openssh/openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch
Petr Cerny fe873a1c10 Accepting request 432093 from home:pcerny:factory
next round of patches
- allow X forwarding over IPv4 when IPv6 sockets is not available
  [openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch]
- do not write PID file when not daemonizing
  [openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch]
- use correct options when invoking login
  [openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch]
- helper application for retrieving users' public keys from
  an LDAP server
  [openssh-7.2p2-ldap.patch]
- allow forcing permissions over sftp
  [openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch]
- do not perform run-time checks for OpenSSL API/ABI change
  [openssh-7.2p2-disable-openssl-abi-check.patch]
- suggest commands for cleaning known hosts file
  [openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch]
- sftp home chroot patch
  [openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch]
- ssh sessions auditing
  [openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch]
- enable seccomp sandbox on additional architectures
  [openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch]

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/432093
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=112
2016-09-30 20:34:19 +00:00

230 lines
7.6 KiB
Diff

# HG changeset patch
# Parent 2b2855c68e979299aee899a7cb6e4aa57a828668
new option UsePAMCheckLocks to enforce checking for locked accounts while
UsePAM is used
bnc#708678, FATE#312033
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
@@ -104,17 +104,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
struct spwd *spw = NULL;
#endif
/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
return 0;
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
- if (!options.use_pam)
+ if (!options.use_pam || options.use_pam_check_locks)
spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
return 0;
#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
@@ -124,17 +124,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
#else
passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
#endif
/* check for locked account */
- if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
+ if ((!options.use_pam || options.use_pam_check_locks) && passwd && *passwd) {
int locked = 0;
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
@@ -69,16 +69,17 @@ extern Buffer cfg;
void
initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
{
memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options));
/* Portable-specific options */
options->use_pam = -1;
+ options->use_pam_check_locks = -1;
/* Standard Options */
options->num_ports = 0;
options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL;
options->num_queued_listens = 0;
options->listen_addrs = NULL;
options->address_family = -1;
@@ -195,16 +196,18 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
void
fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
{
int i;
/* Portable-specific options */
if (options->use_pam == -1)
options->use_pam = 0;
+ if (options->use_pam_check_locks == -1)
+ options->use_pam_check_locks = 0;
/* Standard Options */
if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
@@ -391,17 +394,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
#endif
}
/* Keyword tokens. */
typedef enum {
sBadOption, /* == unknown option */
/* Portable-specific options */
- sUsePAM,
+ sUsePAM, sUsePAMChecklocks,
/* Standard Options */
sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime,
sKeyRegenerationTime, sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
sKerberosGetAFSToken,
sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
@@ -441,18 +444,20 @@ typedef enum {
static struct {
const char *name;
ServerOpCodes opcode;
u_int flags;
} keywords[] = {
/* Portable-specific options */
#ifdef USE_PAM
{ "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "usepamchecklocks", sUsePAMChecklocks, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "usepamchecklocks", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
/* Standard Options */
{ "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
{ "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -1005,16 +1010,19 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
}
}
switch (opcode) {
/* Portable-specific options */
case sUsePAM:
intptr = &options->use_pam;
goto parse_flag;
+ case sUsePAMChecklocks:
+ intptr = &options->use_pam_check_locks;
+ goto parse_flag;
/* Standard Options */
case sBadOption:
return -1;
case sPort:
/* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
return 0;
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
@@ -167,16 +167,17 @@ typedef struct {
*/
u_int num_authkeys_files; /* Files containing public keys */
char *authorized_keys_files[MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES];
char *adm_forced_command;
int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */
+ int use_pam_check_locks; /* internally check for locked accounts even when using PAM */
int permit_tun;
int num_permitted_opens;
char *chroot_directory;
char *revoked_keys_file;
char *trusted_user_ca_keys;
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
@@ -946,16 +946,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an
equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable
either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
non-root user. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+ UsePAMCheckLocks
+ When set to ``yes'', the checks whether the account has been
+ locked with `passwd -l' are performed even when PAM authentication
+ is enabled via UsePAM. This is to ensure that it is not possible
+ to log in with e.g. a public key (in such a case PAM is used only
+ to set up the session and some PAM modules will not check whether
+ the account is locked in this scenario). The default is ``no''.
+
UsePrivilegeSeparation
Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an
unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic.
After successful authentication, another process will be created
that has the privilege of the authenticated user. The goal of
privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by
containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes. The
argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\sandboxM-bM-^@M-^]. If
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
@@ -1578,16 +1578,28 @@ or
.Pp
If
.Cm UsePAM
is enabled, you will not be able to run
.Xr sshd 8
as a non-root user.
The default is
.Dq no .
+.It Cm UsePAMCheckLocks
+When set to
+.Dq yes
+, the checks whether the account has been locked with
+.Pa passwd -l
+are performed even when PAM authentication is enabled via
+.Cm UsePAM .
+This is to ensure that it is not possible to log in with e.g. a
+public key (in such a case PAM is used only to set up the session and some PAM
+modules will not check whether the account is locked in this scenario). The
+default is
+.Dq no .
.It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process
to deal with incoming network traffic.
After successful authentication, another process will be created that has
the privilege of the authenticated user.
The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege