Accepting request 222366 from network

- Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.5p1

- Update to 6.5p1
  Features since 6.4p1:
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for key exchange using ECDH in
    Daniel Bernstein's Curve25519; default when both the client
    and server support it.
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for Ed25519 as a public key type fo
    rboth server and client.  Ed25519 is an EC signature offering
    better security than ECDSA and DSA and good performance.
  * Add a new private key format that uses a bcrypt KDF to better
    protect keys at rest. Used unconditionally for Ed25519 keys,
    on demand for other key types via the -o ssh-keygen(1)
    option.  Intended to become default in the near future.
    Details documented in PROTOCOL.key.
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): new transport cipher
    "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" combining Daniel Bernstein's
    ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an
    authenticated encryption mode. Details documented
    PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305.
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients
    and servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme.
    It will still be possible to connect with these
    clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and
    OpenSSH will refuse connection entirely in a future release.
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse old proprietary clients and servers
    that use a weaker key exchange hash calculation.
  * ssh(1): increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups
    requested for each symmetric key size. New values from NIST
    Special Publication 800-57 with the upper limit specified by (forwarded request 222365 from pcerny)

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/222366
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=90

converter-linking.patch

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---- converter/Makefile.orig
-+++ converter/Makefile
-@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ ssh-keyconverter.o: ssh-keyconverter.c .
- 	gcc $(RPM_OPT_FLAGS) -c -I../ $< -o $@
- 
- ssh-keyconverter: ssh-keyconverter.o ../libssh.a ../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
--	gcc $< -L../ -L../openbsd-compat/ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lpam -ldl -lwrap -lutil -lz -lnsl -lcrypt -lssl -o $@
-+	gcc -Wl,--no-as-needed $(RPM_OPT_FLAGS) -L../ -L../openbsd-compat/ $< -lssl -lcrypto -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssl -lssh -lpam -ldl -lwrap -lutil -lz -lnsl -lcrypt -o $@
- 
- install: ssh-keyconverter ssh-keyconverter.1
- 	if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) ]; then install -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(bindir); fi

converter.tar.bz2

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:da7ff204375259aef8aaf3ad89c7f311134354fe0129cddce927de5d4f7ab349
-size 4792

openssh-5.9p1-audit.patch

@@ -1,224 +0,0 @@
-# add support for Linux audit (FATE #120269)
-================================================================================
---- openssh-6.2p2.orig/Makefile.in
-+++ openssh-6.2p2/Makefile.in
-@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ LIBS=@LIBS@
- K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
- GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
- SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
-+LIBAUDIT=@LIBAUDIT@
- SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
- LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
- AR=@AR@
-@@ -144,7 +145,7 @@ ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SS
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
- 
- sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
--	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) $(LIBAUDIT)
- 
- scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
---- openssh-6.2p2.orig/auth.c
-+++ openssh-6.2p2/auth.c
-@@ -298,6 +298,12 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authent
- 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
- # endif
- #endif
-+#if HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) {
-+		linux_audit_record_event(-1, authctxt->user, NULL,
-+			get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0);
-+	}
-+#endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
- 		audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
-@@ -606,6 +612,10 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
- 		record_failed_login(user,
- 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
- #endif
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+		linux_audit_record_event(-1, user, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(),
-+			"sshd", 0);
-+#endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 		audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
---- openssh-6.2p2.orig/config.h.in
-+++ openssh-6.2p2/config.h.in
-@@ -1554,6 +1554,9 @@
- /* Define if you want SELinux support. */
- #undef WITH_SELINUX
- 
-+/* Define if you want Linux audit support. */
-+#undef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+
- /* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most
-    significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel). */
- #if defined AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD
---- openssh-6.2p2.orig/configure.ac
-+++ openssh-6.2p2/configure.ac
-@@ -3653,6 +3653,20 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
- AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
- AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
- 
-+# Check whether user wants Linux audit support
-+LINUX_AUDIT_MSG="no"
-+LIBAUDIT=""
-+AC_ARG_WITH([linux-audit],
-+	[  --with-linux-audit   Enable Linux audit support],
-+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-+		AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT],[1],[Define if you want Linux audit support.])
-+		LINUX_AUDIT_MSG="yes"
-+		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libaudit.h])
-+		LIBAUDIT="-laudit"
-+	fi
-+	])
-+AC_SUBST([LIBAUDIT])
-+
- # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
- KRB5_MSG="no"
- AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
-@@ -4569,6 +4583,7 @@ echo "                       PAM support
- echo "                   OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
- echo "                 KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
- echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
-+echo "               Linux audit support: $LINUX_AUDIT_MSG"
- echo "                 Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
- echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
- echo "              TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
---- openssh-6.2p2.orig/loginrec.c
-+++ openssh-6.2p2/loginrec.c
-@@ -176,6 +176,10 @@
- #include "auth.h"
- #include "buffer.h"
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+# include <libaudit.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
- # include <util.h>
- #endif
-@@ -198,6 +202,9 @@ int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *l
- int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
- int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
- int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+int linux_audit_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
-+#endif
- int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
- int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
- 
-@@ -438,6 +445,10 @@ login_write(struct logininfo *li)
- 
- 	/* set the timestamp */
- 	login_set_current_time(li);
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+	if (linux_audit_write_entry(li) == 0)
-+		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-+#endif
- #ifdef USE_LOGIN
- 	syslogin_write_entry(li);
- #endif
-@@ -1402,6 +1413,87 @@ wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
- }
- #endif /* USE_WTMPX */
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+static void
-+_audit_hexscape(const char *what, char *where, unsigned int size)
-+{
-+	const char *ptr = what;
-+	const char *hex = "0123456789ABCDEF";
-+
-+	while (*ptr) {
-+		if (*ptr == '"' || *ptr < 0x21 || *ptr > 0x7E) {
-+			unsigned int i;
-+			ptr = what;
-+			for (i = 0; *ptr && i+2 < size; i += 2) {
-+				where[i] = hex[((unsigned)*ptr & 0xF0)>>4]; /* Upper nibble */
-+				where[i+1] = hex[(unsigned)*ptr & 0x0F];   /* Lower nibble */
-+				ptr++;
-+			}
-+			where[i] = '\0';
-+			return;
-+		}
-+		ptr++;
-+	}
-+	where[0] = '"';
-+	if ((unsigned)(ptr - what) < size - 3)
-+	{
-+		size = ptr - what + 3;
-+	}
-+	strncpy(where + 1, what, size - 3);
-+	where[size-2] = '"';
-+	where[size-1] = '\0';
-+}
-+
-+#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128
-+#define AUDIT_ACCT_SIZE (AUDIT_LOG_SIZE - 8)
-+
-+int
-+linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
-+	const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
-+{
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, rc;
-+
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+	 	if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+					errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+		else
-+			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
-+	}
-+	if (username == NULL)
-+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "uid=%d", uid);
-+	else {
-+		char encoded[AUDIT_ACCT_SIZE];
-+		_audit_hexscape(username, encoded, sizeof(encoded));
-+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "acct=%s", encoded);
-+	}
-+	rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
-+		buf, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
-+	close(audit_fd);
-+	if (rc >= 0)
-+		return 1;
-+	else
-+		return 0;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+linux_audit_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
-+{
-+	switch(li->type) {
-+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
-+		return (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+			NULL, li->line, 1));
-+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
-+		return (1);	/* We only care about logins */
-+	default:
-+		logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
-+		return (0);
-+	}
-+}
-+#endif /* HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT */
-+
- /**
-  ** Low-level libutil login() functions
-  **/
---- openssh-6.2p2.orig/loginrec.h
-+++ openssh-6.2p2/loginrec.h
-@@ -127,5 +127,9 @@ char *line_stripname(char *dst, const ch
- char *line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
- 
- void record_failed_login(const char *, const char *, const char *);
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+int linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
-+	const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success);
-+#endif /* HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT */
- 
- #endif /* _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ */

openssh-5.9p1-blocksigalrm.diff

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-Index: log.c
-===================================================================
---- log.c.orig
-+++ log.c
-@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "log.h"
-+#include <signal.h>
- 
- static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
- static int log_on_stderr = 1;
-@@ -336,6 +337,7 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt,
- 	char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
- 	char *txt = NULL;
- 	int pri = LOG_INFO;
-+	sigset_t nset, oset;
- 	int saved_errno = errno;
- 	log_handler_fn *tmp_handler;
- 
-@@ -387,6 +389,14 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt,
- 		snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%s\r\n", fmtbuf);
- 		write(STDERR_FILENO, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf));
- 	} else {
-+		/* Prevent a race between the grace_alarm
-+		* which writes a log message and terminates
-+		* and main sshd code that leads to deadlock
-+		* as syslog is not async safe.
-+		*/
-+		sigemptyset(&nset);
-+		sigaddset(&nset, SIGALRM);
-+		sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
- #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
- 		openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
- 		syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
-@@ -396,6 +406,7 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt,
- 		syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
- 		closelog();
- #endif
-+		sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
- 	}
- 	errno = saved_errno;
- }

openssh-5.9p1-default-protocol.diff

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-Index: ssh_config
-===================================================================
---- ssh_config.orig
-+++ ssh_config
-@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ ForwardX11Trusted yes
- #   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
- #   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa
- #   Port 22
--#   Protocol 2,1
-+    Protocol 2
- #   Cipher 3des
- #   Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc
- #   MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160

openssh-5.9p1-eal3.diff

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-Index: openssh-5.8p1/sshd.8
-===================================================================
---- openssh-5.8p1.orig/sshd.8
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/sshd.8
-@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for
- The file format is described in
- .Xr moduli 5 .
- .Pp
--.It Pa /etc/motd
-+.It Pa /etc/lib/motd
- See
- .Xr motd 5 .
- .Pp
-@@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ are displayed to anyone trying to log in
- refused.
- The file should be world-readable.
- .Pp
--.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
-+.It Pa /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv
- This file is used in exactly the same way as
- .Pa hosts.equiv ,
- but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
-@@ -947,8 +947,7 @@ The content of this file is not sensitiv
- .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
- .Xr chroot 2 ,
- .Xr hosts_access 5 ,
--.Xr login.conf 5 ,
--.Xr moduli 5 ,
-+.Xr login.defs 5 ,
- .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
- .Xr inetd 8 ,
- .Xr sftp-server 8
-Index: openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.5
-===================================================================
---- openssh-5.8p1.orig/sshd_config.5
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.5
-@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ or
- .Pp
- .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
- and
--.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
-+.Pa /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv
- are still used.
- The default is
- .Dq yes .

openssh-5.9p1-engines.diff

@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
-Index: openssh-5.8p1/ssh-add.c
-===================================================================
---- openssh-5.8p1.orig/ssh-add.c
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/ssh-add.c
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
- 
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
- 
- #include <fcntl.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
-@@ -377,6 +378,10 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- 
-+	/* Init available hardware crypto engines. */
-+	ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
-+	ENGINE_register_all_complete();
-+
- 	/* At first, get a connection to the authentication agent. */
- 	ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
- 	if (ac == NULL) {
-Index: openssh-5.8p1/ssh-agent.c
-===================================================================
---- openssh-5.8p1.orig/ssh-agent.c
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/ssh-agent.c
-@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/md5.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
- 
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
-@@ -1153,6 +1154,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- 
-+	/* Init available hardware crypto engines. */
-+	ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
-+	ENGINE_register_all_complete();
-+
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
- 	seed_rng();
- 
-Index: openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keygen.c
-===================================================================
---- openssh-5.8p1.orig/ssh-keygen.c
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keygen.c
-@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/pem.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
- 
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
-@@ -1815,6 +1816,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
- 
- 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-+
-+	/* Init available hardware crypto engines. */
-+	ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
-+	ENGINE_register_all_complete();
-+
- 	log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
- 
- 	seed_rng();
-Index: openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keysign.c
-===================================================================
---- openssh-5.8p1.orig/ssh-keysign.c
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keysign.c
-@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- #include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "log.h"
-@@ -195,6 +196,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		fatal("could not open any host key");
- 
- 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-+
-+	/* Init available hardware crypto engines. */
-+	ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
-+	ENGINE_register_all_complete();
-+
- 	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
- 		rnd[i] = arc4random();
- 	RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-Index: openssh-5.8p1/ssh.c
-===================================================================
---- openssh-5.8p1.orig/ssh.c
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/ssh.c
-@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
-@@ -601,6 +602,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
- 
-+	/* Init available hardware crypto engines. */
-+	ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
-+	ENGINE_register_all_complete();
-+
- 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
- 	buffer_init(&command);
- 
-Index: openssh-5.8p1/sshd.c
-===================================================================
---- openssh-5.8p1.orig/sshd.c
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/sshd.c
-@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
- #include <openssl/md5.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
- #include <sys/security.h>
-@@ -1474,6 +1475,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- 
-+	/* Init available hardware crypto engines. */
-+	ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
-+	ENGINE_register_all_complete();
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
- 	 * key (unless started from inetd)

openssh-5.9p1-gssapimitm.patch

@@ -1,259 +0,0 @@
-The patch below adds support for the deprecated 'gssapi' authentication
-mechanism to OpenSSH 3.8p1. The newer 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism is included
-in this release. The use of 'gssapi' is deprecated due to the presence of 
-potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which 'gssapi-with-mic' is not
-susceptible to.
-
-To use the patch apply it to a OpenSSH 3.8p1 source tree. After compiling,
-backwards compatibility may be obtained by supplying the 
-'GssapiEnableMitmAttack yes' option to either the client or server. 
-
-It should be noted that this patch is being made available purely as a means
-of easing the process of moving to OpenSSH 3.8p1. Any new installations are
-recommended to use the 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism. Existing installations 
-are encouraged to upgrade as soon as possible.
-
-Index: auth2-gss.c
-===================================================================
---- auth2-gss.c.orig
-+++ auth2-gss.c
-@@ -177,6 +177,15 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t p
- 				dispatch_set(
- 				    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
- 				    &input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
-+
-+			/*
-+			 * Old style 'gssapi' didn't have the GSSAPI_MIC
-+			 * and went straight to sending exchange_complete
-+			 */
-+			if (options.gss_enable_mitm)
-+				dispatch_set(
-+				    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
-+				    &input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
- 		}
- 	}
- 
-@@ -298,4 +307,10 @@ Authmethod method_gssapi = {
- 	&options.gss_authentication
- };
- 
-+Authmethod method_gssapi_old = {
-+	"gssapi",
-+	userauth_gssapi,
-+	&options.gss_enable_mitm
-+};
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-Index: auth2.c
-===================================================================
---- auth2.c.orig
-+++ auth2.c
-@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
- extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
-+extern Authmethod method_gssapi_old;
- #endif
- #ifdef JPAKE
- extern Authmethod method_jpake;
-@@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
- 	&method_pubkey,
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	&method_gssapi,
-+	&method_gssapi_old,
- #endif
- #ifdef JPAKE
- 	&method_jpake,
-Index: readconf.c
-===================================================================
---- readconf.c.orig
-+++ readconf.c
-@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oPKCS11Provider,
- 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
- 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
--	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
-+	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, oGssEnableMITM,
- 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
- 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
- 	oHashKnownHosts,
-@@ -170,9 +170,11 @@ static struct {
- #if defined(GSSAPI)
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
- 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
-+	{ "gssapienablemitmattack", oGssEnableMITM },
- #else
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
- 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
-+	{ "gssapienablemitmattack", oUnsupported },
- #endif
- 	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
- 	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
-@@ -483,6 +485,10 @@ parse_flag:
- 		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case oGssEnableMITM:
-+		intptr = &options->gss_enable_mitm;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case oBatchMode:
- 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1093,6 +1099,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
- 	options->gss_authentication = -1;
- 	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
-+	options->gss_enable_mitm = -1;
- 	options->password_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
-@@ -1195,6 +1202,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
- 		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
-+	if (options->gss_enable_mitm == -1)
-+		options->gss_enable_mitm = 0;
- 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- 		options->password_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-Index: readconf.h
-===================================================================
---- readconf.h.orig
-+++ readconf.h
-@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 					/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
- 	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
-+	int 	gss_enable_mitm;	/* Enable old style gssapi auth */
- 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
- 						 * authentication. */
- 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
-Index: servconf.c
-===================================================================
---- servconf.c.orig
-+++ servconf.c
-@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
- 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
- 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-+	options->gss_enable_mitm = -1;
- 	options->password_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-@@ -228,6 +229,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
- 		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
-+	if (options->gss_enable_mitm == -1)
-+		options->gss_enable_mitm = 0;
- 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- 		options->password_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -322,7 +325,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
- 	sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
--	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-+	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, sGssEnableMITM,
- 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
- 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
- 	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
-@@ -386,9 +389,11 @@ static struct {
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapienablemitmattack", sGssEnableMITM },
- #else
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapienablemitmattack", sUnsupported },
- #endif
- 	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
-@@ -948,6 +953,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case sGssEnableMITM:
-+		intptr = &options->gss_enable_mitm;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
- 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-Index: servconf.h
-===================================================================
---- servconf.h.orig
-+++ servconf.h
-@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
- 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-+	int	gss_enable_mitm;	/* If true, enable old style GSSAPI */
- 	int     password_authentication;	/* If true, permit password
- 						 * authentication. */
- 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
-Index: ssh_config
-===================================================================
---- ssh_config.orig
-+++ ssh_config
-@@ -54,5 +54,15 @@ ForwardX11Trusted yes
- #   Tunnel no
- #   TunnelDevice any:any
- #   PermitLocalCommand no
-+#   GSSAPIAuthentication no
-+#   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
-+
-+# Set this to 'yes' to enable support for the deprecated 'gssapi' authentication
-+# mechanism to OpenSSH 3.8p1. The newer 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism is included
-+# in this release. The use of 'gssapi' is deprecated due to the presence of
-+# potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which 'gssapi-with-mic' is not susceptible to.
-+#   GSSAPIEnableMITMAttack no
-+
-+>>>>>>>
- #   VisualHostKey no
- #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
-Index: sshconnect2.c
-===================================================================
---- sshconnect2.c.orig
-+++ sshconnect2.c
-@@ -324,6 +324,10 @@ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
- 		NULL,
- 		&options.gss_authentication,
- 		NULL},
-+	{"gssapi",
-+		userauth_gssapi,
-+		&options.gss_enable_mitm,
-+		NULL},
- #endif
- 	{"hostbased",
- 		userauth_hostbased,
-@@ -701,7 +705,9 @@ process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buf
- 
- 	if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- 		/* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */
--		if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
-+
-+		if (strcmp(authctxt->method->name,"gssapi")==0 ||
-+		    (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) {
- 			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE);
- 			packet_send();
- 		} else {
-Index: sshd_config
-===================================================================
---- sshd_config.orig
-+++ sshd_config
-@@ -73,6 +73,12 @@ PasswordAuthentication no
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
- 
-+# Set this to 'yes' to enable support for the deprecated 'gssapi' authentication
-+# mechanism to OpenSSH 3.8p1. The newer 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism is included
-+# in this release. The use of 'gssapi' is deprecated due to the presence of
-+# potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which 'gssapi-with-mic' is not susceptible to.
-+#GSSAPIEnableMITMAttack no
-+
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, 
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will 
- # be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and

openssh-5.9p1-host_ident.diff

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-Index: openssh-5.7p1/sshconnect.c
-===================================================================
---- openssh-5.7p1.orig/sshconnect.c
-+++ openssh-5.7p1/sshconnect.c
-@@ -958,6 +958,11 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
- 		    user_hostfiles[0]);
- 		error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
- 		    host_found->file, host_found->line);
-+		error("You can use following command to remove all keys for this IP:");
-+		if (host_found->file)
-+			error("ssh-keygen -R %s -f %s", hostname, host_found->file);
-+		else
-+			error("ssh-keygen -R %s", hostname);
- 
- 		/*
- 		 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have

openssh-5.9p1-pam-fix2.diff

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-Index: sshd_config
-===================================================================
---- sshd_config.orig
-+++ sshd_config
-@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
- #IgnoreRhosts yes
- 
- # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
--#PasswordAuthentication yes
-+PasswordAuthentication no
- #PermitEmptyPasswords no
- 
- # Change to no to disable s/key passwords
-@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
- # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
--#UsePAM no
-+UsePAM yes
- 
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes
- #AllowTcpForwarding yes

openssh-5.9p1-pam-fix3.diff

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-Index: auth-pam.c
-===================================================================
---- auth-pam.c.orig
-+++ auth-pam.c
-@@ -786,7 +786,9 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
- 					fatal("Internal error: PAM auth "
- 					    "succeeded when it should have "
- 					    "failed");
--				import_environments(&buffer);
-+#ifndef USE_POSIX_THREADS
-+                import_environments(&buffer);
-+#endif
- 				*num = 0;
- 				**echo_on = 0;
- 				ctxt->pam_done = 1;

openssh-5.9p1-pts.diff

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-Index: loginrec.c
-===================================================================
---- loginrec.c.orig
-+++ loginrec.c
-@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
-  * 1. The full filename (including '/dev')
-  * 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev')
-  * 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00
-- *                               /dev/pts/1  -> ts/1 )
-+ *                               /dev/pts/1  -> /1 )
-  *
-  * Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when
-  * attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is
-@@ -616,6 +616,10 @@ line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *s
- 	if (strncmp(src, "tty", 3) == 0)
- 		src += 3;
- #endif
-+	if (strncmp(src, "pts/", 4) == 0) {
-+		src += 3;
-+		if (strlen(src) > 4) src++;
-+	}
- 
- 	len = strlen(src);
- 

openssh-5.9p1-saveargv-fix.diff

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-Index: sshd.c
-===================================================================
---- sshd.c.orig
-+++ sshd.c
-@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ sighup_handler(int sig)
- static void
- sighup_restart(void)
- {
-+	int i;
- 	logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
- 	close_listen_socks();
- 	close_startup_pipes();
-@@ -1319,7 +1320,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
- 	/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
- 	compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
--	av = saved_argv;
-+
-+	av = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * (saved_argc + 1));
-+	for (i = 0; i < saved_argc; i++)
-+		av[i] = xstrdup(saved_argv[i]);
-+	av[i] = NULL;
- #endif
- 
- 	if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)

openssh-5.9p1-sshconfig-knownhostschanges.diff

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-Index: ssh_config
-===================================================================
---- ssh_config.orig
-+++ ssh_config
-@@ -67,5 +67,13 @@ ForwardX11Trusted yes
- SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
- SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
- SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
--#   VisualHostKey no
-+
-+# This will print the fingerprint of the host key in "visual" form
-+# this should make it easier to also recognize bad things
-+VisualHostKey no
-+
-+# This will hash new host keys and make them so unusable for malicious
-+# people or software trying to use known_hosts to find further hops.
-+HashKnownHosts yes
-+
- #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com

openssh-5.9p1-sshd_config.diff

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-Index: ssh_config
-===================================================================
---- ssh_config.orig
-+++ ssh_config
-@@ -17,9 +17,20 @@
- # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
- # ssh_config(5) man page.
- 
--# Host *
-+Host *
- #   ForwardAgent no
- #   ForwardX11 no
-+
-+# If you do not trust your remote host (or its administrator), you
-+# should not forward X11 connections to your local X11-display for
-+# security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the
-+# remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your
-+# keystrokes as you type, just like any other X11 client could do.
-+# Set this to "no" here for global effect or in your own ~/.ssh/config
-+# file if you want to have the remote X11 authentification data to
-+# expire after two minutes after remote login.
-+ForwardX11Trusted yes
-+
- #   RhostsRSAAuthentication no
- #   RSAAuthentication yes
- #   PasswordAuthentication yes
-Index: sshd_config
-===================================================================
---- sshd_config.orig
-+++ sshd_config
-@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes
- #AllowTcpForwarding yes
- #GatewayPorts no
--#X11Forwarding no
-+X11Forwarding yes
- #X11DisplayOffset 10
- #X11UseLocalhost yes
- #PrintMotd yes
-Index: sshlogin.c
-===================================================================
---- sshlogin.c.orig
-+++ sshlogin.c
-@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty,
- 
- 	li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, tty);
- 	login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen);
-+	li->uid=uid;
- 	login_login(li);
- 	login_free_entry(li);
- }

openssh-5.9p1-xauthlocalhostname.diff

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-Index: session.c
-===================================================================
---- session.c.orig
-+++ session.c
-@@ -1116,7 +1116,7 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char ***
- }
- 
- static char **
--do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
-+do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell, int *env_size)
- {
- 	char buf[256];
- 	u_int i, envsize;
-@@ -1303,6 +1303,8 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
- 		for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
- 			fprintf(stderr, "  %.200s\n", env[i]);
- 	}
-+
-+	*env_size = envsize;
- 	return env;
- }
- 
-@@ -1311,7 +1313,7 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
-  * first in this order).
-  */
- static void
--do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell)
-+do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell, char **env, int *env_size)
- {
- 	FILE *f = NULL;
- 	char cmd[1024];
-@@ -1365,12 +1367,20 @@ do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shel
- 		    options.xauth_location);
- 		f = popen(cmd, "w");
- 		if (f) {
-+			char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
-+
- 			fprintf(f, "remove %s\n",
- 			    s->auth_display);
- 			fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n",
- 			    s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
- 			    s->auth_data);
- 			pclose(f);
-+			if (gethostname(hostname,sizeof(hostname)) >= 0)
-+			    child_set_env(&env,env_size,"XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME",
-+					  hostname);
-+			else
-+			    debug("Cannot set up XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME %s\n",
-+				  strerror(errno));
- 		} else {
- 			fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
- 			    cmd);
-@@ -1608,6 +1618,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- {
- 	extern char **environ;
- 	char **env;
-+	int env_size;
- 	char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
- 	const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL;
- 	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
-@@ -1674,7 +1685,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 	 * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
- 	 * even if shell is overridden from login.conf
- 	 */
--	env = do_setup_env(s, shell);
-+	env = do_setup_env(s, shell, &env_size);
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- 	shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
-@@ -1743,7 +1754,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
- 
- 	if (!options.use_login)
--		do_rc_files(s, shell);
-+		do_rc_files(s, shell, env, &env_size);
- 
- 	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
- 	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);

openssh-6.2p2.tar.gz

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:7f29b9d2ad672ae0f9e1dcbff871fc5c2e60a194e90c766432e32161b842313b
-size 1182922

openssh-6.5p1-X11-forwarding.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# enable trusted X11 forwarding by default in both sshd and sshsystem-wide
+# configuration
+# bnc#50836 (was suse #35836)
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config
+@@ -12,19 +12,30 @@
+ # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
+ # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
+ # configuration file, and defaults at the end.
+ 
+ # Site-wide defaults for some commonly used options.  For a comprehensive
+ # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
+ # ssh_config(5) man page.
+ 
+-# Host *
++Host *
+ #   ForwardAgent no
+ #   ForwardX11 no
++
++# If you do not trust your remote host (or its administrator), you
++# should not forward X11 connections to your local X11-display for
++# security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the
++# remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your
++# keystrokes as you type, just like any other X11 client could do.
++# Set this to "no" here for global effect or in your own ~/.ssh/config
++# file if you want to have the remote X11 authentification data to 
++# expire after two minutes after remote login.
++ForwardX11Trusted yes
++
+ #   RhostsRSAAuthentication no
+ #   RSAAuthentication yes
+ #   PasswordAuthentication yes
+ #   HostbasedAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
+ #   BatchMode no
+ #   CheckHostIP yes
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config
+@@ -94,17 +94,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+ #UsePAM no
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+ #AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ #GatewayPorts no
+-#X11Forwarding no
++X11Forwarding yes
+ #X11DisplayOffset 10
+ #X11UseLocalhost yes
+ #PermitTTY yes
+ #PrintMotd yes
+ #PrintLastLog yes
+ #TCPKeepAlive yes
+ #UseLogin no
+ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox		# Default for new installations.

