# HG changeset patch # Parent 0b2761bdc8c2071a11ca24387c3f58be2fdbaa5e diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ChangeLog.gssapi b/openssh-6.6p1/ChangeLog.gssapi new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ChangeLog.gssapi @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +20110101 + - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1 + - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney + +20100308 + - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ] + Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1 + - [ servconf.c ] + Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag + some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin + Watson. + - + +20100124 + - [ sshconnect2.c ] + Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to + Colin Watson + +20090615 + - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c + sshd.c ] + Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review + Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs + Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled + Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange + Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value + Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust + Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled + Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list + Cast data.length before printing + If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL + +20090201 + - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h + ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ] + Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user + to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server + +20080404 + - [ gss-serv.c ] + Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow + been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav + Stoichkov + +20070317 + - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] + Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a + function + +20061220 + - [ servconf.c ] + Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and + documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson. + +20060910 + - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c + ssh-gss.h ] + add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms + - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ] + Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of + acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines. + + - [ sshd_config ssh_config ] + Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample + configuration files + - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ] + Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf() + Limit length of error messages displayed by client + +20060909 + - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ] + move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server + only, where they belong + + +20060829 + - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] + Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment + variable + +20060828 + - [ gss-genr.c ] + Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem + + +20060818 + - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ] + Make sure that SPENGO is disabled + + +20060421 + - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ] + a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to + fix compiler errors/warnings + (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) + - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ] + fix uninitialized variable warnings + (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) + - [ gssgenr.c ] + pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue) + (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) + + - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] + #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H + (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) + + - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c + add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option + (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) + - [ sshconnect2.c ] + add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic + (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) + diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in b/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in --- a/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in @@ -67,16 +67,17 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \ cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \ compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \ log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \ readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \ atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \ monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \ + kexgssc.o \ msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \ ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o \ sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \ fips.o \ auditstub.o @@ -86,17 +87,17 @@ SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o s SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \ audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \ sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \ auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \ auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \ auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \ auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \ - monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \ + monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexgsss.o \ kexc25519s.o auth-krb5.o \ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \ sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \ sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-krb5.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-krb5.c --- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-krb5.c +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-krb5.c @@ -177,18 +177,23 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c if (problem) goto out; #endif authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6; authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len); +#ifdef USE_CCAPI + snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s", + authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); +#else snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s", authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); +#endif #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname); #endif out: restore_uid(); @@ -238,35 +243,42 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) } #ifndef HEIMDAL krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) { int tmpfd, ret, oerrno; char ccname[40]; mode_t old_umask; +#ifdef USE_CCAPI + char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d"; +#else + char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX"; +#endif ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname), - "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid()); + cctemplate, geteuid()); if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname)) return ENOMEM; +#ifndef USE_CCAPI old_umask = umask(0177); tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:")); oerrno = errno; umask(old_umask); if (tmpfd == -1) { logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); return oerrno; } if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) { oerrno = errno; logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); close(tmpfd); return oerrno; } close(tmpfd); +#endif return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); } #endif /* !HEIMDAL */ #endif /* KRB5 */ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-gss.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-gss.c --- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-gss.c +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-gss.c @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.21 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */ /* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the @@ -47,16 +47,50 @@ extern ServerOptions options; static void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); +/* + * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism. + */ +static int +userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + int authenticated = 0; + Buffer b; + gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; + u_int len; + + mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); + mic.length = len; + + packet_check_eom(); + + ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, + "gssapi-keyex"); + + gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); + gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); + + /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */ + if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, + &gssbuf, &mic)))) + authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, + authctxt->pw)); + + buffer_free(&b); + free(mic.value); + + return (authenticated); +} + /* * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know * how to check local user kuserok and the like) */ static int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) { gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL}; @@ -239,17 +273,18 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, /* * We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in * the dispatcher once the exchange is complete */ packet_check_eom(); - authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); + authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, + authctxt->pw)); authctxt->postponed = 0; dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); } @@ -274,31 +309,38 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic"); gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) - authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); + authenticated = + PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw)); else logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); buffer_free(&b); free(mic.value); authctxt->postponed = 0; dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); } +Authmethod method_gsskeyex = { + "gssapi-keyex", + userauth_gsskeyex, + &options.gss_authentication +}; + Authmethod method_gssapi = { "gssapi-with-mic", userauth_gssapi, &options.gss_authentication }; Authmethod method_gssapi_old = { "gssapi", diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c --- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c @@ -64,24 +64,26 @@ extern Buffer loginmsg; /* methods */ extern Authmethod method_none; extern Authmethod method_pubkey; extern Authmethod method_passwd; extern Authmethod method_kbdint; extern Authmethod method_hostbased; #ifdef GSSAPI +extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex; extern Authmethod method_gssapi; extern Authmethod method_gssapi_old; #endif Authmethod *authmethods[] = { &method_none, &method_pubkey, #ifdef GSSAPI + &method_gsskeyex, &method_gssapi, &method_gssapi_old, #endif &method_passwd, &method_kbdint, &method_hostbased, NULL }; diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/clientloop.c b/openssh-6.6p1/clientloop.c --- a/openssh-6.6p1/clientloop.c +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/clientloop.c @@ -106,16 +106,20 @@ #include "authfd.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "msg.h" #include "roaming.