		    host_found->file, host_found->line);
-+		error("You can use following command to remove all keys for this IP:");
+		error("You can use following command to remove the offending key:");
 +		if (host_found->file)
-+			error("ssh-keygen -R %s -f %s", hostname, host_found->file);
+			error("ssh-keygen -R %s -f %s", host, host_found->file);
 +		else
-+			error("ssh-keygen -R %s", hostname);
+			error("ssh-keygen -R %s", host);
 
 		/*
 		 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  cb9be7363a9f32133f0d105d515149dd77cc8cd3
+# Parent  0f00e960e1069c6a6eec975cc184171343701077

 Do not import PAM environment variables when using login, since it may have
 security implications.
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-keep_slogin.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-keep_slogin.patch
@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  7c29b31d3502bbf5b80e01f8d1db8b2733a3c7f4
+Add slogin back to the distribution, since it might be used downstreams
+
+Revert of cupstream commit 69fead5d7cdaa73bdece9fcba80f8e8e70b90346
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
+@@ -354,16 +354,20 @@ install-files:
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+ 	if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \
+ 		$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8 ; \
+ 		$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap.conf.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh-ldap.conf.5 ; \
+ 	fi
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
+	ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
+	ln -s ./ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
+ 
+ install-sysconf:
+ 	if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) ]; then \
+ 		$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir); \
+ 	fi
+ 	@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \
+ 		$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \
+ 	else \
+@@ -415,16 +419,17 @@ uninstallall:	uninstall
+ 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
+ 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
+ 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
+ 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
+ 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)
+ 	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
+ 
+ uninstall:
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
+@@ -440,16 +445,17 @@ uninstall:
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+ 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
+ 
+ regress-prep:
+ 	[ -d `pwd`/regress ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress
+ 	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests
+ 	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper ] || \
+ 		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper
+ 	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf ] || \
+ 		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-kex_resource_depletion.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-kex_resource_depletion.patch
@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  5d3b620e9c7c42bfb1d8f24eb7e0645a55d967fa
+Prevent memory depletion during key exchange
+
+CVE-2016-8858
+bsc#1005480
+
+upstream commit ec165c392ca54317dbe3064a8c200de6531e89ad
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c
+@@ -523,16 +523,17 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t se
+ 	u_int i;
+ 	size_t dlen;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+ 	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
+ 	if (kex == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
+ 	ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 
+ 	/* discard packet */
+ 	for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
+ 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0)
+ 			return r;
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-ldap.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-ldap.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  b8135c449e59282a8926ff44fcb4670baf8f158e
+# Parent  a47716db81c68026e9d37db568c2c313acc53f86
 # Helper app for retrieving keys from a LDAP server
 # by Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
 #
@ -137,28 +137,26 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
 +SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
 +SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
+ CAVSTEST_CTR=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr
+ CAVSTEST_KDF=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-kdf
 PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
 SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
 STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
 TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
 
 PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
- 	-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
- 	-D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
-@@ -57,17 +59,19 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
- PERL=@PERL@
- SED=@SED@
- ENT=@ENT@
- XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
+@@ -63,16 +65,19 @@ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
 LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
 EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
 MANFMT=@MANFMT@
 
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
-+INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
-+
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT)
+ TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
 
+ TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
+TARGETS += ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT)
+
 LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
 	ssh_api.o \
 	ssherr.o \
@ -166,7 +164,8 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 	sshkey.o \
 	sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
 	sshbuf-misc.o \
-@@ -109,18 +113,18 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw
+ 	sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \
+@@ -114,18 +119,18 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw
 	monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
@ -187,7 +186,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 PATHSUBS	= \
 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \
 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \
-@@ -184,16 +188,19 @@ ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss
+@@ -189,16 +194,19 @@ ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss
 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
 
 ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
@ -205,9 +204,9 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
 	$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
 
- # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
- logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
-@@ -308,32 +315,40 @@ install-files:
+ # FIPS tests
+ cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-ctr.o
+@@ -320,16 +328,20 @@ install-files:
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) scp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
@ -222,12 +221,13 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 +	fi
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
+@@ -338,16 +350,20 @@ install-files:
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 	@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \
 		$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \
 	else \
-@@ -349,16 +364,23 @@ install-sysconf:
+@@ -363,16 +379,23 @@ install-sysconf:
 			echo "moving $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes to $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \
 			mv "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes" "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \
 		else \
@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 
 host-key-force: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh$(EXEEXT)
 	if ./ssh -Q protocol-version | grep '^1$$' >/dev/null; then \
-@@ -389,27 +411,30 @@ uninstall:
+@@ -403,27 +426,30 @@ uninstall:
 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in
 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/configure.ac
-@@ -1620,16 +1620,116 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([audit],
+@@ -1644,16 +1644,116 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([audit],
 		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
 		;;
 	  *)
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  e351203d2784230a3b56b8e3dd6955403ed10ca4
+# Parent  9888bc3f536eab9f528d9c96e5e8a2501ed168f5
 Limit accepted passwords length to prevent DoS by resource consumption
 (via crypt() eating CPU cycles).