openssh-6.5p1-audit1-remove_duplicit_audit.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Don't audit SSH_INVALID_USER twice.
+# PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow()) a few lines above already did this.
+#
+# based on:
+#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
+#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2010
+#   by jchadima@redhat.com
+#
+# PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow()) a few lines above already did this.
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/auth2.c b/openssh-6.5p1/auth2.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/auth2.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/auth2.c
+@@ -242,19 +242,16 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 		authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user));
+ 		authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
+ 		if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
+ 			authctxt->valid = 1;
+ 			debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user);
+ 		} else {
+ 			logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
+ 			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
+-#endif
+ 		}
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 		if (options.use_pam)
+ 			PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
+ #endif
+ 		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
+ 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+ 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);

openssh-6.5p1-audit2-better_audit_of_user_actions.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,867 @@
+# extended auditing of user actions
+# based on:
+#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
+#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2011
+#   by jchadima@redhat.com
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
+@@ -370,20 +370,33 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, 
+ 	/* this is used on IPv4-only machines */
+ 	tid->port = (dev_t)port;
+ 	tid->machine = inet_addr(host);
+ 	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x", tid->machine);
+ 	debug3("BSM audit: machine ID %s", buf);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-void
++int
+ audit_run_command(const char *command)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_count_session_open(void)
++{
++	/* not necessary */
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
+@@ -30,97 +30,210 @@
+ #include "includes.h"
+ #if defined(USE_LINUX_AUDIT)
+ #include <libaudit.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "audit.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
++#include "auth.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
+ #include "canohost.h"
+ 
++extern ServerOptions options;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
++extern u_int utmp_len;
+ const char* audit_username(void);
+ 
+-int
+-linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
+-    const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
++static void
++linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
++    const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
+ {
+ 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+ 
+ 	audit_fd = audit_open();
+ 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ 		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ 		    errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+-			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
++			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ 		else
+-			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
++			goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
+ 	}
+-	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
++	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
+ 	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
+ 	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ 	saved_errno = errno;
+ 	close(audit_fd);
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
+ 	 * root user.
+ 	 */
+ 	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
+ 		rc = 0;
+ 	errno = saved_errno;
+-	return (rc >= 0);
++	if (rc < 0) {
++fatal_report:
++		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
++	}
+ }
+ 
++static void
++linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username,
++    const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
++{
++	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
++	static const char *event_name[] = {
++		"maxtries exceeded",
++		"root denied",
++		"success",
++		"none",
++		"password",
++		"challenge-response",
++		"pubkey",
++		"hostbased",
++		"gssapi",
++		"invalid user",
++		"nologin",
++		"connection closed",
++		"connection abandoned",
++		"unknown"
++	};
++
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++		    errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
++		else
++			goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
++	}
++	
++	if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN))
++		event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
++
++	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH,
++	    NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)",
++	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
++	saved_errno = errno;
++	close(audit_fd);
++	/*
++	 * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
++	 * root user.
++	 */
++	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
++		rc = 0;
++	errno = saved_errno;
++	if (rc < 0) {
++fatal_report:
++		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
++	}
++}
++
++static int user_login_count = 0;
++
+ /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
+ 
+ void
+ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
+ {
++	/* not implemented */
+ }
+-	/* not implemented */
++
++int
++audit_run_command(const char *command)
++{
++	if (!user_login_count++) 
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++		    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
++	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++	    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
++	return 0;
++}
+ 
+ void
+-audit_run_command(const char *command)
++audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+ {
+-	/* not implemented */
++	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++	    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
++	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) 
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++		    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
++}
++
++void
++audit_count_session_open(void)
++{
++	user_login_count++;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+-	if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+-	    NULL, li->line, 1) == 0)
+-		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
++	if (!user_login_count++) 
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++		    NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
++	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++	    NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+-	/* not implemented */
++	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++	    NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
++	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) 
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++		    NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ {
+ 	switch(event) {
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
+-	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+-	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
+-	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+-	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
++		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
++			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 1, event);
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
++	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
++		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
++			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event);
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
++			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
++		break;
++
++	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
++		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
++			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event);
++		break;
++
++	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
++		if (user_login_count) {
++			while (user_login_count--)
++				linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++				    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
++			linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++			    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
++		}
++		break;
++
++	case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
+ 	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
+-		linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+-			get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0);
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
++			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	default:
+ 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+ #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
+@@ -135,16 +135,27 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, 
+ void
+ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ {
+ 	debug("audit event euid %d user %s event %d (%s)", geteuid(),
+ 	    audit_username(), event, audit_event_lookup(event));
+ }
+ 
+ /*
++ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
++ * audit_session_open.
++ */
++void
++audit_count_session_open(void)
++{
++	debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
++	      audit_username());
++}
++
++/*
+  * Called when a user session is started.  Argument is the tty allocated to
+  * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
+  *
+  * Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used
+  * within a single connection.
+  */
+ void
+ audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+@@ -169,18 +180,34 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
+ 
+ 	debug("audit session close euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
+ 	    audit_username(), t);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+  * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command.  Note that
+  * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
+- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
++ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  Returns a "handle" for
++ * audit_end_command.
+  */
+-void
++int
+ audit_run_command(const char *command)
+ {
+ 	debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
+ 	    audit_username(), command);
++	return 0;
+ }
++
++/*
++ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes.  Note that
++ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
++ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  "handle" should come from
++ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
++ */
++void
++audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
++{
++	debug("audit end nopty exec  euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
++	    audit_username(), command);
++}
++
+ # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
+@@ -44,14 +44,16 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE,	/* closed after attempting auth or session */
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
+ 	SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
+ };
+ typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
+ 
+ void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
+ void	audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
++void	audit_count_session_open(void);
+ void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
+ void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
+-void	audit_run_command(const char *);
++int	audit_run_command(const char *);
++void 	audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c
+@@ -181,16 +181,17 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer 
+ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
+ 
+ static Authctxt *authctxt;
+ static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
+ 
+ /* local state for key verify */
+@@ -268,16 +269,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
+     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
+@@ -310,16 +312,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] 
+ 
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
+ 
+ /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
+ 
+@@ -1442,16 +1445,22 @@ mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passw
+ static void
+ mm_session_close(Session *s)
+ {
+ 	debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ 		debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+ 		session_pty_cleanup2(s);
+ 	}
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	if (s->command != NULL) {
++		debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle);
++		session_end_command2(s);
++	}
++#endif
+ 	session_unused(s->self);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ {
+ 	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+ 	Session *s;
+@@ -1764,21 +1773,53 @@ mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer
+ 	return (0);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
+ {
+ 	u_int len;
+ 	char *cmd;
++	Session *s;
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ 	cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ 	/* sanity check command, if so how? */
+-	audit_run_command(cmd);
++	s = session_new();
++	if (s == NULL)
++		fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__);
++	s->command = cmd;
++	s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd);
++
++	buffer_clear(m);
++	buffer_put_int(m, s->self);
++
++	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
++
++	return (0);
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
++{
++	int handle;
++	u_int len;
++	char *cmd;
++	Session *s;
++
++	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
++	handle = buffer_get_int(m);
++	cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++
++	s = session_by_id(handle);
++	if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL ||
++	    strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0)
++		fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__);
++	mm_session_close(s);
++
+ 	free(cmd);
+ 	return (0);
+ }
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ 
+ void
+ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ {
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h
+@@ -64,16 +64,17 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
++	MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 115,
+ 
+ };
+ 
+ struct mm_master;
+ struct monitor {
+ 	int			 m_recvfd;
+ 	int			 m_sendfd;
+ 	int			 m_log_recvfd;
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -1186,27 +1186,48 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 
+ 	buffer_init(&m);
+ 	buffer_put_int(&m, event);
+ 
+ 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, &m);
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+ 
+-void
++int
+ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
+ {
+ 	Buffer m;
++	int handle;
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
+ 
+ 	buffer_init(&m);
+ 	buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
+ 
+ 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
++
++	handle = buffer_get_int(&m);
++	buffer_free(&m);
++
++	return (handle);
++}
++
++void
++mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++
++	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_int(&m, handle);
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
++
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m);
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ OM_uint32
+ mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)
+ {
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -69,17 +69,18 @@ void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt
+ int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+ int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ #include "audit.h"
+ void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+-void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
++int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
++void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct Session;
+ void mm_terminate(void);
+ int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
+ void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
+ 
+ /* SSHv1 interfaces */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/session.c b/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
+@@ -740,16 +740,24 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
+ 	cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	s->pid = pid;
+ 
+ 	/* Parent.  Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
+ 	close(ttyfd);
+ 
++#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
++	/* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process,
++	   compensate.  From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely
++	   ugly. */
++	if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL))
++		audit_count_session_open();
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Enter interactive session. */
+ 	s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
+ 	packet_set_interactive(1, 
+ 	    options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+ 	if (compat20) {
+ 		session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
+ 	} else {
+ 		server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1);
+@@ -834,25 +842,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	    session_type,
+ 	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
+ 	    tty == NULL ? "" : tty,
+ 	    s->pw->pw_name,
+ 	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ 	    get_remote_port());
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
++		fatal("do_exec: command already set");
+ 	if (command != NULL)
+-		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
++		s->command = xstrdup(command);
+ 	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
+ 		char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
+ 
+ 		if (shell[0] == '\0')	/* empty shell means /bin/sh */
+ 			shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
+-		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
++		s->command = xstrdup(shell);
+ 	}
++	if (s->command != NULL)
++		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command));
+ #endif
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ 		ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
+ 	else
+ 		ret = do_exec_no_pty(s, command);
+ 
+ 	original_command = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -1903,16 +1915,17 @@ session_unused(int id)
+ 	bzero(&sessions[id], sizeof(*sessions));
+ 	sessions[id].self = id;
+ 	sessions[id].used = 0;
+ 	sessions[id].chanid = -1;
+ 	sessions[id].ptyfd = -1;
+ 	sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
+ 	sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
+ 	sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
++	sessions[id].command_handle = -1;
+ 	sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
+ 	sessions_first_unused = id;
+ }
+ 
+ Session *
+ session_new(void)
+ {
+ 	Session *s, *tmp;
+@@ -1985,16 +1998,29 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha
+ 	if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid)
+ 		fatal("no user for session %d", s->self);
+ 	debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid);
+ 	s->chanid = chanid;
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ Session *
++session_by_id(int id)
++{
++	if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) {
++		Session *s = &sessions[id];
++		if (s->used)
++			return s;
++	}
++	debug("session_by_id: unknown id %d", id);
++	session_dump();
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++Session *
+ session_by_tty(char *tty)
+ {
+ 	int i;
+ 	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+ 		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ 		if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) {
+ 			debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty);
+ 			return s;
+@@ -2501,16 +2527,40 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta
+ 	 * interested in data we write.
+ 	 * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could
+ 	 * be some more data waiting in the pipe.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+ 		chan_write_failed(c);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++void
++session_end_command2(Session *s)
++{
++	if (s->command != NULL) {
++		audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command);
++		free(s->command);
++		s->command = NULL;
++		s->command_handle = -1;
++	}
++}
++
++static void
++session_end_command(Session *s)
++{
++	if (s->command != NULL) {
++		PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command));
++		free(s->command);
++		s->command = NULL;
++		s->command_handle = -1;
++	}
++}
++#endif
++
+ void
+ session_close(Session *s)
+ {
+ 	u_int i;
+ 	int do_xauth;
+ 
+ 	debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
+ 
+@@ -2541,16 +2591,20 @@ session_close(Session *s)
+ 			int status;
+ 
+ 			waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ 		session_pty_cleanup(s);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	if (s->command)
++		session_end_command(s);
++#endif
+ 	free(s->term);
+ 	free(s->display);
+ 	free(s->x11_chanids);
+ 	free(s->auth_display);
+ 	free(s->auth_data);
+ 	free(s->auth_proto);
+ 	free(s->subsys);
+ 	if (s->env != NULL) {
+@@ -2755,16 +2809,25 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+ 	server_loop2(authctxt);
+ }
+ 
++static void
++do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s)
++{
++	session_pty_cleanup2(s);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	session_end_command2(s);
++#endif
++}
++
+ void
+ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+ 	static int called = 0;
+ 
+ 	debug("do_cleanup");
+ 
+ 	/* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */
+@@ -2803,10 +2866,10 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	/* remove agent socket */
+ 	auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled,
+ 	 * or if running in monitor.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+-		session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2);
++		session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session);
+ }
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/session.h b/openssh-6.5p1/session.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/session.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/session.h
+@@ -56,29 +56,37 @@ struct Session {
+ 	int	*x11_chanids;
+ 	int	is_subsystem;
+ 	char	*subsys;
+ 	u_int	num_env;
+ 	struct {
+ 		char	*name;
+ 		char	*val;
+ 	} *env;
++
++	/* exec */
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	int	command_handle;
++	char	*command;
++#endif
+ };
+ 
+ void	 do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
+ void	 do_cleanup(Authctxt *);
+ 
+ int	 session_open(Authctxt *, int);
+ void	 session_unused(int);
+ int	 session_input_channel_req(Channel *, const char *);
+ void	 session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int);
+ void	 session_close_by_channel(int, void *);
+ void	 session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *));
+ void	 session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
++void	 session_end_command2(Session *);
+ 
+ Session	*session_new(void);
++Session *session_by_id(int);
+ Session	*session_by_tty(char *);
+ void	 session_close(Session *);
+ void	 do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+ void	 child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
+ 		       const char *value);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
+@@ -2504,13 +2504,14 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
+ 			if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
+ 			    errno != ESRCH)
+ 				error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
+ 				    pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
+-	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
++	if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
++	    (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
+ 		audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+ #endif
+ 	_exit(i);
+ }

openssh-6.5p1-audit3-key_auth_usage.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,565 @@
+# auditing key-based authentication (both server and client)
+# based on:
+#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
+#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2012
+#   (replaces: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=1975)
+#   by jchadima@redhat.com
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
+@@ -401,16 +401,22 @@ audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
+ 
++int
++audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
++
+ void
+ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ {
+ 	char    textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ];
+ 	static int logged_in = 0;
+ 	const char *user = the_authctxt ? the_authctxt->user : "(unknown user)";
+ 
+ 	if (cannot_audit(0))
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
+@@ -36,16 +36,18 @@
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "audit.h"
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
+ #include "servconf.h"
+ #include "canohost.h"
+ 
++#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128
++
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern u_int utmp_len;
+ const char* audit_username(void);
+ 
+ static void
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
+     const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
+@@ -125,16 +127,47 @@ linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const cha
+ 		rc = 0;
+ 	errno = saved_errno;
+ 	if (rc < 0) {
+ fatal_report:
+ 		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++int
++audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
++{
++	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
++
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++					 errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
++		else                                                                                                                                       
++			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
++	}
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", get_remote_port());
++	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);
++	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		goto out;
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s rport=%d",
++			type, bits, fp, get_remote_port());
++	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);
++out:
++	saved_errno = errno;
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++	errno = saved_errno;
++	/* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++	return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0));
++}
++
+ static int user_login_count = 0;
+ 
+ /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
+ 
+ void
+ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
+@@ -31,16 +31,17 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 
+ #include "audit.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
+  * audit_connection_from() is called and MAY NOT be initialized when
+  * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called.  Test for NULL before using.
+  */
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ 
+@@ -106,16 +107,32 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
+ 	};
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; event_lookup[i].event != SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; i++)
+ 		if (event_lookup[i].event == ev)
+ 			break;
+ 	return(event_lookup[i].name);
+ }
+ 
++void
++audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key)
++{
++	char *fp;
++	const char *crypto_name;
++
++	fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
++	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1)
++		crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1";
++	else
++		crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key);
++	if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0)
++		*rv = 0;
++	free(fp);
++}
++
+ # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ /*
+  * Null implementations of audit functions.
+  * These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
+  */
+ 
+ /*
+  * Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication
+@@ -204,10 +221,22 @@ audit_run_command(const char *command)
+  */
+ void
+ audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+ {
+ 	debug("audit end nopty exec  euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
+ 	    audit_username(), command);
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.
++ *
++ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.
++ */
++int
++audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
++{
++	debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s, result %d", 
++		host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits,
++		fp, rv);
++}
+ # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
+@@ -23,16 +23,17 @@
+  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+  */
+ 
+ #ifndef _SSH_AUDIT_H
+ # define _SSH_AUDIT_H
+ 
+ #include "loginrec.h"
++#include "key.h"
+ 
+ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
+ 	SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
+ 	SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,
+ 	SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,
+ 	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,
+ 	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,
+ 	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,	/* keyboard-interactive or challenge-response */
+@@ -50,10 +51,12 @@ typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_au
+ void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
+ void	audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+ void	audit_count_session_open(void);
+ void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
+ void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
+ int	audit_run_command(const char *);
+ void 	audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
++int	audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
++void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/auth-rsa.c b/openssh-6.5p1/auth-rsa.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/auth-rsa.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/auth-rsa.c
+@@ -87,17 +87,20 @@ auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
+ 	return challenge;
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
+ {
+ 	u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
+ 	MD5_CTX md;
+-	int len;
++	int len, rv;
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	char *fp;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	/* don't allow short keys */
+ 	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
+ 		error("auth_rsa_verify_response: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
+ 		    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
+ 		return (0);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -108,22 +111,28 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU
+ 	memset(buf, 0, 32);
+ 	BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
+ 	MD5_Init(&md);
+ 	MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
+ 	MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
+ 	MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
+ 
+ 	/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
+-	if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
+-		/* Wrong answer. */
+-		return (0);
++	rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) == 0;
++
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
++	if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) {
++		debug("unsuccessful audit");
++		rv = 0;
+ 	}
+-	/* Correct answer. */
+-	return (1);
++	free(fp);
++#endif
++
++	return rv;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+  * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
+  * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
+  * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
+  */
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/auth.h b/openssh-6.5p1/auth.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/auth.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/auth.h
+@@ -182,16 +182,17 @@ int	allowed_user(struct passwd *);
+ struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user);
+ 
+ char	*get_challenge(Authctxt *);
+ int	verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *);
+ void	abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *);
+ 
+ char	*expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
+ char	*authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
++int	 user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+ 
+ FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ int	 auth_key_is_revoked(Key *);
+ 
+ HostStatus
+ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *,
+     const char *, const char *);
+@@ -199,16 +200,17 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, 
+ /* hostkey handling */
+ Key	*get_hostkey_by_index(int);
+ Key	*get_hostkey_public_by_index(int);
+ Key	*get_hostkey_public_by_type(int);
+ Key	*get_hostkey_private_by_type(int);
+ int	 get_hostkey_index(Key *);
+ int	 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
+ void	 sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
++int	 hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+ 
+ /* debug messages during authentication */
+ void	 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+ void	 auth_debug_send(void);
+ void	 auth_debug_reset(void);
+ 
+ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-hostbased.c b/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-hostbased.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+@@ -124,33 +124,45 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
+ 	    "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
+ 
+ 	/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
+ 	authenticated = 0;
+ 	if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
+-	    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
++	    PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ 			buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
+ 		authenticated = 1;
+ 
+ 	buffer_free(&b);
+ done:
+ 	debug2("userauth_hostbased: authenticated %d", authenticated);
+ 	if (key != NULL)
+ 		key_free(key);
+ 	free(pkalg);
+ 	free(pkblob);
+ 	free(cuser);
+ 	free(chost);
+ 	free(sig);
+ 	return authenticated;
+ }
+ 
++int
++hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
++{
++	int rv;
++
++	rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	audit_key(0, &rv, key);
++#endif
++	return rv;
++}
++
+ /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
+ int
+ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
+     Key *key)
+ {
+ 	const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason;
+ 	HostStatus host_status;
+ 	int len;
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-pubkey.c b/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-pubkey.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -153,17 +153,17 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ #ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ 		buffer_dump(&b);
+ #endif
+ 		pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
+ 
+ 		/* test for correct signature */
+ 		authenticated = 0;
+ 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
+-		    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
++		    PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ 		    buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
+ 			authenticated = 1;
+ 		buffer_free(&b);
+ 		free(sig);
+ 	} else {
+ 		debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
+ 		packet_check_eom();
+ 
+@@ -190,16 +190,28 @@ done:
+ 	debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
+ 	if (key != NULL)
+ 		key_free(key);
+ 	free(pkalg);
+ 	free(pkblob);
+ 	return authenticated;
+ }
+ 
++int
++user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
++{
++	int rv;
++
++	rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	audit_key(1, &rv, key);
++#endif
++	return rv;
++}
++
+ void
+ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
+ {
+ 	char *fp, *extra;
+ 	va_list ap;
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	extra = NULL;
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c
+@@ -1362,26 +1362,30 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ {
+ 	Key *key;
+ 	u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
+ 	u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
++	int type = 0;
+ 	int verified = 0;
+ 	int valid_data = 0;
+ 
++	type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ 	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+ 	signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
+ 	data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
+ 
+ 	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
+ 	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
+ 		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
++	if (type != key_blobtype)
++		fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__);
+ 
+ 	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ 	if (key == NULL)
+ 		fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
+ 
+ 	switch (key_blobtype) {
+ 	case MM_USERKEY:
+ 		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
+@@ -1392,17 +1396,27 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		valid_data = 0;
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+ 	if (!valid_data)
+ 		fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
+ 
+-	verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
++	switch (key_blobtype) {
++	case MM_USERKEY:
++		verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
++		break;
++	case MM_HOSTKEY:
++		verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
++		break;
++	default:
++		verified = 0;
++		break;
++	}
+ 	debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
+ 	    __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
+ 
+ 	key_free(key);
+ 	free(blob);
+ 	free(signature);
+ 	free(data);
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -428,30 +428,31 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, cha
+ 
+ /*
+  * This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the
+  * privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed
+  * for authentication.
+  */
+ 
+ int
+-mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
++mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+ {
+ 	Buffer m;
+ 	u_char *blob;
+ 	u_int len;
+ 	int verified = 0;
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ 
+ 	/* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */
+ 	if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len))
+ 		return (0);
+ 
+ 	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_int(&m, type);
+ 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
+ 	buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
+ 	buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
+ 	free(blob);
+ 
+ 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, &m);
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__);
+@@ -459,16 +460,29 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i
+ 
+ 	verified = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ 
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
+ 
+ 	return (verified);
+ }
+ 
++int
++mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
++{
++	return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
++}
++
++int
++mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
++{
++	return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
++}
++
++
+ /* Export key state after authentication */
+ Newkeys *
+ mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
+ {
+ 	Buffer b;
+ 	u_int len;
+ 	Newkeys *newkey = NULL;
+ 	Enc *enc;
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -44,17 +44,18 @@ int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int 
+ void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
+ struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
+ char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
+ int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
+ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *);
+ int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
+ int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
+ int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
+-int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
++int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
++int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+ int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
+ int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
+ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+    gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);