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif + /* import options */ extern Options options; /* Flag indicating that stdin should be redirected from /dev/null. */ extern int stdin_null_flag; /* Flag indicating that no shell has been requested */ extern int no_shell_flag; @@ -1603,16 +1607,25 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_cha &max_fd2, &nalloc, rekeying); if (quit_pending) break; /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ if (!rekeying) { channel_after_select(readset, writeset); + +#ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_renewal_rekey && + ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) { + debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey"); + need_rekeying = 1; + } +#endif + if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) { debug("need rekeying"); xxx_kex->done = 0; kex_send_kexinit(xxx_kex); need_rekeying = 0; } } diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/configure.ac b/openssh-6.6p1/configure.ac --- a/openssh-6.6p1/configure.ac +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/configure.ac @@ -579,16 +579,40 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary(" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [OS X glob does not do what we expect]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([BIND_8_COMPAT], [1], [Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1], [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) + AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API) + AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include ], + [SessionCreate(0, 0);], + [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes" + AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1, + [platform has the Security Authorization Session API]) + LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], + [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no" + AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]) + AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache) + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [#include ], + [cc_context_t c; + (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);], + [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1, + [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache]) + LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***) + fi], + [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)] + ) m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) [#include ] AC_DEFINE([LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE], [1], [Define if pututxline updates lastlog too]) ) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV], diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/gss-genr.c b/openssh-6.6p1/gss-genr.c --- a/openssh-6.6p1/gss-genr.c +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/gss-genr.c @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.22 2013/11/08 00:39:15 djm Exp $ */ /* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the @@ -34,22 +34,177 @@ #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh2.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include #include "ssh-gss.h" extern u_char *session_id2; extern u_int session_id2_len; +typedef struct { + char *encoded; + gss_OID oid; +} ssh_gss_kex_mapping; + +/* + * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the + * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines + */ + +Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL; + +static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL; + +int +ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() { + return (gss_enc2oid != NULL); +} + +/* + * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program + * + * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting + * a key exchange with a bad mechanism + */ + +char * +ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) { + gss_OID_set gss_supported; + OM_uint32 min_status; + + if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported))) + return NULL; + + return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism, + host, client)); +} + +char * +ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check, + const char *host, const char *client) { + Buffer buf; + size_t i; + int oidpos, enclen; + char *mechs, *encoded; + u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + char deroid[2]; + const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5(); + EVP_MD_CTX md; + + if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) { + for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++) + free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded); + free(gss_enc2oid); + } + + gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) * + (gss_supported->count + 1)); + + buffer_init(&buf); + + oidpos = 0; + for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) { + if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 && + (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) { + + deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE; + deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length; + + EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, + gss_supported->elements[i].elements, + gss_supported->elements[i].length); + EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); + + encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); + enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md), + encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); + + if (oidpos != 0) + buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); + + buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, + sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1); + buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); + buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); + buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, + sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1); + buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); + buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); + buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, + sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1); + buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); + + gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]); + gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded; + oidpos++; + } + } + gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL; + gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL; + + buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0'); + + mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf)); + buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf)); + buffer_free(&buf); + + if (strlen(mechs) == 0) { + free(mechs); + mechs = NULL; + } + + return (mechs); +} + +gss_OID +ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) { + int i = 0; + + switch (kex_type) { + case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: + if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID)) + return GSS_C_NO_OID; + name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1; + break; + case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: + if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID)) + return GSS_C_NO_OID; + name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1; + break; + case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: + if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID)) + return GSS_C_NO_OID; + name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1; + break; + default: + return GSS_C_NO_OID; + } + + while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL && + strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0) + i++; + + if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL) + ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid); + + return gss_enc2oid[i].oid; +} + /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */ int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) { return (ctx != NULL && ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID && ctx->oid->length == len && memcmp(ctx->oid->elements, data, len) == 0); } @@ -192,17 +347,17 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de int deleg_flag = 0; if (deleg_creds) { deleg_flag = GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; debug("Delegating credentials"); } ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, - GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, + ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); return (ctx->major); } @@ -222,60 +377,173 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con &gssbuf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &ctx->name))) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); free(gssbuf.value); return (ctx->major); } OM_uint32 +ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name) +{ + gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; + gss_name_t gssname; + OM_uint32 status; + gss_OID_set oidset; + + gssbuf.value = (void *) name; + gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); + + gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); + + ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf, + GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname); + + if (!ctx->major) + ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, + gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, + &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL); + + gss_release_name(&status, &gssname); + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + + if (ctx->major) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + + return(ctx->major); +} + +OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) { + if (ctx == NULL) + return -1; + if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); return (ctx->major); } +/* Priviledged when used by server */ +OM_uint32 +ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) + return -1; + + ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, + gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); + + return (ctx->major); +} + void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service, const char *context) { buffer_init(b); buffer_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len); buffer_put_char(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); buffer_put_cstring(b, user); buffer_put_cstring(b, service); buffer_put_cstring(b, context); } int -ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) +ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, + const char *client) { gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; OM_uint32 major, minor; gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"}; + Gssctxt *intctx = NULL; + + if (ctx == NULL) + ctx = &intctx; /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && (memcmp(oid->elements, spnego_oid.elements, oid->length) == 0)) return 0; /* false */ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); + + if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client) + major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client); + if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, NULL); gss_release_buffer(&minor, &token); if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &(*ctx)->context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); } - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); return (!GSS_ERROR(major)); } +int +ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) { + static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0; + static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; + static gss_name_t name; + static OM_uint32 last_call = 0; + OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor; + int equal; + gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE; + + now = time(NULL); + + if (ctxt) { + debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions"); + + if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) + gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name); + + major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL); + + if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { + saved_mech = ctxt->oid; + saved_lifetime+= now; + } else { + /* Handle the error */ + } + return 0; + } + + if (now - last_call < 10) + return 0; + + last_call = now; + + if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) + return 0; + + major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL); + if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED) + return 0; + else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return 0; + + major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal); + gss_release_name(&minor, &name); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return 0; + + if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10)) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + #endif /* GSSAPI */ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c b/openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c --- a/openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */ /* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the @@ -117,16 +117,17 @@ static void ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) { krb5_ccache ccache; krb5_error_code problem; krb5_principal princ; OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; int len; const char *errmsg; + const char *new_ccname; if (client->creds == NULL) { debug("No credentials stored"); return; } if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0) return; @@ -175,37 +176,108 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, ccache))) { logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed"); krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache); return; } - client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); + new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); + client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; - len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; - client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); - snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); +#ifdef USE_CCAPI + xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); + client->store.filename = NULL; +#else + xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname); + client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname); +#endif #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval); #endif krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); return; } +int +ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, + ssh_gssapi_client *client) +{ + krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; + krb5_principal principal = NULL; + char *name = NULL; + krb5_error_code problem; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; + + if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) { + logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", + krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); + return 0; + } + + /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */ + if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, + &principal))) { + logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s", + krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); + krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); + return 0; + } + + if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) { + logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s", + krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); + krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); + krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); + return 0; + } + + + if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) { + debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing"); + krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); + krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); + krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); + return 0; + } + krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); + + /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */ + + if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) { + logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", + krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); + krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); + krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); + return 0; + } + + krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); + + if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, + ccache))) { + logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!"); + krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", "Kerberos", {9, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"}, NULL, &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, NULL, - &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds + &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds, + &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds }; #endif /* KRB5 */ #endif /* GSSAPI */ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv.c b/openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv.c --- a/openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv.c +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv.c @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.26 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */ /* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the @@ -40,25 +40,30 @@ #include "buffer.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "log.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "uidswap.h" #include "ssh-gss.h" +#include "monitor_wrap.h" + +extern ServerOptions options; static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, - GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}}; + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = - { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; + { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; #ifdef KRB5 extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; #endif ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= { #ifdef KRB5 &gssapi_kerberos_mech, @@ -95,59 +100,91 @@ ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 /* Privileged (called from ssh_gssapi_server_ctx) */ static OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx) { OM_uint32 status; char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; gss_OID_set oidset; - gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); - gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); + if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) { + gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); - if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { - gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); - return (-1); - } + if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + return (-1); + } - if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { + if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + return (ctx->major); + } + + if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, + ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, + NULL, NULL))) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); return (ctx->major); + } else { + ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; } - - if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, - ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL))) - ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); - - gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); - return (ctx->major); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } /* Privileged */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid) { if (*ctx) ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx)); } /* Unprivileged */ +char * +ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() { + gss_OID_set supported; + + ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported); + return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, + NULL, NULL)); +} + +/* Unprivileged */ +int +ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data, + const char *dummy) { + Gssctxt *ctx = NULL; + int res; + + res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid))); + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx); + + return (res); +} + +/* Unprivileged */ void ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) { int i = 0; OM_uint32 min_status; int present; gss_OID_set supported; gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); - gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); + + if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported))) + return; while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, &supported_mechs[i]->oid, supported, &present))) present = 0; if (present) gss_add_oid_set_member(&min_status, &supported_mechs[i]->oid, oidset); @@ -263,32 +300,79 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably * be called once for a context */ /* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) { int i = 0; + int equal = 0; + gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - gss_buffer_desc ename; + if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) { + if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length || + (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements, + ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) { + debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism"); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, + ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, + NULL, NULL, NULL))) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + return (ctx->major); + } + + ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, + new_name, &equal); + + if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + return (ctx->major); + } + + if (!equal) { + debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name"); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export"); + + gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name); + gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds); + client->name = new_name; + client->creds = ctx->client_creds; + ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; + client->updated = 1; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } client->mech = NULL; while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { if (supported_mechs[i]->oid.length == ctx->oid->length && (memcmp(supported_mechs[i]->oid.elements, ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) == 0)) client->mech = supported_mechs[i]; i++; } if (client->mech == NULL) return GSS_S_FAILURE; + if (ctx->client_creds && + (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, + ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + return (ctx->major); + } + if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, &client->displayname, NULL))) { ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); return (ctx->major); } if ((ctx->major = gss_export_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, &ename))) { @@ -296,16 +380,18 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g return (ctx->major); } if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(ctx,&ename, &client->exportedname))) { return (ctx->major); } + gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); + /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; return (ctx->major); } /* As user - called on fatal/exit */ void @@ -343,45 +429,124 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int gssapi_client.store.envval); child_set_env(envp, envsizep, gssapi_client.store.envvar, gssapi_client.store.envval); } } /* Privileged */ int -ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) +ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) { OM_uint32 lmin; if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 || gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) { debug("No suitable client data"); return 0; } if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) - if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) + if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) { + gssapi_client.used = 1; + gssapi_client.store.owner = pw; return 1; - else { + } else { /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds); explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client, sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client)); return 0; } else debug("ssh_gssapi_userok: Unknown GSSAPI mechanism"); return (0); } /* Privileged */ -OM_uint32 -ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) +/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running + * as the user, the monitor is root. + * + * In the child, we want to : + * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify + * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update + */ + +/* Stuff for PAM */ + +#ifdef USE_PAM +static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, + struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { - ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, - gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); + return (PAM_CONV_ERR); +} +#endif - return (ctx->major); +void +ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() { + int ok; + int ret; +#ifdef USE_PAM + pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; + struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL}; + char *envstr; +#endif + + if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && + gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && + gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL) + return; + + ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store)); + + if (!ok) + return; + + debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully"); + + /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will + * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options + * for rekeying. So, use our own :) + */ +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (!use_privsep) { + debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled"); + return; + } + + ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name, + &pamconv, &pamh); + if (ret) + return; + + xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, + gssapi_client.store.envval); + + ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr); + if (!ret) + pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); + pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); +#endif +} + +int +ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) { + int ok = 0; + + /* Check we've got credentials to store */ + if (!gssapi_client.updated) + return 0; + + gssapi_client.updated = 0; + + temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner); + if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds) + ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client); + else + debug("No update function for this mechanism"); + + restore_uid(); + + return ok; } #endif diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c b/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c --- a/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c @@ -47,16 +47,20 @@ #include "mac.h" #include "match.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "monitor.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "digest.h" #include "audit.