efb05e6527
- Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1
- update to 6.6p1
Security:
* sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5)
AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could
be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that
contains the characters before the wildcard character.
Features since 6.5p1:
* ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code,
which was experimental, never enabled and has been
unmaintained for some time.
* ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed
to match while processing Match blocks.
* ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results
in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse
ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This
gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded
hostname a chance to be applied.
Bugfixes:
* ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file
descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692
* sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and
systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection
is terminated during the pre-auth phase.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1
bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug
unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions.
* sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears
in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
48 lines
1.8 KiB
Diff
48 lines
1.8 KiB
Diff
# bnc#752354, bnc#757360
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# prevent timeouts in libaudit code caused by DNS misconfiguration by
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# explicitely disabling DNS lookups in libaudit when UseDNS is false.
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# Note that this particular solution causes the logs to always contain
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# "hostname=?, addr=?" when DNS lookups are disabled.
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diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
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--- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
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+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
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@@ -62,17 +62,17 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const c
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if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
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errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
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return; /* No audit support in kernel */
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else
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goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
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}
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rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
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NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
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- username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
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+ username == NULL ? uid : -1, options.use_dns ? hostname : NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
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saved_errno = errno;
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close(audit_fd);
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/*
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* Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
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* root user.
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*/
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if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
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rc = 0;
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@@ -114,17 +114,17 @@ linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const cha
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goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
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}
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if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN))
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event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
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rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH,
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NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)",
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- username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
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+ username == NULL ? uid : -1, options.use_dns ? hostname : NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
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saved_errno = errno;
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close(audit_fd);
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/*
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* Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
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* root user.
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*/
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if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
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rc = 0;
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