--- a/openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  295ae9c5f5da12d273f3b91e90145b449984a7dc
+# Parent  b86c2190c93aeaf958c22fc7b224dcaf87100288
 # HG changeset patch
 # Parent  b262fd34c8ecd55e93d457b3ca5593abce716856
 # login-pam cannot handle the option terminator "--" as login from util-linux
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  7ce81a30bb196401c63782b646d8a6d511ddec4b
+# Parent  4011d0f5c00b663976c9940dc4ef79642605cf90
 Do not write a PID file when not daemonizing (e.g. when running from systemd)

 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-prevent_private_key_leakage.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-prevent_private_key_leakage.patch
@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  e2a8c999f737bca97bbc330ce6683de842ba195e
+Pre-allocare buffer for private keys data to prevent leaking of sensitive data
+via heap.
+
+CVE-2016-10011
+bsc#1016369
+
+backported upstream commit 54d022026aae4f53fa74cc636e4a032d9689b64d
+backported upstream commit a9c746088787549bb5b1ae3add7d06a1b6d93d5e
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/authfile.c b/openssh-7.2p2/authfile.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/authfile.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/authfile.c
+@@ -95,23 +95,35 @@ sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, 
+ 
+ /* Load a key from a fd into a buffer */
+ int
+ sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob)
+ {
+ 	u_char buf[1024];
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	struct stat st;
+-	int r;
+	int r, dontmax = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ 	if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
+ 	    st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	/*
+	 * Pre-allocate the buffer used for the key contents and clamp its
+	 * maximum size. This ensures that key contents are never leaked via
+	 * implicit realloc() in the sshbuf code.
+	 */
+	if ((st.st_mode & S_IFREG) == 0 || st.st_size <= 0) {
+		st.st_size = 64*1024; /* 64k should be enough for anyone :) */
+		dontmax = 1;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_allocate(blob, st.st_size)) != 0 ||
+	    (dontmax && (r = sshbuf_set_max_size(blob, st.st_size)) != 0))
+		return r;
+ 	for (;;) {
+ 		if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) {
+ 			if (errno == EPIPE)
+ 				break;
+ 			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0)
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.c
+@@ -311,63 +311,73 @@ sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf
+ 	SSHBUF_TELL("check");
+ 	/* Check that len is reasonable and that max_size + available < len */
+ 	if (len > buf->max_size || buf->max_size - len < buf->size - buf->off)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp)
+sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+ 	size_t rlen, need;
+ 	u_char *dp;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	if (dpp != NULL)
+-		*dpp = NULL;
+-
+-	SSHBUF_DBG(("reserve buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
+	SSHBUF_DBG(("allocate buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If the requested allocation appended would push us past max_size
+ 	 * then pack the buffer, zeroing buf->off.
+ 	 */
+ 	sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, buf->size + len > buf->max_size);
+-	SSHBUF_TELL("reserve");
+-	if (len + buf->size > buf->alloc) {
+-		/*
+-		 * Prefer to alloc in SSHBUF_SIZE_INC units, but
+-		 * allocate less if doing so would overflow max_size.
+-		 */
+-		need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc;
+-		rlen = roundup(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
+-		SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen));
+-		if (rlen > buf->max_size)
+-			rlen = buf->alloc + need;
+-		SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen));
+-		if ((dp = realloc(buf->d, rlen)) == NULL) {
+-			SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail"));
+-			if (dpp != NULL)
+-				*dpp = NULL;
+-			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		}
+-		buf->alloc = rlen;
+-		buf->cd = buf->d = dp;
+-		if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) < 0) {
+-			/* shouldn't fail */
+-			if (dpp != NULL)
+-				*dpp = NULL;
+-			return r;
+-		}
+	SSHBUF_TELL("allocate");
+	if (len + buf->size <= buf->alloc)
+		return 0; /* already have it. */
+
+	/*
+	 * Prefer to alloc in SSHBUF_SIZE_INC units, but
+	 * allocate less if doing so would overflow max_size.
+	 */
+	need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc;
+	rlen = roundup(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
+	SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen));
+	if (rlen > buf->max_size)
+		rlen = buf->alloc + need;
+	SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen));
+	if ((dp = realloc(buf->d, rlen)) == NULL) {
+		SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail"));
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 	}
+	buf->alloc = rlen;
+	buf->cd = buf->d = dp;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) < 0) {
+		/* shouldn't fail */
+		return r;
+	}
+	SSHBUF_TELL("done");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp)
+{
+	u_char *dp;
+	int r;
+
+	if (dpp != NULL)
+		*dpp = NULL;
+
+	SSHBUF_DBG(("reserve buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
+	if ((r = sshbuf_allocate(buf, len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+ 	dp = buf->d + buf->size;
+ 	buf->size += len;
+-	SSHBUF_TELL("done");
+ 	if (dpp != NULL)
+ 		*dpp = dp;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.h
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.h
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshbuf.h
+@@ -134,16 +134,24 @@ u_char *sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct 
+  * Check whether a reservation of size len will succeed in buf
+  * Safer to use than direct comparisons again sshbuf_avail as it copes
+  * with unsigned overflows correctly.
+  * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+  */
+ int	sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
+ 
+ /*
+ * Preallocates len additional bytes in buf.
+ * Useful for cases where the caller knows how many bytes will ultimately be
+ * required to avoid realloc in the buffer code.
+ * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int	sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
+
+/*
+  * Reserve len bytes in buf.
+  * Returns 0 on success and a pointer to the first reserved byte via the
+  * optional dpp parameter or a negative * SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+  */
+ int	sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Consume len bytes from the start of buf
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  323ac0fc20b1d5e9bf7037e020adfd760dd2d5f2
+# Parent  4a254abf4ef391358257310ad2fe15c9e12dee34
 Prevent user enumeration through password processing timing
 CVE-2016-6210
 bsc#989363
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-restrict_pkcs11-modules.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-restrict_pkcs11-modules.patch
@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  22de9aeddbde2b36da9c23475cfa5dcd42e95287
+whitelist paths for loading of PKCS#11 modules in ssh-agent
+
+CVE-2016-10009
+bsc#1016366
+
+upstream commit 786d5994da79151180cb14a6cf157ebbba61c0cc
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.1
+@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
+-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.62 2015/11/15 23:54:15 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.63 2016/11/30 03:07:37 djm Exp $
+ .\"
