openssh/openssh-openssl-3.patch
Antonio Larrosa da2c6cc517 - Update to openssh 9.8p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
    details.

- Fix a dbus connection leaked in the logind patch that was
  missing a sd_bus_unref call (found by Matthias Gerstner):
  * logind_set_tty.patch
- Add a patch that fixes a small memory leak when parsing the
  subsystem configuration option:
  * fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch

- Update to openssh 9.8p1:
  = Security
  * 1) Race condition in sshd(8) (bsc#1226642, CVE-2024-6387).
    A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable
    OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may
    allow arbitrary code execution with root privileges.
    Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit
    Linux/glibc systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack
    requires on average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to
    the maximum the server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit
    systems is believed to be possible but has not been
    demonstrated at this time. It's likely that these attacks will
    be improved upon.
    Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not
    been examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream
    Linux distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable
    per-connection ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no
    - we don't understand why) may potentially have an easier path
    to exploitation. OpenBSD is not vulnerable.

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=272
2024-08-12 09:54:46 +00:00

126 lines
3.6 KiB
Diff

---
fips.c | 5 +++++
kex.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fips.c
+++ b/fips.c
@@ -48,6 +48,11 @@
static int fips_state = -1;
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L)
+# define FIPS_mode() EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL)
+# define FIPS_mode_set(x) EVP_default_properties_enable_fips(NULL,x)
+#endif
+
/* calculates HMAC of contents of a file given by filename using the hash
* algorithm specified by FIPS_HMAC_EVP in fips.h and placing the result into
* newly allacated memory - remember to free it when not needed anymore */
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+# if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L)
+# include <openssl/core_names.h>
+# endif
#endif
#include "ssh.h"
@@ -1191,14 +1194,61 @@ derive_key_via_openssl(struct ssh *ssh,
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
EVP_KDF_CTX *hashctx = NULL;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
u_char *digest = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+# if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L)
+ OSSL_PARAM params[6], *p = params;
+ char type = (char) id;
+ EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch (NULL, "SSHKDF", NULL);
+ if (!kdf)
+ goto out;
+ hashctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new (kdf);
+# else
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
hashctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id (EVP_KDF_SSHKDF);
+# endif
if (!hashctx)
goto out;
+# if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L)
+ switch (kex->hash_alg)
+ {
+ case SSH_DIGEST_MD5:
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
+ SN_md5, strlen(SN_md5));
+ break;
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
+ SN_sha1, strlen(SN_sha1));
+ break;
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
+ SN_sha256, strlen(SN_sha256));
+ break;
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
+ SN_sha384, strlen(SN_sha384));
+ break;
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
+ SN_sha512, strlen(SN_sha512));
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
+ sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret));
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH,
+ hash, (size_t) hashlen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), (size_t) sshbuf_len(kex->session_id));
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE,
+ &type, sizeof(type));
+ *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+# else
md = get_openssl_md_for_hash_alg (kex->hash_alg);
if (!md)
goto out;
@@ -1215,6 +1265,7 @@ derive_key_via_openssl(struct ssh *ssh,
sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id),
(size_t) sshbuf_len(kex->session_id)) != 1)
goto out;
+# endif
digest = calloc (1, need);
if (!digest) {
@@ -1222,7 +1273,11 @@ derive_key_via_openssl(struct ssh *ssh,
goto out;
}
+# if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L)
+ if (EVP_KDF_derive (hashctx, digest, need, params) != 1)
+# else
if (EVP_KDF_derive (hashctx, digest, need) != 1)
+# endif
goto out;
*keyp = digest;
@@ -1233,6 +1288,10 @@ derive_key_via_openssl(struct ssh *ssh,
if (hashctx)
EVP_KDF_CTX_free(hashctx);
+# if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L)
+ EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
+# endif
+
if (digest)
free(digest);