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif + #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256 # else extern const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void); # endif #endif @@ -86,16 +90,21 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, # endif #endif { KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, #endif +#ifdef GSSAPI + { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, + { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, + { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, +#endif { NULL, -1, -1, -1}, }; char * kex_alg_list(char sep) { char *ret = NULL; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/kex.h b/openssh-6.6p1/kex.h --- a/openssh-6.6p1/kex.h +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/kex.h @@ -71,16 +71,19 @@ enum kex_modes { enum kex_exchange { KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, KEX_C25519_SHA256, + KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, + KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, + KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, KEX_MAX }; #define KEX_INIT_SENT 0x0001 typedef struct Kex Kex; typedef struct Mac Mac; typedef struct Comp Comp; @@ -130,16 +133,22 @@ struct Kex { int kex_type; int roaming; Buffer my; Buffer peer; sig_atomic_t done; int flags; int hash_alg; int ec_nid; +#ifdef GSSAPI + int gss_deleg_creds; + int gss_trust_dns; + char *gss_host; + char *gss_client; +#endif char *client_version_string; char *server_version_string; int (*verify_host_key)(Key *); Key *(*load_host_public_key)(int); Key *(*load_host_private_key)(int); int (*host_key_index)(Key *); void (*sign)(Key *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int); void (*kex[KEX_MAX])(Kex *); @@ -163,16 +172,21 @@ void kexdh_server(Kex *); void kexgex_client(Kex *); void kexgex_server(Kex *); void kexecdh_client(Kex *); void kexecdh_server(Kex *); void kexc25519_client(Kex *); void kexc25519_server(Kex *); void newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys); + +#ifdef GSSAPI +void kexgss_client(Kex *); +void kexgss_server(Kex *); +#endif void kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *); void kexgex_hash(int, char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int, int, int, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *); diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/kexgssc.c b/openssh-6.6p1/kexgssc.c new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/kexgssc.c @@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef GSSAPI + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "dh.h" + +#include "ssh-gss.h" + +void +kexgss_client(Kex *kex) { + gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr; + Gssctxt *ctxt; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; + u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen; + DH *dh; + BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; + BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; + BIGNUM *p = NULL; + BIGNUM *g = NULL; + u_char *kbuf, *hash; + u_char *serverhostkey = NULL; + u_char *empty = ""; + char *msg; + char *lang; + int type = 0; + int first = 1; + int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX; + + /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ + ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); + if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) + == GSS_C_NO_OID) + fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); + + if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) + fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); + + if (kex->gss_client && + ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) + fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); + + switch (kex->kex_type) { + case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: + dh = dh_new_group1(); + break; + case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: + dh = dh_new_group14(); + break; + case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: + debug("Doing group exchange\n"); + nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); + packet_put_int(min); + packet_put_int(nbits); + packet_put_int(max); + + packet_send(); + + packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); + + if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal("BN_new() failed"); + packet_get_bignum2(p); + if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal("BN_new() failed"); + packet_get_bignum2(g); + packet_check_eom(); + + if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max) + fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", + min, BN_num_bits(p), max); + + dh = dh_new_group(g, p); + break; + default: + fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); + } + + /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */ + dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); + + /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */ + dh_server_pub = BN_new(); + if (dh_server_pub == NULL) + fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL"); + + token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; + + do { + debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); + + maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, + kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, + &ret_flags); + + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { + if (send_tok.length != 0) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); + packet_put_string(send_tok.value, + send_tok.length); + } + fatal("gss_init_context failed"); + } + + /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ + if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) + free(recv_tok.value); + + if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ + if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) + fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); + + /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ + if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) + fatal("Integrity check failed"); + } + + /* + * If we have data to send, then the last message that we + * received cannot have been a 'complete'. + */ + if (send_tok.length != 0) { + if (first) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT); + packet_put_string(send_tok.value, + send_tok.length); + packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); + first = 0; + } else { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); + packet_put_string(send_tok.value, + send_tok.length); + } + packet_send(); + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); + + /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ + do { + type = packet_read(); + if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { + debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); + if (serverhostkey) + fatal("Server host key received more than once"); + serverhostkey = + packet_get_string(&slen); + } + } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); + + switch (type) { + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: + debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); + if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) + fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); + recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); + recv_tok.length = strlen; + break; + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: + debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); + packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub); + msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); + msg_tok.length = strlen; + + /* Is there a token included? */ + if (packet_get_char()) { + recv_tok.value= + packet_get_string(&strlen); + recv_tok.length = strlen; + /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ + if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete"); + } else { + /* No token included */ + if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token"); + } + break; + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: + debug("Received Error"); + maj_status = packet_get_int(); + min_status = packet_get_int(); + msg = packet_get_string(NULL); + lang = packet_get_string(NULL); + fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg); + default: + packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", + type); + } + token_ptr = &recv_tok; + } else { + /* No data, and not complete */ + if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); + } + } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + + /* + * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the + * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok + */ + + if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) + fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); + + /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */ + if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub)) + packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value"); + + /* compute K=f^x mod p */ + klen = DH_size(dh); + kbuf = xmalloc(klen); + kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh); + if (kout < 0) + fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); + + shared_secret = BN_new(); + if (shared_secret == NULL) + fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed"); + + if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) + fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed"); + + memset(kbuf, 0, klen); + free(kbuf); + + switch (kex->kex_type) { + case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: + case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: + kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string, + kex->server_version_string, + buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), + buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), + (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, + dh->pub_key, /* e */ + dh_server_pub, /* f */ + shared_secret, /* K */ + &hash, &hashlen + ); + break; + case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: + kexgex_hash( + kex->hash_alg, + kex->client_version_string, + kex->server_version_string, + buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), + buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), + (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, + min, nbits, max, + dh->p, dh->g, + dh->pub_key, + dh_server_pub, + shared_secret, + &hash, &hashlen + ); + break; + default: + fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); + } + + gssbuf.value = hash; + gssbuf.length = hashlen; + + /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ + if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) + packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify"); + + free(msg_tok.value); + + DH_free(dh); + if (serverhostkey) + free(serverhostkey); + BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); + + /* save session id */ + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + kex->session_id_len = hashlen; + kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); + memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); + } + + if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) + ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); + + if (gss_kex_context == NULL) + gss_kex_context = ctxt; + else + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); + + kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); + kex_finish(kex); +} + +#endif /* GSSAPI */ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/kexgsss.c b/openssh-6.6p1/kexgsss.c new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/kexgsss.c @@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef GSSAPI + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "servconf.h" + +extern ServerOptions options; + +void +kexgss_server(Kex *kex) +{ + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; + + /* + * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an + * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific + * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently + * activating this non-standard behaviour. + */ + + OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; + gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; + gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; + u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen; + u_char *kbuf, *hash; + DH *dh; + int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; + BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; + BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL; + int type = 0; + gss_OID oid; + char *mechs; + + /* Initialise GSSAPI */ + + /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures + * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back + * into life + */ + if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) + if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) + free(mechs); + + debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name); + oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); + if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) + fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); + + debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__); + + if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) + fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); + + switch (kex->kex_type) { + case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: + dh = dh_new_group1(); + break; + case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: + dh = dh_new_group14(); + break; + case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: + debug("Doing group exchange"); + packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); + min = packet_get_int(); + nbits = packet_get_int(); + max = packet_get_int(); + min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); + max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); + packet_check_eom(); + if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) + fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", + min, nbits, max); + dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); + if (dh == NULL) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found"); + + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); + packet_put_bignum2(dh->p); + packet_put_bignum2(dh->g); + packet_send(); + + packet_write_wait(); + break; + default: + fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); + } + + dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); + + do { + debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT"); + type = packet_read(); + switch(type) { + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: + if (dh_client_pub != NULL) + fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); + recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); + recv_tok.length = slen; + + if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL"); + + packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub); + + /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ + break; + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: + recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); + recv_tok.length = slen; + break; + default: + packet_disconnect( + "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", + type); + } + + maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, + &send_tok, &ret_flags)); + + free(recv_tok.value); + + if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) + fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); + + if (dh_client_pub == NULL) + fatal("No client public key"); + + if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); + packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); + packet_send(); + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); + } + } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { + if (send_tok.length > 0) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); + packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); + packet_send(); + } + fatal("accept_ctx died"); + } + + if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) + fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); + + if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) + fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); + + if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub)) + packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value"); + + klen = DH_size(dh); + kbuf = xmalloc(klen); + kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh); + if (kout < 0) + fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); + + shared_secret = BN_new(); + if (shared_secret == NULL) + fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed"); + + if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) + fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed"); + + memset(kbuf, 0, klen); + free(kbuf); + + switch (kex->kex_type) { + case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: + case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: + kex_dh_hash( + kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, + buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), + buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), + NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */ + dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret, + &hash, &hashlen + ); + break; + case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: + kexgex_hash( + kex->hash_alg, + kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, + buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), + buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), + NULL, 0, + min, nbits, max, + dh->p, dh->g, + dh_client_pub, + dh->pub_key, + shared_secret, + &hash, &hashlen + ); + break; + default: + fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); + } + + BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); + + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + kex->session_id_len = hashlen; + kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); + memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); + } + + gssbuf.value = hash; + gssbuf.length = hashlen; + + if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok)))) + fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); + + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE); + packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); + packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length); + + if (send_tok.length != 0) { + packet_put_char(1); /* true */ + packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); + } else { + packet_put_char(0); /* false */ + } + packet_send(); + + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); + + if (gss_kex_context == NULL) + gss_kex_context = ctxt; + else + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); + + DH_free(dh); + + kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); + kex_finish(kex); + + /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we + * just exchanged. */ + if (options.gss_store_rekey) + ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); +} +#endif /* GSSAPI */ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/key.c b/openssh-6.6p1/key.c --- a/openssh-6.6p1/key.c +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/key.c @@ -1053,16 +1053,18 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = # endif #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ { "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT-V00", KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 }, { "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT-V00", KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 }, { "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT", KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1 }, + { "null", "null", + KEY_NULL, 0, 0 }, { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0 } }; const char * key_type(const Key *k) { const struct keytype *kt; diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/key.h b/openssh-6.6p1/key.h --- a/openssh-6.6p1/key.h +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/key.h @@ -41,16 +41,17 @@ enum types { KEY_ECDSA, KEY_ED25519, KEY_RSA_CERT, KEY_DSA_CERT, KEY_ECDSA_CERT, KEY_ED25519_CERT, KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, + KEY_NULL, KEY_UNSPEC }; enum fp_type { SSH_FP_SHA1, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_SHA256 }; enum fp_rep { diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c --- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c @@ -173,16 +173,18 @@ int mm_answer_pam_respond(int, Buffer *) int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int, Buffer *); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *); @@ -254,21 +256,28 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] #endif {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed}, {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify}, #ifdef GSSAPI {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { +#ifdef GSSAPI + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds}, +#endif {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup}, {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term}, #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, @@ -381,16 +390,20 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg; if (compat20) { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20; /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); +#ifdef GSSAPI + /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); +#endif } else { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15; monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1); } /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */ while (!authenticated) { @@ -486,16 +499,20 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p if (compat20) { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20; /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); +#ifdef GSSAPI + /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); +#endif } else { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15; monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); } if (!no_pty_flag) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1); } @@ -1909,16 +1926,23 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m) fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id"); kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m); kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; +#ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_keyex) { + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; + } +#endif kex->server = 1; kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m); kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); buffer_init(&kex->my); buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen); free(blob); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); @@ -2133,16 +2157,19 @@ monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon) #ifdef GSSAPI int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) { gss_OID_desc goid; OM_uint32 major; u_int len; + if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) + fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); + goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len); goid.length = len; major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid); free(goid.elements); buffer_clear(m); @@ -2160,16 +2187,19 @@ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) { gss_buffer_desc in; gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; OM_uint32 major, minor; OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ u_int len; + if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) + fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); + in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); in.length = len; major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags); free(in.value); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, major); buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length); @@ -2177,27 +2207,31 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m); gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out); if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1); } return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m) { gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic; OM_uint32 ret; u_int len; + if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) + fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); + gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); gssbuf.length = len; mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); mic.length = len; ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic); free(gssbuf.value); @@ -2214,29 +2248,101 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m) { int authenticated; - authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); + if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) + fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); + + authenticated = authctxt->valid && + ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, authenticated); debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m); auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ return (authenticated); } + +int +mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m) +{ + gss_buffer_desc data; + gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + OM_uint32 major, minor; + u_int len; + + if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) + fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); + + data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + data.length = len; + if (data.length != 20) + fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, + (int) data.length); + + /* Save the session ID on the first time around */ + if (session_id2_len == 0) { + session_id2_len = data.length; + session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); + memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len); + } + major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash); + + free(data.value); + + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_int(m, major); + buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length); + + mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); + + gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash); + + /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); + + /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1); + + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) { + ssh_gssapi_ccache store; + int ok; + + store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); + store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); + store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); + + ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store); + + free(store.filename); + free(store.envvar); + free(store.envval); + + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_int(m, ok); + + mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); + + return(0); +} + #endif /* GSSAPI */ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m) { int what; diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h --- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h @@ -65,16 +65,19 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 115, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 116, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 117, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 119, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 121, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 123, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 201, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 202, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 203, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 204, + }; struct mm_master; struct monitor { int m_recvfd; int m_sendfd; int m_log_recvfd; int m_log_sendfd; diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c --- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c @@ -1303,33 +1303,78 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss &m); major = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return(major); } int -mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) +mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) { Buffer m; int authenticated = 0; buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, &m); authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); return (authenticated); } + +OM_uint32 +mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash) +{ + Buffer m; + OM_uint32 major; + u_int len; + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m); + + major = buffer_get_int(&m); + hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); + hash->length = len; + + buffer_free(&m); + + return(major); +} + +int +mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) +{ + Buffer m; + int ok; + + buffer_init(&m); + + buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : ""); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : ""); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : ""); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m); + + ok = buffer_get_int(&m); + + buffer_free(&m); + + return (ok); +} + #endif /* GSSAPI */ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what) { Buffer m; diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h --- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h @@ -54,18 +54,20 @@ int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **); int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *); BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *); #ifdef GSSAPI OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); -int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); +int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *); OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); +OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); +int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *); #endif #ifdef USE_PAM void mm_start_pam(struct Authctxt *); u_int mm_do_pam_account(void); void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt *); int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **); diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c --- a/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c @@ -136,16 +136,18 @@ typedef enum { oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oProtocol, oMacs, oGlobalKnownHostsFile2, oUserKnownHostsFile2, oPubkeyAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias, oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication, oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oPKCS11Provider, oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, oGssEnableMITM, + oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey, + oGssServerIdentity, oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, oHashKnownHosts, oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming, oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass, oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots, oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs, @@ -178,22 +180,31 @@ static struct { { "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, { "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported }, { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, #if defined(GSSAPI) { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, + { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, { "gssapienablemitmattack", oGssEnableMITM }, + { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, + { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity }, + { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity }, + { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey }, #else { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, { "gssapienablemitmattack", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported }, #endif { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, { "usersh", oDeprecated }, { "identityfile", oIdentityFile }, { "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* obsolete */ { "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly }, { "hostname", oHostName }, { "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias }, @@ -838,24 +849,44 @@ parse_time: case oChallengeResponseAuthentication: intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oGssAuthentication: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; + case oGssKeyEx: + intptr = &options->gss_keyex; + goto parse_flag; + case oGssDelegateCreds: intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; goto parse_flag; case oGssEnableMITM: intptr = &options->gss_enable_mitm; goto parse_flag; + case oGssTrustDns: + intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; + goto parse_flag; + + case oGssClientIdentity: + charptr = &options->gss_client_identity; + goto parse_string; + + case oGssServerIdentity: + charptr = &options->gss_server_identity; + goto parse_string; + + case oGssRenewalRekey: + intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey; + goto parse_flag; + case oBatchMode: intptr = &options->batch_mode; goto parse_flag; case oCheckHostIP: intptr = &options->check_host_ip; goto parse_flag; @@ -1498,18 +1529,23 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1; options->xauth_location = NULL; options->gateway_ports = -1; options->use_privileged_port = -1; options->rsa_authentication = -1; options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; options->gss_authentication = -1; + options->gss_keyex = -1; options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; options->gss_enable_mitm = -1; + options->gss_trust_dns = -1; + options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1; + options->gss_client_identity = NULL; + options->gss_server_identity = NULL; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1; options->hostbased_authentication = -1; options->batch_mode = -1; options->check_host_ip = -1; options->strict_host_key_checking = -1; @@ -1618,20 +1654,26 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) if (options->rsa_authentication == -1) options->rsa_authentication = 1; if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) options->pubkey_authentication = 1; if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1) options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; + if (options->gss_keyex == -1) + options->gss_keyex = 0; if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; if (options->gss_enable_mitm == -1) options->gss_enable_mitm = 0; + if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) + options->gss_trust_dns = 0; + if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1) + options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1) options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0; if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) options->hostbased_authentication = 0; diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h b/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h --- a/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h @@ -49,18 +49,23 @@ typedef struct { int rhosts_rsa_authentication; /* Try rhosts with RSA * authentication. */ int rsa_authentication; /* Try RSA authentication. */ int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */ int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */ int challenge_response_authentication; /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ + int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */ int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ int gss_enable_mitm; /* Enable old style gssapi auth */ + int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ + int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */ + char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */ + char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */ int password_authentication; /* Try password * authentication. */ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ char *kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */ int batch_mode; /* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */ int check_host_ip; /* Also keep track of keys for IP address */ int strict_host_key_checking; /* Strict host key checking. */ int compression; /* Compress packets in both directions. */ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c --- a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c @@ -104,18 +104,21 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1; options->rsa_authentication = -1; options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->kerberos_authentication = -1; options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1; options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; options->gss_authentication=-1; + options->gss_keyex = -1; options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; options->gss_enable_mitm = -1; + options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; + options->gss_store_rekey = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; options->permit_empty_passwd = -1; options->permit_user_env = -1; options->use_login = -1; options->compression = -1; options->rekey_limit = -1; @@ -243,20 +246,26 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1) options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1; if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1) options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1; if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1) options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; + if (options->gss_keyex == -1) + options->gss_keyex = 0; if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; if (options->gss_enable_mitm == -1) options->gss_enable_mitm = 0; + if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) + options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; + if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1) + options->gss_store_rekey = 0; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1) options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1) options->permit_empty_passwd = 0; @@ -342,16 +351,17 @@ typedef enum { sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups, sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile, sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions, sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, sGssEnableMITM, + sGssStrictAcceptor, sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, sHostCertificate, sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum, sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sDeprecated, sUnsupported @@ -411,21 +421,31 @@ static struct { { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef GSSAPI { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapienablemitmattack", sGssEnableMITM }, + { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapienablemitmattack", sUnsupported }, + { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif + { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ { "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, @@ -1094,24 +1114,36 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions case sKerberosGetAFSToken: intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token; goto parse_flag; case sGssAuthentication: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; + case sGssKeyEx: + intptr = &options->gss_keyex; + goto parse_flag; + case sGssCleanupCreds: intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; goto parse_flag; case sGssEnableMITM: intptr = &options->gss_enable_mitm; goto parse_flag; + case sGssStrictAcceptor: + intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; + goto parse_flag; + + case sGssStoreRekey: + intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey; + goto parse_flag; + case sPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication: intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; goto parse_flag; @@ -2007,17 +2039,20 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, o->kerberos_or_local_passwd); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosTicketCleanup, o->kerberos_ticket_cleanup); # ifdef USE_AFS dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token); # endif #endif #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex); dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey); #endif dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sChallengeResponseAuthentication, o->challenge_response_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintMotd, o->print_motd); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintLastLog, o->print_lastlog); diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h --- a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h @@ -107,18 +107,21 @@ typedef struct { * authentication mechanism, * such as SecurID or * /etc/passwd */ int kerberos_ticket_cleanup; /* If true, destroy ticket * file on logout. */ int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if * authenticated with Kerberos. */ int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ + int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ int gss_enable_mitm; /* If true, enable old style GSSAPI */ + int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ + int gss_store_rekey; int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password * authentication. */ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ int challenge_response_authentication; int permit_empty_passwd; /* If false, do not permit empty * passwords. */ int permit_user_env; /* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */ int use_login; /* If true, login(1) is used */ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-gss.h b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-gss.h --- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-gss.h +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-gss.h @@ -1,11 +1,11 @@ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */ /* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the @@ -56,53 +56,70 @@ #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN 61 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE 63 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR 64 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK 65 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC 66 #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41 +#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-" +#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" +#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" + typedef struct { char *filename; char *envvar; char *envval; + struct passwd *owner; void *data; } ssh_gssapi_ccache; typedef struct { gss_buffer_desc displayname; gss_buffer_desc exportedname; gss_cred_id_t creds; + gss_name_t name; struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; ssh_gssapi_ccache store; + int used; + int updated; } ssh_gssapi_client; typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { char *enc_name; char *name; gss_OID_desc oid; int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *); int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); + int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); } ssh_gssapi_mech; typedef struct { OM_uint32 major; /* both */ OM_uint32 minor; /* both */ gss_ctx_id_t context; /* both */ gss_name_t name; /* both */ gss_OID oid; /* client */ gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ gss_name_t client; /* server */ - gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ + gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ } Gssctxt; extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; +extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context; int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); void ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *, gss_OID); void ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *); ssh_gssapi_mech *ssh_gssapi_get_ctype(Gssctxt *); void ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(void); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *); @@ -114,21 +131,35 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *, ssh_gssapi_client *); void ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *); char *ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *, OM_uint32 *, OM_uint32 *); void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **); void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *); -int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); +int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *); +OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *); +int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *); /* In the server */ +typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, + const char *); +char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *); +char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *, + const char *); +gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int); +int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, + const char *); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); -int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); +int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); +char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); +int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(); + +int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store); #endif /* GSSAPI */ #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config --- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config @@ -32,16 +32,18 @@ Host * ForwardX11Trusted yes # RhostsRSAAuthentication no # RSAAuthentication yes # PasswordAuthentication yes # HostbasedAuthentication no # GSSAPIAuthentication no # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no +# GSSAPIKeyExchange no +# GSSAPITrustDNS no # BatchMode no # CheckHostIP yes # AddressFamily any # ConnectTimeout 0 # StrictHostKeyChecking ask # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config.5 b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config.5 --- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config.5 +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config.5 @@ -677,21 +677,53 @@ host key database, separated by whitespa The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2 . .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is .Dq no . Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. +.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange +Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using +GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key. +The default is +.Dq no . +Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. +.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity +If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when +connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default +identity will be used. +.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity +If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when +connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the +expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target +hostname. .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is .Dq no . -Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. +Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. +.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey +If set to +.Dq yes +then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the +ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed +credentials to a session on the server. +The default is +.Dq no . +.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns +Set to +.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize +the name of the host being connected to. If +.Dq no, the hostname entered on the +command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. +The default is +.Dq no . +This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. .It Cm HashKnownHosts Indicates that .Xr ssh 1 should hash host names and addresses when they are added to .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts . These hashed names may be used normally by .Xr ssh 1 and diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c --- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c @@ -155,19 +155,44 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc return ret; } void ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) { Kex *kex; +#ifdef GSSAPI + char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL; + char *gss_host = NULL; +#endif + xxx_host = host; xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; +#ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_keyex) { + /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this + * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ + orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; + + if (options.gss_trust_dns) + gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1); + else + gss_host = host; + + gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity); + if (gss) { + debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); + xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], + "%s,%s", gss, orig); + } + } +#endif + if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) { logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults."); options.ciphers = NULL; } if (options.ciphers != NULL) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; } else if (fips_mode()) { @@ -205,32 +230,63 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho compat_pkalg_proposal( order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port)); } if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); +#ifdef GSSAPI + /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the + * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */ + if (options.gss_keyex && gss) { + orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; + xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], + "%s,null", orig); + free(gss); + } +#endif + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, (time_t)options.rekey_interval); /* start key exchange */ kex = kex_setup(myproposal); kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client; +#ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_keyex) { + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client; + } +#endif kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; +#ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_keyex) { + kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds; + kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns; + kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity; + if (options.gss_server_identity) { + kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; + } else { + kex->gss_host = gss_host; + } + } +#endif + xxx_kex = kex; dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); if (options.use_roaming && !kex->roaming) { debug("Roaming not allowed by server"); options.use_roaming = 0; } @@ -310,31 +366,37 @@ int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *); #ifdef GSSAPI int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt); void input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, void *); void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *); void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *); void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); +int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt); #endif void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Identity *); static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *); static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *); static Key *load_identity_file(char *, int); static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist); static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name); static char *authmethods_get(void); Authmethod authmethods[] = { #ifdef GSSAPI + {"gssapi-keyex", + userauth_gsskeyex, + NULL, + &options.gss_authentication, + NULL}, {"gssapi-with-mic", userauth_gssapi, NULL, &options.gss_authentication, NULL}, {"gssapi", userauth_gssapi, NULL, @@ -626,29 +688,41 @@ done: int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) { Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL; static gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL; static u_int mech = 0; OM_uint32 min; int ok = 0; + const char *gss_host; + + if (options.gss_server_identity) + gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; + else if (options.gss_trust_dns) + gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1); + else + gss_host = authctxt->host; /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at * once. */ if (gss_supported == NULL) - gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported); + if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) { + gss_supported = NULL; + return 0; + } /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) { /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, - &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) { + &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, + options.gss_client_identity)) { ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ } else { mech++; } } if (!ok) return 0; @@ -737,18 +811,18 @@ process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buf } /* ARGSUSED */ void input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; - int oidlen; - char *oidv; + u_int oidlen; + u_char *oidv; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; /* Setup our OID */ oidv = packet_get_string(&oidlen); @@ -847,16 +921,58 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p lang=packet_get_string(NULL); packet_check_eom(); debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s", msg); free(msg); free(lang); } + +int +userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + Buffer b; + gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; + gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + OM_uint32 ms; + + static int attempt = 0; + if (attempt++ >= 1) + return (0); + + if (gss_kex_context == NULL) { + debug("No valid Key exchange context"); + return (0); + } + + ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, + "gssapi-keyex"); + + gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); + gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); + + if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) { + buffer_free(&b); + return (0); + } + + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); + packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length); + packet_send(); + + buffer_free(&b); + gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); + + return (1); +} + #endif /* GSSAPI */ int userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt) { /* initial userauth request */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c --- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c @@ -123,16 +123,20 @@ #include "roaming.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "version.h" #include "fips.h" #include "audit.h" +#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API +#include +#endif + #ifdef LIBWRAP #include #include int allow_severity; int deny_severity; #endif /* LIBWRAP */ #ifndef O_NOCTTY @@ -1804,20 +1808,23 @@ main(int ac, char **av) if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && fips_mode()) { logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Not allowed in the FIPS mode."); options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; } if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) { logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; } +#ifndef GSSAPI + /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; } +#endif if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); exit(1); } /* * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical * indices to the public keys that they relate to. @@ -2007,16 +2014,70 @@ main(int ac, char **av) /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */ server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out, &newsock, config_s); } /* This is the child processing a new connection. */ setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]"); +#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API + /* + * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if + * the current session is the root session or we are not launched + * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not + * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from + * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us. + * + * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an + * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating + * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the + * same session (bad). + * + * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us + * automatically. + * + * We must create the session before any credentials are stored + * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below). + */ + { + OSStatus err = 0; + SecuritySessionId sid = 0; + SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0; + + err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs); + if (err) + error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", + (unsigned) err); + else + debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", + (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); + + if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot)) + debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... " + "assuming inetd created the session for us."); + else { + debug("Creating new security session..."); + err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote); + if (err) + error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X", + (unsigned) err); + + err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, + &sattrs); + if (err) + error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", + (unsigned) err); + else + debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", + (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); + } + } +#endif + /* * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't * want the child to be able to affect the parent. */ #if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY) /* * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a @@ -2134,16 +2195,70 @@ main(int ac, char **av) } #endif /* LIBWRAP */ /* Log the connection. */ verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port, get_local_ipaddr(sock_in), get_local_port()); +#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API + /* + * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if + * the current session is the root session or we are not launched + * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not + * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from + * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us. + * + * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an + * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating + * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the + * same session (bad). + * + * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us + * automatically. + * + * We must create the session before any credentials are stored + * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below). + */ + { + OSStatus err = 0; + SecuritySessionId sid = 0; + SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0; + + err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs); + if (err) + error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", + (unsigned) err); + else + debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", + (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); + + if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot)) + debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... " + "assuming inetd created the session for us."); + else { + debug("Creating new security session..."); + err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote); + if (err) + error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X", + (unsigned) err); + + err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, + &sattrs); + if (err) + error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", + (unsigned) err); + else + debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", + (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); + } + } +#endif + /* * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero * indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you * are about to discover the bug. */ @@ -2562,24 +2677,73 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, (time_t)options.rekey_interval); myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( list_hostkey_types()); +#ifdef GSSAPI + { + char *orig; + char *gss = NULL; + char *newstr = NULL; + orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; + + /* + * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising + * the other key exchange algorithms + */ + + if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) + orig = NULL; + + if (options.gss_keyex) + gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); + else + gss = NULL; + + if (gss && orig) + xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); + else if (gss) + newstr = gss; + else if (orig) + newstr = orig; + + /* + * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host + * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only + * host key algorithm we support + */ + if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null"; + + if (newstr) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; + else + fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); + } +#endif + /* start key exchange */ kex = kex_setup(myproposal); kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; +#ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_keyex) { + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; + } +#endif kex->server = 1; kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config --- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config @@ -79,16 +79,18 @@ PasswordAuthentication no #KerberosAuthentication no #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes #KerberosTicketCleanup yes #KerberosGetAFSToken no # GSSAPI options #GSSAPIAuthentication no #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes +#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes +#GSSAPIKeyExchange no # Set this to 'yes' to enable support for the deprecated 'gssapi' authentication # mechanism to OpenSSH 3.8p1. The newer 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism is included # in this release. The use of 'gssapi' is deprecated due to the presence of # potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which 'gssapi-with-mic' is not susceptible to. #GSSAPIEnableMITMAttack no diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 --- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 +++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 @@ -487,22 +487,50 @@ to force remote port forwardings to bind to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is .Dq no . Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. +.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange +Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange +doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity. +The default is +.Dq no . +Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache on logout. The default is .Dq yes . Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. +.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck +Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor +a client authenticates against. If +.Dq yes +then the client must authenticate against the +.Pa host +service on the current hostname. If +.Dq no +then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the +machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation +on multi homed machines. +The default is +.Dq yes . +Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections, +and setting it to +.Dq no +may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries. +.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey +Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a +successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed +or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is +.Dq no . .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together with successful public key client host authentication is allowed (host-based authentication). This option is similar to .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication and applies to protocol version 2 only. The default is