+ .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ .\"                    All rights reserved
+ .\"
+ .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ .\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+@@ -29,29 +29,30 @@
+ .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ .\"
+-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 15 2015 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2016 $
+ .Dt SSH-AGENT 1
+ .Os
+ .Sh NAME
+ .Nm ssh-agent
+ .Nd authentication agent
+ .Sh SYNOPSIS
+ .Nm ssh-agent
+ .Op Fl c | s
+ .Op Fl \&Dd
+ .Op Fl a Ar bind_address
+ .Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+ .Op Fl t Ar life
+.Op Fl P Ar pkcs11_whitelist
+ .Op Ar command Op Ar arg ...
+ .Nm ssh-agent
+ .Op Fl c | s
+ .Fl k
+ .Sh DESCRIPTION
+ .Nm
+ is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication
+ (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519).
+@@ -116,16 +117,28 @@ Valid options are:
+ and
+ .Dq sha256 .
+ The default is
+ .Dq sha256 .
+ .It Fl k
+ Kill the current agent (given by the
+ .Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
+ environment variable).
+.It Fl P
+Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 shared libraries
+that may be added using the
+.Fl s
+option to
+.Xr ssh-add 1 .
+The default is to allow loading PKCS#11 libraries from
+.Dq /usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/* .
+PKCS#11 libraries that do not match the whitelist will be refused.
+See PATTERNS in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for a description of pattern-list syntax.
+ .It Fl s
+ Generate Bourne shell commands on
+ .Dv stdout .
+ This is the default if
+ .Ev SHELL
+ does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
+ .It Fl t Ar life
+ Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent.
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.c b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -78,25 +78,30 @@
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+#include "match.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+ #if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H)
+ #include <sys/prctl.h>	/* For prctl() and PR_SET_DUMPABLE */
+ #endif
+ 
+#ifndef DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST
+# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/*"
+#endif
+
+ typedef enum {
+ 	AUTH_UNUSED,
+ 	AUTH_SOCKET,
+ 	AUTH_CONNECTION
+ } sock_type;
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+ 	int fd;
+@@ -134,16 +139,19 @@ time_t parent_alive_interval = 0;
+ 
+ /* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */
+ pid_t cleanup_pid = 0;
+ 
+ /* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
+ char socket_name[PATH_MAX];
+ char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
+ 
+/* PKCS#11 path whitelist */
+static char *pkcs11_whitelist;
+
+ /* locking */
+ #define LOCK_SIZE	32
+ #define LOCK_SALT_SIZE	16
+ #define LOCK_ROUNDS	1
+ int locked = 0;
+ char lock_passwd[LOCK_SIZE];
+ char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE];
+ 
+@@ -736,17 +744,17 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e, u_int type
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 	sshbuf_free(msg);
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ static void
+ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+ {
+-	char *provider = NULL, *pin;
+	char *provider = NULL, *pin, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
+ 	int r, i, version, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
+ 	u_int seconds;
+ 	time_t death = 0;
+ 	u_char type;
+ 	struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
+ 	Identity *id;
+ 	Idtab *tab;
+ 
+@@ -768,29 +776,40 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
+ 			confirm = 1;
+ 			break;
+ 		default:
+ 			error("process_add_smartcard_key: "
+ 			    "Unknown constraint type %d", type);
+ 			goto send;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
+		verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
+		    provider, strerror(errno));
+		goto send;
+	}
+	if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, pkcs11_whitelist, 0) != 1) {
+		verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
+		    "provider not whitelisted", canonical_provider);
+		goto send;
+	}
+	debug("%s: add %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
+ 	if (lifetime && !death)
+ 		death = monotime() + lifetime;
+ 
+-	count = pkcs11_add_provider(provider, pin, &keys);
+	count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ 		k = keys[i];
+ 		version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
+ 		tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+ 		if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
+ 			id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
+ 			id->key = k;
+-			id->provider = xstrdup(provider);
+-			id->comment = xstrdup(provider); /* XXX */
+			id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
+			id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider); /* XXX */
+ 			id->death = death;
+ 			id->confirm = confirm;
+ 			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+ 			tab->nentries++;
+ 			success = 1;
+ 		} else {
+ 			sshkey_free(k);
+ 		}
+@@ -1171,17 +1190,17 @@ check_parent_exists(void)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ usage(void)
+ {
+ 	fprintf(stderr,
+ 	    "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
+-	    "                 [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
+	    "                 [-P pkcs11_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
+ 	    "       ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
+ 	exit(1);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ main(int ac, char **av)
+ {
+ 	int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
+@@ -1215,31 +1234,36 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+ 	seed_rng();
+ 
+-	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:t:")) != -1) {
+	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:P:t:")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (ch) {
+ 		case 'E':
+ 			fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
+ 			if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
+ 				fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'c':
+ 			if (s_flag)
+ 				usage();
+ 			c_flag++;
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'k':
+ 			k_flag++;
+ 			break;
+		case 'P':
+			if (pkcs11_whitelist != NULL)
+				fatal("-P option already specified");
+			pkcs11_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg);
+			break;
+ 		case 's':
+ 			if (c_flag)
+ 				usage();
+ 			s_flag++;
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'd':
+ 			if (d_flag || D_flag)
+ 				usage();
+@@ -1264,16 +1288,19 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	ac -= optind;
+ 	av += optind;
+ 
+ 	if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag))
+ 		usage();
+ 
+	if (pkcs11_whitelist == NULL)
+		pkcs11_whitelist = xstrdup(DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST);
+
+ 	if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
+ 		shell = getenv("SHELL");
+ 		if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
+ 		    strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
+ 			c_flag = 1;
+ 	}
+ 	if (k_flag) {
+ 		const char *errstr = NULL;
+@@ -1411,17 +1438,17 @@ skip:
+ 		parent_alive_interval = 10;
+ 	idtab_init();
+ 	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ 	signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
+ 	signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
+ 	signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
