Antonio Larrosa
da2c6cc517
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Fix a dbus connection leaked in the logind patch that was
missing a sd_bus_unref call (found by Matthias Gerstner):
* logind_set_tty.patch
- Add a patch that fixes a small memory leak when parsing the
subsystem configuration option:
* fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch
- Update to openssh 9.8p1:
= Security
* 1) Race condition in sshd(8) (bsc#1226642, CVE-2024-6387).
A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable
OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may
allow arbitrary code execution with root privileges.
Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit
Linux/glibc systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack
requires on average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to
the maximum the server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit
systems is believed to be possible but has not been
demonstrated at this time. It's likely that these attacks will
be improved upon.
Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not
been examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream
Linux distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable
per-connection ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no
- we don't understand why) may potentially have an easier path
to exploitation. OpenBSD is not vulnerable.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=272
79 lines
1.7 KiB
Diff
79 lines
1.7 KiB
Diff
commit 15c95d6eb2e8bc549719578c9a16541015363360
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Author: Hans Petter Jansson <hpj@hpjansson.org>
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Date: Mon Oct 26 22:26:46 2020 +0100
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Ensure DHGs are approved in FIPS mode using OpenSSL's DH_check_params()
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Index: openssh-8.8p1/dh.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssh-8.8p1.orig/dh.c
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+++ openssh-8.8p1/dh.c
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@@ -155,6 +155,28 @@ parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, str
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return 0;
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}
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+static int
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+dhg_is_approved(const struct dhgroup *dhg)
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+{
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+ BIGNUM *g, *p;
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+ DH *dh;
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+ int dh_status;
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+ int is_ok = 0;
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+
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+ /* DH_set0_pqg() transfers ownership of the bignums, so we
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+ * make temporary copies here for simplicity. */
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+ g = BN_dup(dhg->g);
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+ p = BN_dup(dhg->p);
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+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
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+
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+ if (dh) {
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+ is_ok = DH_check_params(dh, &dh_status);
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+ }
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+
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+ DH_free(dh);
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+ return is_ok;
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+}
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+
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DH *
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choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
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{
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@@ -173,12 +195,20 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
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linenum = 0;
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best = bestcount = 0;
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while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
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+ int dhg_is_ok;
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+
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linenum++;
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if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
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continue;
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+
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+ dhg_is_ok = dhg_is_approved(&dhg);
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+
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BN_clear_free(dhg.g);
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BN_clear_free(dhg.p);
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+ if (!dhg_is_ok)
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+ continue;
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+
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if (dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min)
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continue;
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@@ -206,10 +236,16 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
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linenum = 0;
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bestcount = 0;
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while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
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+ int dhg_is_ok;
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+
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linenum++;
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if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
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continue;
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- if ((dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min) ||
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+
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+ dhg_is_ok = dhg_is_approved(&dhg);
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+
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+ if (!dhg_is_ok ||
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+ (dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min) ||
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dhg.size != best ||
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bestcount++ != which) {
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BN_clear_free(dhg.g);
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