openssh-6.5p1-audit4-kex_results.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,778 @@
+# key exhange auditing
+# based on:
+#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
+#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2013
+#   (replaces: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=1976)
+#   by jchadima@redhat.com
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/Makefile.in b/openssh-6.5p1/Makefile.in
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/Makefile.in
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/Makefile.in
+@@ -71,17 +71,18 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o
+ 	readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
+ 	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
+ 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
+ 	kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
+ 	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
+ 	jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
+ 	kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
+ 	ssh-ed25519.o digest.o \
+-	sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o
++	sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \
++	auditstub.o
+ 
+ SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+ 	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
+ 	roaming_common.o roaming_client.o
+ 
+ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
+ 	audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
+ 	sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
+@@ -468,9 +468,21 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
+ 		bsm_audit_bad_login("interactive password entry");
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	default:
+ 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+ 	}
+ }
++
++void
++audit_unsupported_body(int what)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
+ #endif /* BSM */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
+@@ -35,16 +35,18 @@
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "audit.h"
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
+ #include "servconf.h"
+ #include "canohost.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
+ 
+ #define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern u_int utmp_len;
+ const char* audit_username(void);
+ 
+@@ -264,9 +266,65 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	default:
+ 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++void
++audit_unsupported_body(int what)
++{
++#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
++	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++	const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
++	char *s;
++	int audit_fd;
++
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
++		name[what], get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
++		get_local_port());
++	free(s);
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0)
++		/* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */
++		return;
++	audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
++			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0);
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++#endif
++}
++
++void
++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
++	       uid_t uid)
++{
++#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
++	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++	const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
++	Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
++	char *s;
++
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
++		direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0,
++		(intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
++		get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port());
++	free(s);
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++					 errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
++		else                                                                                                                                       
++			fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */
++	}
++	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
++			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */
++#endif
++}
++
+ #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
+@@ -23,24 +23,27 @@
+  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+  */
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 
+ #include "audit.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
+  * audit_connection_from() is called and MAY NOT be initialized when
+  * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called.  Test for NULL before using.
+  */
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+@@ -123,16 +126,28 @@ audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const 
+ 		crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1";
+ 	else
+ 		crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key);
+ 	if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0)
+ 		*rv = 0;
+ 	free(fp);
+ }
+ 
++void
++audit_unsupported(int what)
++{
++	PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what));
++}
++
++void
++audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
++{
++	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
++}
++
+ # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ /*
+  * Null implementations of audit functions.
+  * These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
+  */
+ 
+ /*
+  * Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication
+@@ -233,10 +248,31 @@ audit_end_command(int handle, const char
+  */
+ int
+ audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
+ {
+ 	debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s, result %d", 
+ 		host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits,
+ 		fp, rv);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails.
++ */
++void
++audit_unsupported_body(int what)
++{
++	debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
++ */
++void
++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
++	       uid_t uid)
++{
++	debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u",
++		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
++	        (unsigned)uid);
++}
+ # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
+@@ -53,10 +53,14 @@ void	audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+ void	audit_count_session_open(void);
+ void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
+ void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
+ int	audit_run_command(const char *);
+ void 	audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+ int	audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
+ void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
++void	audit_unsupported(int);
++void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
++void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
++void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/auditstub.c b/openssh-6.5p1/auditstub.c
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/auditstub.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
++/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */
++
++/*
++ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ *
++ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
++ */
++
++void
++audit_unsupported(int n)
++{
++}
++
++void
++audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
++{
++}
++
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/cipher.c b/openssh-6.5p1/cipher.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/cipher.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/cipher.c
+@@ -52,31 +52,17 @@
+ 
+ /* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ 
+ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
+ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
+ extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
+ 
+-struct Cipher {
+-	char	*name;
+-	int	number;		/* for ssh1 only */
+-	u_int	block_size;
+-	u_int	key_len;
+-	u_int	iv_len;		/* defaults to block_size */
+-	u_int	auth_len;
+-	u_int	discard_len;
+-	u_int	flags;
+-#define CFLAG_CBC		(1<<0)
+-#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY	(1<<1)
+-	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
+-};
+-
+-static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = {
++struct Cipher ciphers[] = {
+ 	{ "none",	SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
+ 	{ "des",	SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
+ 	{ "3des",	SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
+ 	{ "blowfish",	SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_bf },
+ 
+ 	{ "3des-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
+ 	{ "blowfish-cbc",
+ 			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_bf_cbc },
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/cipher.h b/openssh-6.5p1/cipher.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/cipher.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/cipher.h
+@@ -58,17 +58,30 @@
+ #define SSH_CIPHER_MAX		31
+ 
+ #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT		1
+ #define CIPHER_DECRYPT		0
+ 
+ typedef struct Cipher Cipher;
+ typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
+ 
+-struct Cipher;
++struct Cipher {
++	char	*name;
++	int	number;		/* for ssh1 only */
++	u_int	block_size;
++	u_int	key_len;
++	u_int	iv_len;		/* defaults to block_size */
++	u_int	auth_len;
++	u_int	discard_len;
++	u_int	flags;
++#define CFLAG_CBC		(1<<0)
++#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY	(1<<1)
++	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
++};
++
+ struct CipherContext {
+ 	int	plaintext;
+ 	int	encrypt;
+ 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX evp;
+ 	struct chachapoly_ctx cp_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
+ 	const Cipher *cipher;
+ };
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/kex.c b/openssh-6.5p1/kex.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/kex.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/kex.c
+@@ -45,16 +45,17 @@
+ #include "kex.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "mac.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "dispatch.h"
+ #include "monitor.h"
+ #include "roaming.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+ 
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+ # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
+ # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
+ # else
+ extern const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void);
+ # endif
+ #endif
+@@ -346,53 +347,65 @@ kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *kex)
+ 		fatal("Unsupported key exchange %d", kex->kex_type);
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server)
+ {
+ 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+-	if (name == NULL)
++	if (name == NULL) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++		audit_unsupported(0);
++#endif
+ 		fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s",
+ 		    client, server);
++	}
+ 	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name);
+ 	enc->name = name;
+ 	enc->enabled = 0;
+ 	enc->iv = NULL;
+ 	enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher);
+ 	enc->key = NULL;
+ 	enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher);
+ 	enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher);
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server)
+ {
+ 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+-	if (name == NULL)
++	if (name == NULL) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++		audit_unsupported(1);
++#endif
+ 		fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s",
+ 		    client, server);
++	}
+ 	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
+ 		fatal("unsupported mac %s", name);
+ 	/* truncate the key */
+ 	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HMAC)
+ 		mac->key_len = 16;
+ 	mac->name = name;
+ 	mac->key = NULL;
+ 	mac->enabled = 0;
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
+ {
+ 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+-	if (name == NULL)
++	if (name == NULL) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++		audit_unsupported(2);
++#endif
+ 		fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server);
++	}
+ 	if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ 		comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
+ 	} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
+ 		comp->type = COMP_ZLIB;
+ 	} else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
+ 		comp->type = COMP_NONE;
+ 	} else {
+ 		fatal("unsupported comp %s", name);
+@@ -497,16 +510,19 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
+ 		if (authlen == 0)
+ 			choose_mac(&newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac], sprop[nmac]);
+ 		choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], sprop[ncomp]);
+ 		debug("kex: %s %s %s %s",
+ 		    ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
+ 		    newkeys->enc.name,
+ 		    authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
+ 		    newkeys->comp.name);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++		audit_kex(ctos, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name);
++#endif
+ 	}
+ 	choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
+ 	choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+ 	    sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]);
+ 	need = dh_need = 0;
+ 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+ 		newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode];
+ 		need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.key_len);
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c
+@@ -93,16 +93,17 @@
+ #include "monitor_wrap.h"
+ #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+ #include "jpake.h"
+ #include "roaming.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* Imports */
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern u_int utmp_len;
+@@ -182,16 +183,18 @@ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer
+ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
+ 
+ static Authctxt *authctxt;
+ static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
+ 
+ /* local state for key verify */
+@@ -233,16 +236,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] 
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SKEY
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
+@@ -270,16 +275,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
+@@ -301,28 +308,32 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] 
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
+ 
+ /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
+ 
+@@ -2411,8 +2422,52 @@ mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, 
+ 
+ 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 1);
+ 
+ 	auth_method = "jpake-01@openssh.com";
+ 	return authenticated;
+ }
+ 
+ #endif /* JPAKE */
++
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++int
++mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
++{
++	int what;
++
++	what = buffer_get_int(m);
++
++	audit_unsupported_body(what);
++
++	buffer_clear(m);
++
++	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
++{
++	int ctos, len;
++	char *cipher, *mac, *compress;
++	pid_t pid;
++	uid_t uid;
++
++	ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
++	cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++	mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++	compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++	pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++	uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++
++	audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pid, uid);
++
++	free(cipher);
++	free(mac);
++	free(compress);
++	buffer_clear(m);
++
++	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h
+@@ -65,16 +65,18 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
+ 	MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 115,
++	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 116, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 117,
++	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 119,
+ 
+ };
+ 
+ struct mm_master;
+ struct monitor {
+ 	int			 m_recvfd;
+ 	int			 m_sendfd;
+ 	int			 m_log_recvfd;
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -1483,8 +1483,46 @@ mm_jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k,
+ 
+ 	success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: success = %d", __func__, success);
+ 	return success;
+ }
+ #endif /* JPAKE */
++
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++void
++mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_int(&m, what);
++
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, &m);
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
++				  &m);
++
++	buffer_free(&m);
++}
++
++void
++mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
++		  uid_t uid)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher);
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, mac);
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress);
++	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
++	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
++
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m);
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
++				  &m);
++
++	buffer_free(&m);
++}
++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -72,16 +72,18 @@ int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, cha
+ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ #include "audit.h"
+ void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+ int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+ void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
++void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
++void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct Session;
+ void mm_terminate(void);
+ int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
+ void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
+ 
+ /* SSHv1 interfaces */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
+@@ -114,16 +114,17 @@
+ #include "session.h"
+ #include "monitor_mm.h"
+ #include "monitor.h"
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ #endif
+ #include "monitor_wrap.h"
+ #include "roaming.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+ #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+ #include "version.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef LIBWRAP
+ #include <tcpd.h>
+ #include <syslog.h>
+ int allow_severity;
+ int deny_severity;
+@@ -2312,16 +2313,20 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
+ 		packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
+ 
+ 	/* Get check bytes from the packet.  These must match those we
+ 	   sent earlier with the public key packet. */
+ 	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ 		if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
+ 			packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
+ 
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none");
++#endif
++
+ 	debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
+ 
+ 	/* Get the encrypted integer. */
+ 	if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
+ 	packet_get_bignum(session_key_int);
+ 
+ 	protocol_flags = packet_get_int();

openssh-6.5p1-audit5-session_key_destruction.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,981 @@
+# session key destruction and auditing
+# based on:
+#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
+#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2014
+#   by jchadima@redhat.com
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
+@@ -480,9 +480,15 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
++
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
+ #endif /* BSM */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
+@@ -289,24 +289,25 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+ 		/* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */
+ 		return;
+ 	audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
+ 			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0);
+ 	audit_close(audit_fd);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
++const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
++
+ void
+ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
+ 	       uid_t uid)
+ {
+ #ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
+ 	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ 	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+-	const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
+ 	Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
+ 	char *s;
+ 
+ 	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
+ 		direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0,
+ 		(intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
+ 		get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port());
+ 	free(s);
+@@ -322,9 +323,37 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
+ 			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
+ 	audit_close(audit_fd);
+ 	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ 	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ 		fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++	char *s;
++
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
++		 direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
++		 get_remote_port(),
++		 (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
++		 get_local_port());
++	free(s);
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
++					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
++			error("cannot open audit");
++		return;
++	}
++	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
++			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		error("cannot write into audit");
++}
++
+ #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
+@@ -138,16 +138,22 @@ audit_unsupported(int what)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
+ {
+ 	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
+ }
+ 
++void
++audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
++{
++	PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
++}
++
+ # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ /*
+  * Null implementations of audit functions.
+  * These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
+  */
+ 
+ /*
+  * Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication
+@@ -269,10 +275,20 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+ void
+ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
+ 	       uid_t uid)
+ {
+ 	debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u",
+ 		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
+ 	        (unsigned)uid);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
++ */
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
++		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
++}
+ # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
+@@ -57,10 +57,12 @@ int	audit_run_command(const char *);
+ void 	audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+ int	audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
+ void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
+ void	audit_unsupported(int);
+ void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
+ void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
+ void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++void	audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
++void	audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/auditstub.c b/openssh-6.5p1/auditstub.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/auditstub.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/auditstub.c
+@@ -22,18 +22,29 @@
+  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+  *
+  * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
+  */
+ 
++#include <sys/types.h>
++
+ void
+ audit_unsupported(int n)
+ {
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
+ {
+ }
+ 
++void
++audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
++{
++}
++
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++}
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/kex.c b/openssh-6.5p1/kex.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/kex.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/kex.c
+@@ -698,8 +698,39 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, i
+ 		if (i%32 == 31)
+ 			fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ 		else if (i%8 == 7)
+ 			fprintf(stderr, " ");
+ 	}
+ 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+ #endif
++
++static void
++enc_destroy(Enc *enc)
++{
++	if (enc == NULL)
++		return;
++
++	if (enc->key) {
++		memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
++		free(enc->key);
++	}
++
++	if (enc->iv) {
++		memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->block_size);
++		free(enc->iv);
++	}
++
++	memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc));
++}
++
++void
++newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys)
++{
++	if (newkeys == NULL)
++		return;
++
++	enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc);
++	mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac);
++	memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
++}
++
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/kex.h b/openssh-6.5p1/kex.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/kex.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/kex.h
+@@ -163,16 +163,18 @@ void	 kexdh_client(Kex *);
+ void	 kexdh_server(Kex *);
+ void	 kexgex_client(Kex *);
+ void	 kexgex_server(Kex *);
+ void	 kexecdh_client(Kex *);
+ void	 kexecdh_server(Kex *);
+ void	 kexc25519_client(Kex *);
+ void	 kexc25519_server(Kex *);
+ 
++void	 newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys);
++
+ void
+ kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
+     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
+ void
+ kexgex_hash(int, char *, char *, char *, int, char *,
+     int, u_char *, int, int, int, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/mac.c b/openssh-6.5p1/mac.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/mac.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/mac.c
+@@ -219,16 +219,30 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac)
+ 		if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
+ 			umac128_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
+ 	} else if (mac->evp_md != NULL)
+ 		HMAC_cleanup(&mac->evp_ctx);
+ 	mac->evp_md = NULL;
+ 	mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ 
++void
++mac_destroy(Mac *mac)
++{
++	if (mac == NULL)
++		return;
++
++	if (mac->key) {
++		memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
++		free(mac->key);
++	}
++
++	memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac));
++}
++
+ /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
+ #define	MAC_SEP	","
+ int
+ mac_valid(const char *names)
+ {
+ 	char *maclist, *cp, *p;
+ 
+ 	if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/mac.h b/openssh-6.5p1/mac.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/mac.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/mac.h
+@@ -24,8 +24,9 @@
+  */
+ 
+ int	 mac_valid(const char *);
+ char	*mac_alg_list(char);
+ int	 mac_setup(Mac *, char *);
+ int	 mac_init(Mac *);
+ u_char	*mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int);
+ void	 mac_clear(Mac *);
++void	 mac_destroy(Mac *);
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c
+@@ -185,16 +185,17 @@ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
+ 
+ static Authctxt *authctxt;
+ static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
+ 
+ /* local state for key verify */
+@@ -238,16 +239,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] 
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SKEY
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
+@@ -277,16 +279,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
+@@ -310,30 +313,32 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] 
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
+ 
+ /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
+ 
+@@ -1971,21 +1976,23 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
+ 		goto skip;
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* Get the Kex for rekeying */
+ 		*pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
+ 	current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
++	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
+ 	free(blob);
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
+ 	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
+ 	current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
++	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
+ 	free(blob);
+ 
+ 	/* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
+ 	seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ 	blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+ 	packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ 	bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+ 	packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
+@@ -2021,16 +2028,31 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
+ 
+ 	/* Roaming */
+ 	if (compat20) {
+ 		child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+ 		child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
++
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	if (compat20) {
++		buffer_init(&m);
++		mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
++					  MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
++		mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
++		buffer_free(&m);
++	}
++#endif
++
++	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
++	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
++		;
++
+ }
+ 
+ 
+ /* Allocation functions for zlib */
+ void *
+ mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
+ {
+ 	size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
+@@ -2465,9 +2487,27 @@ mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffe
+ 	free(mac);
+ 	free(compress);
+ 	buffer_clear(m);
+ 
+ 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++int
++mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
++{
++	int ctos;
++	pid_t pid;
++	uid_t uid;
++
++	ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
++	pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++	uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++
++	audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid);
++
++	buffer_clear(m);
++
++	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
++	return 0;
++}
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h
+@@ -67,16 +67,17 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
+ 	MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 115,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 116, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 117,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 119,
++	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 121,
+ 
+ };
+ 
+ struct mm_master;
+ struct monitor {
+ 	int			 m_recvfd;
+ 	int			 m_sendfd;
+ 	int			 m_log_recvfd;
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -651,22 +651,24 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor
+ 	    __func__, packet_get_newkeys(MODE_OUT),
+ 	    packet_get_newkeys(MODE_IN));
+ 
+ 	/* Keys from Kex */
+ 	if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_OUT, &blob, &bloblen))
+ 		fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
+ 
+ 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
++	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
+ 	free(blob);
+ 
+ 	if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen))
+ 		fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
+ 
+ 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
++	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
+ 	free(blob);
+ 
+ 	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
+ 	buffer_put_int(&m, seqnr);
+ 	buffer_put_int64(&m, blocks);
+ 	buffer_put_int(&m, packets);
+ 	buffer_put_int64(&m, bytes);
+ 	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
+@@ -1520,9 +1522,24 @@ mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher
+ 	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
+ 
+ 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m);
+ 	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
+ 				  &m);
+ 
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
+ }
++
++void
++mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
++	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
++	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
++				  &m);
++	buffer_free(&m);
++}
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -74,16 +74,17 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ #include "audit.h"
+ void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+ int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+ void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+ void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct Session;
+ void mm_terminate(void);
+ int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
+ void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
+ 
+ /* SSHv1 interfaces */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/packet.c b/openssh-6.5p1/packet.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/packet.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/packet.c
+@@ -56,16 +56,17 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
+ #include <time.h>
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "packet.h"
+ #include "crc32.h"
+ #include "compress.h"
+ #include "deattack.h"
+ #include "channels.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+ #include "ssh1.h"
+@@ -469,41 +470,51 @@ packet_get_connection_in(void)
+ /* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
+ 
+ int
+ packet_get_connection_out(void)
+ {
+ 	return active_state->connection_out;
+ }
+ 
++static int
++packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state)
++{
++	return state != NULL &&
++		(state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL);
++}
++
+ /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
+ 
+ void
+ packet_close(void)
+ {
+ 	if (!active_state->initialized)
+ 		return;
+ 	active_state->initialized = 0;
+-	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
+-		shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
+-		close(active_state->connection_out);
+-	} else {
+-		close(active_state->connection_in);
+-		close(active_state->connection_out);
+-	}
+ 	buffer_free(&active_state->input);
+ 	buffer_free(&active_state->output);
+ 	buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+ 	buffer_free(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+ 	if (active_state->compression_buffer_ready) {
+ 		buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer);
+ 		buffer_compress_uninit();
+ 	}
+-	cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
+-	cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
++	if (packet_state_has_keys(active_state)) {
++		cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
++		cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
++		audit_session_key_free(2);
++	}
++	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
++		shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
++		close(active_state->connection_out);
++	} else {
++		close(active_state->connection_in);
++		close(active_state->connection_out);
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
+ 
+ void
+ packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int protocol_flags)
+ {
+ 	active_state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
+@@ -729,16 +740,35 @@ packet_send1(void)
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Note that the packet is now only buffered in output.  It won't be
+ 	 * actually sent until packet_write_wait or packet_write_poll is
+ 	 * called.
+ 	 */
+ }
+ 
++static void
++newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys)
++{
++	if (newkeys == NULL)
++		return;
++
++	free(newkeys->enc.name);
++
++	mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
++	/* MAC may happen to be empty - if the GCM mode of AES is used */
++	if (newkeys->mac.name)
++		free(newkeys->mac.name);
++
++	free(newkeys->comp.name);
++
++	newkeys_destroy(newkeys);
++	free(newkeys);
++}
++
+ void
+ set_newkeys(int mode)
+ {
+ 	Enc *enc;
+ 	Mac *mac;
+ 	Comp *comp;
+ 	CipherContext *cc;
+ 	u_int64_t *max_blocks;
+@@ -754,31 +784,19 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
+ 	} else {
+ 		cc = &active_state->receive_context;
+ 		crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
+ 		active_state->p_read.packets = active_state->p_read.blocks = 0;
+ 		max_blocks = &active_state->max_blocks_in;
+ 	}
+ 	if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
+ 		debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");
++		audit_session_key_free(mode);
+ 		cipher_cleanup(cc);
+-		enc  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
+-		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
+-		comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
+-		mac_clear(mac);
+-		memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->iv_len);
+-		memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
+-		memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
+-		free(enc->name);
+-		free(enc->iv);
+-		free(enc->key);
+-		free(mac->name);
+-		free(mac->key);
+-		free(comp->name);
+-		free(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
++		newkeys_destroy_and_free(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
+ 	}
+ 	active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
+ 	if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
+ 		fatal("newkeys: no keys for mode %d", mode);
+ 	enc  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
+ 	mac  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
+ 	comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
+ 	if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0 && mac_init(mac) == 0)
+@@ -2004,54 +2022,93 @@ packet_get_output(void)
+ }
+ 
+ void *
+ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
+ {
+ 	return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode];
+ }
+ 
++static void
++packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state)
++{
++	if (state == NULL)
++		return;
++
++	cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context);
++	cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context);
++
++	buffer_free(&state->input);
++	buffer_free(&state->output);
++	buffer_free(&state->outgoing_packet);
++	buffer_free(&state->incoming_packet);
++	buffer_free(&state->compression_buffer);
++	newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]);
++	state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL;
++	newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]);
++	state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
++	mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac);
++//	TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
++//	memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
++}
++
++void
++packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep)
++{
++	if (audit_it)
++		audit_it = packet_state_has_keys (active_state) ||
++			packet_state_has_keys (backup_state);
++	packet_destroy_state(active_state);
++	packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
++	if (audit_it) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++		if (privsep)
++			audit_session_key_free(2);
++		else
++			audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
++#endif
++	}
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when
+  * resuming a suspended connection.
+  */
+ void
+ packet_backup_state(void)
+ {
+-	struct session_state *tmp;
+-
+ 	close(active_state->connection_in);
+ 	active_state->connection_in = -1;
+ 	close(active_state->connection_out);
+ 	active_state->connection_out = -1;
+-	if (backup_state)
+-		tmp = backup_state;
+-	else
+-		tmp = alloc_session_state();
+ 	backup_state = active_state;
+-	active_state = tmp;
++	active_state = alloc_session_state();
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+  * Swap in the old state when resuming a connecion.
+  */
+ void
+ packet_restore_state(void)
+ {
+ 	struct session_state *tmp;
+ 	void *buf;
+ 	u_int len;
+ 
+ 	tmp = backup_state;
+ 	backup_state = active_state;
+ 	active_state = tmp;
+ 	active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in;
+-	backup_state->connection_in = -1;
+ 	active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out;
+-	backup_state->connection_out = -1;
+ 	len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input);
+ 	if (len > 0) {
+ 		buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input);
+ 		buffer_append(&active_state->input, buf, len);
+ 		buffer_clear(&backup_state->input);
+ 		add_recv_bytes(len);
+ 	}
++	backup_state->connection_in = -1;
++	backup_state->connection_out = -1;
++	packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
++	free(backup_state);
++	backup_state = NULL;
+ }
++
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/packet.h b/openssh-6.5p1/packet.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/packet.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/packet.h
+@@ -119,9 +119,10 @@ void	 packet_set_rekey_limits(u_int32_t,
+ time_t	 packet_get_rekey_timeout(void);
+ 
+ void	 packet_backup_state(void);
+ void	 packet_restore_state(void);
+ 
+ void	*packet_get_input(void);
+ void	*packet_get_output(void);
+ 
++void	 packet_destroy_all(int, int);
+ #endif				/* PACKET_H */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/session.c b/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
+@@ -1689,16 +1689,19 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 	int env_size;
+ 	char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
+ 	const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL;
+ 	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+ 	destroy_sensitive_data();
++	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
++	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
++	packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
+ 
+ 	/* Force a password change */
+ 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+ 		do_setusercontext(pw);
+ 		child_close_fds();
+ 		do_pwchange(s);
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
+@@ -711,16 +711,18 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+ 		if (box != NULL)
+ 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
+ 
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
++
+ static void
+ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+ 	u_int32_t rnd[256];
+ 
+ #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
+ 	if (1) {
+ #else
+@@ -735,16 +737,20 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
+ 	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
+ 		fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+ 	else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
+ 		verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
+ 		buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
++ 		newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_OUT]);
++		newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_IN]);
++		audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
++		packet_destroy_all(0, 0);
+ 		monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
+ 
+ 		/* NEVERREACHED */
+ 		exit(0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* child */
+ 
+@@ -2104,16 +2110,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		do_authentication(authctxt);
+ 	}
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
+ 	 * the current keystate and exits
+ 	 */
+ 	if (use_privsep) {
+ 		mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
++		packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
+ 		exit(0);
+ 	}
+ 
+  authenticated:
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
+ 	 * authentication.
+ 	 */
+@@ -2156,16 +2163,18 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
+ 	    options.client_alive_count_max);
+ 
+ 	/* Start session. */
+ 	do_authenticated(authctxt);
+ 
+ 	/* The connection has been terminated. */
++	packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
++
+ 	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
+ 	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
+ 	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
+ 	    (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
+ 
+ 	verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -2497,26 +2506,38 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ #endif
+ 	debug("KEX done");
+ }
+ 
+ /* server specific fatal cleanup */
+ void
+ cleanup_exit(int i)
+ {
++	static int in_cleanup = 0;
++	int is_privsep_child;
++
++	/* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
++	   wrappers used for auditing.  Make sure we don't recurse
++	   indefinitely. */
++	if (in_cleanup)
++		_exit(i);
++	in_cleanup = 1;
++
+ 	if (the_authctxt) {
+ 		do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
+ 		if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
+ 			debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
+ 			if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
+ 			    errno != ESRCH)
+ 				error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
+ 				    pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && (pmonitor != NULL) && !mm_is_monitor();
++	packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
+ 	if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
+ 	    (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
+ 		audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+ #endif
+ 	_exit(i);
+ }