+ 	nalloc = 0;
+ 
+-	if (pledge("stdio cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1)
+	if (pledge("stdio rpath cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1)
+ 		fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
+ 	platform_pledge_agent();
+ 
+ 	while (1) {
+ 		prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp);
+ 		result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp);
+ 		saved_errno = errno;
+ 		if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-s390_OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11_syscalls.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-s390_OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11_syscalls.patch
@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  bb92b9f037cc3686a669cd84caa44a2716f34058
+Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 14:27:34 -0300
+
+[PATCH 0/3] Allow syscalls for openssl engines
+From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+To: openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org
+In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
+and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
+implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
+crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
+this is only need on s390 architecture.
+
+The EP11 crypto card also needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
+specific argument.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+
+related to bsc#1016709
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -150,16 +150,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW(stat),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_exit
+ 	SC_ALLOW(exit),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_exit_group
+ 	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
+ #endif
+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
+	SC_ALLOW(flock),
+#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getpgid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getpid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getuid),
+@@ -180,16 +183,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getuid),
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid32 /* not defined on x86_64 */
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
+ #endif
+ #endif
+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
+	SC_ALLOW(ipc),
+#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_madvise
+ 	SC_ALLOW(madvise),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_mmap
+ 	SC_ALLOW(mmap),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_mmap2
+ 	SC_ALLOW(mmap2),
+@@ -233,16 +239,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ #ifdef __NR_socketcall
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_ioctl
+ #ifdef __s390__
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
+	/* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Default deny */
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
+ };
+ 
+ static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = {
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-s390_hw_crypto_syscalls.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-s390_hw_crypto_syscalls.patch
@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  6d8637bec747de081eccba9874f640dcbc4fbb68
+This patch enables specific ioctl calls for ICA crypto card on s390
+platform. Without this patch, users using the IBMCA engine are not able
+to perform ssh login as the filter blocks the communication with the
+crypto card.
+
+Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+
+bsc#1016709
+
+Upstreamed as:
+5f1596e11d55539678c41f68aed358628d33d86f
+58b8cfa2a062b72139d7229ae8de567f55776f24
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -54,42 +54,53 @@
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stddef.h>  /* for offsetof */
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+#include <endian.h>
+
+#ifdef __s390__
+#include <asm/zcrypt.h>
+#endif
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ 
+ /* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */
+ #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL
+ 
+ /* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */
+ #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+ # undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL
+ # define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
+ #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
+ 
+ /* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
+#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)])
+#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
+#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)]) + sizeof(uint32_t)
+#else
+#error "Unknown endianness"
+#endif
+ #define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
+ 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno))
+ #define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \
+ 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
+ #define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
+ 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 4), \
+-	/* load first syscall argument */ \
+-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+-	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)])), \
+	/* load the syscall argument to check into accumulator */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, LO_ARG(_arg_nr)), \
+ 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_arg_val), 0, 1), \
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
+ 	/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+ 		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
+ 
+ /* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */
+ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+@@ -217,16 +228,23 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW(time),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_write
+ 	SC_ALLOW(write),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_socketcall
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
+ #endif
+#ifdef __NR_ioctl
+#ifdef __s390__
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
+#endif
+#endif
+ 
+ 	/* Default deny */
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
+ };
+ 
+ static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = {
+ 	.len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])),
+ 	.filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns,
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_geteuid.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_geteuid.patch
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  b07f00d5d805c043f5bdc7b8cf6701d924879fa6
+Add the 'geteuid' syscall to allowed list, since it may becalled on the
+mainframes when OpenSSL is using hardware crypto accelerator via libica
+(via ibmica)
+
+bsc#1004258
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -148,16 +148,22 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getuid),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid32
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
+ #endif
+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
+	SC_ALLOW(geteuid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
+	SC_ALLOW(geteuid32),
+#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+ 	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_madvise
+ 	SC_ALLOW(madvise),
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  c66097e5e31cd607bf2206b2da95730cce518b7a
+# Parent  d75417bf0f4d50cabd84299773bab4ac68f68caa
 add 'getuid' syscall to list of allowed ones to prevent the sanboxed thread
 from being killed by the seccomp filter

