efb05e6527
- Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1
- update to 6.6p1
Security:
* sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5)
AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could
be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that
contains the characters before the wildcard character.
Features since 6.5p1:
* ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code,
which was experimental, never enabled and has been
unmaintained for some time.
* ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed
to match while processing Match blocks.
* ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results
in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse
ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This
gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded
hostname a chance to be applied.
Bugfixes:
* ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file
descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692
* sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and
systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection
is terminated during the pre-auth phase.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1
bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug
unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions.
* sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears
in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
34 lines
1.1 KiB
Diff
34 lines
1.1 KiB
Diff
# Don't audit SSH_INVALID_USER twice.
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# PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow()) a few lines above already did this.
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#
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# based on:
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# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
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# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2010
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# by jchadima@redhat.com
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#
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# PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow()) a few lines above already did this.
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diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c
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--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c
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+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c
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@@ -236,19 +236,16 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
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authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user));
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authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
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if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
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authctxt->valid = 1;
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debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user);
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} else {
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logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
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authctxt->pw = fakepw();
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-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
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- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
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-#endif
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}
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#ifdef USE_PAM
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if (options.use_pam)
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PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
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#endif
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setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
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use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
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authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
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