openssh-6.5p1-audit6-server_key_destruction.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,738 @@
+# server key destruction and auditing
+# based on:
+#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
+#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2015
+#   by jchadima@redhat.com
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
+@@ -486,9 +486,27 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
++
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
+ #endif /* BSM */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
+@@ -351,9 +351,55 @@ audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pi
+ 	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
+ 			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
+ 	audit_close(audit_fd);
+ 	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ 	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ 		error("cannot write into audit");
+ }
+ 
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ",
++		fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid);
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
++					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
++			error("cannot open audit");
++		return;
++	}
++	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
++			buf, NULL,
++			listening_for_clients() ? NULL : get_remote_ipaddr(),
++			NULL, 1);
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		error("cannot write into audit");
++}
++
++void
++audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
++{
++	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=create kind=server fp=%s direction=? ", fp);
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
++					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
++			error("cannot open audit");
++		return;
++	}
++	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
++			buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		error("cannot write into audit");
++}
+ #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
+@@ -285,10 +285,29 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
+  * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
+  */
+ void
+ audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+ {
+ 	debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
+ 		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key
++ */
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u",
++		geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
++ */
++void
++audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
++{
++	debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
++}
+ # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
+@@ -43,26 +43,30 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
+ 	SSH_INVALID_USER,
+ 	SSH_NOLOGIN,		/* denied by /etc/nologin, not implemented */
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE,	/* closed after attempting auth or session */
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
+ 	SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
+ };
+ typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
+ 
++int	listening_for_clients(void);
++
+ void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
+ void	audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+ void	audit_count_session_open(void);
+ void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
+ void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
+ int	audit_run_command(const char *);
+ void 	audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+ int	audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
+ void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
+ void	audit_unsupported(int);
+ void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
+ void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
+ void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void	audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
+ void	audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
++void	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++void	audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/key.c b/openssh-6.5p1/key.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/key.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/key.c
+@@ -1959,16 +1959,41 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
+ 		fatal("key_demote: bad key type %d", k->type);
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return (pk);
+ }
+ 
+ int
++key_is_private(const Key *k)
++{
++	switch (k->type) {
++	case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
++	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
++	case KEY_RSA1:
++	case KEY_RSA:
++		return k->rsa->d != NULL;
++	case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
++	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
++	case KEY_DSA:
++		return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL;
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
++	case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
++	case KEY_ECDSA:
++		return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL;
++#endif
++	default:
++		/* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */
++		debug2("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type);
++		return 1;
++	}
++}
++
++int
+ key_is_cert(const Key *k)
+ {
+ 	if (k == NULL)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	return key_type_is_cert(k->type);
+ }
+ 
+ /* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/key.h b/openssh-6.5p1/key.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/key.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/key.h
+@@ -113,16 +113,17 @@ int		 key_read(Key *, char **);
+ u_int		 key_size(const Key *);
+ enum fp_type	 key_fp_type_select(void);
+ char		*key_fp_type_str(enum fp_type);
+ 
+ Key	*key_generate(int, u_int);
+ Key	*key_from_private(const Key *);
+ int	 key_type_from_name(char *);
+ int	 key_is_cert(const Key *);
++int	 key_is_private(const Key *k);
+ int	 key_type_is_cert(int);
+ int	 key_type_plain(int);
+ int	 key_to_certified(Key *, int);
+ int	 key_drop_cert(Key *);
+ int	 key_certify(Key *, Key *);
+ void	 key_cert_copy(const Key *, struct Key *);
+ int	 key_cert_check_authority(const Key *, int, int, const char *,
+ 	    const char **);
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c
+@@ -110,16 +110,18 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
+ extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
+ extern z_stream incoming_stream;
+ extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
+ extern u_char session_id[];
+ extern Buffer auth_debug;
+ extern int auth_debug_init;
+ extern Buffer loginmsg;
+ 
++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
++
+ /* State exported from the child */
+ 
+ struct {
+ 	z_stream incoming;
+ 	z_stream outgoing;
+ 	u_char *keyin;
+ 	u_int keyinlen;
+ 	u_char *keyout;
+@@ -186,16 +188,17 @@ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
+ 
+ static Authctxt *authctxt;
+ static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
+ 
+ /* local state for key verify */
+@@ -240,16 +243,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] 
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SKEY
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
+@@ -280,16 +284,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
+     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
+@@ -314,31 +319,33 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] 
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
+ 
+ /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
+ 
+@@ -1761,16 +1768,18 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
+ 	/* The child is terminating */
+ 	session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam)
+ 		sshpam_cleanup();
+ #endif
+ 
++	destroy_sensitive_data(0);
++
+ 	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+ 		if (errno != EINTR)
+ 			exit(1);
+ 
+ 	res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
+ 
+ 	/* Terminate process */
+ 	exit(res);
+@@ -2505,9 +2514,30 @@ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(in
+ 
+ 	audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid);
+ 
+ 	buffer_clear(m);
+ 
+ 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
++
++int
++mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, Buffer *m)
++{
++	int len;
++	char *fp;
++	pid_t pid;
++	uid_t uid;
++
++	fp = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++	pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++	uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++
++	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
++
++	free(fp);
++	buffer_clear(m);
++
++	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
++	return 0;
++}
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h
+@@ -68,16 +68,17 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
+ 	MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 115,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 116, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 117,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 119,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 121,
++	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 123,
+ 
+ };
+ 
+ struct mm_master;
+ struct monitor {
+ 	int			 m_recvfd;
+ 	int			 m_sendfd;
+ 	int			 m_log_recvfd;
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -1537,9 +1537,25 @@ mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos,
+ 	buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
+ 	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
+ 	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
+ 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
+ 	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
+ 				  &m);
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
+ }
++
++void
++mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, fp);
++	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
++	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
++
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m);
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE,
++				  &m);
++	buffer_free(&m);
++}
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -75,16 +75,17 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ #include "audit.h"
+ void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+ int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+ void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+ void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
++void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct Session;
+ void mm_terminate(void);
+ int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
+ void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
+ 
+ /* SSHv1 interfaces */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/session.c b/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
+@@ -132,17 +132,17 @@ static int session_pty_req(Session *);
+ 
+ /* import */
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern char *__progname;
+ extern int log_stderr;
+ extern int debug_flag;
+ extern u_int utmp_len;
+ extern int startup_pipe;
+-extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
+ extern Buffer loginmsg;
+ 
+ /* original command from peer. */
+ const char *original_command = NULL;
+ 
+ /* data */
+ static int sessions_first_unused = -1;
+ static int sessions_nalloc = 0;
+@@ -1688,17 +1688,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 	char **env;
+ 	int env_size;
+ 	char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
+ 	const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL;
+ 	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+-	destroy_sensitive_data();
++	destroy_sensitive_data(1);
+ 	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
+ 	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
+ 	packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
+ 
+ 	/* Force a password change */
+ 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+ 		do_setusercontext(pw);
+ 		child_close_fds();
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
+@@ -256,17 +256,17 @@ Buffer cfg;
+ 
+ /* message to be displayed after login */
+ Buffer loginmsg;
+ 
+ /* Unprivileged user */
+ struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
+ 
+ /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
+-void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
++void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
+ void demote_sensitive_data(void);
+ 
+ static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
+ static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Close all listening sockets
+  */
+@@ -275,16 +275,25 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
+ {
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
+ 		close(listen_socks[i]);
+ 	num_listen_socks = -1;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
++ * client connection?)
++ */
++int listening_for_clients(void)
++{
++	return num_listen_socks > 0;
++}
++
+ static void
+ close_startup_pipes(void)
+ {
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (startup_pipes)
+ 		for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+ 			if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
+@@ -554,60 +563,99 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in
+ 		close(sock_out);
+ 		logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
+ 		    get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ 		    server_version_string, client_version_string);
+ 		cleanup_exit(255);
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-/* Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
++/*
++ * Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed.  Careful,
++ * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere.
++ */
+ void
+-destroy_sensitive_data(void)
++destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep)
+ {
+ 	int i;
++	pid_t pid;
++	uid_t uid;
+ 
+ 	if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
+ 		key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+ 		sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
+ 	}
++	pid = getpid();
++	uid = getuid();
+ 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ 		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
++			char *fp;
++
++			if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
++				fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i],
++					key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
++			else
++				fp = NULL;
+ 			key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ 			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
++			if (fp != NULL) {
++				if (privsep)
++					PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
++						pid, uid));
++				else
++					audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
++						pid, uid);
++				free(fp);
++			}
+ 		}
+-		if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
++		if (sensitive_data.host_certificates
++		    && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
+ 			key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
+ 			sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
+ 	memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
+ }
+ 
+ /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
+ void
+ demote_sensitive_data(void)
+ {
+ 	Key *tmp;
++	pid_t pid;
++	uid_t uid;
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
+ 		tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
+ 		key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+ 		sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
+ 	}
+ 
++	pid = getpid();
++	uid = getuid();
+ 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ 		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
++			char *fp;
++
++			if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
++				fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i],
++					key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
++			else
++				fp = NULL;
+ 			tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ 			key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ 			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
+ 			if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
+ 				sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
++			if (fp != NULL) {
++				audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
++				free(fp);
++			}
+ 		}
+ 		/* Certs do not need demotion */
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie.  XXX - Okay Niels? */
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+@@ -1192,16 +1240,17 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 
+ 		/* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
+ 		ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ 		if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
+ 			error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ 		if (received_sigterm) {
+ 			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+ 			    (int) received_sigterm);
++			destroy_sensitive_data(0);
+ 			close_listen_socks();
+ 			unlink(options.pid_file);
+ 			exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
+ 		}
+ 		if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
+ 			generate_ephemeral_server_key();
+ 			key_used = 0;
+ 			key_do_regen = 0;
+@@ -2153,27 +2202,28 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	/*
+ 	 * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
+ 	 * file descriptor passing.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (use_privsep) {
+ 		privsep_postauth(authctxt);
+ 		/* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
+ 		if (!compat20)
+-			destroy_sensitive_data();
++			destroy_sensitive_data(0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
+ 	    options.client_alive_count_max);
+ 
+ 	/* Start session. */
+ 	do_authenticated(authctxt);
+ 
+ 	/* The connection has been terminated. */
+ 	packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
++	destroy_sensitive_data(1);
+ 
+ 	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
+ 	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
+ 	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
+ 	    (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
+ 
+ 	verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
+ 
+@@ -2392,17 +2442,17 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
+ 		MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
+ 		MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md);
+ 		memset(buf, 0, bytes);
+ 		free(buf);
+ 		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ 			session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
+ 	}
+ 	/* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
+-	destroy_sensitive_data();
++	destroy_sensitive_data(0);
+ 
+ 	if (use_privsep)
+ 		mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
+ 
+ 	/* Destroy the decrypted integer.  It is no longer needed. */
+ 	BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
+ 
+ 	/* Set the session key.  From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
+@@ -2527,16 +2577,18 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
+ 			debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
+ 			if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
+ 			    errno != ESRCH)
+ 				error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
+ 				    pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && (pmonitor != NULL) && !mm_is_monitor();
++	if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL)
++		destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child);
+ 	packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
+ 	if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
+ 	    (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
+ 		audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+ #endif
+ 	_exit(i);

openssh-6.5p1-audit7-libaudit_compat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+# definitions for AUDIT_CRYPTO_* symbols fom libaudit 2.x
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
+@@ -25,16 +25,17 @@
+  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+  *
+  * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
+  */
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ #if defined(USE_LINUX_AUDIT)
+ #include <libaudit.h>
++#include "compat-libaudit.h"
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "audit.h"
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/compat-libaudit.h b/openssh-6.5p1/compat-libaudit.h
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/compat-libaudit.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
++/* AUDIT_CRYPTO symbol definitions from libaudit 2.x */
++/* libaudit.h -- 
++ * Copyright 2004-2011 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
++ * All Rights Reserved.
++ *
++ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
++ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
++ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
++ *
++ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
++ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
++ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
++ *
++ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
++ * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
++ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
++ * 
++ * Authors:
++ *	Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
++ *	Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
++ */
++#ifndef _COMPAT_LIBAUDIT_H_
++#define _COMPAT_LIBAUDIT_H_
++
++#ifdef __cplusplus
++extern "C" {
++#endif
++
++#ifndef AUDIT_FIRST_CRYPTO_MSG
++#define AUDIT_FIRST_CRYPTO_MSG		2400
++#endif
++
++#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_TEST_USER
++#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_TEST_USER		2400 /* Crypto test results */
++#endif
++
++#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE_USER
++#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE_USER	2401 /* Crypto attribute change */
++#endif
++
++#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_LOGIN
++#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_LOGIN		2402 /* Logged in as crypto officer */
++#endif
++
++#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_LOGOUT
++#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_LOGOUT		2403 /* Logged out from crypto */
++#endif
++
++#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER
++#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER		2404 /* Create,delete,negotiate */
++#endif
++
++#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_FAILURE_USER
++#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_FAILURE_USER	2405 /* Fail decrypt,encrypt,randomiz */
++#endif
++
++#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_REPLAY_USER
++#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_REPLAY_USER	2406 /* Crypto replay detected */
++#endif
++
++#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
++#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION		2407 /* Record parameters set during
++						TLS session establishment */
++#endif
++
++
++#ifndef AUDIT_LAST_CRYPTO_MSG
++#define AUDIT_LAST_CRYPTO_MSG		2499
++#endif
++
++
++#ifdef __cplusplus
++}
++#endif
++
++#endif /* _COMPAT_LIBAUDIT_H_ */
++

openssh-6.5p1-audit8-libaudit_dns_timeouts.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# bnc#752354, bnc#757360
+# prevent timeouts in libaudit code caused by DNS misconfiguration by
+# explicitely disabling DNS lookups in libaudit when UseDNS is false.
+# Note that this particular solution causes the logs to always contain
+# "hostname=?, addr=?" when DNS lookups are disabled.
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
+@@ -62,17 +62,17 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const c
+ 		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ 		    errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ 			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ 		else
+ 			goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
+ 	}
+ 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
+ 	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
+-	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
++	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, options.use_dns ? hostname : NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
+ 	saved_errno = errno;
+ 	close(audit_fd);
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
+ 	 * root user.
+ 	 */
+ 	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
+ 		rc = 0;
+@@ -114,17 +114,17 @@ linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const cha
+ 			goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
+ 	}
+ 	
+ 	if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN))
+ 		event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
+ 
+ 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH,
+ 	    NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)",
+-	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
++	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, options.use_dns ? hostname : NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
+ 	saved_errno = errno;
+ 	close(audit_fd);
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
+ 	 * root user.
+ 	 */
+ 	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
+ 		rc = 0;

openssh-6.5p1-blocksigalrm.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+# block SIGALRM while logging through syslog to prevent deadlocks (through
+# grace_alarm_handler)
+# bnc#57354
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/log.c b/openssh-6.5p1/log.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/log.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/log.c
+@@ -47,16 +47,17 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+ # include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "log.h"
++#include <signal.h>
+ 
+ static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ static int log_on_stderr = 1;
+ static int log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO;
+ static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
+ static char *argv0;
+ static log_handler_fn *log_handler;
+ static void *log_handler_ctx;
+@@ -384,16 +385,17 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, 
+ {
+ #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+ 	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+ #endif
+ 	char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
+ 	char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
+ 	char *txt = NULL;
+ 	int pri = LOG_INFO;
++	sigset_t nset, oset;
+ 	int saved_errno = errno;
+ 	log_handler_fn *tmp_handler;
+ 
+ 	if (level > log_level)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	switch (level) {
+ 	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
+@@ -442,20 +444,29 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, 
+ 		tmp_handler = log_handler;
+ 		log_handler = NULL;
+ 		tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);
+ 		log_handler = tmp_handler;
+ 	} else if (log_on_stderr) {
+ 		snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%s\r\n", fmtbuf);
+ 		(void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf));
+ 	} else {
++		/* Prevent a race between the grace_alarm
++		* which writes a log message and terminates
++		* and main sshd code that leads to deadlock 
++		* as syslog is not async safe.
++		*/ 
++		sigemptyset(&nset);
++		sigaddset(&nset, SIGALRM);
++		sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
+ #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+ 		openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
+ 		syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
+ 		closelog_r(&sdata);
+ #else
+ 		openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
+ 		syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
+ 		closelog();
+ #endif
++		sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
+ 	}
+ 	errno = saved_errno;
+ }

openssh-6.5p1-default-protocol.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# only enable SSHv2 protocol by default (upstream default is fallback to v1)
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config
+@@ -41,17 +41,17 @@ ForwardX11Trusted yes
+ #   CheckHostIP yes
+ #   AddressFamily any
+ #   ConnectTimeout 0
+ #   StrictHostKeyChecking ask
+ #   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
+ #   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+ #   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+ #   Port 22
+-#   Protocol 2,1
++Protocol 2
+ #   Cipher 3des
+ #   Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc
+ #   MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160
+ #   EscapeChar ~
+ #   Tunnel no
+ #   TunnelDevice any:any
+ #   PermitLocalCommand no
+ #   VisualHostKey no

openssh-6.5p1-disable-openssl-abi-check.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# disable run-time check for OpenSSL ABI by version number as that is not a
+# reliable indicator of ABI changes and doesn't make much sense in a
+# distribution package
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/entropy.c b/openssh-6.5p1/entropy.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/entropy.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/entropy.c
+@@ -212,22 +212,23 @@ seed_rng(void)
+ #endif
+ 	/*
+ 	 * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
+ 	 * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
+ 	 * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
+ 	 * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
+ 	 * within a patch series.
+ 	 */
++#if 0
+ 	u_long version_mask = SSLeay() >= 0x1000000f ?  ~0xffff0L : ~0xff0L;
+ 	if (((SSLeay() ^ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) & version_mask) ||
+ 	    (SSLeay() >> 12) < (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >> 12))
+ 		fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
+ 		    "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
+-
++#endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ 	if (RAND_status() == 1) {
+ 		debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
+ 		fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");

openssh-6.5p1-eal3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# fix paths and references in sshd man pages
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.8 b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.8
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.8
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.8
+@@ -875,17 +875,17 @@ See
+ If this file exists,
+ .Nm
+ refuses to let anyone except root log in.
+ The contents of the file
+ are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
+ refused.
+ The file should be world-readable.
+ .Pp
+-.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
++.It Pa /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv
+ This file is used in exactly the same way as
+ .Pa hosts.equiv ,
+ but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+ rlogin/rsh.
+ .Pp
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+@@ -956,17 +956,17 @@ The content of this file is not sensitiv
+ .Xr sftp 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+ .Xr chroot 2 ,
+ .Xr hosts_access 5 ,
+-.Xr login.conf 5 ,
++.Xr login.defs 5 ,
+ .Xr moduli 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+ .Xr inetd 8 ,
+ .Xr sftp-server 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+ Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5
+@@ -278,18 +278,17 @@ The contents of the specified file are s
+ authentication is allowed.
+ If the argument is
+ .Dq none
+ then no banner is displayed.
+ This option is only available for protocol version 2.
+ By default, no banner is displayed.
+ .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
+-PAM or though authentication styles supported in
+-.Xr login.conf 5 )
++PAM)
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
+ .It Cm ChrootDirectory
+ Specifies the pathname of a directory to
+ .Xr chroot 2
+ to after authentication.
+ All components of the pathname must be root-owned directories that are
+ not writable by any other user or group.
+@@ -576,17 +575,17 @@ and
+ .Pa .shosts
+ files will not be used in
+ .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+ or
+ .Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+ .Pp
+ .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+ and
+-.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
++.Pa /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv
+ are still used.
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
+ .It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts
+ Specifies whether
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ should ignore the user's
+ .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts

openssh-6.5p1-fingerprint_hash.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,730 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent 450c3933f35c6801a682ea32c588e4c9ff73414a
+
+# select fingerprint hash algorithms based on the environment variable
+# SSH_FP_TYPE_ENVVAR and append it to hex and randomart fingerprints
+# Petr Cerny <pcerny@suse.cz>
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/auth-rsa.c b/openssh-6.5p1/auth-rsa.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/auth-rsa.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/auth-rsa.c
+@@ -226,17 +226,17 @@ rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *p
+ 
+ 		/* check the real bits  */
+ 		keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+ 		if (keybits < 0 || bits != keybits)
+ 			logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
+ 			    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
+ 			    file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
+ 
+-		fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++		fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 		debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
+ 		    file, linenum, key_type(key), fp);
+ 		free(fp);
+ 
+ 		/* Never accept a revoked key */
+ 		if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
+ 			break;
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/auth.c b/openssh-6.5p1/auth.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/auth.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/auth.c
+@@ -680,17 +680,17 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
+ 	case -1:
+ 		/* Error opening revoked_keys_file: refuse all keys */
+ 		error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key "
+ 		    "authentication");
+ 		return 1;
+ 	case 1:
+  revoked:
+ 		/* Key revoked */
+-		key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++		key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 		error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
+ 		    "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
+ 		free(key_fp);
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
+ 	fatal("key_in_file returned junk");
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-hostbased.c b/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-hostbased.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+@@ -202,23 +202,23 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw,
+ 		    _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2,
+ 		    options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL :
+ 		    _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
+ 		if (key_is_cert(key)) {
+ 			fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+-			    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++			    key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 			verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
+ 			    "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
+ 			    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
+ 			    cuser, lookup);
+ 		} else {
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++			fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
+ 			    key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
+ 		}
+ 		free(fp);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return (host_status == HOST_OK);
+ }
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-pubkey.c b/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-pubkey.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -208,25 +208,25 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con
+ 		i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap);
+ 		va_end(ap);
+ 		if (i < 0 || extra == NULL)
+ 			fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);	
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (key_is_cert(key)) {
+ 		fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+-		    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++		    key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", 
+ 		    key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
+ 		    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
+ 		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
+ 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
+ 		free(fp);
+ 	} else {
+-		fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++		fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp,
+ 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
+ 		free(fp);
+ 	}
+ 	free(extra);
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -360,17 +360,17 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file,
+ 		if (key_is_cert(key)) {
+ 			if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
+ 				continue;
+ 			if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
+ 			    linenum) != 1)
+ 				continue;
+ 			if (!key_is_cert_authority)
+ 				continue;
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,
++			fp = key_fingerprint(found, key_fp_type_select(),
+ 			    SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
+ 			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
+ 			/*
+ 			 * If the user has specified a list of principals as
+ 			 * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
+ 			 * their username in the certificate principals list.
+ 			 */
+@@ -401,17 +401,17 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file,
+ 			break;
+ 		} else if (key_equal(found, key)) {
+ 			if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
+ 			    linenum) != 1)
+ 				continue;
+ 			if (key_is_cert_authority)
+ 				continue;
+ 			found_key = 1;
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++			fp = key_fingerprint(found, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 			debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
+ 			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
+ 			free(fp);
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	if (found != NULL)
+ 		key_free(found);
+@@ -427,17 +427,17 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, 
+ 	char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
+ 	const char *reason;
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ 	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+-	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	    key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 
+ 	if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
+ 	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) {
+ 		debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
+ 		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
+ 		    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/key.c b/openssh-6.5p1/key.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/key.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/key.c
+@@ -420,30 +420,39 @@ key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum f
+ 		*dgst_raw_length = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
+ 	} else {
+ 		fatal("%s: blob is null", __func__);
+ 	}
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
+ static char *
+-key_fingerprint_hex(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len)
++key_fingerprint_hex(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len, enum fp_type dgst_type)
+ {
+ 	char *retval;
+ 	u_int i;
+ 
+-	retval = xcalloc(1, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
++	/* reserve space for both the key hash and the string for the hash type */
++	retval = xcalloc(1, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1 + SSH_FP_TYPE_STRLEN + 2);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
+ 		char hex[4];
+ 		snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%02x:", dgst_raw[i]);
+ 		strlcat(retval, hex, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Remove the trailing ':' character */
+-	retval[(dgst_raw_len * 3) - 1] = '\0';
++	retval[(dgst_raw_len * 3) - 1] = ' ';
++
++	/* Append hash type */
++	{
++		char hash[SSH_FP_TYPE_STRLEN + 2 + 1];
++	    snprintf(hash, sizeof(hash), "[%s]", key_fp_type_str(dgst_type));
++		strlcat(retval, hash, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1 + SSH_FP_TYPE_STRLEN + 2);
++	}
++
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
+ static char *
+ key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len)
+ {
+ 	char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' };
+ 	char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm',
+@@ -518,17 +527,18 @@ key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgs
+  * can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 .
+  * Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would
+  * fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore.
+  */
+ #define	FLDBASE		8
+ #define	FLDSIZE_Y	(FLDBASE + 1)
+ #define	FLDSIZE_X	(FLDBASE * 2 + 1)
+ static char *
+-key_fingerprint_randomart(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len, const Key *k)
++key_fingerprint_randomart(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len, const Key *k,
++    enum fp_type dgst_type)
+ {
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Chars to be used after each other every time the worm
+ 	 * intersects with itself.  Matter of taste.
+ 	 */
+ 	char	*augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE";
+ 	char	*retval, *p;
+ 	u_char	 field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y];
+@@ -585,18 +595,19 @@ key_fingerprint_randomart(u_char *dgst_r
+ 		*p++ = '|';
+ 		for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++)
+ 			*p++ = augmentation_string[MIN(field[x][y], len)];
+ 		*p++ = '|';
+ 		*p++ = '\n';
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* output lower border */
+-	*p++ = '+';
+-	for (i = 0; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
++	i = snprintf(p, FLDSIZE_X, "+--[%s]", key_fp_type_str(dgst_type));
++	p += i;
++	for (i--; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
+ 		*p++ = '-';
+ 	*p++ = '+';
+ 
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+ key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
+@@ -605,34 +616,91 @@ key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_ty
+ 	u_char *dgst_raw;
+ 	u_int dgst_raw_len;
+ 
+ 	dgst_raw = key_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_type, &dgst_raw_len);
+ 	if (!dgst_raw)
+ 		fatal("key_fingerprint: null from key_fingerprint_raw()");
+ 	switch (dgst_rep) {
+ 	case SSH_FP_HEX:
+-		retval = key_fingerprint_hex(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
++		retval = key_fingerprint_hex(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, dgst_type);
+ 		break;
+ 	case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE:
+ 		retval = key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ 		break;
+ 	case SSH_FP_RANDOMART:
+-		retval = key_fingerprint_randomart(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k);
++		retval = key_fingerprint_randomart(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k, dgst_type);
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		fatal("key_fingerprint: bad digest representation %d",
+ 		    dgst_rep);
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+ 	memset(dgst_raw, 0, dgst_raw_len);
+ 	free(dgst_raw);
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
++enum fp_type
++key_fp_type_select(void)
++{
++	static enum fp_type fp;
++	static char fp_defined = 0;
++	char *env;
++
++	if (!fp_defined) {
++		env = getenv(SSH_FP_TYPE_ENVVAR);
++		if (env) {
++			if (!strcasecmp(env, "md5") ||
++			    !strcasecmp(env, "md-5"))
++				fp = SSH_FP_MD5;
++			else if (!strcasecmp(env, "sha1") ||
++			    !strcasecmp(env, "sha-1"))
++				fp = SSH_FP_SHA1;
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
++			else if (!strcasecmp(env, "sha256") ||
++			    !strcasecmp(env, "sha-256"))
++				fp = SSH_FP_SHA256;
++#endif
++			else {
++				error("invalid key type in environment variable "
++				    SSH_FP_TYPE_ENVVAR ": '%s' - falling back to MD5.",
++				    env);
++				fp = SSH_FP_MD5;
++			}
++		} else
++			fp = SSH_FP_MD5;
++
++		fp_defined = 1;
++   }
++   return fp;
++}
++
++/* 
++ * string lengths must be less or equal to SSH_FP_TYPE_STRLEN (defined in
++ * key.h) as to fit into the fingerprint string buffer
++ */
++char *
++key_fp_type_str(enum fp_type dgst_type)
++{
++	switch (dgst_type) {
++	case SSH_FP_MD5:
++		return "MD5";
++	case SSH_FP_SHA1:
++		return "SHA-1";
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
++	case SSH_FP_SHA256:
++		return "SHA-256";
++#endif
++	default:
++		fatal("%s: unknown key fingerprint hash algorithm requested", __func__);
++	}
++}
++
++
+ /*
+  * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
+  * the pointer.  The integer must already be initialized.  This function is
+  * permitted to modify the buffer.  This leaves *cpp to point just beyond the
+  * last processed (and maybe modified) character.  Note that this may modify
+  * the buffer containing the number.
+  */
+ static int
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/key.h b/openssh-6.5p1/key.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/key.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/key.h
+@@ -53,16 +53,18 @@ enum fp_type {
+ 	SSH_FP_MD5,
+ 	SSH_FP_SHA256
+ };
+ enum fp_rep {
+ 	SSH_FP_HEX,
+ 	SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE,
+ 	SSH_FP_RANDOMART
+ };
++#define SSH_FP_TYPE_ENVVAR  "SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE"
++#define SSH_FP_TYPE_STRLEN  8
+ 
+ /* key is stored in external hardware */
+ #define KEY_FLAG_EXT		0x0001
+ 
+ #define CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS	256
+ struct KeyCert {
+ 	Buffer		 certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */
+ 	u_int		 type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */
+@@ -104,16 +106,18 @@ int		 key_equal_public(const Key *, cons
+ int		 key_equal(const Key *, const Key *);
+ char		*key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);
+ u_char		*key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
+ const char	*key_type(const Key *);
+ const char	*key_cert_type(const Key *);
+ int		 key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
+ int		 key_read(Key *, char **);
+ u_int		 key_size(const Key *);
++enum fp_type	 key_fp_type_select(void);
++char		*key_fp_type_str(enum fp_type);
+ 
+ Key	*key_generate(int, u_int);
+ Key	*key_from_private(const Key *);
+ int	 key_type_from_name(char *);
+ int	 key_is_cert(const Key *);
+ int	 key_type_is_cert(int);
+ int	 key_type_plain(int);
+ int	 key_to_certified(Key *, int);
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-add.c b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-add.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-add.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-add.c
+@@ -325,17 +325,17 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection
+ 	int version;
+ 
+ 	for (version = 1; version <= 2; version++) {
+ 		for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, version);
+ 		    key != NULL;
+ 		    key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) {
+ 			had_identities = 1;
+ 			if (do_fp) {
+-				fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5,
++				fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(),
+ 				    SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 				printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n",
+ 				    key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key));
+ 				free(fp);
+ 			} else {
+ 				if (!key_write(key, stdout))
+ 					fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed");
+ 				fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", comment);
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-agent.c b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -193,17 +193,17 @@ lookup_identity(Key *key, int version)
+ 
+ /* Check confirmation of keysign request */
+ static int
+ confirm_key(Identity *id)
+ {
+ 	char *p;
+ 	int ret = -1;
+ 
+-	p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	p = key_fingerprint(id->key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
+ 	    id->comment, p))
+ 		ret = 0;
+ 	free(p);
+ 
+ 	return (ret);
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-keygen.c b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-keygen.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-keygen.c
+@@ -741,27 +741,27 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ 	Key **keys = NULL;
+ 	int i, nkeys;
+ 	enum fp_rep rep;
+ 	enum fp_type fptype;
+ 	char *fp, *ra;
+ 
+-	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
++	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fp_type_select();
+ 	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
+ 
+ 	pkcs11_init(0);
+ 	nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys);
+ 	if (nkeys <= 0)
+ 		fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
+ 	for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ 		if (print_fingerprint) {
+ 			fp = key_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep);
+-			ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], SSH_FP_MD5,
++			ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], key_fp_type_select(),
+ 			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 			printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", key_size(keys[i]),
+ 			    fp, key_type(keys[i]));
+ 			if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ 				printf("%s\n", ra);
+ 			free(ra);
+ 			free(fp);
+ 		} else {
+@@ -784,29 +784,29 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+ 	FILE *f;
+ 	Key *public;
+ 	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra;
+ 	int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1;
+ 	enum fp_rep rep;
+ 	enum fp_type fptype;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 
+-	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
++	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fp_type_select();
+ 	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
+ 
+ 	if (!have_identity)
+ 		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ 	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+ 		perror(identity_file);
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 	public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);
+ 	if (public != NULL) {
+ 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+-		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++		ra = key_fingerprint(public, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment,
+ 		    key_type(public));
+ 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ 			printf("%s\n", ra);
+ 		key_free(public);
+ 		free(comment);
+ 		free(ra);
+ 		free(fp);
+@@ -862,17 +862,17 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			public = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+ 			if (key_read(public, &cp) != 1) {
+ 				key_free(public);
+ 				continue;
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 		comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
+ 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+-		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++		ra = key_fingerprint(public, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp,
+ 		    comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public));
+ 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ 			printf("%s\n", ra);
+ 		free(ra);
+ 		free(fp);
+ 		key_free(public);
+ 		invalid = 0;
+@@ -983,20 +983,20 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
+ static void
+ printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key *public, int ca, int hash)
+ {
+ 	if (print_fingerprint) {
+ 		enum fp_rep rep;
+ 		enum fp_type fptype;
+ 		char *fp, *ra;
+ 
+-		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
++		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fp_type_select();
+ 		rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
+ 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+-		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++		ra = key_fingerprint(public, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name,
+ 		    key_type(public));
+ 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ 			printf("%s\n", ra);
+ 		free(ra);
+ 		free(fp);
+ 	} else {
+ 		if (hash && (name = host_hash(name, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
+@@ -1873,19 +1873,19 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
+ 	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ 	if ((key = key_load_public(identity_file, NULL)) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("%s is not a public key", identity_file);
+ 	if (!key_is_cert(key))
+ 		fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file);
+ 	v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00;
+ 
+-	key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+-	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	    key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 
+ 	printf("%s:\n", identity_file);
+ 	printf("        Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key),
+ 	    key_cert_type(key));
+ 	printf("        Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp);
+ 	printf("        Signing CA: %s %s\n",
+ 	    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp);
+ 	printf("        Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
+@@ -2681,18 +2681,18 @@ passphrase_again:
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 	if (!key_write(public, f))
+ 		fprintf(stderr, "write key failed\n");
+ 	fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
+ 	fclose(f);
+ 
+ 	if (!quiet) {
+-		char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-		char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5,
++		char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
++		char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, key_fp_type_select(),
+ 		    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 		printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
+ 		    identity_file);
+ 		printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
+ 		printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
+ 		printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
+ 		printf("%s\n", ra);
+ 		free(ra);
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect.c b/openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect.c
+@@ -906,18 +906,18 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ 				    "address '%.128s' to the list of known "
+ 				    "hosts (%.30s).", type, ip,
+ 				    user_hostfiles[0]);
+ 			else
+ 				logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
+ 				    "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
+ 				    "of known hosts.", type, ip);
+ 		} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
++			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
++			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(),
+ 			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra);
+ 			free(ra);
+ 			free(fp);
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case HOST_NEW:
+ 		if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
+@@ -947,18 +947,18 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ 
+ 			if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key))
+ 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1),
+ 				    "\nbut keys of different type are already"
+ 				    " known for this host.");
+ 			else
+ 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
+ 			/* The default */
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
++			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
++			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(),
+ 			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 			msg2[0] = '\0';
+ 			if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
+ 				if (matching_host_key_dns)
+ 					snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
+ 					    "Matching host key fingerprint"
+ 					    " found in DNS.\n");
+ 				else
+@@ -1212,17 +1212,17 @@ fail:
+ 
+ /* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
+ int
+ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
+ {
+ 	int flags = 0;
+ 	char *fp;
+ 
+-	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 	debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp);
+ 	free(fp);
+ 
+ 	/* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */
+ 	if (!key_is_cert(host_key) && options.verify_host_key_dns &&
+ 	    verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) {
+ 		if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
+ 
+@@ -1319,18 +1319,18 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkey
+ 	char *fp, *ra;
+ 	const struct hostkey_entry *found;
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) {
+ 		if (type[i] == key->type)
+ 			continue;
+ 		if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
+ 			continue;
+-		fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-		ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++		fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
++		ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 		logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
+ 		    "in %s:%lu\n"
+ 		    "%s key fingerprint %s.",
+ 		    key_type(found->key),
+ 		    found->host, found->file, found->line,
+ 		    key_type(found->key), fp);
+ 		if (options.visual_host_key)
+ 			logit("%s", ra);
+@@ -1341,17 +1341,17 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkey
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
+ {
+ 	char *fp;
+ 
+-	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 
+ 	error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ 	error("@    WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!     @");
+ 	error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ 	error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
+ 	error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
+ 	error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
+ 	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect2.c b/openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -592,17 +592,17 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+ 	if (key->type != pktype) {
+ 		error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
+ 		    "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
+ 		    key->type, pktype);
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
+ 	free(fp);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been
+ 	 * moved to the end of the queue.  this also avoids confusion by
+ 	 * duplicate keys
+ 	 */
+@@ -1206,17 +1206,17 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt,
+ 	Buffer b;
+ 	u_char *blob, *signature;
+ 	u_int bloblen, slen;
+ 	u_int skip = 0;
+ 	int ret = -1;
+ 	int have_sig = 1;
+ 	char *fp;
+ 
+-	fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp);
+ 	free(fp);
+ 
+ 	if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+ 		/* we cannot handle this key */
+ 		debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}