--- a/openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  def949a57b8101691c79ecce6366cc7ae1685b07
+# Parent  2153c4af090728c778931d2fad72d4b260294122
 Allow the stat() syscall for OpenSSL re-seed patch
 (which causes OpenSSL use stat() on some file)

--- a/openssh-7.2p2-secure_unix_sockets_forwarding.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-secure_unix_sockets_forwarding.patch
@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  4e1fd41aaa9cafe8f7b07868ac38ed4dbdf594aa
+Do not allow unix socket when running without privilege separation to prevent
+privilege escalation through a socket created with root: ownership.
+
+CVE-2016-10010
+bsc#1016368
+
+backported upstream commit b737e4d7433577403a31cff6614f6a1b0b5e22f4
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/serverloop.c b/openssh-7.2p2/serverloop.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/serverloop.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/serverloop.c
+@@ -990,17 +990,17 @@ server_request_direct_streamlocal(void)
+ 	originator_port = packet_get_int();
+ 	packet_check_eom();
+ 
+ 	debug("server_request_direct_streamlocal: originator %s port %d, target %s",
+ 	    originator, originator_port, target);
+ 
+ 	/* XXX fine grained permissions */
+ 	if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
+-	    !no_port_forwarding_flag) {
+	    !no_port_forwarding_flag && use_privsep) {
+ 		c = channel_connect_to_path(target,
+ 		    "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
+ 	} else {
+ 		logit("refused streamlocal port forward: "
+ 		    "originator %s port %d, target %s",
+ 		    originator, originator_port, target);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1274,17 +1274,17 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_
+ 
+ 		memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+ 		fwd.listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ 		debug("server_input_global_request: streamlocal-forward listen path %s",
+ 		    fwd.listen_path);
+ 
+ 		/* check permissions */
+ 		if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0
+-		    || no_port_forwarding_flag) {
+		    || no_port_forwarding_flag || !use_privsep) {
+ 			success = 0;
+ 			packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding.");
+ 		} else {
+ 			/* Start listening on the socket */
+ 			success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(
+ 			    &fwd, NULL, &options.fwd_opts);
+ 		}
+ 		free(fwd.listen_path);
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  efa850d8312ceef224dbec0f2ae1002201afabd9
+# Parent  7b45c4f3fef6836db00c5b198736cce17290c5cd
 additional option for sftp-server to force file mode for new files
 FATE#312774
 http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2010-November/029044.html
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # HG changeset patch
-# Parent  9b1033f35a6cb173fbc13416065ed40c4b14e656
+# Parent  fc81df6f2bf393e45e703c89976c3a0fe6e0a273
 run sftp sessions inside a chroot

 diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-ssh_case_insensitive_host_matching.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-ssh_case_insensitive_host_matching.patch
@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  1b99f71db584917a37c5e9140bf63dcb860e8b59
+Match hostnames in a case-insensitive manner.
+
+bsc#1017099
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
+@@ -526,16 +526,17 @@ execute_in_shell(const char *cmd)
+  * Parse and execute a Match directive.
+  */
+ static int
+ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw,
+     const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, int post_canon,
+     const char *filename, int linenum)
+ {
+ 	char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria;
+	char *hostlc;
+ 	const char *ruser;
+ 	int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate;
+ 	char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we
+ 	 * must be prepared to use default values.
+ 	 */
+@@ -546,16 +547,20 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
+ 	} else if (options->hostname != NULL) {
+ 		/* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */
+ 		host = percent_expand(options->hostname,
+ 		    "h", host_arg, (char *)NULL);
+ 	} else {
+ 		host = xstrdup(host_arg);
+ 	}
+ 
+	/* match_hostname() requires the hostname to be lowercase */
+	hostlc = xstrdup(host);
+	lowercase(hostlc);
+
+ 	debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s",
+ 	    cp, host, original_host);
+ 	while ((oattrib = attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
+ 		criteria = NULL;
+ 		this_result = 1;
+ 		if ((negate = attrib[0] == '!'))
+ 			attrib++;
+ 		/* criteria "all" and "canonical" have no argument */
+@@ -584,18 +589,18 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
+ 		}
+ 		/* All other criteria require an argument */
+ 		if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
+ 			error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
+ 			result = -1;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
+-			criteria = xstrdup(host);
+-			r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1;
+			criteria = xstrdup(hostlc);
+			r = match_hostname(hostlc, arg) == 1;
+ 			if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
+ 				this_result = result = 0;
+ 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) {
+ 			criteria = xstrdup(original_host);
+ 			r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1;
+ 			if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
+ 				this_result = result = 0;
+ 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
+@@ -658,16 +663,17 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
+ 		error("One or more attributes required for Match");
+ 		result = -1;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+  out:
+ 	if (result != -1)
+ 		debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
+ 	*condition = cp;
+	free(hostlc);
+ 	free(host);
+ 	return result;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Check and prepare a domain name: removes trailing '.' and lowercases */
+ static void
+ valid_domain(char *name, const char *filename, int linenum)
+ {
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-verify_CIDR_address_ranges.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-verify_CIDR_address_ranges.patch
@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  1b2dad1b57b086d094fe09327fcf1c490475a7cd
+Check for invalid CIDR adress masks.
+bsc#1005893
+
+backported upstream commit: 010359b32659f455fddd2bd85fd7cc4d7a3b994a (7.4)
+backported upstream commit: 1a6f9d2e2493d445cd9ee496e6e3c2a2f283f66a
+backported upstream commit: fe06b68f824f8f55670442fb31f2c03526dd326c
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
+@@ -95,16 +95,17 @@ int auth_debug_init;
+  * Otherwise true is returned.
+  */
+ int
+ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+ {
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
+ 	u_int i;
+	int r;
+ #ifdef USE_SHADOW
+ 	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
+ 	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+@@ -183,31 +184,41 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+ 	if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
+ 	    options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
+ 		hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+ 		ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
+ 	if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
+-		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
+-			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+-			    options.deny_users[i])) {
+		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) {
+			r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+			    options.deny_users[i]);
+			if (r < 0) {
+				fatal("Invalid DenyUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
+				    options.deny_users[i]);
+			} else if (r != 0) {
+ 				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+ 				    "because listed in DenyUsers",
+ 				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
+ 				return 0;
+ 			}
+		}
+ 	}
+ 	/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
+ 	if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
+-		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
+-			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+-			    options.allow_users[i]))
+		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) {
+			r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+			    options.allow_users[i]);
+			if (r < 0) {
+				fatal("Invalid AllowUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
+				    options.allow_users[i]);
+			} else if (r == 1)
+ 				break;
+		}
+ 		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
+ 		if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
+ 			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
+ 			    "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/match.c b/openssh-7.2p2/match.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/match.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/match.c
