Antonio Larrosa
da2c6cc517
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Fix a dbus connection leaked in the logind patch that was
missing a sd_bus_unref call (found by Matthias Gerstner):
* logind_set_tty.patch
- Add a patch that fixes a small memory leak when parsing the
subsystem configuration option:
* fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch
- Update to openssh 9.8p1:
= Security
* 1) Race condition in sshd(8) (bsc#1226642, CVE-2024-6387).
A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable
OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may
allow arbitrary code execution with root privileges.
Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit
Linux/glibc systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack
requires on average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to
the maximum the server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit
systems is believed to be possible but has not been
demonstrated at this time. It's likely that these attacks will
be improved upon.
Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not
been examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream
Linux distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable
per-connection ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no
- we don't understand why) may potentially have an easier path
to exploitation. OpenBSD is not vulnerable.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=272
159 lines
3.8 KiB
Diff
159 lines
3.8 KiB
Diff
Index: openssh-8.8p1/kex.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssh-8.8p1.orig/kex.c
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+++ openssh-8.8p1/kex.c
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@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
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#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/dh.h>
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+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
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#endif
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#include "ssh.h"
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@@ -1115,8 +1116,93 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
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return r;
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}
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+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
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+
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+static const EVP_MD *
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+get_openssl_md_for_hash_alg (int hash_alg)
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+{
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+ if (hash_alg < 0 || hash_alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX)
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+ return NULL;
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+
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+ switch (hash_alg)
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+ {
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+ case SSH_DIGEST_MD5:
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+ return EVP_md5();
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+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
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+ return EVP_sha1();
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+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
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+ return EVP_sha256();
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+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
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+ return EVP_sha384();
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+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
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+ return EVP_sha512();
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+ default:
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+ break;
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+ }
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+
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+ return NULL;
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+}
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+
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static int
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-derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
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+derive_key_via_openssl(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
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+ const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
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+{
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+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
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+ EVP_KDF_CTX *hashctx = NULL;
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+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
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+ u_char *digest = NULL;
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+ int r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
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+
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+ hashctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id (EVP_KDF_SSHKDF);
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+ if (!hashctx)
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+ goto out;
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+
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+ md = get_openssl_md_for_hash_alg (kex->hash_alg);
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+ if (!md)
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+ goto out;
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+
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+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl (hashctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD,
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+ md) != 1
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+ || EVP_KDF_ctrl (hashctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
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+ sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret)) != 1
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+ || EVP_KDF_ctrl (hashctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE,
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+ (int) id) != 1
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+ || EVP_KDF_ctrl (hashctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH,
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+ hash, (size_t) hashlen) != 1
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+ || EVP_KDF_ctrl (hashctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
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+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id),
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+ (size_t) sshbuf_len(kex->session_id)) != 1)
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+ goto out;
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+
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+ digest = calloc (1, need);
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+ if (!digest) {
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+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (EVP_KDF_derive (hashctx, digest, need) != 1)
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+ goto out;
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+
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+ *keyp = digest;
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+ digest = NULL;
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+ r = 0;
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+
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+ out:
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+ if (hashctx)
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+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(hashctx);
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+
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+ if (digest)
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+ free(digest);
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+
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+ return r;
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+}
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+
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+#else
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+# error This version of openssh must be built with openssl to benefit from FIPS certification.
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+#endif
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+
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+static int
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+derive_key_via_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
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const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
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{
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struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
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@@ -1179,6 +1265,50 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_in
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return r;
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}
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+/* Belt and suspenders; we want the output from openssl because it's FIPS certified. However,
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+ * if there's a bug in the implementation, we should not proceed. Minimize risk by requiring
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+ * the implementations agree. */
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+static int
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+derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
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+ const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
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+{
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+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
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+
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+ u_char *buf_openssl = NULL, *buf_internal = NULL;
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+ int r;
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+
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+ r = derive_key_via_openssl (ssh, id, need, hash, hashlen, shared_secret, &buf_openssl);
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+ if (r != 0)
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+ goto out;
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+
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+ r = derive_key_via_internal (ssh, id, need, hash, hashlen, shared_secret, &buf_internal);
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+ if (r != 0)
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+ goto out;
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+
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+ if (memcmp (buf_openssl, buf_internal, need))
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+ {
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+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+
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+ *keyp = buf_openssl;
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+ buf_openssl = NULL;
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+
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+ out:
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+ if (buf_openssl)
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+ free (buf_openssl);
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+ if (buf_internal)
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+ free (buf_internal);
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+
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+ return r;
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+
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+#else
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+
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+ return derive_key_via_internal (ssh, id, need, hash, hashlen, shared_secret, keyp);
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+
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+#endif
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+}
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+
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#define NKEYS 6
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int
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kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
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