openssh-6.5p1-gssapimitm.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,431 @@
+# The patch below adds support for the deprecated 'gssapi' authentication
+# mechanism to OpenSSH 3.8p1. The newer 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism is included
+# in this release. The use of 'gssapi' is deprecated due to the presence of
+# potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which 'gssapi-with-mic' is not
+# susceptible to.
+#
+# To use the patch apply it to a OpenSSH 3.8p1 source tree. After compiling,
+# backwards compatibility may be obtained by supplying the
+# 'GssapiEnableMitmAttack yes' option to either the client or server.
+#
+# It should be noted that this patch is being made available purely as a means
+# of easing the process of moving to OpenSSH 3.8p1. Any new installations are
+# recommended to use the 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism. Existing installations
+# are encouraged to upgrade as soon as possible.
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-gss.c b/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-gss.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-gss.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -173,16 +173,25 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t p
+ 			dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ 			if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)
+ 				dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
+ 				    &input_gssapi_mic);
+ 			else
+ 				dispatch_set(
+ 				    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
+ 				    &input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
++
++			/* 
++			 * Old style 'gssapi' didn't have the GSSAPI_MIC 
++			 * and went straight to sending exchange_complete 
++			 */
++			if (options.gss_enable_mitm)
++				dispatch_set(
++				    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
++				    &input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+@@ -291,9 +300,15 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ }
+ 
+ Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+ 	"gssapi-with-mic",
+ 	userauth_gssapi,
+ 	&options.gss_authentication
+ };
+ 
++Authmethod method_gssapi_old = {
++	"gssapi",
++	userauth_gssapi,
++	&options.gss_enable_mitm
++};
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/auth2.c b/openssh-6.5p1/auth2.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/auth2.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/auth2.c
+@@ -65,26 +65,28 @@ extern Buffer loginmsg;
+ 
+ extern Authmethod method_none;
+ extern Authmethod method_pubkey;
+ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
+ extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+ extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
++extern Authmethod method_gssapi_old;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+ extern Authmethod method_jpake;
+ #endif
+ 
+ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+ 	&method_none,
+ 	&method_pubkey,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	&method_gssapi,
++	&method_gssapi_old,
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+ 	&method_jpake,
+ #endif
+ 	&method_passwd,
+ 	&method_kbdint,
+ 	&method_hostbased,
+ 	NULL
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/readconf.c b/openssh-6.5p1/readconf.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/readconf.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/readconf.c
+@@ -134,17 +134,17 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	oCompressionLevel, oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts,
+ 	oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oProtocol, oMacs,
+ 	oGlobalKnownHostsFile2, oUserKnownHostsFile2, oPubkeyAuthentication,
+ 	oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias,
+ 	oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication,
+ 	oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oPKCS11Provider,
+ 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+-	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, oGssEnableMITM,
+ 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ 	oHashKnownHosts,
+ 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
+ 	oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming, oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+ 	oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
+ 	oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
+ 	oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
+@@ -178,19 +178,21 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
+ 	{ "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },  /* alias */
+ 	{ "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++	{ "gssapienablemitmattack", oGssEnableMITM },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapienablemitmattack", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+ 	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
+ 	{ "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
+ 	{ "identityfile2", oIdentityFile },			/* obsolete */
+ 	{ "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly },
+ 	{ "hostname", oHostName },
+ 	{ "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias },
+@@ -837,16 +839,20 @@ parse_time:
+ 
+ 	case oGssAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
+ 	case oGssDelegateCreds:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
++		
++	case oGssEnableMITM:
++		intptr = &options->gss_enable_mitm;
++		goto parse_flag;
+ 
+ 	case oBatchMode:
+ 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
+ 	case oCheckHostIP:
+ 		intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1484,16 +1490,17 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ 	options->xauth_location = NULL;
+ 	options->gateway_ports = -1;
+ 	options->use_privileged_port = -1;
+ 	options->rsa_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++	options->gss_enable_mitm = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+ 	options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->batch_mode = -1;
+ 	options->check_host_ip = -1;
+ 	options->strict_host_key_checking = -1;
+@@ -1591,16 +1598,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 	if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ 		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++	if (options->gss_enable_mitm == -1)
++		options->gss_enable_mitm = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
+ 	if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/readconf.h b/openssh-6.5p1/readconf.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/readconf.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/readconf.h
+@@ -50,16 +50,17 @@ typedef struct {
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     rsa_authentication;	/* Try RSA authentication. */
+ 	int     pubkey_authentication;	/* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
+ 	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
+ 	int     challenge_response_authentication;
+ 					/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
+ 	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
++	int 	gss_enable_mitm;	/* Enable old style gssapi auth */
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+ 	char	*kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */
+ 	int     zero_knowledge_password_authentication;	/* Try jpake */
+ 	int     batch_mode;	/* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */
+ 	int     check_host_ip;	/* Also keep track of keys for IP address */
+ 	int     strict_host_key_checking;	/* Strict host key checking. */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.c
+@@ -104,16 +104,17 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions 
+ 	options->rsa_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kerberos_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
+ 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+ 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
+ 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
++	options->gss_enable_mitm = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+ 	options->permit_user_env = -1;
+ 	options->use_login = -1;
+ 	options->compression = -1;
+ 	options->rekey_limit = -1;
+@@ -242,16 +243,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1)
+ 		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
+ 	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
+ 		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+ 		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
++	if (options->gss_enable_mitm == -1)
++		options->gss_enable_mitm = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
+ 	if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1)
+ 		options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
+@@ -338,17 +341,17 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPermitUserEnvironment, sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
+ 	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
+ 	sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile,
+ 	sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem,
+ 	sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
+ 	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
+ 	sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+-	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
++	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, sGssEnableMITM,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+ 	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
+ 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+ 	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
+ 	sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
+ 	sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent,
+ 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
+@@ -405,19 +408,21 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapienablemitmattack", sGssEnableMITM },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapienablemitmattack", sUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+ 	{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication", sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+@@ -1093,16 +1098,20 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 	case sGssAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
+ 	case sGssCleanupCreds:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sGssEnableMITM:
++		intptr = &options->gss_enable_mitm;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
+ 	case sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.h b/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.h
+@@ -108,16 +108,17 @@ typedef struct {
+ 						 * such as SecurID or
+ 						 * /etc/passwd */
+ 	int     kerberos_ticket_cleanup;	/* If true, destroy ticket
+ 						 * file on logout. */
+ 	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
+ 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
++	int	    gss_enable_mitm;	/* If true, enable old style GSSAPI */
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* If true, permit password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
+ 	int     challenge_response_authentication;
+ 	int     zero_knowledge_password_authentication;
+ 					/* If true, permit jpake auth */
+ 	int     permit_empty_passwd;	/* If false, do not permit empty
+ 					 * passwords. */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config
+@@ -51,9 +51,16 @@ ForwardX11Trusted yes
+ #   Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc
+ #   MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160
+ #   EscapeChar ~
+ #   Tunnel no
+ #   TunnelDevice any:any
+ #   PermitLocalCommand no
+ #   VisualHostKey no
+ #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
++
++# Set this to 'yes' to enable support for the deprecated 'gssapi' authentication
++# mechanism to OpenSSH 3.8p1. The newer 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism is included
++# in this release. The use of 'gssapi' is deprecated due to the presence of 
++# potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which 'gssapi-with-mic' is not susceptible to.
++#   GSSAPIEnableMITMAttack no
++
+ #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect2.c b/openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -324,16 +324,21 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
+ 
+ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	{"gssapi-with-mic",
+ 		userauth_gssapi,
+ 		NULL,
+ 		&options.gss_authentication,
+ 		NULL},
++	{"gssapi",
++		userauth_gssapi,
++		NULL,
++		&options.gss_enable_mitm,
++		NULL},
+ #endif
+ 	{"hostbased",
+ 		userauth_hostbased,
+ 		NULL,
+ 		&options.hostbased_authentication,
+ 		NULL},
+ 	{"publickey",
+ 		userauth_pubkey,
+@@ -698,17 +703,19 @@ process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buf
+ 
+ 		packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+ 		packet_send();
+ 		gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ 		/* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */
+-		if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
++		
++		if (strcmp(authctxt->method->name,"gssapi") == 0 ||
++		    (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) {
+ 			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE);
+ 			packet_send();
+ 		} else {
+ 			ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user,
+ 			    authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic");
+ 
+ 			gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+ 			gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config
+@@ -80,16 +80,23 @@ PasswordAuthentication no
+ #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+ #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
+ #KerberosGetAFSToken no
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+ 
++# Set this to 'yes' to enable support for the deprecated 'gssapi' authentication
++# mechanism to OpenSSH 3.8p1. The newer 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism is included
++# in this release. The use of 'gssapi' is deprecated due to the presence of 
++# potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which 'gssapi-with-mic' is not susceptible to.
++#GSSAPIEnableMITMAttack no
++ 
++
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+ # be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
+ # PasswordAuthentication.  Depending on your PAM configuration,
+ # PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
+ # the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication

openssh-6.5p1-host_ident.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# identify hashed hosts in known_hosts and suggest command line for their
+# removal
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect.c b/openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect.c
+@@ -1067,16 +1067,21 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ 				    ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
+ 		}
+ 		/* The host key has changed. */
+ 		warn_changed_key(host_key);
+ 		error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
+ 		    user_hostfiles[0]);
+ 		error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
+ 		    host_found->file, host_found->line);
++		error("You can use following command to remove all keys for this IP:");
++		if (host_found->file)
++			error("ssh-keygen -R %s -f %s", hostname, host_found->file);
++		else
++			error("ssh-keygen -R %s", hostname);
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
+ 		 * to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
+ 		 */
+ 		if (options.strict_host_key_checking) {
+ 			error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
+ 			    "requested strict checking.", type, host);

openssh-6.5p1-key-converter.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,534 @@
+# SSHv1 to SSHv2 RSA keys converter
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/converter/Makefile b/openssh-6.5p1/converter/Makefile
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/converter/Makefile
+@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
++
++bindir=/usr/bin
++mandir=/usr/share/man
++
++all :	ssh-keyconverter
++
++ssh-keyconverter.o: ssh-keyconverter.c ../key.h ../authfile.h ../misc.h ../xmalloc.h
++	gcc $(RPM_OPT_FLAGS) -c -I../ $< -o $@
++
++ssh-keyconverter: ssh-keyconverter.o ../libssh.a ../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
++	gcc $< -Wl,--no-as-needed $(RPM_OPT_FLAGS) -L../ -L../openbsd-compat/ -lcrypto -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lpam -ldl -lwrap -lutil -lz -lnsl -lcrypt -lssl -o $@
++
++install: ssh-keyconverter ssh-keyconverter.1
++	if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) ]; then install -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(bindir); fi
++	install -m 755 ssh-keyconverter $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
++	if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1 ]; then install -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1; fi
++	install -m 644 ssh-keyconverter.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.1 b/openssh-6.5p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.1
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.1
+@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
++.\" Manpage for ssh-keyconverter
++.\"
++.Dd February 2, 2002
++.Dt SSH-KEYCONVER 1
++.Os
++.Sh NAME
++.Nm ssh-keyconvert
++.Nd convert ssh v1 keys and authorization files
++.Sh SYNOPSIS
++.Nm ssh-keyconvert
++.Op Fl k
++.Op Fl o Ar output_file
++.Ar identity_file ...
++.Nm ssh-keyconvert
++.Op Fl a
++.Op Fl o Ar output_file
++.Ar authorization_file ...
++.Sh DESCRIPTION
++.Nm
++converts RSA public and private keys used for public key based
++user authentication with protocol version 1 to the format
++used with protocol version 2.
++.Pp
++When using RSA user authentication with SSH protocol version 1,
++the client uses the private key from
++.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
++to provide its identity to the server. The server grants or denies
++access based on whether the public part of this key is listed in
++.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys .
++.Pp
++SSH protocol version 2 supports both DSA and RSA keys, but the
++way RSA keys are stored are differently. On the client, the default
++file name is
++.Pa .ssh/id_rsa
++rather than
++.Pa .ssh/identity ,
++and the file's format is different as well. On the server, the
++public porting of the key can still be stored in
++.Pa .ssh/authorized_keys ,
++but the key notation has changed as well.
++Therefore, when switching from protocol version 1
++to version 2, you either have to create a new identity key using
++.Xr ssh-keygen 1
++and add that key to the server's
++.Pa authorized_keys
++file, or you need to convert your keys using
++.Nm ssh-keyconvert .
++.Pp
++By default,
++.Nm
++will try to guess the type of file that is to be converted.
++If it fails to guess correctly, you can tell if what type of
++conversion to perform by specifying the
++.Fl k
++option to convert the private key, or the
++.Fl a
++option to convert an authorisation file.
++.Pp
++When converting your private keys stored in
++.Pa .ssh/identity ,
++.Nm
++will read the private key, prompting you for the pass phrase
++if the key is protected by a pass phrase. If the
++.Fl o
++option is given, it will write the private key to the specified
++file, using version 2 syntax. If the key was protected by a
++pass phrase, it will use the same pass phrase to protect the new
++file.
++It will also write the public portion of the key to a second file,
++using the specified file name with
++.Dq .pub
++appended.
++If the 
++.Fl o
++option was not given, private and public key will be written to
++.Pa id_rsa
++and
++.Pa id_rsa.pub ,
++respectively, relative to the directory of the input key file.
++.Pp
++If the destination file already exists,
++.Nm
++will prompt the user for confirmation before overwriting the
++file, unless the
++.Fl f
++option is given.
++.Pp
++When converting your
++.Pa authorized_keys
++file,
++.Nm
++will ignore any keys in SSH version 2 format. Any public keys
++in version 1 format will be converted and appended to the output file
++using the new syntax. If the
++.Fl o
++option is given, keys are appended to the specified file. If it
++is not given,
++.Nm
++will append all keys to the input file.
++.Pp
++Note that
++.Nm
++does not check for duplicate keys, so if you run it on
++.Pa .ssh/authorized_keys
++more several times, the converted keys will show up several times.
++.Sh OPTIONS
++.Bl -tag -width Ds
++.It Fl k
++Convert private key file(s). The default is to guess the
++type of file that should be converted.
++.It Fl a
++Convert 
++.Pa authorized_keys
++file(s). The default is to guess the
++type of file that should be converted.
++.It Fl o Ar outfile
++Specify the name of the output file.
++When converting an authorization file, all public keys will
++be appended to this file.
++For private key conversion, the private and public components of
++the key will be stored in
++.Pa outfile
++and
++.Pa outfile.pub ,
++respectively.
++Note that since every key must be stored in a separate file, you
++cannot use this option when you specify several input files.
++.It Fl f
++When converting a key file, and the output file already exists,
++.Nm
++will ask the user whether to overwrite the file. Using this option
++forces overwriting.
++.El
++.Sh AUTHORS
++OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
++ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
++Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
++Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
++removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
++created OpenSSH.
++.Nm
++was contributed by Olaf Kirch.
++.Sh SEE ALSO
++.Xr ssh 1 ,
++.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
++.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
++.Xr sshd 8
++.Rs
++.%A J. Galbraith
++.%A R. Thayer
++.%T "SECSH Public Key File Format"
++.%N draft-ietf-secsh-publickeyfile-01.txt
++.%D March 2001
++.%O work in progress material
++.Re
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.c b/openssh-6.5p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.c
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
++/*
++ * SSH v1 to v2 RSA key converter.
++ *
++ * Instead of a manpage:
++ *
++ *	ssh-keyconverter ~/.ssh/identity
++ *		will put the old RSA key in ~/.ssh/id_rsa and id_rsa.pub
++ *		If a "-o foofah" is given, the keys will be written to
++ *		foofah and foofah.pub, respectively.
++ *
++ *	ssh-keyconverter ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
++ *		will convert all old RSA keys and add them to the
++ *		input file. The -o foofah option will direct
++ *		output to a different file.
++ *		(Note that it's harmless to specify the same file
++ *		as input and output, as ssh-keyconverter will ignore
++ *		any v2 keys, and output is always appended, never
++ *		replacing the original file).
++ *
++ * To compile:
++ *
++ *  gcc -g -Wall -o ssh-keyconverter converter.c \
++ *		-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/  -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh \
++ *		-lpam -ldl -lwrap -lutil -lz -lnsl \
++ *		-Wl,-Bstatic -lcrypto -Wl,-dy
++ *
++ * Enjoy. --okir
++ */
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <getopt.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <sys/param.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include "key.h"
++#include "authfile.h"
++#include "misc.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++
++#define TYPE_KEY		0
++#define TYPE_AUTHKEYS		1
++
++#define PASSPHRASE_ATTEMPTS	3
++
++static int	opt_verbose = 0;
++static int	opt_force = 0;
++
++static void	convert(int, const char *, const char *);
++static void	convert_private_key(const char *, const char *);
++static void	convert_authorized_keys(const char *, const char *);
++static int	fileok(const char *, char *, size_t);
++static int	guess_type(const char *);
++
++int
++main(int argc, char **argv)
++{
++	int	opt_type = -1;
++	char	*opt_outfile = NULL;
++	int	c;
++
++	while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "afko:")) != -1) {
++		switch (c) {
++		case 'a':
++			opt_type = TYPE_AUTHKEYS;
++			break;
++		case 'f':
++			opt_force = 1;
++			break;
++		case 'k':
++			opt_type = TYPE_KEY;
++			break;
++		case 'o':
++			opt_outfile = optarg;
++			break;
++		case 'v':
++			opt_verbose++;
++			break;
++		default:
++			fprintf(stderr,
++				"usage: ssh-keyconvert [-a | -k] "
++				"[-o filename] [-v] ...\n");
++			exit(1);
++		}
++	}
++
++	/* Warning, nanny code follows */
++#if 0
++	if (opt_outfile && (argc - optind) > 1 && opt_type != TYPE_AUTHKEY) {
++		fprintf(stderr,
++			"Output file ambiguous: more than two "
++			"input files given. Abort.\n");
++		exit(1);
++	}
++#endif
++
++	if (optind == argc) {
++		fprintf(stderr,
++			"Missing input file(s).\n");
++		exit(1);
++	}
++
++	for (; optind < argc; optind++) {
++		char	*name = argv[optind];
++		int	type;
++
++		if ((type = opt_type) < 0)
++			type = guess_type(name);
++		convert(type, name, opt_outfile);
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static void
++convert(int type, const char *iname, const char *oname)
++{
++	if (type == TYPE_KEY) {
++		convert_private_key(iname, oname);
++	} else if (type == TYPE_AUTHKEYS) {
++		convert_authorized_keys(iname, oname);
++	} else {
++		fprintf(stderr,
++			"Conversion type not yet implemented.\n");
++		exit(1);
++	}
++}
++
++static void
++convert_private_key(const char *iname, const char *oname)
++{
++	char	prompt[1024], privname[PATH_MAX], pubname[PATH_MAX];
++	char	*comment = NULL, *passphrase;
++	Key	*key = NULL, *pk = NULL;
++	int	i;
++	FILE	*pf = NULL;
++
++	passphrase = xstrdup("");
++	snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
++		"Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ",iname);
++	for (i = 0; !key && i < PASSPHRASE_ATTEMPTS; i++) {
++		if (i) {
++			/* Zap old pass phrase */
++			memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
++			free(passphrase);
++
++			/* Get a pass phrase from the user */
++			passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
++		}
++		key = key_load_private(iname, passphrase, &comment);
++		if (!key && i)
++			printf("Bad passphrase, please try again.\n");
++	}
++
++	if (oname != NULL) {
++		strcpy(privname, oname);
++	} else {
++		const char	*s;
++
++		if ((s = strrchr(iname, '/')) != NULL) {
++			int	n = s + 1 - iname;
++
++			strncpy(privname, iname, n);
++			privname[n++] = '\0';
++		}
++		strcat(privname, "id_rsa");
++	}
++
++	if (!fileok("private", privname, sizeof(privname)))
++		goto out;
++
++	sprintf(pubname, "%s.pub", privname);
++	if (!fileok("public",  pubname, sizeof(pubname)))
++		goto out;
++
++	/* "convert" from RSA1 to RSA */
++	key->type = KEY_RSA;
++	pk = key_from_private(key);
++
++	/* Now write the key in earnest */
++	if (!key_save_private(key, privname, passphrase, comment)) {
++		fprintf(stderr,
++			"Failed to save private key to %s: %m.\n", privname);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (!(pf = fopen(pubname, "w"))) {
++		fprintf(stderr,
++			"Failed to save public key to %s: %m.\n", pubname);
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (!key_write(pk, pf)) {
++		fprintf(stderr,
++			"Failed to save public key to %s: %m.\n", pubname);
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (comment)
++		fprintf(pf, " %s\n", comment);
++
++out:
++	memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
++	free(passphrase);
++	if (key)
++		key_free(key);
++	if (pk)
++		key_free(pk);
++	if (pf)
++		fclose(pf);
++}
++
++static void
++convert_authorized_keys(const char *iname, const char *oname)
++{
++	char	line[1024];
++	FILE	*ifp, *ofp;
++	Key	*key;
++
++	if (!(ifp = fopen(iname, "r"))) {
++		perror(iname);
++		exit(1);
++	}
++
++	if (oname == NULL)
++		oname = iname;
++
++	if (!strcmp(oname, "-")) {
++		ofp = stdout;
++	} else {
++		if ((ofp = fopen(oname, "a")) == NULL) {
++			perror(oname);
++			exit(1);
++		}
++	}
++	setlinebuf(ofp);
++
++#define whitespace(c)	((c) == ' ' || (c) == '\t')
++	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), ifp) != NULL) {
++		char	*cp = line, *options = NULL;
++
++		while (whitespace(*cp))
++			cp++;
++		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
++			continue;
++
++		key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
++		if (key_read(key, &cp) != 1) {
++			/* Skip options, if any */
++			int	quoted = 0;
++
++			options = cp;
++			for (; *cp && (quoted || !whitespace(*cp)); cp++) {
++				if (cp[0] == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
++					++cp;
++				else if (*cp == '"')
++					quoted = !quoted;
++			}
++			if (quoted)
++				goto next;
++			*cp++ = '\0';
++			while (whitespace(*cp))
++				cp++;
++			if (key_read(key, &cp) != 1) 
++				goto next;
++		}
++
++		if (options)
++			fprintf(ofp, "%s ", options);
++		/* "convert" from RSA1 to RSA */
++		key->type = KEY_RSA;
++		key_write(key, ofp);
++		fputs(cp, ofp);
++		key_free(key);
++
++	next:
++		;
++	}
++}
++
++/* if file exists, ask user whether to overwrite it */
++static int
++fileok(const char *what, char *filename, size_t size)
++{
++	char	buffer[PATH_MAX];
++	int	n;
++
++checkagain:
++	if (access(filename, F_OK) < 0)
++		return 1;
++	printf("%s key file %s already exists.\n", what, filename);
++	if (opt_force) {
++		printf("Overwriting because of -f option...\n");
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++tryagain:
++	printf("Please enter a different filename, "
++		"or return to overwrite: ");
++	fflush(stdout);
++
++	n = read(0, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
++	if (n <= 0)
++		printf("\n");
++	if (n < 0) {
++		perror("read failed");
++		exit(1);
++	}
++	if (n == 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "EOF from standard input. Bye.\n");
++		exit(1);
++	}
++	buffer[n] = '\0';
++	while (n && buffer[n-1] == '\n')
++		buffer[--n] = '\0';
++	if (n == 0)
++		return 1;
++	if (n >= size) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Filename too long.\n");
++		goto tryagain;
++	}
++	strcpy(filename, buffer);
++	goto checkagain;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Guess the type of file to be converted.
++ * XXX: should look at the file; v1 key files
++ * start with "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE"
++ */
++static int
++guess_type(const char *name)
++{
++	printf("%s... ", name);
++	if (strstr(name, "identity")) {
++		printf("looks like a key file\n");
++		return TYPE_KEY;
++	}
++	if (strstr(name, "authorized_keys")) {
++		printf("looks like an authorized_keys file\n");
++		return TYPE_AUTHKEYS;
++	}
++
++	if (opt_verbose)
++		printf("unable to identify.");
++	fprintf(stderr, "Please specify the file type for %s. Abort.\n", name);
++	exit(1);
++}

