Antonio Larrosa
da2c6cc517
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Fix a dbus connection leaked in the logind patch that was
missing a sd_bus_unref call (found by Matthias Gerstner):
* logind_set_tty.patch
- Add a patch that fixes a small memory leak when parsing the
subsystem configuration option:
* fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch
- Update to openssh 9.8p1:
= Security
* 1) Race condition in sshd(8) (bsc#1226642, CVE-2024-6387).
A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable
OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may
allow arbitrary code execution with root privileges.
Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit
Linux/glibc systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack
requires on average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to
the maximum the server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit
systems is believed to be possible but has not been
demonstrated at this time. It's likely that these attacks will
be improved upon.
Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not
been examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream
Linux distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable
per-connection ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no
- we don't understand why) may potentially have an easier path
to exploitation. OpenBSD is not vulnerable.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=272
47 lines
1.3 KiB
Diff
47 lines
1.3 KiB
Diff
# HG changeset patch
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# Parent a60c0d88667efe0a64c030168950b69476af1622
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# --used to be called '-xauth'
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try to remove xauth cookies on logout
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bnc#98815
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Index: openssh-8.8p1/session.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssh-8.8p1.orig/session.c
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+++ openssh-8.8p1/session.c
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@@ -2441,6 +2441,34 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *
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ssh_remote_port(ssh),
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s->self);
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+ if ((s->display != NULL) && (s->auth_proto != NULL) &&
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+ (s->auth_data != NULL) && (options.xauth_location != NULL)) {
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+ pid_t pid;
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+ FILE *f;
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+ char cmd[1024];
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+ struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
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+
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+ if (!(pid = fork())) {
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+ permanently_set_uid(pw);
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+
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+ /* Remove authority data from .Xauthority if appropriate. */
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+ debug("Running %.500s remove %.100s\n",
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+ options.xauth_location, s->auth_display);
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+
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+ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "unset XAUTHORITY && HOME=\"%.200s\" %s -q -",
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+ s->pw->pw_dir, options.xauth_location);
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+ f = popen(cmd, "w");
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+ if (f) {
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+ fprintf(f, "remove %s\n", s->auth_display);
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+ pclose(f);
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+ } else
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+ error("Could not run %s\n", cmd);
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+ exit(0);
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+ } else if (pid > 0) {
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+ waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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if (s->ttyfd != -1)
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session_pty_cleanup(s);
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free(s->term);
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