openssh/openssh-6.6p1-pam-fix3.patch
Petr Cerny efb05e6527 Accepting request 230097 from home:pcerny:factory
- Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1

- update to 6.6p1
  Security:
  * sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5)
    AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could
    be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that
    contains the characters before the wildcard character.
  Features since 6.5p1:
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code,
    which was experimental, never enabled and has been
    unmaintained for some time.
  * ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed
    to match while processing Match blocks.
  * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results
    in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse
    ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This
    gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded
    hostname a chance to be applied.
  Bugfixes:
  * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file
    descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692
  * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and
    systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection
    is terminated during the pre-auth phase.
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1
    bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug
    unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions.
  * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears
    in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
2014-04-14 21:53:01 +00:00

27 lines
843 B
Diff

# posix threads are generally not supported nor safe
# (see upstream log from 2005-05-24)
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-pam.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-pam.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-pam.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-pam.c
@@ -781,17 +781,19 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
}
if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||
(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
fatal("Internal error: PAM auth "
"succeeded when it should have "
"failed");
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
import_environments(&buffer);
+#endif
*num = 0;
**echo_on = 0;
ctxt->pam_done = 1;
free(msg);
return (0);
}
error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg,
sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",