openssh-6.5p1-lastlog.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# set uid for functions that use it to seek in lastlog and wtmp files
+# bnc#18024 (was suse #3024)
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshlogin.c b/openssh-6.5p1/sshlogin.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshlogin.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshlogin.c
+@@ -128,16 +128,17 @@ record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty,
+ {
+ 	struct logininfo *li;
+ 
+ 	/* save previous login details before writing new */
+ 	store_lastlog_message(user, uid);
+ 
+ 	li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, tty);
+ 	login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen);
++	li->uid = uid;
+ 	login_login(li);
+ 	login_free_entry(li);
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+ void
+ record_utmp_only(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user,
+ 		 const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen)

openssh-6.5p1-login_options.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# login-pam cannot handle the option terminator "--" as login from util-linux
+# (this is correct behaviour considering its man-page), hence use option which
+# selects the compile-time branch in the code which doesn't use the terminator
+#
+# bnc#833605
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/configure.ac b/openssh-6.5p1/configure.ac
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/configure.ac
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/configure.ac
+@@ -695,16 +695,18 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
+ 	AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
+ 	;;
+ *-*-linux*)
+ 	no_dev_ptmx=1
+ 	use_pie=auto
+ 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ 	check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
++	AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT], [1],
++	    [Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--")])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1],
+ 		[Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"],
+ 		[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM],
+ 		[Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported"
+ 		if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.])

openssh-6.5p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Do not write a PID file when not daemonizing (e.g. when running from systemd)
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
+@@ -1973,17 +1973,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+ 		signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+ 		signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
+ 		 * is setup and the listen sockets are bound
+ 		 */
+-		if (!debug_flag) {
++		if (!(debug_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
+ 			FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
+ 
+ 			if (f == NULL) {
+ 				error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
+ 				    options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
+ 			} else {
+ 				fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
+ 				fclose(f);

openssh-6.5p1-pam-check-locks.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+# new option UsePAMCheckLocks to enforce checking for locked accounts while
+# UsePAM is used
+# bnc#708678, FATE#312033
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/auth.c b/openssh-6.5p1/auth.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/auth.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/auth.c
+@@ -103,17 +103,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+ 	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
+ 	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_SHADOW
+-	if (!options.use_pam)
++	if (!options.use_pam || options.use_pam_check_locks)
+ 		spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
+ #ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
+ 	if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
+ 		return 0;
+ #endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
+ #endif /* USE_SHADOW */
+ 
+ 	/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
+@@ -123,17 +123,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+ #ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+ 		passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
+ #else
+ 		passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
+ #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* check for locked account */
+-	if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
++	if ((!options.use_pam || options.use_pam_check_locks) && passwd && *passwd) {
+ 		int locked = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
+ 		if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
+ 			 locked = 1;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
+ 		if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.c
+@@ -66,16 +66,17 @@ extern Buffer cfg;
+ 
+ void
+ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ {
+ 	memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options));
+ 
+ 	/* Portable-specific options */
+ 	options->use_pam = -1;
++	options->use_pam_check_locks = -1;
+ 
+ 	/* Standard Options */
+ 	options->num_ports = 0;
+ 	options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
+ 	options->listen_addrs = NULL;
+ 	options->address_family = -1;
+ 	options->num_host_key_files = 0;
+ 	options->num_host_cert_files = 0;
+@@ -158,16 +159,18 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions 
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ {
+ 	/* Portable-specific options */
+ 	if (options->use_pam == -1)
+ 		options->use_pam = 0;
++	if (options->use_pam_check_locks == -1)
++		options->use_pam_check_locks = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* Standard Options */
+ 	if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ 		options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
+ 	if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
+ 		/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
+ 		if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
+ 			options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
+@@ -320,17 +323,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ #endif
+ 
+ }
+ 
+ /* Keyword tokens. */
+ typedef enum {
+ 	sBadOption,		/* == unknown option */
+ 	/* Portable-specific options */
+-	sUsePAM,
++	sUsePAM, sUsePAMChecklocks,
+ 	/* Standard Options */
+ 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime, sKeyRegenerationTime,
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+ 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+ 	sKerberosGetAFSToken,
+ 	sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+ 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+@@ -365,18 +368,20 @@ typedef enum {
+ static struct {
+ 	const char *name;
+ 	ServerOpCodes opcode;
+ 	u_int flags;
+ } keywords[] = {
+ 	/* Portable-specific options */
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	{ "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "usepamchecklocks", sUsePAMChecklocks, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "usepamchecklocks", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	/* Standard Options */
+ 	{ "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },		/* alias */
+ 	{ "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -878,16 +883,19 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	switch (opcode) {
+ 	/* Portable-specific options */
+ 	case sUsePAM:
+ 		intptr = &options->use_pam;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
++	case sUsePAMChecklocks:
++		intptr = &options->use_pam_check_locks;
++		goto parse_flag;
+ 
+ 	/* Standard Options */
+ 	case sBadOption:
+ 		return -1;
+ 	case sPort:
+ 		/* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
+ 		if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
+ 			return 0;
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.h b/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.h
+@@ -162,16 +162,17 @@ typedef struct {
+ 					 */
+ 
+ 	u_int num_authkeys_files;	/* Files containing public keys */
+ 	char   *authorized_keys_files[MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES];
+ 
+ 	char   *adm_forced_command;
+ 
+ 	int	use_pam;		/* Enable auth via PAM */
++	int	use_pam_check_locks;	/* internally check for locked accounts even when using PAM */
+ 
+ 	int	permit_tun;
+ 
+ 	int	num_permitted_opens;
+ 
+ 	char   *chroot_directory;
+ 	char   *revoked_keys_file;
+ 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.0
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.0
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.0
+@@ -720,16 +720,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
+ 
+              Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an
+              equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable
+              either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
+ 
+              If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
+              non-root user.  The default is ``no''.
+ 
++     UsePAMCheckLocks
++             When set to ``yes'', the checks whether the account has been
++             locked with `passwd -l' are performed even when PAM authentication
++             is enabled via UsePAM.  This is to ensure that it is not possible
++             to log in with e.g. a public key (in such a case PAM is used only
++             to set up the session and some PAM modules will not check whether
++             the account is locked in this scenario). The default is ``no''.
++
+      UsePrivilegeSeparation
+              Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an
+              unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic.
+              After successful authentication, another process will be created
+              that has the privilege of the authenticated user.  The goal of
+              privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by
+              containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes.  The
+              default is ``yes''.  If UsePrivilegeSeparation is set to
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1199,16 +1199,28 @@ or
+ .Pp
+ If
+ .Cm UsePAM
+ is enabled, you will not be able to run
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ as a non-root user.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
++.It Cm UsePAMCheckLocks
++When set to 
++.Dq yes
++, the checks whether the account has been locked with
++.Pa passwd -l
++are performed even when PAM authentication is enabled via 
++.Cm UsePAM .
++This is to ensure that it is not possible to log in with e.g. a
++public key (in such a case PAM is used only to set up the session and some PAM
++modules will not check whether the account is locked in this scenario). The
++default is 
++.Dq no .
+ .It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
+ Specifies whether
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process
+ to deal with incoming network traffic.
+ After successful authentication, another process will be created that has
+ the privilege of the authenticated user.
+ The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege

openssh-6.5p1-pam-fix2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# force PAM in defaullt install (this was removed from upstream in 3.8p1)
+# bnc#46749
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config
+@@ -64,17 +64,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ #HostbasedAuthentication no
+ # Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for
+ # RhostsRSAAuthentication and HostbasedAuthentication
+ #IgnoreUserKnownHosts no
+ # Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
+ #IgnoreRhosts yes
+ 
+ # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
+-#PasswordAuthentication yes
++PasswordAuthentication no
+ #PermitEmptyPasswords no
+ 
+ # Change to no to disable s/key passwords
+ #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
+ 
+ # Kerberos options
+ #KerberosAuthentication no
+ #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+@@ -89,17 +89,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+ # be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
+ # PasswordAuthentication.  Depending on your PAM configuration,
+ # PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
+ # the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+-#UsePAM no
++UsePAM yes
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+ #AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ #GatewayPorts no
+ X11Forwarding yes
+ #X11DisplayOffset 10
+ #X11UseLocalhost yes
+ #PermitTTY yes

openssh-6.5p1-pam-fix3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# posix threads are generally not supported nor safe
+# (see upstream log from 2005-05-24)
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/auth-pam.c b/openssh-6.5p1/auth-pam.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/auth-pam.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/auth-pam.c
+@@ -781,17 +781,19 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
+ 			}
+ 			if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ 				if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||
+ 				    (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ 				    options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+ 					fatal("Internal error: PAM auth "
+ 					    "succeeded when it should have "
+ 					    "failed");
++#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+ 				import_environments(&buffer);
++#endif
+ 				*num = 0;
+ 				**echo_on = 0;
+ 				ctxt->pam_done = 1;
+ 				free(msg);
+ 				return (0);
+ 			}
+ 			error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg,
+ 			    sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",

openssh-6.5p1-pts.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# use same lines naming as utempter (prevents problems with using different
+# formats in ?tmp? files)
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/loginrec.c b/openssh-6.5p1/loginrec.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/loginrec.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/loginrec.c
+@@ -538,17 +538,17 @@ getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+ /*
+  * 'line' string utility functions
+  *
+  * These functions process the 'line' string into one of three forms:
+  *
+  * 1. The full filename (including '/dev')
+  * 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev')
+  * 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00
+- *                               /dev/pts/1  -> ts/1 )
++ *                               /dev/pts/1  -> /1 )
+  *
+  * Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when
+  * attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is
+  * performed by one application - say, sshd - so as long as the choice
+  * uniquely identifies a terminal it's ok.
+  */
+ 
+ 
+@@ -599,16 +599,20 @@ line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *s
+ 	/* Always skip prefix if present */
+ 	if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+ 		src += 5;
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY
+ 	if (strncmp(src, "tty", 3) == 0)
+ 		src += 3;
+ #endif
++	if (strncmp(src, "pts/", 4) == 0) {
++		src += 3;
++		if (strlen(src) > 4) src++;
++	}
+ 
+ 	len = strlen(src);
+ 
+ 	if (len > 0) {
+ 		if (((int)len - dstsize) > 0)
+ 			src +=  ((int)len - dstsize);
+ 
+ 		/* note: _don't_ change this to strlcpy */

openssh-6.5p1-saveargv-fix.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# related to bnc#49845, upstream bug #529
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
+@@ -1399,17 +1399,21 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv));
+ 	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+ 		saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
+ 	saved_argv[i] = NULL;
+ 
+ #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+ 	/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
+ 	compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
+-	av = saved_argv;
++
++	av = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * (saved_argc + 1));
++	for (i = 0; i < saved_argc; i++)
++		av[i] = xstrdup(saved_argv[i]);
++	av[i] = NULL;
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
+ 		debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
+ 
+ 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ 	sanitise_stdfd();
+ 

openssh-6.5p1-seed-prng.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,542 @@
+# extended support for (re-)seeding the OpenSSL PRNG from /dev/random
+# bnc#703221, FATE#312172
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-bsm.c
+@@ -504,9 +504,15 @@ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char 
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
++
++void
++audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
+ #endif /* BSM */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit-linux.c
+@@ -398,9 +398,31 @@ audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(cons
+ 	}
+ 	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
+ 			buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
+ 	audit_close(audit_fd);
+ 	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ 	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ 		error("cannot write into audit");
+ }
++
++void
++audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
++{
++	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=prng_seed kind=server bytes=%li source=%s ", bytes, rf);
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
++					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
++			error("cannot open audit");
++		return;
++	}
++	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE_USER,
++			buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		error("cannot write into audit");
++}
+ #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.c
+@@ -304,10 +304,16 @@ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char 
+ /*
+  * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
+  */
+ void
+ audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
+ {
+ 	debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
+ }
++
++void
++audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
++{
++	debug("audit PRNG seed euid %d bytes %li source %s", geteuid(), bytes, rf);
++}
+ # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/audit.h
+@@ -63,10 +63,11 @@ void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
+ void	audit_unsupported(int);
+ void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
+ void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
+ void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void	audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
+ void	audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void	audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
++void	audit_linux_prng_seed(long, const char *);
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/entropy.c b/openssh-6.5p1/entropy.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/entropy.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/entropy.c
+@@ -45,16 +45,17 @@
+ 
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "atomicio.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "buffer.h"
++#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding:
+  * If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from
+  * /dev/random), then collect RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes of randomness from
+  * PRNGd.
+  */
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+@@ -229,11 +230,14 @@ seed_rng(void)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
+ 		fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");
+ 	RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
+ 	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+ 
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
++
++	linux_seed();
++
+ 	if (RAND_status() != 1)
+ 		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
+ }
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openssh-6.5p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+@@ -15,17 +15,17 @@ AR=@AR@
+ RANLIB=@RANLIB@
+ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+ LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
+ 
+ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha2.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o
+ 
+ COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
+ 
+-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
++PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+ 
+ .c.o:
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+ 
+ all: libopenbsd-compat.a
+ 
+ $(COMPAT): ../config.h
+ $(OPENBSD): ../config.h
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c b/openssh-6.5p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
++ *           (c) 2011 Petr Cerny <pcerny@suse.cz>
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++#include "defines.h"
++
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <openssl/rand.h>
++
++#include "log.h"
++#include "port-linux.h"
++#include "audit.h"
++
++#define RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT	6L
++#define RNG_ENV_VAR			"SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG"
++
++long rand_bytes = 0;
++char *rand_file = NULL;
++
++static void
++linux_seed_init(void)
++{
++	long elen = 0;
++	char *env = getenv(RNG_ENV_VAR);
++
++	if (env) {
++		errno = 0;
++		elen = strtol(env, NULL, 10);
++		if (errno) {
++			debug("bogus value in the %s environment variable, using default %li\n",
++				RNG_ENV_VAR, RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT);
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (elen)
++		rand_file = "/dev/random";
++	else
++		rand_file = "/dev/urandom";
++
++	rand_bytes = MAX(elen, RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT);
++}
++
++void
++linux_seed(void)
++{
++	long len;
++	if (!rand_file)
++		linux_seed_init();
++
++	errno = 0;
++	len = RAND_load_file(rand_file, rand_bytes);
++	if (len != rand_bytes) {
++		if (errno)
++			fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", random, strerror(errno));
++		else
++			fatal ("EOF reading %s", random);
++	}
++}
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openssh-6.5p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -14,16 +14,20 @@
+  * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+  * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+  */
+ 
+ #ifndef _PORT_LINUX_H
+ #define _PORT_LINUX_H
+ 
++extern long rand_bytes;
++extern char *rand_file;
++void linux_seed(void);
++
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-add.1 b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-add.1
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-add.1
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-add.1
+@@ -156,16 +156,30 @@ or related script.
+ (Note that on some machines it
+ may be necessary to redirect the input from
+ .Pa /dev/null
+ to make this work.)
+ .It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ Identifies the path of a
+ .Ux Ns -domain
+ socket used to communicate with the agent.
++.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .El
+ .Sh FILES
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
+ Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+ Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-agent.1 b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-agent.1
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-agent.1
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-agent.1
+@@ -196,16 +196,33 @@ Contains the protocol version 2 ED25519 
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+ Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+ .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt
+ .Ux Ns -domain
+ sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
+ These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
+ The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
+ .El
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-keygen.1 b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-keygen.1
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-keygen.1
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-keygen.1
+@@ -827,16 +827,33 @@ on all machines
+ where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
+ There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
+ .Pp
+ .It Pa /etc/moduli
+ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
+ The file format is described in
+ .Xr moduli 5 .
+ .El
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+ .Xr moduli 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ .Rs
+ .%R RFC 4716
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-keysign.8 b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-keysign.8
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-keysign.8
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh-keysign.8
+@@ -75,16 +75,33 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authe
+ .Pp
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
+ If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
+ information corresponding with the private keys above.
+ .El
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ .Sh HISTORY
+ .Nm
+ first appeared in
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh.1 b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh.1
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh.1
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh.1
+@@ -1304,16 +1304,30 @@ reads
+ and adds lines of the format
+ .Dq VARNAME=value
+ to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to
+ change their environment.
+ For more information, see the
+ .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+ option in
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 .
++.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .Sh FILES
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+ .It Pa ~/.rhosts
+ This file is used for host-based authentication (see above).
+ On some machines this file may need to be
+ world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
+ because
+ .Xr sshd 8
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.8 b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.8
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.8
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.8
+@@ -946,16 +946,33 @@ and not group or world-writable.
+ .It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
+ Contains the process ID of the
+ .Nm
+ listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
+ concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
+ started last).
+ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+ .El
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr scp 1 ,
+ .Xr sftp 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c
+@@ -50,16 +50,18 @@
+ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+ # include <sys/stat.h>
+ #endif
+ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+ # include <sys/time.h>
+ #endif
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
++#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h"
++
+ #include <sys/wait.h>
+ 
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <netdb.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+ #include <paths.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -215,16 +217,23 @@ struct {
+ 	Key	**host_pubkeys;		/* all public host keys */
+ 	Key	**host_certificates;	/* all public host certificates */
+ 	int	have_ssh1_key;
+ 	int	have_ssh2_key;
+ 	u_char	ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+ } sensitive_data;
+ 
+ /*
++ * Every RESEED_AFTERth connection triggers call to linux_seed() to re-seed the
++ * random pool.
++ */
++#define RESEED_AFTER    100
++static int re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
++
++/*
+  * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
+  * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
+  */
+ static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
+ 
+ /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
+ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
+ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
+@@ -1313,16 +1322,21 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 			for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
+ 				if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
+ 					startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
+ 					if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
+ 						maxfd = startup_p[0];
+ 					startups++;
+ 					break;
+ 				}
++			if(!(--re_seeding_counter)) {
++				re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
++				linux_seed();
++				audit_linux_prng_seed(rand_bytes, rand_file);
++			}
+ 
+ 			/*
+ 			 * Got connection.  Fork a child to handle it, unless
+ 			 * we are in debugging mode.
+ 			 */
+ 			if (debug_flag) {
+ 				/*
+ 				 * In debugging mode.  Close the listening

openssh-6.5p1-send_locale.patch

@@ -1,23 +1,33 @@
-Index: ssh_config
-===================================================================
---- ssh_config.orig
-+++ ssh_config
-@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ ForwardX11Trusted yes
+# send locales in default configuration
+# bnc#65747
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config
+@@ -58,9 +58,14 @@ ForwardX11Trusted yes
+ #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable support for the deprecated 'gssapi' authentication
+ # mechanism to OpenSSH 3.8p1. The newer 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism is included
+ # in this release. The use of 'gssapi' is deprecated due to the presence of 
  # potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which 'gssapi-with-mic' is not susceptible to.
  #   GSSAPIEnableMITMAttack no
  
-->>>>>>>
 +# This enables sending locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see ssh_config(5).
 +SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
 +SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
 +SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
- #   VisualHostKey no
- #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
-Index: sshd_config
-===================================================================
---- sshd_config.orig
-+++ sshd_config
-@@ -117,6 +117,11 @@ X11Forwarding yes
++
+ #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config
+@@ -127,14 +127,19 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox		# Defaul
+ #VersionAddendum none
+ 
+ # no default banner path
+ #Banner none
+ 
  # override default of no subsystems
  Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
  