+@@ -186,41 +186,50 @@ match_hostname(const char *host, const c
+  * successful match.
+  */
+ int
+ match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
+     const char *patterns)
+ {
+ 	int mhost, mip;
+ 
+-	/* error in ipaddr match */
+ 	if ((mip = addr_match_list(ipaddr, patterns)) == -2)
+-		return -1;
+-	else if (mip == -1) /* negative ip address match */
+-		return 0;
+		return -1; /* error in ipaddr match */
+	else if (host == NULL || ipaddr == NULL || mip == -1)
+		return 0; /* negative ip address match, or testing pattern */
+ 
+ 	/* negative hostname match */
+ 	if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns)) == -1)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	/* no match at all */
+ 	if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+- * match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern
+ * Match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern.
+ * If user, host and ipaddr are all NULL then validate pattern/
+ * Returns -1 on invalid pattern, 0 on no match, 1 on match.
+  */
+ int
+ match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
+     const char *pattern)
+ {
+ 	char *p, *pat;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+	/* test mode */
+	if (user == NULL && host == NULL && ipaddr == NULL) {
+		if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) != NULL &&
+		    match_host_and_ip(NULL, NULL, p + 1) < 0)
+			return -1;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+ 	if ((p = strchr(pattern,'@')) == NULL)
+ 		return match_pattern(user, pattern);
+ 
+ 	pat = xstrdup(pattern);
+ 	p = strchr(pat, '@');
+ 	*p++ = '\0';
+ 
+ 	if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1)
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+@@ -1462,28 +1462,34 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
+ 		goto parse_multistate;
+ 
+ 	case sAllowUsers:
+ 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ 			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
+ 				fatal("%s line %d: too many allow users.",
+ 				    filename, linenum);
+			if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1)
+				fatal("%s line %d: invalid AllowUsers pattern: "
+				    "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg);
+ 			if (!*activep)
+ 				continue;
+ 			options->allow_users[options->num_allow_users++] =
+ 			    xstrdup(arg);
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	case sDenyUsers:
+ 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ 			if (options->num_deny_users >= MAX_DENY_USERS)
+ 				fatal("%s line %d: too many deny users.",
+ 				    filename, linenum);
+			if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1)
+				fatal("%s line %d: invalid DenyUsers pattern: "
+				    "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg);
+ 			if (!*activep)
+ 				continue;
+ 			options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] =
+ 			    xstrdup(arg);
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	case sAllowGroups:
--- a/openssh-askpass-gnome.spec
+++ b/openssh-askpass-gnome.spec
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #
 # spec file for package openssh-askpass-gnome
 #
-# Copyright (c) 2017 SUSE LINUX GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
+# Copyright (c) 2017 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
 #
 # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties
 # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed
--- a/openssh.changes
+++ b/openssh.changes
@ -1,3 +1,48 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Mon May 15 20:47:29 UTC 2017 - pcerny@suse.com
+
+- Fix preauth seccomp separation on mainframes (bsc#1016709)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-s390_hw_crypto_syscalls.patch]
+  [openssh-7.2p2-s390_OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11_syscalls.patch]
+- enable case-insensitive hostname matching (bsc#1017099)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-ssh_case_insensitive_host_matching.patch]
+- add CAVS tests 
+  [openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-ctr.patch]
+  [openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-kdf.patch]
+- Adding missing pieces for user matching (bsc#1021626)
+- Properly verify CIDR masks in configuration
+  (bsc#1005893)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-verify_CIDR_address_ranges.patch]
+- Remove pre-auth compression support from the server to prevent
+  possible cryptographic attacks.
+  (CVE-2016-10012, bsc#1016370)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-disable_preauth_compression.patch]
+- limit directories for loading PKCS11 modules
+  (CVE-2016-10009, bsc#1016366)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-restrict_pkcs11-modules.patch]
+- Prevent possible leaks of host private keys to low-privilege
+  process handling authentication
+  (CVE-2016-10011, bsc#1016369)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-prevent_private_key_leakage.patch]
+- Do not allow unix socket forwarding when running without
+  privilege separation
+  (CVE-2016-10010, bsc#1016368)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-secure_unix_sockets_forwarding.patch]
+- prevent resource depletion during key exchange
+  (bsc#1005480, CVE-2016-8858)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-kex_resource_depletion.patch]
+- fix suggested command for removing conflicting server keys from
+  the known_hosts file (bsc#1006221)
+- enable geteuid{,32} syscalls on mainframes, since it may be
+  called from libica/ibmica on machines with hardware crypto
+  accelerator (bsc#1004258)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_geteuid.patch]
+- fix regression of (bsc#823710)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-audit_fixes.patch]
+- add slogin (removed upstreams)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-keep_slogin.patch]
+- require OpenSSL < 1.1 where that one is a default
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Wed Feb 22 19:31:08 UTC 2017 - crrodriguez@opensuse.org

