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Author SHA256 Message Date
Petr Cerny
d83100ae13 Accepting request 539322 from home:pcerny:factory
- upgrade to 7.6p1
  see main package changelog for details

- Update to vanilla 7.6p1
  Most important changes (more details below):
  * complete removal of the ancient SSHv1 protocol
  * sshd(8) cannot run without privilege separation
  * removal of suport for arcfourm blowfish and CAST ciphers
    and RIPE-MD160 HMAC
  * refuse RSA keys shorter than 1024 bits
  Distilled upstream log:
- OpenSSH 7.3
  ---- Security
  * sshd(8): Mitigate a potential denial-of-service attack
    against the system's crypt(3) function via sshd(8). An
    attacker could send very long passwords that would cause
    excessive CPU use in crypt(3). sshd(8) now refuses to accept
    password authentication requests of length greater than 1024
    characters. Independently reported by Tomas Kuthan (Oracle),
    Andres Rojas and Javier Nieto.
  * sshd(8): Mitigate timing differences in password
    authentication that could be used to discern valid from
    invalid account names when long passwords were sent and
    particular password hashing algorithms are in use on the
    server. CVE-2016-6210, reported by EddieEzra.Harari at
    verint.com
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix observable timing weakness in the CBC
    padding oracle countermeasures. Reported by Jean Paul
    Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin
    Albrecht. Note that CBC ciphers are disabled by default and

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/539322
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=122
2017-11-06 14:50:53 +00:00