@@ -29,3 +39,6 @@ Index: sshd_config
  # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
  #Match User anoncvs
  #	X11Forwarding no
+ #	AllowTcpForwarding no
+ #	PermitTTY no
+ #	ForceCommand cvs server

openssh-6.5p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+# additional option for sftp-server to force file mode for new files
+# FATE#312774
+# http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2010-November/029044.html
+# http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=128896838930893
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-server.8 b/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-server.8
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-server.8
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-server.8
+@@ -33,16 +33,17 @@
+ .Bk -words
+ .Op Fl ehR
+ .Op Fl d Ar start_directory
+ .Op Fl f Ar log_facility
+ .Op Fl l Ar log_level
+ .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
+ .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
+ .Op Fl u Ar umask
++.Op Fl m Ar force_file_permissions
+ .Ek
+ .Nm
+ .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
+ .Sh DESCRIPTION
+ .Nm
+ is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
+ to stdout and expects client requests from stdin.
+ .Nm
+@@ -133,16 +134,20 @@ Places this instance of
+ into a read-only mode.
+ Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change
+ the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
+ .It Fl u Ar umask
+ Sets an explicit
+ .Xr umask 2
+ to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
+ user's default mask.
++.It Fl m Ar force_file_permissions
++Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
++of the default or client requested mode.  Numeric values include:
++777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Option -u is ineffective if -m is set.
+ .El
+ .Pp
+ For logging to work,
+ .Nm
+ must be able to access
+ .Pa /dev/log .
+ Use of
+ .Nm
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-server.c b/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-server.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-server.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-server.c
+@@ -75,16 +75,20 @@ static u_int version;
+ static int init_done;
+ 
+ /* Disable writes */
+ static int readonly;
+ 
+ /* Requests that are allowed/denied */
+ static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist;
+ 
++/* Force file permissions */
++int permforce = 0;
++long permforcemode;
++
+ /* portable attributes, etc. */
+ typedef struct Stat Stat;
+ 
+ struct Stat {
+ 	char *name;
+ 	char *long_name;
+ 	Attrib attrib;
+ };
+@@ -670,16 +674,20 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 	int handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ 
+ 	name = get_string(NULL);
+ 	pflags = get_int();		/* portable flags */
+ 	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
+ 	a = get_attrib();
+ 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
+ 	mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a->perm : 0666;
++    if (permforce == 1) {
++        mode = permforcemode;
++        (void)umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
++    }
+ 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
+ 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
+ 	if (readonly &&
+ 	    ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY ||
+ 	    (flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) {
+ 		verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
+ 	  	status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
+ 	} else {
+@@ -1425,17 +1433,18 @@ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i)
+ static void
+ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ {
+ 	extern char *__progname;
+ 
+ 	fprintf(stderr,
+ 	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
+ 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
+-	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
++	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n\t"
++	    "[-m force_file_permissions]\n",
+ 	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
+ 	    __progname, __progname);
+ 	exit(1);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
+ {
+@@ -1450,17 +1459,17 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, 
+ 	extern char *__progname;
+ 
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+ 	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 
+ 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+ 
+ 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+-	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
++	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (ch) {
+ 		case 'Q':
+ 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
+ 				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n");
+ 				exit(1);
+ 			}
+ 			for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
+ 				printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name);
+@@ -1510,16 +1519,23 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, 
+ 		case 'u':
+ 			errno = 0;
+ 			mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
+ 			if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
+ 			    cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0))
+ 				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
+ 			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
+ 			break;
++        case 'm':
++            permforce = 1;
++            permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
++            if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
++                cp == optarg || (permforcemode == 0 && errno != 0))
++                fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
++            break;
+ 		case 'h':
+ 		default:
+ 			sftp_server_usage();
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 

openssh-6.5p1-sftp_homechroot.patch

@@ -1,45 +1,14 @@
-Index: chrootenv.h
-===================================================================
---- /dev/null
-+++ chrootenv.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
-+/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.30 2008/05/08 12:21:16 djm Exp $ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+#ifndef CHROOTENV_H
-+#define CHROOTENV_H
-+
-+extern int	chroot_no_tree;
-+
-+#endif
-+
-Index: session.c
-===================================================================
---- session.c.orig
-+++ session.c
-@@ -120,6 +120,8 @@ void	do_child(Session *, const char *);
+# run sftp sessions inside a chroot
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/session.c b/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
+@@ -120,16 +120,18 @@ int	do_exec(Session *, const char *);
+ void	do_login(Session *, const char *);
+ #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+ static void	do_pre_login(Session *s);
+ #endif
+ void	do_child(Session *, const char *);
  void	do_motd(void);
  int	check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
  
@@ -48,8 +17,18 @@ Index: session.c
  static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *);
  static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *);
  
-@@ -808,6 +810,11 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 		debug("Forced command (key option) '%.900s'", command);
+ static int session_pty_req(Session *);
+ 
+ /* import */
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern char *__progname;
+@@ -827,16 +829,21 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		    "subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys);
+ 	} else if (command == NULL) {
+ 		snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell");
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */
+ 		snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command");
  	}
  
 +	if ((s->is_subsystem != SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) && chroot_no_tree) {
@@ -57,10 +36,20 @@ Index: session.c
 +		exit (1);
 +	}
 +
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 	if (command != NULL)
- 		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
-@@ -1421,6 +1428,63 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ 		tty = s->tty;
+ 		if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+ 			tty += 5;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d",
+ 	    session_type,
+@@ -1458,67 +1465,132 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
+  		while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
+  			fputs(buf, stderr);
+  		fclose(f);
+  	}
+ 	exit(254);
  }
  
  /*
@@ -85,7 +74,7 @@ Index: session.c
 +			    strerror (errno));
 +		if (!s) {
 +			pclose (f);
-+			fatal ("cannot found filesystem with the chroot directory");
++			fatal ("cannot find filesystem with the chroot directory");
 +		}
 +		(void) strtok (buf, " ");
 +		on = strtok (NULL, " ");
@@ -116,7 +105,7 @@ Index: session.c
 +				return;
 +			}
 +		}
-+		fatal ("chroot into directory without nodev or nosuid");
++		fatal ("chroot into directory without nodev and either noexec or nosuid");
 +	}
 +}
 +
@@ -124,7 +113,9 @@ Index: session.c
   * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components
   * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions.
   */
-@@ -1430,6 +1494,7 @@ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t ui
+ static void
+ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
+ {
  	const char *cp;
  	char component[MAXPATHLEN];
  	struct stat st;
@@ -132,7 +123,11 @@ Index: session.c
  
  	if (*path != '/')
  		fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
-@@ -1441,7 +1506,7 @@ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t ui
+ 	if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
+ 		fatal("chroot path too long");
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Descend the path, checking that each component is a
  	 * root-owned directory with strict permissions.
  	 */
  	for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
@@ -141,7 +136,12 @@ Index: session.c
  			strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
  		else {
  			cp++;
-@@ -1454,14 +1519,20 @@ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t ui
+ 			memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
+ 			component[cp - path] = '\0';
+ 		}
+ 	
+ 		debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component);
+ 
  		if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
  			fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
  			    component, strerror(errno));
@@ -155,52 +155,93 @@ Index: session.c
  			    cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
 +	}
 +	setenv ("TZ", "/etc/localtime", 0);
-+	tzset ();
++	tzset();
  
 +	if (st.st_uid) {
-+		test_nosuid (path, st.st_dev);
++		test_nosuid(path, st.st_dev);
 +		++chroot_no_tree;
  	}
  
  	if (chdir(path) == -1)
-@@ -1472,6 +1543,10 @@ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t ui
+ 		fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
+ 		    "%s", path, strerror(errno));
+ 	if (chroot(path) == -1)
+ 		fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
  	if (chdir("/") == -1)
  		fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s",
  		    __func__, strerror(errno));
-+
-+	if (access ("/etc/localtime", R_OK) < 0)
-+		++chroot_no_tree;
 +
  	verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path);
  }
  
-Index: sftp.c
-===================================================================
---- sftp.c.orig
-+++ sftp.c
-@@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, cons
- 
- extern char *__progname;
- 
-+int	chroot_no_tree = 0;
+ /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
+ void
+ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ 	char *chroot_path, *tmp;
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-chrootenv.h b/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-chrootenv.h
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-chrootenv.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F Chadima.  All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++#ifndef CHROOTENV_H
++#define CHROOTENV_H
 +
- /* Separators for interactive commands */
- #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
++extern int	chroot_no_tree;
++
++#endif
++
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-common.c b/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-common.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-common.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-common.c
+@@ -42,16 +42,17 @@
+ #endif
  
-Index: sftp-common.c
-===================================================================
---- sftp-common.c.orig
-+++ sftp-common.c
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
  #include "xmalloc.h"
  #include "buffer.h"
  #include "log.h"
-+#include "chrootenv.h"
  
  #include "sftp.h"
  #include "sftp-common.h"
-@@ -196,13 +197,13 @@ ls_file(const char *name, const struct s
++#include "sftp-chrootenv.h"
+ 
+ /* Clear contents of attributes structure */
+ void
+ attrib_clear(Attrib *a)
+ {
+ 	a->flags = 0;
+ 	a->size = 0;
+ 	a->uid = 0;
+@@ -193,23 +194,23 @@ ls_file(const char *name, const struct s
+ 	int ulen, glen, sz = 0;
+ 	struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime);
+ 	char *user, *group;
+ 	char buf[1024], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1];
  	char sbuf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+ 	time_t now;
  
  	strmode(st->st_mode, mode);
 -	if (!remote) {
@@ -215,11 +256,20 @@ Index: sftp-common.c
  		group = group_from_gid(st->st_gid, 0);
  	} else {
  		snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid);
-Index: sftp-server-main.c
-===================================================================
---- sftp-server-main.c.orig
-+++ sftp-server-main.c
-@@ -22,11 +22,14 @@
+ 		group = gbuf;
+ 	}
+ 	if (ltime != NULL) {
+ 		now = time(NULL);
+ 		if (now - (365*24*60*60)/2 < st->st_mtime &&
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-server-main.c b/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-server-main.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-server-main.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sftp-server-main.c
+@@ -17,21 +17,24 @@
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
  #include <stdarg.h>
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <unistd.h>
@@ -229,16 +279,47 @@ Index: sftp-server-main.c
  #include "sftp.h"
  #include "misc.h"
  
-+int	chroot_no_tree = 0;
++int chroot_no_tree = 0;
 +
  void
  cleanup_exit(int i)
  {
-Index: sshd_config.0
-===================================================================
---- sshd_config.0.orig
-+++ sshd_config.0
-@@ -143,6 +143,14 @@ DESCRIPTION
+ 	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(i);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ main(int argc, char **argv)
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sftp.c b/openssh-6.5p1/sftp.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sftp.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sftp.c
+@@ -109,16 +109,18 @@ struct complete_ctx {
+ 	char **remote_pathp;
+ };
+ 
+ int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
+     int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
+ 
+ extern char *__progname;
+ 
++int chroot_no_tree = 0;
++
+ /* Separators for interactive commands */
+ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+ 
+ /* ls flags */
+ #define LS_LONG_VIEW	0x0001	/* Full view ala ls -l */
+ #define LS_SHORT_VIEW	0x0002	/* Single row view ala ls -1 */
+ #define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW	0x0004	/* Long view with numeric uid/gid */
+ #define LS_NAME_SORT	0x0008	/* Sort by name (default) */
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.0
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.0
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.0
+@@ -189,16 +189,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
+              session this requires at least a shell, typically sh(1), and
+              basic /dev nodes such as null(4), zero(4), stdin(4), stdout(4),
+              stderr(4), arandom(4) and tty(4) devices.  For file transfer
+              sessions using ``sftp'', no additional configuration of the
+              environment is necessary if the in-process sftp server is used,
               though sessions which use logging do require /dev/log inside the
               chroot directory (see sftp-server(8) for details).
  
@@ -253,11 +334,20 @@ Index: sshd_config.0
               The default is not to chroot(2).
  
       Ciphers
-Index: sshd_config.5
-===================================================================
---- sshd_config.5.orig
-+++ sshd_config.5
-@@ -268,6 +268,17 @@ inside the chroot directory (see
+              Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2.  Multiple
+              ciphers must be comma-separated.  The supported ciphers are:
+ 
+              ``3des-cbc'', ``aes128-cbc'', ``aes192-cbc'', ``aes256-cbc'',
+              ``aes128-ctr'', ``aes192-ctr'', ``aes256-ctr'',
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5
+@@ -324,16 +324,27 @@ For file transfer sessions using
+ no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the
+ in-process sftp server is used,
+ though sessions which use logging do require
+ .Pa /dev/log
+ inside the chroot directory (see
  .Xr sftp-server 8
  for details).
  .Pp
@@ -275,3 +365,8 @@ Index: sshd_config.5
  The default is not to
  .Xr chroot 2 .
  .It Cm Ciphers
+ Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2.
+ Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+ The supported ciphers are:
+ .Pp
+ .Dq 3des-cbc ,

openssh-6.5p1-xauth.patch

@@ -1,8 +1,15 @@
-Index: session.c
-===================================================================
---- session.c.orig
-+++ session.c
-@@ -2463,8 +2463,40 @@ void
+# try to remove xauth cookies on logout
+# bnc#98815
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/session.c b/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
+@@ -2505,18 +2505,50 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta
+ 	if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+ 		chan_write_failed(c);
+ }
+ 
+ void
  session_close(Session *s)
  {
  	u_int i;
@@ -10,7 +17,7 @@ Index: session.c
  
  	debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
 +
-+	do_xauth = s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
++	do_xauth = (s->display != NULL) && (s->auth_proto != NULL) && (s->auth_data != NULL);
 +	if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) {
 +		pid_t pid;
 +		FILE *f;
@@ -42,4 +49,9 @@ Index: session.c
 +
  	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
  		session_pty_cleanup(s);
- 	if (s->term)
+ 	free(s->term);
+ 	free(s->display);
+ 	free(s->x11_chanids);
+ 	free(s->auth_display);
+ 	free(s->auth_data);
+ 	free(s->auth_proto);

openssh-6.5p1-xauthlocalhostname.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+# handle hostname changes when forwarding X
+# bnc#98627
+
+diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/session.c b/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
+--- a/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
++++ b/openssh-6.5p1/session.c
+@@ -1141,17 +1141,17 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char ***
+ 		debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
+ 		child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
+ 
+ 		free(var_name);
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+ static char **
+-do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
++do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell, int *env_size)
+ {
+ 	char buf[256];
+ 	u_int i, envsize;
+ 	char **env, *laddr;
+ 	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+ #if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
+ 	char *path = NULL;
+ #endif
+@@ -1328,25 +1328,27 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
+ 		read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
+ 	}
+ 	if (debug_flag) {
+ 		/* dump the environment */
+ 		fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
+ 		for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
+ 			fprintf(stderr, "  %.200s\n", env[i]);
+ 	}
++
++	*env_size = envsize;
+ 	return env;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+  * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found
+  * first in this order).
+  */
+ static void
+-do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell)
++do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell, char **env, int *env_size)
+ {
+ 	FILE *f = NULL;
+ 	char cmd[1024];
+ 	int do_xauth;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 
+ 	do_xauth =
+ 	    s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
+@@ -1390,22 +1392,30 @@ do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shel
+ 			    "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
+ 			    options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
+ 			    s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
+ 		}
+ 		snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -",
+ 		    options.xauth_location);
+ 		f = popen(cmd, "w");
+ 		if (f) {
++			char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
++		    
+ 			fprintf(f, "remove %s\n",
+ 			    s->auth_display);
+ 			fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n",
+ 			    s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
+ 			    s->auth_data);
+ 			pclose(f);
++			if (gethostname(hostname,sizeof(hostname)) >= 0)
++			    child_set_env(&env,env_size,"XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME",
++					  hostname);
++			else
++			    debug("Cannot set up XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME %s\n",
++				  strerror(errno));
+ 		} else {
+ 			fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+ 			    cmd);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+@@ -1659,16 +1669,17 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+  * ids, and executing the command or shell.
+  */
+ #define ARGV_MAX 10
+ void
+ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
+ {
+ 	extern char **environ;
+ 	char **env;
++	int env_size;
+ 	char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
+ 	const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL;
+ 	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+ 	destroy_sensitive_data();
+ 
+@@ -1725,17 +1736,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 	 * legal, and means /bin/sh.
+ 	 */
+ 	shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
+ 	 * even if shell is overridden from login.conf
+ 	 */
+-	env = do_setup_env(s, shell);
++	env = do_setup_env(s, shell, &env_size);
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ 	shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */
+ 	if (options.use_login)
+ 		hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
+@@ -1794,17 +1805,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 			    strerror(errno));
+ 		if (r)
+ 			exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ 
+ 	if (!options.use_login)
+-		do_rc_files(s, shell);
++		do_rc_files(s, shell, env, &env_size);
+ 
+ 	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
+ 	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+ 
+ 	if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) {
+ 		printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n");
+ 		fflush(NULL);
+ 		exit(1);

openssh-6.5p1.tar.gz

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a1195ed55db945252d5a1730d4a2a2a5c1c9a6aa01ef2e5af750a962623d9027
+size 1293187

openssh-askpass-gnome.changes

@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Wed Feb 12 01:24:16 UTC 2014 - pcerny@suse.com
+
+- Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.5p1
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Fri Jan 24 15:13:09 UTC 2014 - pcerny@suse.com
+
+- Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.4p1
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Thu Sep 19 02:02:56 UTC 2013 - pcerny@suse.com
+
+- spec file cleanup (don't pointelssly build whole OpenSSH)
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Sat Aug  3 18:12:20 UTC 2013 - crrodriguez@opensuse.org
 

openssh-askpass-gnome.spec

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #
 # spec file for package openssh-askpass-gnome
 #
-# Copyright (c) 2013 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
+# Copyright (c) 2014 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
 #
 # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties
 # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ BuildRequires:  openssl-devel
 BuildRequires:  pam-devel
 BuildRequires:  tcpd-devel
 BuildRequires:  update-desktop-files
-Version:        6.2p2
+Version:        6.5p1
 Release:        0
 Requires:       openssh = %{version}
 Summary:        A GNOME-Based Passphrase Dialog for OpenSSH
@@ -35,14 +35,6 @@ Group:          Productivity/Networking/SSH
 Url:            http://www.openssh.com/
 %define _name openssh
 Source:         ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
-Patch:          %{_name}-5.9p1-sshd_config.diff
-Patch1:         %{_name}-5.9p1-pam-fix2.diff
-Patch2:         %{_name}-5.9p1-saveargv-fix.diff
-Patch3:         %{_name}-5.9p1-pam-fix3.diff
-Patch4:         %{_name}-5.9p1-gssapimitm.patch
-Patch5:         %{_name}-5.9p1-eal3.diff
-Patch6:         %{_name}-5.9p1-engines.diff
-Patch7:         %{_name}-5.9p1-blocksigalrm.diff
 BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
 
 %description
@@ -52,35 +44,14 @@ GNOME-based passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
 
 %prep
 %setup -q -n %{_name}-%{version}
-%patch 
-%patch1
-%patch2
-%patch3
-%patch4
-%patch5 -p1
-%patch6 -p1
-%patch7
 
 %build
-aclocal
-autoheader
-autoconf
-%configure \
-	--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
-	--libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/ssh \
-	--with-tcp-wrappers \
-	--with-pam \
-	--with-kerberos5=/usr \
-	--with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \
-	--disable-strip \
-        --target=%{_target_cpu}-suse-linux
 cd contrib
 make %{?_smp_mflags} gnome-ssh-askpass2
-mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass
 
 %install
 install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/
-install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2 %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
 
 %files
 %defattr(-,root,root)

openssh-nocrazyabicheck.patch

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
---- entropy.c.orig
-+++ entropy.c
-@@ -216,12 +216,13 @@ seed_rng(void)
- 	 * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
- 	 * within a patch series.
- 	 */
-+#if 0
- 	u_long version_mask = SSLeay() >= 0x1000000f ?  ~0xffff0L : ~0xff0L;
- 	if (((SSLeay() ^ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) & version_mask) ||
- 	    (SSLeay() >> 12) < (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >> 12))
- 		fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
- 		    "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
--
-+#endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
- 	if (RAND_status() == 1) {
- 		debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");

openssh-nodaemon-nopid.patch

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---- sshd.c.orig
-+++ sshd.c
-@@ -1840,7 +1840,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		 * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
- 		 * is setup and the listen sockets are bound
- 		 */
--		if (!debug_flag) {
-+		if (!(debug_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
- 			FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
- 
- 			if (f == NULL) {

openssh.changes

@@ -1,3 +1,232 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Wed Feb 12 01:24:16 UTC 2014 - pcerny@suse.com
+
+- Update to 6.5p1
+  Features since 6.4p1:
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for key exchange using ECDH in
+    Daniel Bernstein's Curve25519; default when both the client
+    and server support it.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for Ed25519 as a public key type fo
+    rboth server and client.  Ed25519 is an EC signature offering
+    better security than ECDSA and DSA and good performance.
+  * Add a new private key format that uses a bcrypt KDF to better
+    protect keys at rest. Used unconditionally for Ed25519 keys,
+    on demand for other key types via the -o ssh-keygen(1)
+    option.  Intended to become default in the near future.
+    Details documented in PROTOCOL.key.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): new transport cipher
+    "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" combining Daniel Bernstein's
+    ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an
+    authenticated encryption mode. Details documented
+    PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients
+    and servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme.
+    It will still be possible to connect with these
+    clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and
+    OpenSSH will refuse connection entirely in a future release.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse old proprietary clients and servers
+    that use a weaker key exchange hash calculation.
+  * ssh(1): increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups
+    requested for each symmetric key size. New values from NIST
+    Special Publication 800-57 with the upper limit specified by
+    RFC4419.
+  * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): support pkcs#11 tokens that only
+    provide X.509 certs instead of raw public keys (requested as
+    bz#1908).
+  * ssh(1): new ssh_config(5) "Match" keyword that allows
+    conditional configuration to be applied by matching on
+    hostname, user and result of arbitrary commands.
+  * ssh(1): support for client-side hostname canonicalisation
+    using a set of DNS suffixes and rules in ssh_config(5). This
+    allows unqualified names to be canonicalised to
+    fully-qualified domain names to eliminate ambiguity when
+    looking up keys in known_hosts or checking host certificate
+    names.
+  * sftp-server(8): ability to whitelist and/or blacklist sftp
+    protocol requests by name.
+  * sftp-server(8): sftp "fsync@openssh.com" to support calling
+    fsync(2) on an open file handle.
+  * sshd(8): ssh_config(5) PermitTTY to disallow TTY allocation,
+    mirroring the longstanding no-pty authorized_keys option.
+  * ssh(1): ssh_config ProxyUseFDPass option that supports the
+    use of ProxyCommands that establish a connection and then
+    pass a connected file descriptor back to ssh(1). This allows
+    the ProxyCommand to exit rather than staying around to
+    transfer data.
+  Bugfixes since 6.4p1:
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix potential stack exhaustion caused by
+    nested certificates.
+  * ssh(1): bz#1211: make BindAddress work with
+    UsePrivilegedPort.
+  * sftp(1): bz#2137: fix the progress meter for resumed
+    transfer.
+  * ssh-add(1): bz#2187: do not request smartcard PIN when
+    removing keys from ssh-agent.
+  * sshd(8): bz#2139: fix re-exec fallback when original sshd
+    binary cannot be executed.
+  * ssh-keygen(1): make relative-specified certificate expiry
+    times relative to current time and not the validity start
+    time.
+  * sshd(8): bz#2161: fix AuthorizedKeysCommand inside a Match
+    block.
+  * sftp(1): bz#2129: symlinking a file would incorrectly
+    canonicalise the target path.
+  * ssh-agent(1): bz#2175: fix a use-after-free in the PKCS#11
+    agent helper executable.
+  * sshd(8): improve logging of sessions to include the user
+    name, remote host and port, the session type (shell, command,
+    etc.) and allocated TTY (if any).
+  * sshd(8): bz#1297: tell the client (via a debug message) when
+    their preferred listen address has been overridden by the
+    server's GatewayPorts setting.
+  * sshd(8): bz#2162: include report port in bad protocol banner
+    message.
+  * sftp(1): bz#2163: fix memory leak in error path in
+    do_readdir().
+  * sftp(1): bz#2171: don't leak file descriptor on error.
+  * sshd(8): include the local address and port in "Connection
+    from ..." message (only shown at loglevel>=verbose).
+- systemd systems
+  * create sysconfig file on systemd systems as well, yet do not
+    require it at run-time (bnc#862600)
+  * symlink rcsshd to /usr/bin/service
+- rename "-forcepermissions" patch to "-sftp_force_permissions"
+- disable key converter - ssh-keygen is able to do the same
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Tue Feb 11 07:42:09 UTC 2014 - meissner@suse.com
+
+- add a rcsshd symlink to /usr/sbin/service
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Wed Feb  5 08:38:11 UTC 2014 - idonmez@suse.com
+
+- Add openssh-6.2p1-forcepermissions.patch to implement a force
+  permissions mode (fate#312774). The patch is based on
+  http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=128896838930893
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Fri Jan 24 15:13:09 UTC 2014 - pcerny@suse.com
+
+- Update to 6.4p1
+  Features since 6.2p2:
+  * ssh-agent(1) support in sshd(8); allows encrypted hostkeys, or
+    hostkeys on smartcards.
+  * ssh(1)/sshd(8): allow optional time-based rekeying via a
+    second argument to the existing RekeyLimit option. RekeyLimit
+    is now supported in sshd_config as well as on the client.
+  * sshd(8): standardise logging of information during user
+    authentication.
+  * The presented key/cert and the remote username (if available)
+    is now logged in the authentication success/failure message on
+    the same log line as the local username, remote host/port and
+    protocol in use.  Certificates contents and the key
+    fingerprint of the signing CA are logged too.
+  * ssh(1) ability to query what cryptographic algorithms are
+    supported in the binary.
+  * ssh(1): ProxyCommand=- for cases where stdin and stdout
+    already point to the proxy.
+  * ssh(1): allow IdentityFile=none
+  * ssh(1)/sshd(8): -E option to append debugging logs to a
+    specified file instead of stderr or syslog.
+  * sftp(1): support resuming partial downloads with the "reget"
+    command and on the sftp commandline or on the "get"
+    commandline with the "-a" (append) option.
+  * ssh(1): "IgnoreUnknown" configuration option to selectively
+    suppress errors arising from unknown configuration directives.
+  * sshd(8): support for submethods to be appended to required
+    authentication methods listed via AuthenticationMethods.
+  Bugfixes since 6.2p2:
+  * sshd(8): fix refusal to accept certificate if a key of a
+    different type to the CA key appeared in authorized_keys
+    before the CA key.
+  * ssh(1)/ssh-agent(1)/sshd(8): Use a monotonic time source for
+    timers so that things like keepalives and rekeying will work
+    properly over clock steps.
+  * sftp(1): update progressmeter when data is acknowledged, not
+    when it's sent. bz#2108
+  * ssh(1)/ssh-keygen(1): improve error messages when the current
+    user does not exist in /etc/passwd; bz#2125
+  * ssh(1): reset the order in which public keys are tried after
+    partial authentication success.
+  * ssh-agent(1): clean up socket files after SIGINT when in debug
+    mode; bz#2120
+  * ssh(1) and others: avoid confusing error messages in the case
+    of broken system resolver configurations; bz#2122
+  * ssh(1): set TCP nodelay for connections started with -N;
+    bz#2124
+  * ssh(1): correct manual for permission requirements on
+    ~/.ssh/config; bz#2078
+  * ssh(1): fix ControlPersist timeout not triggering in cases
+    where TCP connections have hung. bz#1917
+  * ssh(1): properly deatch a ControlPersist master from its
+    controlling terminal.
+  * sftp(1): avoid crashes in libedit when it has been compiled
+    with multi- byte character support. bz#1990
+  * sshd(8): when running sshd -D, close stderr unless we have
+    explicitly requested logging to stderr. bz#1976,
+  * ssh(1): fix incomplete bzero; bz#2100
+  * sshd(8): log and error and exit if ChrootDirectory is
+    specified and running without root privileges.
+  * Many improvements to the regression test suite. In particular
+    log files are now saved from ssh and sshd after failures.
+  * Fix a number of memory leaks. bz#1967 bz#2096 and others
+  * sshd(8): fix public key authentication when a :style is
+    appended to the requested username.
+  * ssh(1): do not fatally exit when attempting to cleanup
+    multiplexing- created channels that are incompletely opened.
+    bz#2079
+  * sshd(8): fix a memory corruption problem triggered during
+    rekeying when an AES-GCM cipher is selected
+  * Fix unaligned accesses in umac.c for strict-alignment
+    architectures.  bz#2101
+  * Fix broken incorrect commandline reporting errors. bz#1448
+  * Only include SHA256 and ECC-based key exchange methods if
+    libcrypto has the required support.
+  * Fix crash in SOCKS5 dynamic forwarding code on
+    strict-alignment architectures.
+ - FIPS and GSSKEX patched disabled for now
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Fri Oct  4 17:50:32 UTC 2013 - pcerny@suse.com
+
+- fix server crashes when using AES-GCM
+- removed superfluous build dependency on X
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Thu Sep 19 02:02:56 UTC 2013 - pcerny@suse.com
+
+- spec file and patch cleanup
+  * key converter is now in the -key-converter.patch
+  * openssh-nodaemon-nopid.patch is -no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
+  * openssh-nocrazyabicheck.patch is
+    -disable-openssl-abi-check.patch
+  * removing obsolete -engines.diff patch
+- patches from SLE11
+  * use auditing infrastructure extending upstream hooks
+    (-auditX-*.patch) instead of the single old patch
+    (-audit.patch)
+  * FIPS enablement (currently disabled)
+    (-fingerprint_hash.patch, -fips.patch)
+  * GSSAPI key exchange
+    (bnc#784689, fate#313068, -gssapi_key_exchange.patch)
+  * SysV init script update - 'stop' now terminates all sshd
+    processes and closes all connections, 'soft-stop' only
+    terminates the listener process (keeps active sessions intact)
+    (fate#314243)
+  * helper application for retrieving users' public keys from
+    an LDAP server (bnc#683733, fate#302144, -ldap.patch)
+    - subpackage openssh-akc-ldap
+  * several bugfixes:
+    - login invocation
+      (bnc#833605, -login_options.patch)
+    - disable locked accounts when using PAM
+      (bnc#708678, fate#312033, -pam-check-locks.patch)
+    - fix wtmp handling
+      (bnc#18024, -lastlog.patch)
+- init script is moved into documentation for openSUSE 12.3+
+  (as it confused systemd)
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Tue Sep 10 21:15:59 UTC 2013 - crrodriguez@opensuse.org
 

openssh.spec

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #
 # spec file for package openssh
 #
-# Copyright (c) 2013 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
+# Copyright (c) 2014 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
 #
 # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties
 # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed
@@ -16,27 +16,83 @@
 #
 