--- a/openssh.spec
+++ b/openssh.spec
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #
 # spec file for package openssh
 #
-# Copyright (c) 2017 SUSE LINUX GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
+# Copyright (c) 2017 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
 #
 # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties
 # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed
@ -77,9 +77,12 @@ BuildRequires:  libedit-devel
 %if %{has_libselinux}
 BuildRequires:  libselinux-devel
 %endif
-BuildRequires:  openldap2-devel
-BuildRequires:  openssl
+%if %{suse_version} < 1330
 BuildRequires:  openssl-devel
+%else
+BuildRequires:  libopenssl-1_0_0-devel
+%endif
+BuildRequires:  openldap2-devel
 BuildRequires:  pam-devel
 %if %{uses_systemd}
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(systemd)
@ -125,25 +128,39 @@ Patch11:        openssh-7.2p2-pts_names_formatting.patch
 Patch12:        openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch
 Patch13:        openssh-7.2p2-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
 Patch14:        openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch
-Patch15:        openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch
-Patch16:        openssh-7.2p2-fips.patch
-Patch17:        openssh-7.2p2-seed-prng.patch
-Patch18:        openssh-7.2p2-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
-Patch19:        openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch
-Patch20:        openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch
-Patch21:        openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch
-Patch22:        openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
-Patch23:        openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
-Patch24:        openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch
-Patch25:        openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch
-Patch26:        openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch
-Patch27:        openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
-Patch28:        openssh-7.2p2-ldap.patch
-Patch29:        openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch
-Patch30:        openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
-Patch31:        openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch
-Patch32:        openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch
-Patch33:        openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch
+Patch15:        openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_geteuid.patch
+Patch16:        openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch
+Patch17:        openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch
+Patch18:        openssh-7.2p2-fips.patch
+Patch19:        openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-ctr.patch
+Patch20:        openssh-7.2p2-cavstest-kdf.patch
+Patch21:        openssh-7.2p2-seed-prng.patch
+Patch22:        openssh-7.2p2-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
+Patch23:        openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch
+Patch24:        openssh-7.2p2-audit_fixes.patch
+Patch25:        openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch
+Patch26:        openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch
+Patch27:        openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
+Patch28:        openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
+Patch29:        openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch
+Patch30:        openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch
+Patch31:        openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch
+Patch32:        openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
+Patch33:        openssh-7.2p2-ldap.patch
+Patch34:        openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
+Patch35:        openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch
+Patch36:        openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch
+Patch37:        openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch
+Patch38:        openssh-7.2p2-keep_slogin.patch
+Patch39:        openssh-7.2p2-kex_resource_depletion.patch
+Patch40:        openssh-7.2p2-verify_CIDR_address_ranges.patch
+Patch41:        openssh-7.2p2-restrict_pkcs11-modules.patch
+Patch42:        openssh-7.2p2-prevent_private_key_leakage.patch
+Patch43:        openssh-7.2p2-secure_unix_sockets_forwarding.patch
+Patch44:        openssh-7.2p2-ssh_case_insensitive_host_matching.patch
+Patch45:        openssh-7.2p2-disable_preauth_compression.patch
+Patch46:        openssh-7.2p2-s390_hw_crypto_syscalls.patch
+Patch47:        openssh-7.2p2-s390_OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11_syscalls.patch
 BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
 Conflicts:      nonfreessh
 Recommends:     audit
@ -229,13 +246,27 @@ FIPS140 CAVS tests related parts of the OpenSSH package
 %patch31 -p2
 %patch32 -p2
 %patch33 -p2
+%patch34 -p2
+%patch35 -p2
+%patch36 -p2
+%patch37 -p2
+%patch38 -p2
+%patch39 -p2
+%patch40 -p2
+%patch41 -p2
+%patch42 -p2
+%patch43 -p2
+%patch44 -p2
+%patch45 -p2
+%patch46 -p2
+%patch47 -p2
 cp %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE4} %{SOURCE11} .

 %build
 # set libexec dir in the LDAP patch
 sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \
    $( grep -Rl @LIBEXECDIR@ \
-        $( grep "^+++" %{PATCH28} | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' )
+        $( grep "^+++" %{PATCH33} | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' )
    )

 autoreconf -fiv