 
+%if 0%{suse_version} >= 1100
+%define has_fw_dir 1
+%else
+%define has_fw_dir 0
+%endif
+
+%if 0%{suse_version} >= 1110
+%define has_libselinux 1
+%else
+%define has_libselinux 0
+%endif
+
+%if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1130
+%define needs_all_dirs 1
+%else
+%define needs_all_dirs 0
+%endif
+
+%if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1140
+%define needs_libedit 1
+%else
+%define needs_libedit 0
+%endif
+
+%if 0%{?suse_version} > 1140
+%define has_krb_mini 1
+%else
+%define has_krb_mini 0
+%endif
+
+%if 0%{?suse_version} > 1220
+%define uses_systemd 1
+%else
+%define uses_systemd 0
+%endif
+
+%define sandbox_seccomp 0
+%ifarch %ix86 x86_64
+%if 0%{?suse_version} > 1220
+%define sandbox_seccomp 1
+%endif
+%endif
+
+%define _fwdir   %{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/SuSEfirewall2.d
+%define _fwdefdir   %{_fwdir}/services
+%define _appdefdir  %( grep "configdirspec=" $( which xmkmf ) | sed -r 's,^[^=]+=.*-I(.*)/config.*$,\\1/app-defaults,' )
+%{!?_initddir:%global _initddir %{_initrddir}}
+
 Name:           openssh
-%define _fwdefdir %{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/SuSEfirewall2.d/services
-%define _appdefdir      %{_prefix}/share/X11/app-defaults
 BuildRequires:  audit-devel
 BuildRequires:  autoconf
 BuildRequires:  groff
+%if %{has_krb_mini}
 BuildRequires:  krb5-mini-devel
+%else
+BuildRequires:  krb5-devel
+%endif
+%if %{needs_libedit}
 BuildRequires:  libedit-devel
-%if 0%{suse_version} > 1100
+%endif
+%if %{has_libselinux}
 BuildRequires:  libselinux-devel
 %endif
+BuildRequires:  openldap2-devel
 BuildRequires:  openssl-devel
 BuildRequires:  pam-devel
+%if %{uses_systemd}
+BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(systemd)
+%{?systemd_requires}
+%endif
 BuildRequires:  tcpd-devel
-Requires:       /bin/netstat
 PreReq:         pwdutils %{insserv_prereq} %{fillup_prereq} coreutils
 Conflicts:      nonfreessh
 Recommends:     xauth
-Version:        6.2p2
+Recommends:     %{name}-helpers
+Version:        6.5p1
 Release:        0
-%define xversion 1.2.4.1
 Summary:        Secure Shell Client and Server (Remote Login Program)
 License:        BSD-3-Clause and MIT
 Group:          Productivity/Networking/SSH
@@ -44,43 +100,50 @@ Url:            http://www.openssh.com/
 Source:         ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
 Source1:        sshd.init
 Source2:        sshd.pamd
-Source4:        README.SuSE
-Source5:        converter.tar.bz2
-Source6:        README.kerberos
-Source7:        ssh.reg
-Source8:        ssh-askpass
-Source9:        sshd.fw
-Source10:       sysconfig.ssh
-Source11:       sshd-gen-keys-start
-Source12:       sshd.service
-Patch:          %{name}-5.9p1-sshd_config.diff
-Patch2:         %{name}-5.9p1-pam-fix2.diff
-Patch3:         %{name}-5.9p1-saveargv-fix.diff
-Patch4:         %{name}-5.9p1-pam-fix3.diff
-Patch5:         %{name}-5.9p1-gssapimitm.patch
-Patch6:         %{name}-5.9p1-eal3.diff
-Patch7:         %{name}-5.9p1-engines.diff
-Patch8:         %{name}-5.9p1-blocksigalrm.diff
-Patch9:         %{name}-5.9p1-send_locale.diff
-Patch10:        %{name}-5.9p1-xauthlocalhostname.diff
-Patch12:        %{name}-5.9p1-xauth.diff
-Patch14:        %{name}-5.9p1-default-protocol.diff
-Patch15:        %{name}-5.9p1-audit.patch
-Patch16:        %{name}-5.9p1-pts.diff
-Patch17:        %{name}-5.9p1-homechroot.patch
-Patch18:        %{name}-5.9p1-sshconfig-knownhostschanges.diff
-Patch19:        %{name}-5.9p1-host_ident.diff
-Patch20:        converter-linking.patch
-Patch21:        openssh-nocrazyabicheck.patch
-Patch22:        openssh-nodaemon-nopid.patch
-BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
-%if 0%{?suse_version} > 1140
-BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(systemd)
-%{?systemd_requires}
-%define has_systemd 1
-%endif
+Source3:        README.SuSE
+Source4:        README.kerberos
+Source5:        ssh.reg
+Source6:        ssh-askpass
+Source7:        sshd.fw
+Source8:        sysconfig.ssh
+Source9:        sshd-gen-keys-start
+Source10:       sshd.service
+Patch1:         openssh-6.5p1-key-converter.patch
+Patch2:         openssh-6.5p1-X11-forwarding.patch
+Patch3:         openssh-6.5p1-lastlog.patch
+Patch4:         openssh-6.5p1-pam-fix2.patch
+Patch5:         openssh-6.5p1-saveargv-fix.patch
+Patch6:         openssh-6.5p1-pam-fix3.patch
+Patch7:         openssh-6.5p1-gssapimitm.patch
+Patch8:         openssh-6.5p1-eal3.patch
+Patch9:         openssh-6.5p1-blocksigalrm.patch
+Patch10:        openssh-6.5p1-send_locale.patch
+Patch11:        openssh-6.5p1-xauthlocalhostname.patch
+Patch12:        openssh-6.5p1-xauth.patch
+Patch13:        openssh-6.5p1-default-protocol.patch
+Patch14:        openssh-6.5p1-pts.patch
+Patch15:        openssh-6.5p1-pam-check-locks.patch
+Patch16:        openssh-6.5p1-fingerprint_hash.patch
+Patch17:        openssh-6.5p1-audit1-remove_duplicit_audit.patch
+Patch18:        openssh-6.5p1-audit2-better_audit_of_user_actions.patch
+Patch19:        openssh-6.5p1-audit3-key_auth_usage.patch
+Patch20:        openssh-6.5p1-audit4-kex_results.patch
+Patch21:        openssh-6.5p1-audit5-session_key_destruction.patch
+Patch22:        openssh-6.5p1-audit6-server_key_destruction.patch
+Patch23:        openssh-6.5p1-audit7-libaudit_compat.patch
+Patch24:        openssh-6.5p1-audit8-libaudit_dns_timeouts.patch
+Patch25:        openssh-6.5p1-seed-prng.patch
+Patch26:        openssh-6.5p1-ldap.patch
+Patch27:        openssh-6.5p1-fips.patch
+Patch28:        openssh-6.5p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
+Patch29:        openssh-6.5p1-login_options.patch
+Patch30:        openssh-6.5p1-disable-openssl-abi-check.patch
+Patch31:        openssh-6.5p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
+Patch32:        openssh-6.5p1-host_ident.patch
+Patch33:        openssh-6.5p1-sftp_homechroot.patch
+Patch34:        openssh-6.5p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch
 
-%{!?_initddir:%global _initddir %{_initrddir}}
+BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
 
 %description
 SSH (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into and executing commands
@@ -91,119 +154,185 @@ hosts over an insecure network.
 xorg-x11 (X Window System) connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can
 also be forwarded over the secure channel.
 
+
+%package helpers
+Summary:        OpenSSH AuthorizedKeysCommand helpers
+Group:          Productivity/Networking/SSH
+Requires:       openldap2
+Requires:       openssh
+
+%description helpers
+Helper applications for OpenSSH which retrieve keys from various sources.
+
+
 %prep
-%setup -q -a 5
-%patch 
-%patch2
-%patch3
-%patch4
-%patch5
-%patch6 -p1
-%patch7 -p1
-%patch8
-%patch9
-%patch10
-%patch12
-%patch14
-%patch15 -p1
-%patch16
-%patch17
-%patch18
-%patch19 -p1
-%patch20
-%patch21
-%patch22
-cp -v %{SOURCE4} .
-cp -v %{SOURCE6} .
+%setup -q
+#patch1 -p2
+%patch2 -p2
+%patch3 -p2
+%patch4 -p2
+%patch5 -p2
+%patch6 -p2
+%patch7 -p2
+%patch8 -p2
+%patch9 -p2
+%patch10 -p2
+%patch11 -p2
+%patch12 -p2
+%patch13 -p2
+%patch14 -p2
+%patch15 -p2
+%patch16 -p2
+%patch17 -p2
+%patch18 -p2
+%patch19 -p2
+%patch20 -p2
+%patch21 -p2
+%patch22 -p2
+%patch23 -p2
+%patch24 -p2
+%patch25 -p2
+%patch26 -p2
+#patch27 -p2
+#patch28 -p2
+%patch29 -p2
+%patch30 -p2
+%patch31 -p2
+%patch32 -p2
+%patch33 -p2
+%patch34 -p2
+cp %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE4} .
 
 %build
+# set libexec dir in the LDAP patch
+sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \
+    $( grep -Rl @LIBEXECDIR@ \
+        $( grep "^+++" %{PATCH26} | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' )
+    )
+
 autoreconf -fiv
 %ifarch s390 s390x %sparc
 PIEFLAGS="-fPIE"
 %else
 PIEFLAGS="-fpie"
 %endif
-export CFLAGS="%{optflags} $PIEFLAGS -fstack-protector"
-export CXXFLAGS="%{optflags} $PIEFLAGS -fstack-protector"
-export LDFLAGS="-pie"
-%configure \
-%if 0%{?has_systemd}
-    --with-pid-dir=/run \
-%endif
-    --with-ssl-engine \
-%if 0%{suse_version} >= 1140
-    --with-libedit \
-%endif
+CFLAGS="%{optflags} $PIEFLAGS -fstack-protector"
+#%if 0%{?suse_version} < 1230
+#CFLAGS="-lrt $CFLAGS"
+#%endif
+CXXFLAGS="%{optflags} $PIEFLAGS -fstack-protector"
+LDFLAGS="-pie -Wl,--as-needed"
+#%if 0%{?suse_version} < 1230
+#LDFLAGS="-lrt $LDFLAGS"
+#%endif
+#CPPFLAGS="%{optflags} -DUSE_INTERNAL_B64"
+export LDFLAGS CFLAGS CXXFLAGS CPPFLAGS
+./configure \
+    --prefix=%{_prefix} \
+    --mandir=%{_mandir} \
+    --infodir=%{_infodir} \
     --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
     --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/ssh \
     --with-tcp-wrappers \
-%if 0%{suse_version} > 1100
+%if %{has_libselinux}
     --with-selinux \
 %endif
+%if %{uses_systemd}
+    --with-pid-dir=/run \
+%endif
+    --with-ssl-engine \
     --with-pam \
-    --with-kerberos5=/usr \
+    --with-kerberos5=%{_prefix} \
     --with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \
+%if %{sandbox_seccomp}
+    --with-sandbox=seccomp_filter \
+%else
     --with-sandbox=rlimit \
+%endif
+%ifnarch s390 s390x
+    --with-opensc \
+%endif
     --disable-strip \
-    --with-linux-audit \
-    --with-xauth=%{_prefix}/bin/xauth \
-    --target=%{_target_cpu}-suse-linux
-#   --with-afs=/usr \
+    --with-audit=linux \
+    --with-ldap \
+    --with-xauth=%{_bindir}/xauth \
+%if %{needs_libedit}
+    --with-libedit \
+%endif
+    --target=%{_target_cpu}-suse-linux \
+
+### configure end
 make %{?_smp_mflags}
-(cd converter; make %{?_smp_mflags})
+
+#make %{?_smp_mflags} -C converter
 
 %install
-make DESTDIR=%{buildroot}/ install
+make install DESTDIR=%{buildroot}
+#make install DESTDIR=%{buildroot} -C converter
+
 install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d
 install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}/var/lib/sshd
-install -m 644 %{S:2} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/sshd
+install -m 644 %{SOURCE2} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/sshd
 install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/
-install -m 644 %{S:7} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/
+install -m 644 %{SOURCE5} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/
 install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_initddir}
-install -m 755 %{S:1} %{buildroot}%{_initddir}/sshd
-ln -vs ../..%{_initddir}/sshd %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd
+%if %{uses_systemd}
+install -m 0755 %{SOURCE1} .
+install -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE10} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/sshd.service
+ln -s /usr/sbin/service %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd
+%else
+install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE1} %{buildroot}%{_initddir}/sshd
+install -m 0644 %{SOURCE10} .
+ln -s ../..%{_initddir}/sshd %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd
+%endif
 install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}/var/adm/fillup-templates
-install -m 644 %{S:10} %{buildroot}/var/adm/fillup-templates
+install -m 644 %{SOURCE8} %{buildroot}/var/adm/fillup-templates
 # install shell script to automate the process of adding your public key to a remote machine
 install -m 755 contrib/ssh-copy-id %{buildroot}%{_bindir}
 install -m 644 contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1
-sed -e "s,@LIBEXEC@,%{_libexecdir},g" < %{S:8} > %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
-( cd converter; make install DESTDIR=%{buildroot} )
-rm -f %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/Ssh.bin
 sed -i -e s@/usr/libexec@%{_libexecdir}@g %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
+
+%if %{has_fw_dir}
 #install firewall definitions format is described here:
 #%{_datadir}/SuSEfirewall2/services/TEMPLATE
 mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_fwdefdir}
-install -m 644 %{S:9} %{buildroot}%{_fwdefdir}/sshd
-%if 0%{?has_systemd}
-install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE11} %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/sshd-gen-keys-start
-install -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE12} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/sshd.service
+install -m 644 %{SOURCE7} %{buildroot}%{_fwdefdir}/sshd
 %endif
 
+# askpass wrapper
+sed -e "s,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir},g" < %{SOURCE6} > %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
+rm -f %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/Ssh.bin
+# sshd keys generator wrapper
+install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE9} %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/sshd-gen-keys-start
+
 %pre
 getent group sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/groupadd -r sshd
 getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g sshd -d /var/lib/sshd -s /bin/false -c "SSH daemon" sshd
-%if 0%{?has_systemd}
+%if %{uses_systemd}
 %service_add_pre sshd.service
 %endif
 
 %post
-%{fillup_and_insserv -n ssh sshd}
-%if 0%{?has_systemd}
+%if %{uses_systemd}
+%{fillup_only -n ssh sshd}
 %service_add_post sshd.service
+%else
+%{fillup_and_insserv -n ssh sshd}
 %endif
 
 %preun
-%stop_on_removal sshd
-%if 0%{?has_systemd}
+%if %{uses_systemd}
 %service_del_preun sshd.service
+%else
+%stop_on_removal sshd
 %endif
 
 %postun
+%if %{uses_systemd}
+%service_del_postun sshd.service
+%else
 %restart_on_update sshd
 %{insserv_cleanup}
-%if 0%{?has_systemd}
-%service_del_postun sshd.service
 %endif
 
 %files
@@ -212,40 +341,41 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g sshd -d /var/lib/sshd
 %doc README.SuSE README.kerberos ChangeLog OVERVIEW README TODO LICENCE CREDITS
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
 %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
-%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
-%attr(0640,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
-%attr(0644,root,root) %config %{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/sshd
+%verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
+%verify(not mode) %attr(0640,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/sshd
+%if %{uses_systemd}
+%doc sshd.init
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config %{_unitdir}/sshd.service
+%else
 %attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_initddir}/sshd
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
-%{_bindir}/scp
-%{_bindir}/sftp
-%{_bindir}/slogin
-%{_bindir}/ssh-*
-%{_sbindir}/*
-%attr(444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1.gz
-%attr(444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1.gz
-%attr(444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyconverter.1.gz
-%attr(444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1.gz
-%attr(444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1.gz
-%attr(444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
-%attr(444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
-%attr(444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
-%attr(444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
-%attr(444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-copy-id.1*
-%attr(444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/*
-%attr(444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/*
+%doc sshd.service
+%endif
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-keysign
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
+%exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/*
+%attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/*
+%attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/*
+%attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/*
 %dir %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d
 %config %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/ssh.reg
 /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh
+%if %{has_fw_dir}
+%if %{needs_all_dirs}
+%dir %{_fwdir}
+%dir %{_fwdefdir}
+%endif
 %config %{_fwdefdir}/sshd
-%if 0%{?has_systemd}
-%{_sbindir}/sshd-gen-keys-start
-%{_unitdir}/sshd.service
 %endif
 
+%files helpers
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
+%verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ldap.conf
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
+%doc HOWTO.ldap-keys openssh-lpk-openldap.schema openssh-lpk-sun.schema
+
 %changelog

ssh-askpass

@@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ if [ -z "$SESSION" ] ; then
   fi
 fi
 
-GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS="@LIBEXEC@/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass"
-KDE_SSH_ASKPASS="@LIBEXEC@/ssh/ksshaskpass"
-X11_SSH_ASKPASS="@LIBEXEC@/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass"
+GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS="@LIBEXECDIR@/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass"
+KDE_SSH_ASKPASS="@LIBEXECDIR@/ssh/ksshaskpass"
+X11_SSH_ASKPASS="@LIBEXECDIR@/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass"
 
 case "$SESSION" in
   gnome)

sshd-gen-keys-start

@@ -1,21 +1,5 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-
-       if ! grep -q '^[[:space:]]*HostKey[[:space:]]' /etc/ssh/sshd_config; then
-                if ! test -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key ; then
-                    echo Generating /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.
-                    ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -b 2048 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ''
-                fi
-                if ! test -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ; then
-                    echo Generating /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.
-                    ssh-keygen -t dsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ''
-                fi
-                if ! test -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key ; then
-                    echo Generating /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.
-                    ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ''
-                fi
-                if ! test -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ; then
-                    echo Generating /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.
-                    ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 256 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N ''
-                fi
-        fi
-
+#!/bin/sh
+if ! grep -q '^[[:space:]]*HostKey[[:space:]]' /etc/ssh/sshd_config; then
+    echo "Checking for missing server keys in /etc/ssh"
+    ssh-keygen -A
+fi

sshd.init

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #! /bin/sh
-# Copyright (c) 1995-2000 SuSE GmbH Nuernberg, Germany.
+# Copyright (c) 1995-2013 SuSE GmbH Nuernberg, Germany.
 #
 # Author: Jiri Smid <feedback@suse.de>
 #
@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@
 # Provides: sshd
 # Required-Start: $network $remote_fs
 # Required-Stop: $network $remote_fs
+# Should-Start: haveged auditd
 # Default-Start: 3 5
 # Default-Stop: 0 1 2 6
 # Description: Start the sshd daemon
-# Short-Description: Start the sshd daemon
 ### END INIT INFO
 
 SSHD_BIN=/usr/sbin/sshd
@@ -39,48 +39,60 @@ SSHD_PIDFILE=/var/run/sshd.init.pid
 #      rc_reset         clear local rc status (overall remains)
 #      rc_exit          exit appropriate to overall rc status
 
+function soft_stop () {
+    echo -n "Shutting down the listening SSH daemon"
+    killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -TERM $SSHD_BIN
+}
+
+function force_stop () {
+    echo -n "Shutting down SSH daemon *with all active connections*"
+    trap '' TERM
+    killall sshd 2>/dev/null
+    trap - TERM
+}
+
 # First reset status of this service
 rc_reset
 
 case "$1" in
     start)
-        if ! grep -q '^[[:space:]]*HostKey[[:space:]]' /etc/ssh/sshd_config; then
-                if ! test -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key ; then
-                    echo Generating /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.
-                    ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ''
-                fi
-                if ! test -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ; then
-                    echo Generating /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.
-                    ssh-keygen -t dsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ''
-                fi
-                if ! test -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key ; then
-                    echo Generating /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.
-                    ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ''
-                fi
-                if ! test -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ; then
-                    echo Generating /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.
-                    ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N ''
-                fi
-        fi
-	echo -n "Starting SSH daemon"
-	## Start daemon with startproc(8). If this fails
-	## the echo return value is set appropriate.
+        /usr/sbin/sshd-gen-keys-start
+        echo -n "Starting SSH daemon"
+        ## Start daemon with startproc(8). If this fails
+        ## the echo return value is set appropriate.
+        startproc -f -p $SSHD_PIDFILE $SSHD_BIN $SSHD_OPTS -o "PidFile=$SSHD_PIDFILE" 
 
-	startproc -f $SSHD_BIN $SSHD_OPTS -o "PidFile=$SSHD_PIDFILE" 
-
-	# Remember status and be verbose
-	rc_status -v
-	;;
+        # Remember status and be verbose
+        rc_status -v
+        ;;
     stop)
-	echo -n "Shutting down SSH daemon"
-	## Stop daemon with killproc(8) and if this fails
-	## set echo the echo return value.
+        # If we're shutting down, kill active sshd connections so they're not
+        # left hanging.
+        runlevel=$(set -- $(runlevel); eval "echo \$$#")
+        if [ "x$runlevel" = x0 -o "x$runlevel" = x6 ] ; then
+            force_stop
+        else
+            soft_stop
+        fi
+        
+        # Remember status and be verbose
+        rc_status -v
+        ;;
+    soft-stop)
+        ## Stop the listener daemon process with killproc(8) and if this
+        ## fails set echo the echo return value.
+        soft_stop
 
-	killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -TERM $SSHD_BIN
+        # Remember status and be verbose
+        rc_status -v
+        ;;
+    force-stop)
+        ## stop all running ssh
+        force_stop
 
-	# Remember status and be verbose
-	rc_status -v
-	;;
+        # Remember status and be verbose
+        rc_status -v
+        ;;
     try-restart)
         ## Stop the service and if this succeeds (i.e. the 
         ## service was running before), start it again.
@@ -90,27 +102,27 @@ case "$1" in
         rc_status
         ;;
     restart)
-        ## Stop the service and regardless of whether it was
-        ## running or not, start it again.
-        $0 stop
+        ## Stop the service without closing live connections 
+        ## and start it again regardless of whether it was
+        ## running or not
+        $0 soft-stop
         $0 start
 
         # Remember status and be quiet
         rc_status
         ;;
     force-reload|reload)
-	## Signal the daemon to reload its config. Most daemons
-	## do this on signal 1 (SIGHUP).
+        ## Signal the daemon to reload its config. Most daemons
+        ## do this on signal 1 (SIGHUP).
+        echo -n "Reload service sshd"
 
-	echo -n "Reload service sshd"
-
-	killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -HUP $SSHD_BIN
+        killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -HUP $SSHD_BIN
 
         rc_status -v
 
         ;;
     status)
-	echo -n "Checking for service sshd "
+        echo -n "Checking for service sshd "
         ## Check status with checkproc(8), if process is running
         ## checkproc will return with exit status 0.
 
@@ -120,19 +132,19 @@ case "$1" in
         # 2 - service dead, but /var/lock/ lock file exists
         # 3 - service not running
 
-	checkproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE $SSHD_BIN
+        checkproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE $SSHD_BIN
 
-	rc_status -v
-	;;
+        rc_status -v
+        ;;
     probe)
-	## Optional: Probe for the necessity of a reload,
-	## give out the argument which is required for a reload.
+        ## Optional: Probe for the necessity of a reload,
+        ## give out the argument which is required for a reload.
 
         test /etc/ssh/sshd_config -nt $SSHD_PIDFILE && echo reload
-	;;
+        ;;
     *)
-	echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|status|try-restart|restart|force-reload|reload|probe}"
-	exit 1
-	;;
+        echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|soft-stop|force-stop|status|try-restart|restart|force-reload|reload|probe}"
+        exit 1
+        ;;
 esac
 rc_exit

sshd.pamd

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 #%PAM-1.0
-auth	 requisite	pam_nologin.so
-auth     include        common-auth
-account  requisite      pam_nologin.so
-account  include        common-account
-password include        common-password
-session	 required	pam_loginuid.so
-session  include        common-session
+auth        requisite   pam_nologin.so
+auth        include     common-auth
+account     requisite   pam_nologin.so
+account     include     common-account
+password    include     common-password
+session     required    pam_loginuid.so
+session     include     common-session
 session  optional       pam_lastlog.so   silent noupdate showfailed

sshd.service

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Description=OpenSSH Daemon
 After=network.target
 
 [Service]
-EnvironmentFile=/etc/sysconfig/ssh
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/ssh
 ExecStartPre=/usr/sbin/sshd-gen-keys-start
 ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $SSHD_OPTS
 ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID